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Replaces #559, which conflicted.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-25 01:55:36 +00:00
parent 1647b43aa6
commit 537374e4cc
311 changed files with 35614 additions and 14120 deletions
+41 -22
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware/middlewaretest"
)
func TestPostRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ func rateLimitMiddleware(
&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
))
return middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil)
return middlewaretest.New(t, log, cfg, nil)
}
// trustedProxies parses CIDR strings for a test Config.
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// pass.
for i := range limit {
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
// carrying a Retry-After header.
w := receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
assert.NotEmpty(
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-b",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -305,7 +306,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
w = receiverPost(
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
const (
limit = 2
ip = "7.7.7.7:1234"
path = "/webhook/uuid-c"
path = "/h/uuid-c"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
@@ -384,8 +385,8 @@ const (
// trustedProxyCIDR is the proxy network the forwarded-path
// tests configure, and trustedPeer an address inside it. A
// production deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so this is the shape the
// bucketing has to hold in.
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by
// a set value, so this is the shape the bucketing has to hold in.
trustedProxyCIDR = "10.0.0.0/8"
trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
)
@@ -426,8 +427,8 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
}
// TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer is the test
// this gating exists for: with no trusted proxies configured (the
// default), a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// this gating exists for: from a peer that is not a trusted
// proxy, a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
// request must stay in one bucket. If forwarded headers were
// trusted unconditionally, each spoofed value would mint a fresh
// bucket and the limit would stop no one.
@@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
// none of them shares a per-entrypoint bucket with another.
for i := range aggregate {
w := receiverPost(
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", i),
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", i),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
@@ -724,17 +725,17 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
}
w := receiverPost(
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", aggregate),
handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", aggregate),
)
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"a client must not be able to raise its aggregate rate "+
"against /webhook/* by varying the path",
"against /h/* by varying the path",
)
// The aggregate limit is still per client IP: exhausting one
// address must not throttle another.
w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/webhook/invented-0")
w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/h/invented-0")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
"a different client IP must not be affected",
@@ -771,7 +772,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
// limit requests are served; the rest are rejected by the
// per-entrypoint limiter but still count against the aggregate.
for i := range aggregate {
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/exhausted")
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/exhausted")
want := http.StatusTooManyRequests
if i < limit {
@@ -784,7 +785,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
)
}
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/never-used")
w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/never-used")
assert.Equal(
t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
"requests rejected per entrypoint must still count "+
@@ -823,7 +824,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
const (
limit = 3
peer = "203.0.113.10:44444"
path = "/webhook/uuid-d"
path = "/h/uuid-d"
)
handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
@@ -1012,6 +1013,23 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_UnparseablePeerKeepsDistinctBuckets(
)
}
// TestRateLimitKey_EmptyPeerSharesOneBucket pins what the fallback
// does with an empty RemoteAddr: it keys on the empty string, so every
// such request shares one bucket. That is the fail-closed direction
// and is kept on purpose; only a hand-built request carries an empty
// RemoteAddr.
func TestRateLimitKey_EmptyPeerSharesOneBucket(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
assert.Empty(
t, clientKeyFor(t, m, ""),
"every peer with an empty RemoteAddr must key on the "+
"empty string and so share one bucket",
)
}
// TestPostRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the behavioural
// half, and the regression test for the bypass itself: a client that
// rotates source addresses inside its own routed /64 must stay in one
@@ -1097,8 +1115,9 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
// that arrives from trustedPeer — a configured trusted proxy — and
// names forwarded as its client in X-Forwarded-For. That is the
// production path: a deployment is required to run behind a reverse
// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so the forwarded address, not the
// peer, is what the limiters bucket on there.
// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by a
// set value, so the forwarded address, not the peer, is what the
// limiters bucket on there.
func forwardedKeyFor(
t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, forwarded string,
) string {
@@ -1178,9 +1197,9 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
//
// Every existing test of this fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
// bucketKey is the identity function, so replacing the call with
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only operator-listed
// addresses reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so this
// pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only addresses inside
// TRUSTED_PROXIES reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so
// this pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
func TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer(
t *testing.T,
) {