feat: add CSRF protection, SSRF prevention, and login rate limiting
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Security hardening implementing three issues: CSRF Protection (#35): - Session-based CSRF tokens with cryptographically random generation - Constant-time token comparison to prevent timing attacks - CSRF middleware applied to /pages, /sources, /source, and /user routes - Hidden csrf_token field added to all 12+ POST forms in templates - Excluded from /webhook (inbound) and /api (stateless) routes SSRF Prevention (#36): - ValidateTargetURL blocks private/reserved IP ranges at target creation - Blocked ranges: 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, plus multicast, reserved, test-net, and CGN ranges - SSRF-safe HTTP transport with custom DialContext for defense-in-depth at delivery time (prevents DNS rebinding attacks) - Only http/https schemes allowed Login Rate Limiting (#37): - Per-IP rate limiter using golang.org/x/time/rate - 5 attempts per minute per IP on POST /pages/login - GET requests (form rendering) pass through unaffected - Automatic cleanup of stale per-IP limiter entries - X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP header support for reverse proxies Closes #35, closes #36, closes #37
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@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ func New(lc fx.Lifecycle, params EngineParams) *Engine {
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dbManager: params.DBManager,
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log: params.Logger.Get(),
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client: &http.Client{
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Timeout: httpClientTimeout,
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Timeout: httpClientTimeout,
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Transport: NewSSRFSafeTransport(),
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},
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deliveryCh: make(chan DeliveryTask, deliveryChannelSize),
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retryCh: make(chan DeliveryTask, retryChannelSize),
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