Correct release-blocking README and startup-warning inaccuracies (closes #151)

The empty-TRUSTED_PROXIES warning was gated on IsProd(), but
WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so an internet-exposed
deployment whose operator never set it got no warning at all — the
exact operator error the warning exists to catch. It now fires whenever
the list is empty, in any environment, and its text is accurate both
behind a reverse proxy (shared buckets, remotely deniable admin login)
and with nothing in front of the process (harmless). The startup
configuration summary also now logs sessionIdleTimeout, the one value
where a valid setting silently disables a security control.

The README documented a two-stage Docker build on golang:1.24 running
"make check" (the tree has three stages: a golangci-lint lint stage
running fmt-check and lint, a golang:1.26.1-bookworm builder running
test and build, then the Alpine runtime), advertised the public
receiver as accepting all methods (it answers 405 to everything but
POST), claimed unqualified per-IP login rate limiting, and left the
session-expiry prose orphaned inside the trusted-proxy subsection.

The rest of the README was swept against the code rather than only the
reported lines: every documented route checked method-by-method against
internal/server/routes.go (adding the password-change, entrypoint and
target routes that were missing), every environment variable checked
against internal/config/config.go (MAINTENANCE_MODE serves no
maintenance page — it only sets a healthcheck field), the fx wiring,
package tree, prerequisites and dev commands brought back in line with
the tree.

Statements the sweep had waved through, each re-derived from the code
this time:

- Circuit breakers are not HTTP-only. target_slack.go embeds httpCore
  and hands its own MaxRetries to the same retry path, so a slack
  target with max_retries > 0 gets a breaker on the same defaults.
- No WAL exists. Both DSNs are file:%s?cache=shared&mode=rwc and no
  journal_mode pragma is issued anywhere, so every database runs on
  SQLite's rollback journal.
- Slack config is keyed webhookUrl, not webhook_url; the underscored
  spelling is only the error message. An operator copying the README
  wrote config that was silently ignored.
- Setting carries no BaseModel, so neither the common-field list nor
  "soft deletes on all entities" held for it.
- DeliveryTask names no type; it is delivery.Task.
- script/lint runs golangci-lint on the host. Only script/cibuild and
  script/docker involve Docker; #109 tracks changing that, and until it
  lands the README says what the tree does.
- An entrypoint's path column holds a bare UUID. The /webhook/ prefix
  is route only and never stored.
- max_queue_size is stored and displayed but consulted by nothing;
  queue depth is the two fixed 10,000-entry channels.
- Inline event bodies are cut at "< 16 KiB", not "≤".
- retention_days 0 belongs to the retain-forever band — BeforeSave
  rewrites it to the sentinel — not the finite one, whose floor is 1.
  A negative value is a 400 in parseRetentionDays.
- The receiver's per-client limit keys on the request path
  (httprate.KeyByEndpoint), not on the entrypoint; the paragraph eight
  lines below already said so and the two contradicted each other.
- Shutdown goes through lifecycle.WaitForShutdown, which is bounded by
  fx's stop context and can return with goroutines still running,
  rather than a bare WaitGroup.Wait().
- Nine of the Makefile's fifteen targets shim script/; build, run, dev,
  deps, clean and css are inline.
- Nine entities are documented and nine model files exist, not eight.
- The metrics middleware is only registered when METRICS_USERNAME is
  set, so an over-limit request is not always counted.

Two gaps closed while checking: the target-type list omitted slack
entirely, and the package tree omitted event_log_view.go and the three
testing.go files, which are ordinary compiled sources exporting
NewTestDatabase and NewForTest rather than _test.go scaffolding.

TestStaticServesEveryMethod settles what /s/* actually answers: chi's
Mount registers every method and http.FileServer special-cases only
HEAD, so POST, PUT and DELETE to an asset are served the file. The
README claimed GET and HEAD.

TODO.md drops the unsupported half of its CI claim, keeping the
cache-defeated container runs, and splits the landed password change
away from the unimplemented reset flow.

Rebasing onto current next moved the tree under three of these
sections, so they were re-derived against the rebased tree rather
than the one the branch was cut from: alpine.min.js is no longer
committed but fetched and hash-verified by script/fetch-assets, so the
package tree entry for it was wrong and vendor.sha256 was absent; the
builder stage runs that script before make test; the Makefile is now
ten shims out of sixteen targets, and fmt-check was missing from the
development command list. The Quick Start was also wrong in a way that
costs a new contributor a red build: it said make deps, which only
runs go mod download and tidy, and make check then fails two tests on
the absent asset. It now says make bootstrap, which fetches it.

README.md

@@ -11,9 +11,14 @@ with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 
 ### Prerequisites
 
-- Go 1.26+
+- Go 1.26.1+ (the version in `go.mod`)
-- golangci-lint v2.11+
+- golangci-lint v2.12.2 (the version pinned in `script/bootstrap` and
-- Docker (for containerized deployment)
+  in the `Dockerfile`'s lint stage; `make bootstrap` installs it)
+- Docker (for containerized deployment, and for the lint and test
+  stages of the CI gate)
+- `curl`, used by `script/fetch-assets` to download the third-party
+  browser assets, which are not committed (`make bootstrap` installs
+  it if missing)
 
 ### Quick Start
 
@@ -22,14 +27,18 @@ with retry support, logging, and observability. Category: infrastructure
 git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker.git
 cd webhooker
 
-# Install Go dependencies
+# Install Go dependencies, the pinned linter, and the third-party
-make deps
+# browser assets. `make deps` alone is not enough: it only runs
+# go mod download/tidy, and the checks below need the fetched assets.
+make bootstrap
 
-# Run all checks (format, lint, test, build)
+# Run all checks (test, lint, format check)
 make check
 
-# Run in development mode (uses SQLite in current directory)
+# Run in development mode. DATA_DIR defaults to /var/lib/webhooker in
-make dev
+# every environment, so set it (in .env or the shell) to a writable
+# directory when running from a clone.
+DATA_DIR=./data make dev
 
