Add fault-injection tests for interruption and corruption (closes #72 )

Introduce internal/storage/faultstore, a storage.Storer wrapper that injects faults through the existing seam rather than patching production code: an upload that dies partway, a backend that reports success while storing nothing, and reads that return corrupt or truncated bytes. Cover all six scenarios from the issue, each asserting the observable end state (index, destination, and what the user is told), not just that an error came back. Scenario 1b (a retry after an interrupted upload must restore) exposed a real defect and is skipped with a pointer to #148; scenario 2 asserts honest reporting of a half-exported snapshot, with automatic repair also left to that issue. No production behavior changes. The tests run serially: each calls log.Initialize, which replaces the global logger a concurrent backup reads, so parallel runs race under -race — the same choice prune_count_test.go already makes. model: claude-opus-4-8
2026-09-21 23:01:46 +00:00
194 changed files with 4018 additions and 15200 deletions
@@ -1,79 +1,10 @@
-# .dockerignore does NOT use .gitignore semantics. Docker matches with
+.git
-# moby/patternmatcher: filepath.Match plus `**`, so `*` does not cross
+.gitea
-# `/` and an unprefixed pattern is anchored at the context root. Every
+*.md
-# depth-independent pattern therefore needs `**/`, or `config/.env` and
+LICENSE
-# `certs/server.key` still ship while this file reads as solved. Only
+vaultik
-# genuinely root-anchored entries go unprefixed. Never transplant these
+dist
-# into .gitignore, where `**/` is wrong.
+.tool
-#
+coverage.out
-# Matching is case-sensitive, so secrets use character ranges rather
+coverage.html
-# than an ALL-CAPS twin, which would still miss `Server.Key`.
+.DS_Store
 #
 # Extend with this repo's own host-built artifacts, written anchored:
 # `/myapp`, never `**/myapp`, which also matches `cmd/myapp/` and
 # deletes the package directory from the context.
 # .git is sent without its config. Without a VERSION build argument the
 # stage that compiles runs `git describe --tags --always` on .git, which
 # does not need .git/config; that file can hold a credential, such as a
 # password in a remote URL or the token the CI checkout step stores there.
 # Each submodule keeps a config with the same exposure in its git directory
 # under .git/modules/, nested again for a submodule's own submodules, or in
 # its own .git directory when it keeps one.
 # KNOWN GAP: a submodule whose name has a `config` segment (`config`,
 # `deploy/config`, `config/lib`) loses its whole git directory, because
 # `**/.git/modules/**/config` also matches that segment's directory
 # under .git/modules/. Go's version stamping then fails the build;
 # nothing leaks. Name such a submodule without that segment:
 # `git submodule add --name`.
 **/.git/config
 **/.git/modules/**/config
 # Agent scratch: one full checkout of the repo per in-flight agent.
 # Anchored because it occurs once where agents run at the repo root.
 # KNOWN GAP: a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
 # `services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry.
 .claude
 # Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
 # convention. Re-include a committed template with a negation if the
 # build needs one: `!docs/example.env`.
 **/*.[eE][nN][vV]
 **/.[eE][nN][vV].*
 **/.[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
 # Private keys and the bundles carrying them. Public certificates
 # (*.crt, *.cer) are deliberately absent: they are legitimate inputs.
 **/*.[pP][eE][mM]
 **/*.[kK][eE][yY]
 **/*.[pP]12
 **/*.[pP][fF][xX]
 **/[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
 **/[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
 **/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
 **/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]_[sS][kK]
 **/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
 **/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519_[sS][kK]
 # Dependencies: restored inside the image, never copied in.
 **/node_modules
 # OS metadata.
 **/.DS_Store
 **/Thumbs.db
 # Editor state: never a build input, and it churns COPY.
 **/*.swp
 **/*.swo
 **/*~
 **/*.bak
 **/.idea
 **/.vscode
 **/*.sublime-*
 # This repo's own host-built artifacts.
 /vaultik
 /dist
 /.tool
 /coverage.out
 /coverage.html
@@ -10,6 +10,3 @@ insert_final_newline = true
 [Makefile]
 indent_style = tab
 [*.go]
 indent_style = tab
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
 name: check
-on: [push]
+on:
  push:
    branches: [main, next]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main, next]
 jobs:
-    check:
+  check:
-        runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-        steps:
+    steps:
-            # actions/checkout v4.2.2, 2026-02-22
+      # actions/checkout v4, 2024-09-16
-            - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5
-            - run: script/cibuild
+      - name: Build and check
        run: script/cibuild
@@ -16,12 +16,11 @@ jobs:
          fetch-depth: 0
      # goreleaser is not a compiler: it shells out to `go` for the
      # `before:` hook and for every one of the four cross-compiles.
-      # Without this step the release either fails at the before-hook or,
+      # Nothing else in this repo puts a Go toolchain on the runner --
-      # worse, ships binaries built by whatever Go the runner happens to
+      # check.yml runs script/cibuild, which does all of its work inside
-      # carry. check.yml's runner gets the same Go through
+      # the digest-pinned Dockerfile images -- so without this step the
-      # script/bootstrap, which calls script/install-go, and uses it only
+      # release either fails at the before-hook or, worse, ships binaries
-      # for `go mod download` and gofmt; it compiles inside the
+      # built by whatever Go the runner happens to carry.
      # digest-pinned Dockerfile images.
      #
      # actions/setup-go would pin the action by commit sha, but the Go
      # tarball it downloads at runtime is verified against no value in
@@ -1,62 +1,28 @@
 # Binary
 /vaultik
 # goreleaser output
 /dist/
 # Locally installed pinned tools (script/install-goreleaser)
 /.tool/
 # Test artifacts
 *.out
 *.test
 coverage.html
 coverage.out
 # IDE
 .vscode/
 .idea/
 *.swp
 *.swo
 # OS
 .DS_Store
 Thumbs.db
-# Editors
+# Local config for development
 *.swp
 *.swo
 *~
 *.bak
 .idea/
 .vscode/
 *.sublime-*
 # Agent scratch (worktrees of this repo, created and destroyed by
 # in-flight tooling). Unanchored: .gitignore patterns already match at
 # every depth, so no prefix is wanted here. This is not a .dockerignore
 # entry and must not be given a `**/` prefix on the way into one.
 .claude/
 # Node
 node_modules/
 # Secrets. Unanchored like every entry above, so each matches at every
 # depth. Matching is case-sensitive on Linux, so names use character
 # ranges rather than a lowercase form that misses `Server.Key`.
 # Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
 # convention. Only the templates `example.env` and `sample.env` are
 # re-included below. A repository that commits any other template adds
 # its own negation after these lines, for example `!.env.example`.
 *.[eE][nN][vV]
 .[eE][nN][vV].*
 .[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
 !example.env
 !sample.env
 # Private keys and the bundles carrying them.
 *.[pP][eE][mM]
 *.[kK][eE][yY]
 *.[pP]12
 *.[pP][fF][xX]
 [iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
 [iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
 [iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
 [iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]_[sS][kK]
 [iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
 [iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519_[sS][kK]
 # Go build and test output.
 *.log
 *.out
 *.test
 coverage.html
 # This repo's own host-built artifacts.
 /vaultik
 /dist/
 /.tool/
 # Local configs for development; they hold storage credentials.
 local-config.yaml
-dev-config.yaml
+dev-config.yaml
@@ -10,21 +10,14 @@ run:
 linters:
  default: all
  enable:
    # Successor to the deprecated gomodguard. Named explicitly, rather than
    # left to `default: all`, because it carries the module policy below.
    - gomodguard_v2
  disable:
    # Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
    - exhaustruct      # Requires all struct fields
-    - exhaustruct_v5   # Requires all struct fields (successor to exhaustruct)
+    - depguard         # Dependency allow/block lists
    - godot            # Requires comments to end with periods
    - wsl              # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
    - wrapcheck        # Too verbose for internal packages
    - varnamelen       # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go
    # Deprecated: the warning is attached to the old name, so it is
    # silenced by disabling that name, not by enabling the successor.
    - wsl              # Deprecated, replaced by wsl_v5
    - gomodguard       # Deprecated, replaced by gomodguard_v2
  settings:
    lll:
      line-length: 88
@@ -35,68 +28,6 @@ linters:
      max-complexity: 15
    dupl:
      threshold: 100
    depguard:
      # Test-support code must not be compiled into the shipped binary. A
      # test-support package exists to hand a test privileges the program
      # itself must never have, so a file that is not a test must not import
      # one. Test files, and the files inside a package whose directory name
      # ends in `test`, are where that code belongs, and are exempt.
      #
      # The deny list below is the one part of this file a repository is
      # expected to extend, and the only part it may. depguard matches an
      # import path against a list of prefixes, so it cannot be told "any path
      # whose last segment ends in test"; a repository's own test-support
      # packages have to be named here one at a time, by full import path,
      # under a module path that differs from repository to repository. Add
      # them; change nothing else.
      rules:
        test-support:
          list-mode: lax
          files:
            - "$all"
            - "!$test"
            - "!**/*test/**"
          deny:
            - pkg: net/http/httptest
              desc: >-
                Test-support code belongs in test files and in packages whose
                directory name ends in test, not in the shipped binary.
            - pkg: sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage/faultstore
              desc: >-
                Test-support code belongs in test files and in packages whose
                directory name ends in test, not in the shipped binary.
    # Only decisions already recorded in the Go package defaults are
    # listed here. Every entry matches the module path exactly.
    gomodguard_v2:
      blocked:
        - module: github.com/rs/zerolog
          recommendations:
            - log/slog
          reason: "Structured logging is stdlib log/slog."
        # One entry per pre-fork module path, because the later releases
        # are separate paths. A prefix match would be shorter but would
        # also reach github.com/go-redis/redismock, the test double for
        # the successor these entries recommend.
        - module: github.com/go-redis/redis
          recommendations:
            - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
          reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
        - module: github.com/go-redis/redis/v7
          recommendations:
            - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
          reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
        - module: github.com/go-redis/redis/v8
          recommendations:
            - github.com/redis/go-redis/v9
          reason: "Pre-fork module; use the maintained go-redis v9."
        - module: github.com/sergi/go-diff
          recommendations:
            - github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff
          reason: "No unified diff output; use go-udiff."
        - module: github.com/hexops/gotextdiff
          recommendations:
            - github.com/aymanbagabas/go-udiff
          reason: "Unmaintained fork; use go-udiff."
 issues:
  max-issues-per-linter: 0
@@ -47,7 +47,9 @@ checksum:
 # A snapshot is not a release and must not name itself like one. The
 # previous `{{ incpatch .Version }}-next` derived a plausible-looking
 # release number from the last tag -- and with no tags in the repo at
-# all, from goreleaser's fabricated v0.0.0.
+# all, from goreleaser's fabricated v0.0.0. This produces the same
 # string script/version produces for an untagged build, so a snapshot
 # binary and a `make vaultik` binary of the same clean commit agree.
 snapshot:
  version_template: "dev-{{ slice .FullCommit 0 12 }}"
@@ -102,29 +102,14 @@ Version: 2025-06-08
    build files are acceptable in the root, but source code and other files
    should be organized in appropriate subdirectories.
-13. Pre-1.0: NEVER add a database migration. Migrations are supported, but
+13. Pre-1.0: NEVER write database migrations. There are no live databases
-    nothing is installed anywhere yet, so there is nothing to migrate. To
+    anywhere — every user's local index can be rebuilt from a fresh full
-    change the schema, edit `internal/database/schema/001.sql` (and any
+    backup. To change the schema, edit `internal/database/schema/001.sql`
-    code that touches the affected tables) directly. After 1.0, each schema
+    (and any code that touches the affected tables) directly; do not add new
-    change is a new numbered file in that directory and a released file is
+    numbered schema files. Those numbered files and the `schema_migrations`
-    never edited; an existing local database is then migrated when vaultik
+    table they populate only bootstrap a fresh database — they are not an
-    is updated. Before 1.0, a local database left on an older schema is
+    upgrade path. The local index is disposable until 1.0 ships and is
-    deleted and re-created by a full backup. See
+    tagged; once 1.0 is tagged that clause expires and the question of
-    [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md#schema-migrations).
+    upgrading existing indexes returns. See [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md)
    for the full explanation.
 14. Never use `git add -A`.  Stage only the files you intentionally
    changed.
 15. Commit messages carry no attribution or advertising trailers for the
    tool that helped write the code, or for its vendor: the owner is the
    sole author of code written with a tool.
 16. Run the whole test suite with `make test` every time, and read its full
    output.  Never run `go test`, a single test or a single package, and
    never grep the output.
 17. Do not stop working on a task until the definition of done given in the
    initial instruction is met: all of the work, not part or most of it.
 18. For estimates: backing up over 2.5Gbit/s ethernet to an S3 server
    backed by 2000MB/sec SSD takes about 4 seconds per gigabyte.
@@ -54,18 +54,16 @@ The database tracks five primary entities and their relationships:
 #### File (`database.File`)
 Represents a file, directory, or symlink in the backup system. Stores metadata needed for restoration:
- Path, mtime
+- Path, source_path (for restore path stripping), mtime
 - Size, mode, ownership (uid, gid)
 - Symlink target (if applicable)
 It also stores `source_path`, the source directory the scan found it under, made absolute and with symlinks resolved. Restore does not read it.
 #### Chunk (`database.Chunk`)
 A content-addressed unit of data. Files are split into variable-size chunks using the FastCDC algorithm:
 - `ChunkHash`: SHA256 hash of chunk content (primary key)
 - `Size`: Chunk size in bytes
-Chunk sizes vary between `avgChunkSize/4` and `avgChunkSize*4` (2.5MB-40MB for the 10MB default average).
+Chunk sizes vary between `avgChunkSize/4` and `avgChunkSize*4` (typically 16KB-256KB for 64KB average).
 #### FileChunk (`database.FileChunk`)
 Maps files to their constituent chunks:
@@ -76,19 +74,17 @@ Maps files to their constituent chunks:
 #### Blob (`database.Blob`)
 The final storage unit uploaded to S3. Contains many compressed and encrypted chunks:
 - `ID`: UUID assigned at creation
- `Hash`: `hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))`, computed before compression and encryption (see [docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#blobs-directory-blobs))
+- `Hash`: SHA256 of final compressed+encrypted content
 - `UncompressedSize`: Total raw chunk data before compression
 - `CompressedSize`: Size after zstd compression and age encryption
 - `CreatedTS`, `FinishedTS`, `UploadedTS`: Lifecycle timestamps
 Blob creation process:
 1. Chunks are accumulated (up to MaxBlobSize, typically 10GB)
-2. As each chunk is added, its uncompressed bytes are fed to a running SHA-256
+2. Compressed with zstd
-3. Concurrently, the same bytes are compressed with zstd, then encrypted with age (recipients configured in config), and written to a temporary file
+3. Encrypted with age (recipients configured in config)
-4. On finalize, the blob's name is the double SHA-256 of the uncompressed contents — `hex(SHA256(SHA256(...)))` — not a hash of the compressed, encrypted bytes
+4. SHA256 hash computed → becomes filename in S3
-5. The finished file is uploaded to `blobs/{hash[0:2]}/{hash[2:4]}/{hash}` and then deleted
+5. Uploaded to `blobs/{hash[0:2]}/{hash[2:4]}/{hash}`
 A backup needs free temporary space, because each blob is written whole to a temporary file before it is uploaded (up to about `blob_size_limit`; an rclone destination that cannot stream uploads needs about twice that) and the metadata export writes copies of the local index. Temporary files go to `$TMPDIR` (default `/tmp`); with `TMPDIR` unset, SQLite writes one of those copies to `/var/tmp`.
 #### BlobChunk (`database.BlobChunk`)
 Maps chunks to their position within blobs:
@@ -124,7 +120,7 @@ The CLI uses fx for dependency injection. Here's the instantiation order:
 ```go
 // cli/app.go: NewApp()
 fx.New(
-    fx.Supply(config.Path(opts.ConfigPath)),         // 1. Config path
+    fx.Supply(config.ConfigPath(opts.ConfigPath)),  // 1. Config path
    fx.Supply(opts.LogOptions),                      // 2. Log options
    fx.Provide(globals.New),                         // 3. Globals
    fx.Provide(log.New),                             // 4. Logger config
@@ -197,7 +193,7 @@ scanner := v.ScannerFactory(snapshot.ScannerParams{
 - **Created by**: `chunker.NewChunker(avgChunkSize)`
 - **When**: Inside `snapshot.NewScanner()`
 - **Configuration**:
-  - `avgChunkSize`: From config (default 10MB)
+  - `avgChunkSize`: From config (typically 64KB)
  - `minChunkSize`: avgChunkSize / 4
  - `maxChunkSize`: avgChunkSize * 4
@@ -288,10 +284,9 @@ Manages snapshot lifecycle and metadata export.
 Key methods:
 - `CreateSnapshot(ctx, hostname, version, commit)` → Create snapshot record
- `PopulateSnapshotBlobs(ctx, snapshotID)` → Record every blob the snapshot references
+- `CompleteSnapshot(ctx, snapshotID)` → Mark snapshot complete
 - `ExportSnapshotMetadata(ctx, dbPath, snapshotID)` → Export to S3
- `MarkSnapshotComplete(ctx, snapshotID)` → Record completion, only after a successful export
+- `CleanupIncompleteSnapshots(ctx, hostname)` → Remove failed snapshots
 - `CompleteSnapshot(ctx, snapshotID)` → Convenience: populate blobs, then mark complete (no export between)
 ### `internal/database`
 SQLite database for local index. Single-writer mode for thread safety.
@@ -312,7 +307,7 @@ Repository interfaces:
 ```
 CreateSnapshot(opts)
    │
-    ├─► PruneDatabase()   // Critical: avoid dedup errors
+    ├─► CleanupIncompleteSnapshots()   // Critical: avoid dedup errors
    │
    ├─► SnapshotManager.CreateSnapshot()   // Create DB record
    │
@@ -339,25 +334,23 @@ CreateSnapshot(opts)
    │       │
    │       └─► Accumulate statistics
    │
    ├─► SnapshotManager.PopulateSnapshotBlobs()   // record referenced blobs
    │
    ├─► SnapshotManager.UpdateSnapshotStatsExtended()
    │
-    ├─► SnapshotManager.ExportSnapshotMetadata()
+    ├─► SnapshotManager.CompleteSnapshot()
    │       │
    │       ├─► Copy database to temp file
    │       ├─► Clean to only current snapshot data (VACUUM)
    │       ├─► Compress binary SQLite with zstd
    │       ├─► Encrypt with age
    │       ├─► Upload db.zst.age to storage
    │       └─► Upload manifest.json.zst to storage
    │
-    └─► SnapshotManager.MarkSnapshotComplete()   // only after the export succeeds
+    └─► SnapshotManager.ExportSnapshotMetadata()
            │
            ├─► Copy database to temp file
            ├─► Clean to only current snapshot data (VACUUM)
            ├─► Compress binary SQLite with zstd
            ├─► Encrypt with age
            ├─► Upload db.zst.age to storage
            └─► Upload manifest.json.zst to storage
 ```
 ## Deduplication Strategy
-1. **File-level**: Files unchanged since last backup are skipped (metadata comparison: size, mtime, mode, uid, gid), unless the file lists a chunk that no uploaded blob holds; such a file is re-chunked
+1. **File-level**: Files unchanged since last backup are skipped (metadata comparison: size, mtime, mode, uid, gid)
 2. **Chunk-level**: Chunks are content-addressed by SHA256 hash. If a chunk hash already exists in the database, the chunk data is not re-uploaded.
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
 # Rules
 Read the rules in AGENTS.md and follow them.
 # Memory
 * Claude is an inanimate tool.  The spam that Claude attempts to insert into
  commit messages (which it erroneously refers to as "attribution") is not
  attribution, as I am the sole author of code created using Claude.  It is
  corporate advertising for Anthropic and is therefore completely
  unacceptable in commit messages.
 * NEVER use `git add -A`.  Always add only the files you intentionally
  changed.
 * Tests should always be run before committing code.  No commits should be
  made that do not pass tests.
 * Code should always be formatted before committing.  Do not commit
  unformatted code.
 * Code should always be linted before committing.  Do not commit
  unlinted code.
 * The test suite is fast and local.  When running tests, don't run
  individual parts of the test suite, always run the whole thing by running
  "make test".
 * Do not stop working on a task until you have reached the definition of
  done provided to you in the initial instruction.  Don't do part or most of
  the work, do all of the work until the criteria for done are met.
 * We do not need to support migrations; schema upgrades can be handled by
  deleting the local state file and doing a full backup to re-create it.
 * When testing on a 2.5Gbit/s ethernet to an s3 server backed by 2000MB/sec SSD, 
  estimate about 4 seconds per gigabyte of backup time.
 * When running tests, don't run individual tests, or grep the output.  run
  the entire test suite every time and read the full output.
 * When running tests, don't run individual tests, or try to grep the output.
  never run "go test".  only ever run "make test" to run the full test
  suite, and examine the full output.
@@ -1,76 +1,96 @@
-# Lint phase. The linter is invoked directly rather than through `make
+# This file has no lint stage, deliberately.
-# lint` or `script/lint`, which are themselves a docker build and would
+#
-# recurse into a daemon that does not exist in a build step.
+# Linting lives in Dockerfile.lint, built by script/lint, and
-# golangci/golangci-lint:v2.14.0, 2026-10-05
+# script/cibuild builds both. A lint stage here would have to either
-FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.14.0@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f AS lint
+# shell out to `make lint` -- which is now `docker build`, so
-WORKDIR /src
+# docker-in-docker inside a BuildKit step with no daemon -- or call
-COPY go.mod go.sum ./
+# golangci-lint directly, which would mean a second, independently
-RUN go mod download
+# bumpable digest pin for the linter alongside the one in
-COPY . .
+# Dockerfile.lint. Two pins for one tool is the drift that
-# `golangci-lint run` silently ignores an unknown top-level key in
+# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/78 was filed over. See
-# .golangci.yml, such as a misspelt `linters:`; `config verify` fails on it.
+# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/113 for the ruling.
-RUN golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
+#
-RUN golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
+# Consequence, stated rather than left to be discovered: script/docker
 # builds this file only and therefore does not lint. `make fmt-check`
 # and `make test` still run here, so what a green build of this file
 # means is "formatted, tested, and it compiles" -- the lint verdict
 # comes from script/lint or script/cibuild.
-# Test phase. -race needs cgo and so a C compiler, which the Debian Go
+# Build stage
 # image ships and the alpine one does not.
 # golang:1.26.1 (Debian trixie), 2026-10-05
 FROM golang:1.26.1@sha256:cd78d88e00afadbedd272f977d375a6247455f3a4b1178f8ae8bbcb201743a8a AS test
 WORKDIR /src
 COPY go.mod go.sum ./
 RUN go mod download
 COPY . .
 RUN go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
    { echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
      go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
 # Build stage. Nothing is wanted from either phase above; the copies
 # are what make BuildKit build them first, so this stage cannot run
 # unless lint and test passed.
 # golang:1.26.1-alpine, 2026-03-17
 FROM golang:1.26.1-alpine@sha256:2389ebfa5b7f43eeafbd6be0c3700cc46690ef842ad962f6c5bd6be49ed82039 AS builder
-COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
+
-COPY --from=test /src/go.sum /dev/null
+# Build tooling: make, plus a C toolchain because `go test -race` needs cgo.
-RUN apk add --no-cache git
+# The sqlite driver is pure Go (modernc.org/sqlite), so no sqlite library or
-# A tar-stream context keeps the sender's file owners, which git refuses.
+# CLI is required.
-RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
+RUN apk add --no-cache make build-base
 WORKDIR /src
 # Copy go mod files first for better layer caching
 COPY go.mod go.sum ./
 RUN go mod download
 # Copy source code
 COPY . .
-# The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
+# Run the format check and the tests.
-# `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. The
+#
-# commit and its date always come from that .git. With .git present, a
+# CHECK_EPOCH must stay immediately above these RUNs. These layers are
-# version that is still empty, dev or unknown, or a commit or date that
+# keyed on its value, so they are cache-eligible only for a value
-# is unknown, fails the build: git is missing or could not read the
+# already built against this same tree. script/cibuild and script/docker
-# checkout, as when .git is a file pointing outside the context. A
+# each pass a fresh value on every invocation, which is what makes their
-# context without .git, such as a source export, stamps "dev" and an
+# green mean the checks really executed.
-# "unknown" commit and date.
+#
-ARG VERSION
+# The value is expanded into each check command rather than left to a
-RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always || echo dev)}"; \
+# bare declaration, so the cache miss does not depend on BuildKit's
-    commit="$(git rev-parse HEAD || echo unknown)"; \
+# unreferenced-ARG handling staying as it is. It also puts the epoch in
-    commit_date="$(git show -s --format=%cs HEAD || echo unknown)"; \
+# the build log, where a reader can see the layer was keyed fresh.
-    if [ -e .git ]; then \
+#
-        case "$VERSION" in ""|dev|unknown) \
+# The guard is what makes a build that omits --build-arg fail instead of
-            echo "version is '$VERSION' although .git is present" >&2; \
+# lie. An unset ARG is an empty string, and an empty string is a
-            exit 1 ;; \
+# perfectly stable cache key: without the guard the first such build
-        esac; \
+# runs the checks and every one after it on an unchanged tree replays
-        if [ "$commit" = unknown ] || [ "$commit_date" = unknown ]; then \
+# these layers from cache, executes nothing, and still exits 0. Failed
-            echo "commit is '$commit' and its date '$commit_date'" \
+# steps are never cached, so the guard fails on EVERY invocation rather
-                "although .git is present" >&2; \
+# than once -- a bare `docker build .` is a loud error, not a quiet
-            exit 1; \
+# green. Do not give CHECK_EPOCH a default value; a default would
-        fi; \
+# satisfy the guard with a constant and restore the hole.
-    fi; \
+#
-    globals=sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals; \
+# Everything above this line (apk, go.mod, `go mod download`) is
-    CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
+# deliberately outside the busted range and keeps caching.
-        -ldflags="-s -w -X ${globals}.Version=${VERSION} \
+ARG CHECK_EPOCH
-            -X ${globals}.Commit=${commit} \
+RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1
-            -X ${globals}.CommitDate=${commit_date}" \
+RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && make fmt-check
-        -o /vaultik ./cmd/vaultik
+RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && make test
-# Runtime stage, and the last one: a plain `docker build .` builds this
+# Version, commit and build date are computed on the host by
-# stage's chain and nothing else.
+# script/docker and script/cibuild (where .git exists) and passed in as
 # build args. The build context excludes .git (see .dockerignore), so
 # the build cannot derive them itself: it used to try, with `git
 # rev-parse` inside this stage, and always got "unknown". VERSION comes
 # from script/version, the source of truth shared with the Makefile, so
 # it carries the same tag / dev-<sha> / -dirty rules and a Docker image
 # reports the same string a local build of the same tree would.
 #
 # The defaults are the fallback for a bare `docker build .` that passes
 # none of them: an unset arg would otherwise stamp an empty string and
 # produce an image that cannot report its own version, commit or date.
 # They match what an out-of-git build reports elsewhere.
 #
 # These ARGs sit here, after the checks, rather than at the top of the
 # stage: every commit changes their values, and a value change
 # invalidates all layers below the ARG. Declared up top they would bust
 # `go mod download`; here they only rekey this build layer, which the
 # COPY of the sources above already rebuilds on any change anyway.
 ARG VERSION=dev
 ARG COMMIT=unknown
 ARG COMMIT_DATE=unknown
 # Build (pure Go, no CGO required since we use modernc.org/sqlite)
 RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -ldflags "-X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.Version=${VERSION}' -X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.Commit=${COMMIT}' -X 'sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals.CommitDate=${COMMIT_DATE}'" -o /vaultik ./cmd/vaultik
 # Runtime stage
 # alpine:3.21, 2026-02-25
 FROM alpine:3.21@sha256:c3f8e73fdb79deaebaa2037150150191b9dcbfba68b4a46d70103204c53f4709
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
 # Lint image.
 #
 # Every lint run in this repo happens inside this image, invoked through
 # script/lint, and linting is a BUILD STEP rather than a container
 # command: a successful build of this file IS a clean lint. That shape
 # also works where the docker daemon is remote and bind mounts are
 # impossible, which `docker run` against a mounted worktree does not.
 #
 # This FROM line is the single source of truth for the linter version in
 # this repo. Nothing else pins golangci-lint: the product Dockerfile has
 # no lint stage, deliberately, so there is no second digest to bump and
 # no pair of pins that can drift apart. Bump the tag AND the digest here
 # and nowhere else.
 #
 # Note for readers coming from REPO_POLICIES.md: that document still
 # describes the older pattern, a lint stage inside the product
 # Dockerfile wired up with `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`.
 # That pattern is superseded here by the owner's ruling recorded in
 # https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/113 -- lint runs in its own
 # image, per run, with its own cache and its own lock, which is what
 # makes concurrent runs on one host safe. The policy text is org-wide
 # and is being amended separately; this file is what this repo does.
 #
 # golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2, 2026-08-10
 FROM golangci/golangci-lint:v2.12.2@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240
 WORKDIR /src
 # Copy the dependency manifests first so the module download layer stays
 # cached until they change. Everything above the ARG below is cacheable
 # on purpose; a cold module download on every lint would make the inner
 # loop unusable and buys nothing, because it is not what the gate is
 # asserting.
 COPY go.mod go.sum ./
 RUN go mod download
 COPY . .
 # Force the check layers to execute on every invocation.
 #
 # CHECK_EPOCH must stay immediately above the RUNs below. Those layers
 # are keyed on its value, so they are cache-eligible only for a value
 # already built against this same tree; script/lint and script/cibuild
 # each pass a fresh value on every invocation, which is what makes their
 # green mean the linter really ran. Without it, `docker build -f
 # Dockerfile.lint .` on an unchanged tree exits 0 in well under a second
 # having linted nothing.
 #
 # The value is expanded into each check command itself rather than left
 # to a bare declaration, so the cache miss does not depend on BuildKit's
 # unreferenced-ARG handling staying as it is. It also puts the epoch in
 # the build log, where a reader can see the layer was keyed fresh.
 #
 # The guard is what makes a build that omits --build-arg fail instead of
 # lie. An unset ARG is an empty string, and an empty string is a
 # perfectly stable cache key: without the guard the first such build
 # lints and every one after it on an unchanged tree replays this layer,
 # executes nothing, and still exits 0. Failed steps are never cached, so
 # the guard fails on EVERY invocation rather than once. Do not give
 # CHECK_EPOCH a default value; a default would satisfy the guard with a
 # constant and restore the hole.
 ARG CHECK_EPOCH
 RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1
 # Validate .golangci.yml before linting with it.
 #
 # This is not belt-and-braces; it closes a hole that `golangci-lint run`
 # leaves wide open. `run` rejects YAML it cannot PARSE, but it silently
 # IGNORES an unknown top-level KEY. Renaming `linters:` to `linterz:` --
 # one character -- discards `default: all`, the whole disable list and
 # every threshold, leaves only golangci-lint's small default linter set
 # running, and exits 0 reporting `0 issues.` on a tree the real config
 # fails. Demonstrated on this repo at this pin, recorded on
 # https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/pulls/114: with a planted
 # over-length line, `script/lint` exits 1 naming the `revive` finding
 # with `linters:` and exits 0 with `linterz:`. A set-but-ineffective
 # config quietly falling back to defaults is precisely the false-green
 # class this gate exists to eliminate, so it must not sit in the gate's
 # own configuration.
 #
 # `config verify` catches it, and it does so OFFLINE at this pinned
 # version -- verified, not assumed. Under `docker run --network none`
 # against the pinned digest it exits 0 on this repo's config and exits 3
 # on the `linterz:` variant with `additional properties 'linterz' not
 # allowed`. An earlier revision of this file asserted the opposite, that
 # the schema is fetched over live HTTPS from an unpinned URL, and used
 # that to justify omitting this line. That claim was false at v2.12.2;
 # the schema is embedded. If a future bump reintroduces a network fetch
 # the failure is loud and this comment is where to record it.
 #
 # It is keyed on CHECK_EPOCH, like the lint run below, so it executes on
 # every invocation. Content-addressing alone would arguably be enough --
 # .golangci.yml arrives through `COPY . .`, so a cache hit here implies
 # a byte-identical config was validated when the layer really ran. That
 # argument is exactly the one that would also excuse caching the lint
 # layer, and this repo has ruled it insufficient: a cached check layer
 # checks nothing, and the cost of being wrong is silent. Forcing it costs
 # milliseconds and puts the epoch in the log, where a reader can see that
 # this validation ran rather than being replayed.
 RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && \
    golangci-lint config verify --config .golangci.yml
 RUN echo "check epoch: ${CHECK_EPOCH}" && \
    golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
 .PHONY: all bootstrap setup check test lint lint-fix fmt fmt-check build clean deps test-coverage local install release release-snapshot docker hooks
-# Where script/bootstrap installs Go when the host has none.
+# Version number, derived from git by script/version -- the tag when
-export PATH := $(PATH):$(CURDIR)/.tool/go/bin
+# HEAD is on one, otherwise dev-<sha>. This used to be a hardcoded
 # Version number, derived from git by script/version (`git describe
 # --tags --always --dirty`). This used to be a hardcoded
 # constant, which meant every local build claimed to be a release that
 # had never been tagged.
 VERSION := $(shell script/version)
@@ -43,10 +40,9 @@ setup:
 check:
 	@script/check
-# Run tests only, by building the test phase of the Dockerfile. This
+# Run tests only. This runs the ENTIRE suite -- there is no separate
-# runs the ENTIRE suite -- there is no separate integration target and
+# integration target and no build-tagged subset held back. In
-# no build-tagged subset held back. In particular
+# particular internal/vaultik/integration_test.go, which does full
 # internal/vaultik/integration_test.go, which does full
 # chunk -> pack -> encrypt -> upload -> restore round-trips, runs here.
 # A `test-integration` target used to exist and was removed: no file in
 # the repo carried a build tag, so `-tags=integration` selected nothing
@@ -91,17 +87,17 @@ clean:
 	go clean
 # Install dependencies. The linter is deliberately not installed here:
-# script/lint lints by building the lint phase of the Dockerfile, whose
+# script/lint lints by building Dockerfile.lint, whose FROM line is the
-# FROM line is the single source of truth for the linter version. A
+# single source of truth for the linter version. A second, separately
-# second, separately pinned copy on PATH could drift from it and make a
+# pinned copy on PATH could drift from it and make a local `make lint`
-# local `make lint` disagree with CI.
+# disagree with CI.
 deps:
 	go mod download
-# Run tests with coverage, on the host. -count=1 because without it an
+# Run tests with coverage. -count=1 for the same reason script/test
-# unchanged package is served from Go's test result cache, and a
+# uses it: without it an unchanged package is served from Go's test
-# coverage profile assembled from cached results describes a run that
+# result cache, and a coverage profile assembled from cached results
-# did not happen.
