Bound the receiver rate limit per client IP across /webhook/* (closes #139)
check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested

The receiver limiter keyed on the request path, and /webhook/{uuid} matches any single segment, so a client minted a fresh bucket per invented path and had unlimited aggregate rate against the only unauthenticated endpoint. An outer limiter keyed on the client address alone now bounds that, chained in front of the unchanged per-entrypoint limiter. Its rejections log at DEBUG without the path, and the README states what each limit does and does not bound.
This commit was merged in pull request #143.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-12 13:19:43 +02:00
rodzic 0e397b3174
commit 95161c7768
5 zmienionych plików z 265 dodań i 19 usunięć
+12 -6
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@@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
h.log.Info("webhook request received",
"entrypoint_uuid", entrypointUUID,
"method", r.Method,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
)
entrypoint, ok := h.lookupEntrypoint(
w, r, entrypointUUID,
)
@@ -52,6 +46,18 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleWebhook() http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// Logged only once the UUID is known to name a real
// entrypoint. The UUID comes straight out of the path on
// the one unauthenticated endpoint, so logging it before
// the lookup let a client write an INFO line per invented
// path; the request itself is already in the access log
// and a miss is already logged at DEBUG.
h.log.Info("webhook request received",
"entrypoint_uuid", entrypointUUID,
"method", r.Method,
"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
)
if !entrypoint.Active {
http.Error(w, "Gone", http.StatusGone)