 # Build Docker image
 make docker
@@ -42,13 +51,18 @@ make bootstrap  # Install all dependencies (idempotent)
 make setup      # Bootstrap + install git pre-commit hook
 make assets     # Fetch + verify third-party browser assets
 make fmt        # Format code (gofmt + goimports)
+make fmt-check  # Fail if gofmt would change anything (writes nothing)
 make lint       # Run golangci-lint
 make test       # Run tests with race detection
 make check      # test + lint + fmt-check (CI gate)
 make build      # Build binary to bin/webhooker
+make run        # build, then run ./bin/webhooker
 make dev        # go run ./cmd/webhooker
+make deps       # go mod download + go mod tidy
 make docker     # Build Docker image
 make hooks      # Install git pre-commit hook that runs script/precommit
+make css        # Regenerate static/css/tailwind.css (needs tailwindcss)
+make clean      # Remove bin/
 ```
 
 ### Configuration
@@ -90,7 +104,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
 | `PORT`                  | HTTP listen port                    | `8080`   |
 | `DATA_DIR`              | Directory for all SQLite databases  | `/var/lib/webhooker` |
 | `DEBUG`                 | Enable debug logging                | `false`  |
-| `MAINTENANCE_MODE`      | Serve the maintenance page          | `false`  |
+| `MAINTENANCE_MODE`      | Report `maintenanceMode: true` in the healthcheck JSON. It does not change how any request is served — no maintenance page exists | `false`  |
 | `METRICS_USERNAME`      | Basic auth username for `/metrics`  | `""`     |
 | `METRICS_PASSWORD`      | Basic auth password for `/metrics`  | `""`     |
 | `SENTRY_DSN`            | Sentry error reporting DSN          | `""`     |
@@ -130,8 +144,13 @@ sustained trickle re-locks them immediately.
 
 The remedy is to set `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to your reverse proxy's
 address, which restores per-client buckets. webhooker logs a warning
-at startup when `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod` and `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is
+at startup whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty, in every environment —
-empty. See [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
+not only when `WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT=prod`, because that variable
+defaults to `dev` and an operator who never set it is precisely the
+one at risk. The warning is informational when nothing proxies to the
+process: with no proxy in front, the peer address is the client's own
+and the buckets are already per-client. See
+[Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting) for what each limit shares.
 
 `X-Real-IP` and `True-Client-IP` are **never** read, from any peer.
 Reverse proxies append to `X-Forwarded-For` but forward other client
@@ -163,6 +182,8 @@ Two operator requirements follow:
   makes all three limits, including the unauthenticated webhook
   receiver, silently bypassable by every client in the block.
 
+#### Sessions
+
 Sessions are bounded by two independent clocks, and end at whichever
 one runs out first:
 
@@ -232,17 +253,20 @@ docker run -d \
 The container runs as a non-root user (`webhooker`, UID 1000), exposes
 port 8080, and includes a health check against
 `/.well-known/healthcheck`. The `/var/lib/webhooker` volume holds all
-SQLite databases: the main application database (`webhooker.db`) and
+SQLite databases: the main application database (`webhooker.db`), the
-the per-webhook event databases (`events-{uuid}.db`). Mount this as a
+per-webhook event databases (`events-{uuid}.db`), and any archive
-persistent volume to preserve data across container restarts.
+databases written by `database` targets (`archive-{uuid}.db`). Mount
+this as a persistent volume to preserve data across container
+restarts.
 
 ## Entrypoints
 
 This repository adheres to the
 [Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
 standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
-development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call
+development workflow. Ten of the Makefile's sixteen targets are thin
-them. We provide:
+shims that call them; `build`, `run`, `dev`, `deps`, `clean` and `css`
+are inline commands with no script behind them. We provide:
 
 - `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (idempotent)
 - `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development
@@ -354,7 +378,11 @@ It uses:
 - **[gorilla/csrf](https://github.com/gorilla/csrf)** for CSRF
   protection (cookie-based double-submit tokens)
 - **[go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate)** for
-  per-IP login rate limiting (sliding window counter)
+  sliding-window rate limiting of the login, password-change and
+  webhook receiver endpoints. The bucket is per client IP only when
+  `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
+  behind that proxy shares one bucket per limit (see
+  [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
 - **[Prometheus](https://prometheus.io)** for metrics, served at
   `/metrics` behind basic auth
 - **[Sentry](https://sentry.io)** for optional error reporting
@@ -372,7 +400,7 @@ The codebase uses consistent naming throughout (rename completed in
 
 ### Data Model
 
-webhooker's data model has eight entities organized into two tiers: the
+webhooker's data model has nine entities organized into two tiers: the
 **application tier** (user and webhook configuration) and the **event
 tier** (event ingestion, delivery, and logging).
 
@@ -464,9 +492,25 @@ days (`database.RetentionForeverDays`). The retention reaper recognises
 that sentinel and skips the webhook entirely, and the web UI displays
 such a webhook's retention as "forever" rather than as a day count.
 
-A *finite* retention is capped at `database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays`
+Submitted `retention_days` values therefore fall into three bands, not
-(106751 days, about 292 years), and a larger one is rejected with a
+two:
-400. The cap is not arbitrary: the reaper computes its cutoff as a
+
+- `1` up to `database.MaxFiniteRetentionDays` (106751 days, about 292
+  years) is accepted as a finite retention.
+- Above that ceiling but below the retain-forever sentinel of 365000
+  (`database.RetentionForeverDays`) is rejected with a 400. This is the
+  band the cap exists for.
+- `0`, and `365000` or above, are accepted and mean retain forever,
+  collapsing to the sentinel — `0` in `Webhook.BeforeSave`, the large
+  values in `parseRetentionDays`. The large values are not out of
+  range: the edit form pre-fills the sentinel for a retain-forever
+  webhook, so submitting that form back unchanged has to keep meaning
+  "forever".
+
+A negative value is in none of the three: `parseRetentionDays` rejects
+it with a 400 before `BeforeSave` ever sees it.
+
+The cap is not arbitrary: the reaper computes its cutoff as a