+# describes a run that did not happen.
 test-coverage:
 	go test -v -count=1 -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...
 	go tool cover -html=coverage.out -o coverage.html
@@ -38,10 +38,9 @@ vaultik snapshot list
 Features:
-* modern encryption ([age](https://age-encryption.org/), X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305)
+* modern encryption ([age](https://age-encryption.org/), X25519 + XChaCha20-Poly1305)
 * content-defined chunking with deduplication (FastCDC)
-* incremental backups (a file is re-chunked only when it changed or a
+* incremental backups (only changed files are re-chunked)
  chunk it lists is held by no uploaded blob)
 * multithreaded zstd compression at configurable levels
 * content-addressed immutable storage
 * local state tracking in SQLite (enables write-only incremental backups)
@@ -72,21 +71,14 @@ Requirements that no existing tool meets:
 ## daily use
 ```sh
-# verify a snapshot (shallow: checks all blobs are present with the listed size)
+# verify a snapshot (shallow: checks all blobs exist)
 vaultik snapshot verify <snapshot-id>
-# put the private key file in the environment (reading it from the file
+# deep verify (downloads and cryptographically verifies every blob)
-# keeps the key out of your shell history); the whole age-keygen file,
+VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' vaultik snapshot verify --deep <snapshot-id>
 # with one or more identities, is accepted
 export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"
-# deep verify (downloads every blob, decrypts it, and re-hashes it to
+# restore (requires the private key)
-# detect corruption — this checks integrity, not who wrote the blob)
+VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' vaultik snapshot restore <snapshot-id> /tmp/restored
 vaultik snapshot verify --deep <snapshot-id>
 # restore (requires the private key). Restore into a new directory you own,
 # writable only by you — not a shared location like /tmp
 vaultik snapshot restore <snapshot-id> ~/vaultik-restore
 # daily cron job: back up, keep a 4-week rolling window of snapshots
 # 0 3 * * * vaultik snapshot create --cron --prune --keep-newer-than 4w
@@ -127,18 +119,15 @@ Use that remote key — the hex printed inside `<remote only:...>`, or the
 full `remote_key` from `snapshot list --json` — to restore and verify:
 ```sh
-# put the private key file in the environment (reading it from the file
+# restore everything to /tmp/restored, then check every restored file's
-# keeps the key out of your shell history)
+# chunk hashes
-export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"
+VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' \
  vaultik snapshot restore --verify <remote-key> /tmp/restored
-# restore everything to a new directory you own (writable only by you, not a
+# optionally, deep-verify the snapshot against the store (downloads and
-# shared location like /tmp), then check every restored file's chunk hashes
+# cryptographically checks every blob)
-vaultik snapshot restore --verify <remote-key> ~/vaultik-restore
+VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' \
-
+  vaultik snapshot verify --deep <remote-key>
 # optionally, deep-verify the snapshot against the store (downloads every
 # blob, decrypts it, and re-hashes it to detect corruption — this checks
 # integrity, not who wrote the blob)
 vaultik snapshot verify --deep <remote-key>
 ```
 `age_recipients` (the public key) is not needed to restore — only the
@@ -158,10 +147,10 @@ vaultik [--config <path>] config edit
 vaultik [--config <path>] config get <key>
 vaultik [--config <path>] config set <key> <value>
 vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot create [snapshot-names...] [--cron] [--prune] [--keep-newer-than <duration>]
-vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot list [--json]                  # alias: ls
+vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot list [--json]
 vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot verify <snapshot-id> [--deep] [--json]
 vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot purge [--keep-latest | --older-than <duration>] [--snapshot <name>...] [--force]
-vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot remove <snapshot-id> [--dry-run] [--force] [--local-only] [--json]  # alias: rm
+vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot remove <snapshot-id> [--dry-run] [--force] [--local-only] [--json]
 vaultik [--config <path>] snapshot restore <snapshot-id> <target-dir> [paths...] [--verify]
 vaultik [--config <path>] prune [--force] [--json]
 vaultik [--config <path>] info
@@ -178,32 +167,13 @@ vaultik version
 * `--verbose`, `-v`: Enable verbose output (on stderr — see below)
 * `--debug`: Enable debug output (on stderr — see below)
 * `--quiet`, `-q`: Suppress non-error output (also suppresses startup banner)
-* `--skip-errors`: Skip files that cannot be read when creating a snapshot, or that cannot be restored when restoring, instead of aborting. Packing and storage errors while creating a snapshot (which would leave a chunk recorded but not stored) still abort the run.
+* `--skip-errors`: Continue past per-file errors instead of aborting (applies to `snapshot create` and `restore`)
 ### locking
 Commands that write persistent state — `snapshot create`, `snapshot
 purge`, `snapshot remove`, `prune`, and `remote nuke` — take a
 process-wide lock at `$XDG_DATA_HOME/vaultik/vaultik.pid`
 (`~/.local/share/vaultik/vaultik.pid` on Linux) for the whole run. Only
 one of them runs at a time: a second one exits immediately with an
 "already running" error rather than waiting, so two writers can never
 corrupt the local index or the destination store.
 Read-only commands — `info`, `snapshot list`, `snapshot verify`, and
 `remote info` — do not take the lock and are never blocked, so they run
 even while a backup is in progress. `snapshot restore` does not take the
 lock either: it writes only to the target directory you name, not the
 local index or the destination store. `config`, `database delete`,
 `completion`, and `version` do not take the lock.
 ### stdout and stderr
 Log output — everything from `--verbose` and `--debug`, and every
-warning and error the logger emits — goes to **stderr**, and so does the
+warning and error the logger emits — goes to **stderr**. stdout carries
-startup banner. stdout carries the output you asked for: tables, the
+the output you asked for: tables, and the documents produced by `--json`.
 documents produced by `--json`, `config get` values, and completion
 scripts.
 This means `vaultik snapshot list --verbose > out.txt` captures the
 listing and leaves the diagnostics on your terminal. To capture both,
@@ -230,11 +200,9 @@ and `vaultik prune --json | jq .` both work as written.
 ### environment variables
-* `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY`: Age private key for decryption (required for `snapshot restore` and `snapshot verify --deep`). May hold the whole `age-keygen` file — comments and every identity in it are accepted. Set it from the file, e.g. `export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"`, so the key is not typed into your shell history.
+* `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY`: Age private key for decryption (required for `snapshot restore` and `snapshot verify --deep`)
 * `VAULTIK_CONFIG`: Path to config file (overridden by `--config`)
 * `VAULTIK_INDEX_PATH`: Override local SQLite index path
 * `VAULTIK_CPUPROFILE`: Write a CPU profile to this path for the duration of the run (development/debugging)
 * `VAULTIK_MEMPROFILE`: Write a heap profile to this path when the run exits (development/debugging)
 ### shell completion
@@ -325,9 +293,7 @@ local index alone, and still exits zero.
  logger, so stdout stays a single parseable document.
 **`snapshot verify`**: Verify snapshot integrity.
-* Default (shallow): checks that every blob the manifest lists is present in
+* Default (shallow): checks that all blobs referenced in the manifest exist in storage
  storage with the size the manifest records, and that the encrypted database is
  present. It does not read blob contents.
 * `--deep`: Downloads and decrypts each blob, verifies chunk hashes against the
  encrypted metadata database
 * Accepts the same identifiers as `snapshot restore`: a snapshot ID, or a
@@ -352,15 +318,13 @@ may hold snapshots this host doesn't know about), which is what
 prune` invocation to run as a follow-up. Local row cleanup (files,
 chunks, blobs the snapshot was the last referrer for) runs
 automatically. If the destination store is unreachable, the local-DB
-removal still completes and a warning is emitted; run `vaultik snapshot
+removal still completes and a warning is emitted; rerun `vaultik prune`
-remove <snapshot-id>` again once the store is reachable to remove the
+once the store is reachable to finish remote cleanup. To wipe everything
 snapshot's metadata from it (`vaultik prune` does not). To wipe everything
 on the destination in one go, use `vaultik remote nuke --force`.
 * `--local-only`: Skip remote cleanup; only touch the local index
 * `--dry-run`: Show what would be deleted without deleting
 * `--force`: Skip confirmation prompt
-* `--json`: Output result as JSON. Also skips the confirmation prompt, as
+* `--json`: Output result as JSON
  `--force` does.
 **`snapshot restore`**: Restore files from a backup snapshot.
 * Requires `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY` environment variable
@@ -384,22 +348,14 @@ manifests — network cost scales with the number of snapshots. `snapshot
 create --prune` runs the same cleanup automatically; this is the
 manual entry point for the same work.
 * `--force`: Skip confirmation prompt
-* `--json`: Output stats as JSON. Also skips the confirmation prompt, as
+* `--json`: Output stats as JSON
  `--force` does.
 **`info`**: Display system configuration, storage settings, encryption
 recipients, and local database statistics.
 **`remote info`**: Show storage backend type and location plus detailed
 remote storage inventory: per-snapshot metadata sizes, blob counts, and
-orphaned blob detection. A name under `metadata/` that is not a remote
+orphaned blob detection.
 key is skipped with a warning and is not printed. If a listed
 `manifest.json.zst` cannot be read, or sits under a skipped name, the
 orphaned blob figures are reported as unknown; `--json` gives them as
 `null`, lists the remote key of each unreadable manifest in
 `unreadable_manifests` and counts the manifests under skipped names in
 `skipped_manifest_count`. An unreadable manifest also leaves its
 snapshot's blob count and blob size unknown, `null` in `--json`.
 * `--json`: Output as JSON
 **`remote nuke`**: Delete every snapshot's metadata and every blob from the
@@ -431,16 +387,6 @@ a local or mounted filesystem. Useful for testing or backing up to a NAS.
 **Rclone** (`rclone://remote/path`): Uses rclone's 70+ supported cloud
 providers. Requires rclone to be configured separately (`rclone config`).
 An upload cut off part-way leaves nothing under the object's name on S3, which
 shows an object only once its upload has completed, and on the local filesystem
 backend, which writes a temporary file and renames it into place. Rclone
 remotes with a server-side move (local and sftp among them) are written under a
 temporary name ending in `.partial` and moved into place. Rclone remotes without
 one are written in place: where such a remote shows a file while it is still
 being written, a killed upload can leave a truncated object under its name,
 which a later backup takes for complete. A leftover `.partial` file is ignored
 and can be deleted.
 Legacy S3 configuration via `s3.*` fields (endpoint, bucket, prefix, etc.) is
 still supported for backward compatibility. `storage_url` takes precedence if
 both are set.
@@ -449,10 +395,6 @@ both are set.
 ## architecture
 For an implementation-level view of the internals — the data model, the
 `fx` dependency-injection wiring, and the scanner — see
 [`ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md).
 ### remote storage layout
 ```
@@ -475,19 +417,14 @@ Snapshot IDs follow the human-readable format
 `<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339-timestamp>` (e.g.
 `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`), but this ID is never written to the
 destination store in plaintext. Each snapshot's metadata directory is named
-with its `<remote-key>`, a one-way double SHA-256 hash of the ID, so a plain
+with its `<remote-key>`, a one-way double SHA-256 hash of the ID, so a listing
-listing of the store shows no hostname or snapshot name. The hash uses no
+of the store reveals no hostname or snapshot name. The backup time is not
-secret, though, so an observer who guesses a candidate hostname and snapshot
+hidden: manifest.json.zst carries a plaintext timestamp, and object
 name can hash it and confirm the snapshot is present; the remote key keeps
 names out of a listing but does not hide them from a guess. The backup time is
 not hidden either: manifest.json.zst carries a plaintext timestamp, and object
 modification times are visible at the storage layer regardless. For example,
 `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z` is stored under
 `metadata/17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa/`.
 See [docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation) for the
-derivation, and [Security Considerations](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#security-considerations)
+derivation.
 (including [Accepted Risks](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#accepted-risks)) for what the
 format does and does not protect.
 ### data flow
@@ -522,44 +459,38 @@ format does and does not protect.
 * Content-defined chunking using the FastCDC algorithm
 * Average chunk size: configurable (default 10MB)
-* Deduplication at file level (unchanged files skipped, unless a chunk
+* Deduplication at file level (unchanged files skipped) and chunk level
-  the file lists is held by no uploaded blob) and chunk level (identical
+  (identical chunks across files stored once)
  chunks across files stored once)
 * Multiple chunks packed into blobs to reduce object count
 ### encryption
-* Asymmetric encryption using age (X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305)
+* Asymmetric encryption using age (X25519 + XChaCha20-Poly1305)
 * Only the public key is needed on the source host
 * Each blob and each metadata database is encrypted independently
 * Multiple recipients supported (encrypt to multiple keys)
 ### compression
-* zstd compression at configurable level (1-19, default 3). The level is
+* zstd compression at configurable level (1-19, default 3)
  accepted as 1-19 but maps onto zstd's four internal speed presets:
  1-2 fastest, 3-5 default, 6-9 better, 10-19 best. Levels within the
  same band compress identically.
 * Applied before encryption at the blob level
 ---
 ## configuration reference
-Run `vaultik config init` to generate a fully commented config file; a
+Run `vaultik config init` to generate a fully commented config file.
-complete annotated example also lives in
+Key fields:
 [`config.example.yml`](config.example.yml). Key fields:
 | Field | Default | Description |
 |-------|---------|-------------|
-| `age_recipients` | (required by `snapshot create`) | Age public keys for encryption. Other commands run without one, so a machine that only restores can leave it empty |
+| `age_recipients` | (required) | Age public keys for encryption |
 | `age_secret_key` | (unset) | Age private key for decryption (`snapshot restore`, `snapshot verify --deep`). Setting it in the config file places the private key on the backed-up host, defeating the public-key-only design (see "why" above). Prefer the `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY` environment variable, supplied only on the machine you restore from. |
 | `snapshots` | (required) | Named snapshot definitions with paths and excludes |
 | `storage_url` | | Storage backend URL (`s3://`, `file://`, `rclone://`) |
 | `s3.*` | | Legacy S3 configuration (endpoint, bucket, credentials) |
 | `exclude` | | Global exclude patterns (applied to all snapshots) |
 | `chunk_size` | `10MB` | Average chunk size for content-defined chunking |
-| `blob_size_limit` | `10GB` | Maximum blob size before splitting. Must be at least four times `chunk_size` (the largest chunk the chunker can emit), otherwise a single-chunk blob could exceed the limit. A backup needs free temporary space, because each blob is written whole to a temporary file before it is uploaded (up to about `blob_size_limit`; an rclone destination that cannot stream uploads needs about twice that) and the metadata export writes copies of the local index. Temporary files go to `$TMPDIR` (default `/tmp`); with `TMPDIR` unset, SQLite writes one of those copies to `/var/tmp` |
+| `blob_size_limit` | `10GB` | Maximum blob size before splitting |
 | `compression_level` | `3` | zstd compression level (1-19) |
 | `hostname` | system hostname | Hostname used in snapshot IDs |
 | `index_path` | platform data dir | Local SQLite index path |
@@ -583,13 +514,13 @@ complete annotated example also lives in
  sequentially. Restore speed is bound by single-stream throughput.
 * **Device nodes, named pipes, and sockets are silently skipped.** Only
  regular files, directories, and symlinks are backed up.
-* **Before 1.0, an update can make the local index unusable.** Vaultik
+* **No upgrade path between versions.** There is no supported way to carry
-  supports schema migrations, but none are added before 1.0 because
+  an existing local index across a schema change; if the local SQLite
-  there is no installed base yet. If an update leaves your local index
+  schema changes between versions, delete the local database (`vaultik
-  unusable, run `vaultik database delete` and then a full backup; remote
+  database delete`) and run a full backup. Remote storage is unaffected.
-  storage is unaffected. After 1.0, the local index is migrated when
+  (The binary does embed numbered schema files and a `schema_migrations`
-  vaultik is updated. See
+  table to bootstrap a fresh database — see [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md)
-  [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md#schema-migrations).
+  — but that is not an upgrade path.)
 * **Files that change during backup may be inconsistent.** There is no
  filesystem snapshot or freeze. If a file is modified between the scan
  and chunk phases, the backed-up copy may reflect a partial write.
@@ -601,18 +532,22 @@ complete annotated example also lives in
 ## roadmap
-Work planned after 1.0. Loosely ordered by priority.
+Items still to do before / shortly after 1.0. Loosely ordered by
 priority.
 ### correctness and operability
-* **Outside security audit.** Before 1.0 the encryption and
+* **Security audit of the encryption implementation.** Pre-1.0
-  blob-generation code was reviewed: every bug the review found was
+  blocker if we're advertising "secure" at the top of this README.
-  fixed, and the risks it accepted are listed in
+  age + zstd + content-defined chunking is mostly off-the-shelf
-  [Accepted Risks](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#accepted-risks). No outside
+  pieces, but the seams (key handling, recipient parsing, manifest
-  audit has been done. age + zstd + content-defined chunking
+  trust boundary, restore-time identity validation) need an outside
-  is mostly off-the-shelf pieces, but the seams (key handling,
+  read.
-  recipient parsing, manifest trust boundary, restore-time identity
+* **Error-condition tests.** Today's coverage is the happy path
-  validation) need an outside read.
+  plus a few specific regressions. Need fault-injection coverage:
  network failures mid-blob, disk-full during restore, corrupted /
  truncated / missing blobs, partial uploads, kill -9 between
  manifest and db.zst.age writes.
 * **Verify restored content end-to-end in CI.** The current
  integration test does this for a small synthetic snapshot but
  not at scale. A nightly job against a multi-GB representative
@@ -635,15 +570,13 @@ Work planned after 1.0. Loosely ordered by priority.
  doesn't resume from where it stopped or skip already-present
  files. A `--resume` mode that checks targets before fetching
  blobs would matter for very large restores.
 * **Daemon mode.** A long-running mode that watches for file
  changes so frequent backups, such as hourly, skip the full scan.
  It adds little for the usual runs from cron every 12 to 36 hours.
  See [issue #204](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/204).
 ### usability
 * **Man pages and richer `--help` examples.** Cobra generates
  basic help; man pages would be a separate target.
 * **`--bwlimit` style human-readable size flags** across the
  command surface where they're currently raw integers.
 * **`vaultik snapshot diff <a> <b>`** — show which files changed
  between two snapshots without restoring either.
 * **Status reporting hook for `--cron`.** When a backup fails
@@ -653,11 +586,12 @@ Work planned after 1.0. Loosely ordered by priority.
 ### infrastructure
-* **Schema migrations after 1.0.** Migrations are supported, but none
+* **Cross-version schema upgrades.** There is no upgrade path between
-  are added before 1.0 because there is no installed base yet. After
+  released versions — pre-1.0 schema changes are handled by `vaultik
-  1.0, each schema change is a new migration, so an existing local
+  database delete` plus a full re-scan (see
-  index is migrated when vaultik is updated (see
+  [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md)). Post-1.0 we'll need a
-  [`docs/DATAMODEL.md`](docs/DATAMODEL.md#schema-migrations)).
+  migration story to keep existing index databases usable across
  upgrades.
 * **Storage backend coverage tests.** S3, file://, and rclone://
  all share the Storer interface but the rclone path is the least
  exercised in CI.
@@ -666,38 +600,19 @@ Work planned after 1.0. Loosely ordered by priority.
 ## output style
-Every command's user-facing output is governed by `internal/ui`, in one
+All user-facing output goes through helpers in `internal/ui` and conforms
-of two ways. Color is enabled when the stream written to is a TTY and
+to a uniform style. Color is enabled when stdout is a TTY and the
-the `NO_COLOR` environment variable is unset (https://no-color.org/).
+`NO_COLOR` environment variable is unset (https://no-color.org/).
-* **Status, progress, warnings, and errors** go through the `internal/ui`
+`internal/ui` writes to stdout; it is the output the user asked for.
-  message methods below: marker-prefixed, colored on a TTY, and — except
+Structured log records are a different thing and go through
-  warnings and errors — silenced by `--quiet`. This is the operational
+`internal/log`, which writes to stderr (see "stdout and stderr" above).
  narration of the long-running commands (`snapshot create`, `prune`,
  `snapshot restore`, and the like) and the confirmations of
  `config init`, `config set`, and `database delete`.
 * **The data a command exists to produce** is written plain, with no
  marker and no color, because a marker would corrupt a table or a
  parsed document. This covers the `version`, `info`, `remote info` and
  `snapshot verify` reports, the `snapshot list` table, `config get`
  values, and every `--json` document. `--quiet` silences the human
  reports and tables (`version`, `info`, `remote info`, `snapshot
  verify`, `snapshot list`) but never the machine-consumed `config get`
  value or the `--json` documents, which a script depends on. The
  `database delete` confirmation prompt is also written this way and
  always shown: it is an interactive exchange the operator must see.
 `internal/ui` writes to stdout; it is the output the user asked for. The
 exceptions are the startup banner and the error a failed command ends
 with, which go to stderr. Structured log records are a different thing
 and go through `internal/log`, which writes to stderr (see "stdout and
 stderr" above).
 Message classes:
 | Class | Marker | Alignment | Use for |
 |-------|--------|-----------|---------|
-| Banner | none | column 0 | The startup line printed once per invocation, on stderr |
+| Banner | none | column 0 | The startup line printed once per invocation |
 | Begin | `》` (white) | column 0 | An operation is about to start (present-continuous verb) |
 | Complete | `》` (green) | column 0 | An operation just finished (past-tense verb) |
 | Info | `》` (white) | column 0 | Neutral status update |
@@ -752,11 +667,12 @@ regardless of color setting (emoji are not color).
 ## requirements
 * Go 1.26 or later
-* Docker, with a reachable daemon, to test, lint, check, or commit:
+* Docker, with a reachable daemon, to lint, check, or commit:
-  `script/test` and `script/lint` build the `test` and `lint` phases of
+  `script/lint` lints by building `Dockerfile.lint`, which runs the
-  the `Dockerfile`, and `make check` and the pre-commit hook both run
+  digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image as a build step, and `make check`
-  them. A `golangci-lint` installed on `PATH` is not a substitute and is
+  and the pre-commit hook both run it. A `golangci-lint` installed on
-  never used on a host, whatever its version.
+  `PATH` is not a substitute and is never used on a host, whatever its
  version.
 * S3-compatible object storage (or local filesystem, or rclone remote)
 ## development workflow
@@ -787,20 +703,16 @@ standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
 development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call
 them. We provide:
-* `script/bootstrap` — install all development dependencies (Go, Go
+* `script/bootstrap` — install all development dependencies (go, Go
-  module download). A host without Go gets the `go.mod` version through
+  module download). It deliberately does not install `golangci-lint`;
-  `script/install-go`, in `.tool/go`, which `script/bootstrap` itself,
+  see `script/lint` below.
  the `Makefile`, `script/fmt`, `script/fmt-check`, `script/precommit`
  and `script/release` add to their `PATH`. It
  deliberately does not install `golangci-lint`; see `script/lint`
  below.
 * `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: runs
  `script/bootstrap`, then `script/install-precommit`
 * `script/projectname` — print the project name (used for the Docker
  image tag)
 * `script/version` — print the version string to bake into the binary.
-  The `Makefile`'s `LDFLAGS` call this. See [releasing](#releasing) for
+  The `Makefile`'s `LDFLAGS` call this; it is the single source of truth
-  the rules.
+  for the version. See [releasing](#releasing) for the rules.
 * `script/install-goreleaser` — install the pinned `goreleaser` into
  `.tool/bin` from a sha256-verified release archive. Idempotent, and
  called by `script/bootstrap`; the release workflow calls it directly
@@ -808,60 +720,100 @@ them. We provide:
  `script/bootstrap` insists on.
 * `script/install-go` — install the Go toolchain named by `go.mod`'s
  `go` directive into `.tool/go` from a sha256-verified `go.dev`
-  archive, for Linux or macOS on amd64 or arm64. Idempotent. On a CI
+  archive, and put it on `PATH`. Idempotent. Called only by the release
-  runner it also puts `.tool/go/bin` on `PATH` for the steps that
+  workflow, which needs a host Go for `goreleaser` to shell out to;
-  follow. Called by the release workflow, which needs a host Go for
+  nothing else on the release runner does. `actions/setup-go` is not
-  `goreleaser` to shell out to, and by `script/bootstrap` on a host
+  used because it verifies the downloaded toolchain against no value in
-  without Go. `actions/setup-go` is not used because it verifies the
+  this repo. Bumping Go edits `go.mod`, the checksum in this script, and
-  downloaded toolchain against no value in this repo. Bumping Go edits
+  the `Dockerfile` `golang` digest together.
  `go.mod`, the checksums in this script, and the two `golang` digests
  in the `Dockerfile` together.
 * `script/release` — cross-compile and publish the release artifacts
  with the pinned `goreleaser`. Refuses a `goreleaser` on `PATH` whose
-  version is not the pinned one, because a different version would build
+  version is not the pinned one, on the same reasoning as `script/lint`.
  a different release from the same tag.
 * `script/release-snapshot` — the same build with no publishing and no
  tagging, into `./dist`
-* `script/test` — run the test suite by building the `test` phase of
+* `script/test` — run the test suite (verbose rerun on failure). This
-  the `Dockerfile` (verbose rerun on failure). This runs *everything*:
+  runs *everything*: there is no separate integration target and no
-  there is no separate integration target and no build-tagged subset
+  build-tagged subset held back, so the full round-trip tests in
-  held back, so the full round-trip tests in
+  `internal/vaultik/integration_test.go` run on every invocation. It
-  `internal/vaultik/integration_test.go` run on every invocation. The
+  passes `-count=1`, which disables Go's test result cache. That is
-  90s `-timeout` is a hang backstop rather than a performance budget; it
+  deliberate and it is not free: on this repo's suite it costs about 11
-  applies per test binary, to test execution only.
+  seconds on every repeat run (measured, back to back: 0.4s cached
-* `script/lint` — lint by building the `lint` phase of the
+  versus 11.6s with `-count=1`). That is the price of the run meaning
-  `Dockerfile`, which runs `golangci-lint config verify` and then
+  anything, because without it an unchanged package prints
-  `golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...` as build steps in
+  `ok <pkg> (cached)`, which is indistinguishable from a package that
-  the digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image. Nothing lints on the host.
+  really ran, so the whole suite can report a full set of `ok` lines in
-  That `FROM` line is the only pin of the linter version, and it changes
+  under half a second having executed nothing. The `-timeout` is a hang
-  in the same commit as a re-vendored `.golangci.yml`.
+  backstop rather than a performance budget — it applies per test binary
-* `script/lint-fix` — apply the linter's autofixes (rewrites files),
+  to test execution only, not to compilation — and is set well above the
-  using the same pinned image, parsed out of the `lint` phase's `FROM`
+  slowest package's measured runtime. Its 120s value deliberately
-  line. It cannot be a build step, because fixes have to land in the
+  diverges from the 30s `REPO_POLICIES.md` mandates; the reasoning is in
-  worktree, so it bind-mounts the tree into a `docker run` and therefore
+  the comment in the script, and issue #101 proposes amending the policy
-  needs a *local* daemon. It is a developer convenience and never a
+  text.
-  gate: no gate reads its exit status. Run `make lint` afterwards to
+* `script/lint` — lint by building `Dockerfile.lint`, which runs
-  find out whether the tree is clean.
+  `golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...` as a build step
-* `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
+  inside the digest-pinned `golangci-lint` image, so a successful build
-* `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only). It runs `gofmt` on
+  *is* a clean lint. Nothing lints on the host, at any version, ever;
-  the host, over every Go file outside `.tool`.
+  the script requires Docker and fails loudly rather than falling back
-* `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, and
+  to a `golangci-lint` on `PATH`. That `FROM` line is the single source
-  `script/fmt-check`.
+  of truth for the linter version — bump it there and nowhere else.
 * `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via
  `script/projectname`, stamped with the version
  `git describe --tags --always --dirty` gives on the host, or `unknown`
  outside a git checkout. The image's build stage depends on the `lint`
  and `test` phases, so this lints and tests too.
 * `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: runs `script/bootstrap`,
  `script/check`, and then the same image build as `script/docker`.
  `.gitea/workflows/check.yml` runs it on every push.
-  Every `docker build` in these scripts passes `--no-cache`, because on
+  It takes no arguments, because a build step has no command line to
-  an unchanged tree a cached check layer is replayed without running and
+  pass flags to, and it passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` on
-  the build still exits 0. A plain `docker build .` is therefore no
+  every invocation so the lint layer cannot be replayed from cache (see
-  evidence that the checks ran. The cost is that `script/cibuild` runs
+  `script/cibuild` below for what that mechanism defends against). To
-  the `lint` and `test` phases twice: once in `script/check` and again
+  watch the linter execute, run it as
-  in the image build.
+  `BUILDKIT_PROGRESS=plain script/lint` and check that the lint layer
  says `RUN … golangci-lint` rather than `CACHED`.
  One container per run means one lint cache and one `golangci-lint`
  lock per run, both private to it and discarded with it, so concurrent
  runs on one host cannot contaminate or block each other.
 * `script/lint-fix` — apply the linter's autofixes (rewrites files),
  using the same pinned image, parsed out of `Dockerfile.lint`. It
  cannot be a build step, because fixes have to land in the worktree, so
  it bind-mounts the tree into a `docker run` and therefore needs a
  *local* daemon. It is a developer convenience and never a gate: no
  gate reads its exit status. Run `make lint` afterwards to find out
  whether the tree is clean.
 * `script/fmt` — format all code (writes)
 * `script/fmt-check` — check formatting (read-only)
 * `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, and
  `script/fmt-check`. This is authoritative *because* `script/lint`
  builds `Dockerfile.lint`: a local `make check` and CI cannot disagree
  about lint findings.
 * `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged via
  `script/projectname`. Passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` for the
  same reason `script/cibuild` does, so a local image build cannot be
  green on checks it replayed from cache. It builds the *product* image
  only, and the product `Dockerfile` has no lint stage, so it does not
  lint: a green here means formatted, tested, and it compiles.
 * `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint, and the full gate. Two builds, in
  order: `Dockerfile.lint` (the linter, as a build step) and then
  `Dockerfile` (`make fmt-check` and `make test` in its builder stage,
  then the product image). Either failing fails the script. It runs the
  checks in the same containers CI does, from a clean copy of the tree,
  so it also catches anything that depends on host state.
  `.gitea/workflows/check.yml` runs it on every push to `main` and
  `next` and on every pull request against either.
  It passes a fresh `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH` to each build, unique per
  invocation, which both files declare immediately above their check
  `RUN`s and expand into each check command. Those layers are keyed on
  that value, so a new value re-runs them even on a byte-identical tree,
  and a green from this script means the checks executed. Dependency and
  module layers sit above the `ARG` and still cache, so a build is not
  cold.
  A build that supplies no `CHECK_EPOCH` — a bare `docker build .` or
  `docker build -f Dockerfile.lint .` — fails rather than lying. An
  unset `ARG` is an empty string and an empty string is a stable cache
  key, so without a guard such a build would serve every check layer
  from cache, execute nothing, and still exit 0. Each file therefore
  asserts the value is non-empty before running anything, and because
  failed steps are never cached that assertion fires on every
  invocation rather than once. Use `script/lint`, `script/docker` or
  `script/cibuild`, which pass the arg; a bare `docker build` is a loud
  error.
 * `script/precommit` — pre-commit gate: `go mod tidy` + `go fmt` (must
  not change files), then `script/check`
 * `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
@@ -872,35 +824,24 @@ them. We provide:
 ### version numbers
 The version a binary reports comes from git, not from a constant in a
-file. It is `git describe --tags --always --dirty`, which
+file. `script/version` decides it, and everything that stamps a binary
-`script/version` runs for the `Makefile`, and `script/docker` and
+agrees with it:
 `script/cibuild` run themselves:
-* `HEAD` is exactly on a tag → that tag, such as `v1.0.0`.
+* `HEAD` is exactly on a tag → that tag with a leading `v` stripped, so
-* a commit after a tag → `<tag>-<N>-g<short sha>`.
+  the tag `v1.0.0` produces `vaultik 1.0.0`, matching the archive name
-* no tag reachable → the short commit sha.
+  `vaultik_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz`. `goreleaser` strips the prefix the
-* any of these, with uncommitted changes to tracked files → a `-dirty`
+  same way.
 * anything else → `dev-<12 chars of the commit sha>`.
 * either, with uncommitted changes to tracked files → a `-dirty`
  suffix, because a modified checkout of a tag is not that tag.
-A `docker build .` of a clone, with no build arguments, runs the same
+A build that is not a release never names itself like one. `vaultik
-`git describe` (without `--dirty`) on the `.git` in its build context,
+version` says so in as many words on a development build, and
-so it stamps the same value for a clean commit; the build fails if the
+`goreleaser --snapshot` stamps the same `dev-<sha>` string rather than
-context carries `.git` and no version, commit or commit date comes out.
+inventing the next patch number. If `script/version` cannot be run at
-A binary built without
+all, `make` stops with an error instead of building an unversioned
-git metadata reports `dev`, or `unknown` when `script/docker` or
+binary, and a binary that somehow carries an empty version string still
-`script/cibuild` built it outside a git checkout.
+reports itself as a development build.
 `goreleaser` stamps a release binary with the tag minus its leading
 `v`, so the tag `v1.0.0` produces `vaultik 1.0.0`, matching the archive
 name `vaultik_1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz`. `goreleaser --snapshot` stamps
 `dev-<12 chars of the commit sha>` rather than inventing the next patch
 number. `vaultik version` calls a build a development build when its
 version is `dev`, `unknown`, `dev-<sha>`, the short commit sha or
 `<tag>-<N>-g<short sha>`, with or without `-dirty`; only a plain tag,
 such as `v1.0.0` or `1.0.0`, is a release. If `script/version` cannot
 be run at all, `make` stops with an error instead of building an
 unversioned binary, and a binary that somehow carries an empty version
 string still reports itself as a development build.
 ### cutting a release
@@ -929,14 +870,14 @@ It is passed to `goreleaser` as `GITEA_TOKEN`. The runner's automatic
 token is deliberately not used: it is not guaranteed to carry release
 write access.
-The Go toolchain that compiles the released binaries is installed by
+The Go toolchain that compiles the released binaries comes from an
-`script/install-go`, which downloads the version named by `go.mod`
+`actions/setup-go` step pinned by commit sha, reading its version from
-(currently `1.26.1`, the same version the `Dockerfile` builder stage
+`go.mod` (currently `1.26.1`, the same version the `Dockerfile` builder
-pins by digest) and refuses the archive unless its sha256 matches the
+stage pins by digest). `goreleaser` shells out to `go` for every
 value committed in the script. `goreleaser` shells out to `go` for every
 cross-compile, so without that step the release would either fail
 outright or ship binaries built by whatever unpinned toolchain the
-runner happened to carry.
+runner happened to carry — the one unpinned thing in an otherwise
 hash-pinned release path.
 To rehearse the whole build without publishing or tagging anything:
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Repository Policies
-last_modified: 2026-10-04
+last_modified: 2026-07-06
 ---
 This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -60,28 +60,17 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
  prerequisite since nvm requires bash. yarn is then pinned via
  `corepack prepare yarn@<version> --activate`. Never install "latest" or "lts";
  always exact versions. `script/cibuild` runs the CI build: it changes to the
-  repo root, runs `script/bootstrap`, runs `script/check`, and builds the image
+  repo root and runs `docker build .`; the Gitea workflow calls it. Four further
-  with the version; the Gitea workflow calls it. **`script/cibuild` runs
+  scripts are our own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs
-  `script/bootstrap` first**, because the workflow checks out the repo and runs
+  `script/test`, `script/lint`, and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is
-  nothing else, while `script/fmt-check` runs the formatter on the host: on a
+  what the git pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`;
-  pristine checkout with nothing installed the run dies there, after the
+  `script/install-precommit` installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks`
-  containerised gates have passed. **The bootstrap alone is not enough**:
+  target shims to it); and `script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply
-  `script/bootstrap` installs node and yarn under nvm and leaves neither on the
+  outputs the project's name. Scripts that need the name call
-  `PATH` of the shell that called it, so a bare `yarn` still exits 127. The host
+  `script/projectname` — e.g. `script/docker` assembles its image tag from it —
-  entrypoints that need yarn — `script/fmt` and `script/fmt-check` — therefore
+  so those scripts stay byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific
-  source nvm for the pinned node version before invoking it, exactly as
+  pre-commit extras (e.g. `go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in
-  `script/bootstrap`'s own install step does. A runner carrying nothing but
+  `script/precommit`, not in the hook itself. Model scripts are at
  docker and git then gets through `script/check`. Four further scripts are our
  own extensions to the standard: `script/check` runs `script/test`,
  `script/lint` and `script/fmt-check`; `script/precommit` is what the git
  pre-commit hook runs, and it calls `script/check`; `script/install-precommit`
  installs the git pre-commit hook (the `make hooks` target shims to it); and
  `script/projectname` (literally that filename) simply outputs the project's
  name. Scripts that need the name call `script/projectname` — e.g.
