Add a read-only Settings page for the loaded configuration (closes #402)

The page at /settings, behind the login and linked from the
navigation bar, lists every field of the configuration the server
started with: each by its environment variable name, with the
README's description and the value in effect. METRICS_PASSWORD and
SENTRY_DSN show only as set or not set; their values never reach the
template. The handlers now take the loaded Config from the dependency
graph.

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 | `TRUSTED_PROXIES`       | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted. A set value replaces the default. If any client can reach webhooker, or the proxy in front of it, from an RFC 1918 source address, set it to the proxy's address alone. See [Trusted proxies](#trusted-proxies) | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` (RFC 1918) |
 | `ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS`  | CIDRs that delivery targets may reach despite the SSRF blocklist. Read [Allowing egress to your own network](#allowing-egress-to-your-own-network) before setting it | `""` (none) |
 
+The Settings page of the web UI (`/settings`, behind the login) lists
+every one of these with the value the running server loaded. It is
+read-only, and it shows `METRICS_PASSWORD` and `SENTRY_DSN` only as
+set or not set, never their values.
+
 #### Allowing egress to your own network
 
 By default every delivery target must resolve to a public address. The
@@ -2780,6 +2785,7 @@ returns to the page that was asked for.
 | ------ | ------------------------ | ----------- |
 | `GET`  | `/user/{username}`       | User profile page |
 | `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then `429`; `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one) |
+| `GET`  | `/settings`              | Read-only list of the configuration the server is running with; `METRICS_PASSWORD` and `SENTRY_DSN` show only as set or not set |
 | `GET`  | `/hooks`                 | List user's webhooks |
 | `GET`  | `/hooks/new`             | Create webhook form |
 | `POST` | `/hooks/new`             | Create webhook submission |
@@ -2893,6 +2899,7 @@ webhooker/
 │   │   ├── healthcheck.go     # Health check handler
 │   │   ├── index.go           # Index page handler
 │   │   ├── profile.go         # User profile handler
+│   │   ├── settings.go        # Read-only Settings page handler
 │   │   ├── source_management.go  # Webhook CRUD handlers
 │   │   └── webhook.go         # Webhook receiver handler
 │   ├── healthcheck/
@@ -3002,14 +3009,14 @@ local record instead of nothing. What that placement gives up is
 recovery of a panic in the six entries above it, none of which does
 more than set a header or start a timer.
 
-Each admin page route group (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
-`/hook/*`) starts with its own **Recoverer** and, if `SENTRY_DSN` is
-set, its own **Sentry** error reporting. That Recoverer answers a panic
+Each admin page route group (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/settings`,
+`/hooks`, `/hook/*`) starts with its own **Recoverer** and, if
+`SENTRY_DSN` is set, its own **Sentry** error reporting. That Recoverer answers a panic
 with the `500` error page in the normal layout; the global one keeps
 the plain-text `500` for every other route.
 
-Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
-`/hook/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
+Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/settings`,
+`/hooks`, `/hook/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
 POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
 CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
 gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
@@ -3028,7 +3035,7 @@ declared length. A chunked request, or
 one that lies about its length, is hard-capped by
 `http.MaxBytesReader` and fails downstream at form-parse time.
 
-Those same four route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
+Those same five route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
 (`Cache-Control: no-store`, `Pragma: no-cache`), and every group except
 `/pages` applies **RequireAuth**. The rate limiters are per-route
 rather than global: **PasswordChangeRateLimit** on
@@ -3074,12 +3081,12 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
   by middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
 - **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
   on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
-  HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/hooks`, `/hook`, and
-  `/user` routes. Excluded from `/h` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
-  `/api` (stateless API). The middleware detects TLS per-request through
-  `internal/reqtls.IsTLS` — the same predicate the session cookie uses —
-  to set appropriate cookie security flags and Origin/Referer validation
-  mode
+  HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/hooks`, `/hook`,
+  `/settings`, and `/user` routes. Excluded from `/h` (inbound webhook
+  POSTs) and `/api` (stateless API). The middleware detects TLS
+  per-request through `internal/reqtls.IsTLS` — the same predicate the
+  session cookie uses — to set appropriate cookie security flags and
+  Origin/Referer validation mode
 - **The entrypoint URL is the receiver's only credential.** Nothing
   about an inbound request is verified; possession of the UUID
   authorises submission, and no shared secret or signature check will