 `time.Duration`, an int64 nanosecond count, and a longer period
 overflows it. An overflowed cutoff lands in the future, where it
 matches every row, so the sweep would delete every event the webhook
@@ -484,7 +528,7 @@ the full request and creates an Event.
 | -------------- | ------- | ----------- |
 | `id`           | UUID    | Primary key |
 | `webhook_id`   | UUID    | Foreign key → Webhook |
-| `path`         | string  | Unique URL path (UUID-based, e.g. `/webhook/{uuid}`) |
+| `path`         | string  | Unique bare UUID, generated at creation. The `/webhook/` prefix is route only and is not stored: the receiver matches this column against the raw `{uuid}` path segment |
 | `description`  | string  | Optional description |
 | `active`       | boolean | Whether this entrypoint accepts events (default: true) |
 
@@ -508,8 +552,8 @@ events should be forwarded.
 | `type`           | TargetType | One of: `http`, `slack`, `database`, `log` |
 | `active`         | boolean    | Whether deliveries are enabled (default: true) |
 | `config`         | JSON text  | Type-specific configuration |
-| `max_retries`    | integer    | Maximum retry attempts for HTTP targets (0 = fire-and-forget, >0 = retries with backoff) |
+| `max_retries`    | integer    | Maximum retry attempts for `http` and `slack` targets (0 = fire-and-forget, >0 = retries with backoff and a circuit breaker). Ignored by `database` and `log` targets |
-| `max_queue_size` | integer    | Maximum queued deliveries (for HTTP targets with retries) |
+| `max_queue_size` | integer    | Stored and shown on the target's detail view, but not enforced anywhere yet: nothing in the delivery engine consults it. Queue depth is set by the two fixed 10,000-entry channels |
 
 **Relations:** Belongs to Webhook. Has many Deliveries.
 
@@ -522,6 +566,11 @@ events should be forwarded.
   greater than 0, failed deliveries are retried with exponential backoff
   up to `max_retries` attempts, protected by a per-target circuit
   breaker.
+- **`slack`** — Post the event as a formatted message to a
+  Slack-compatible incoming webhook URL (`webhookUrl` in `config`). It
+  is built on the same HTTP core as `http` and honours `max_retries`
+  identically, circuit breaker included. See the Slack target section
+  under "Per-Webhook Event Databases" for the message format.
 - **`database`** — Archive the full event as a row into a separate
   per-webhook archive database (`archive-{webhookID}.db`) for long-term
   retention, with an optional creation-validated expiry (default: keep
@@ -558,7 +607,7 @@ data for auditing and for the planned replay capability.
 | `id`             | UUID   | Primary key |
 | `webhook_id`     | UUID   | Foreign key → Webhook |
 | `entrypoint_id`  | UUID   | Foreign key → Entrypoint |
-| `method`       | string | HTTP method (POST, PUT, etc.) |
+| `method`       | string | HTTP method of the captured request. Always `POST`: the receiver answers every other method with 405 before an Event is created |
 | `headers`      | JSON   | Complete request headers |
 | `body`         | text   | Raw request body |
 | `content_type` | string | Content-Type header value |
@@ -613,7 +662,9 @@ retries) is individually logged for full observability.
 
 #### Common Fields
 
-All entities include these fields from `BaseModel`:
+Every entity except `Setting` includes these fields from `BaseModel`.
+`Setting` is a bare key-value row with no `id`, no timestamps and no
+soft delete:
 
 | Field        | Type      | Description |
 | ------------ | --------- | ----------- |
@@ -659,7 +710,7 @@ handles connection pooling, lazy opening, migrations, and cleanup.
 This separation provides:
 
 - **Isolation** — a high-volume webhook won't cause lock contention or
-  WAL bloat affecting the main application or other webhooks.
+  journal growth affecting the main application or other webhooks.
 - **Independent lifecycle** — event databases can be independently
   backed up, archived, rotated, or size-limited without impacting the
   application.
@@ -669,9 +720,12 @@ This separation provides:
 - **Per-webhook retention** — the `retention_days` field on each webhook
   controls automatic cleanup of old events in that webhook's database
   only, or disables cleanup entirely when set to `0` (retain forever).
-- **Performance** — each webhook's database has its own WAL, its own
+- **Performance** — each webhook's database has its own page cache and
-  page cache, and its own lock, so concurrent event ingestion across
+  its own lock, so concurrent event ingestion across webhooks won't
-  webhooks won't contend.
+  contend. No write-ahead log is involved: both DSNs are
+  `file:{path}?cache=shared&mode=rwc` and no `journal_mode` pragma is
+  ever issued, so every database runs on SQLite's default rollback
+  journal.
 
 The **database target type** builds on this architecture to provide
 long-term archiving, separate from the per-webhook event database (which
@@ -727,8 +781,9 @@ and other compatible services). Each message includes event metadata
 pretty-printed in a code block. JSON payloads are automatically
 formatted with indentation for readability; non-JSON payloads are shown
 as raw text. Large payloads are truncated to keep messages reasonable.
-Config stores `webhook_url` — the Slack/Mattermost incoming webhook
+Config stores `webhookUrl` — the Slack/Mattermost incoming webhook
-endpoint.
+endpoint. That is the JSON key; the error text for a missing one reads
+`webhook_url is required`, which is the message, not the key.
 
 The database uses the
 [modernc.org/sqlite](https://pkg.go.dev/modernc.org/sqlite) driver at
@@ -750,8 +805,9 @@ External Service
                      1. Look up Entrypoint by UUID
                      2. Capture full request as Event
                      3. Create Delivery records for each active Target
-                     4. Build self-contained DeliveryTask structs
+                     4. Build self-contained delivery.Task structs
-                        (target config + event data inline for ≤16KB)
+                        (target config + event data inline for
+                         bodies < 16 KiB)
                      5. Notify Engine via channel (no DB read needed)
                                                 │
                                                 ▼
@@ -786,7 +842,7 @@ at any time, preventing goroutine explosions regardless of queue depth.
   a delivery channel (new tasks from the webhook handler) and a retry
   channel (tasks from backoff timers). Both are buffered to 10,000.
 - **Fan-out via channel, not goroutines:** When an event arrives with
-  multiple targets, each `DeliveryTask` is sent to the delivery channel.
+  multiple targets, each `delivery.Task` is sent to the delivery channel.
   Workers pick them up and process them — no goroutine-per-target.
 - **Worker goroutines:** A fixed number of worker goroutines select from