  `script/docker` assembles its image tag from it — so those scripts stay
  byte-identical across all repos. Repo-type-specific pre-commit extras (e.g.
  `go mod tidy` verification in Go repos) belong in `script/precommit`, not in
  the hook itself. Model scripts are at
  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/script/<name>`. The README
  must document the provided scripts in an **Entrypoints** section (see the
  README requirements below).
@@ -100,198 +89,87 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
  contributor should be able to understand the entire development workflow by
  reading the Makefile.
- Every repo should have a `Dockerfile`, and it carries the repo's gates: a
+- Every repo should have a `Dockerfile`. All Dockerfiles must run `make check`
-  `lint` phase and a `test` phase, with the final stage depending on both so the
+  as a build step so the build fails if the branch is not green. For non-server
-  image cannot be built unless they pass. For non-server repos the final stage
+  repos, the Dockerfile should bring up a development environment and run
-  brings up a development environment; for server repos it is the runtime image.
+  `make check`. For server repos, `make check` should run as an early build
-  The gate phases and the build stage start from their pinned base images and
+  stage before the final image is assembled. Dockerfiles install development
-  install what those images lack either inline, as the canonical Go `Dockerfile`
+  prerequisites by running `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating installs
-  below does for `git`, or by running `script/bootstrap`, as the `prompts`
+  inline; COPY `script/` and the dependency manifests (`package.json` +
-  repo's own `Dockerfile` does for its yarn packages. The development
+  `yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it so the bootstrap
-  environment stage installs development prerequisites by running
+  layer stays cached until dependencies change.
  `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating its installs inline. A stage that
  runs `script/bootstrap` COPYs `script/` and the dependency manifests
  (`package.json` + `yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it.
- **Linting and testing run in Docker, as phases of the `Dockerfile`.** There is
+- **Dockerfiles must use a separate lint stage for fail-fast feedback.** Go
-  no separate lint file. `script/lint` and `script/test` each build one phase
+  repos use a multistage build where linting runs in an independent stage based
-  and nothing else:
+  on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by hash). This stage runs
  `make fmt-check` and `make lint` before the full build begins. The build stage
  then declares an explicit dependency on the lint stage via
  `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null`, which forces BuildKit to complete
  linting before proceeding to compilation and tests. This ensures lint failures
  surface in seconds rather than minutes, without blocking on dependency
  download or compilation in the build stage.
-    ```sh
+    The standard pattern for a Go repo Dockerfile is:
    docker build --no-cache --target lint -t "$(script/projectname)-lint" .
    docker build --no-cache --target test -t "$(script/projectname)-test" .
    ```
    **A stage that is not the last one in the file is built only when the final
    stage's chain depends on it, or when `--target` names it.** That is why the
    two gates are always invoked by name here, and why the final stage carries a
    `COPY --from=` of a harmless file from each of them: without that edge a
    plain `docker build .` builds the last stage alone and exits 0 having linted
    and tested nothing.
    **Every `docker build` in `script/` is tagged**, here and in
    `script/cibuild` and `script/docker`. An untagged build leaves a dangling
    image behind on every invocation, on every developer host and every CI
    runner; a tagged one replaces the previous image.
    Inside a phase the tool is invoked directly — `golangci-lint`, `go test`,
    `eslint`, `prettier` — never through `make lint` or `script/test`, which are
    themselves a `docker build` and would recurse into a daemon that does not
    exist in a build step. Formatting is the exception and stays on the host:
    `script/fmt` writes the working tree, and `script/fmt-check` is its
    read-only twin.
    **No lint verdict may come from a host invocation of the linter.** On a
    shared host golangci-lint reads a result cache keyed on file content rather
    than location, so a second checkout of the same content is served the first
    one's findings, and a host-global lock in `$TMPDIR` makes concurrent runs
    exit non-zero with `parallel golangci-lint is running` — a status a caller
    cannot tell from real findings. Both have produced wrong verdicts in this
    org, in both directions. A container has its own cache, its own `TMPDIR` and
    a digest-pinned binary, so neither is reachable.
 - **Any build that runs checks is built with `--no-cache`.** Docker invalidates
  a `COPY` layer only when the copied content changes, so on an unchanged tree
  the check `RUN` is served from cache, nothing executes, and the build still
  exits 0. Every `docker build` in `script/` therefore passes `--no-cache`:
  `script/lint`, `script/test`, `script/cibuild` and `script/docker` are the
  four, and there is no fifth — `script/check` runs the two gate phases and
  `script/fmt-check`, and builds no image of its own. A bare `docker build .` is
  not evidence that anything ran: a sub-second build reporting success is a
  cache hit, not a result. Never invalidate by pruning — `docker builder prune`
  and friends destroy a build cache shared with every other build on the host.
  When a check is added or changed, prove it works by planting a defect it must
  catch and watching the run fail on it, then revert the defect. A green run
  alone shows neither that the check ran nor that it covers what it should.
 - **The gate phases are separate stages, and the build stage depends on both.**
  The lint phase is based on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by
  hash), so lint failures surface in seconds rather than after a full compile,
  and the test phase is based on the Debian Go image. The canonical Go repo
  `Dockerfile`:
    ```dockerfile
-    # Lint phase
+    # Lint stage — fast feedback on formatting and lint issues
    # golangci/golangci-lint:v2.x.x, YYYY-MM-DD
    FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:... AS lint
    WORKDIR /src
    COPY go.mod go.sum ./
    RUN go mod download
    COPY . .
-    RUN golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
+    RUN make fmt-check
    RUN make lint
-    # Test phase. -race needs cgo and so a C compiler, which the Debian Go
+    # Build stage
    # image ships and the alpine one does not.
    # golang:1.x, YYYY-MM-DD
    FROM golang@sha256:... AS test
    WORKDIR /src
    COPY go.mod go.sum ./
    RUN go mod download
    COPY . .
    RUN go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
        { echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
          go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
    # Build stage. Nothing is wanted from either phase above; the copies
    # are what make BuildKit build them first, so this stage cannot run
    # unless lint and test passed.
    # golang:1.x-alpine, YYYY-MM-DD
    FROM golang@sha256:... AS builder
    COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
    COPY --from=test /src/go.sum /dev/null
    RUN apk add --no-cache git
    # A tar-stream context keeps the sender's file owners, which git refuses.
    RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
    WORKDIR /src
    # Force BuildKit to run the lint stage before proceeding
    COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
    COPY go.mod go.sum ./
    RUN go mod download
    COPY . .
    RUN make test
-    # The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
+    ARG VERSION=dev
-    # `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
+    RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-    # .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
+        -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-    # build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
+        -o /app ./cmd/app/
    ARG VERSION
    RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
        if [ -e .git ]; then \
            case "$VERSION" in ""|dev|unknown) \
                echo "version is '$VERSION' although .git is present" >&2; \
                exit 1 ;; \
            esac; \
        fi; \
        CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
            -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
            -o /app ./cmd/app/
-    # Runtime stage, and the last one
+    # Runtime stage
    FROM alpine@sha256:...
    COPY --from=builder /app /usr/local/bin/app
    ENTRYPOINT ["app"]
    ```
    Key points:
-    - The lint phase uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it has
+    - The lint stage uses the `golangci/golangci-lint` image directly (it
-      both Go and the linter), so nothing needs installing.
+      includes both Go and the linter), so there is no need to install the
-    - `COPY --from=<phase> /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op copy whose only
+      linter separately.
-      purpose is the ordering edge. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default,
+    - `COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null` is a no-op file copy that creates
-      and a stage nothing depends on is not built at all, so without these two
+      a stage dependency. BuildKit runs stages in parallel by default; without
-      lines a red gate would not fail the build.
+      this line, the build stage would not wait for lint to finish and a lint
-    - Keep the runtime stage last, and if you add a stage after it, give it the
+      failure might not fail the overall build.
      same two copies. A plain `docker build .` builds the last stage's chain
      and nothing else.
    - If the project uses `//go:embed` directives that reference build artifacts
-      (e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint phase must
+      (e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint stage must
      create placeholder files so the embed directives resolve. Example:
      `RUN mkdir -p web/dist && touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css`.
-    - If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting, install them
+      The lint stage should not depend on the actual build output — it exists to
-      in the lint phase. The `golangci/golangci-lint` image is Debian-based and
+      fail fast.
-      has no `apk`, so install with `apt-get` under the Debian package name
+    - If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting (e.g.
-      (`libvips-dev`, where alpine says `vips-dev`), and delete the package
+      `vips-dev`), install them in the lint stage with `apk add`.
-      lists in the same `RUN`, so the layer does not keep them:
+    - The build stage runs `make test` after compilation setup. Tests run in the
-
+      build stage, not the lint stage, because they may require compiled
-        ```dockerfile
+      artifacts or heavier dependencies.
        RUN apt-get update \
            && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libvips-dev \
            && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
        ```
    - `.dockerignore` lets `.git` into the build context. It keeps out every git
      `config` at any depth (`**/.git/config`, `**/.git/modules/**/config`): the
      repository's own, each submodule's under `.git/modules/`, and that of a
      submodule keeping its own `.git` directory. `git describe` does not need
      them, and each can hold a credential: a password in a remote URL, or the
      token the CI checkout step stores there. A submodule whose name has a
      `config` segment (`config`, `deploy/config`, `config/lib`) loses its whole
      git directory to `**/.git/modules/**/config`, and Go's version stamping
      then fails the build: give it a name without that segment
      (`git submodule add --name`). The stage that compiles has `git` (the
      Debian Go image has it; an alpine one needs `apk add --no-cache git`) and
      takes the version from the `VERSION` build argument when one is given,
      otherwise from `git describe --tags --always`. That gives the tag on a
      tagged commit; on a later commit, the tag, the number of commits since it
      and the short commit (`v1.2.3-4-gabc1234`); and the short commit when no
      tag is reachable. The stage that compiles also marks its working directory
      safe for git (`git config --system --add safe.directory /src`): a context
      sent as a tar stream keeps the sender's file owners, and git refuses a
      checkout owned by another user, so the version would come out empty.
      `ARG VERSION` has no default, and the build fails if the context carries
      `.git` and the version still comes out empty, `dev` or `unknown`. A plain
      `docker build .` with no build arguments must succeed; a Dockerfile that
      refuses an empty build argument drops that refusal and keeps the argument.
 - Every repo should have a Gitea Actions workflow (`.gitea/workflows/`) that
-  runs `script/cibuild` on push, and checks out the repo as its only other step.
+  runs `script/cibuild` (which runs `docker build .`) on push. Since the
-  That script bootstraps, runs the gate phases, and then builds the image, so a
+  Dockerfile already runs `make check`, a successful build implies all checks
-  successful run means every check passed; a bare `docker build .` does not
+  pass.
  carry the same guarantee, because its gate phases may come from the cache. The
  image build is uncached and so runs the gate phases a second time. That is the
  price of the rule above, and it is worth paying: the image that ships is built
  from a run of its own gates rather than from a cache entry. A separate
  workflow limited to `main` by a `branches` list under `on: push` cannot be
  checked by review: to try a change to it, add the feature branch to that list
  and push, then remove the branch from the list again before merging. Keep any
  job in it that publishes behind `if: github.ref_name == 'main'`, so the run
  from the feature branch publishes nothing.
 - Use platform-standard formatters: `black` for Python, `prettier` for
  JS/CSS/Markdown/HTML, `go fmt` for Go. Always use default configuration with
@@ -311,21 +189,14 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
  module under test to verify it compiles/parses. There is no excuse for
  `make test` to be a no-op.
- `make test` must complete in under 60 seconds. That is the hard cap, and a
+- `make test` must complete in under 20 seconds. Add a 30-second timeout in the
-  suite that exceeds it fails. Under 20 seconds is the target. A suite between
+  Makefile.
  20 and 60 seconds is still green, but the overage must be filed as an
  improvement bug against that repo. Add a 90-second timeout to the test
  invocation (`go test -timeout 90s`). The backstop deliberately sits above the
  hard cap so that it catches a genuinely hung test rather than a merely slow
  one.
- **The test command should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run
+- **`make test` should use the conditional verbose rerun pattern.** Run tests
-  tests without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with
+  without `-v` (verbose) first. If tests fail, automatically rerun with `-v` to
-  `-v` to show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean
+  show full output. This keeps CI logs and `docker build` output clean on
-  on success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic
+  success (just package/suite summaries) while providing full diagnostic detail
-  detail on failure (every test case, every assertion). The command lives in the
+  on failure (every test case, every assertion). The general shell pattern:
  `test` phase of the `Dockerfile`, since `script/test` builds that phase; the
  Makefile form below is the same pattern for any repo-local invocation:
    ```makefile
    test:
@@ -338,26 +209,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
    ```makefile
    test:
-    	@go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
+    	@go test -timeout 30s -race -cover ./... || \
    		{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
-    		  go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
+    		  go test -timeout 30s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
    ```
    `-count=1` is required on both invocations: it defeats Go's test _result_
    cache, so neither run can report a stored pass in place of running the
    tests. It leaves the build cache alone, so it costs the runtime of the suite
    and no recompilation.
    That cache is Go's own, separate from Docker's layer cache. Go stores a
    passing result in its cache directory (`GOCACHE`), and when the same tests
    run again on unchanged code it prints that result, marked `(cached)`,
    without running them. That matters on a developer's machine, where this
    target runs and the directory lasts from one run to the next. The `test`
    phase of the `Dockerfile` needs no `-count=1`: its base image holds no
    result for this repo's tests and nothing before its `go test` step runs a
    test, so there is nothing to replay. `--no-cache` (above) is what makes that
    step run on an unchanged tree.
    Python example:
    ```makefile
@@ -383,84 +239,10 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
  must be in `.gitignore`. No exceptions.
 - `.gitignore` should be comprehensive from the start: OS files (`.DS_Store`),
-  editor files (`.swp`, `*~`), in-repo agent scratch directories (`.claude/`),
+  editor files (`.swp`, `*~`), language build artifacts, and `node_modules/`.
-  language build artifacts, and `node_modules/`. Fetch the standard `.gitignore`
+  Fetch the standard `.gitignore` from
-  from `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when
+  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.gitignore` when setting up
-  setting up a new repo. These patterns are written to `.gitignore`'s own
+  a new repo.
  semantics, in which an unanchored pattern already matches at every depth; they
  are not a `.dockerignore` and must not be transplanted into one unmodified.
 - **`.dockerignore` does not use `.gitignore` semantics, and copying patterns
  across unmodified leaves secrets in the build context.** Docker matches with
  `moby/patternmatcher`: `filepath.Match` semantics plus a `**` extension, so
  `*` does not cross `/` and a pattern without a leading `**/` is anchored at
  the build-context root. A `.dockerignore` listing `.env`, `*.pem` and `*.key`
  therefore excludes only the copies at the repository root, while `config/.env`
  and `certs/server.key` still reach the context and can land in an image layer
  — which is more dangerous than a short file with no secret patterns at all,
  because it reads as solved and stops anyone looking. Give every
  depth-independent pattern the `**/` prefix and leave only genuinely
  root-anchored entries unprefixed: `.claude`, and the repo's own host-built
  binary, written `/myapp` and never `**/myapp`, which would also match
  `cmd/myapp/` and delete the package directory from the context. Matching is
  case-sensitive, and an ALL-CAPS twin per pattern still misses `Server.Key`, so
  secret names use character ranges — `**/*.[kK][eE][yY]`, `**/*.[pP][eE][mM]`,
  and likewise for `.envrc` and the extensionless SSH keys. Where such a pattern
  also catches something the build needs, re-include it with a negation
  (`!docs/example.env`); deleting the pattern reopens the exposure for every
  other file it covers. Fetch the standard `.dockerignore` from
  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.dockerignore` and extend
  it with the repo's own artifacts.
 - **In-repo agent scratch belongs in both files, written to each file's own
  semantics.** `.claude/` holds one worktree per in-flight agent — an entire
  additional checkout of the repo — so under `COPY . .` the build context
  inflates by a multiple of the repo and another session's unreviewed work can
  be copied into an image layer. In `.gitignore` the entry is `.claude/`,
  unanchored. In `.dockerignore` it is `.claude`, anchored and with **no** `**/`
  prefix, because the prefixed form would also delete any nested directory of
  that name from the build. Anchoring carries a known gap that the canonical
  `.dockerignore` states in its own comment, since consuming repos receive the
  file and not the tracker: the directory is created in the agent's working
  directory, so a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
  `services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry there.
 - **A plain `docker build .` of a clone stamps the version that
  `git describe --tags --always` gives**, derived from the `.git` in the build
  context as the canonical `Dockerfile` above shows. Without its failure check,
  a missing `git` or an unreadable checkout would leave `-X main.Version=` empty
  and the build would still exit 0. `script/docker` and `script/cibuild` pass
  the version they compute on the host; it takes precedence. They do this
  byte-identically across repos:
    ```sh
    # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does not
    # trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades to an empty constant.
    version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
    [ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
    docker build --no-cache \
        --build-arg VERSION="$version" \
        -t "$(script/projectname)" .
    ```
    `--always` makes an untagged repo yield an abbreviated commit hash rather
    than failing, and the `[ -n "$version" ]` line is the single place the
    fallback is applied — a live check that fires on a build from an export with
    no `.git` and on a repository with no commits yet. Do not fold it into the
    substitution as `|| echo unknown`, which makes the guard unreachable. The
    Dockerfile's side is `ARG VERSION` in the stage that compiles, declared
    there because `ARG` is stage-scoped; passing `VERSION` to a repo whose
    Dockerfile declares no such `ARG` is ignored and costs nothing, which is why
    the scripts stay byte-identical. One consequence for CI: the standard
    checkout action clones shallow and fetches no tags, so a repo that embeds a
    tag-derived version must set `fetch-depth: 0` on its checkout step.
 - **Verify `.dockerignore` by enumerating the image, not by reading the
  patterns.** Plant files at the root _and_ at least two directories deep, build
  a probe image that does `COPY . .`, and list what actually landed
  (`docker run --rm --entrypoint find IMAGE /app`). The `transferring context`
  size is not a substitute: a nested secret is a few bytes, and BuildKit
  transfers only the delta from the previous build.
 - **No build artifacts in version control.** Code-derived data (compiled
  bundles, minified output, generated assets) must never be committed to the
@@ -476,56 +258,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 - Make all changes on a feature branch. You can do whatever you want on a
  feature branch.
- `.golangci.yml` is standardized. The vendored copy in a consuming repo must
+- `.golangci.yml` is standardized and must _NEVER_ be modified by an agent, only
-  _NEVER_ be modified by an agent: fetch it from
+  manually by the user. Fetch from
-  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml` and keep it
+  `https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/raw/branch/main/.golangci.yml`.
  byte-identical, so that no repo can quietly loosen its own linting. Linter
  configuration changes are made to the canonical copy in the `prompts` repo and
  reach consuming repos by re-vendoring; an agent may open a PR against
  canonical, which only the user merges. One list is exempt from byte-identity,
  because it cannot be written once for every repo: the `deny` list of the
  `test-support` depguard rule, where a repo names its own test-support packages
  by full import path. A repo adds entries there and changes nothing else, and a
  re-vendor carries its entries forward. The canonical golangci-lint version is
  v2.14.0 (released 2026-09-24), pinned as the digest of the lint phase's base
  image
  (`golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f`,
  which reports `2.14.0 built with go1.27.0 from 114493f9`). A module's `go`
  directive must not name a newer Go minor version than the one golangci-lint
  was built with, or golangci-lint refuses to lint it: this release lints
  `go 1.27.1` but not `go 1.28`. That digest is the only pin, since no repo
  installs golangci-lint on the host. A repo sets the lint phase digest to the
  one named here and re-vendors `.golangci.yml` in the same commit, whichever of
  the two prompted the change: the canonical copy can name linters that an older
  golangci-lint rejects, and a newer golangci-lint can add linters that
  `default: all` switches on until the canonical copy disables them.
 - **`script/bootstrap` installs a pinned tool by comparing versions, never by
  testing presence.** An `if ! command -v <tool>; then install; fi` guard tests
  `PATH` only, so on an already-provisioned machine the pin is inert and a
  version bump is a silent no-op — while the Dockerfile, installing into a clean
  image, gets the pinned version, so a local `make check` and `make docker` can
  disagree about what the tool even is. The canonical form:
    - compares the installed version against the pin over the **whole** version
      token; a parser that stops at the first `-` reports `2.12.2` for a host
      running `2.12.2-rc1` and skips the install;
    - treats absent, non-zero, empty or unrecognised `--version` output as a
      mismatch, so the failure direction is a redundant install and never a
      skipped one;
    - after installing, re-resolves the binary the way callers do — `hash -r`,
      then through `PATH`, not through the directory the installer wrote to —
      and fails naming the resolved path, since an install that a shadowing
      binary hides succeeds while changing nothing any caller sees;
    - is actually called, and prints the version on both success paths: a
      function defined and never invoked has the same exit status and the same
      empty output as one that worked.
    Keep it POSIX sh: no arrays, no `[[`, no `grep -P`.
    A Go tool a repo needs on the host is installed with `go install` pinned to
    a commit hash (`go install <package>@<commit hash>`). It is never tracked as
    a `go.mod` tool dependency or through a `tools.go` file, either of which
    pulls the tool's own dependencies into the repo's `go.mod` and `go.sum`.
 - When pinning images or packages by hash, add a comment above the reference
  with the version and date (YYYY-MM-DD).
@@ -639,14 +374,12 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
  settings.
 - Avoid putting files in the repo root unless necessary. Root should contain
-  only project-level config files (`README.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `Makefile`,
+  only project-level config files (`README.md`, `Makefile`, `Dockerfile`,
-  `Dockerfile`, `LICENSE`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`, `REPO_POLICIES.md`,
+  `LICENSE`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`, `REPO_POLICIES.md`, and
-  and language-specific config). Everything else goes in a subdirectory.
+  language-specific config). Everything else goes in a subdirectory. Canonical
-  Canonical subdirectory names:
+  subdirectory names:
    - `bin/` — executable scripts and tools
-    - `cmd/` — Go command entrypoints; thin only: one `main.go` per binary whose
+    - `cmd/` — Go command entrypoints
      body is a single call into `internal/` or `pkg/`, no project logic in
      `cmd/`
    - `configs/` — configuration templates and examples
    - `deploy/` — deployment manifests (k8s, compose, terraform)
    - `docs/` — documentation and markdown (README.md stays in root)
@@ -673,7 +406,3 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
    - Go: `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `.golangci.yml`
    - JS: `package.json`, `yarn.lock`, `.prettierrc`, `.prettierignore`
    - Python: `pyproject.toml`
 - Guidance for coding agents lives in one `AGENTS.md` at the repository root. It
  is never committed under a file or directory named after one agent tool, such
  as `CLAUDE.md` or `.claude/`, and never split into separate memory files.
@@ -14,445 +14,17 @@ pre-1.0
 # Next Step
-The 1.0 work is complete on `next`: the scope settled on
+Define the remaining scope for the first tagged release under the 1.0.0
-[issue #125](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/125) was the work
+milestone, then cut that tag. The mechanism to cut it now exists and is
-already planned for 1.0, and all of it has landed. The mechanism to cut
+exercised; what is left is the scope decision, which is the owner's.
-the tag exists and is exercised; what is left is merging `next` to
+This step deliberately names one version number: it previously said
-`main` and tagging, both the owner's.
+"cut v0.1.0" while the `Makefile` baked in `1.0.0-rc.1` and the issue
 milestone said 1.0.0, and three different answers to "what is the next
 release" is exactly the contradiction
 [issue #65](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/65) was filed over.
 # Completed Steps
 - 2026-10-08: Made a backup cancelled under `--skip-errors` stop at once
  ([issue #286](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/286)). After
  Ctrl-C or SIGTERM, phase 2 treated the cancellation error from each
  remaining file like an unreadable file: it opened the file, printed an
  error line for it, counted it as failed and went on to the next one.
  The run now stops at the first file after the cancellation, and no
  file is counted as failed because of it.
 - 2026-10-08: Made `remote nuke` delete the `.partial` files that
  uploads cut off part-way leave on the destination store
  ([issue #281](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/281)). The
  file and rclone listings skip such a file, so the command left it in
  place and still reported the store empty. It now removes them under
  `metadata/` and `blobs/` as its last step.
 - 2026-10-08: Made a local index error while recording a directory or
  symlink stop a backup under `--skip-errors`
  ([issue #284](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/284)). Phase 2
  only records such an entry in the local index, since it has no data
  to open or read, but an error doing so was skipped like an unreadable
  file. The snapshot then completed without the entry, and a restore
  did not recreate it. The error now stops the backup, as it does
  without the flag.
 - 2026-10-08: Counted a file that a backup could not store as failed
  ([issue #280](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/280)). A file
  that phase 1 counted and phase 2 could not open, because it was
  unreadable under `--skip-errors` or removed in between, was reported
  in the summary as unchanged with its bytes as backed up, and the
  `snapshots` row's `file_count` and `total_size` included it. The
  summary now counts it as failed, and its data total and the row leave
  it out.
 - 2026-10-08: Made `remote info` report a snapshot's blob count and
  blob size as unknown when its manifest cannot be read
  ([issue #272](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/272)). The
  orphan figures were already unknown in that case, but the snapshot's
  row still gave 0 blobs and 0 B, in the table and in `--json`. The row
  now reads `unknown` and `--json` gives `null`. A directory with no
  manifest still shows 0, since the orphan figures count its blobs as
  orphaned.
 - 2026-10-08: Kept the progress line of a snapshot with more than one
  path within 100%
  ([issue #271](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/271)). The
  bytes and files processed counted every path, but the totals they
  were divided by held only the current path's, so a second path
  smaller than the first showed more than 100% and an ETA of `unknown`.
  The totals now add up over the paths scanned so far. The rate behind
  the ETA restarts when each path's scan phase ends, so that phase does
  not lower the rate while the path is processed; until then the rate
  is the previous path's.
 - 2026-10-08: Made a second `snapshot create` of one name succeed when
  it starts in the same second as the first
  ([issue #270](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/270)). The
  timestamp in a snapshot ID is in whole seconds, so the second run got
  the first run's ID and failed with `UNIQUE constraint failed:
  snapshots.id`. When the local index already has a snapshot with the
  ID, the create now waits a second and takes a new timestamp.
 - 2026-10-07: Documented that `--json` skips the confirmation prompt of
  `snapshot remove` and `prune`
  ([issue #268](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/268)). Both
  commands delete without asking under `--json`, since a prompt on stdout
  would break the JSON document, but the help and the README described
  only `--force` as skipping it. The `--json` help of both commands and
  their README entries now say so.
 - 2026-10-07: Made a symlink whose target cannot be read stop the backup
  ([issue #269](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/269)). It was
  left out of the snapshot with only a debug log line, even without
  `--skip-errors`. It now aborts the run, or with `--skip-errors` is
  skipped with the `Failed to access` error line that any other entry
  the scan cannot read gets.
 - 2026-10-07: Stopped a killed rclone upload from leaving a truncated
  object under its key
  ([issue #266](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/266)). The
  rclone backend wrote each object straight to its key, so killing an
  upload to a local or sftp remote left a truncated object there; the
  next backup found the key with `Stat`, skipped the upload and recorded
  a snapshot that could not be restored. On a remote with a server-side
  move, an object is now written under a temporary name ending in
  `.partial` and moved into place, and listings skip such names. Remotes
  without one are still written in place.
 - 2026-10-07: Made an interrupted command exit 130 and say so
  ([issue #267](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/267)). Ctrl-C
  or SIGTERM during `snapshot create`, `snapshot restore` or `snapshot
  verify` exited 0 with no error line (`snapshot verify --json` exited
  1, also without one), so a `--cron` run that never finished looked
  like a success. A command stopped by either signal now exits 130 and
  prints `interrupted before the command finished` on stderr, under
  `--cron` and `--json` too.
 - 2026-10-07: Corrected documentation, help text and comments that were
  false about the code
  ([issue #233](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/233)). A blob
  is not streamed to storage. The README, `ARCHITECTURE.md` and
  `config.example.yml` now say a backup needs free temporary space,
  because each blob is written whole to a temporary file before it is
  uploaded (up to about `blob_size_limit`; an rclone destination that
  cannot stream uploads needs about twice that) and the metadata export
  writes copies of the local index. Temporary files go to `$TMPDIR`
  (default `/tmp`); with `TMPDIR` unset, SQLite writes one of those
  copies to `/var/tmp`. Also corrected: the snapshot ID format, what restore
  reads and how incomplete snapshots are removed in `docs/DATAMODEL.md`,
  what `source_path` holds, the `index_path` and config file defaults,
  what `snapshot remove` cleans up, how the release gets its Go
  toolchain, and the `script/release` and `script/fmt-check` comments.
 - 2026-10-07: Cut the time the `internal/vaultik` and `internal/database`
  tests take ([issue #235](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/235)).
  Most of the `internal/vaultik` time went to 24 tests that ran one at a
  time only because they call `log.Initialize`; they now call it before
  `t.Parallel()`, as the package's other tests do. `TestLargeDatasets`
  committed each of its 1,500 inserts on its own and now makes them in
  one transaction. `TestDedupOnlySnapshotRestores` gives its second
  backup its own snapshot name instead of sleeping past the one-second
  timestamp in the snapshot ID.
 - 2026-10-07: Made two messages say only what is true
  ([issue #240](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/240)). A config
  file that others can read was warned about as containing S3
  credentials even when it set none, as a `file://` config does. The
  warning now says the file may contain S3 credentials only when
  `s3.access_key_id` or `s3.secret_access_key` is set, since either may
  come from a `${...}` reference rather than the file, and otherwise
  says the file is readable by others. `snapshot purge` against a
  destination store it could not list gave an error with
  `listing remote snapshots:` in it twice; the prefix now appears once.
 - 2026-10-07: Made `s3.part_size` set the multipart upload part size
  ([issue #232](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/232)). It was
  loaded and defaulted but never passed to the S3 client, whose uploader
  used a fixed 10MiB part. It now reaches the uploader for `storage_url`
  and for the `s3.*` fields, and a part size S3 refuses, below 5MiB or
  above 5GiB, `0` included, fails at config load. A blob too large for
  S3's limit of 10,000 parts at the configured size is uploaded in larger
  parts. The docs gave the default as `5MB`, which the config file reads
  as 5,000,000 bytes, below the minimum; they now say `5MiB`.
 - 2026-10-07: Made per-name retention work when the hostname contains `_`
  ([issue #230](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/230)). A
  snapshot ID is `hostname_name_timestamp`, and the name was read as
  everything between the first and the last `_`, so with
  `hostname: my_host` the name `home` came out as `host_home`.
  `snapshot purge --keep-latest --snapshot home` then printed "No
  snapshots to delete", and `snapshot create --prune` purged nothing
  without a message. The name is now read using the hostname the
  `snapshots` table stores with each snapshot, cut at its first `.` as it
  is in the ID.
 - 2026-10-07: Made `remote info` stop reporting a snapshot's blobs as
  orphaned when its manifest cannot be read, and stop printing raw
  names from under `metadata/`
  ([issue #228](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/228)). A
  manifest it failed to read was skipped, so that snapshot's blobs were
  counted as orphaned and the report advised running `vaultik prune`.
  The orphan figures are now unknown in that case, with no prune
  advice, and `--json` gives them as `null` with the unreadable remote
  keys in `unreadable_manifests`. A name under `metadata/` that is not
  64 lowercase hex characters is now skipped with a warning instead of
  being printed, control characters included. A manifest under a
  skipped name is then not read either, so it also leaves the orphan
  figures unknown, and `--json` counts such manifests in
  `skipped_manifest_count`. A directory with no manifest in it, as left
  by an interrupted backup, leaves the figures known.
 - 2026-10-07: Made `config set` keep a string that looks like a number
  ([issue #229](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/229)). It wrote
  every value unquoted, and `config.Load` reads the file through untyped
  YAML, so an access key `00112233` loaded as `38043` and a hostname `007`
  as `7`. A value for a string setting in `config.Config` is now tagged as
  a YAML string, which the file quotes wherever YAML would read a number or
  a boolean; other settings are still written unquoted.
 - 2026-10-07: Made a backup notice a file rewritten with its size
  unchanged and a new mtime in the same second as the one in the index
  ([issue #226](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/226)). The
  `files` table held mtime in whole seconds and the scanner compared
  whole seconds, so every later snapshot kept the old content. A new
  `mtime_nsec` column holds the nanoseconds within the second that
  `mtime` holds, and the scanner compares the full mtime. A local index
  created before the change lacks the column and is rebuilt with
  `vaultik database delete` and a full backup.
 - 2026-10-07: Made taking the process-wide lock atomic
  ([issue #227](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/227)). The lock
  read `vaultik.pid`, checked whether that PID was alive and then wrote
  its own, so two writers started together could both pass the check and
  both run. It is now an `flock` on `vaultik.pid`, held until the run
  ends; the kernel drops it when the process exits, so a crash leaves no
  lock behind. A clean exit now empties the file instead of deleting it,
  because deleting it would let two later runs each lock a different
  file.
 - 2026-10-06: Made `snapshot remove --json` write only its document to
  stdout when the destination store cannot be reached
  ([issue #251](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/251)). Its
  warning that the snapshot's metadata was left on the destination store
  went to stdout ahead of the document, breaking `| jq` on a command that
  exited 0. Under `--json` the warning now reaches stderr only, through
  the logger. The warning, the README and the command's help said
  `vaultik prune` would finish the cleanup, but `prune` never removes
  snapshot metadata; they now say to run `vaultik snapshot remove` for the
  snapshot again once the destination store is reachable.
 - 2026-10-06: Made the backup summary and the `snapshots` row count each
  file, byte and upload once
  ([issue #225](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/225)). The
  scanner added a file's bytes again for each new chunk and counted a
  file as unchanged for each chunk already stored, so a first backup
  reported twice its size and "backed up" could go negative. Upload
  figures came from the progress reporter, which `--cron` turns off, and
  `blob_count` counted earlier paths' blobs again for each later path.
  The scanner now counts uploads itself; `blob_size`,
  `blob_uncompressed_size` and `compression_ratio` describe the blobs
  the snapshot references, and `docs/DATAMODEL.md` now says
  `chunk_count` and `blob_count` count what the run added.
 - 2026-10-06: Made command output follow the README's stdout and stderr
  rules ([issue #224](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/224)). The
  startup banner went to stdout, so a `completion` script or a
  `config get` value started with it; the banner now goes to stderr. A
  failing `remote info`, `prune` or `snapshot remove` under `--json`
  printed nothing on either stream, and now reports its error on stderr.
  `snapshot verify --quiet` printed its whole report; it now prints
  none, and a failure still reaches stderr with the same exit status.
 - 2026-10-06: Made a backup without `--cron` of a snapshot with two or
  more `paths` complete instead of panicking with `close of closed
  channel` ([issue #253](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/253)).
  `Scan` runs once per path and started and stopped the progress
  reporter each time, and a second stop panics. The reporter is now
  started and stopped once per snapshot, around the scans of all its
  paths.
 - 2026-10-06: Made a restore path argument select only that path and
  what is beneath it
  ([issue #223](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/223)). The
  lookup matched with SQL `LIKE`, so `/home/u/doc` also restored
  `doc2`, `DOC` and `doc.txt.bak`, and a `_` or `%` in the path acted
  as a wildcard. A backup used the same lookup to load the known files
  of each configured path, so files of a longer sibling path were
  counted as deleted. `FileRepository.ListUnderPath`, which replaces
  `ListByPrefix`, returns the file at the path and every file whose
  path starts with the path plus `/`, compared case-sensitively.
 - 2026-10-06: Made restore return an error instead of panicking on a
  malformed snapshot database
  ([issue #231](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/231)). A chunk
  hash shorter than 16 characters crashed the error message naming it,
  and `--verify` dereferenced a missing `chunks` row and allocated
  whatever chunk size the database gave. Those messages now go through
  `shortHash`, a missing row is an error, and `--verify` rejects a
  negative size and hashes each chunk as a stream.
