Files
vaultik/internal/vaultik/blob_fetch.go
T
clawbot d156a02c49
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Name each prefix once in restore, verify and purge errors (closes #327)
A missing blob during restore, a failed shallow verify and an invalid
purge duration each printed their prefix twice. FetchBlob now returns
the storage error as is, since restore and deep verify name the blob
themselves; purge returns the duration parser's error unchanged; and a
failed shallow verify wraps "problems found in storage" instead of
"verification failed", which the command already prints. Deep verify
words a storage error other than not found as a blob it could not
check, and its log line no longer says S3.

Already fixed for #314: the
deep verify size message naming S3 and other errors called missing;
tests now check both.
Not tested: the log line.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 04:04:14 +02:00

170 lines
5.3 KiB
Go

package vaultik
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"filippo.io/age"
"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
)
// errBlobHashMismatch is returned when a fetched blob's content hash does
// not match the expected double-SHA-256 hash.
var errBlobHashMismatch = errors.New("blob hash mismatch")
// errBlobNotFullyRead is returned when the verifying reader is closed
// before its plaintext reached EOF. The hash can only be checked once
// the whole stream has been read, so an early or short-read close must
// fail rather than silently skip verification.
var errBlobNotFullyRead = errors.New(
"blob closed before fully read; hash not verified")
// hashVerifyReader wraps a blobgen.Reader and verifies the double-SHA-256 hash
// of decrypted plaintext when Close is called. It reuses the hash that
// blobgen.Reader already computes internally via its TeeReader, avoiding
// redundant SHA-256 computation.
type hashVerifyReader struct {
reader *blobgen.Reader // underlying decrypted blob reader (has internal hasher)
limited io.Reader // reader bounded to the blob's recorded plaintext size
fetcher io.ReadCloser // raw fetched stream (closed on Close)
blobHash string // expected double-SHA-256 hex
done bool // EOF reached
}
func (h *hashVerifyReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := h.limited.Read(p)
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
h.done = true
}
return n, err
}
// Close closes the underlying readers and verifies the blob hash. The
// hash check cannot be skipped: closing before the plaintext reached
// EOF (a short read or an early close) is an error, so a caller can
// never obtain unverified blob bytes.
func (h *hashVerifyReader) Close() error {
readerErr := h.reader.Close()
fetcherErr := h.fetcher.Close()
if !h.done {
return errBlobNotFullyRead
}
actualHashHex := hex.EncodeToString(blobgen.DoubleSHA256(h.reader.Sum256()))
if actualHashHex != h.blobHash {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: expected %s, got %s",
errBlobHashMismatch, shortHash(h.blobHash), shortHash(actualHashHex))
}
if readerErr != nil {
return readerErr
}
return fetcherErr
}
// FetchAndDecryptBlob downloads a blob, decrypts and decompresses it, and
// returns a streaming reader that computes the double-SHA-256 hash on the fly.
// The hash is verified when the returned reader is closed (after fully reading).
// This avoids buffering the entire blob in memory.
//
// maxPlaintextSize is the blob's uncompressed_size as recorded in the
// snapshot database. Decompression stops with blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge
// once the plaintext exceeds it, so a tampered blob cannot expand without
// limit — using the recorded size, not the restoring host's
// blob_size_limit, since that config may differ from the backup host's.
func (v *Vaultik) FetchAndDecryptBlob(
ctx context.Context, blobHash string, maxPlaintextSize int64,
identities ...age.Identity,
) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
rc, err := v.FetchBlob(ctx, blobHash)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(rc, identities...)
if err != nil {
_ = rc.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating blob reader: %w", err)
}
return &hashVerifyReader{
reader: reader,
limited: blobgen.LimitReader(reader, maxPlaintextSize),
fetcher: rc,
blobHash: blobHash,
}, nil
}
// FetchBlob downloads a blob and returns a reader for the encrypted data.
// The reader is closed as soon as ctx is cancelled, which ends a read
// blocked inside it. A storage error is returned as is: restore and deep
// verify name the blob in their own errors.
func (v *Vaultik) FetchBlob(
ctx context.Context, blobHash string,
) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
// blobHash reaches here from the snapshot database, which is not
// trusted. Reject a malformed hash before it is spliced into a storage
// path (blobHash[:2]/blobHash[2:4]) or a fetch is attempted.
if !isBlobHash(blobHash) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidBlobHash, shortHash(blobHash))
}
blobPath := fmt.Sprintf("blobs/%s/%s/%s", blobHash[:2], blobHash[2:4], blobHash)
rc, err := v.Storage.Get(ctx, blobPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return newCloseOnCancelReader(ctx, rc), nil
}
// closeOnCancelReader closes the reader it wraps when ctx is cancelled.
// Not every backend's reader stops on cancel by itself (the file
// backend's does not), and a read stalled on a slow or hung source would
// otherwise outlast the shutdown timeout, so the process would exit
// before restore or deep verify removed its decrypted temporary files.
type closeOnCancelReader struct {
io.ReadCloser
ctx context.Context //nolint:containedctx // Read reports its error
stop func() bool
}
func newCloseOnCancelReader(
ctx context.Context, rc io.ReadCloser,
) *closeOnCancelReader {
return &closeOnCancelReader{
ReadCloser: rc,
ctx: ctx,
stop: context.AfterFunc(ctx, func() { _ = rc.Close() }),
}
}
// Read returns the context's error, not the closed reader's, once ctx
// has been cancelled.
func (r *closeOnCancelReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := r.ReadCloser.Read(p)
if err != nil && r.ctx.Err() != nil {
return n, r.ctx.Err()
}
return n, err
}
// Close closes the wrapped reader, unless the cancel already closed it.
func (r *closeOnCancelReader) Close() error {
if !r.stop() {
return nil
}
return r.ReadCloser.Close()
}