   both channels. Each worker processes one task at a time, then picks up
@@ -810,7 +866,12 @@ This means:
 - **Independent results** — each worker records its own delivery result
   in the per-webhook database without coordination.
 - **Graceful shutdown** — cancel the context, workers finish their
-  current task and exit. `WaitGroup.Wait()` ensures clean shutdown.
+  current task and exit. The stop hook waits for the pool via
+  `lifecycle.WaitForShutdown`, which bounds that wait by fx's stop
+  timeout rather than blocking forever on a wedged worker. On timeout
+  it logs at `ERROR` and returns an error, and the goroutines that
+  did not finish are still running — an unclean shutdown is reported
+  rather than hidden.
 
 **Recovery paths:**
 
@@ -838,12 +899,13 @@ remains stored in the per-webhook event database, there is no way to
 redeliver it: manual redelivery is planned, not implemented (see
 [TODO.md](TODO.md)).
 
-### Circuit Breaker (HTTP Targets with Retries)
+### Circuit Breaker (HTTP and Slack Targets with Retries)
 
-HTTP targets with `max_retries` > 0 are protected by a **per-target circuit breaker** that
+`http` and `slack` targets with `max_retries` > 0 are protected by a
-prevents hammering a down target with repeated failed delivery attempts.
+**per-target circuit breaker** that prevents hammering a down target
-The circuit breaker is in-memory only and resets on restart (which is
+with repeated failed delivery attempts. The circuit breaker is
-fine — startup recovery rescans the database anyway).
+in-memory only and resets on restart (which is fine — startup recovery
+rescans the database anyway).
 
 **States:**
 
@@ -879,10 +941,12 @@ fine — startup recovery rescans the database anyway).
 - **Failure threshold:** 5 consecutive failures before opening
 - **Cooldown:** 30 seconds in open state before probing
 
-**Scope:** Circuit breakers only apply to **HTTP targets with
+**Scope:** Circuit breakers apply to **`http` and `slack` targets with
-`max_retries` > 0**. Fire-and-forget HTTP targets (`max_retries` == 0),
+`max_retries` > 0**. The Slack target is built on the same HTTP core
-Slack targets, database targets (local operations), and log
+and hands its own `max_retries` to the same retry path, so it gets a
-targets (stdout) do not use circuit breakers.
+breaker with the same 5-failure / 30-second defaults. Fire-and-forget
+targets of either type (`max_retries` == 0), database targets (local
+operations), and log targets (stdout) do not use circuit breakers.
 
 When a circuit is open and a new delivery arrives, the engine marks the
 delivery as `retrying` and schedules a retry timer for after the
@@ -898,9 +962,11 @@ unpredictable rates, and blanket limits shared with other routes would
 cause legitimate deliveries to be dropped.
 
 The receiver instead has its own dedicated abuse limit, scoped to the
-`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per entrypoint: one
+`/webhook/{uuid}` route only and keyed per client IP per request path
-misbehaving sender is throttled without affecting other senders of the
+(`httprate.KeyByEndpoint`): one misbehaving sender is throttled without
-same entrypoint or the same sender's other entrypoints. The limit is
+affecting other senders of the same entrypoint or the same sender's
+other entrypoints. Keying on the path rather than on the entrypoint
+matters — see the aggregate limit below. The limit is
 `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` requests per minute (default 120, generous for
 legitimate webhook senders). Requests over the limit receive HTTP 429
 with a `Retry-After` header. A set-but-invalid `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`
@@ -958,8 +1024,8 @@ opposite directions:
   login bucket full, and the operator's own login returns HTTP 429 for
   as long as that trickle continues. A restart clears the in-memory
   buckets and a resumed trickle re-locks them. Production deployments
-  must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup when it is
+  must set `TRUSTED_PROXIES`; webhooker warns at startup whenever it is
-  empty in `prod`.
+  empty, in any environment.
 
 Finer-grained per-webhook rate limits (configured in the web UI and
 enforced in the webhook handler) can layer on top of this env-level
@@ -971,17 +1037,17 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 
 | Method | Path                        | Description |
 | ------ | --------------------------- | ----------- |
-| `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
+| `GET`  | `/`                         | Root redirect, 303 (authenticated → `/sources`, unauthenticated → `/pages/login`) |
-| `GET`  | `/.well-known/healthcheck`  | Health check (JSON: status, uptime, version) |
+| `GET`  | `/.well-known/healthcheck`  | Health check (JSON: `status`, `now`, `uptimeSeconds`, `uptimeHuman`, `version`, `appname`, `maintenanceMode`) |
-| `GET`  | `/s/*`                      | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS) |
+| any    | `/s/*`                      | Static file serving (embedded CSS, JS). Mounted for every method, not just `GET`/`HEAD`: chi's `Mount` registers all methods and `http.FileServer` special-cases only `HEAD` (by omitting the body), so a `POST` or `DELETE` to an asset is answered `200` with the file. Pinned by `TestStaticServesEveryMethod` |
-| `ANY`  | `/webhook/{uuid}`           | Webhook receiver endpoint (accepts all methods) |
+| `POST` | `/webhook/{uuid}`           | Webhook receiver endpoint. `POST` only — every other method is answered `405 Method Not Allowed` with `Allow: POST`. Rate limited (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)) |
 
 #### Authentication Endpoints
 
 | Method | Path            | Description |
 | ------ | --------------- | ----------- |
-| `GET`  | `/pages/login`  | Login page |
+| `GET`  | `/pages/login`  | Login page (not rate limited; the limiter applies to POST only) |
-| `POST` | `/pages/login`  | Login form submission |
+| `POST` | `/pages/login`  | Login form submission (5 per minute per bucket, then 429) |
 | `POST` | `/pages/logout` | Logout (destroys session) |
 
 #### Authenticated Endpoints
@@ -989,6 +1055,7 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | Method | Path                     | Description |
 | ------ | ------------------------ | ----------- |
 | `GET`  | `/user/{username}`       | User profile page |
+| `POST` | `/user/{username}/password` | Change the user's password (5 per minute per bucket, then 429) |
 | `GET`  | `/sources`               | List user's webhooks |
 | `GET`  | `/sources/new`           | Create webhook form |
 | `POST` | `/sources/new`           | Create webhook submission |
@@ -998,13 +1065,17 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | `POST` | `/source/{id}/delete`    | Delete webhook |
 | `GET`  | `/source/{id}/logs`      | Webhook event logs |
 | `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints` | Add entrypoint to webhook |
+| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/delete` | Delete an entrypoint |
+| `POST` | `/source/{id}/entrypoints/{entrypointID}/toggle` | Enable or disable an entrypoint |
 | `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets`   | Add target to webhook |
+| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/delete` | Delete a target |
+| `POST` | `/source/{id}/targets/{targetID}/toggle` | Enable or disable a target |
 
 #### Infrastructure Endpoints
 
 | Method | Path       | Description |
 | ------ | ---------- | ----------- |
-| `GET`  | `/metrics` | Prometheus metrics (requires basic auth) |
+| `GET`  | `/metrics` | Prometheus metrics, behind basic auth. The route is registered only when `METRICS_USERNAME` is set; otherwise it does not exist and returns 404 |
 
 #### API (Planned)
 
@@ -1018,8 +1089,10 @@ abuse limit later; they are tracked as future work.
 | `GET`    | `/api/v1/webhooks/{id}/events` | List events for webhook |
 | `POST`   | `/api/v1/events/{id}/redeliver`| Redeliver an event |
 
-API authentication will use API keys passed via `Authorization: Bearer
+None of these exist yet. `/api/v1` is mounted with no routes, so every
-<key>` header.
+path under it returns 404 today. API authentication will use API keys
+passed via `Authorization: Bearer <key>` header; no Bearer middleware
+is implemented either.
 
 ### Package Layout
 
@@ -1047,16 +1120,30 @@ webhooker/
 │   │   ├── model_delivery_result.go  # DeliveryResult entity (per-webhook DB)
 │   │   ├── model_apikey.go    # APIKey entity
 │   │   ├── password.go        # Argon2id hashing and verification
+│   │   ├── retention.go       # Retention reaper (per-webhook event expiry)
+│   │   ├── testing.go         # NewTestDatabase: wrapper for tests, no fx lifecycle
 │   │   └── webhook_db_manager.go  # Per-webhook DB lifecycle manager
 │   ├── globals/
 │   │   └── globals.go         # Build-time variables (appname, version, arch)
 │   ├── delivery/
 │   │   ├── engine.go          # Event-driven delivery engine (channel + timer based)
-│   │   ├── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for HTTP targets with retries
+│   │   ├── circuit_breaker.go # Per-target circuit breaker for http/slack targets with retries
+│   │   ├── target.go          # Target interface, Task, Scheduler
+│   │   ├── target_http.go     # HTTP target (retries, circuit breaker)
+│   │   ├── target_slack.go    # Slack/Mattermost incoming-webhook target
+│   │   ├── target_database.go # Database archive target
+│   │   ├── target_database_archive.go  # Archive file lifecycle and pruning
+│   │   ├── target_log.go      # Log target (stdout)
+│   │   ├── target_config_view.go  # Masked target config for templates
+│   │   ├── archive_sweeper.go # Periodic pruning of idle archives
+│   │   ├── url_mask.go        # Strips credentials from *url.Error
 │   │   └── ssrf.go            # SSRF prevention (IP validation, safe HTTP transport)
+│   ├── lifecycle/
+│   │   └── lifecycle.go       # Shared fx start/stop hook helpers
 │   ├── handlers/
 │   │   ├── handlers.go        # Base handler struct, JSON helpers, template rendering
 │   │   ├── auth.go            # Login, logout handlers
+│   │   ├── event_log_view.go  # Event log projection, byte-capped in SQL
 │   │   ├── healthcheck.go     # Health check handler
 │   │   ├── index.go           # Index page handler
 │   │   ├── profile.go         # User profile handler
@@ -1069,20 +1156,27 @@ webhooker/
 │   ├── middleware/
 │   │   ├── middleware.go      # Logging, CORS, Auth, Metrics, MetricsAuth, SecurityHeaders, MaxBodySize
 │   │   ├── csrf.go            # CSRF protection middleware (gorilla/csrf)
-│   │   └── ratelimit.go       # Per-IP rate limiting middleware (go-chi/httprate)
+│   │   ├── ratelimit.go       # Per-IP rate limiting middleware (go-chi/httprate)
+│   │   └── testing.go         # NewForTest: Middleware without the fx lifecycle
 │   ├── server/
 │   │   ├── server.go          # Server struct, fx lifecycle, signal handling
 │   │   ├── http.go            # HTTP server setup with timeouts
 │   │   └── routes.go          # All route definitions
 │   └── session/
-│       └── session.go         # Cookie-based session management
+│       ├── session.go         # Cookie-based session management
+│       └── testing.go         # NewForTest: Session without the fx lifecycle
 ├── static/
 │   ├── static.go              # //go:embed directive
-│   ├── css/style.css          # Custom stylesheet (system font stack, card effects, layout)
+│   ├── css/input.css          # Tailwind input, source for tailwind.css (make css)
-│   └── js/app.js              # Client-side JavaScript (minimal bootstrap)
+│   ├── css/tailwind.css       # Generated stylesheet the pages load
-├── templates/                 # Go HTML templates (base, index, login, etc.)
+│   ├── css/style.css          # Older hand-written stylesheet, no longer loaded
-├── Dockerfile                 # Multi-stage: lint, build+test, then Alpine runtime
+│   ├── js/app.js              # Progressive-enhancement copy-to-clipboard
-├── Makefile                   # fmt, lint, test, check, build, docker targets
+│   ├── js/alpine.min.js       # Alpine.js, fetched by script/fetch-assets, not committed
+│   └── vendor.sha256          # Pinned hashes the fetched assets are verified against
+├── templates/                 # Go HTML templates (base, login, sources, etc.)
+├── script/                    # Scripts to Rule Them All entrypoints
+├── Dockerfile                 # Three stages: lint, test+build, Alpine runtime
+├── Makefile                   # 10 of 16 targets shim script/; 6 are inline
 ├── go.mod / go.sum
 └── .golangci.yml              # Linter configuration
 ```
@@ -1098,21 +1192,27 @@ Components are wired via Uber fx in this order:
    user seed
 5. `database.NewWebhookDBManager` — Per-webhook event database
    lifecycle manager
-6. `healthcheck.New` — Health check service
+6. `database.NewRetentionReaper` — Per-webhook event retention sweep
-7. `session.New` — Cookie-based session manager (key from database)
+7. `healthcheck.New` — Health check service
-8. `handlers.New` — HTTP handlers
+8. `session.New` — Cookie-based session manager (key from database)
-9. `middleware.New` — HTTP middleware
+9. `handlers.New` — HTTP handlers
-10. `delivery.New` — Event-driven delivery engine
+10. `middleware.New` — HTTP middleware
-11. `delivery.Engine` → `handlers.DeliveryNotifier` — interface bridge
+11. `delivery.New` — Event-driven delivery engine
-12. `server.New` — HTTP server and router
+12. `delivery.NewArchiveSweeper` — Periodic pruning of idle archives
+13. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.Notifier` — interface bridge
+14. `delivery.Engine` → `delivery.WebhookEvictor` — interface bridge so
+    deleting a webhook releases its archive writer
+15. `server.New` — HTTP server and router
 
