Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies (closes #141)
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Four defects found by the integration review, each of which would have made the README or the release notes untrue at the moment of tagging. RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL was absent from the README env table while two other passages referred to it as documented. Enumerated every variable read by internal/config from the source (12 in total) rather than by eye; that was the only one missing. TODO.md omitted five of the units landed in this milestone (#64, #79, #90, #113, #118), two of them credential-exposure fixes, which are precisely the entries a reader of the release notes wants to find. The list is now derived from git log origin/main..origin/next. The README sold Replay in the present tense as a core capability while no redelivery code exists anywhere in the tree, and the roadmap entry for it had been dropped without it being implemented. Every mention of replay or redelivery in the README is now either marked planned or already under a Planned heading: the Rationale item, the Use Cases bullet, the Event model's field description, and the delivery-semantics passage on target-type edits, which told an operator that a terminally failed delivery was recoverable by hand when nothing can recover it. The comment on failUnretryableRetry made the same claim and is corrected with it. The roadmap entry is back in TODO.md. The production JS asset shipped a console.log on load. The rest of the file and every other shipped asset were checked; that was the only one (alpine.min.js is vendored and untouched). No behavioural change: the only non-comment, non-documentation edit is the deleted console.log.
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TODO.md
31
TODO.md
@@ -61,6 +61,34 @@ rests on.
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Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
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button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
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actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
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- 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs:
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Go embeds the request URL in `*url.Error`, so every transport failure
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persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event
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database via `DeliveryResult.Error`, a field a future REST API would
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have served. `maskURLError` drops path, query and userinfo while
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preserving the wrapped cause, so `errors.Is`/`As` and `Timeout()`
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still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently
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(#118)
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- 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint
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(`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus
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entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget;
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over-limit requests get 429 with `Retry-After`. It was the one
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unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
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- 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form:
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`MaxBodySize` is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so
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an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in
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full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
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- 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which
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rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack
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incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked
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per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a `TargetView` of
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labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
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- 2026-08-11 Allow `retention_days` of 0 to mean retain forever, via a
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sentinel written in `BeforeSave` so the GORM column default cannot
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win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts
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above 106751 overflowed `time.Duration` and wrapped the cutoff into
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the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything
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(#79)
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- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
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(`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
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requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
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@@ -115,6 +143,9 @@ rests on.
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# Future Steps
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- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
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README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
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tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
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- Delivery status and retry management UI
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- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
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plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
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