Every 400, 403, 404 and 500 on an admin page now answers with an error page in the normal layout: the status, one fixed line explaining it, and a link back to the webhook list, or to sign-in when nobody is signed in. Unknown paths reach it through the router's not-found handler, a refused form token through the CSRF middleware, and a panic through a recoverer each admin page route group installs first. Status codes are unchanged, and the page always sends Cache-Control: no-store.
If the error page fails to render, the answer is the same status in plain text; if it panics, the answer is a 500. The receiver, the healthcheck and /metrics keep their plain answers.
Model: opus-5-5
The webhook page and everything under it move from /source/ID to /hook/ID; the list and new-webhook form from /sources to /hooks and /hooks/new; the event log from .../logs to /hook/ID/events; entrypoint URLs, the ones senders post to, from /webhook/UUID to /h/UUID. The old paths are simply gone, per the owner's ruling. Every link, redirect, form action, test, comment and README mention follows; every link to the event log, and its title and heading, read "Full Event Log".
Keeping the UUID out of logs, metrics labels and error reports, and the receiver rate limits, key on the route itself, so they cover /h/ unchanged. Routed tests follow every link and form the pages render to a moved page.
Model: opus-5-5
## Problem
After the security hardening in PR #42, login fails with `Forbidden - invalid CSRF token` in production deployments.
The CSRF middleware tied its `PlaintextHTTPRequest` wrapping and cookie `Secure` flag to the `IsDev()` environment check. This meant production mode always assumed HTTPS via gorilla/csrf's strict mode, which broke login in common deployment scenarios:
1. **Production behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy**: gorilla/csrf assumed HTTPS but `r.TLS` was nil (the Go server receives HTTP from the proxy). Origin/Referer scheme mismatches caused `referer not supplied` or `origin invalid` errors.
2. **Production over direct HTTP** (testing/staging with prod config): the `Secure` cookie flag prevented the browser from sending the CSRF cookie back over HTTP, causing `CSRF token invalid` errors.
## Root Cause
gorilla/csrf v1.7.3 defaults to HTTPS-strict mode unless `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` is called. In strict mode it:
- Forces `requestURL.Scheme = "https"` for Origin/Referer comparisons
- Requires a `Referer` header on POST and rejects `http://` Referer schemes
- The `csrf.Secure(true)` option makes the browser refuse to send the CSRF cookie over HTTP
The old code only called `PlaintextHTTPRequest()` in dev mode, leaving prod mode permanently stuck in HTTPS-strict mode regardless of the actual transport.
## Fix
Detect the actual transport protocol **per-request** using:
- `r.TLS != nil` — direct TLS connection to the Go server
- `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header — TLS-terminating reverse proxy
Two gorilla/csrf middleware instances are maintained (one with `Secure: true`, one with `Secure: false`) since `csrf.Secure()` is a creation-time option. Both use the same signing key, so cookies are interchangeable.
| Scenario | Cookie Secure | Origin/Referer Mode |
|---|---|---|
| Direct TLS (`r.TLS != nil`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) |
| Behind TLS proxy (`X-Forwarded-Proto: https`) | ✅ Secure | Strict (HTTPS scheme) |
| Plaintext HTTP | ❌ Non-Secure | Relaxed (PlaintextHTTPRequest) |
CSRF token validation (cookie + form double-submit) is always enforced regardless of mode.
## Testing
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode over plaintext HTTP
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_BehindProxy_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode behind TLS proxy
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_DirectTLS_POSTWithValidToken` — prod mode with direct TLS
- Added `TestCSRF_ProdMode_PlaintextHTTP_POSTWithoutToken` — token still required
- Added `TestIsClientTLS_*` — TLS detection unit tests
- All existing CSRF tests pass unchanged
- `docker build .` passes (includes `make check`)
- Manual verification: built and ran the container in both `dev` and `prod` modes, confirmed login succeeds in both
Closes #53
Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #54
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
clawbot
