Correct release-blocking documentation inaccuracies (closes #141)
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check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
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check / check (push) Superseded by a newer commit; never tested
The README env table was missing RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL, TODO.md omitted five landed units, and three passages sold manual redelivery in the present tense when nothing implements it. The same false claim was corrected in the doc comment on failUnretryableRetry, which was its source text. Also removes a console.log from the shipped static asset.
This commit was merged in pull request #144.
This commit is contained in:
19
README.md
19
README.md
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ TTY detection, and security headers are always applied.
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| `METRICS_USERNAME` | Basic auth username for `/metrics` | `""` |
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| `METRICS_PASSWORD` | Basic auth password for `/metrics` | `""` |
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| `SENTRY_DSN` | Sentry error reporting DSN | `""` |
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| `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` | Retention reaper period (Go duration, must be positive) | `1h` |
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| `RETENTION_SWEEP_INTERVAL` | How often the retention reaper and archive sweeper run (Go duration, must be positive) | `1h` |
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| `SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | Idle session timeout (Go duration) | `24h` |
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| `RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT` | Receiver requests/minute per IP per entrypoint | `120` |
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| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | CIDRs whose forwarded headers are trusted | `""` (none) |
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@@ -265,9 +265,10 @@ webhooker solves this by acting as a durable intermediary:
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targets simultaneously. This enables patterns like forwarding a
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GitHub webhook to both a deployment service and a Slack channel.
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5. **Replay** — Stored events can be manually redelivered for debugging
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or testing, without requiring the original sender to fire the webhook
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again.
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5. **Replay** (not yet implemented) — Every received event is stored in
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full, which is what manual redelivery for debugging or testing will
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be built on. No redelivery exists today, in the web UI or the API;
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see [TODO.md](TODO.md).
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### Use Cases
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@@ -277,6 +278,7 @@ webhooker solves this by acting as a durable intermediary:
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size, and delivery performance
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- **Debugging** and introspection of webhook payloads in the web UI
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- **Replay** of webhook events for application testing and development
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(planned; not yet implemented)
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- **Fan-out** delivery of a single webhook to multiple downstream
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targets
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- **High-availability ingestion** for delivery to less reliable backend
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@@ -502,7 +504,7 @@ A programmatic access credential for API authentication.
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#### Event
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A captured incoming webhook request. Stores the complete HTTP request
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data for replay and auditing.
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data for auditing and for the planned replay capability.
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| Field | Type | Description |
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| -------------- | ------ | ----------- |
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@@ -784,9 +786,10 @@ unknown) one while one of its deliveries is still `retrying`, both
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recovery paths above terminally mark that delivery `failed` and record a
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`DeliveryResult` naming the current target type as the reason, logging it
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at warn level. The delivery is not re-dispatched under the new type — the
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operator never asked for that delivery — and the event itself remains
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stored in the per-webhook event database, so it can be redelivered
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manually.
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operator never asked for that delivery — and while the event itself
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remains stored in the per-webhook event database, there is no way to
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redeliver it: manual redelivery is planned, not implemented (see
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[TODO.md](TODO.md)).
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### Circuit Breaker (HTTP Targets with Retries)
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31
TODO.md
31
TODO.md
@@ -61,6 +61,34 @@ rests on.
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Profile settings placeholder removed, a progressive-enhancement copy
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button for the entrypoint URL, and retention form copy that states the
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actual policy (deletion by the reaper, 0 retains forever) (#57)
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- 2026-08-11 Mask the webhook credential in delivery errors and logs:
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Go embeds the request URL in `*url.Error`, so every transport failure
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persisted the full Slack webhook URL into the per-webhook event
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database via `DeliveryResult.Error`, a field a future REST API would
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have served. `maskURLError` drops path, query and userinfo while
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preserving the wrapped cause, so `errors.Is`/`As` and `Timeout()`
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still work and DNS, TLS and timeout failures still read differently
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(#118)
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- 2026-08-11 Rate-limit the public webhook receiver endpoint
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(`RECEIVER_RATE_LIMIT`, default 120/min), keyed on client IP plus
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entrypoint path so one entrypoint cannot exhaust another's budget;
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over-limit requests get 429 with `Retry-After`. It was the one
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unauthenticated, internet-facing endpoint with no limit at all (#64)
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- 2026-08-11 Enforce the body size limit before CSRF parses the form:
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`MaxBodySize` is now first in all four form-parsing route groups, so
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an oversized request is rejected with 413 instead of being read in
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full by the CSRF middleware before any cap applied (#90)
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- 2026-08-11 Mask target config on the source detail page, which
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rendered the stored blob verbatim and so exposed the Slack
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incoming-webhook URL — a bearer credential that cannot be revoked
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per-holder. Config reaches the template only as a `TargetView` of
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labelled fields, and header values are rendered as a count (#113)
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- 2026-08-11 Allow `retention_days` of 0 to mean retain forever, via a
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sentinel written in `BeforeSave` so the GORM column default cannot
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win the race. Also bounds the reaper's cutoff arithmetic: day counts
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above 106751 overflowed `time.Duration` and wrapped the cutoff into
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the future, where every row matched and the sweep deleted everything
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(#79)
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- 2026-08-09 Inactivity-based session timeout: sliding idle expiry
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(`SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT`, default `24h`) refreshed on authenticated
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requests, with the 7-day absolute cap kept as an independent
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@@ -115,6 +143,9 @@ rests on.
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# Future Steps
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- Manual event redelivery from the web UI — the "Replay" capability the
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README describes as planned. No redelivery code exists anywhere in the
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tree; events are stored in full, which is all it would be built on
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- Delivery status and retry management UI
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- Per-webhook rate limiting in the receiver handler (per-webhook config
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plus handler enforcement; global limits must not apply to receiver
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@@ -785,9 +785,9 @@ func (e *Engine) sweepSingleRetry(
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// status retrying themselves. Re-dispatching under the new type
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// would be a delivery the operator never asked for, and leaving
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// the row retrying strands it forever, so the delivery is
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// failed with a recorded reason and can be redelivered
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// manually. Logged at warn, not error: this is operator-caused
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// state, not a system fault.
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// failed with a recorded reason. The event stays stored, but
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// nothing redelivers it today. Logged at warn, not error: this
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// is operator-caused state, not a system fault.
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func (e *Engine) failUnretryableRetry(
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webhookDB *gorm.DB,
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webhookID string,
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@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
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// Webhooker client-side JavaScript
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console.log("Webhooker loaded");
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// Copy-to-clipboard, as progressive enhancement.
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//
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