Harden operator-set target headers (closes #233) (#242)
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This commit was merged in pull request #242.
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2026-08-20 10:54:43 +02:00
parent 03cd1859d7
commit 687405993e
9 changed files with 746 additions and 62 deletions

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@@ -1160,6 +1160,53 @@ events should be forwarded.
The `config` field stores type-specific configuration as JSON (e.g.,
destination URL, custom headers, timeout settings).
**`http` target configuration:**
| Key | Type | Description |
| --------- | ------------- | ----------- |
| `url` | string | Destination the event is POSTed to |
| `headers` | object | Extra request headers, applied last so they win over the event's own forwarded headers |
| `timeout` | integer (sec) | Per-target request timeout; unset (or 0) uses the shared 30-second client timeout |
`timeout` is capped at **300 seconds**, and the form rejects anything
above it rather than substituting the cap. A delivery attempt holds one
of the bounded pool's workers for its whole duration, so an unbounded
timeout would let a single unresponsive destination stall the queue.
`headers` rejects the names the delivery path or `net/http` writes
regardless of what is configured: `Host`, `Content-Length`,
`Transfer-Encoding`, `Connection`, `Trailer` and `User-Agent`. These are
refused at the form rather than accepted and ignored, because a stored
header that provably never reaches the wire tells the operator their
configuration took effect when it did not. `Content-Type` is _not_
reserved: a configured one deliberately overrides the event's.
**Redirects.** A redirect from an `http` target's destination is
followed, up to ten hops, and the delivery's recorded status and body
come from the final hop. One rule governs every header the delivery
carries for someone else — the configured `headers` and the inbound
event headers forwarded from the sender alike: **a hop that leaves the
origin the target names carries none of them.** Leaving the origin
means a different host, a different port, or a step down from `https`
to `http`. Both classes routinely carry a secret — a configured
`X-Api-Key` or `PRIVATE-TOKEN`, an inbound `X-Hub-Signature` — and an
open redirect at the destination would otherwise hand it to a host the
operator never chose. `net/http` already does this for `Authorization`
and `Cookie`. The delivery path's own headers (`Content-Type`,
`User-Agent`) are not origin-scoped and always travel, so a body
preserved across a `307` is still typed. A `301`, `302` or `303` is a
different matter, and this is `net/http`'s behaviour rather than
webhooker's: the POST becomes a GET and the event body and its
`Content-Type` are dropped, so the destination the chain ends at
receives no event at all — and the delivery is still recorded
`Delivered` on that hop's `2xx`. Redirects within the target's own
origin keep everything, so a destination that redirects its own paths
is unaffected; the drop is per hop rather than permanent, so a chain
that returns to the configured origin carries the headers again,
exactly as `net/http` treats `Authorization`. Each hop is dialled
through the same SSRF guard as the first, so a redirect aimed at a
private or reserved address is refused at connect time.
#### APIKey
A programmatic access credential for API authentication.