The SSRF blocklist had no escape hatch, so the thing webhooker is
mostly for — taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something
on your own network — could not be configured at all. Every private
address, Docker sibling and loopback service was permanently
unreachable as a delivery destination.
ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS (default empty) names blocks that delivery
targets may reach despite the default blocklist. It is an allowlist
and only ever adds destinations: there is no boolean, and no value
disables SSRF protection wholesale. Empty, the guard behaves exactly
as before.
A fixed set of addresses is refused before the allowlist is
consulted, so no supplied CIDR opens one — not the exact address,
not a supernet, not 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0. It is the two link-local
blocks (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) plus host routes for the cloud
metadata endpoints that sit outside them: AWS's IPv6 IMDS at
fd00:ec2::254, which lives in ordinary ULA space, and Alibaba's
100.100.100.200, which lives in CGNAT. Allowlisting fd00::/8 or
100.64.0.0/10 (Tailscale's range) is an ordinary thing for an
operator to do and must not reopen instance-credential theft. The
IPv4-compatible (::a9fe:a9fe) and NAT64 (64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe)
spellings of 169.254.169.254 are listed too, because To4() does not
normalise them into the link-local block the way it does the
IPv4-mapped form. Reaching any of these is credential theft rather
than delivery to an internal service.
The policy now lives in one function, Guard.checkIP, which both
target-creation validation and the delivery dialer call. The two
paths previously decided separately, which is how they came to
disagree about a destination. The guard is built once from config
and injected via fx into both the handlers and the delivery engine,
so there is a single instance and a single answer.
A set-but-unparseable value aborts startup naming the variable,
reusing the existing envPrefixList parser. A non-empty list is
logged at startup with the blocks spelled out, not counted, so the
hole is visible in the log of any deployment that has one.
Tests: an allowlisted loopback CIDR both validates and delivers to a
live server (and the same URL still fails without the allowlist); a
private address outside the listed block stays refused on both
paths; every unconditionally blocked address stays refused on both
paths under an allowlist that covers it, and the set itself is
pinned entry by entry; public addresses are unaffected either way;
and config coverage for parsing, startup abort, and the warning's
contents.
The admin bootstrap password was printed once, as one line among roughly
45 fx lines, and under docker run -d went to container logs subject to
rotation. There was no reset path at all -- no subcommand, no forgot-password
flow, no env override -- so recovery meant hand-deleting the users row from
webhooker.db, which was documented nowhere.
Adds webhooker resetpw [-generate] <username>. The password is read from
stdin or generated with the existing crypto/rand helper, never taken from
argv where /proc would publish it. It reuses the existing Argon2id hashing
rather than reimplementing the parameters, and writes a single UPDATE only
after the hash is complete, so no failure can leave an account with no
usable password. An unknown username is a hard error and never creates an
account.
It refuses to run against a DATA_DIR held by a live instance, via the
exclusive lock from #201. DATA_DIR and webhooker.db are checked to exist
before the lock is acquired, so a mistyped path creates nothing -- neither
a directory tree nor a stray lock file.
The bootstrap password now appears exactly once, in a distinct banner
written straight to a caller-named writer rather than as an fx log line.