 - 2026-10-06: Made `s3://bucket/prefix` and `s3://bucket/prefix/` the same
  destination ([issue #222](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/222)).
  The S3 client put the prefix directly in front of each key, so a prefix
  without a trailing slash stored `prefixblobs/...`. A non-empty prefix is
  now joined to every key with one `/`, giving the README's
  `<bucket>/<prefix>/blobs/...` layout. The `s3.prefix` config setting goes
  through the same client and gets the same join.
 - 2026-10-06: Made restore apply owners, modes and times in an order
  that keeps them
  ([issue #219](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/219)). A
  directory got its stored mode and mtime before its contents were
  written, so a read-only directory came back without its files and a
  non-empty one carried the time of the restore. Directories are now
  created owner-only and get their stored owner, mode and mtime once the
  restore loop is done, each before its parent. A file's mode is applied
  after its chown, which on Linux clears setuid and setgid, and a
  symlink gets its stored owner (as root) and mtime on the link itself.
 - 2026-10-06: Made `go.mod` what `go mod tidy` writes, so the
  pre-commit hook no longer stops every commit
  ([issue #246](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/246)). A test
  in `internal/cli` imports `github.com/spf13/pflag` directly, but
  `go.mod` still marked it `// indirect`, and `script/precommit` fails
  whenever the tidy changes `go.mod`. It is now in the direct `require`
  block.
 - 2026-10-06: Made the README's steps for restoring on another machine
  work ([issue #221](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/221)).
  `config init` wrote a placeholder recipient that `config.Load`
  rejects, so every command on the new machine failed before reaching
  the store. The file now has an empty `age_recipients` list,
  `config.Load` accepts an empty list, and `snapshot create` refuses to
  run without a recipient.
 - 2026-10-06: Made `snapshot restore --skip-errors` skip the files that
  need a blob it cannot download
  ([issue #218](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/218)). A missing
  or damaged blob ended the restore even with the flag, after restoring
  whichever files happened to come first. Every file that needs such a
  blob is now reported as failed, the rest are restored, and the command
  still exits non-zero. Without the flag the blob error still aborts.
 - 2026-10-06: Re-vendored the canonical files from `sneak/prompts` at
  `dd4027b` ([issue #213](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/213)).
  Linting and testing are now the `lint` and `test` phases of the
  `Dockerfile`, and the build stage depends on both. `Dockerfile.lint`,
  `CHECK_EPOCH` and the tests that checked them are gone; every
  `docker build` in `script/` passes `--no-cache` instead. golangci-lint
  is v2.14.0, with its new findings fixed in the code, and the rules in
  `CLAUDE.md` now live in `AGENTS.md`.
 - 2026-10-06: Made the local index actually run in WAL mode with a busy
  timeout ([issue #217](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/217)).
  The connection settings were written in a form the SQLite driver
  ignores, so the index ran without either and `snapshot list` or `info`
  during a backup could make the backup's next write fail with
  `database is locked`. They are now `_pragma=` parameters, and the
  metadata export copies the open index with `VACUUM INTO`, because a
  copy of the file alone misses rows still in the `-wal` file.
 - 2026-10-06: Made a backup record the real uid and gid of files,
  directories and symlinks
  ([issue #216](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/216)). The
  scanner asked the stat result for `Uid()` and `Gid()` methods, which
  `*syscall.Stat_t` does not have, so every entry was stored as `0:0`
  and a restore as root gave every file to root. It now reads the
  `Uid` and `Gid` fields of `*syscall.Stat_t`.
 - 2026-10-06: Made a `file://` destination whose directory is missing
  count as one that cannot be listed
  ([issue #220](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/220)). The file
  backend listed a missing directory as an empty store, so with the
  quickstart's USB stick unplugged `snapshot list` reported every local
  snapshot as missing from the store, `snapshot remove` claimed to have
  removed metadata it never reached, and `prune` dropped every local
  snapshot record. Listing a missing destination directory is now an
  error; a first backup still creates the directory.
 - 2026-10-06: Made `--older-than` and `--keep-newer-than` reject a
  duration with characters outside its number-and-unit parts
  ([issue #215](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/215)). The
  parser picked out the parts it recognised and skipped the rest, so
  `1.0y` became zero and `--prune --keep-newer-than 1.0y` deleted every
  snapshot of the backed-up names, the new one included. `1.0y`,
  `1,5y`, `30 days`, `x7d` and a bare `0` are now errors; decimals still
  work in Go units such as `1.5h`.
 - 2026-10-06: Made a backup re-chunk a known file that lists a chunk no
  uploaded blob holds
  ([issue #214](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/214)). File
  rows are shared by every snapshot and updated in place, so removing or
  pruning the only snapshot that referenced a changed file's current
  blob left an older snapshot keeping a row that matched the disk while
  no blob held its chunks. The next backup skipped the file and
  completed a snapshot that could not restore it.
 - 2026-09-22: Routed the last direct-to-stdout command output through
  `internal/ui`
  ([issue #149](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/149)). The
  `version`, `info`, `remote info`, `config`, and `database delete`
  commands wrote plain text straight to stdout, so they were unstyled and
  ignored `--quiet`. Output now falls in two buckets, both governed by
  `internal/ui`: status lines and confirmations go through its message
  methods (styled, and `--quiet` silences them), while the data a command
  exists to produce — the reports, the `snapshot list` table, `config get`
  values, and the `--json` documents — is written plain. `--quiet`
  silences the human reports and tables but never the `config get` value
  or the `--json` documents, which a script depends on, and the
  `database delete` confirmation prompt is always shown. The README
  output-style section now states this rule.
 - 2026-09-22: Validated blob hashes, offsets and lengths read back from
  the destination before using them
  ([issue #155](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/155)). A blob
  hash taken from the downloaded database or the store listing was
  trusted unchecked, so a hostile remote could drive a decrypted blob to
  be written outside the cache directory (a hash like `aa/../../etc`) or
  crash a command with a short or negative value. `blobDiskCache.path`
  now refuses any key containing a path separator, and `ReadAt` rejects a
  negative offset or length and bounds with `length > size-offset` so a
  sum cannot overflow past the check. A new `isBlobHash` helper (a plain
  function, not a method — the packer stores `temp-placeholder-{uuid}` as
  a hash) gates `FetchBlob`, shallow and deep verify; the `blobs/` and
  `metadata/` listings skip a non-conforming name with a warning; and
  short-hash prefixes in log and error text go through a `shortHash`
  helper that cannot panic. `verify`'s chunk reader also rejects a
  negative `blob_chunks` length and streams the chunk instead of
  allocating a database-supplied size. `restore.go` and
  `internal/database` were left untouched to avoid colliding with the
  in-flight [issue #156](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/156)
  work; the cache-path and `FetchBlob` guards already stop the unsafe
  write and fetch, so restore's own `buildBlobIndexes` early check is
  deferred as fail-fast defense in depth.
 - 2026-09-21: Stopped an interrupted blob upload from making a later
  backup deduplicate against data that was never stored
  ([issue #148](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/148)). The
  packer commits a blob's `chunks`, `blob_chunks`, and `blobs` rows
  before the upload is attempted, so a failed upload left chunk rows
  behind and the next run skipped re-uploading them, producing a
  snapshot that reported success but could not be restored. A run now
  deduplicates only against chunks held by a blob whose `uploaded_ts` is
  set, and at startup drops any un-uploaded blob rows (and the chunks
  they orphan) so the affected data is re-chunked and re-uploaded. Blobs
  recorded with no remote backend are marked uploaded so this invariant
  holds uniformly.
 - 2026-09-22: Made restore refuse any snapshot path that would write
  outside the target directory
  ([issue #154](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/154)).
  `restoreFile` and `verifyRestoredFiles` joined the stored path onto the
  target with no containment check, so a `..` segment or an absolute path
  escaped the target and a restored symlink could redirect a later child
  write anywhere on disk. Every stored path is now rejected unless
  `filepath.IsLocal` accepts it with the leading separator removed, and
  each existing ancestor directory below the target is `Lstat`ed to refuse
  descending through a symlink; honest symlinks pointing outside the tree
  are still written verbatim. age decryption proves a snapshot is
  readable, not honest, and restore usually runs as root.
 - 2026-09-21: Stopped `--json` from silencing stderr diagnostics
  ([issue #112](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/112)). `--json`
  used to be folded into `Quiet`, which pinned the log level to `WARN`,
  so `prune --json` gave a machine consumer no record of the local index
  rows it deleted even under `--verbose`. `--json` now quiets only the
  stdout UI (the JSON document must stay clean, per
  [issue #108](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/108)); the stderr
  log level follows `--verbose`/`--debug` again. The coupling was
  removed the same way for `snapshot verify`, `snapshot remove`, and
  `remote info`, which carried it for the same outdated reason.
 - 2026-09-21: Stopped `prune` from reporting a failed row count as 0
  ([issue #96](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/96)). The seven
  `getTableCount` reads in `PruneDatabase` discarded their error, so a
@@ -1046,5 +618,4 @@ the tag exists and is exercised; what is left is merging `next` to
 # Future Steps
-Work planned after 1.0 is listed in the README
+None queued; the release-scoping item is now the Next Step.
 [roadmap](README.md#roadmap).
@@ -11,139 +11,92 @@ import (
 // This file guards the version stamping of the product image (issue
 // #75). The failure it protects against is silent: the image still
 // builds and runs, but `vaultik version` inside it reports "commit:
-// unknown" or a version of "dev", so an operator cannot tell which
+// unknown", so an operator cannot tell which source produced a given
-// source produced a given backup. The build takes the version as a
+// backup. .dockerignore excludes .git, so the build cannot derive the
-// build arg, which script/docker computes on the host, and otherwise
+// commit itself; the values must be computed on the host and passed in.
 // derives it from the .git in its context; the commit and its date
 // always come from that .git.
 //
-// These are parses of the committed files, because shelling out to
+// These are parses of the committed files, for the same reason the lint
-// docker would nest a build inside `make test`. That `vaultik version`
+// guards next door are: shelling out to docker would nest a build
-// in the built image really prints the host's version is verified by
+// inside `make test`. That `vaultik version` in the built image really
-// hand.
+// prints the host's version is verified by hand and recorded on the
 // pull request.
-// The files under guard, relative to the repository root.
+// dockerScript is script/docker, relative to the repository root.
-const (
+const dockerScript = "script/docker"
 	productDockerfile = "Dockerfile"
 	dockerScript      = "script/docker"
 )
-// TestProductDockerfileTakesVersionAsBuildArg fails unless the build
+// versionArgs are the ldflag targets the build stamps and, matching
-// declares ARG VERSION, with no default, and stamps it into the binary
+// them, the build args the host must supply. The names line up so the
-// whenever it is given, ahead of the value derived in the container.
+// same list checks both files.
-func TestProductDockerfileTakesVersionAsBuildArg(t *testing.T) {
+func versionArgs() []string {
-	t.Parallel()
+	return []string{"VERSION", "COMMIT", "COMMIT_DATE"}
 	found := instructions(t, productDockerfile)
 	require.Contains(t, found, "ARG VERSION",
 		"%s must declare `ARG VERSION`, with no default, so the host can"+
 			" pass it in", productDockerfile)
 	assertLdflagReferences(t, found, "VERSION")
 }
-// TestProductDockerfileDerivesVersionFromGit fails unless a build given
+// TestProductDockerfileTakesVersionAsBuildArgs fails unless the build
-// no VERSION, such as a plain `docker build .` of a clone, takes it from
+// declares each version arg and stamps it into the binary by ldflag
-// `git describe` of the .git in its context, stamps "dev" when the
+// reference, rather than computing it in the container.
-// context has no .git, and fails rather than stamp "dev" when that .git
+func TestProductDockerfileTakesVersionAsBuildArgs(t *testing.T) {
 // yields no version. The commit and its date come from the same .git,
 // and the build fails rather than stamp them "unknown" when it is
 // present.
 func TestProductDockerfileDerivesVersionFromGit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	found := instructions(t, productDockerfile)
-	buildAt := indexContaining(found, "go build")
+	for _, arg := range versionArgs() {
-	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, buildAt, 0, "%s must build", productDockerfile)
+		require.GreaterOrEqual(t, indexOf(found, "ARG "+arg), 0,
 			"%s must declare `ARG %s` so the host can pass it in",
 			productDockerfile, arg)
-	assert.Contains(t, found[buildAt], "git describe --tags --always || echo dev",
+		assertLdflagReferences(t, found, arg)
-		"%s must derive the version from git when no VERSION is given,"+
+	}
-			" and stamp dev when the context has no .git", productDockerfile)
+}
-	assert.Contains(t, found[buildAt], "[ -e .git ]",
+
-		"%s must fail when the context carries .git but yields no version",
+// TestProductDockerfileDoesNotDeriveVersionItself is the anti-regression
-		productDockerfile)
+// for the original defect: the container ran `git rev-parse`, but .git
-	assert.Contains(t, found[buildAt], "git rev-parse HEAD",
+// is not in the build context, so it always resolved to "unknown". No
-		"%s must stamp the commit from git", productDockerfile)
+// git command may reach into a build that cannot see the history.
-	assert.Contains(t, found[buildAt], "git show -s --format=%cs HEAD",
+func TestProductDockerfileDoesNotDeriveVersionItself(t *testing.T) {
-		"%s must stamp the commit date from git", productDockerfile)
+	t.Parallel()
-	assert.Contains(t, found[buildAt],
+
-		`[ "$commit" = unknown ] || [ "$commit_date" = unknown ]`,
+	text := instructionText(readRepoFile(t, productDockerfile))
-		"%s must fail when the context carries .git but yields no commit"+
+
-			" or date", productDockerfile)
+	assert.NotContains(t, text, "git ",
 		"%s must not run git: .git is excluded from the build context, so"+
 			" any value it derives is wrong. Pass version, commit and date"+
 			" in as build args instead.", productDockerfile)
 }
 // TestDockerScriptComputesVersionOnTheHost fails unless script/docker
-// passes the version it derives where .git exists as a build arg.
+// derives each value where .git exists and passes it as a build arg,
 // with VERSION coming from script/version so a Docker build reports the
 // same string a local build of the same tree would.
 func TestDockerScriptComputesVersionOnTheHost(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	script := readRepoFile(t, dockerScript)
-	assert.Contains(t, script, "--build-arg VERSION=",
+	for _, arg := range versionArgs() {
-		"%s must pass --build-arg VERSION to the build", dockerScript)
+		assert.Contains(t, script, "--build-arg "+arg+"=",
 			"%s must pass --build-arg %s to the build", dockerScript, arg)
 	}
 	assert.Contains(t, script, "/version",
 		"%s must take VERSION from script/version, the source of truth"+
 			" shared with the Makefile", dockerScript)
 }
-// assertLdflagReferences fails unless the build instruction uses the
+// assertLdflagReferences fails unless some build instruction stamps the
-// named ARG whenever it is given (a ${arg:- reference), so a value
+// named variable from the ARG (a ${arg} reference), not from a value
-// passed in is not overridden by one derived inside the container.
+// computed inside the container.
 func assertLdflagReferences(t *testing.T, found []string, arg string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	for _, instruction := range found {
 		if strings.HasPrefix(instruction, "RUN ") &&
 			strings.Contains(instruction, "go build") &&
-			strings.Contains(instruction, "${"+arg+":-") {
+			strings.Contains(instruction, "${"+arg+"}") {
 			return
 		}
 	}
 	assert.Fail(t, "version arg is declared but never stamped",
-		"the go build in %s must use ${%s:-...}, or the arg is passed and"+
+		"the go build in %s must reference ${%s} in its ldflags, or the"+
-			" discarded", productDockerfile, arg)
+			" arg is passed and discarded", productDockerfile, arg)
 }
 // instructions returns the Dockerfile's instructions, one per element,
 // with comments and blank lines dropped and continuation lines joined,
 // so a multi-line RUN is one string.
 func instructions(t *testing.T, name string) []string {
 	t.Helper()
 	var (
 		out         []string
 		continued   string
 		isContinued bool
 	)
 	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(readRepoFile(t, name), "\n") {
 		trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
 		if !isContinued && (trimmed == "" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#")) {
 			continue
 		}
 		isContinued = strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, `\`)
 		continued += strings.TrimSuffix(trimmed, `\`)
 		if isContinued {
 			continue
 		}
 		out = append(out, strings.Join(strings.Fields(continued), " "))
 		continued = ""
 	}
 	return out
 }
 // indexContaining returns the position of the first instruction
 // containing want; -1 if there is none.
 func indexContaining(found []string, want string) int {
 	for i, instruction := range found {
 		if strings.Contains(instruction, want) {
 			return i
 		}
 	}
 	return -1
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
 package main_test
 import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 )
 // This file guards the shape of the lint gate. Every property asserted
 // here is one whose loss is SILENT: the build still exits 0, the gate
 // still looks green, and nothing was linted or tested.
 //
 // The gate is a build step. script/lint builds Dockerfile.lint, which
 // runs golangci-lint as a RUN instruction, so a successful build is a
 // clean lint. BuildKit will happily replay that RUN from cache on an
 // unchanged tree in well under a second, which is why the check layers
 // are keyed on a CHECK_EPOCH build arg that the calling script
 // regenerates per invocation, and why an empty value is a hard error
 // rather than a stable cache key.
 //
 // These are parses rather than invocations. Shelling out to docker from
 // the test suite would nest a build inside `make test`, which itself
 // runs inside a build in CI. The one property a parse cannot establish
 // -- that a real finding actually fails the build -- is verified by
 // hand against a deliberately broken tree, recorded on the pull
 // request.
 //
 // One property is deliberately NOT tested here: that no script runs the
 // linter on the host. script/lint is the only lint entry point, and it
 // runs golangci-lint only inside the container; keeping it that way is a
 // review matter, not something a test in this file establishes.
 // The files under guard, relative to the repository root.
 const (
 	lintDockerfile    = "Dockerfile.lint"
 	productDockerfile = "Dockerfile"
 	lintScript        = "script/lint"
 	cibuildScript     = "script/cibuild"
 )
 // linterBinary is the linter's command name, used to locate the
 // config-verify and lint steps in Dockerfile.lint.
 const linterBinary = "golangci-lint"
 // checkEpochARG is the declaration, with no default value. A default
 // would satisfy the non-empty guard with a constant, and a constant is
 // a stable cache key: the checks would be replayed from cache forever
 // after the first build.
 const checkEpochARG = "ARG CHECK_EPOCH"
 // checkEpochGuard is what turns a build that omits --build-arg into a
 // loud failure instead of a quiet green. Failed steps are never cached,
 // so it fires on every such invocation rather than once.
 const checkEpochGuard = `RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1`
 // freshEpoch is the epoch computation the calling scripts must use, as
 // a bare assignment on its own line. Inline in an argument, a failing
 // `date` would not abort under `set -eu`; CHECK_EPOCH would become the
 // empty string, and the guard above would be the only thing standing
 // between that and a permanently cached green. `$$` is required because
 // `date +%s` is second-granular and busybox silently drops `%N`, so
 // without the pid two concurrent runs in one second can collide.
 const freshEpoch = `epoch="$(date +%s%N)$$"`
 // TestLintDockerfilePinsTheLinterByDigest fails if the lint image stops
 // being pinned. An unpinned tag makes the gate's verdict depend on
 // whatever the registry currently serves under that name.
 func TestLintDockerfilePinsTheLinterByDigest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	from := ""
 	for _, instruction := range instructions(t, lintDockerfile) {
 		if strings.HasPrefix(instruction, "FROM ") {
 			from = instruction
 			break
 		}
 	}
 	require.NotEmpty(t, from, "%s declares no FROM", lintDockerfile)
 	assert.Contains(t, from, "golangci/golangci-lint",
 		"the lint image must be the golangci-lint image")
 	assert.Contains(t, from, "@sha256:",
 		"the lint image must be pinned by digest, not by tag alone")
 }
 // TestLintDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen pins the whole cache-busting
 // mechanism in the file that lints: the declaration with no default,
 // the non-empty guard, and the value expanded into the lint command
 // itself rather than merely declared.
 func TestLintDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	found := instructions(t, lintDockerfile)
 	argAt := indexOf(found, checkEpochARG)
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, argAt, 0,
 		"%s must declare `%s` with no default value",
 		lintDockerfile, checkEpochARG)
 	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, indexOf(found, checkEpochGuard), argAt,
 		"%s must guard against an empty CHECK_EPOCH with `%s`",
 		lintDockerfile, checkEpochGuard)
 	assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found[argAt:], "golangci-lint run")
 	// Dependency layers must stay above the ARG, or every lint run
 	// re-downloads the module cache and the inner loop becomes
 	// unusable.
 	download := indexOf(found, "RUN go mod download")
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, download, 0,
 		"%s must download modules in their own layer", lintDockerfile)
 	assert.Less(t, download, argAt,
 		"`%s` must come after `go mod download` so dependency layers"+
 			" still cache", checkEpochARG)
 }
 // TestLintDockerfileVerifiesTheLinterConfig guards the validation of
 // .golangci.yml itself. `golangci-lint run` rejects a config it cannot
 // parse but silently IGNORES an unknown top-level key, so renaming
 // `linters:` to `linterz:` discards `default: all` and every threshold
 // and still exits 0 reporting no issues. `config verify` is what turns
 // that into a failure, and it has to run BEFORE the lint, or the lint
 // spends a minute reporting a verdict from a config already known to be
 // wrong.
 func TestLintDockerfileVerifiesTheLinterConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	found := instructions(t, lintDockerfile)
 	verify := linterBinary + " config verify"
 	verifyAt := indexContaining(found, verify)
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, verifyAt, 0,
 		"%s must run `%s --config .golangci.yml`: without it a typo'd"+
 			" top-level key in .golangci.yml is silently ignored and the"+
 			" gate passes with only the default linter set", lintDockerfile,
 		verify)
 	runAt := indexContaining(found, linterBinary+" run")
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, runAt, 0, "%s must lint", lintDockerfile)
 	assert.Less(t, verifyAt, runAt,
 		"%s must verify the config before linting with it", lintDockerfile)
 	// Keyed on the epoch like every other check layer, so it executes
 	// per invocation rather than being replayed. A cached validation
 	// validates nothing.
 	assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found, verify)
 }
 // TestProductDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen holds the same line for the
 // checks that remain in the product image build.
 func TestProductDockerfileCannotBeCachedGreen(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	found := instructions(t, productDockerfile)
 	argAt := indexOf(found, checkEpochARG)
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, argAt, 0,
 		"%s must declare `%s` with no default value",
 		productDockerfile, checkEpochARG)
 	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, indexOf(found, checkEpochGuard), argAt,
 		"%s must guard against an empty CHECK_EPOCH", productDockerfile)
 	assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found[argAt:], "make fmt-check")
 	assertEpochExpandedInto(t, found[argAt:], "make test")
 }
 // TestProductDockerfileDoesNotLint records the split deliberately: the
 // linter lives in Dockerfile.lint and nowhere else, so there is exactly
 // one digest pinning it. A lint stage reintroduced here would either be
 // docker-in-docker (`make lint` is now `docker build`) or a second,
 // independently bumpable pin.
 func TestProductDockerfileDoesNotLint(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	contents := readRepoFile(t, productDockerfile)
 	for _, forbidden := range []string{"golangci", "make lint"} {
 		assert.NotContains(t, instructionText(contents), forbidden,
 			"%s must not lint: the linter is pinned once, in %s",
 			productDockerfile, lintDockerfile)
 	}
 }
 // TestLintScriptBuildsTheLintDockerfileWithAFreshEpoch is the other
 // half of the mechanism. The Dockerfile's guard only rejects an EMPTY
 // epoch; a constant non-empty one would satisfy it and still be served
 // from cache forever.
 func TestLintScriptBuildsTheLintDockerfileWithAFreshEpoch(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	script := readRepoFile(t, lintScript)
 	assertBareEpochAssignment(t, script, lintScript)
 	assert.Contains(t, script, `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch"`,
 		"%s must pass the fresh epoch to the build", lintScript)
 	assert.Contains(t, script, lintDockerfile,
 		"%s must build %s", lintScript, lintDockerfile)
 }
 // TestCibuildBuildsBothDockerfilesWithFreshEpochs guards the CI gate:
 // dropping either build silently removes a whole class of check from
 // CI while leaving it green.
 func TestCibuildBuildsBothDockerfilesWithFreshEpochs(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	script := readRepoFile(t, cibuildScript)
 	assertBareEpochAssignment(t, script, cibuildScript)
 	assert.Equal(t, 2, strings.Count(script, freshEpoch),
 		"%s must compute a fresh epoch for each of its two builds",
 		cibuildScript)
 	assert.Equal(t, 2,
 		strings.Count(script, `--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$epoch"`),
 		"%s must pass a fresh epoch to both builds", cibuildScript)
 	assert.Contains(t, script, "-f Dockerfile.lint",
 		"%s must build %s", cibuildScript, lintDockerfile)
 }
 // assertEpochExpandedInto fails unless some instruction runs the named
 // command with the epoch expanded into it. Expansion, not mere
 // declaration: an ARG that no instruction references is not guaranteed
 // to key the layer, and the expansion also puts the value in the build
 // log where a reader can see the layer was keyed fresh.
 func assertEpochExpandedInto(t *testing.T, found []string, command string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	for _, instruction := range found {
 		if !strings.HasPrefix(instruction, "RUN ") {
 			continue
 		}
 		if strings.Contains(instruction, command) &&
 			strings.Contains(instruction, "${CHECK_EPOCH}") {
 			return
 		}
 	}
 	assert.Fail(t, "no epoch-keyed layer runs the command",
 		"`%s` must run in a layer that expands ${CHECK_EPOCH}, or it"+
 			" will be replayed from cache without executing", command)
 }
 // assertBareEpochAssignment fails unless the script computes the epoch
 // as a bare assignment on its own line.
 func assertBareEpochAssignment(t *testing.T, script, name string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(script, "\n") {
 		if strings.TrimSpace(line) == freshEpoch {
 			return
 		}
 	}
 	assert.Fail(t, "no bare epoch assignment",
 		"%s must compute `%s` as a bare assignment on its own line, so"+
 			" `set -e` catches a failing date instead of quietly"+
 			" building with an empty epoch", name, freshEpoch)
 }
 // instructions returns the Dockerfile's instructions, one per element,
 // with comments and blank lines dropped and continuation lines joined,
 // so a multi-line RUN is one string.
 func instructions(t *testing.T, name string) []string {
 	t.Helper()
 	return strings.Split(instructionText(readRepoFile(t, name)), "\n")
 }
 // instructionText is instructions' parse, before splitting: it is also
 // what a "must not contain" assertion should look at, so that a word
 // appearing only in a comment is not mistaken for behaviour.
 func instructionText(contents string) string {
 	var (
 		out         []string
 		continued   string
 		isContinued bool
 	)
 	for line := range strings.SplitSeq(contents, "\n") {
 		trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
 		if !isContinued && (trimmed == "" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#")) {
 			continue
 		}
 		isContinued = strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, `\`)
 		continued += strings.TrimSuffix(trimmed, `\`)
 		if isContinued {
 			continue
 		}
 		out = append(out, strings.Join(strings.Fields(continued), " "))
 		continued = ""
 	}
 	return strings.Join(out, "\n")
 }
 // indexOf returns the position of the first instruction equal to, or
 // beginning with, want; -1 if there is none. An `ARG NAME=default`
 // counts as beginning with `ARG NAME`, so a declared arg is found
 // whether or not it carries a default.
 func indexOf(found []string, want string) int {
 	for i, instruction := range found {
 		if instruction == want ||
 			strings.HasPrefix(instruction, want+" ") ||
 			strings.HasPrefix(instruction, want+"=") {
 			return i
 		}
 	}
 	return -1
 }
 // indexContaining returns the position of the first instruction
 // containing want; -1 if there is none.
 func indexContaining(found []string, want string) int {
 	for i, instruction := range found {
 		if strings.Contains(instruction, want) {
 			return i
 		}
 	}
 	return -1
 }
 // readRepoFile reads a file by its path relative to the repository
 // root.
 func readRepoFile(t *testing.T, name string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	//nolint:gosec // G304: the path is a constant relative to this repo
 	contents, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot(t), name))
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	return string(contents)
 }
 // repoRoot returns the repository root. The test binary runs with its
 // package directory as the working directory, so the root is found by
 // walking up until the module file appears.
 func repoRoot(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	dir, err := os.Getwd()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	for {
 		_, err = os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod"))
 		if err == nil {
 			return dir
 		}
 		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
 		require.NotEqual(t, dir, parent,
 			"walked to the filesystem root without finding a go.mod")
 		dir = parent
 	}
 }
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
 package main_test
 import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"regexp"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
@@ -86,48 +84,14 @@ func TestBuildTargetBuildsTheBinary(t *testing.T) {
 		"`make build` must depend on the rule that builds the binary")
 }
-// readMakefile returns the contents of the repository's Makefile.
+// readMakefile returns the contents of the repository's Makefile. The
 // root is located by the shared walk in lintdocker_test.go.
 func readMakefile(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	return readRepoFile(t, "Makefile")
 }
 // readRepoFile reads a file by its path relative to the repository
 // root.
 func readRepoFile(t *testing.T, name string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	//nolint:gosec // G304: the path is a constant relative to this repo
 	contents, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot(t), name))
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	return string(contents)
 }
 // repoRoot returns the repository root. The test binary runs with its
 // package directory as the working directory, so the root is found by
 // walking up until the module file appears.
 func repoRoot(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	dir, err := os.Getwd()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	for {
 		_, err = os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod"))
 		if err == nil {
 			return dir
 		}
 		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
 		require.NotEqual(t, dir, parent,
 			"walked to the filesystem root without finding a go.mod")
 		dir = parent
 	}
 }
 // phonyTargets returns every name declared phony, across all .PHONY
 // lines.
 func phonyTargets(makefile string) []string {
@@ -3,8 +3,7 @@
 # Copy this file and uncomment/modify the values you need
 # Age recipient public keys for encryption
-# Backups are encrypted to these public keys. snapshot create needs at least
+# This is REQUIRED - backups are encrypted to these public keys
 # one; listing, verifying and restoring do not
 # Generate with: age-keygen | grep "public key"
 age_recipients:
  - age1cj2k2addawy294f6k2gr2mf9gps9r3syplryxca3nvxj3daqm96qfp84tz
@@ -258,16 +257,16 @@ exclude:
 # Storage URL - use either this OR the s3 section below
 # Supports: s3://bucket/prefix, file:///path, rclone://remote/path
-storage_url: "rclone://myremote/path/to/backups"
+storage_url: "rclone://las1stor1//srv/pool.2024.04/backups/heraklion"
 # S3-compatible storage configuration
 #s3:
 #  # S3-compatible endpoint URL
 #  # Examples: https://s3.amazonaws.com, https://storage.googleapis.com
-#  endpoint: https://s3.example.com
+#  endpoint: http://10.100.205.122:8333
 #
 #  # Bucket name where backups will be stored
-#  bucket: mybucket
+#  bucket: testbucket
 #
 #  # Prefix (folder) within the bucket for this host's backups
 #  # Useful for organizing backups from multiple hosts
@@ -275,8 +274,8 @@ storage_url: "rclone://myremote/path/to/backups"
 #  #prefix: "hosts/myserver/"
 #
 #  # S3 access credentials
-#  access_key_id: YOUR_ACCESS_KEY
+#  access_key_id: Z9GT22M9YFU08WRMC5D4
-#  secret_access_key: YOUR_SECRET_KEY
+#  secret_access_key: Pi0tPKjFbN4rZlRhcA4zBtEkib04yy2WcIzI+AXk
 #
 #  # S3 region
 #  # Default: us-east-1
@@ -287,18 +286,15 @@ storage_url: "rclone://myremote/path/to/backups"
 #  #use_ssl: true
 #
 #  # Part size for multipart uploads
-#  # Minimum 5MiB, maximum 5GiB; affects memory usage during upload
+#  # Minimum 5MB, affects memory usage during upload
-#  # A blob too large for 10,000 parts of this size gets larger parts
+#  # Supports: 5MB, 10M, 100MiB, etc.
-#  # Supports: 10MB, 16MiB, 100MiB, etc. (5MB is below the minimum)
+#  # Default: 5MB
-#  # Default: 5MiB
+#  #part_size: 5MB
 #  #part_size: 5MiB
 # Path to local SQLite index database
 # This database tracks file state for incremental backups
-# Default: the platform data directory, e.g.
+# Default: /var/lib/vaultik/index.sqlite
-#   macOS: ~/Library/Application Support/vaultik/index.sqlite
+#index_path: /var/lib/vaultik/index.sqlite
 #   Linux: ~/.local/share/vaultik/index.sqlite
 #index_path: /path/to/index.sqlite
 # Average chunk size for content-defined chunking
 # Smaller chunks = better deduplication but more metadata
@@ -308,17 +304,6 @@ storage_url: "rclone://myremote/path/to/backups"
 # Maximum blob size
 # Multiple chunks are packed into blobs up to this size
 # Must be at least four times chunk_size (the largest chunk the chunker can
 # emit); a smaller limit would let a single-chunk blob exceed it.
 # Chunking uses no secret (the FastCDC parameters are fixed and public). At a
 # large limit a blob holds hundreds of chunks, so individual chunk lengths are
 # not visible in its size; lowering the limit toward chunk_size exposes them.
 # A backup needs free temporary space, because each blob is written whole to
 # a temporary file before it is uploaded (up to about blob_size_limit; an
 # rclone destination that cannot stream uploads needs about twice that) and
 # the metadata export writes copies of the local index. Temporary files go to
 # $TMPDIR (default /tmp); with TMPDIR unset, SQLite writes one of those copies
 # to /var/tmp.
 # Supports: 1GB, 10G, 500MB, 1GiB, etc.
 # Default: 10GB
 #blob_size_limit: 10GB
@@ -6,28 +6,33 @@ Vaultik uses a local SQLite database to track file metadata, chunk mappings, and
 **Important Notes:**
 This section is the authoritative explanation of the schema/migration story;
 other documents (the README and `AGENTS.md`) link here.
 - **No upgrade path between versions (pre-1.0)**: Vaultik has no supported way to
  carry an existing local index across a schema change. The index is disposable
  — if the on-disk schema changes between versions, delete the local SQLite
  database (`vaultik database delete`) and run a full backup. Remote storage is
  unaffected; the new index re-deduplicates against existing remote blobs. This
  is the standing project policy, and it is separate from the schema bootstrap
  described next.
 - **Schema bootstrap**: a fresh database is populated from numbered SQL files
  embedded in the binary under `internal/database/schema/`. `000.sql` creates the
  `schema_migrations` table; `001.sql` creates the application tables. On opening
  a database the code applies each numbered file that has not yet run and records
  its version in `schema_migrations`. This bootstraps a new database; it does not
  upgrade an existing one between released versions.
 - **Changing the schema (pre-1.0)**: edit `internal/database/schema/001.sql` (and
  the code that touches the affected tables) directly. Do not add new numbered
  files — there is no installed base to migrate.
 - **Disposability expires at 1.0**: the index is treated as disposable only until
  1.0 ships and is tagged. Once 1.0 is tagged that clause expires and the
  question of upgrading existing indexes returns. It is deliberately left open
  here.
 - **Version Compatibility**: In rare cases, you may need to use the same version
  of Vaultik to restore a backup as was used to create it. This ensures
  compatibility with the metadata format stored in S3.
 ## Schema Migrations
 Vaultik supports schema migrations. They are the numbered SQL files in
 `internal/database/schema/`, embedded in the binary: `000.sql` creates the
 `schema_migrations` table, which records each migration that has run, and
 `001.sql` creates the application tables. `database.New` opens a database and
 applies, in order, every migration that database has not yet recorded.