-The server starts via `fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server, *delivery.Engine)
+The server starts via `fx.Invoke(func(*server.Server, *delivery.Engine,
-{})` which triggers the fx lifecycle hooks in dependency order. The
+*database.RetentionReaper, *delivery.ArchiveSweeper) {})`, which
-`DeliveryNotifier` interface allows the webhook handler to send
+triggers the fx lifecycle hooks in dependency order. The
-self-contained `DeliveryTask` slices to the engine without a direct
+`delivery.Notifier` interface allows the webhook handler to send
+self-contained `delivery.Task` slices to the engine without a direct
 package dependency. Each task carries all target config and event data
-inline (for bodies ≤16KB), so the engine can deliver without reading
+inline (for bodies under 16 KiB, `delivery.MaxInlineBodySize`), so the
-from any database — it only writes to record results.
+engine can deliver without reading from any database — it only writes
+to record results.
 
 ### Middleware Stack
 
@@ -1138,16 +1238,32 @@ CSRF middleware in every one of those route groups, because
 gorilla/csrf parses the form; if the cap were installed after it, form
 parsing would run under net/http's 10 MB default and the 1 MB limit
 would never apply. A request that declares a `Content-Length` over the
-limit is answered with `413 Request Entity Too Large` before any other
+limit is answered with `413 Request Entity Too Large` without its body
-middleware or handler runs; a chunked request, or one that lies about
+being read and without reaching CSRF, the route group's remaining
-its length, is hard-capped by `http.MaxBytesReader` and fails
+middleware, or the handler. It is not rejected before *any* other
-downstream at form-parse time.
+middleware, though: the global entries listed above all run first, so
+such a request is still logged and given the security headers — and
+counted in the metrics, on a deployment where `METRICS_USERNAME` is
+set and the Metrics middleware is therefore registered at all. The
+rejection itself is logged at `WARN` with the method, path and
+declared length. A chunked request, or
+one that lies about its length, is hard-capped by
+`http.MaxBytesReader` and fails downstream at form-parse time.
+
+Those same four route groups then apply **CSRF** and **NoCache**
+(`Cache-Control: no-store`, `Pragma: no-cache`), and every group except
+`/pages` applies **RequireAuth**. The rate limiters are per-route
+rather than global: **LoginRateLimit** on `/pages/login`,
+**PasswordChangeRateLimit** on `/user/{username}/password`, and
+**ReceiverRateLimit** on `/webhook/{uuid}`.
 
 ### Authentication
 
 - **Web UI:** Cookie-based sessions using gorilla/sessions with
   encrypted cookies. Sessions are configured with HttpOnly, SameSite
-  Lax, and Secure (in production). Session lifetime is 7 days.
+  Lax, and Secure (in production). Absolute session lifetime is 7 days,
+  with a sliding idle timeout on top of it (see
+  [Sessions](#sessions)).
 - **API (planned):** API key authentication via `Authorization: Bearer`
   header. API keys are stored per-user with usage tracking
   (`last_used_at`).
@@ -1179,33 +1295,53 @@ downstream at form-parse time.
   IPs before connecting, preventing DNS rebinding attacks)
 - **Login rate limiting** via [go-chi/httprate](https://github.com/go-chi/httprate):
   sliding-window rate limiter on the login endpoint, 5 POST attempts
-  per minute per bucket, to slow brute-force attacks. The bucket is per
+  per minute per bucket, to slow brute-force attacks. GET requests to
-  client IP only when `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy;
+  the login page are not limited. The password-change endpoint carries
-  unset, every client shares one bucket and the login becomes remotely
+  the same 5-per-minute limit. The bucket is per client IP only when
-  deniable (see [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting))
+  `TRUSTED_PROXIES` names the reverse proxy; unset, every client
+  shares one bucket and the login becomes remotely deniable (see
+  [Rate Limiting](#rate-limiting)). webhooker warns at startup
+  whenever `TRUSTED_PROXIES` is empty
 - Prometheus metrics behind basic auth
 - Static assets embedded in binary (no filesystem access needed at
   runtime)
 - Container runs as non-root user (UID 1000)
-- GORM soft deletes on all entities (data preserved for audit)
+- GORM soft deletes on every entity that carries `BaseModel`, which is
+  all of them but `Setting` (data preserved for audit)
 
