Refuse [::], 0.0.0.0, IPv6 multicast and documentation space (closes #341)
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On the build host a connection to [::] reaches a listener on ::1, and one to 0.0.0.0 reaches 127.0.0.1, so a delivery target at either reached this host's loopback past the guard. 0.0.0.0/32 and ::/128 are now in alwaysBlockedNetworks, which no allowlist opens; an allowlist reaches loopback only through an entry covering a loopback address. IPv6 multicast (ff00::/8) and documentation space (2001:db8::/32) are refused by default and reopen when listed. Every default blocklist entry has a one-line comment, each list is pinned on its own, and tests refuse each address at target creation and at delivery. The README and the rules above each list match. Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #422.
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@@ -196,12 +196,13 @@ type Config struct {
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// otherwise refuse. The guard itself is always on: there is no
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// setting that disables SSRF protection, and delivery's
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// alwaysBlockedNetworks stays blocked no matter what is listed
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// here. That set is link-local plus the cloud metadata
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// endpoints outside it that disclose credentials or user data
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// at a provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not
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// exhaustive of every cloud's metadata address. See
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// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and the
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// criterion it is built from.
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// here. That set is link-local, the unspecified addresses
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// 0.0.0.0 and ::, and the cloud metadata endpoints outside
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// link-local that disclose credentials or user data at a
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// provider-fixed, non-public address; it is not exhaustive of
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// every cloud's metadata address. See
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// alwaysBlockedNetworks for the authoritative list and why
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// each entry is on it.
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AllowedEgressCIDRs []netip.Prefix
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params *ConfigParams
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