 **Before 1.0** no migrations are added, because nothing is installed anywhere
 yet. A schema change edits `001.sql` (and the code that uses the affected
 tables) directly. A local database created before the change has already
 recorded `001.sql` as run, so it keeps the old schema and can become unusable;
 `vaultik database delete` followed by a full backup rebuilds it.
 **After 1.0** each schema change is a new numbered file, so an existing local
 database is migrated the first time an updated vaultik opens it. A file that
 has shipped in a release is never edited.
 ## Database Tables
 ### 1. `files`
@@ -36,8 +41,7 @@ Stores metadata about files in the filesystem being backed up.
 **Columns:**
 - `id` (TEXT PRIMARY KEY) - UUID for the file record
 - `path` (TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE) - Absolute file path
- `mtime` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - Modification time, whole seconds since the Unix epoch
+- `mtime` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - Modification time as Unix timestamp
 - `mtime_nsec` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - Nanoseconds within that second, 0 to 999999999
 - `size` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - File size in bytes
 - `mode` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - Unix file permissions and type
 - `uid` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - User ID of file owner
@@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ Stores information about packed, compressed, and encrypted blob files.
 **Columns:**
 - `id` (TEXT PRIMARY KEY) - UUID assigned when blob creation starts
- `blob_hash` (TEXT UNIQUE) - `hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))`, computed before compression and encryption (NULL until finalized); see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#blobs-directory-blobs)
+- `blob_hash` (TEXT UNIQUE) - SHA256 hash of final blob (NULL until finalized)
 - `created_ts` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - Creation timestamp
 - `finished_ts` (INTEGER) - Finalization timestamp (NULL if in progress)
 - `uncompressed_size` (INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0) - Total size of chunks before compression
@@ -111,17 +115,17 @@ Maps chunks to the blobs that contain them.
 Tracks backup snapshots.
 **Columns:**
- `id` (TEXT PRIMARY KEY) - Snapshot ID (format: `hostname_name_timestamp`, e.g. `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`: the hostname up to its first `.`, the snapshot name, and an RFC 3339 UTC timestamp)
+- `id` (TEXT PRIMARY KEY) - Snapshot ID (format: hostname-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSSZ)
 - `hostname` (TEXT) - Hostname where backup was created
 - `vaultik_version` (TEXT) - Version of Vaultik used
 - `vaultik_git_revision` (TEXT) - Git revision of Vaultik used
 - `started_at` (INTEGER) - Start timestamp
 - `completed_at` (INTEGER) - Completion timestamp (NULL if in progress)
 - `file_count` (INTEGER) - Number of files in snapshot
- `chunk_count` (INTEGER) - Number of chunks this snapshot stored that were not stored before
+- `chunk_count` (INTEGER) - Number of unique chunks
- `blob_count` (INTEGER) - Number of blobs this snapshot created
+- `blob_count` (INTEGER) - Number of blobs referenced
 - `total_size` (INTEGER) - Total size of all files
- `blob_size` (INTEGER) - Total compressed size of all referenced blobs
+- `blob_size` (INTEGER) - Total size of all blobs (compressed)
 - `blob_uncompressed_size` (INTEGER) - Total uncompressed size of all referenced blobs
 - `compression_ratio` (REAL) - Compression ratio achieved
 - `compression_level` (INTEGER) - Compression level used for this snapshot
@@ -196,7 +200,6 @@ Tracks blob upload metrics.
 1. **Change Detection**
   - `SELECT * FROM files WHERE path = ?` - Get previous file metadata
   - Compare mtime, size, mode to detect changes
   - Re-chunk a file that lists a chunk no uploaded blob holds, even when its metadata is unchanged
   - Skip unchanged files but still add to `snapshot_files`
 2. **Chunk Reuse**
@@ -213,13 +216,13 @@ After a snapshot is completed:
 5. Upload to S3 as `metadata/{remote-key}/db.zst.age`
 6. Generate blob manifest and upload as `metadata/{remote-key}/manifest.json.zst`
-The `{remote-key}` directory name is a one-way hash of the human snapshot ID, so the ID is never written to the store in plaintext. The hash uses no secret, so a guessed hostname and snapshot name can still be confirmed against a listing; see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation) and its [Accepted Risks](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#accepted-risks).
+The `{remote-key}` directory name is a one-way hash of the human snapshot ID, so the ID is never written to the store in plaintext; see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation).
 ### 4. Restore Process
 The restore process doesn't use the local database. Instead:
-1. Downloads and decrypts the snapshot's metadata database (`db.zst.age`) from S3
+1. Downloads snapshot metadata from S3
-2. Downloads the blobs holding the chunks of the files being restored, found through that database's `blob_chunks` table; the manifest is not read
+2. Downloads required blobs based on manifest
 3. Reconstructs files from decrypted and decompressed chunks
 ### 5. Pruning
@@ -232,8 +235,9 @@ The restore process doesn't use the local database. Instead:
 Before each backup:
 1. Query incomplete snapshots (where `completed_at IS NULL`)
-2. Delete each one and all its associations, without checking S3 for its metadata
+2. Check if metadata exists in S3
-3. Clean up orphaned files, chunks, and blobs
+3. If no metadata, delete snapshot and all associations
 4. Clean up orphaned files, chunks, and blobs
 ## Repository Pattern
@@ -280,7 +284,7 @@ This ensures consistency, especially important for operations like:
 3. **Batch Operations**: Where possible, operations are batched within transactions
-4. **Write-Ahead Logging**: The local index runs in SQLite WAL mode with a 10-second busy timeout, so a read-only command such as `snapshot list` can read it while a backup writes to it. Committed rows can sit in the `-wal` file beside the index until a checkpoint, so the metadata export copies the index through SQLite (`VACUUM INTO`), not as a file
+4. **Write-Ahead Logging**: SQLite WAL mode is enabled for better concurrency
 ## Data Integrity
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The metadata subdirectory is named with the **remote key**, a one-way hash of th
 - **What it contains**: Packed collections of content-defined chunks from files
 - **Format**: Zstandard compressed, then Age encrypted
 - **Encryption**: Always encrypted with Age using the configured recipients
- **Naming**: Content-addressed. The blob's name is `hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))` — the double SHA-256 of the concatenated chunk data, computed before compression and encryption, not a hash of the stored (compressed, encrypted) bytes. One consequence: only a holder of the age private key can check a stored blob's integrity, because matching a blob to its name means decrypting and decompressing it first — which is what `restore` and `verify --deep` do. Implemented in `internal/blobgen` (`DoubleSHA256`). This is the canonical description of blob naming; other documents and comments point here.
+- **Naming**: Content-addressed using SHA256 hash of the encrypted blob
 ### Why Encrypted
 Blobs contain the actual file data from backups and must be encrypted for security. The content-addressing ensures deduplication while the encryption ensures privacy.
@@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ This ID reveals the hostname, the configured snapshot name, and the backup time,
 ### Remote Key Derivation
-The remote key is `hex(SHA256(SHA256("vaultik|" + snapshot-id)))`: a double SHA-256 over the snapshot ID, with a `vaultik|` domain-separation prefix. The result is a 64-character hex string. The hash is not reversible, but it uses no secret: an observer who guesses a candidate hostname and snapshot name can hash it the same way and confirm whether that snapshot is present. The remote key keeps names out of a plain listing; it does not hide them from a guess. Implemented in `internal/snapshot/remotekey.go`.
+The remote key is `hex(SHA256(SHA256("vaultik|" + snapshot-id)))`: a double SHA-256 over the snapshot ID, with a `vaultik|` domain-separation prefix. The result is a 64-character hex string with no structure a remote observer can reverse. Implemented in `internal/snapshot/remotekey.go`.
 Worked example:
 - Snapshot ID: `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`
 - Remote key: `17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa`
 - Directory: `metadata/17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa/`
-A plain listing of the destination store therefore shows only these hashes, not the hostname or snapshot name of any backup — but because the hash uses no secret, a guessed hostname and snapshot name can be hashed and confirmed against the listing. The same remote key is stored in the manifest's `snapshot_id` field.
+Because the hash is one-way, a listing of the destination store reveals neither the hostname nor the snapshot name of any backup. The same remote key is stored in the manifest's `snapshot_id` field.
 ### Files in Each Snapshot Directory
@@ -124,44 +124,31 @@ From the unencrypted data, an observer of the destination store can determine:
 - **When each backup was taken** — not from the directory name, which is a one-way hash, but from the plaintext `timestamp` field in manifest.json.zst, which is published in the clear
 - How many blobs each snapshot references, and the total compressed size
 - The compressed size of each blob, and which blobs are shared between snapshots (deduplication patterns)
 - **Whether a guessed hostname and snapshot name are present** — the remote key is an unkeyed hash, so an observer holding candidate names can hash each one and match it against the directory listing. The human ID is never published, so it cannot be read off directly, but it can be confirmed by guessing.
 Together these give an observer a timing-and-size profile of every snapshot. This is an accepted, documented property of the format, not a defect: the manifest is unencrypted so that pruning can run without the private key, and the timing channel could not be closed by encrypting it anyway — object creation times and per-object sizes stay visible at the storage layer on both `s3://` and `file://` destinations regardless.
 An observer cannot determine:
- The hostname or snapshot name of any backup by reading it off the store — the directory name and the manifest `snapshot_id` are unkeyed hashes of the human ID, so the text is never published (though a guessed name can be confirmed, as above)
+- The hostname or snapshot name of any backup (the directory name and the manifest `snapshot_id` are one-way hashes of the human ID)
 - File names or paths
 - File contents
 - File permissions or ownership
 - Directory structure
 - Which chunks belong to which files
 ### Accepted Risks
 These are known, deliberate properties of the format and the tooling, recorded so an operator can weigh them rather than discover them.
 1. **No proof of authorship.** Restore and `verify --deep` prove that data decrypts with the age private key and matches its unkeyed content hashes. They do not prove who wrote it: anyone who knows a recipient public key and can replace objects on the destination can substitute a snapshot they built. The recipient string is not stored at the destination, but a compromised backed-up host has it. Defences live on the destination side — bucket versioning or object lock, credentials for the source host that cannot delete or overwrite existing versions, and pruning from a trusted host. Note that S3 `PutObject` overwrites an existing key, so PUT permission alone is not append-only.
 2. **Compression reveals sizes.** Blobs and `db.zst.age` are zstd-compressed then age-encrypted; the manifest is compressed only. age does not pad, so an object's size is the exact compressed length of its contents. All new chunks packed into one blob share a single zstd stream (8 MiB window, 4 MiB at compression levels 1-2), and a blob is closed at `blob_size_limit` and at the end of each configured path. Because a stored chunk is never packed again, someone who can write into a backed-up file and watch blob sizes learns something only when their controlled data and a secret land in the same chunk of a file that keeps changing. Advice: back up any outsider-writable directory as its own snapshot.
 3. **Chunking uses no secret.** The FastCDC parameters are fixed and public. The default 10 MB average yields chunks between 2.5 MB and 40 MB, and any file of 2.5 MB or less is a single chunk. At the default 10 GB `blob_size_limit` a blob holds hundreds of chunks, so individual chunk lengths are not visible in the blob's size; lowering the limit toward the chunk size begins to expose them.
 4. **Decrypted data on local disk.** Several commands stage plaintext under `$TMPDIR`: `snapshot restore` writes decrypted blobs under `vaultik-blobcache-*/` (no size cap) and the decrypted metadata database at `vaultik-restore-*/snapshot.db`; `verify --deep` writes that database at `vaultik-verify-*/snapshot.db`; `snapshot create` keeps a plaintext copy of the index at `vaultik-snapshot-*/snapshot.db`. These files are created `0600` and removed on success, but a `kill -9` or a power loss leaves them behind — delete any leftover `vaultik-*` directory under `$TMPDIR` by hand. `$TMPDIR` should be trusted to the same degree as the restore target.
 5. **Store permissions differ per command.** The backed-up host needs only PUT to run `snapshot create`: it writes blobs and metadata and neither reads nor deletes them. Other commands need more — `snapshot verify`, `snapshot restore`, and `prune` list and read; `prune`, `snapshot purge`, `snapshot remove`, and `remote nuke` also delete. The recommended cron line uses `--prune`, which runs `prune` on the backed-up host, so granting that host `--prune` gives it credentials that can delete its own backups. To keep the source host to PUT only, prune from a separate trusted host instead.
 6. **Changing recipients does not re-encrypt existing data.** Deduplicated chunks and same-named blobs already on the destination stay encrypted to the recipients in force when they were written. A new snapshot that reuses them cannot be restored with a newly added recipient's key alone, because those reused objects were never encrypted to it. To make everything readable by a new key, run `vaultik database delete` and take a full backup to a fresh destination or prefix.
 7. **X25519 recipients only.** vaultik rejects age ssh and plugin recipients. Long-lived ciphertext held by a third party (the destination operator) has no fallback if X25519 is ever broken: there is no second recipient type and no post-quantum option.
 ## Consistency Guarantees
 1. **Blobs are immutable** - Once written, a blob is never modified
 2. **Blobs are written before metadata** - A snapshot's metadata is only written after all its blobs are successfully uploaded
 3. **Metadata is written atomically** - Both db.zst.age and manifest.json.zst are written as complete files
-4. **A snapshot is marked complete in the local DB only after its metadata is uploaded** - `finalizeSnapshotMetadata` runs `ExportSnapshotMetadata` first and records completion (`MarkSnapshotComplete`) only once the export succeeds (see the backup data flow in [ARCHITECTURE.md](../ARCHITECTURE.md)). A crash during the export therefore leaves the snapshot incomplete, so the next backup's `PruneDatabase` drops it and re-backs-up its data, rather than leaving a completed-looking row in the local index with no matching metadata on the destination store. (A crash in the brief moment after the export succeeds but before completion is recorded leaves a fully-restorable snapshot on the destination that the local index drops as incomplete on the next run; `snapshot list` then reports it honestly as remote-only, which is the safe direction: the destination copy stays restorable.)
+4. **Snapshots are marked complete in local DB only after metadata upload** - Ensures consistency between local and remote state
 ## Pruning Safety
 The prune operation is safe because:
-1. It keeps every blob listed in any snapshot's manifest and deletes only blobs that no manifest references
+1. It only deletes blobs not referenced in any manifest
 2. Manifests are unencrypted and can be read without keys
-3. If any manifest cannot be downloaded or decoded, prune deletes nothing and exits with an error, rather than treating that snapshot's blobs as unreferenced
+3. The operation compares the latest local DB snapshot with the latest S3 snapshot to ensure consistency
-4. Prune requires exclusive access to the destination: running it during a concurrent backup can race a snapshot whose manifest is not yet written, so do not prune while a backup is in progress
+4. Pruning will fail if these don't match, preventing accidental deletion of needed blobs
 ## Restoration Requirements
@@ -20,11 +20,9 @@ require (
 	github.com/rclone/rclone v1.72.1
 	github.com/spf13/afero v1.15.0
 	github.com/spf13/cobra v1.10.1
 	github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10
 	github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
 	go.uber.org/fx v1.24.0
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.18.0
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0
 	golang.org/x/term v0.37.0
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
 	modernc.org/sqlite v1.38.0
@@ -227,6 +225,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/smarty/assertions v1.16.0 // indirect
 	github.com/sony/gobreaker v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/spacemonkeygo/monkit/v3 v3.0.25-0.20251022131615-eb24eb109368 // indirect
 	github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.10 // indirect
 	github.com/t3rm1n4l/go-mega v0.0.0-20251031123324-a804aaa87491 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
@@ -264,6 +263,7 @@ require (
 	golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20251023183803-a4bb9ffd2546 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/net v0.47.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.33.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.38.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/text v0.31.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/time v0.14.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/tools v0.38.0 // indirect
@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
 // Package blob handles the creation of blobs - the final storage units for Vaultik.
 // A blob is a large file (up to 10GB) containing many compressed and encrypted chunks
-// from multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed: a blob's filename is
+// from multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed, meaning their filename
-// hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed from the concatenated
+// is derived from the SHA256 hash of their compressed and encrypted content.
 // chunk data before compression and encryption, not from the stored bytes. See
 // blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md.
 //
 // The blob creation process:
-//  1. Chunks are accumulated from multiple files
+// 1. Chunks are accumulated from multiple files
-//  2. Each chunk's uncompressed bytes are fed to a running SHA-256 and, in the same
+// 2. The collection is compressed using zstd
-//     pass, compressed with zstd and encrypted with age into the temp file
+// 3. The compressed data is encrypted using age
-//  3. On finalize, the name is the double SHA-256 of that uncompressed content
+// 4. The encrypted blob is hashed to create its content-addressed name
-//  4. The blob is uploaded to S3 using the name as the filename
+// 5. The blob is uploaded to S3 using the hash as the filename
 //
 // This design optimizes storage efficiency by batching many small chunks into
 // larger blobs, reducing the number of S3 operations and associated costs.
@@ -489,7 +487,7 @@ func (p *Packer) closeBlobWriter() (string, int64, error) {
 		return "", 0, fmt.Errorf("seeking to start: %w", err)
 	}
-	finalHash := p.currentBlob.writer.ContentID()
+	finalHash := p.currentBlob.writer.Sum256()
 	return hex.EncodeToString(finalHash), finalSize, nil
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
 // Package blobgen implements the blob data pipeline: streaming zstd
 // compression, age encryption, and SHA256 content hashing for blob
 // creation, plus the matching decrypt/decompress/verify reader.
 package blobgen
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 )
 // CompressResult contains the results of compression
 type CompressResult struct {
 	Data             []byte
 	UncompressedSize int64
 	CompressedSize   int64
 	SHA256           string
 }
 // CompressData compresses and encrypts data, returning the result with hash
 func CompressData(
 	data []byte, compressionLevel int, recipients []string,
 ) (*CompressResult, error) {
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	// Create writer
 	w, err := NewWriter(&buf, compressionLevel, recipients)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Write data
 	_, err = w.Write(data)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = w.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("writing data: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Close to flush
 	err = w.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("closing writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	return &CompressResult{
 		Data:             buf.Bytes(),
 		UncompressedSize: int64(len(data)),
 		CompressedSize:   int64(buf.Len()),
 		SHA256:           hex.EncodeToString(w.Sum256()),
 	}, nil
 }
 // CompressStream compresses and encrypts from reader to writer, returning
 // the number of uncompressed bytes written and the content hash.
 func CompressStream(
 	dst io.Writer, src io.Reader, compressionLevel int, recipients []string,
 ) (int64, string, error) {
 	// Create writer
 	w, err := NewWriter(dst, compressionLevel, recipients)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("creating writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	closed := false
 	defer func() {
 		if !closed {
 			_ = w.Close()
 		}
 	}()
 	// Copy data
 	_, err = io.Copy(w, src)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("copying data: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Close to flush
 	err = w.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, "", fmt.Errorf("closing writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	closed = true
 	return w.BytesWritten(), hex.EncodeToString(w.Sum256()), nil
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // testRecipient is a static age recipient for tests.
 const testRecipient = "age1cplgrwj77ta54dnmydvvmzn64ltk83ankxl5sww04mrtmu62kv3s89gmvv"
 // TestCompressStreamNoDoubleClose is a regression test for issue #28.
 // It verifies that CompressStream does not panic or return an error due to
 // double-closing the underlying blobgen.Writer. Before the fix in PR #33,
 // the explicit Close() on the happy path combined with defer Close() would
 // cause a double close.
 func TestCompressStreamNoDoubleClose(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	input := []byte("regression test data for issue #28 double-close fix")
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	written, hash, err := blobgen.CompressStream(
 		&buf, bytes.NewReader(input), 3, []string{testRecipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "CompressStream should not return an error")
 	assert.Positive(t, written, "expected bytes written > 0")
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, hash, "expected non-empty hash")
 	assert.Positive(t, buf.Len(), "expected non-empty output")
 }
 // TestCompressStreamLargeInput exercises CompressStream with a larger payload
 // to ensure no double-close issues surface under heavier I/O.
 func TestCompressStreamLargeInput(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	data := make([]byte, 512*1024) // 512 KB
 	_, err := rand.Read(data)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	written, hash, err := blobgen.CompressStream(
 		&buf, bytes.NewReader(data), 3, []string{testRecipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Positive(t, written)
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, hash)
 }
 // TestCompressStreamEmptyInput verifies CompressStream handles empty input
 // without double-close issues.
 func TestCompressStreamEmptyInput(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	_, hash, err := blobgen.CompressStream(
 		&buf, strings.NewReader(""), 3, []string{testRecipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, hash)
 }
 // TestCompressDataNoDoubleClose mirrors the stream test for CompressData,
 // ensuring the explicit Close + error-path Close pattern is also safe.
 func TestCompressDataNoDoubleClose(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	input := []byte("CompressData regression test for double-close")
 	result, err := blobgen.CompressData(input, 3, []string{testRecipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Positive(t, result.CompressedSize)
 	assert.Equal(t, result.UncompressedSize, int64(len(input)))
 	assert.NotEmpty(t, result.SHA256)
 }
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"testing"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // ageChunkSize is age's STREAM plaintext chunk size (64 KiB); each encrypted
 // chunk adds a 16-byte ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag.
 const (
 	ageChunkSize    = 64 * 1024
 	ageChunkTagSize = 16
 	ageSegmentSize  = ageChunkSize + ageChunkTagSize
 	ageNonceSize    = 16
 )
 // makeIdentity returns a fresh X25519 identity and its recipient string.
 func makeIdentity(t *testing.T) (*age.X25519Identity, string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	id, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	return id, id.Recipient().String()
 }
 // randomBytes returns n cryptographically random bytes, which do not compress
 // so the encrypted payload spans multiple age segments.
 func randomBytes(t *testing.T, n int) []byte {
 	t.Helper()
 	b := make([]byte, n)
 	_, err := rand.Read(b)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	return b
 }
 // compressibleBytes returns n bytes of a repeating pattern, which zstd packs
 // down to a small payload.
 func compressibleBytes(n int) []byte {
 	pattern := bytes.Repeat([]byte("compressible-"), n/13+1)
 	return pattern[:n]
 }
 // encryptBlob compresses, encrypts and returns a blob for plaintext at
 // compression level 1.
 func encryptBlob(t *testing.T, plaintext []byte, recipients ...string) []byte {
 	t.Helper()
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	w, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, 1, recipients)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	_, err = w.Write(plaintext)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
 	return buf.Bytes()
 }
 // ageHeaderLen returns the byte length of blob's age header, i.e. the offset
 // of the 16-byte payload nonce that follows it. The header ends with a MAC
 // line "--- <mac>\n"; the nonce begins right after that newline.
 func ageHeaderLen(t *testing.T, blob []byte) int {
 	t.Helper()
 	i := bytes.Index(blob, []byte("\n--- "))
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, i, 0, "age MAC footer line not found")
 	nl := bytes.IndexByte(blob[i+1:], '\n')
 	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, nl, 0, "newline ending MAC line not found")
 	return i + 1 + nl + 1
 }
 // requireBlobUnreadable asserts that data never decrypts to a plaintext with a
 // nil error: either NewReader fails, or reading it does.
 func requireBlobUnreadable(t *testing.T, data []byte, id age.Identity) {
 	t.Helper()
 	r, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data), id)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 	_, err = io.ReadAll(r)
 	_ = r.Close()
 	require.Error(t, err, "reading a damaged blob must fail")
 }
 // errFailWriter is returned by failAfterWriter once its byte limit is passed.
 var errFailWriter = errors.New("destination write failed")
 // failAfterWriter accepts writes until more than limit bytes have been sent,
 // then fails every write. It models a destination that dies mid-blob.
 type failAfterWriter struct {
 	limit   int
 	written int
 }
 func (f *failAfterWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	f.written += len(p)
 	if f.written > f.limit {
 		return 0, errFailWriter
 	}
 	return len(p), nil
 }
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 )
 // ErrOutputTooLarge is returned by a reader from LimitReader once it has
 // been asked for more than its limit. It bounds how far an untrusted
 // compressed stream may expand, so a small, highly compressible object
 // from the store cannot decompress without limit.
 var ErrOutputTooLarge = errors.New("output exceeds size limit")
 // LimitReader returns a reader that yields at most limit bytes from r and
 // then fails with ErrOutputTooLarge. Unlike io.LimitReader, which reports
 // a silent io.EOF at the limit (indistinguishable from a stream that
 // simply ended), this fails, so a caller decoding or copying the stream
 // sees an error rather than a truncated value. A stream of exactly limit
 // bytes reads back cleanly to EOF; the first byte beyond it is the error.
 func LimitReader(r io.Reader, limit int64) io.Reader {
 	// remaining counts down from limit+1: the extra byte is the one that,
 	// if it ever arrives, proves the stream is longer than the limit.
 	return &limitReader{r: r, remaining: limit + 1}
 }
 type limitReader struct {
 	r         io.Reader
 	remaining int64
 }
 func (l *limitReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	if l.remaining <= 0 {
 		return 0, ErrOutputTooLarge
 	}
 	if int64(len(p)) > l.remaining {
 		p = p[:l.remaining]
 	}
 	n, err := l.r.Read(p)
 	l.remaining -= int64(n)
 	if l.remaining <= 0 {
 		// The (limit+1)th byte was just read: the stream is too long.
 		return n, ErrOutputTooLarge
 	}
 	return n, err
 }
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"io"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // TestLimitReaderPassesExactSize checks that a stream of exactly the limit
 // reads back cleanly to EOF: the bound must not reject a legitimate blob
 // whose plaintext equals its recorded size.
 func TestLimitReaderPassesExactSize(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const n = 1000
 	r := blobgen.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(bytes.Repeat([]byte("a"), n)), n)
 	got, err := io.ReadAll(r)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.Len(t, got, n)
 }
 // TestLimitReaderFailsPastLimit feeds a large, highly compressible run of
 // zeros — the decompressed output a zip bomb would produce — through a
 // small limit and checks it fails within the bound rather than passing
 // the whole stream through.
 func TestLimitReaderFailsPastLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const limit = 1000
 	r := blobgen.LimitReader(
 		bytes.NewReader(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, limit*1000)), limit)
 	n, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, r)
 	require.ErrorIs(t, err, blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge)
 	require.LessOrEqual(t, n, int64(limit)+1,
 		"reader must stop within one byte of the limit")
 }
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"fmt"
 	"testing"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // TestNewReaderWrongIdentity covers issue case 4: opening a blob with an
 // identity other than the recipient reports no matching identity.
 func TestNewReaderWrongIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	_, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	other, _ := makeIdentity(t)
 	blob := encryptBlob(t, []byte("secret payload"), recipient)
 	_, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(blob), other)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	var noMatch *age.NoIdentityMatchError
 	assert.ErrorAs(t, err, &noMatch)
 }
 // TestNewReaderTruncated covers issue case 6: a multi-segment blob cut at
 // several points must never read back as valid data. The point immediately
 // after the header and nonce is intentionally excluded: it reads as a valid
 // empty blob today and is the regression case for
 // https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/152.
 func TestNewReaderTruncated(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	id, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	blob := encryptBlob(t, randomBytes(t, 4*65536+123), recipient)
 	h := ageHeaderLen(t, blob)
 	require.Greater(t, len(blob), h+ageNonceSize+ageSegmentSize,
 		"test needs a blob of at least two age segments")
 	cases := []struct {
 		name string
 		size int
 	}{
 		{"inside header", h / 2},
 		{"inside nonce", h + 8},
 		{"inside first segment", h + ageNonceSize + 100},
 		{"end of first full segment", h + ageNonceSize + ageSegmentSize},
 		{"last byte removed", len(blob) - 1},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			requireBlobUnreadable(t, blob[:tc.size], id)
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestNewReaderCorrupted covers issue case 7: one flipped byte in each region
 // of a multi-segment blob makes it unreadable.
 func TestNewReaderCorrupted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	id, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	blob := encryptBlob(t, randomBytes(t, 4*65536+123), recipient)
 	h := ageHeaderLen(t, blob)
 	firstNL := bytes.IndexByte(blob, '\n')
 	require.Positive(t, firstNL, "header must have a version line")
 	cases := []struct {
 		name string
 		pos  int
 	}{
 		{"header stanza", firstNL + 5},
 		{"header MAC line", h - 2},
 		{"nonce", h + 4},
 		{"body segment", h + ageNonceSize + 50},
 		{"final tag", len(blob) - 1},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			corrupt := append([]byte(nil), blob...)
 			corrupt[tc.pos] ^= 0xff
 			requireBlobUnreadable(t, corrupt, id)
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestNewReaderTrailingAndGarbage covers issue case 8: bytes appended after a
 // valid blob, empty input, and random garbage each fail to read.
 func TestNewReaderTrailingAndGarbage(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	id, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	valid := encryptBlob(t, []byte("small payload"), recipient)
 	appended := append(append([]byte(nil), valid...), []byte("trailing junk")...)
 	t.Run("appended bytes", func(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
 		requireBlobUnreadable(t, appended, id)
 	})
 	t.Run("empty input", func(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
 		requireBlobUnreadable(t, []byte{}, id)
 	})
 	t.Run("random garbage", func(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
 		requireBlobUnreadable(t, randomBytes(t, 512), id)
 	})
 }
 // TestNewWriterInvalidLevel covers the rejected end of issue case 9: an
 // out-of-range compression level errors and writes nothing to the destination.
 func TestNewWriterInvalidLevel(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	_, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	for _, level := range []int{0, -1, 20} {
 		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("level%d", level), func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			var buf bytes.Buffer
 			w, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, level, []string{recipient})
 			require.ErrorIs(t, err, blobgen.ErrInvalidCompressionLevel)
 			assert.Nil(t, w)
 			assert.Zero(t, buf.Len(), "nothing written on an invalid level")
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestNewWriterInvalidRecipients covers issue case 10: nil and empty recipient
 // lists and an unparsable recipient string each error.
 func TestNewWriterInvalidRecipients(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cases := []struct {
 		name       string
 		recipients []string
 	}{
 		{"nil list", nil},
 		{"empty list", []string{}},
 		{"invalid recipient string", []string{"not-a-recipient"}},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			var buf bytes.Buffer
 			w, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, 1, tc.recipients)
 			require.Error(t, err)
 			assert.Nil(t, w)
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestNewWriterFailingDestination covers issue case 11: a destination that
 // fails mid-blob surfaces its error from Write or Close.
 func TestNewWriterFailingDestination(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	_, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	// The limit clears the age header and nonce so NewWriter succeeds, then
 	// trips once the compressed body starts flowing.
 	dst := &failAfterWriter{limit: 512}
 	w, err := blobgen.NewWriter(dst, 1, []string{recipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	_, writeErr := w.Write(randomBytes(t, 256*1024))
 	closeErr := w.Close()
 	assert.True(t, writeErr != nil || closeErr != nil,
 		"destination failure must surface from Write or Close")
 }
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package blobgen
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"hash"
 	"io"
@@ -21,12 +20,10 @@ type Reader struct {
 	bytesRead    int64
 }
-// NewReader creates a new Reader that decrypts, decompresses, and verifies
+// NewReader creates a new Reader that decrypts, decompresses, and verifies data
-// data. Every supplied identity is offered to age.Decrypt, so a blob
+func NewReader(r io.Reader, identity age.Identity) (*Reader, error) {
 // encrypted to any one of them can be read.
 func NewReader(r io.Reader, identities ...age.Identity) (*Reader, error) {
 	// Create decryption reader
-	decReader, err := age.Decrypt(r, identities...)
+	decReader, err := age.Decrypt(r, identity)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating decryption reader: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -57,22 +54,6 @@ func (r *Reader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	n, err := r.teeReader.Read(p)
 	r.bytesRead += int64(n)
 	// When the ciphertext is cut right after the age header plus its
 	// 16-byte nonce, the age reader's first read fails with
 	// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, and the zstd decoder maps that to a clean
 	// io.EOF at frame start. That makes a truncated stream look like a
 	// valid empty one. Distinguish the two: on EOF, read once more from
 	// the age reader. A genuine end leaves it at (0, io.EOF); a truncated
 	// stream leaves its stored io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, which we surface.
 	if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
 		var probe [1]byte
 		m, ageErr := r.decryptor.Read(probe[:])
 		if m != 0 || !errors.Is(ageErr, io.EOF) {
 			return n, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
 		}
 	}
 	return n, err
 }
@@ -83,9 +64,7 @@ func (r *Reader) Close() error {
 	return nil
 }
-// Sum256 returns the single SHA-256 of the plaintext read so far. This is the
+// Sum256 returns the SHA256 hash of all data read
 // first hash only; the stored object name is its double hash, which callers
 // obtain by passing this digest to DoubleSHA256.
 func (r *Reader) Sum256() []byte {
 	return r.hasher.Sum(nil)
 }
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"io"
 	"testing"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // TestMultipleRecipients verifies that data written for several recipients can
 // be read back by each recipient's identity. Moved from internal/crypto, which
 // held the only multi-recipient test; blobgen is now the sole encryption path.
 func TestMultipleRecipients(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	identities := make([]*age.X25519Identity, 3)
 	recipients := make([]string, 3)
 	for i := range identities {
 		identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 		identities[i] = identity
 		recipients[i] = identity.Recipient().String()
 	}
 	plaintext := []byte("Secret message for multiple recipients")
 	var encrypted bytes.Buffer
 	writer, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&encrypted, 3, recipients)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	_, err = writer.Write(plaintext)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, writer.Close())
 	// Every recipient's identity must recover the original plaintext.
 	for i, identity := range identities {
 		reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(
 			bytes.NewReader(encrypted.Bytes()), identity)
 		require.NoError(t, err, "recipient %d should open the reader", i+1)
 		got, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
 		require.NoError(t, err, "recipient %d should read the plaintext", i+1)
 		require.NoError(t, reader.Close())
 		assert.Equal(t, plaintext, got,
 			"recipient %d should recover the original plaintext", i+1)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"testing"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // checkRoundTrip writes input through a Writer, reads it back through a Reader,
 // and verifies the plaintext, the byte counts, and the content hashes.
 func checkRoundTrip(
 	t *testing.T, id *age.X25519Identity, recipient string,
 	level int, input []byte,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	w, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, level, []string{recipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	n, err := w.Write(input)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, len(input), n)
 	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
 	require.Equal(t, int64(len(input)), w.BytesWritten())
 	r, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()), id)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	got, err := io.ReadAll(r)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, r.Close())
 	assert.Equal(t, input, got, "decrypted output must equal input")
 	require.Equal(t, int64(len(input)), r.BytesRead())
 	// The hash values are checked by decrypting: the reader's single SHA-256
 	// is the hash of the plaintext, and hashing it once more (DoubleSHA256)
 	// gives the writer's ContentID.
 	single := sha256.Sum256(got)
 	assert.Equal(t, single[:], r.Sum256())
 	assert.Equal(t, blobgen.DoubleSHA256(r.Sum256()), w.ContentID())
 }
 // TestWriterReaderRoundTrip covers issue cases 1 and 2: every size round trips
 // for both random and compressible data, and the reader hash, its double hash
 // and the byte counts all agree.
 func TestWriterReaderRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	id, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	// Sizes exercise the age segment boundary (64 KiB) from just below to a
 	// few segments above it, plus the empty and single-byte edges.
 	sizes := []int{0, 1, 65535, 65536, 65537, 4*65536 + 123}
 	kinds := []struct {
 		name string
 		fill func(*testing.T, int) []byte
 	}{
 		{"random", randomBytes},
 		{"compressible", func(_ *testing.T, n int) []byte {
 			return compressibleBytes(n)
 		}},
 	}
 	for _, k := range kinds {
 		for _, size := range sizes {
 			name := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", k.name, size)
 			t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Parallel()
 				checkRoundTrip(t, id, recipient, 1, k.fill(t, size))
 			})
 		}
 	}
 }
 // TestZeroLengthNoWrite covers issue case 3: a Writer closed with no Write at
 // all produces the double hash of the empty input, and the blob reads back as
 // empty with no error.
 func TestZeroLengthNoWrite(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	id, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	w, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, 1, []string{recipient})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), w.BytesWritten())
 	empty := sha256.Sum256(nil)
 	doubled := sha256.Sum256(empty[:])
 	assert.Equal(t, doubled[:], w.ContentID(),
 		"ContentID of empty input is SHA256(SHA256(\"\"))")
 	r, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()), id)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	got, err := io.ReadAll(r)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, r.Close())
 	assert.Empty(t, got, "empty blob decrypts to empty output")
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), r.BytesRead())
 	assert.Equal(t, empty[:], r.Sum256())
 }
 // TestNewWriterValidLevelsRoundTrip covers the accepted end of issue case 9:
 // the boundary compression levels 1 and 19 both round trip.
 func TestNewWriterValidLevelsRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	id, recipient := makeIdentity(t)
 	input := randomBytes(t, 4096)
 	for _, level := range []int{1, 19} {
 		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("level%d", level), func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			checkRoundTrip(t, id, recipient, level, input)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
 package blobgen_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"io"
 	"testing"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // TestReaderRejectsHeaderNonceTruncation guards against a stream cut right
 // after the age header plus its 16-byte nonce. age.Decrypt still succeeds on
 // such an object, and the zstd decoder maps the age reader's
 // io.ErrUnexpectedEOF to a clean io.EOF at frame start, so without the extra
 // check the truncated stream would read as a valid empty one. Reading it must
 // now fail.
 func TestReaderRejectsHeaderNonceTruncation(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	// Encrypting empty plaintext yields header + nonce(16) + a single
 	// 16-byte final chunk tag. Dropping the trailing tag leaves exactly the
 	// age header plus its nonce — the truncation point that triggers the bug.
 	var full bytes.Buffer
 	w, err := age.Encrypt(&full, identity.Recipient())
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
 	truncated := full.Bytes()[:full.Len()-16]
 	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(truncated), identity)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
 	_, err = io.ReadAll(reader)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	require.ErrorIs(t, err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
 }
 // TestReaderReadsGenuinelyEmptyBlob confirms the truncation check does not
 // reject a legitimately empty payload: a blob written with no data must round
 // trip back to zero bytes with no error.
 func TestReaderReadsGenuinelyEmptyBlob(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	var encrypted bytes.Buffer
 	writer, err := blobgen.NewWriter(
 		&encrypted, 3, []string{identity.Recipient().String()})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, writer.Close())
 	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(encrypted.Bytes()), identity)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
 	data, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.Empty(t, data)
 }
@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
 // Package blobgen implements the blob data pipeline: streaming zstd
 // compression, age encryption, and SHA256 content hashing for blob
 // creation, plus the matching decrypt/decompress/verify reader.
 package blobgen
 import (
@@ -15,24 +12,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
 )
 // DoubleSHA256 returns the double SHA-256 of content whose single SHA-256
 // digest is sum: it hashes that digest once more. Stored objects — a blob, and
 // the metadata database export — are named by this second hash.
