Add an egress CIDR allowlist to the SSRF guard (closes #204)
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The SSRF blocklist had no escape hatch, so the thing webhooker is
mostly for — taking a public webhook and forwarding it to something
on your own network — could not be configured at all. Every private
address, Docker sibling and loopback service was permanently
unreachable as a delivery destination.

ALLOWED_EGRESS_CIDRS (default empty) names blocks that delivery
targets may reach despite the default blocklist. It is an allowlist
and only ever adds destinations: there is no boolean, and no value
disables SSRF protection wholesale. Empty, the guard behaves exactly
as before.

Link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) is refused before the
allowlist is consulted, so no supplied CIDR can open it — not the
exact address, not a supernet, not 0.0.0.0/0. Reaching cloud
instance metadata is credential theft rather than delivery to an
internal service.

The policy now lives in one function, Guard.checkIP, which both
target-creation validation and the delivery dialer call. The two
paths previously decided separately, which is how they came to
disagree about a destination. The guard is built once from config
and injected via fx into both the handlers and the delivery engine,
so there is a single instance and a single answer.

A set-but-unparseable value aborts startup naming the variable,
reusing the existing envPrefixList parser. A non-empty list is
logged at startup with the blocks spelled out, not counted, so the
hole is visible in the log of any deployment that has one.

Tests: an allowlisted loopback CIDR both validates and delivers to a
live server (and the same URL still fails without the allowlist); a
private address outside the listed block stays refused on both
paths; metadata stays refused under six different covering CIDRs;
public addresses are unaffected either way; and config coverage for
parsing, startup abort, and the warning's contents.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-20 04:13:06 +00:00
parent 10c8dd2331
commit 71a3c3cf75
16 changed files with 886 additions and 61 deletions

View File

@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ func TestIsBlockedIP_PrivateRanges(t *testing.T) {
{"192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1", true},
{"192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255", true},
{"169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1", true},
{"169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254", true},
{metadataIP, metadataIP, true},
{"8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8", false},
{"1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1", false},
{"93.184.216.34", "93.184.216.34", false},
{publicIP, publicIP, false},
{"::1", "::1", true},
{"fd00::1", "fd00::1", true},
{"fc00::1", "fc00::1", true},
@@ -72,12 +72,12 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
blockedURLs := []string{
"http://127.0.0.1/hook",
loopbackHookURL,
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/hook",
"https://10.0.0.1/hook",
"http://192.168.1.1/webhook",
"http://172.16.0.1/api",
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
metadataURL,
"http://[::1]/hook",
"http://[fc00::1]/hook",
"http://[fe80::1]/hook",
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Blocked(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), u,
)
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(u, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), u,
)
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "ftp://example.com/hook",
)
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidScheme(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "http:///path",
)
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ func TestValidateTargetURL_EmptyHost(t *testing.T) {
func TestValidateTargetURL_InvalidURL(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
err := delivery.ValidateTargetURL(
err := delivery.NewTestGuard().ValidateTargetURL(
context.Background(), "://invalid",
)