Move webhook pages to /hook/ID and inbound URLs to /h/UUID (closes #367)

The webhook page and everything under it move from /source/ID to
/hook/ID, the list and new-webhook form to /hooks and /hooks/new, and
the event log from .../logs to /hook/ID/events, body download
included. Entrypoint URLs move from /webhook/UUID to /h/UUID, and the
webhook page shows only that form. The old paths are gone.

Links, redirects, form actions, tests, comments and the README follow.
Both links to the event log page, and its title and heading, now read
"Full Event Log". Go identifiers and template file names are
unchanged. A new route test posts to the entrypoint URL the webhook
page shows and checks that the receiver rate limit applies to it.

Model: opus-5-5

README.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ services, durably stores them, and delivers them to configured targets
 with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 / web service. License: MIT.
 
-Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/webhook/{uuid}`, and
+Each entrypoint is a version 4 UUID served at `/h/{uuid}`, and
 that UUID is the entrypoint's only credential. webhooker does not use
 shared secrets, HMAC signatures or token headers on the receiver, and
 will not add them — read
@@ -1178,7 +1178,7 @@ backups at rest and restrict who can read them.
 
 **The entrypoint UUID is the credential, and it is the only one.**
 webhooker mints a version 4 UUID per entrypoint and serves it at
-`/webhook/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
+`/h/{uuid}`. Possession of that URL is the authentication:
 anyone who holds it can submit events to the entrypoint, and the
 receiver verifies nothing else about the sender.
 
@@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ the full request and creates an Event.
 | -------------- | ------- | ----------- |
 | `id`           | UUID    | Primary key |
 | `webhook_id`   | UUID    | Foreign key → Webhook |
-| `path`         | string  | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/webhook/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment. It is also the entrypoint's credential; see [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret) |
+| `path`         | string  | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/h/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment. It is also the entrypoint's credential; see [The entrypoint URL is the authentication secret](#the-entrypoint-url-is-the-authentication-secret) |
 | `description`  | string  | Optional description |
 | `active`       | boolean | Whether this entrypoint accepts events (default: true) |
 