 //
 // The second hash does not hide whether known content is stored: an attacker
 // who can reproduce an object's entire plaintext computes the same name simply
 // by hashing twice, exactly as this code does. What limits that is blob
 // packing, not the double hash — a blob's name covers all of its concatenated
 // chunk plaintext, so a name can be confirmed only by someone who can
 // reproduce the whole blob (a snapshot made entirely of known content, or a
 // known file large enough to fill blobs on its own). An ordinary file that
 // shares a blob with other, unknown data cannot be confirmed this way.
 func DoubleSHA256(sum []byte) []byte {
 	h := sha256.Sum256(sum)
 	return h[:]
 }
 // Zstd compression level bounds accepted by NewWriter.
 const (
 	minCompressionLevel = 1
@@ -48,11 +27,6 @@ const reservedCompressionCPUs = 2
 var ErrInvalidCompressionLevel = errors.New(
 	"invalid compression level: must be between 1 and 19")
 // errInvalidRecipient is returned when a recipient string does not parse as
 // an X25519 age1... public key. It omits the value, which can be sensitive.
 var errInvalidRecipient = errors.New(
 	"not a valid X25519 age1... recipient")
 // Writer wraps compression and encryption with SHA256 hashing.
 // Data flows: input -> tee(hasher, compressor -> encryptor -> destination)
 // The hash is computed on the uncompressed input for deterministic content-addressing.
@@ -83,12 +57,10 @@ func NewWriter(
 	// Parse recipients
 	var ageRecipients []age.Recipient
-	for i, recipient := range recipients {
+	for _, recipient := range recipients {
 		// The recipient string can be sensitive (e.g. a secret key pasted by
 		// mistake), so the error names its position, never its value.
 		r, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(recipient)
 		if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: recipient %d", errInvalidRecipient, i)
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing recipient %s: %w", recipient, err)
 		}
 		ageRecipients = append(ageRecipients, r)
@@ -151,12 +123,17 @@ func (w *Writer) Close() error {
 	return nil
 }
-// ContentID returns the double SHA-256 of the uncompressed input data: the
+// Sum256 returns the double SHA256 hash of the uncompressed input data.
-// name under which this content is stored. It is the second hash of the
+// Double hashing (SHA256(SHA256(data))) prevents information leakage about
-// running SHA-256, via DoubleSHA256; see that function for what naming content
+// the plaintext - an attacker cannot confirm existence of known content
-// this way does and does not hide.
+// by computing its hash and checking for a matching blob filename.
-func (w *Writer) ContentID() []byte {
+func (w *Writer) Sum256() []byte {
-	return DoubleSHA256(w.hasher.Sum(nil))
+	// First hash: SHA256(plaintext)
 	firstHash := w.hasher.Sum(nil)
 	// Second hash: SHA256(firstHash) - this is the blob ID
 	secondHash := sha256.Sum256(firstHash)
 	return secondHash[:]
 }
 // BytesWritten returns the number of uncompressed bytes written
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
-// TestWriterHashIsDoubleHash verifies that Writer.ContentID() returns
+// TestWriterHashIsDoubleHash verifies that Writer.Sum256() returns
-// SHA256(SHA256(plaintext)). Stored objects are named by this second hash so a
+// the double hash SHA256(SHA256(plaintext)) for security.
-// name is not the plaintext's own SHA-256; this does not stop someone who
+// Double hashing prevents attackers from confirming existence of known content.
 // already holds the plaintext from confirming it.
 func TestWriterHashIsDoubleHash(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ func TestWriterHashIsDoubleHash(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	// Get the hash from the writer
-	writerHash := hex.EncodeToString(writer.ContentID())
+	writerHash := hex.EncodeToString(writer.Sum256())
 	// Calculate the expected double hash: SHA256(SHA256(plaintext))
 	firstHash := sha256.Sum256(testData)
@@ -61,11 +60,11 @@ func TestWriterHashIsDoubleHash(t *testing.T) {
 	// The writer hash should match the double hash
 	assert.Equal(t, expectedDoubleHash, writerHash,
-		"Writer.ContentID() must be SHA256(SHA256(plaintext))")
+		"Writer.Sum256() should return SHA256(SHA256(plaintext)) for security")
-	// It must be the second hash, not the plaintext's own SHA-256.
+	// Verify it's NOT the single hash (would leak information)
 	assert.NotEqual(t, singleHashStr, writerHash,
-		"Writer hash must be the double hash, not the single SHA-256")
+		"Writer hash should not be single hash (would allow content confirmation attacks)")
 }
 // TestWriterDeterministicHash verifies that the same input always produces
@@ -94,8 +93,8 @@ func TestWriterDeterministicHash(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, writer2.Close())
-	hash1 := hex.EncodeToString(writer1.ContentID())
+	hash1 := hex.EncodeToString(writer1.Sum256())
-	hash2 := hex.EncodeToString(writer2.ContentID())
+	hash2 := hex.EncodeToString(writer2.Sum256())
 	// Hashes should be identical (deterministic)
 	assert.Equal(t, hash1, hash2, "Same input should produce same hash")
@@ -109,20 +108,3 @@ func TestWriterDeterministicHash(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Logf("Encrypted size 1: %d bytes", buf1.Len())
 	t.Logf("Encrypted size 2: %d bytes", buf2.Len())
 }
 // TestNewWriterSecretKeyNotEchoed verifies that a secret key mistakenly passed
 // as a recipient does not appear in the returned error. A recipient string can
 // be sensitive, so the error must name only the position, not the value.
 func TestNewWriterSecretKeyNotEchoed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	secretKey := "AGE-SECRET-KEY-19CR5YSFW59HM4TLD6GX" +
 		"VEDMZFTVVF7PPHKUT68TXSFPK7APHXA2QS2NJA5"
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	_, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, 3, []string{secretKey})
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.NotContains(t, err.Error(), secretKey,
 		"error must not echo the recipient value")
 }
@@ -33,10 +33,9 @@ type Chunker struct {
 	maxChunkSize int
 }
-// ChunkSizeSpread is the FastCDC-recommended factor between the average
+// chunkSizeSpread is the FastCDC-recommended factor between the average
 // chunk size and the minimum (avg/spread) and maximum (avg*spread) sizes.
-// The largest chunk the chunker can emit is therefore avg*ChunkSizeSpread.
+const chunkSizeSpread = 4
 const ChunkSizeSpread = 4
 // NewChunker creates a new chunker with the specified average chunk size.
 // The actual chunk sizes will vary between avgChunkSize/4 and avgChunkSize*4
@@ -46,8 +45,8 @@ func NewChunker(avgChunkSize int64) *Chunker {
 	// FastCDC recommends min = avg/4 and max = avg*4
 	return &Chunker{
 		avgChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize),
-		minChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize / ChunkSizeSpread),
+		minChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize / chunkSizeSpread),
-		maxChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize * ChunkSizeSpread),
+		maxChunkSize: int(avgChunkSize * chunkSizeSpread),
 	}
 }
@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/adrg/xdg"
@@ -30,33 +33,14 @@ import (
 // may take before we give up.
 const shutdownTimeout = 30 * time.Second
-// lockMode says whether a command mutates persistent state — the local
+// AppOptions contains common options for creating the fx application.
-// index database or the remote store — and so must hold the process-wide
+// It includes the configuration file path, logging options, and additional
-// PID lock, or only reads that state and may run alongside a mutator.
+// fx modules and invocations that should be included in the application.
 type lockMode int
 const (
 	// mutating commands (snapshot create, snapshot purge, snapshot remove,
 	// prune, remote nuke) write the local index or the remote store. They
 	// hold the PID lock so that at most one runs at a time.
 	mutating lockMode = iota
 	// readOnly commands (info, snapshot list, snapshot verify, remote info,
 	// snapshot restore) do not write the local index or the remote store,
 	// so they run without the lock and are never blocked by a running
 	// mutator. restore writes only to the target directory it is given.
 	readOnly
 )
 // AppOptions contains common options for creating and running the fx
 // application: the configuration file path, logging options, additional fx
 // modules and invocations, and whether the command mutates persistent
 // state (which decides whether it takes the PID lock).
 type AppOptions struct {
 	ConfigPath string
 	LogOptions log.Options
 	Modules    []fx.Option
 	Invokes    []fx.Option
 	Mode       lockMode
 }
 // setupGlobals records the startup time and, when an output-suppression
@@ -65,11 +49,6 @@ type AppOptions struct {
 // silenced — per the documented convention that --quiet suppresses
 // non-error output only. The startup banner is printed by Entry
 // before cobra parses arguments, gated by the same arg-level check.
 //
 // --json quiets the UI here too, because stdout then carries a JSON
 // document and human narration would corrupt it. Unlike Quiet it does
 // not lower the stderr log level (issue #112), so --verbose/--debug
 // still surface diagnostics alongside the document.
 func setupGlobals(
 	lc fx.Lifecycle, g *globals.Globals, v *vaultik.Vaultik, opts log.Options,
 ) {
@@ -77,7 +56,7 @@ func setupGlobals(
 		OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 			g.StartTime = time.Now().UTC()
-			if opts.Cron || opts.Quiet || opts.JSON {
+			if opts.Cron || opts.Quiet {
 				v.UI.SetQuiet(true)
 			}
@@ -158,58 +137,73 @@ func cleanStartupError(err error) error {
 	return &startupError{msg: msg}
 }
-// RunApp starts the fx application, blocks until it is asked to stop, and
+// RunApp starts and stops the fx application within the given context.
-// then stops it. The app is asked to stop either by an OS interrupt
+// It handles graceful shutdown on interrupt signals (SIGINT, SIGTERM) and
-// (SIGINT/SIGTERM — fx installs its own handler when app.Wait is called) or,
+// ensures the application stops cleanly. The function blocks until the
-// on normal completion, by the finished operation calling
+// application completes or is interrupted. Returns an error if startup fails.
 // Shutdowner.Shutdown(); both arrive on the app.Wait channel.
 //
 // Stopping runs the fx OnStop hooks, and RunApp does not return until Stop
 // returns. On an interrupt the operation's OnStop hook cancels the running
 // command and waits for it to unwind — removing its decrypted scratch files —
 // so the process cannot proceed to exit mid-cleanup (issue #159). Waiting for
 // Stop before returning is what makes that hook effective: routing the
 // interrupt through app.Stop and not returning until it completes is required,
 // because fx also fires the app.Wait channel on the signal, and an earlier
 // version returned on that alone — unwinding to os.Exit while the concurrent
 // cleanup still ran. The stop is bounded by shutdownTimeout. Returns an error
 // if startup fails.
 func RunApp(ctx context.Context, app *fx.App) error {
 	// Set up signal handling for graceful shutdown
 	sigChan := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
 	signal.Notify(sigChan, os.Interrupt, syscall.SIGTERM)
 	// Create a context that will be cancelled on signal
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	defer cancel()
 	// Start the app
 	err := app.Start(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return cleanStartupError(err)
 	}
-	// Block until an interrupt or the finished operation's
+	// Handle shutdown
-	// Shutdowner.Shutdown() arrives, then stop the app in this goroutine so we
+	shutdownComplete := make(chan struct{})
 	// return only after its OnStop hooks — including the operation's cleanup
 	// wait — have run. Detach the stop from ctx's cancellation but keep its
 	// values, and bound it by shutdownTimeout.
 	<-app.Wait()
-	shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(
+	go func() {
-		context.WithoutCancel(ctx), shutdownTimeout)
+		defer close(shutdownComplete)
 	defer cancel()
-	err = app.Stop(shutdownCtx)
+		<-sigChan
-	if err != nil {
+		log.Notice("Received interrupt signal, shutting down gracefully...")
-		log.Error("Error during shutdown", "error", err)
+
 		// Create a timeout context for shutdown. The parent ctx is being
 		// cancelled, so detach from its cancellation but keep its values.
 		shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(
 			context.WithoutCancel(ctx), shutdownTimeout)
 		defer shutdownCancel()
 		err := app.Stop(shutdownCtx)
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Error("Error during shutdown", "error", err)
 		}
 	}()
 	// Wait for the signal handler to complete shutdown or the app to
 	// request shutdown.
 	select {
 	case <-shutdownComplete:
 		// Shutdown completed via signal
 		return nil
 	case <-ctx.Done():
 		// Context cancelled (shouldn't happen in normal operation)
 		err := app.Stop(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Error("Error stopping app", "error", err)
 		}
 		return ctx.Err()
 	case <-app.Done():
 		// App finished running (e.g., backup completed)
 		return nil
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // errReported marks a failure the operation has already shown the user
-// (or, under `snapshot verify --json`, put in its document). Entry
+// (and deliberately withheld under --json). Entry turns it into a
-// turns it into a non-zero exit status without printing anything
+// non-zero exit status without printing anything further, so the error
-// further, so the error line is not doubled. It flows up from
+// line is not doubled. It flows up from RunOperation through cobra to
-// RunOperation through cobra to Entry.
+// Entry.
 var errReported = errors.New("operation failed")
 // errInterrupted marks an operation that SIGINT or SIGTERM stopped
 // before it finished. Entry shows it and returns exitCodeInterrupted.
 var errInterrupted = errors.New("interrupted before the command finished")
 // RunOperation runs op against the Vaultik instance inside the fx app
 // and turns a failure into a returned error rather than an os.Exit from
 // within the goroutine. An os.Exit there skipped main's deferred
@@ -220,50 +214,31 @@ var errInterrupted = errors.New("interrupted before the command finished")
 //
 // op runs in a goroutine so OnStart returns promptly and an interrupt
 // can still cancel through OnStop; when it finishes, success or failure,
-// it triggers shutdown, which is what lets RunWithApp return. On an
+// it triggers shutdown, which is what lets RunWithApp return. report is
-// interrupt OnStop cancels op and waits for the goroutine to return, so
+// called with a non-canceled failure so the caller can log it (and
-// op's cleanup (removing decrypted scratch files) runs before the
+// suppress it under --json) before it becomes errReported. A context
-// process exits; the wait is bounded by shutdownTimeout. report is
+// cancellation is the interrupt path, not a failure: it is neither
-// called with a failure so the caller can show it to the user before
+// reported nor counted as one.
 // it becomes errReported.
 //
 // The run counts as interrupted unless op returned, without an
 // interrupt having cancelled it, before RunWithApp returned. An
 // interrupted op is not reported, whatever it returned; RunOperation
 // returns errInterrupted instead.
 func RunOperation(
 	ctx context.Context, opts AppOptions,
 	op func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error, report func(err error),
 ) error {
 	var (
-		mu       sync.Mutex
+		mu     sync.Mutex
-		finished bool // op returned before any interrupt cancelled it
+		failed bool
 		failed   bool // op finished with an error
 	)
 	opts.Invokes = append(opts.Invokes,
 		fx.Invoke(func(v *vaultik.Vaultik, lc fx.Lifecycle) {
 			var stop func(context.Context) bool
 			lc.Append(fx.Hook{
 				OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
-					stop = v.StartOperation(func() {
+					go func() {
 						err := op(v)
-
+						if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-						// Only stop, called from OnStop below, cancels the
+							report(err)
 						// Vaultik context, so a live context means no
 						// interrupt cancelled op. Check the context, not
 						// err: an interrupted op need not return
 						// context.Canceled (`snapshot verify --json`
 						// returns a verification failure).
 						if v.Context().Err() == nil {
 							if err != nil {
 								report(err)
 							}
 							mu.Lock()
-							finished = true
+							failed = true
 							failed = err != nil
 							mu.Unlock()
 						}
@@ -271,20 +246,12 @@ func RunOperation(
 						if stopErr != nil {
 							log.Error("Failed to shutdown", "error", stopErr)
 						}
-					})
+					}()
 					return nil
 				},
-				// On an interrupt, cancel the operation and wait for it to
+				OnStop: func(_ context.Context) error {
-				// unwind so its cleanup defers (which remove decrypted
+					v.Cancel()
 				// scratch files from the temp directory) run before the
 				// process exits. The wait is bounded by ctx, the existing
 				// shutdownTimeout.
 				OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
 					if !stop(ctx) {
 						log.Warn("Shutdown timed out before the operation " +
 							"finished; decrypted temporary files may remain")
 					}
 					return nil
 				},
@@ -296,34 +263,26 @@ func RunOperation(
 		return err
 	}
-	// RunWithApp returns only after the app was asked to stop, either by
+	// The goroutine sets failed before triggering the shutdown that lets
-	// an interrupt or by the goroutine's Shutdown call. When op finished
+	// RunWithApp return, so the write is in place by the time we read it.
 	// without being cancelled, the goroutine set finished before that
 	// call. So if finished is unset here, an interrupt stopped the app,
 	// and op either returned after it was cancelled or is still running
 	// because the shutdown timed out.
 	mu.Lock()
 	defer mu.Unlock()
-	switch {
+	if failed {
 	case !finished:
 		return errInterrupted
 	case failed:
 		return errReported
 	default:
 		return nil
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // runVaultikApp runs the standard single-operation command lifecycle
-// shared by the snapshot list/purge/remove and remote nuke subcommands:
+// shared by the list/purge/verify/remove/remote-info subcommands:
 // resolve the config, then run op against the Vaultik instance through
-// RunOperation, reporting a failure prefixed with failMsg on stderr. mode
+// RunOperation, reporting a failure prefixed with failMsg (suppressed
-// says whether the command takes the PID lock. jsonOutput marks a command
+// while suppressErrors is true, e.g. under --json). extraQuiet is OR-ed
-// whose stdout is a JSON document: it quiets the UI but, unlike Quiet,
+// into LogOptions.Quiet (e.g. --json output modes).
 // leaves the stderr log level alone.
 func runVaultikApp(
-	cmd *cobra.Command, mode lockMode, jsonOutput bool,
+	cmd *cobra.Command, extraQuiet, suppressErrors bool,
 	failMsg string, op func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error,
 ) error {
 	configPath, err := ResolveConfigPath()
@@ -338,11 +297,13 @@ func runVaultikApp(
 		LogOptions: log.Options{
 			Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
 			Debug:   rootFlags.Debug,
-			Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
+			Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet || extraQuiet,
 			JSON:    jsonOutput,
 		},
 		Mode: mode,
 	}, op, func(err error) {
 		if suppressErrors {
 			return
 		}
 		log.Error(failMsg, "error", err)
 		ReportErrorf("%s: %v", failMsg, err)
 	})
@@ -351,46 +312,28 @@ func runVaultikApp(
 // RunWithApp is a helper that creates and runs an fx app with the given options.
 // It combines NewApp and RunApp into a single convenient function. This is the
 // preferred way to run CLI commands that need the full application context.
-// A mutating command takes the process-wide PID lock before starting so that
+// It acquires a PID lock before starting to prevent concurrent instances.
 // only one runs at a time; a read-only command runs without it and is not
 // blocked while a mutator holds the lock (opts.Mode).
 func RunWithApp(ctx context.Context, opts AppOptions) error {
-	release, err := acquireLockIfMutating(opts.Mode,
+	// Acquire PID lock to prevent concurrent instances
-		filepath.Join(xdg.DataHome, "vaultik"))
+	lockDir := filepath.Join(xdg.DataHome, "vaultik")
 	lock, err := pidlock.Acquire(lockDir)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		if errors.Is(err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning) {
 			return fmt.Errorf("cannot start: %w", err)
 		}
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to acquire lock: %w", err)
 	}
-	defer release()
+	defer func() {
 		err := lock.Release()
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Warn("Failed to release PID lock", "error", err)
 		}
 	}()
 	app := NewApp(opts)
 	return RunApp(ctx, app)
 }
 // acquireLockIfMutating takes the process-wide PID lock in lockDir for a
 // mutating command and returns a function that releases it. A read-only
 // command takes no lock, so it returns a no-op release and is never blocked
 // while a mutator holds the lock. ErrAlreadyRunning (another mutator holds
 // the lock) is surfaced as a "cannot start" error.
 func acquireLockIfMutating(mode lockMode, lockDir string) (func(), error) {
 	if mode != mutating {
 		return func() {}, nil
 	}
 	lock, err := pidlock.Acquire(lockDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning) {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot start: %w", err)
 		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to acquire lock: %w", err)
 	}
 	return func() {
 		err := lock.Release()
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Warn("Failed to release PID lock", "error", err)
 		}
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -2,10 +2,7 @@ package cli //nolint:testpackage // needs access to unexported cleanStartupError
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/pidlock"
 )
 func TestCleanStartupError(t *testing.T) {
@@ -56,42 +53,3 @@ func TestCleanStartupError(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestLockScopedToMutatingCommands proves the partition the PID lock now
 // enforces: a read-only command runs while a mutator holds the lock, and
 // two mutating commands still mutually exclude.
 func TestLockScopedToMutatingCommands(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	lockDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "vaultik")
 	// A mutating command takes the process-wide lock.
 	releaseMutator, err := acquireLockIfMutating(mutating, lockDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("mutating command could not acquire lock: %v", err)
 	}
 	// A read-only command runs to completion even while the lock is held.
 	releaseReader, err := acquireLockIfMutating(readOnly, lockDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("read-only command was blocked by held lock: %v", err)
 	}
 	releaseReader()
 	// A second mutating command is refused while the first holds the lock.
 	_, err = acquireLockIfMutating(mutating, lockDir)
 	if !errors.Is(err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning) {
 		t.Fatalf("second mutating command was not excluded, got: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Once the first mutator releases, another mutating command may run.
 	releaseMutator()
 	release, err := acquireLockIfMutating(mutating, lockDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("mutating command could not acquire released lock: %v", err)
 	}
 	release()
 }
@@ -7,15 +7,11 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 // configFileMode is the permission set for freshly written config files;
@@ -34,9 +30,6 @@ const configDirMode = 0o755
 // yaml.Marshal's 4-space default.
 const configYAMLIndent = 2
 // yamlStringTag is YAML's tag for a string scalar.
 const yamlStringTag = "!!str"
 var (
 	errConfigExists     = errors.New("config file already exists")
 	errEmptyConfig      = errors.New("empty config file")
@@ -51,19 +44,13 @@ const defaultConfigTemplate = `# vaultik configuration
 # ─── REQUIRED ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Age recipient public keys for encryption. snapshot create needs at least
+# Age recipient public keys for encryption.
-# one; listing, verifying and restoring do not, so a machine that only
+# Backups are encrypted to ALL listed recipients. Any one of the corresponding
-# restores can leave this empty.
+# private keys can decrypt. Generate a keypair with:
 # Backups are encrypted to ALL listed recipients; any one of the corresponding
 # private keys can decrypt. Adding a recipient later does not re-encrypt data
 # already stored: deduplicated chunks and existing blobs stay encrypted to the
 # earlier recipients, so a newly added key cannot restore them on its own (see
 # docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md, Accepted Risks). Generate a keypair and add its
 # public key with:
 #   age-keygen -o vaultik_backup_private_key.txt
 #   grep 'public key' vaultik_backup_private_key.txt
-#   vaultik config set age_recipients.0 age1...
+age_recipients:
-age_recipients: []
+  - age1REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY
 # Named snapshots. Each snapshot backs up one or more paths and can have its
 # own exclude patterns in addition to the global excludes below.
@@ -205,8 +192,8 @@ storage_url: ""
 #   access_key_id: YOUR_ACCESS_KEY
 #   secret_access_key: YOUR_SECRET_KEY
 #   # region: us-east-1        # Default: us-east-1
-#   # part_size: 5MiB          # Upload part size, 5MiB to 5GiB. Default: 5MiB
+#   # use_ssl: true            # Default: true
-#   # For the s3:// form, disable TLS with ?ssl=false in the URL, not use_ssl.
+#   # part_size: 5MB           # Multipart upload part size. Default: 5MB
 # ─── OPTIONAL ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -225,8 +212,6 @@ storage_url: ""
 # chunk_size: 10MB
 # Maximum blob size before splitting into a new blob.
 # Must be at least four times chunk_size (the largest chunk the chunker can
 # emit); a smaller limit would let a single-chunk blob exceed it.
 # Accepts: 1GB, 10G, 500MB, etc.
 # Default: 10GB
 # blob_size_limit: 10GB
@@ -274,7 +259,7 @@ The config is written to the path from --config, $VAULTIK_CONFIG, or
 the platform default config directory (e.g. ~/Library/Application Support/
 on macOS, ~/.config/ on Linux, /etc/vaultik/ as root).`,
 		Args: cobra.NoArgs,
-		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 			path := configPathForInit()
 			_, err := os.Stat(path)
@@ -294,11 +279,8 @@ on macOS, ~/.config/ on Linux, /etc/vaultik/ as root).`,
 				return fmt.Errorf("writing config file: %w", err)
 			}
-			// A written-confirmation, not scriptable output: route it
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "Config written to %s\n", path)
-			// through the UI so it is styled and --quiet silences it.
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout,
 			out := commandUI(cmd)
 			out.Infof("Config written to %s.", path)
 			out.Infof(
 				"Edit it to set your age_recipients, snapshots, and storage_url.")
 			return nil
@@ -340,7 +322,7 @@ func newConfigGetCommand() *cobra.Command {
 		Use:   "get <key>",
 		Short: "Print a config value by dotted path (e.g. storage_url, compression_level)",
 		Args:  cobra.ExactArgs(1),
-		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			path, err := ResolveConfigPath()
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
@@ -356,13 +338,8 @@ func newConfigGetCommand() *cobra.Command {
 				return err
 			}
 			// The value is scriptable output: it must stay machine-plain
 			// (no marker, no color) and is never silenced by --quiet, so it
 			// is written straight to stdout rather than through the UI.
 			w := cmd.OutOrStdout()
 			if node.Kind == yaml.ScalarNode {
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, node.Value)
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, node.Value)
 				return nil
 			}
@@ -372,7 +349,7 @@ func newConfigGetCommand() *cobra.Command {
 				return fmt.Errorf("marshaling value: %w", err)
 			}
-			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, string(out))
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(os.Stdout, string(out))
 			return nil
 		},
@@ -394,59 +371,46 @@ Examples:
  vaultik config set compression_level 9
  vaultik config set s3.bucket mybucket  # legacy S3 fields still supported`,
 		Args: cobra.ExactArgs(configSetArgs),
-		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			path, err := ResolveConfigPath()
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
-			return writeConfigSet(commandUI(cmd), path, args[0], args[1])
+			root, err := loadYAMLFile(path)
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 			err = yamlPathSet(root, strings.Split(args[0], "."), args[1])
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 			out, err := marshalConfigYAML(root)
 			if err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("marshaling config: %w", err)
 			}
 			mode := os.FileMode(configFileMode)
 			info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
 			if statErr == nil {
 				mode = info.Mode().Perm()
 			}
 			err = os.WriteFile(path, out, mode)
 			if err != nil {
 				return fmt.Errorf("writing config file: %w", err)
 			}
 			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "%s = %s\n", args[0], args[1])
 			return nil
 		},
 	}
 }
 // writeConfigSet applies key=value to the config at path, writes it back
 // owner-only, and confirms the write by naming just the key through the
 // UI writer (styled, and silenced by --quiet). The value is never
 // echoed: it may be a secret such as s3.secret_access_key, and captured
 // stdout or a pasted terminal would then leak it.
 func writeConfigSet(out *ui.Writer, path, key, value string) error {
 	root, err := loadYAMLFile(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	err = yamlPathSet(root, strings.Split(key, "."), value)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	data, err := marshalConfigYAML(root)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("marshaling config: %w", err)
 	}
 	err = os.WriteFile(path, data, configFileMode)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("writing config file: %w", err)
 	}
 	// os.WriteFile does not change the mode of a file that already exists,
 	// so a config that was group- or world-readable stays that way. As it
 	// may hold S3 credentials, tighten it to owner-only after writing.
 	info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
 	if statErr == nil && info.Mode().Perm()&0o044 != 0 {
 		err = os.Chmod(path, configFileMode)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("tightening config file permissions: %w", err)
 		}
 	}
 	out.Infof("Set %s.", key)
 	return nil
 }
 // marshalConfigYAML renders a config document tree with 2-space indentation,
 // matching defaultConfigTemplate. yaml.Marshal defaults to 4 spaces, which
 // would reindent the whole file on the first `config set` despite the promise
@@ -589,58 +553,9 @@ func yamlPathSet(root *yaml.Node, keys []string, value string) error {
 		}
 	}
 	// config.Load reads the file through untyped YAML, which turns an
 	// unquoted 00112233 into the number 38043 and 1e5 into 100000. Tagging
 	// a string setting as a string makes the encoder quote such a value.
 	// Other settings stay unquoted, so compression_level 9 is a number.
 	// The encoder refuses to write a value that is not valid UTF-8 as a
 	// string. Left untagged, such a value is written as base64 !!binary and
 	// loads back unchanged.
 	if configKeyIsString(keys) && utf8.ValidString(value) {
 		node.Tag = yamlStringTag
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // configKeyIsString reports whether the dotted key names a string in
 // config.Config, following the fields' yaml tags, as s3.access_key_id and
 // snapshots.home.exclude.0 do.
 func configKeyIsString(keys []string) bool {
 	typ := reflect.TypeFor[config.Config]()
 	for _, key := range keys {
 		switch {
 		case typ.Kind() == reflect.Map || typ.Kind() == reflect.Slice:
 			// The key is a snapshot name or a list index.
 			typ = typ.Elem()
 		case typ.Kind() == reflect.Struct:
 			field, ok := yamlField(typ, key)
 			if !ok {
 				return false
 			}
 			typ = field.Type
 		default:
 			return false
 		}
 	}
 	return typ.Kind() == reflect.String
 }
 // yamlField returns the field of struct type typ whose yaml tag names key.
 func yamlField(typ reflect.Type, key string) (reflect.StructField, bool) {
 	for field := range typ.Fields() {
 		name, _, _ := strings.Cut(field.Tag.Get("yaml"), ",")
 		if name == key {
 			return field, true
 		}
 	}
 	return reflect.StructField{}, false
 }
 // yamlSetInMapping resolves (creating if needed) the value node for key
 // within a mapping node, setting it to value when it is the final path
 // element, and returns the node to descend into.
@@ -1,16 +1,11 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported yamlPathGet/yamlPathSet
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 // TestDefaultConfigTemplateParses ensures the init template is valid YAML
@@ -25,10 +20,8 @@ func TestDefaultConfigTemplateParses(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("default config template is not valid YAML: %v", err)
 	}
-	// A placeholder recipient would fail config.Load, so the template
+	if len(cfg.AgeRecipients) != 1 {
-	// leaves the list empty.
+		t.Errorf("expected 1 placeholder age recipient, got %d", len(cfg.AgeRecipients))
 	if len(cfg.AgeRecipients) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("expected no age recipients, got %d", len(cfg.AgeRecipients))
 	}
 	home, ok := cfg.Snapshots["home"]
@@ -58,147 +51,6 @@ func TestDefaultConfigTemplateParses(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigSetRecipientOnFreshConfig follows the README quickstart: on the
 // file `config init` writes, `config set age_recipients.0` and
 // `config set storage_url` give a config that loads with that recipient.
 func TestConfigSetRecipientOnFreshConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const recipient = "age1278m9q7dp3chsh2dcy82qk27v047zywyvtxwnj4cvt0z65jw6a7q5dqhfj"
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yml")
 	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(defaultConfigTemplate), configFileMode)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
 	}
 	out := ui.NewWithColor(&bytes.Buffer{}, false)
 	err = writeConfigSet(out, path, "age_recipients.0", recipient)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("config set age_recipients.0: %v", err)
 	}
 	err = writeConfigSet(out, path, "storage_url", "file:///mnt/backups")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("config set storage_url: %v", err)
 	}
 	cfg, err := config.Load(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("config.Load: %v", err)
 	}
 	if len(cfg.AgeRecipients) != 1 || cfg.AgeRecipients[0] != recipient {
 		t.Errorf("age_recipients = %v, want [%s]", cfg.AgeRecipients, recipient)
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigSetStringLooksLikeNumber sets string settings to values that
 // YAML reads as numbers or booleans when they are unquoted, and checks that
 // config.Load returns each one unchanged.
 func TestConfigSetStringLooksLikeNumber(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tests := []struct {
 		key   string
 		value string
 		field func(cfg *config.Config) string
 	}{
 		{"s3.access_key_id", "00112233",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.S3.AccessKeyID }},
 		{"s3.secret_access_key", "12345678901234567890123456789012",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.S3.SecretAccessKey }},
 		{"hostname", "007",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.Hostname }},
 		{"s3.prefix", "1e5",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.S3.Prefix }},
 		{"s3.bucket", "true",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.S3.Bucket }},
 		{"s3.region", "FALSE",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.S3.Region }},
 		{"snapshots.home.exclude.0", "1.10",
 			func(cfg *config.Config) string { return cfg.Snapshots["home"].Exclude[0] }},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.key+"="+tt.value, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			cfg := loadAfterConfigSet(t, tt.key, tt.value)
 			got := tt.field(cfg)
 			if got != tt.value {
 				t.Errorf("%s = %q after config set %q", tt.key, got, tt.value)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigSetNonUTF8Path checks that config set still accepts a value that
 // is not valid UTF-8, such as a path with a Latin-1 file name, and that
 // config.Load returns it unchanged.
 func TestConfigSetNonUTF8Path(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const dir = "/srv/caf\xe9"
 	cfg := loadAfterConfigSet(t, "snapshots.home.paths.0", dir)
 	got := cfg.Snapshots["home"].Paths[0]
 	if got != dir {
 		t.Errorf("snapshots.home.paths.0 = %q, want %q", got, dir)
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigSetNumberStaysNumber checks that a number set for an integer
 // setting is still read as a number, not as a quoted string.
 func TestConfigSetNumberStaysNumber(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const level = 9
 	cfg := loadAfterConfigSet(t, "compression_level", strconv.Itoa(level))
 	if cfg.CompressionLevel != level {
 		t.Errorf("compression_level = %d, want %d", cfg.CompressionLevel, level)
 	}
 }
 // loadAfterConfigSet writes the file `config init` writes, sets storage_url
 // to a local directory so that the file passes validation, applies
 // `config set key value` and returns what config.Load reads back.
 func loadAfterConfigSet(t *testing.T, key, value string) *config.Config {
 	t.Helper()
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yml")
 	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(defaultConfigTemplate), configFileMode)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
 	}
 	out := ui.NewWithColor(&bytes.Buffer{}, false)
 	err = writeConfigSet(out, path, "storage_url", "file:///mnt/backups")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("config set storage_url: %v", err)
 	}
 	err = writeConfigSet(out, path, key, value)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("config set %s: %v", key, err)
 	}
 	cfg, err := config.Load(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("config.Load: %v", err)
 	}
 	return cfg
 }
 const testYAML = `# top comment
 compression_level: 3
 age_recipients:
@@ -377,70 +229,6 @@ func TestConfigSetPreservesFormatting(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // TestWriteConfigSetHidesSecret checks that setting a secret key prints
 // only the key name, never the value, to the confirmation output.
 func TestWriteConfigSetHidesSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const secret = "SUPERSECRETVALUE"
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yaml")
 	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("version: 1\n"), 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	err = writeConfigSet(ui.NewWithColor(&buf, false), path,
 		"s3.secret_access_key", secret)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("writeConfigSet: %v", err)
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(buf.String(), secret) {
 		t.Errorf("output echoed the secret value: %q", buf.String())
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "s3.secret_access_key") {
 		t.Errorf("output did not confirm the key name: %q", buf.String())
 	}
 }
 // TestWriteConfigSetTightensMode checks that a pre-existing group- or
 // world-readable config is tightened to owner-only after a set, since
 // os.WriteFile leaves an existing file's mode untouched.
 func TestWriteConfigSetTightensMode(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yaml")
 	// Seed a world-readable config; the loose mode is the condition under
 	// test, so gosec's G306 is expected here.
