Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint (closes #64)
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The receiver was the one unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no
rate limit, so a misbehaving or hostile sender could flood a webhook
without bound. RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT (default 120/min) now caps it, keyed on
client IP plus entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's
budget. Over-limit requests get 429 with Retry-After.

The limiter deliberately does not reuse postRateLimit: that helper is
POST-only and keys on IP alone, whereas the receiver must count every
method. A test locks that property in.

Config parsing follows the fail-loudly idiom: a set-but-unparseable or
non-positive value aborts startup rather than falling back to the default.

Known limitation, tracked in #88: the key still trusts forwarded headers
unconditionally, so the limit is evadable by rotating X-Forwarded-For until
trusted-proxy gating lands.
This commit was merged in pull request #87.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-11 14:47:21 +02:00
parent d51cd0fd29
commit 84b758b785
6 changed files with 316 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ const (
// passwordChangeRateInterval is the time window for the
// password change rate limit.
passwordChangeRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
// receiverRateInterval is the time window for the webhook
// receiver rate limit. The configured limit is expressed in
// requests per minute.
receiverRateInterval = 1 * time.Minute
)
// LoginRateLimit returns middleware that enforces per-IP rate
@@ -105,3 +110,37 @@ func (m *Middleware) postRateLimit(
})
}
}
// ReceiverRateLimit returns middleware that rate-limits the
// public webhook receiver endpoint per client IP per request
// path (the path contains the entrypoint UUID, so each sender
// is limited per entrypoint without affecting other senders or
// other entrypoints). The limit is Config.ReceiverRateLimit
// requests per minute. Requests over the limit receive a 429;
// httprate adds the Retry-After header (RFC 6585). IP
// extraction honours X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and
// True-Client-IP headers for reverse-proxy setups.
func (m *Middleware) ReceiverRateLimit() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return httprate.Limit(
m.params.Config.ReceiverRateLimit,
receiverRateInterval,
httprate.WithKeyFuncs(
httprate.KeyByRealIP,
httprate.KeyByEndpoint,
),
httprate.WithLimitHandler(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
m.log.Warn(
"webhook receiver rate limit exceeded",
"path", r.URL.Path,
)
http.Error(
w,
"Too many requests. "+
"Please slow down.",
http.StatusTooManyRequests,
)
},
)),
)
}

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,10 @@ package middleware_test
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -179,3 +181,133 @@ func TestLoginRateLimit_IndependentPerIP(t *testing.T) {
"different IP should not be affected",
)
}
// receiverLimitedHandler builds a ReceiverRateLimit-wrapped
// handler with the given per-minute limit.
func receiverLimitedHandler(
t *testing.T, limit int,
) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
log := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(
os.Stderr,
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
))
m := middleware.NewForTest(
log,
&config.Config{ReceiverRateLimit: limit},
nil,
)
return m.ReceiverRateLimit()(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
},
))
}
// receiverPost sends one POST to the handler from the given IP
// and path and returns the recorder.
func receiverPost(
handler http.Handler, ip, path string,
) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(),
http.MethodPost, path, nil,
)
req.RemoteAddr = ip
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const limit = 3
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
// The first limit requests from one IP to one entrypoint
// pass.
for i := range limit {
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"request %d should pass", i,
)
}
// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
// carrying a Retry-After header.
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
assert.NotEmpty(
t, w.Header().Get("Retry-After"),
"429 must carry a Retry-After header",
)
// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a different entrypoint must not be affected",
)
// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a different client IP must not be affected",
)
}
// TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod proves the receiver
// limit counts non-POST requests too: a GET shares the bucket
// with a POST and is itself rejected once over the limit.
func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
limit = 2
ip = "7.7.7.7:1234"
path = "/webhook/uuid-c"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
get := func() *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(
context.Background(), http.MethodGet, path, nil,
)
req.RemoteAddr = ip
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
return w
}
// One POST plus one GET fill the bucket, so the GET must
// have been counted.
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, receiverPost(handler, ip, path).Code,
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, get().Code)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, get().Code,
"a GET over the limit must be rate-limited",
)
}