sneak
492b27a42f
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Every backup writes vaultik-destination.txt at the destination root. While the local index holds snapshots, a destination without it is not present: snapshot create refuses before writing, prune and snapshot purge fail, and snapshot list and snapshot remove act as for a destination that cannot be listed. remote nuke deletes it last. The file:// backend no longer creates its destination directory and checks for it on every write; that protects a directory on a removable volume, not a mount point. Tests back up into directories that exist; fixtures standing for a written destination carry the marker; two tests check they get past it. Judgement call: the marker is rewritten on every backup. Deviation: for the complexity limit, two blocks moved, unchanged, into snapshotNamesToCreate and confirmRemoveSnapshot. Model: opus-5-5
86 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
86 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
package vaultik_test
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"io"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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"filippo.io/age"
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"github.com/spf13/afero"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
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)
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// TestRestoreRejectsTruncatedMetadataDB backs up a real tree, then replaces
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// the snapshot's db.zst.age with a stream cut right after the age header and
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// its 16-byte nonce. age.Decrypt still accepts such an object and the zstd
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// decoder turns the truncated read into a clean EOF, so before the fix restore
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// built a fresh empty schema and reported success. Restore must now fail with
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// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, the error the reader raises for a truncated object.
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// Asserting that specific error pins the reader fix: without it the truncation
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// yields an empty database, which the identity check rejects for an unrelated
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// reason, and this test would pass anyway.
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func TestRestoreRejectsTruncatedMetadataDB(t *testing.T) {
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log.Initialize(log.Config{})
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t.Parallel()
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fs := afero.NewOsFs()
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tempDir := t.TempDir()
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dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "source")
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storeDir := t.TempDir()
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restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
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dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
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chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
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maxBlobSize := int64(512 * 1024)
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setupE2ESourceTree(t, fs, dataDir, chunkSize)
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ctx := context.Background()
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cfg, storer, snapshotID := runFileStorageBackup(
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ctx, t, fs, dataDir, storeDir, dbPath, chunkSize, maxBlobSize)
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// Encrypting empty plaintext to the snapshot recipient yields
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// header + nonce(16) + a single 16-byte final chunk tag. Dropping the
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// trailing tag leaves exactly the age header plus its nonce — the
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// truncation an attacker can write over metadata without any key.
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recipient, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(testAgePublicKey)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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var full bytes.Buffer
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w, err := age.Encrypt(&full, recipient)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NoError(t, w.Close())
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truncated := full.Bytes()[:full.Len()-16]
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dbKeyPath := filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata",
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snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID), "db.zst.age")
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require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, dbKeyPath, truncated, 0o644))
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restoreVaultik := &vaultik.Vaultik{
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Config: cfg,
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Storage: storer,
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Fs: fs,
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Stdout: io.Discard,
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Stderr: io.Discard,
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UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
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}
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restoreVaultik.SetContext(ctx)
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err = restoreVaultik.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
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SnapshotID: snapshotID,
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TargetDir: restoreDir,
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Verify: true,
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})
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require.ErrorIs(t, err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
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}
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