Replaces #559, which conflicted. Model: opus-5-5
This commit is contained in:
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/config"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware"
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"sneak.berlin/go/webhooker/internal/middleware/middlewaretest"
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)
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func TestPostRateLimit_AllowsGET(t *testing.T) {
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@@ -198,7 +199,7 @@ func rateLimitMiddleware(
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&slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug},
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))
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return middleware.NewForTest(log, cfg, nil)
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return middlewaretest.New(t, log, cfg, nil)
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}
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// trustedProxies parses CIDR strings for a test Config.
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@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
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// pass.
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for i := range limit {
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w := receiverPost(
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handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
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handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
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)
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
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@@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
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// The next request over the limit is rejected with a 429
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// carrying a Retry-After header.
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w := receiverPost(
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handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
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handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
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)
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assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code)
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assert.NotEmpty(
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@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
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// The same IP is not limited on a different entrypoint.
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w = receiverPost(
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handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/webhook/uuid-b",
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handler, "9.9.9.9:1234", "/h/uuid-b",
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)
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
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@@ -305,7 +306,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsPerIPAndPath(t *testing.T) {
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// A different IP is not limited on the same entrypoint.
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w = receiverPost(
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handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/webhook/uuid-a",
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handler, "8.8.8.8:1234", "/h/uuid-a",
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)
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
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@@ -322,7 +323,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_CountsEveryMethod(t *testing.T) {
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const (
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limit = 2
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ip = "7.7.7.7:1234"
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path = "/webhook/uuid-c"
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path = "/h/uuid-c"
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)
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handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
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@@ -384,8 +385,8 @@ const (
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// trustedProxyCIDR is the proxy network the forwarded-path
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// tests configure, and trustedPeer an address inside it. A
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// production deployment is required to run behind a reverse
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// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so this is the shape the
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// bucketing has to hold in.
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// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by
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// a set value, so this is the shape the bucketing has to hold in.
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trustedProxyCIDR = "10.0.0.0/8"
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trustedPeer = "10.0.0.1:44444"
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)
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@@ -426,8 +427,8 @@ func assertSharedBucket(
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}
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// TestRateLimitKey_SpoofedForwardedFromUntrustedPeer is the test
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// this gating exists for: with no trusted proxies configured (the
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// default), a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
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// this gating exists for: from a peer that is not a trusted
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// proxy, a client that rotates a forwarded header on every
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// request must stay in one bucket. If forwarded headers were
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// trusted unconditionally, each spoofed value would mint a fresh
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// bucket and the limit would stop no one.
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@@ -715,7 +716,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
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// none of them shares a per-entrypoint bucket with another.
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for i := range aggregate {
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w := receiverPost(
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handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", i),
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handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", i),
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)
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
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@@ -724,17 +725,17 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_LimitsAggregateAcrossInventedPaths(
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}
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w := receiverPost(
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handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/webhook/invented-%d", aggregate),
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handler, ip, fmt.Sprintf("/h/invented-%d", aggregate),
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)
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
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"a client must not be able to raise its aggregate rate "+
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"against /webhook/* by varying the path",
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"against /h/* by varying the path",
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)
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// The aggregate limit is still per client IP: exhausting one
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// address must not throttle another.
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w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/webhook/invented-0")
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w = receiverPost(handler, "6.6.6.7:1234", "/h/invented-0")
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusOK, w.Code,
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"a different client IP must not be affected",
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@@ -771,7 +772,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
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// limit requests are served; the rest are rejected by the
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// per-entrypoint limiter but still count against the aggregate.
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for i := range aggregate {
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w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/exhausted")
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w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/exhausted")
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want := http.StatusTooManyRequests
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if i < limit {
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@@ -784,7 +785,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_RejectedRequestsCountTowardAggregate(
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)
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}
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w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/webhook/never-used")
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w := receiverPost(handler, ip, "/h/never-used")
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assert.Equal(
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t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code,
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"requests rejected per entrypoint must still count "+
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@@ -823,7 +824,7 @@ func TestReceiverRateLimit_IgnoresForwardedFromUntrustedPeer(
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const (
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limit = 3
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peer = "203.0.113.10:44444"
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path = "/webhook/uuid-d"
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path = "/h/uuid-d"
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)
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handler := receiverLimitedHandler(t, limit)
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@@ -1012,6 +1013,23 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_UnparseablePeerKeepsDistinctBuckets(
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)
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}
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// TestRateLimitKey_EmptyPeerSharesOneBucket pins what the fallback
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// does with an empty RemoteAddr: it keys on the empty string, so every
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// such request shares one bucket. That is the fail-closed direction
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// and is kept on purpose; only a hand-built request carries an empty
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// RemoteAddr.
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func TestRateLimitKey_EmptyPeerSharesOneBucket(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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m := rateLimitMiddleware(t, &config.Config{})
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assert.Empty(
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t, clientKeyFor(t, m, ""),
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"every peer with an empty RemoteAddr must key on the "+
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"empty string and so share one bucket",
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)
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}
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// TestPostRateLimit_IPv6SharesBucketWithinSlash64 is the behavioural
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// half, and the regression test for the bypass itself: a client that
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// rotates source addresses inside its own routed /64 must stay in one
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@@ -1097,8 +1115,9 @@ func TestPostRateLimit_IPv4IndependentPerAddress(t *testing.T) {
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// that arrives from trustedPeer — a configured trusted proxy — and
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// names forwarded as its client in X-Forwarded-For. That is the
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// production path: a deployment is required to run behind a reverse
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// proxy with TRUSTED_PROXIES set, so the forwarded address, not the
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// peer, is what the limiters bucket on there.
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// proxy that TRUSTED_PROXIES covers, either by the default or by a
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// set value, so the forwarded address, not the peer, is what the
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// limiters bucket on there.
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func forwardedKeyFor(
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t *testing.T, m *middleware.Middleware, forwarded string,
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) string {
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@@ -1178,9 +1197,9 @@ func TestRateLimitKey_ForwardedIPv6BucketsByPrefix(t *testing.T) {
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//
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// Every existing test of this fallback uses an IPv4 proxy, where
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// bucketKey is the identity function, so replacing the call with
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// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only operator-listed
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// addresses reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so this
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// pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
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// peer.String() leaves the whole suite green. Only addresses inside
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// TRUSTED_PROXIES reach this line and the fallback is fail-closed, so
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// this pins behaviour rather than fixing a defect.
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func TestRateLimitKey_TrustedPeerUnusableForwardedMasksPeer(
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t *testing.T,
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) {
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