The build no longer downloads Alpine.js. Its npm package tarball is
committed as 3p/alpinejs-3.14.9.tgz; its sha256 matches the value
script/fetch-assets pinned, and the cdn.min.js inside it matches the
value static/vendor.sha256 pinned.
make assets extracts package/dist/cdn.min.js to the ignored
static/js/alpine.min.js. make test, check, build and dev run it first,
and the Dockerfile builds through make test and make build.
script/fetch-assets, its Dockerfile step, static/vendor.sha256 and
static/vendor_test.go are removed, along with bootstrap's curl install.
Model: opus-5-5
static/js/alpine.min.js was a committed minified bundle, which
REPO_POLICIES forbids, referenced by no content hash at all. A minified
blob is unreviewable, which is the shape a supply-chain compromise
takes.
script/fetch-assets now downloads Alpine 3.14.9 from the npm registry
and verifies sha256 on both the tarball and the extracted file, and
static/vendor_test.go re-hashes the bytes go:embed actually placed in
the binary. The shipped bytes are byte-identical to the blob that was
committed, so the served asset does not change.
Independently reviewed. Five negative controls reproduced by the
reviewer: flipped expected hash, repointed URL, post-fetch tampering,
asset absent, and manifest inconsistencies — each fails closed with
static/js/ left clean. Registry hashes confirmed against the pins, and
the runtime image was built, run and curled to confirm the asset is
still served and the login page still loads it.
Known gap, filed separately: static/static.go embeds the js directory
rather than named files, so a missing fetched asset is not a compile
error on ungated local build paths. Every gated path fails loudly, so
the release artifact is unaffected.
clawbot