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Bound username length at creation (closes #184)
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Usernames are limited to 1024 bytes, so no account can exist that is unable to log in. The username rides in the session cookie, which browsers and securecookie refuse past about 4 KB, leaving room for roughly 2000 bytes of username; the limit is about half that.

User.BeforeSave returns ErrUsernameTooLong when a whole User is created or saved. A byte-counting check constraint on users.username catches every other write, including a column update. The limit appears in the constant and in the struct tag; a test fails if they disagree.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #338.
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clawbot
2026-10-01 21:38:48 +02:00
parent b79e4649a1
commit 507980a347
5 changed files with 154 additions and 16 deletions
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README.md
+9 -9
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@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ A registered user of the webhooker service.
| Field | Type | Description |
| ---------- | -------- | ----------- |
| `id` | UUID | Primary key |
| `username` | string | Unique login name |
| `username` | string | Unique login name, at most 1024 bytes so that it fits in the session cookie |
| `password` | string | Argon2id hash (never exposed via API) |
**Relations:** Has many Webhooks. Has many APIKeys.
@@ -2379,14 +2379,14 @@ Removing either cap fails 14 subtests.
`internal/middleware/logbound_test.go` and
`internal/handlers/logbound_test.go` drive 8 KB of client-chosen text
at each of these — 1 KB at `invalid password`, whose accounts are
shared with the successful-login line, where a username past 4 KB
overflows the session cookie and answers 500 before that line is
written — through both handlers, and through seven fills: plain text
as the baseline, and then the quotation mark, backslash, tab, newline,
C0 control and astral non-printable, six characters the wider of the
two handlers spends more on than the client spent sending them. Every
case holds each line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling
at each of these — just under 1 KB at `invalid password`, whose
accounts are shared with the successful-login line and so must stay
within the 1024-byte username limit — through both handlers, and
through seven fills: plain text as the baseline, and then the
quotation mark, backslash, tab, newline, C0 control and astral
non-printable, six characters the wider of the two handlers spends
more on than the client spent sending them. Every case holds each
line to the 2,560-byte ceiling. That per-line ceiling
is what the figure above states, and every row establishes it.
Three of the sites go further and bound the whole flood's output — the