Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot 2de98cedbe Render admin page errors in the normal layout (closes #382)
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Every 400, 403, 404 and 500 on an admin page now answers with an
error page in the normal layout: one fixed line for the status and a
link back to the webhook list, or to sign-in when nobody is signed
in. The router's handler for unknown paths, the CSRF middleware's
refusal and a panic in an admin page route group use the same page;
each such group has its own recoverer and error reporting for that.
The page always sends Cache-Control: no-store. Status codes are
unchanged. The receiver, the healthcheck and /metrics keep their
plain answers. If the error page cannot render, or panics, the answer
is the same status in plain text.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-02 00:21:49 +00:00
clawbot aab448b076 Clarify web UI terminology, copy, and the entrypoint URL (closes #57)
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Unifies user-visible copy on "Webhook" (routes and URLs unchanged), drops
the placeholder Profile settings section, and adds a copy-to-clipboard
affordance for the entrypoint URL as progressive enhancement — the button
stays hidden unless both the target element and the Clipboard API resolve,
so no dead control appears without JavaScript and the URL stays selectable.

Retention copy now matches what the code does: deletion is permanent, 0
retains forever, and a blank field means the default on create or the
current value on edit. The permanent-deletion sentence is suppressed for a
retain-forever webhook, which the reaper exempts before computing a cutoff.

Template tests gained a render-completed assertion. Without it, a page that
aborted mid-render still satisfied assertions matching the already-flushed
prefix, because renderTemplate streams to the ResponseWriter (#123).
2026-08-11 15:42:08 +02:00
60786c5019 feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting (#42)
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## Security Hardening

This PR implements three security hardening issues:

### CSRF Protection (closes #35)

- Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random 256-bit generation
- Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks
- CSRF middleware applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and `/user` routes
- Hidden `csrf_token` field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates
- Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API)

### SSRF Prevention (closes #36)

- `ValidateTargetURL()` blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation time
- Blocked ranges: `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges
- SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom `DialContext` in the delivery engine for defense-in-depth (prevents DNS rebinding attacks)
- Only `http` and `https` schemes allowed

### Login Rate Limiting (closes #37)

- Per-IP rate limiter using `golang.org/x/time/rate`
- 5 attempts per minute per IP on `POST /pages/login`
- GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected
- Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries every 5 minutes
- `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` header support for reverse proxies

### Files Changed

**New files:**
- `internal/middleware/csrf.go` + tests — CSRF middleware
- `internal/middleware/ratelimit.go` + tests — Login rate limiter
- `internal/delivery/ssrf.go` + tests — SSRF validation + safe transport

**Modified files:**
- `internal/server/routes.go` — Wire CSRF and rate limit middleware
- `internal/handlers/handlers.go` — Inject CSRF token into template data
- `internal/handlers/source_management.go` — SSRF validation on target creation
- `internal/delivery/engine.go` — SSRF-safe HTTP transport for production
- All form templates — Added hidden `csrf_token` fields
- `README.md` — Updated Security section and TODO checklist

`docker build .` passes (lint + tests + build).

Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.git.eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@eeqj.de>
Co-authored-by: Jeffrey Paul <sneak@noreply.example.org>
Reviewed-on: #42
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-17 12:38:45 +01:00
clawbotanduser 011ec270c2 Replace Bootstrap with Tailwind CSS + Alpine.js (#14)
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## Summary

Replaces Bootstrap CSS/JS framework with Tailwind CSS v4 + Alpine.js, matching the µPaaS UI pattern.

## Changes

- **Removed Bootstrap** — all Bootstrap CSS/JS references removed from templates
- **Added Tailwind CSS v4** — `static/css/input.css` with Material Design inspired theme, compiled to `static/css/tailwind.css`
- **Added Alpine.js 3.14.9** — vendored as `static/js/alpine.min.js` for reactive UI components
- **Rewrote all templates** to use Tailwind utility classes:
  - `base.html` — new layout structure with footer, matches µPaaS pattern
  - `htmlheader.html` — Tailwind CSS link, `[x-cloak]` style
  - `navbar.html` — Alpine.js mobile menu toggle, responsive design
  - `index.html` — card-based dashboard with Tailwind classes
  - `login.html` — centered login form with Material Design styling
  - `profile.html` — clean profile layout
- **Added `make css` target** — compiles Tailwind CSS using standalone CLI
- **Component classes** in `input.css` — reusable `.btn-primary`, `.card`, `.input`, `.alert-error` etc.

## Testing

- `make fmt` ✅
- `make check` (fmt-check, lint, test, build) ✅
- `docker build .` ✅

closes #4

Co-authored-by: user <user@Mac.lan guest wan>
Reviewed-on: #14
Co-authored-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
Co-committed-by: clawbot <clawbot@noreply.example.org>
2026-03-02 00:42:29 +01:00
sneak 1244f3e2d5 initial 2026-03-01 22:52:08 +07:00