 	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("version: 1\n"), 0o644) //nolint:gosec // G306
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	err = writeConfigSet(ui.NewWithColor(&buf, false), path,
 		"compression_level", "9")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("writeConfigSet: %v", err)
 	}
 	info, err := os.Stat(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("stat config: %v", err)
 	}
 	if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
 		t.Errorf("config mode = %04o, want 0600", info.Mode().Perm())
 	}
 }
 func splitPath(s string) []string {
 	return strings.Split(s, ".")
 }
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ storage destination on that run.
 Use --force to skip the confirmation prompt.`,
 		Args: cobra.NoArgs,
-		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 			// Resolve config path
 			configPath, err := ResolveConfigPath()
 			if err != nil {
@@ -62,31 +62,26 @@ Use --force to skip the confirmation prompt.`,
 			}
 			dbPath := cfg.IndexPath
 			out := commandUI(cmd)
 			// Check if database exists
 			_, err = os.Stat(dbPath)
 			if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-				out.Infof("Local state database does not exist: %s.", dbPath)
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "Database does not exist: %s\n", dbPath)
 				return nil
 			}
-			// Confirm unless --force. The prompt and its immediate result
+			// Confirm unless --force
 			// are an interactive exchange the operator must see, so they go
 			// straight to stdout rather than through the UI and --quiet does
 			// not silence them.
 			if !force {
-				w := cmd.OutOrStdout()
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout,
 				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w,
 					"This will delete the local state database at:\n  %s\n\n", dbPath)
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, "Are you sure? Type 'yes' to confirm: ")
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprint(os.Stdout, "Are you sure? Type 'yes' to confirm: ")
 				var confirm string
 				_, err = fmt.Scanln(&confirm)
 				if err != nil || confirm != "yes" {
-					_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, "Aborted.")
+					_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, "Aborted.")
 					//nolint:nilerr // a failed/aborted confirmation is a clean abort
 					return nil
@@ -105,7 +100,11 @@ Use --force to skip the confirmation prompt.`,
 			_ = os.Remove(walPath) // Ignore errors - files may not exist
 			_ = os.Remove(shmPath)
-			out.Infof("Local state database deleted: %s.", dbPath)
+			rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
 			if !rootFlags.Quiet {
 				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "Database deleted: %s\n", dbPath)
 			}
 			log.Info("Local state database deleted", "path", dbPath)
 			return nil
@@ -15,25 +15,17 @@ import (
 // the startup banner.
 const shortCommitLen = 12
 // exitCodeInterrupted is the exit status of a command that SIGINT or
 // SIGTERM stopped. It is 128 plus SIGINT's number, 2, which is what a
 // shell reports for a command stopped by Ctrl-C.
 const exitCodeInterrupted = 130
 // Entry is the main entry point for the CLI application.
-// It prints the startup banner to stderr (unless a banner-suppressing
+// It prints the startup banner to stdout (unless a banner-suppressing
 // flag is present in os.Args — see bannerSuppressedInArgs), executes the
 // root cobra command, and routes any returned error through the
 // ui.Writer so the user sees a properly formatted "🛑 ERROR:" line.
 // The banner goes to stderr because stdout carries only the output the
 // user asked for, such as a completion script or a `config get` value.
 //
-// It returns the process exit code (0 on success, 130 when interrupted,
+// It returns the process exit code (0 on success, 1 on error) rather
-// 1 on any other error) rather than calling os.Exit, so that main's
+// than calling os.Exit, so that main's deferred profile writers run
-// deferred profile writers run before the process ends. See run in
+// before the process ends. See run in cmd/vaultik/main.go.
 // cmd/vaultik/main.go.
 func Entry() int {
-	emitStartupBanner(os.Args[1:], os.Stderr)
+	emitStartupBanner(os.Args[1:], os.Stdout)
 	rootCmd := NewRootCommand()
 	rootCmd.SilenceErrors = true
@@ -41,20 +33,14 @@ func Entry() int {
 	err := rootCmd.Execute()
 	if err != nil {
 		// An operation that ran inside the fx app has already reported
-		// its own failure (`snapshot verify --json` puts it in the
+		// its own failure (and suppressed it under --json); errReported
-		// document instead); errReported says so. Printing it again
+		// says so. Printing it again here would double the error line.
 		// here would double the error line.
 		// Every other error — bad arguments, a config that would not
-		// load, an interrupt — reaches Entry unreported, so it is shown
+		// load — reaches Entry unreported, so it is shown here.
 		// here.
 		if !errors.Is(err, errReported) {
 			ReportErrorf("%s", err.Error())
 		}
 		if errors.Is(err, errInterrupted) {
 			return exitCodeInterrupted
 		}
 		return 1
 	}
@@ -63,8 +49,9 @@ func Entry() int {
 // emitStartupBanner writes the startup banner to w unless args (the
 // argument vector with the program name already stripped) contains a
-// flag that suppresses it. Split out of Entry so that the decision is
+// flag that suppresses it. Split out of Entry so that the decision — the
-// reachable from a test without running the whole CLI.
+// only thing standing between a --json invocation and a parseable
 // stdout — is reachable from a test without running the whole CLI.
 func emitStartupBanner(args []string, w io.Writer) {
 	if bannerSuppressedInArgs(args) {
 		return
@@ -99,7 +86,8 @@ func ReportErrorf(format string, args ...any) {
 // --json is a subcommand flag rather than a persistent one, but so is
 // --cron (it exists only on `snapshot create`), so this adds no new
 // class of imprecision. The only cost of a false positive is a missing
-// decorative banner.
+// decorative banner; the cost of a false negative is a corrupt document
 // on stdout, so the scan errs deliberately in that direction.
 func bannerSuppressedInArgs(args []string) bool {
 	for _, a := range args {
 		if a == "--" {
@@ -36,14 +36,23 @@ const (
 	// strips it before scanning, so it has to be present.
 	programName = "vaultik"
-	// someSnapshotID only fills the positional argument; no test needs
+	// someSnapshotID is any snapshot identifier: these tests never run
-	// the snapshot to exist.
+	// the command, so it only has to occupy the positional argument.
 	someSnapshotID = "host_2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
 )
 // placeholderJSONDocument stands in for whatever document a --json
 // command writes to stdout. `snapshot list --json` with no snapshots
 // prints exactly this; the other --json commands print an object rather
 // than an array, but this test is not about their shape. It is about
 // what is on stdout *before* them, which is the same for all of them
 // because Entry prints the banner before cobra has parsed anything and
 // therefore before it can know which command is running.
 const placeholderJSONDocument = "[]\n"
 // jsonArgumentVectors are the argument vectors of every --json
 // invocation the CLI accepts, with the program name stripped exactly as
-// Entry strips it. Each one must suppress the banner.
+// Entry strips it. Each one must leave stdout untouched by the banner.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // read-only test fixture shared by two tests
 var jsonArgumentVectors = map[string][]string{
@@ -65,23 +74,39 @@ var jsonArgumentVectors = map[string][]string{
 	},
 }
-// TestJSONInvocationSuppressesBanner checks that every --json
+// TestJSONInvocationStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument is the CLI-layer
-// invocation suppresses the startup banner, as the README says --json
+// regression guard for issue #106: `vaultik snapshot list --json | jq`
-// does along with --quiet and --cron. The scan is over the raw argument
+// must work with no other flags.
-// vector, so each position and spelling of --json is listed.
+//
-func TestJSONInvocationSuppressesBanner(t *testing.T) {
+// internal/vaultik's TestListSnapshots_JSONStdoutIsOnlyTheDocument
 // guards the same contract one layer down, but it calls the library
 // function directly and so cannot see Entry, which is where the
 // contamination was: the startup banner is written to stdout before
 // cobra parses anything, and the suppression scan did not know about
 // --json. The two banner lines and the blank line landed ahead of the
 // document and `jq` refused the result.
 //
 // The document is a constant here because this test is about the
 // argument vectors, one per --json command; the one that runs a real
 // command end to end is TestEntryJSONStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument below.
 func TestJSONInvocationStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for name, argv := range jsonArgumentVectors {
 		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
-			var banner bytes.Buffer
+			var stdout bytes.Buffer
-			emitStartupBanner(argv, &banner)
+			emitStartupBanner(argv, &stdout)
-			assert.Empty(t, banner.String(),
+			require.Empty(t, stdout.String(),
-				"--json suppresses the banner")
+				"nothing may reach stdout ahead of a --json document")
 			_, err := stdout.WriteString(placeholderJSONDocument)
 			require.NoError(t, err)
 			requireExactlyOneJSONDocument(t, stdout.String())
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -102,11 +127,11 @@ func TestBannerStillPrintedWithoutSuppressingFlag(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
-			var banner bytes.Buffer
+			var stdout bytes.Buffer
-			emitStartupBanner(argv, &banner)
+			emitStartupBanner(argv, &stdout)
-			assert.Contains(t, banner.String(), "starting up at",
+			assert.Contains(t, stdout.String(), "starting up at",
 				"the banner belongs on invocations that did not opt out")
 		})
 	}
@@ -147,9 +172,9 @@ func TestBannerSuppressedInArgs(t *testing.T) {
 // hermeticConfig is a complete, valid config that needs no network and
 // no credentials: file:// storage is exempt from the S3 credential
-// checks. A test that lists the destination must create its directory
+// checks, and FileStorer over a directory that does not exist lists
-// first, because listing a directory that does not exist is an error.
+// zero objects without erroring. Chunk, blob and compression settings
-// Chunk, blob and compression settings are filled in by config.Load.
+// are filled in by config.Load.
 const hermeticConfig = `age_recipients:
  - age1278m9q7dp3chsh2dcy82qk27v047zywyvtxwnj4cvt0z65jw6a7q5dqhfj
 snapshots:
@@ -171,25 +196,22 @@ hostname: test-host
 // `snapshot list` is the command chosen because it is the only --json
 // command that reaches its document without a populated destination
 // store: it reads the local index, streams `metadata/` (empty here),
-// and treats an empty destination directory as an empty list rather
+// and treats a barren destination as an empty list rather than a
-// than a failure.
+// failure.
 //
 // Not parallel: it replaces os.Args, os.Stdout and the xdg globals.
 func TestEntryJSONStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
 	storeDir := filepath.Join(dir, "store")
 	contents := fmt.Sprintf(hermeticConfig,
 		filepath.Join(dir, "source"),
-		storeDir,
+		filepath.Join(dir, "store"),
 		filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite"))
 	require.NoError(t,
 		os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(contents), configFileMode))
 	require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(storeDir, 0o750))
 	// The PID lock lives under xdg.DataHome, which xdg resolves at
 	// package init; point it at the temp dir so the test neither
 	// touches nor collides with the real one.
@@ -222,7 +244,9 @@ func TestEntryJSONStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument(t *testing.T) {
 // captureProcessStdout redirects the process's own stdout to a pipe for
 // the duration of fn and returns what was written to it. The redirection
 // has to be at the file-descriptor level rather than through an injected
-// writer, because the commands Entry runs reach os.Stdout directly.
+// writer, because the banner and the JSON encoder reach os.Stdout
 // independently and the point of the test is that both land in the same
 // place.
 //
 // Not parallel-safe: os.Stdout is process-global.
 func captureProcessStdout(t *testing.T, fn func()) string {
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // shares runEntry and the argument constants
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/adrg/xdg"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 )
 // stalledStoreConfig is hermeticConfig with an s3:// destination store
 // in place of the file:// one. The server behind it accepts any
 // credentials.
 const stalledStoreConfig = `age_recipients:
  - age1278m9q7dp3chsh2dcy82qk27v047zywyvtxwnj4cvt0z65jw6a7q5dqhfj
 snapshots:
  test:
    paths:
      - %s
 storage_url: s3://bucket?endpoint=%s&ssl=false
 s3:
  access_key_id: key
  secret_access_key: secret
 index_path: %s
 hostname: test-host
 `
 // interruptRepeat is how often interruptOnFirstRequest sends SIGINT.
 const interruptRepeat = 50 * time.Millisecond
 // TestEntryInterruptedRun sends SIGINT to the test process while a
 // command waits on the destination store, and checks that Entry returns
 // 130 and prints one line on stderr saying the run was interrupted. The
 // store is a local HTTP server that holds every request open, so the
 // command is always mid-operation when the signal arrives. The two
 // cases cover --cron and --json, which silence other output.
 //
 // Not parallel: it signals the process and replaces os.Args, os.Stdout,
 // os.Stderr and the xdg globals.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // signals the process and replaces process globals
 func TestEntryInterruptedRun(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, testCase := range []struct {
 		name string
 		args []string
 	}{
 		{
 			name: "snapshot create --cron",
 			args: []string{cmdSnapshot, cmdCreate, "--cron"},
 		},
 		{
 			name: "snapshot verify --json",
 			args: []string{cmdSnapshot, cmdVerify, someSnapshotID, flagJSON},
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			endpoint, requestArrived := startStalledStore(t)
 			configPath := writeStalledStoreConfig(t, endpoint)
 			interruptOnFirstRequest(t, requestArrived)
 			code, _, stderr := runEntry(t,
 				append([]string{flagConfig, configPath}, testCase.args...)...)
 			assert.Equal(t, 130, code)
 			assert.Equal(t, 1,
 				strings.Count(stderr, errInterrupted.Error()), stderr)
 		})
 	}
 }
 // interruptOnFirstRequest sends SIGINT to the test process every
 // interruptRepeat, from the first request to the destination store until
 // the test ends. One signal is not enough: the command can reach the
 // store before fx has started catching signals. The test catches SIGINT
 // too, so that a signal fx is not catching does not kill the test
 // binary.
 func interruptOnFirstRequest(t *testing.T, requestArrived <-chan struct{}) {
 	t.Helper()
 	self, err := os.FindProcess(os.Getpid())
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	caught := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
 	signal.Notify(caught, os.Interrupt)
 	testEnded := make(chan struct{})
 	senderDone := make(chan struct{})
 	// Stop catching SIGINT only after the sender has returned. The sender
 	// waits for each SIGINT it sends to arrive on caught; one still on
 	// its way after signal.Stop would kill the test binary.
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		close(testEnded)
 		<-senderDone
 		signal.Stop(caught)
 	})
 	go func() {
 		defer close(senderDone)
 		select {
 		case <-requestArrived:
 		case <-testEnded:
 			return
 		}
 		ticker := time.NewTicker(interruptRepeat)
 		defer ticker.Stop()
 		for {
 			// Empty caught, so that the receive below waits for this
 			// SIGINT rather than an earlier one.
 			select {
 			case <-caught:
 			default:
 			}
 			sendErr := self.Signal(os.Interrupt)
 			if sendErr != nil {
 				t.Errorf("sending SIGINT: %v", sendErr)
 				return
 			}
 			<-caught
 			select {
 			case <-testEnded:
 				return
 			case <-ticker.C:
 			}
 		}
 	}()
 }
 // startStalledStore starts an HTTP server that never answers: each
 // request is held until the client gives up on it or the test ends.
 // It returns the server's host:port and a channel that receives a value
 // when the first request arrives.
 func startStalledStore(t *testing.T) (string, <-chan struct{}) {
 	t.Helper()
 	requestArrived := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	release := make(chan struct{})
 	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
 		func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			select {
 			case requestArrived <- struct{}{}:
 			default:
 			}
 			select {
 			case <-r.Context().Done():
 			case <-release:
 			}
 		}))
 	// Cleanups run last-registered first, so release lets any held
 	// request return before Close waits for it.
 	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
 	t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
 	return server.Listener.Addr().String(), requestArrived
 }
 // writeStalledStoreConfig writes a config whose destination store is the
 // server at endpoint and whose snapshot source holds one small file, so
 // that `snapshot create` has a blob to upload. Returns the config path.
 func writeStalledStoreConfig(t *testing.T, endpoint string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
 	sourceDir := filepath.Join(dir, "source")
 	require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(sourceDir, 0o750))
 	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(sourceDir, "file.txt"),
 		[]byte("contents"), 0o600))
 	contents := fmt.Sprintf(stalledStoreConfig,
 		sourceDir, endpoint, filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite"))
 	require.NoError(t,
 		os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(contents), configFileMode))
 	// The PID lock lives under xdg.DataHome, which xdg resolves at
 	// package init; point it at the temp dir so the test neither
 	// touches nor collides with the real one.
 	t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", filepath.Join(dir, "data"))
 	xdg.Reload()
 	t.Cleanup(xdg.Reload)
 	return configPath
 }
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // shares the prune fixtures and capture helpers
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"io"
 	"os"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 )
 // staleRecordLogMessage is the local-cleanup audit line CleanupLocalSnapshots
 // logs for each stale record. It is exactly the signal issue #112 says a
 // machine consumer lost under --json: gated off stdout, and pinned below
 // the log level on stderr because --json used to force Quiet.
 const staleRecordLogMessage = "Removing stale local snapshot record"
 // TestEntryPruneJSONStderrHonoursVerbosity is the end-to-end regression
 // guard for issue #112. Under --json the log level must still follow
 // --verbose/--debug rather than being pinned to WARN, so the
 // local-cleanup records reach stderr under --verbose while stdout stays
 // exactly one JSON document; without --verbose they stay below the
 // level, as they do without --json.
 //
 // Both halves are asserted together on the same run, because the fix has
 // to keep the document clean (issue #108) while freeing stderr.
 //
 // Not parallel: it replaces os.Args, os.Stdout, os.Stderr and the xdg
 // globals.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args, os.Stdout, os.Stderr and the xdg globals
 func TestEntryPruneJSONStderrHonoursVerbosity(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, testCase := range []struct {
 		name         string
 		verbose      bool
 		wantOnStderr bool
 	}{
 		{
 			name:         "verbose json surfaces the cleanup record on stderr",
 			verbose:      true,
 			wantOnStderr: true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:         "json alone keeps the cleanup record below the level",
 			verbose:      false,
 			wantOnStderr: false,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			configPath := writeHermeticPruneConfig(t, true)
 			previousArgs := os.Args
 			t.Cleanup(func() {
 				os.Args = previousArgs
 				rootFlags = RootFlags{}
 			})
 			args := []string{
 				programName, flagConfig, configPath, cmdPrune, flagJSON,
 			}
 			if testCase.verbose {
 				args = append(args, "--verbose")
 			}
 			os.Args = args
 			stdout, stderr := captureProcessStdoutAndStderr(t,
 				func() { _ = Entry() })
 			// The document stays clean in both cases: freeing stderr must
 			// not regress issue #108.
 			requireExactlyOneJSONDocument(t, stdout)
 			if testCase.wantOnStderr {
 				assert.Contains(t, stderr, staleRecordLogMessage,
 					"--verbose --json must emit the cleanup record on stderr")
 				assert.Contains(t, stderr, stalePruneSnapshotID,
 					"the record must name the snapshot it removed")
 			} else {
 				assert.NotContains(t, stderr, staleRecordLogMessage,
 					"without --verbose the record stays below the log level")
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // captureProcessStdoutAndStderr redirects both of the process's own
 // standard streams to pipes for the duration of fn and returns what was
 // written to each. The redirection is at the file-descriptor level
 // because the logger binds os.Stderr when it initializes inside fn, and
 // the JSON document reaches os.Stdout independently; the point is to see
 // where each actually lands.
 //
 // Not parallel-safe: os.Stdout and os.Stderr are process-global.
 func captureProcessStdoutAndStderr(t *testing.T, fn func()) (string, string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	outReader, outWriter, err := os.Pipe()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	errReader, errWriter, err := os.Pipe()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	previousOut, previousErr := os.Stdout, os.Stderr
 	os.Stdout, os.Stderr = outWriter, errWriter
 	capturedOut := drain(outReader)
 	capturedErr := drain(errReader)
 	fn()
 	os.Stdout, os.Stderr = previousOut, previousErr
 	require.NoError(t, outWriter.Close())
 	require.NoError(t, errWriter.Close())
 	out, errOut := <-capturedOut, <-capturedErr
 	require.NoError(t, outReader.Close())
 	require.NoError(t, errReader.Close())
 	return out, errOut
 }
 // drain copies a reader to a string on a goroutine and delivers the
 // result once the writer end is closed.
 func drain(reader io.Reader) <-chan string {
 	captured := make(chan string, 1)
 	go func() {
 		var buf bytes.Buffer
 		_, _ = io.Copy(&buf, reader)
 		captured <- buf.String()
 	}()
 	return captured
 }
@@ -98,30 +98,25 @@ func TestEntryPruneJSONStdoutIsExactlyOneDocument(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
-// writeHermeticPruneConfig builds a config over a temp directory with an
+// writeHermeticPruneConfig builds a config over a temp directory and, if
-// empty destination directory and, if seedStale is set, creates the
+// seedStale is set, creates the index database up front with one
-// index database up front with one snapshot record that has no
+// snapshot record that has no counterpart on the destination store.
-// counterpart on the destination store. Returns the config path.
+// Returns the config path.
 func writeHermeticPruneConfig(t *testing.T, seedStale bool) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
 	indexPath := filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite")
 	storeDir := filepath.Join(dir, "store")
 	contents := fmt.Sprintf(hermeticConfig,
 		filepath.Join(dir, "source"),
-		storeDir,
+		filepath.Join(dir, "store"),
 		indexPath)
 	require.NoError(t,
 		os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(contents), configFileMode))
 	// prune fails on a destination directory that does not exist, so the
 	// empty store is created here rather than left to a first backup.
 	require.NoError(t, os.Mkdir(storeDir, 0o750))
 	// The PID lock lives under xdg.DataHome, which xdg resolves at
 	// package init; point it at the temp dir so the test neither
 	// touches nor collides with the real one.
@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
 // run, so a failing command must come back with a non-zero code rather
 // than ending the process here.
 //
-// Stdout and stderr are captured only to keep the banner and command
+// Stdout is captured only to keep the banner and command output off the
-// output off the test log; the assertion is on the returned code.
+// test log; the assertion is on the returned code.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args and rootFlags
 func TestEntryReturnsStatusCode(t *testing.T) {
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func TestEntryReturnsStatusCode(t *testing.T) {
 			var code int
-			_, _ = captureProcessStdoutAndStderr(t, func() { code = Entry() })
+			_ = captureProcessStdout(t, func() { code = Entry() })
 			assert.Equal(t, testCase.want, code)
 		})
@@ -1,200 +0,0 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // shares hermeticConfig and the capture helpers
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/adrg/xdg"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
 )
 // TestEntryCompletionStdoutIsTheScript runs `vaultik completion bash`,
 // whose stdout the README tells the user to source. The script has to
 // start on the first line.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args, os.Stdout and os.Stderr
 func TestEntryCompletionStdoutIsTheScript(t *testing.T) {
 	code, stdout, _ := runEntry(t, "completion", "bash")
 	require.Equal(t, 0, code)
 	firstLine, _, _ := strings.Cut(stdout, "\n")
 	assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(firstLine, "# bash completion"),
 		"the first line of stdout must be the script's, got %q", firstLine)
 }
 // TestEntryConfigGetStdoutIsTheValue runs `vaultik config get`, whose
 // stdout a script reads as the value and nothing else.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args, os.Stdout and os.Stderr
 func TestEntryConfigGetStdoutIsTheValue(t *testing.T) {
 	configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yml")
 	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(configPath,
 		[]byte("hostname: test-host\n"), configFileMode))
 	code, stdout, _ := runEntry(t,
 		flagConfig, configPath, "config", "get", "hostname")
 	require.Equal(t, 0, code)
 	assert.Equal(t, "test-host\n", stdout)
 }
 // TestEntryJSONFailureIsReportedOnStderr runs each --json command that
 // writes no document when it fails, against a destination it cannot
 // use. The error must reach stderr, and stdout must stay empty.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args, os.Stdout, os.Stderr and the xdg globals
 func TestEntryJSONFailureIsReportedOnStderr(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, testCase := range []struct {
 		name         string
 		args         []string
 		wantOnStderr string
 	}{
 		{
 			name:         "remote info",
 			args:         []string{cmdRemote, cmdInfo, flagJSON},
 			wantOnStderr: "Failed to get remote info",
 		},
 		{
 			name:         "prune",
 			args:         []string{cmdPrune, flagJSON},
 			wantOnStderr: "Prune failed",
 		},
 		{
 			name:         "snapshot remove",
 			args:         []string{cmdSnapshot, cmdRemove, someSnapshotID, flagJSON},
 			wantOnStderr: "Failed to remove snapshot",
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(testCase.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			configPath := writeUnusableDestinationConfig(t)
 			code, stdout, stderr := runEntry(t,
 				append([]string{flagConfig, configPath}, testCase.args...)...)
 			assert.Equal(t, 1, code)
 			assert.Empty(t, stdout,
 				"a failed --json command has no document to write")
 			assert.Contains(t, stderr, testCase.wantOnStderr,
 				"the failure must be reported on stderr")
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestEntrySnapshotRemoveJSONWarningIsOnStderr runs `snapshot remove
 // --json` on a snapshot in the local index, against a destination
 // directory that does not exist. The command removes the snapshot from
 // the local index and still exits 0. Its stdout must hold the document
 // alone, with the warning about the destination store on stderr: the
 // command to run again once it is reachable, and the snapshot's ID in
 // the record's snapshot_id field.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // replaces os.Args, os.Stdout, os.Stderr and the xdg globals
 func TestEntrySnapshotRemoveJSONWarningIsOnStderr(t *testing.T) {
 	configPath, indexPath := writeMissingDestinationConfig(t)
 	seedStaleSnapshotRecord(t, indexPath)
 	code, stdout, stderr := runEntry(t, flagConfig, configPath,
 		cmdSnapshot, cmdRemove, stalePruneSnapshotID, flagJSON)
 	require.Equal(t, 0, code)
 	requireExactlyOneJSONDocument(t, stdout)
 	// stderr is a pipe here, so the logger writes one JSON record a line.
 	var warning map[string]any
 	for line := range strings.Lines(stderr) {
 		if strings.Contains(line,
 			"Could not remove snapshot metadata from remote storage") {
 			require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &warning))
 		}
 	}
 	require.NotNil(t, warning, "the warning must reach stderr")
 	assert.Contains(t, warning[slog.MessageKey],
 		"run 'vaultik snapshot remove' with the snapshot's ID again")
 	assert.Equal(t, stalePruneSnapshotID, warning["snapshot_id"])
 }
 // writeMissingDestinationConfig builds a config whose destination
 // directory does not exist. Returns the config path and the path of
 // its local index, which is not created here.
 func writeMissingDestinationConfig(t *testing.T) (string, string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
 	indexPath := filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite")
 	contents := fmt.Sprintf(hermeticConfig,
 		filepath.Join(dir, "source"),
 		filepath.Join(dir, "missing-store"),
 		indexPath)
 	require.NoError(t,
 		os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(contents), configFileMode))
 	// The PID lock lives under xdg.DataHome, which xdg resolves at
 	// package init; point it at the temp dir so the test neither
 	// touches nor collides with the real one.
 	t.Setenv("XDG_DATA_HOME", filepath.Join(dir, "data"))
 	xdg.Reload()
 	t.Cleanup(xdg.Reload)
 	return configPath, indexPath
 }
 // writeUnusableDestinationConfig builds a config whose destination
 // directory does not exist, which fails `remote info`, and whose local
 // index is bound to another destination, which fails `prune` and
 // `snapshot remove` (a missing destination alone only makes `snapshot
 // remove` warn). Returns the config path.
 func writeUnusableDestinationConfig(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	configPath, indexPath := writeMissingDestinationConfig(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	db, err := database.New(ctx, indexPath)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	defer func() { require.NoError(t, db.Close()) }()
 	require.NoError(t, database.NewRepositories(db).LocalMeta.Set(ctx,
 		database.LocalMetaKeyStorageURL, "file://"+t.TempDir()))
 	return configPath
 }
 // runEntry runs Entry with args after the program name and returns its
 // exit code and what it wrote to stdout and stderr.
 //
 // Not parallel-safe: it replaces os.Args, os.Stdout and os.Stderr.
 func runEntry(t *testing.T, args ...string) (int, string, string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	previousArgs := os.Args
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		os.Args = previousArgs
 		rootFlags = RootFlags{}
 	})
 	os.Args = append([]string{programName}, args...)
 	var code int
 	stdout, stderr := captureProcessStdoutAndStderr(t,
 		func() { code = Entry() })
 	return code, stdout, stderr
 }
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ func NewInfoCommand() *cobra.Command {
 					Debug:   rootFlags.Debug,
 					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
 				},
 				Mode: readOnly,
 			}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 				return v.ShowInfo()
 			}, func(err error) {
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported command constructor
 import (
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 )
 // TestJSONHelpSaysConfirmationPromptIsSkipped checks that the --json help
 // of `snapshot remove` and `prune` says the flag skips the confirmation
 // prompt. Both delete without asking under --json, since a prompt on
 // stdout would break the JSON document.
 func TestJSONHelpSaysConfirmationPromptIsSkipped(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, cmd := range []*cobra.Command{
 		newSnapshotRemoveCommand(),
 		NewPruneCommand(),
 	} {
 		assert.Contains(t, cmd.Flags().Lookup("json").Usage,
 			"skips the confirmation prompt", cmd.Name())
 	}
 }
@@ -22,11 +22,9 @@ scans every snapshot manifest in the destination store, builds the
 set of still-referenced blob hashes, and deletes any blob not in that
 set.
-Snapshot create --prune runs the same cleanup automatically; this
+Snapshot create --prune and snapshot remove run the same cleanup
-command is the manual entry point for the same work (e.g. after a
+automatically; this command is the manual entry point for the same
-crashed backup or to reclaim storage). Snapshot remove leaves blobs in
+work (e.g. after a crashed backup or to reclaim storage).`,
 place; run this command afterwards to delete the ones no longer
 referenced.`,
 		Args: cobra.NoArgs,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 			// Use unified config resolution
@@ -43,13 +41,15 @@ referenced.`,
 				LogOptions: log.Options{
 					Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
 					Debug:   rootFlags.Debug,
-					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
+					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet || opts.JSON,
 					JSON:    opts.JSON,
 				},
 				Mode: mutating,
 			}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 				return v.Prune(opts)
 			}, func(err error) {
 				if opts.JSON {
 					return
 				}
 				log.Error("Prune operation failed", "error", err)
 				ReportErrorf("Prune failed: %v", err)
 			})
@@ -57,8 +57,7 @@ referenced.`,
 	}
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Force, "force", false, "Skip confirmation prompt")
-	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.JSON, "json", false,
+	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.JSON, "json", false, "Output pruning stats as JSON")
 		"Output pruning stats as JSON; skips the confirmation prompt, as --force does")
 	return cmd
 }
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // sets the unexported rootFlags directly
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 )
 // setRootFlags overrides the global rootFlags for the duration of one
 // test and restores it afterward. These tests must not run in parallel:
 // the flags are process-global, so the whole struct is saved and put
 // back rather than left mutated for the next test.
 func setRootFlags(t *testing.T, f RootFlags) {
 	t.Helper()
 	old := rootFlags
 	rootFlags = f
 	t.Cleanup(func() { rootFlags = old })
 }
 // seedFile writes content to a fresh file and returns its path.
 func seedFile(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
 	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("seeding %s: %v", name, err)
 	}
 	return path
 }
 // mustExecute runs a command with its output captured and fails the test
 // if it errors, returning what the command printed.
 func mustExecute(t *testing.T, cmd *cobra.Command, args ...string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	var out bytes.Buffer
 	cmd.SetOut(&out)
 	cmd.SetArgs(args)
 	err := cmd.Execute()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("%s failed: %v", cmd.Name(), err)
 	}
 	return out.String()
 }
 // TestVersionQuietSuppressesReport checks that --quiet silences the whole
 // version report: it is human-facing output, not a scriptable value.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestVersionQuietSuppressesReport(t *testing.T) {
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true})
 	out := mustExecute(t, NewVersionCommand())
 	if out != "" {
 		t.Errorf("--quiet version printed %q, want nothing", out)
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigGetIgnoresQuiet checks that a config value is printed even
 // under --quiet: it is scriptable output a caller depends on, so --quiet
 // must not suppress it, and it stays machine-plain (no marker, no color).
