Default WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT to prod (closes #307)
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An unset WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT now means prod, not dev. The only
thing dev still changes is CORS, which then answers every origin with
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, so an operator who forgets the
variable is no longer silently permissive; dev must be set
explicitly. Cookie Secure and CSRF strictness follow each request's
transport and are unaffected.

The README, comments and tests no longer describe dev as the default:
the deployment checklist asks only that the environment is not dev,
the Docker and nginx examples drop the now-redundant setting, and the
TRUSTED_PROXIES warning gives its real reason for firing in every
environment.

Model: opus-4-8 (implementation); opus-5-5 (rework)
This commit was merged in pull request #322.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-28 12:47:31 +02:00
parent 7ed1588443
commit 237f131367
7 changed files with 39 additions and 46 deletions
+7 -7
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@@ -585,12 +585,14 @@ func resolveMetricsAuth() (string, string, error) {
)
}
// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to
// dev, and rejects unrecognised values.
// resolveEnvironment reads WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT, defaulting to prod
// when it is unset so a deployment that forgets the variable is not
// silently permissive; dev must be set explicitly. It rejects
// unrecognised values.
func resolveEnvironment() (string, error) {
environment := os.Getenv("WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT")
if environment == "" {
environment = EnvironmentDev
environment = EnvironmentProd
}
if environment != EnvironmentDev &&
@@ -772,10 +774,8 @@ func (c *Config) warnEgressAllowlist(log *slog.Logger) {
// everyone else's wrong passwords, and the receiver's limits become
// service-wide ceilings.
//
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT. That
// variable defaults to dev, so gating on it would silence the warning
// for exactly the operator who forgot to configure the deployment —
// the case it exists to catch.
// The warning is deliberately not gated on WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT:
// behind a proxy every client shares one bucket in dev and prod alike.
//
// The default of trusting nobody is deliberate — trusting forwarded
// headers from arbitrary peers lets any client choose its own bucket —
+6 -11
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@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ func TestEnvironmentConfig(t *testing.T) {
isProd bool
}{
{
name: "default is dev",
isDev: true,
isProd: false,
name: "default is prod",
isDev: false,
isProd: true,
},
{
name: "explicit dev",
@@ -848,10 +848,9 @@ func TestEgressAllowlistWarning(t *testing.T) {
// tells an operator a deployment behind a reverse proxy shares one
// rate-limit bucket between every client, which turns the receiver
// limits into service-wide ceilings and collapses login failure
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty,
// in any environment: WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT defaults to dev, so gating
// on it would silence the warning for exactly the operator who never
// configured the deployment. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
// counting. It must fire whenever TRUSTED_PROXIES is empty, in any
// environment, because behind a proxy every client shares one bucket
// in dev and prod alike. It stays quiet once proxies are named.
func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
@@ -871,10 +870,6 @@ func TestSharedRateLimitBucketWarning(t *testing.T) {
expectWarning: false,
},
{
// The default environment. An internet-exposed
// deployment whose operator never set
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT lands here and has exactly
// the exposure the warning announces.
name: "dev without trusted proxies warns",
environment: config.EnvironmentDev,
expectWarning: true,
+2 -3
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@@ -380,9 +380,8 @@ func csrfTookStrictPath(
// TestCSRF_ForwardedProtoSpellingsTakeStrictPath runs the header
// spellings a real proxy emits through the middleware. The environment
// is dev -- the DEFAULT when WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset -- to pin
// that the routing is a per-request transport decision and owes
// nothing to configuration.
// is set to dev -- the permissive setting -- to pin that the routing is
// a per-request transport decision and owes nothing to configuration.
func TestCSRF_ForwardedProtoSpellingsTakeStrictPath(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+1 -1
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
// several packages, by hand, and the answers disagreed. The session
// cookie's Secure attribute was decided at startup from the configured
// environment while the CSRF cookie's was decided per-request, so a
// deployment behind a TLS proxy in the default environment emitted one
// deployment behind a TLS proxy in the dev environment emitted one
// Secure cookie and one non-Secure cookie on the same response.
// Everything kept working, which is exactly why nobody noticed.
//
+2 -2
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@@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ func newStore(key []byte) *sessions.CookieStore {
//
// This is decided per-request, not once at startup. Deciding it at
// startup from the configured environment is what this replaces, and
// it got the DEFAULT posture wrong: "dev" is the environment when
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset, so a deployment terminating TLS at a
// it got the DEFAULT posture wrong: "dev" was then the environment when
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT was unset, so a deployment terminating TLS at a
// proxy without also setting the environment emitted the
// authentication cookie with no Secure attribute -- silently, and on
// the same response as a CSRF cookie that did have one.
+2 -2
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@@ -990,8 +990,8 @@ func sessionCookieFrom(
// TestSave_SecureFollowsRequestTransport is the regression test for
// the defect this replaces: Secure was fixed at startup from the
// configured environment, and "dev" is the environment when
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT is unset. A deployment behind a TLS proxy in
// configured environment, and "dev" was then the environment when
// WEBHOOKER_ENVIRONMENT was unset. A deployment behind a TLS proxy in
// that DEFAULT posture shipped the authentication cookie with no
// Secure attribute and said nothing about it.
//