Decide request TLS in one place, per request (closes #269)

Two places decided whether a request was TLS, by two different means,
and they disagreed.

The session cookie's Secure attribute was fixed at startup from
!Config.IsDev(). "dev" is the environment when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is
unset, so a deployment terminating TLS at a proxy without also setting
the environment shipped the authentication cookie with no Secure
attribute -- on the same response as a CSRF cookie that had one. It
failed silently: everything kept working, so nothing prompted anyone to
look.

The CSRF middleware's per-request check compared X-Forwarded-Proto with
== "https" exactly, so "HTTPS", "https, http" and "https,https" all took
the plaintext path. Uppercase is legal for a case-insensitive token and
the comma forms are what a proxy chained behind another proxy emits by
appending rather than replacing. On that path gorilla/csrf stops
enforcing the strict Referer check on a site that genuinely is HTTPS.

Both now go through internal/reqtls.IsTLS, which folds case and takes
the leftmost comma-separated element -- the hop nearest the client, and
so the one a cookie's Secure attribute is about. A third package is
needed because internal/middleware already imports internal/session, so
session cannot import middleware back.

Per-request beat a startup warning for the session cookie because it
turned out to need no restructuring: gorilla/sessions gives every
session its own copy of the store's Options and renders the cookie from
that copy, and every session-cookie write here already goes through
Session.Save or Session.Regenerate, both of which hold the request. The
store's template Secure becomes true so that a write path added later
which forgets to track the transport fails visibly instead of silently
dropping Secure.

The flag tracks the transport in both directions rather than latching
on. Secure over plaintext is discarded by the browser without an error,
which would make a plain-HTTP local run impossible to log into -- and
would also void the deletion cookies in Destroy and Regenerate, leaving
a session the user just tried to end still live.

A third site that makes this decision, internal/handlers'
BaseURL construction, assigns the raw header straight into the URL
scheme. It is left alone here and filed separately.

internal/server/sentry.go

@@ -147,10 +147,13 @@ func sentryRoutePattern(hint *sentry.EventHint) string {
 //
 // The scheme is load-bearing and is kept: the SDK derives it from
 // r.TLS != nil || r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") == "https"
-// (interfaces.go:180), byte for byte the predicate
-// internal/middleware/csrf.go uses, so it is the CSRF TLS decision and
-// the reason dropping X-Forwarded-Proto from the header allowlist
-// costs nothing. The host is parsed.Host of the SDK's
+// (interfaces.go:180), which is the reason dropping X-Forwarded-Proto
+// from the header allowlist costs nothing. That predicate is the SDK's
+// own and is stricter than reqtls.IsTLS, which this service now uses
+// everywhere it decides transport: the SDK reports "http" for the
+// "HTTPS" and "https, http" spellings reqtls accepts. Only a reported
+// scheme is affected, no decision is, so it is left to the SDK rather
+// than reimplemented. The host is parsed.Host of the SDK's
 // scheme://r.Host/path, so it is whatever the client's Host header
 // carried: this service validates no hostname. It is kept because that
 // same header is on the allowlist, so scrubbing it here would withhold