@@ -1893,7 +1893,7 @@ runtime, though CGO is required at build time due to the transitive
 ```
 External Service
        │
-       │  POST /webhook/{uuid}
+       │  POST /h/{uuid}
        ▼
 ┌─────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐     ┌──────────────┐
 │  chi Router │────►│  Middleware   │────►│   Webhook    │
@@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@ The middleware records three more on the same registry:
 Two of those labels are written once per request from bytes the client
 chose, so both are bounded to something this service registers:
 
-- `handler` is the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`, never the
+- `handler` is the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`, never the
   concrete path. A request matching no route carries `(unmatched)`,
   and no entrypoint UUID ever reaches a label.
 - `method` is the request method when the router can route it, and
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ unpredictable rates, and blanket limits shared with other routes would
 cause legitimate deliveries to be dropped.
 
 The receiver instead has its own dedicated abuse limit, scoped to the
-`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
+`/h/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
 (`httprate.KeyByEndpoint`): one misbehaving sender is throttled without
 affecting other senders of the same entrypoint or the same sender's
 other entrypoints. Keying on the path rather than on the entrypoint
@@ -2186,7 +2186,7 @@ log spends. The access log is bounded by neither limit: every request
 is recorded once at `INFO`, served or rejected alike.
 
 What the access log does bound is the _content_ of those lines. A 3xx
-or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/webhook/{uuid}`,
+or 4xx response logs the chi route pattern — `/h/{uuid}`,
 `/user/{username}//`, or the literal `(unmatched)` when the request hit
 no route at all — in place of the concrete URL. Those are the outcomes
 an unauthenticated client can drive for free: 404 and 429 on any
@@ -2220,12 +2220,12 @@ reduces the headers to a fixed allowlist — `Accept`, `Content-Length`,
 
 The same hook rewrites the request URL. The SDK builds it as
 `scheme://host/path` from the concrete path, which on the receiver
-route is `/webhook/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
+route is `/h/<uuid>` in full — and that UUID is a write
 capability, not an identifier: anyone holding it can post events this
 service accepts and its targets then deliver. A tracker has its own
 retention, access control and deletion policy, so the rule the access
 log follows above does not carry across that boundary. What is sent is
-the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/webhook/{uuid}`.
+the chi route pattern instead: `http://host/h/{uuid}`.
 
 The scheme and the host are kept, and everything else in the URL is
 discarded rather than edited, so a future SDK version that starts
@@ -2269,8 +2269,8 @@ fallback is never the concrete path. The path becomes the literal
 rewrite cannot parse into a scheme is withheld whole. A transaction
 event additionally carries the SDK's own `METHOD /path` name, built
 from the concrete path as well; it is rewritten on the same terms, to
-`POST /webhook/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST
-/(redacted)` where it is not.
+`POST /h/{uuid}` where the pattern is known and `POST /(redacted)`
+where it is not.
 
 The headers are an allowlist for the same reason the rules above are
 unconditional: the SDK's own filter removes four names and passes
@@ -2405,7 +2405,7 @@ logger printed the fully interpolated SQL — parameters and all — to
 standard output on every statement that returned an error, including a
 plain record-not-found, at a level no operator setting reached. Two of
 this service's lookups miss by design on unauthenticated routes: the
-entrypoint lookup behind `/webhook/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
+entrypoint lookup behind `/h/{uuid}` and the user lookup behind
 the login form, whose path segment and submitted username the client
 picks outright. Every
 `gorm.Open` in the service now installs the adapter in
@@ -2683,10 +2683,10 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 
 | Method | Path                        | Description |
 | ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
-| `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
+| `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/hooks`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
 | `GET`  | `/.well-known/healthcheck`  | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
 | `GET`, `HEAD` | `/s/*`              | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). `GET` and `HEAD` only — `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `DELETE`, `OPTIONS`, `TRACE` and `CONNECT` are answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: GET, HEAD`. Any other method (such as `PROPFIND`) is refused by chi before it reaches this route, and gets `405` without an `Allow` header. Pinned by `TestStaticServesOnlyGetAndHead` |
-| `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}`           | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
+| `POST` | `/h/{uuid}`                 | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
 
 #### Authentication Endpoints
 
@@ -2702,25 +2702,25 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | ------ | ------------------------ | ----------- |
 | `GET`  | `/user/{username}`       | User profile page |
 | `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then `429`; `503` if no verification slot frees up within 5s, or immediately if 16 requests are already queued for one) |
-| `GET`  | `/sources`               | List user's webhooks |
-| `GET`  | `/sources/new`           | Create webhook form |
-| `POST` | `/sources/new`           | Create webhook submission |
-| `GET`  | `/source/{id}`           | Webhook detail view |
-| `GET`  | `/source/{id}/edit`      | Edit webhook form |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/edit`      | Edit webhook submission |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/delete`    | Delete webhook |
-| `GET`  | `/source/{id}/logs`      | Webhook event logs |
-| `GET`  | `/source/{id}/logs/{eventID}/body` | Download an event's full stored body. The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so this is the only route that serves a whole one; it is offered wherever a body is shown truncated |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/events/{eventID}/resubmit` | Resubmit a stored event: creates a new event copying it and fans that out to every currently active target (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets`   | Add target to webhook |
-| `GET`  | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target form. The one page that renders a target's destination URL and header values in full, rather than masked |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target submission |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
-| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
+| `GET`  | `/hooks`                 | List user's webhooks |
+| `GET`  | `/hooks/new`             | Create webhook form |
+| `POST` | `/hooks/new`             | Create webhook submission |
+| `GET`  | `/hook/{id}`             | Webhook detail view |
+| `GET`  | `/hook/{id}/edit`        | Edit webhook form |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/edit`        | Edit webhook submission |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/delete`      | Delete webhook |
+| `GET`  | `/hook/{id}/events`      | Full Event Log |
+| `GET`  | `/hook/{id}/events/{eventID}/body` | Download an event's full stored body. The log page renders each body only up to its cap, so this is the only route that serves a whole one; it is offered wherever a body is shown truncated |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryID}/replay` | Replay a finished delivery: creates a new delivery for the same event against the target's current configuration (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/events/{eventID}/resubmit` | Resubmit a stored event: creates a new event copying it and fans that out to every currently active target (30 per minute per bucket, then `429`) |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets`     | Add target to webhook |
+| `GET`  | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target form. The one page that renders a target's destination URL and header values in full, rather than masked |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/edit` | Edit target submission |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
+| `POST` | `/hook/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
 
 #### Infrastructure Endpoints
 
@@ -2921,8 +2921,8 @@ local record instead of nothing. What that placement gives up is
 recovery of a panic in the six entries above it, none of which does
 more than set a header or start a timer.
 
-Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/sources`,
-`/source/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
+Additionally, form endpoints (`/pages`, `/user/*`, `/hooks`,
+`/hook/*`) apply a **MaxBodySize** middleware that limits
 POST/PUT/PATCH request bodies to 1 MB. It is registered ahead of the
 CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
 gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
@@ -2946,7 +2946,7 @@ Those same four route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
 `/pages` applies **RequireAuth**. The rate limiters are per-route
 rather than global: **PasswordChangeRateLimit** on
 `/user/{username}/password` and **ReceiverRateLimit** on
-`/webhook/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
+`/h/{uuid}`. There is deliberately none on `/pages/login` — that
 endpoint counts failures inside the handler, after the credential
 check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
 
@@ -2987,8 +2987,8 @@ check, see [The login endpoint](#the-login-endpoint).
   by middleware that runs before CSRF parses the form
 - **CSRF protection** via [gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)
   on all state-changing forms (cookie-based double-submit tokens with
-  HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/sources`, `/source`, and
-  `/user` routes. Excluded from `/webhook` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
+  HMAC authentication). Applied to `/pages`, `/hooks`, `/hook`, and
+  `/user` routes. Excluded from `/h` (inbound webhook POSTs) and
   `/api` (stateless API). The middleware detects TLS per-request through
   `internal/reqtls.IsTLS` — the same predicate the session cookie uses —
   to set appropriate cookie security flags and Origin/Referer validation