 ### Docker
 
-The Dockerfile uses a multi-stage build:
+The Dockerfile uses a three-stage build. Each stage is pinned by
+digest, and the two check stages are separate images so the linter's
+version is fixed independently of the compiler's:
 
-1. **Builder stage** (Debian-based `golang:1.24`) — installs
+1. **Lint stage** (`golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2`, Debian-based) —
-   golangci-lint, downloads dependencies, copies source, runs `make
+   installs `make`, downloads dependencies, copies the source, and runs
-   check` (format verification, linting, tests, compilation).
+   `make fmt-check` then `make lint`.
-2. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the binary, creates the
+2. **Builder stage** (`golang:1.26.1-bookworm`) — depends on the lint
-   `/var/lib/webhooker` directory for all SQLite databases, runs as
+   stage passing (it copies a file from it), runs `script/fetch-assets`
-   non-root user, exposes port 8080, includes a health check.
+   to download and verify the third-party browser assets, then runs
+   `make test` and `make build`, and finally rebuilds the binary with
+   `CGO_ENABLED=1` and static linking so it runs on musl.
+3. **Runtime stage** (`alpine:3.21`) — copies the static binary,
+   creates the `/var/lib/webhooker` directory for all SQLite databases,
+   runs as the non-root `webhooker` user (UID 1000), exposes port 8080,
+   and includes a health check against `/.well-known/healthcheck`.
 
-The builder uses Debian rather than Alpine because GORM's SQLite
+Both check stages use Debian rather than Alpine because
-dialect pulls in CGO-dependent headers at compile time. The runtime
+`gorm.io/driver/sqlite` pulls in `mattn/go-sqlite3`, which needs CGO
-binary is statically linked and runs on Alpine.
+and does not compile against musl. Only the final binary is statically
+linked, which is what lets it run on the Alpine runtime image.
 
-`docker build .` is the CI gate — if it passes, the code is formatted,
+`script/cibuild` — `docker build .` — is the CI gate: the four check
-linted, tested, and compiled.
+targets run inside the image, so a build that succeeds is a repo that
+is formatted, linted, tested and compiled. Only `script/cibuild` and
+`script/docker` involve Docker. `script/lint`, and therefore
+`make lint` and `make check`, run whatever `golangci-lint` is on the
+host, which can be a different version from the pinned one — so the
+container is the authoritative lint result
+([issue #109](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/webhooker/issues/109) tracks
+routing local linting through it as well).
 
 #### CI gate honesty
 
@@ -1221,16 +1357,17 @@ the hash of the last commit that touched the build context, so:
   `make fmt-check`, `make lint`, `make test`, and `make build`. A run
   that reports success ran them.
 - A docs-only commit leaves the fingerprint unchanged — `.dockerignore`
-  excludes `*.md` and `LICENSE` from the context anyway — so the image
+  excludes `*.md`, `LICENSE` and `.editorconfig` from the context
-  replays from cache and costs seconds.
+  anyway — so the image replays from cache and costs seconds.
 
 The module download layer sits above `COPY . .` and stays cached either
 way.
 
-The workflow's first step covers a second way the gate lied: Gitea
+A separate workflow step, run before the fingerprint is written, covers
-cancels an in-flight run when a newer commit lands on the same branch
+a second way the gate lied: Gitea cancels an in-flight run when a newer
-and records that cancellation as a `failure` status, marking a commit
+commit lands on the same branch and records that cancellation as a
-red that was never tested. Cancellation is unconditional server-side for
+`failure` status, marking a commit red that was never tested.
+Cancellation is unconditional server-side for
 push events, so the superseding run rewrites the exact
 `Has been cancelled` status to `skipped`. Genuine failures are never
 touched.

TODO.md

@@ -25,13 +25,17 @@ password change flow (#65), policy compliance (#6), pinned lint tooling
 (#55), and fail-loud configuration parsing (#80).
 
 `next` holds the completed 1.0.0 milestone: every issue in it is closed,
-and it is verified green both by CI and by cache-defeated container
+and it is verified green by cache-defeated container runs
-runs. The two were only made to mean the same thing this cycle — before
+(`docker build --no-cache-filter=lint --no-cache-filter=builder`). The
-#119, a warm layer cache let the gate report success without executing
+CI status is not independently claimed here: a superseded run is
-anything, and replayed the previous build's console log so the lie
+recorded as `skipped` and still rolls up green, so a commit status on
-looked like a real run. Note: TODO.md was deliberately deleted from this
+`next` does not by itself evidence an executed check (#152). Before
-repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was folded into the README
+#119, a warm layer cache also let the gate report success without
-TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as of 2026-07-06.
+executing anything, and replayed the previous build's console log so
+the lie looked like a real run. Note: `TODO.md` was deliberately
+deleted from this repo in f9a9569 (2026-03-01, #6); its content was
+folded into the README TODO section, which this draft reconstructs as
+of 2026-07-06.
 
