Refuse [::], 0.0.0.0, IPv6 multicast and documentation space (closes #341)
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On Linux a connection to the unspecified address [::] or 0.0.0.0
reaches the host's own loopback, and the SSRF guard let [::] through.
Both unspecified addresses now sit in alwaysBlockedNetworks, so an
allowlist reaches loopback only by naming it; ::/128 joins the default
blocklist beside 0.0.0.0/8. IPv6 multicast (ff00::/8) and documentation
space (2001:db8::/32) are refused by default. Every default blocklist
entry gets a one-line comment, and the README, the rules above each
list and the two pinning tests follow.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-02 07:14:58 +00:00
parent eb4c4cc849
commit aadbab8cf0
6 changed files with 143 additions and 47 deletions
+50 -10
View File
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ var (
"blocked cloud metadata address",
)
errBlockedMetadata = errors.New(
"blocked link-local or cloud instance metadata " +
"address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
"blocked link-local, cloud instance metadata or " +
"unspecified address: ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS cannot open it",
)
errInvalidScheme = errors.New(
"only http and https are allowed",
@@ -72,14 +72,16 @@ var blockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// alwaysBlockedNetworks are the ranges no configuration can
// open: the link-local blocks and the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them. Reaching one is credential
// or user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal
// service, so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still
// leaves it blocked.
// open: the link-local blocks, the cloud instance metadata
// endpoints that live outside them, and the unspecified
// addresses. Reaching a metadata endpoint is credential or
// user-data theft rather than delivery to an internal service,
// so a supplied CIDR that covers such an address still leaves it
// blocked.
//
// Inclusion criterion — an address belongs here only if BOTH
// hold, and every entry below satisfies both:
// hold, and every entry below but the unspecified addresses
// satisfies both:
//
// 1. It is a fixed address assigned by the provider, or a
// range reserved by IANA — never one the operator chose.
@@ -112,6 +114,12 @@ var blockedPublicNetworks []*net.IPNet
// This is a criterion, not an enumeration of every metadata
// address in existence.
//
// The unspecified addresses 0.0.0.0 and :: fail (2) and are here
// anyway. No host can have either, and on Linux a connection to
// one reaches this host's own loopback, so an allowlist opens
// loopback only by naming it (127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128). Nothing else
// lives at either address, so refusing them costs nothing.
//
// Every entry is either already in blockedNetworks — this list is
// what makes it unconditional — or an alternate encoding of
// 169.254.169.254 that Contains does not match against
@@ -131,23 +139,46 @@ var alwaysBlockedNetworks []*net.IPNet
//nolint:gochecknoinits // init is the idiomatic way to parse CIDRs once at startup
func init() {
blockedNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
// IPv4 loopback.
"127.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"10.0.0.0/8",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"172.16.0.0/12",
// RFC 1918 private network.
"192.168.0.0/16",
// IPv4 link-local.
"169.254.0.0/16",
// "This network", holding the IPv4 unspecified address 0.0.0.0.
"0.0.0.0/8",
// Carrier-grade NAT shared address space.
"100.64.0.0/10",
// IETF protocol assignments.
"192.0.0.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-1).
"192.0.2.0/24",
// Benchmarking.
"198.18.0.0/15",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-2).
"198.51.100.0/24",
// IPv4 documentation (TEST-NET-3).
"203.0.113.0/24",
// IPv4 multicast.
"224.0.0.0/4",
// Reserved, including the broadcast address.
"240.0.0.0/4",
// IPv6 loopback.
"::1/128",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// IPv6 unique local addresses.
"fc00::/7",
// IPv6 link-local.
"fe80::/10",
// IPv6 multicast.
"ff00::/8",
// IPv6 documentation.
"2001:db8::/32",
})
blockedPublicNetworks = mustParseCIDRs([]string{
@@ -207,6 +238,14 @@ func init() {
// allowlist from opening it.
"192.0.0.192/32",
// The unspecified addresses, each of which reaches this
// host's loopback on Linux.
//
// IPv4 unspecified address, inside the blocked 0.0.0.0/8.
"0.0.0.0/32",
// IPv6 unspecified address.
"::/128",
// 169.254.169.254 as an IPv4-compatible IPv6 address.
"::a9fe:a9fe/128",
// 169.254.169.254 behind the NAT64 well-known prefix.
@@ -343,8 +382,9 @@ func (g *Guard) allows(ip net.IP) bool {
// The order is the policy:
//
// 1. alwaysBlockedNetworks is refused before the allowlist is
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local or a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address.
// consulted, so no configured CIDR reaches link-local, a
// cloud metadata endpoint at a non-public address, or an
// unspecified address.
// 2. The allowlist is consulted next, so a listed private
// network, or a listed public address on the default
// blocklist, becomes reachable.