 # Next Step
 
@@ -190,7 +194,9 @@ rate-limit keys should bucket by `/64`).
     - OpenAPI specification
 - Analytics dashboard: success rates, response times, volume
 - A remember-me option at login
-- Password change and reset flow
+- Password reset flow for a forgotten password. The authenticated
+  password *change* flow already landed on `main` (#65); reset does not
+  exist
 - Later, nice to have
     - email delivery target type
     - SNS and S3 delivery targets

internal/config/config.go

@@ -422,33 +422,43 @@ func loadFromEnv() (*Config, error) {
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning when a production
+// warnSharedRateLimitBucket logs a startup warning whenever
-// deployment leaves TRUSTED_PROXIES empty.
+// TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any environment.
 //
 // With no trusted proxies every rate limiter keys on the connecting
-// peer's address. A production deployment is required to run behind a
+// peer's address. Whether that is harmless or dangerous depends on
-// TLS-terminating reverse proxy, and the peer is then that proxy for
+// what is in front of the process, which this code cannot observe:
-// every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter. The
+// with nothing in front, the peer is the client and the limits are
+// per-client as intended; behind a reverse proxy the peer is the proxy
+// for every request, so all clients share one bucket per limiter. The
 // login limiter's bucket is the dangerous one: any remote client can
-// keep it full, which denies the only administrative login to
+// keep it full, which denies the only administrative login to everyone
-// everyone until the process restarts.
+// until the process restarts.
+//
+// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
+// variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
+// for exactly the operator who forgot to configure the deployment —
+// the case it exists to catch.
 //
 // The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
 // headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
 // so this warns rather than failing startup or changing the key.
 func (c *Config) warnSharedRateLimitBucket(log *slog.Logger) {
-	if !c.IsProd() || len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
+	if len(c.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
 		return
 	}
 
 	log.Warn(
-		"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: rate limits key on the "+
+		"TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty: every rate limit keys on the "+
-			"connecting peer, so behind the reverse proxy a "+
+			"connecting peer's address. With nothing proxying to "+
-			"production deployment runs behind, every client "+
+			"this process that is the client itself and the limits "+
-			"shares one bucket per limit. Any remote client can "+
+			"are per-client as intended. Behind a reverse proxy the "+
-			"then keep the login limit full and deny the admin "+
+			"peer is the proxy on every request, so all clients "+
-			"login, the only administrative path, until restart. "+
+			"share one bucket per limit and any remote client can "+
-			"Set TRUSTED_PROXIES to your reverse proxy's address.",
+			"keep the login limit full, denying the admin login — "+
+			"the only administrative path — until restart. If "+
+			"anything proxies to this process, set TRUSTED_PROXIES "+
+			"to its address.",
 		"environment", c.Environment,
 		"trustedProxies", len(c.TrustedProxies),
 	)
@@ -491,6 +501,10 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params ConfigParams) (*Config, error) {
 		"maintenanceMode", s.MaintenanceMode,
 		"dataDir", s.DataDir,
 		"retentionSweepInterval", s.RetentionSweepInterval.String(),
+		// Logged because a perfectly valid non-positive value here
+		// disables idle expiry entirely, and that is worth showing
+		// back to the operator.
+		"sessionIdleTimeout", s.SessionIdleTimeout.String(),
 		"receiverRateLimit", s.ReceiverRateLimit,
 		"trustedProxies", len(s.TrustedProxies),
 		"hasSentryDSN", s.SentryDSN != "",

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -628,10 +628,12 @@ func testTrustedProxiesSuccess(
 }
 
 // TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning covers the startup warning that
-// tells an operator their production deployment shares one rate-limit
+// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
-// bucket between every client, which makes the admin login remotely
+// rate-limit bucket between every client, which makes the admin login
-// deniable. It must fire when TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty in production
+// remotely deniable. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
-// and stay quiet otherwise.
+// in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
+// on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
+// configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
 func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name           string
@@ -651,11 +653,18 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 			expectWarning:  false,
 		},
 		{
-			// Development is not required to run behind a
+			// The default environment. An internet-exposed
-			// reverse proxy, so the shared bucket the warning
+			// deployment whose operator never set
-			// describes is not the expected shape there.
+			// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT lands here and has exactly
-			name:          "dev without trusted proxies is quiet",
+			// the exposure the warning announces.
+			name:          "dev without trusted proxies warns",
 			environment:   config.EnvironmentDev,
+			expectWarning: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:           "dev with trusted proxies is quiet",
+			environment:    config.EnvironmentDev,
+			trustedProxies: cidrPrivateV4,
 			expectWarning:  false,
 		},
 	}
@@ -697,8 +706,14 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
 
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, `"level":"WARN"`)
 			assert.Contains(t, logged, "TRUSTED_PROXIES")
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "shares one bucket")
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "share one bucket")
-			assert.Contains(t, logged, "deny the admin login")
+			assert.Contains(t, logged, "denying the admin login")
+			// The text must stay accurate for a developer with
+			// nothing in front of the process, where an empty
+			// list costs nothing.
+			assert.Contains(
+				t, logged, "nothing proxying to this process",
+			)
 		})
 	}
 }

internal/server/routes_test.go

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/server"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/session"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/static"
 )
 
 // csrfCookieName is the cookie gorilla/csrf issues when it runs. Its
@@ -246,6 +247,56 @@ func (e *testEnv) storedHash(t *testing.T, username string) string {
 	return user.Password
 }
 
+// --- /s static group ---
+
+// TestStaticServesEveryMethod pins what the static mount actually
+// answers. chi's Mount registers the handler for all methods and
+// http.FileServer only special-cases HEAD (by suppressing the body),
+// so a POST or a DELETE to an asset is served the file rather than
+// refused. The README documents this; the test is what keeps the two
+// from drifting.
+func TestStaticServesEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newTestEnv(t)
+
+	body, err := static.Static.ReadFile("js/app.js")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, body)
+
+	for _, method := range []string{
+		http.MethodGet,
+		http.MethodHead,
+		http.MethodPost,
+		http.MethodPut,
+		http.MethodDelete,
+	} {
+		t.Run(method, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
+				context.Background(), method,
+				"/s/js/app.js", nil,
+			)
+			w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			env.router.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
+				"static mount answers every method")
+
+			if method == http.MethodHead {
+				assert.Empty(t, w.Body.Bytes(),
+					"HEAD must not carry a body")
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			assert.Equal(t, body, w.Body.Bytes(),
+				"the asset itself is returned")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // --- /pages group ---
 
 // TestPagesLogin_OversizeBody_RejectedBeforeCSRF proves the cap runs