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestConfigGetIgnoresQuiet(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", "storage_url: file:///mnt/x\n")
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: path})
 	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigGetCommand(), "storage_url")
 	if out != "file:///mnt/x\n" {
 		t.Errorf("config get --quiet = %q, want the plain value", out)
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigSetQuietSuppressesConfirmation checks that --quiet silences
 // the confirmation line while still writing the value to the file.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestConfigSetQuietSuppressesConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", "compression_level: 3\n")
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: path})
 	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigSetCommand(), "compression_level", "9")
 	if out != "" {
 		t.Errorf("--quiet config set printed %q, want nothing", out)
 	}
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // G304: test-controlled path
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("reading config back: %v", err)
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(string(data), "compression_level: 9") {
 		t.Errorf("config set did not write the value under --quiet:\n%s", data)
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigSetConfirmsWhenNotQuiet checks that the confirmation names
 // the key (styled) when --quiet is not set.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestConfigSetConfirmsWhenNotQuiet(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", "compression_level: 3\n")
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{ConfigPath: path})
 	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigSetCommand(), "compression_level", "9")
 	if !strings.Contains(out, "compression_level") {
 		t.Errorf("config set did not confirm the key: %q", out)
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigInitQuietSuppressesConfirmation checks that --quiet silences
 // the "config written" confirmation while still writing the file.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestConfigInitQuietSuppressesConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := filepath.Join(dir, "new-config.yml")
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: path})
 	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigInitCommand())
 	if out != "" {
 		t.Errorf("--quiet config init printed %q, want nothing", out)
 	}
 	_, err := os.Stat(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("config init did not write the file under --quiet: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 // seedDatabaseDeleteConfig writes a valid config whose index_path is a
 // seeded database file, and returns both paths.
 func seedDatabaseDeleteConfig(t *testing.T, dir string) (string, string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	dbPath := seedFile(t, dir, "index.sqlite", "not-a-real-db")
 	cfg := fmt.Sprintf(hermeticConfig,
 		filepath.Join(dir, "source"), filepath.Join(dir, "store"), dbPath)
 	cfgPath := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", cfg)
 	return dbPath, cfgPath
 }
 // TestDatabaseDeleteQuietSuppressesMessage checks that --quiet silences
 // the "database deleted" line while still removing the file.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestDatabaseDeleteQuietSuppressesMessage(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	dbPath, cfgPath := seedDatabaseDeleteConfig(t, dir)
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: cfgPath})
 	out := mustExecute(t, newDatabaseDeleteCommand(), "--force")
 	if out != "" {
 		t.Errorf("--quiet database delete printed %q, want nothing", out)
 	}
 	_, err := os.Stat(dbPath)
 	if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
 		t.Errorf("database delete did not remove the file: stat err = %v", err)
 	}
 }
 // TestDatabaseDeleteReportsWhenNotQuiet checks that the deletion is
 // reported when --quiet is not set.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
 func TestDatabaseDeleteReportsWhenNotQuiet(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	_, cfgPath := seedDatabaseDeleteConfig(t, dir)
 	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{ConfigPath: cfgPath})
 	out := mustExecute(t, newDatabaseDeleteCommand(), "--force")
 	if !strings.Contains(out, "deleted") {
 		t.Errorf("database delete did not report the deletion: %q", out)
 	}
 }
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ This is destructive and irreversible. Requires --force.`,
 				return errNukeNeedsForce
 			}
-			return runVaultikApp(cmd, mutating, false, "Remote nuke failed",
+			return runVaultikApp(cmd, false, false, "Remote nuke failed",
 				func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 					return v.NukeRemote(true)
 				})
@@ -85,13 +85,15 @@ func newRemoteInfoCommand() *cobra.Command {
 				LogOptions: log.Options{
 					Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
 					Debug:   rootFlags.Debug,
-					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
+					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet || jsonOutput,
 					JSON:    jsonOutput,
 				},
 				Mode: readOnly,
 			}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 				return v.RemoteInfo(jsonOutput)
 			}, func(err error) {
 				if jsonOutput {
 					return
 				}
 				log.Error("Failed to get remote info", "error", err)
 				ReportErrorf("Failed to get remote info: %v", err)
 			})
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/adrg/xdg"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 // errConfigNotFound is wrapped by all config-resolution failures.
@@ -58,10 +57,8 @@ on the source system.`,
 	cmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&rootFlags.Quiet, "quiet", "q", false,
 		"Suppress non-error output")
 	cmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&rootFlags.SkipErrors, "skip-errors", false,
-		"Skip files that cannot be read when creating a snapshot, or "+
+		"Continue past per-file errors instead of aborting "+
-			"that cannot be restored when restoring, instead of aborting "+
+			"(applies to snapshot create and restore)")
 			"(packing and storage errors while creating a snapshot still "+
 			"abort)")
 	// Add subcommands
 	cmd.AddCommand(
@@ -83,20 +80,6 @@ func GetRootFlags() RootFlags {
 	return rootFlags
 }
 // commandUI returns a UI writer for a command's stdout, in quiet mode
 // when the global --quiet flag is set. This is how the pure-cli
 // commands (version, config, database) reach internal/ui: color follows
 // the writer (a TTY gets color, a captured test buffer does not), and
 // --quiet silences the same message classes it silences everywhere else.
 func commandUI(cmd *cobra.Command) *ui.Writer {
 	w := ui.New(cmd.OutOrStdout())
 	if GetRootFlags().Quiet {
 		w.SetQuiet(true)
 	}
 	return w
 }
 // ResolveConfigPath resolves the config file path from flags, environment, or default.
 // Search order: --config flag, VAULTIK_CONFIG env, XDG config dir,
 // /etc/vaultik/config.yml.
@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
 package cli_test
 import (
 	"context"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/cli"
 )
 // TestRunAppWaitsForOperationCleanupOnShutdown drives RunApp with an fx app
 // wired the way RunOperation wires a command: a single lifecycle hook whose
 // OnStart launches the operation in its own goroutine and whose OnStop cancels
 // it and blocks until that goroutine returns. The operation stands in for a
 // restore blocked mid-download — it holds a decrypted "scratch" file and only
 // removes it as it unwinds on cancellation.
 //
 // The app is asked to stop once the operation is running (standing in for an
 // OS interrupt; fx delivers a real signal and Shutdowner.Shutdown() on the
 // same app.Wait channel, so both drive the identical shutdown path). RunApp
 // must not return until app.Stop has run the OnStop hook, so the scratch file
 // must be gone by the time RunApp returns. Before the fix RunApp returned as
 // soon as the app.Wait/Done channel fired, without running app.Stop, so the
 // cleanup never ran and this file would still be on disk (issue #159).
 func TestRunAppWaitsForOperationCleanupOnShutdown(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	scratch := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decrypted-scratch")
 	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(scratch, []byte("secret"), 0o600))
 	// Cancel and reap the operation even if RunApp returns without doing so
 	// (the buggy path), so the goroutine cannot leak past the test.
 	opCtx, opCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	t.Cleanup(opCancel)
 	var stop func(context.Context) bool
 	app := fx.New(
 		fx.NopLogger,
 		fx.Invoke(func(lc fx.Lifecycle, sh fx.Shutdowner) {
 			lc.Append(fx.Hook{
 				OnStart: func(_ context.Context) error {
 					done := make(chan struct{})
 					go func() {
 						defer close(done)
 						// Blocked mid-operation until cancelled, then run the
 						// cleanup an interrupted restore would run.
 						<-opCtx.Done()
 						_ = os.Remove(scratch)
 					}()
 					stop = func(ctx context.Context) bool {
 						opCancel()
 						select {
 						case <-done:
 							return true
 						case <-ctx.Done():
 							return false
 						}
 					}
 					// Ask the app to stop now that the operation is running.
 					go func() { _ = sh.Shutdown() }()
 					return nil
 				},
 				OnStop: func(ctx context.Context) error {
 					stop(ctx)
 					return nil
 				},
 			})
 		}),
 	)
 	done := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() { done <- cli.RunApp(context.Background(), app) }()
 	select {
 	case err := <-done:
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 	case <-time.After(30 * time.Second):
 		t.Fatal("RunApp did not return after shutdown was requested")
 	}
 	_, err := os.Stat(scratch)
 	require.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err),
 		"RunApp returned before the operation removed its decrypted scratch file")
 }
@@ -66,9 +66,8 @@ func newSnapshotCreateCommand() *cobra.Command {
 If snapshot names are provided, only those snapshots are created.
 If no names are provided, all configured snapshots are created.
-The config is read from the path given by --config or VAULTIK_CONFIG;
+Config is located at /etc/vaultik/config.yml by default, but can be overridden by
-otherwise from the platform config directory (~/.config/vaultik/config.yml
+specifying a path using --config or by setting VAULTIK_CONFIG to a path.`,
 on Linux), then /etc/vaultik/config.yml.`,
 		Args: cobra.ArbitraryArgs,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			// Pass snapshot names from args
@@ -93,7 +92,6 @@ on Linux), then /etc/vaultik/config.yml.`,
 					Cron:    opts.Cron,
 					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
 				},
 				Mode: mutating,
 			}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 				return v.CreateSnapshot(opts)
 			}, func(err error) {
@@ -127,7 +125,7 @@ func newSnapshotListCommand() *cobra.Command {
 		Long:    "Lists all snapshots with their ID, timestamp, and compressed size",
 		Args:    cobra.NoArgs,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-			return runVaultikApp(cmd, readOnly, false,
+			return runVaultikApp(cmd, false, false,
 				"Failed to list snapshots",
 				func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 					return v.ListSnapshots(jsonOutput)
@@ -163,7 +161,7 @@ restrict the operation to specific snapshot names.`,
 				return errPurgeCriteriaBoth
 			}
-			return runVaultikApp(cmd, mutating, false,
+			return runVaultikApp(cmd, false, false,
 				"Failed to purge snapshots",
 				func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 					return v.PurgeSnapshotsWithOptions(opts)
@@ -189,12 +187,8 @@ func newSnapshotVerifyCommand() *cobra.Command {
 	cmd := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "verify <snapshot-id>",
-		Short: "Check a snapshot's blobs are present with the listed size",
+		Short: "Verify snapshot integrity",
-		Long: "Checks that every blob the snapshot's manifest lists is present\n" +
+		Long: "Verifies that all blobs referenced in a snapshot exist.\n\n" +
 			"in storage with the size the manifest records, and that the\n" +
 			"snapshot's encrypted database is present. It does not read blob\n" +
 			"contents; use --deep to download, decrypt, and re-hash every blob\n" +
 			"to detect corruption -- integrity, not who wrote it.\n\n" +
 			"The snapshot may be named by its ID or, on a host with no local\n" +
 			"index, by the remote key that 'snapshot list' prints for a\n" +
 			"remote-only snapshot (an unambiguous leading part is enough).",
@@ -215,10 +209,8 @@ func newSnapshotVerifyCommand() *cobra.Command {
 				LogOptions: log.Options{
 					Verbose: rootFlags.Verbose,
 					Debug:   rootFlags.Debug,
-					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
+					Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet || opts.JSON,
 					JSON:    opts.JSON,
 				},
 				Mode: readOnly,
 			}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 				return v.VerifySnapshotWithOptions(snapshotID, opts)
 			}, func(err error) {
@@ -259,15 +251,14 @@ Use --local-only to skip the remote half (e.g. when you want to forget a
 snapshot locally without touching the destination store).
 If the remote is unreachable, the local-database removal still completes
-and a warning is emitted; run 'vaultik snapshot remove <snapshot-id>' again
+and a warning is emitted; rerun 'vaultik prune' once the destination store
-once the destination store is reachable to remove the snapshot's metadata
+is reachable to finish remote cleanup.
 from it ('vaultik prune' does not).
 To wipe the entire destination store and start over, use 'vaultik remote
 nuke --force' — it is the single supported entry point for that.`,
 		Args: requireSnapshotIDArg,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-			return runVaultikApp(cmd, mutating, opts.JSON,
+			return runVaultikApp(cmd, opts.JSON, opts.JSON,
 				"Failed to remove snapshot",
 				func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 					_, err := v.RemoveSnapshot(args[0], opts)
@@ -280,8 +271,7 @@ nuke --force' — it is the single supported entry point for that.`,
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVarP(&opts.Force, "force", "f", false, "Skip confirmation prompt")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.DryRun, "dry-run", false,
 		"Show what would be removed without removing")
-	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.JSON, "json", false,
+	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.JSON, "json", false, "Output result as JSON")
 		"Output result as JSON; skips the confirmation prompt, as --force does")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.LocalOnly, "local-only", false,
 		"Skip remote cleanup; only touch the local index")
@@ -35,12 +35,8 @@ The snapshot may be named by its ID or, when restoring on a host with no
 local index, by the remote key that 'snapshot list' prints for a
 remote-only snapshot (an unambiguous leading part is enough).
-Requires the age private key in the VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY environment
+Requires the VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY environment variable to be set with
-variable. The variable may hold the whole age-keygen file (comments and
+the age private key.
 all of its identities are accepted); read it from the file rather than
 typing the key, so it does not land in your shell history:
  export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"
 Examples:
  # Restore entire snapshot
@@ -92,7 +88,6 @@ func runRestore(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string, opts *RestoreOptions) error {
 			Debug:   rootFlags.Debug,
 			Quiet:   rootFlags.Quiet,
 		},
 		Mode: readOnly,
 	}, func(v *vaultik.Vaultik) error {
 		return v.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
 			SnapshotID: snapshotID,
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
 package cli //nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported command constructor
 import (
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
 )
 // TestRestoreCommandDoesNotTakeKeyAsArgument guards the fix for the age
 // key being echoed on the command line: restore must take the key only
 // from the environment, never as a flag value, and its help must show the
 // file-based form rather than a literal key that would land in shell
 // history.
 func TestRestoreCommandDoesNotTakeKeyAsArgument(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cmd := newSnapshotRestoreCommand()
 	cmd.Flags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
 		lower := strings.ToLower(f.Name)
 		for _, banned := range []string{"key", "secret", "age", "identity"} {
 			if strings.Contains(lower, banned) {
 				t.Errorf("restore must not accept the key as a flag; found --%s", f.Name)
 			}
 		}
 	})
 	help := cmd.Long
 	if strings.Contains(help, "AGE-SECRET-KEY-") {
 		t.Error("restore help must not show a literal age private key to type")
 	}
 	if !strings.Contains(help, "$(cat ") {
 		t.Error("restore help should read the key from a file, e.g. $(cat ...)")
 	}
 }
@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ package cli
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"runtime"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 // NewVersionCommand creates the version command
@@ -17,25 +17,16 @@ func NewVersionCommand() *cobra.Command {
 		Long:  `Print version, git commit, and build information for vaultik.`,
 		Args:  cobra.NoArgs,
 		Run: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
-			writeVersion(commandUI(cmd))
+			writeVersion(cmd.OutOrStdout())
 		},
 	}
 	return cmd
 }
-// writeVersion prints the version report through the UI writer. The
+// writeVersion prints the version report. It takes a writer rather than
-// report is the output this command exists to produce, so it is written
+// using os.Stdout directly so the output can be asserted on in tests.
-// plain (markers would corrupt the aligned report) via the writer's
+func writeVersion(w io.Writer) {
 // underlying stdout; --quiet silences it like any other non-error
 // output.
 func writeVersion(out *ui.Writer) {
 	if out.Quiet() {
 		return
 	}
 	w := out.Out()
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "vaultik %s\n", globals.Version)
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "  commit:     %s\n", globals.Commit)
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "  build date: %s\n", globals.CommitDate)
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ func runVersionCommand(t *testing.T) string {
 // the report is the version the binary was actually built with. The
 // test binary carries no -ldflags, so that is the "dev" default -- the
 // same string an untagged `make vaultik` build stamps a prefix of.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // executes a command that reads the global rootFlags
 func TestVersionCommandReportsBuildVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	out := runVersionCommand(t)
 	wantFirst := "vaultik " + globals.Version
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ func TestVersionCommandReportsBuildVersion(t *testing.T) {
 // being exactly "dev", so once untagged builds started carrying their
 // commit sha it would have gone silent and an unreleased binary would
 // have looked like a release.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // executes a command that reads the global rootFlags
 func TestVersionCommandFlagsDevelopmentBuild(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	if !globals.IsDevVersion(globals.Version) {
 		t.Skipf("test binary was stamped with release version %q",
 			globals.Version)
@@ -16,50 +16,34 @@ import (
 	"github.com/adrg/xdg"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/chunker"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
 )
 const appName = "vaultik"
 // secretKeyPrefix marks an age secret (private) key. It is compared
 // case-insensitively so a recipient entry that is actually a private key is
 // caught and never passed to age or echoed back.
 //
 //nolint:gosec // G101: marker for detecting a pasted secret key, not a credential
 const secretKeyPrefix = "AGE-SECRET-KEY-"
 // Defaults and validation bounds for tunable settings.
 const (
 	defaultBlobSizeLimit    = Size(10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024) // 10GB
 	defaultChunkSize        = Size(10 * 1024 * 1024)        // 10MB
-	defaultS3PartSize       = Size(5 * 1024 * 1024)         // 5MiB
+	defaultS3PartSize       = Size(5 * 1024 * 1024)         // 5MB
 	defaultCompressionLevel = 3
 	minChunkSize            = 1024 * 1024 // 1MB
 	minCompressionLevel     = 1
 	maxCompressionLevel     = 19
 	// S3 accepts a multipart upload part from 5MiB to 5GiB.
 	minS3PartSize = 5 * 1024 * 1024
 	maxS3PartSize = 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
 )
 // Sentinel validation errors.
 var (
-	errNoConfigPath         = errors.New("config path not provided")
+	errNoConfigPath    = errors.New("config path not provided")
-	errRecipientIsSecretKey = errors.New(
+	errNoAgeRecipients = errors.New(
-		"an age secret key was given where a public key (age1...) belongs")
+		"at least one age_recipient is required (generate with: age-keygen)")
 	errRecipientNotX25519 = errors.New(
 		"not a valid recipient; only X25519 age1... public keys are supported")
 	errNoSnapshots = errors.New(
 		"at least one snapshot must be configured (see config.example.yml)")
 	errSnapshotNoPaths   = errors.New("snapshot must have at least one path")
 	errChunkSizeTooSmall = errors.New("chunk_size must be at least 1MB")
-	errBlobSizeTooSmall  = errors.New(
+	errBlobSizeTooSmall  = errors.New("blob_size_limit must be at least chunk_size")
-		"blob_size_limit must be at least the largest chunk the chunker can " +
+	errBadCompression    = errors.New("compression_level must be between 1 and 19")
-			"emit (chunk_size times the FastCDC size spread)")
+	errBadStorageScheme  = errors.New(
 	errBadCompression   = errors.New("compression_level must be between 1 and 19")
 	errBadS3PartSize    = errors.New("s3.part_size must be between 5MiB and 5GiB")
 	errBadStorageScheme = errors.New(
 		"storage_url must start with s3://, file://, or rclone://")
 	errStorageNotConfigured = errors.New(
 		"storage not configured; set storage_url or provide s3.endpoint + " +
@@ -137,26 +121,6 @@ func (c *Config) SnapshotNames() []string {
 	return names
 }
 // Names of the two places the age secret key can be configured, used by
 // AgeSecretKeySourceName for error messages that must not echo the value.
 //
 //nolint:gosec // G101: these are the names of the config sources, not a key
 const (
 	ageSecretKeySourceEnv    = "VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY"
 	ageSecretKeySourceConfig = "age_secret_key"
 )
 // AgeSecretKeySourceName returns the human name of where AgeSecretKey was
 // configured. A Config built directly (as in tests) has no recorded
 // source, so it reports the config-file field name.
 func (c *Config) AgeSecretKeySourceName() string {
 	if c.AgeSecretKeySource != "" {
 		return c.AgeSecretKeySource
 	}
 	return ageSecretKeySourceConfig
 }
 // Config represents the application configuration for Vaultik.
 // It defines all settings for backup operations, including source directories,
 // encryption recipients, storage configuration, and performance tuning parameters.
@@ -166,13 +130,8 @@ func (c *Config) AgeSecretKeySourceName() string {
 type Config struct {
 	AgeRecipients []string `yaml:"age_recipients"`
 	AgeSecretKey  string   `yaml:"age_secret_key"`
-	// AgeSecretKeySource names where AgeSecretKey was configured
+	BlobSizeLimit Size     `yaml:"blob_size_limit"`
-	// ("VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY" or "age_secret_key") so a later parse
+	ChunkSize     Size     `yaml:"chunk_size"`
 	// failure can name the source without echoing the secret value. It is
 	// set by Load and never read from or written to the config file.
 	AgeSecretKeySource string `yaml:"-"`
 	BlobSizeLimit      Size   `yaml:"blob_size_limit"`
 	ChunkSize          Size   `yaml:"chunk_size"`
 	// Exclude holds global excludes applied to all snapshots.
 	Exclude          []string                  `yaml:"exclude"`
 	Hostname         string                    `yaml:"hostname"`
@@ -203,10 +162,8 @@ type S3Config struct {
 	AccessKeyID     string `yaml:"access_key_id"`
 	SecretAccessKey string `yaml:"secret_access_key"`
 	Region          string `yaml:"region"`
-	// UseSSL selects HTTPS for a scheme-less endpoint. Omitted (nil) means
+	UseSSL          bool   `yaml:"use_ssl"`
-	// the default, TLS; set it to false only to force plain HTTP.
+	PartSize        Size   `yaml:"part_size"`
 	UseSSL   *bool `yaml:"use_ssl"`
 	PartSize Size  `yaml:"part_size"`
 }
 // Path wraps the config file path for fx dependency injection.
@@ -248,7 +205,6 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 		ChunkSize:        defaultChunkSize,
 		IndexPath:        filepath.Join(xdg.DataHome, appName, "index.sqlite"),
 		CompressionLevel: defaultCompressionLevel,
 		S3:               S3Config{PartSize: defaultS3PartSize},
 	}
 	// Convert smartconfig data to YAML then unmarshal
@@ -282,7 +238,10 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 		cfg.IndexPath = expandTilde(envIndexPath)
 	}
-	cfg.setAgeSecretKey()
+	// Check for environment variable override for AgeSecretKey
 	if envAgeSecretKey := os.Getenv("VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY"); envAgeSecretKey != "" {
 		cfg.AgeSecretKey = extractAgeSecretKey(envAgeSecretKey)
 	}
 	// Get hostname if not set
 	if cfg.Hostname == "" {
@@ -299,13 +258,17 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 		cfg.S3.Region = "us-east-1"
 	}
 	if cfg.S3.PartSize == 0 {
 		cfg.S3.PartSize = defaultS3PartSize
 	}
 	// Check config file permissions (warn if world or group readable)
 	//nolint:gosec // G703: config path is operator-supplied by design
 	info, statErr := os.Stat(path)
 	if statErr == nil {
 		mode := info.Mode().Perm()
 		if mode&0044 != 0 { // group or world readable
-			log.Warn(cfg.readableByOthersWarning(),
+			log.Warn("Config file has insecure permissions (contains S3 credentials)",
 				"path", path,
 				"mode", fmt.Sprintf("%04o", mode),
 				"recommendation", "chmod 600 "+path)
@@ -322,26 +285,16 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 // Validate checks if the configuration is valid and complete.
 // It ensures all required fields are present and have valid values:
-//   - Every age recipient must parse as an X25519 age1... public key (so a
+// - At least one age recipient must be specified
-//     bad entry fails at load, not mid-backup); errors name the position,
+// - At least one snapshot must be configured with at least one path
-//     never the value. An empty list is accepted, because only snapshot
+// - Storage must be configured (either storage_url or s3.* fields)
-//     create needs a recipient and it checks for one itself
+// - Chunk size must be at least 1MB
-//   - At least one snapshot must be configured with at least one path
+// - Blob size limit must be at least the chunk size
-//   - Storage must be configured (either storage_url or s3.* fields)
+// - Compression level must be between 1 and 19
 //   - Chunk size must be at least 1MB
 //   - Blob size limit must be at least the largest chunk the chunker can emit
 //     (chunk_size times chunker.ChunkSizeSpread), so a single-chunk blob never
 //     exceeds the configured limit
 //   - Compression level must be between 1 and 19
 //   - S3 part size must be between 5MiB and 5GiB, the part sizes S3 accepts
 //
 // Returns an error describing the first validation failure encountered.
 func (c *Config) Validate() error {
-	for i, recipient := range c.AgeRecipients {
+	if len(c.AgeRecipients) == 0 {
-		err := validateAgeRecipient(recipient)
+		return errNoAgeRecipients
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("age_recipients[%d]: %w", i, err)
 		}
 	}
 	if len(c.Snapshots) == 0 {
@@ -364,13 +317,8 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		return errChunkSizeTooSmall
 	}
-	// The chunker can emit chunks up to chunk_size * ChunkSizeSpread, and the
+	if c.BlobSizeLimit.Int64() < c.ChunkSize.Int64() {
-	// packer places a single such chunk into an otherwise empty blob. A limit
+		return errBlobSizeTooSmall
 	// below that bound would let a blob exceed it, so reject it.
 	largestChunk := c.ChunkSize.Int64() * chunker.ChunkSizeSpread
 	if c.BlobSizeLimit.Int64() < largestChunk {
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: need at least %d bytes",
 			errBlobSizeTooSmall, largestChunk)
 	}
 	if c.CompressionLevel < minCompressionLevel ||
@@ -378,58 +326,9 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
 		return errBadCompression
 	}
 	if c.S3.PartSize.Int64() < minS3PartSize ||
 		c.S3.PartSize.Int64() > maxS3PartSize {
 		return errBadS3PartSize
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // validateAgeRecipient parses one age_recipients entry with the age library
 // and returns a value-free error on failure. A recipient string can be
 // sensitive (an operator may paste a secret key by mistake), so neither the
 // entry nor age's own error (which quotes its input) is ever included.
 func validateAgeRecipient(recipient string) error {
 	if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToUpper(recipient), secretKeyPrefix) {
 		return errRecipientIsSecretKey
 	}
 	_, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(recipient)
 	if err != nil {
 		return errRecipientNotX25519
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // setAgeSecretKey records the age secret key and where it came from. The
 // value is stored raw and parsed only where decryption happens
 // (internal/vaultik), so backup, list and prune keep working whatever the
 // field holds. The environment variable overrides the config-file field.
 func (c *Config) setAgeSecretKey() {
 	if c.AgeSecretKey != "" {
 		c.AgeSecretKeySource = ageSecretKeySourceConfig
 	}
 	if env := os.Getenv("VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY"); env != "" {
 		c.AgeSecretKey = env
 		c.AgeSecretKeySource = ageSecretKeySourceEnv
 	}
 }
 // readableByOthersWarning is the warning Load logs when others can read
 // the config file. It says "may contain" because the S3 credentials are
 // seen only after smartconfig has replaced any ${...} reference in the
 // file with its value, so a set credential need not be in the file.
 func (c *Config) readableByOthersWarning() string {
 	if c.S3.AccessKeyID != "" || c.S3.SecretAccessKey != "" {
 		return "Config file is readable by others and may contain S3 credentials"
 	}
 	return "Config file is readable by others"
 }
 // validateStorage validates storage configuration.
 // If StorageURL is set, it takes precedence. S3 URLs require credentials.
 // File URLs don't require any S3 configuration.
@@ -486,6 +385,22 @@ func (c *Config) validateStorageURL() error {
 	}
 }
 // extractAgeSecretKey extracts the AGE-SECRET-KEY from the input using
 // the age library's parser, which handles comments and whitespace.
 func extractAgeSecretKey(input string) string {
 	identities, err := age.ParseIdentities(strings.NewReader(input))
 	if err != nil || len(identities) == 0 {
 		// Fall back to trimmed input if parsing fails
 		return strings.TrimSpace(input)
 	}
 	// Return the string representation of the first identity
 	if id, ok := identities[0].(*age.X25519Identity); ok {
 		return id.String()
 	}
 	return strings.TrimSpace(input)
 }
 // Module exports the config module for fx dependency injection.
 // It provides the Config type to other modules in the application.
 //
@@ -1,14 +1,9 @@
-package config //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported source constants
+package config //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported extractAgeSecretKey
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/chunker"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
 )
 const (
@@ -88,48 +83,6 @@ func TestConfigLoad(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // TestExampleConfigIsScrubbedAndLoads checks that the shipped
 // config.example.yml carries only neutral placeholders (no real credentials,
 // private addresses, or internal host names) and still parses.
 func TestExampleConfigIsScrubbedAndLoads(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	examplePath := filepath.Join("..", "..", "config.example.yml")
 	cfg, err := Load(examplePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to load config.example.yml: %v", err)
 	}
 	if cfg.StorageURL != "rclone://myremote/path/to/backups" {
 		t.Errorf("Expected neutral storage_url, got '%s'", cfg.StorageURL)
 	}
 	//nolint:gosec // G304: examplePath is a fixed in-repo path, not user input
 	raw, err := os.ReadFile(examplePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to read config.example.yml: %v", err)
 	}
 	text := string(raw)
 	wantSubstrings := []string{
 		"YOUR_ACCESS_KEY",
 		"YOUR_SECRET_KEY",
 		"endpoint: https://",
 	}
 	for _, want := range wantSubstrings {
 		if !strings.Contains(text, want) {
 			t.Errorf("Expected config.example.yml to contain %q", want)
 		}
 	}
 	// A raw "http://" scheme would mean a plaintext, likely private endpoint.
 	if strings.Contains(text, "http://") {
 		t.Error("config.example.yml should not contain an http:// endpoint")
 	}
 }
 // TestConfigFromEnv tests loading config path from environment variable
 func TestConfigFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -148,121 +101,53 @@ func TestConfigFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
-// TestValidateBlobSizeLimit checks the blob_size_limit boundary: it must be at
+// TestExtractAgeSecretKey tests extraction of AGE-SECRET-KEY from various inputs
-// least the largest chunk the chunker can emit (chunk_size times
+func TestExtractAgeSecretKey(t *testing.T) {
 // chunker.ChunkSizeSpread), because the packer places a single such chunk into
 // an otherwise empty blob. A limit between chunk_size and that bound is rejected.
 func TestValidateBlobSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const chunkSize = Size(10 * 1024 * 1024) // 10MB
 	largestChunk := chunkSize.Int64() * chunker.ChunkSizeSpread
 	newConfig := func(blobLimit Size) *Config {
 		return &Config{
 			AgeRecipients:    []string{testSneakAgePublicKey},
 			Snapshots:        map[string]SnapshotConfig{"test": {Paths: []string{"/tmp/src"}}},
 			StorageURL:       "file:///tmp/vaultik-test-store",
 			ChunkSize:        chunkSize,
 			BlobSizeLimit:    blobLimit,
 			CompressionLevel: 3,
 			S3:               S3Config{PartSize: defaultS3PartSize},
 		}
 	}
 	tests := []struct {
 		name      string
 		blobLimit Size
 		wantErr   bool
 	}{
 		{
 			name:      "at chunk_size but below largest chunk is rejected",
 			blobLimit: chunkSize,
 			wantErr:   true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:      "between chunk_size and largest chunk is rejected",
 			blobLimit: Size(chunkSize.Int64() * 2),
 			wantErr:   true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:      "one byte below largest chunk is rejected",
 			blobLimit: Size(largestChunk - 1),
 			wantErr:   true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:      "exactly at largest chunk is accepted",
 			blobLimit: Size(largestChunk),
 			wantErr:   false,
 		},
 		{
 			name:      "above largest chunk is accepted",
 			blobLimit: Size(largestChunk * 100),
 			wantErr:   false,
 		},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			err := newConfig(tt.blobLimit).Validate()
 			if tt.wantErr {
 				if !errors.Is(err, errBlobSizeTooSmall) {
 					t.Fatalf("Validate() error = %v, want errBlobSizeTooSmall", err)
 				}
 				return
 			}
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("Validate() unexpected error: %v", err)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestValidateS3PartSize checks that s3.part_size is held to the part sizes
 // S3 accepts, 5MiB to 5GiB, by changing only the part size of the test
 // config. "5MB" in the config file is 5,000,000 bytes, below the minimum.
 func TestValidateS3PartSize(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	base, err := Load(os.Getenv("VAULTIK_CONFIG"))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to load config: %v", err)
 	}
 	tests := []struct {
 		name     string
-		partSize Size
+		input    string
-		wantErr  bool
+		expected string
 	}{
 		{
-			name:     "5MB is rejected",
+			name:     "plain key",
-			partSize: 5_000_000,
+			input:    testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
-			wantErr:  true,
+			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "one byte below 5MiB is rejected",
+			name:     "key with trailing newline",
-			partSize: minS3PartSize - 1,
+			input:    testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "\n",
-			wantErr:  true,
+			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "5MiB is accepted",
+			name: "full age-keygen output",
-			partSize: minS3PartSize,
+			input: "# created: 2025-01-14T12:00:00Z\n" +
-			wantErr:  false,
+				"# public key: " + testIntegrationAgePublicKey + "\n" +
 				testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "\n",
 			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "5GiB is accepted",
+			name: "age-keygen output with extra blank lines",
-			partSize: maxS3PartSize,
+			input: "# created: 2025-01-14T12:00:00Z\n" +
-			wantErr:  false,
+				"# public key: " + testIntegrationAgePublicKey + "\n\n" +
 				testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "\n\n",
 			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "one byte above 5GiB is rejected",
+			name:     "key with leading whitespace",
-			partSize: maxS3PartSize + 1,
+			input:    "  " + testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "  ",
-			wantErr:  true,
+			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "empty input",
 			input:    "",
 			expected: "",
 		},
 		{
 			name:     "only comments",
 			input:    "# this is a comment\n# another comment",
 			expected: "# this is a comment\n# another comment",
 		},
 	}
@@ -270,314 +155,10 @@ func TestValidateS3PartSize(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
-			cfg := *base
+			result := extractAgeSecretKey(tt.input)
-			cfg.S3.PartSize = tt.partSize
+			if result != tt.expected {
-
+				t.Errorf("extractAgeSecretKey(%q) = %q, want %q",
-			err := cfg.Validate()
+					tt.input, result, tt.expected)
 			if tt.wantErr {
 				if !errors.Is(err, errBadS3PartSize) {
 					t.Fatalf("Validate() error = %v, want errBadS3PartSize", err)
 				}
 				return
 			}
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("Validate() unexpected error: %v", err)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestLoadS3PartSize checks that a config file without s3.part_size loads
 // with the 5MiB default, and that an explicit 0 fails at load like any other
 // part size S3 refuses.
 func TestLoadS3PartSize(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const withoutPartSize = "snapshots:\n" +
 		"  test:\n" +
 		"    paths: [/tmp/vaultik-test-source]\n" +
 		"storage_url: file:///tmp/vaultik-test-storage\n"
 	writeConfig := func(t *testing.T, text string) string {
 		t.Helper()
 		path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.yml")
 		err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(text), 0o600)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("write config: %v", err)
 		}
 		return path
 	}
 	t.Run("absent loads as 5MiB", func(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
 		cfg, err := Load(writeConfig(t, withoutPartSize))
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("Load() unexpected error: %v", err)
 		}
 		if cfg.S3.PartSize != defaultS3PartSize {
 			t.Errorf("s3.part_size = %d, want %d",
 				cfg.S3.PartSize, defaultS3PartSize)
 		}
 	})
 	t.Run("0 is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
 		_, err := Load(writeConfig(t, withoutPartSize+"s3:\n  part_size: 0\n"))
 		if !errors.Is(err, errBadS3PartSize) {
 			t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v, want errBadS3PartSize", err)
 		}
 	})
 }
 // TestValidateAgeRecipients checks that recipients are parsed at config load
 // (a bad entry fails immediately, not mid-backup) and that no invalid entry —
 // least of all a pasted secret key — is echoed in the error. An empty list
 // loads, because only snapshot create needs a recipient.
 func TestValidateAgeRecipients(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	baseConfig := func(recipients []string) *Config {
 		return &Config{
 			AgeRecipients:    recipients,
 			Snapshots:        map[string]SnapshotConfig{"test": {Paths: []string{"/tmp/src"}}},
 			StorageURL:       "file:///tmp/vaultik-test-store",
 			ChunkSize:        Size(10 * 1024 * 1024),
 			BlobSizeLimit:    Size(10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024),
 			CompressionLevel: 3,
 			S3:               S3Config{PartSize: defaultS3PartSize},
 		}
 	}
 	tests := []struct {
 		name       string
 		recipients []string
 		wantErr    bool
 	}{
 		{
 			name:       "no recipients is accepted",
 			recipients: nil,
 			wantErr:    false,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "placeholder recipient is rejected",
 			recipients: []string{"age1REPLACE_WITH_YOUR_PUBLIC_KEY"},
 			wantErr:    true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "ssh-ed25519 recipient is rejected",
 			recipients: []string{"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIexamplekeydata"},
 			wantErr:    true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "truncated age1 string is rejected",
 			recipients: []string{"age1short"},
 			wantErr:    true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "secret key passed as recipient is rejected",
 			recipients: []string{testIntegrationAgePrivateKey},
 			wantErr:    true,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "two valid recipients are accepted",
 			recipients: []string{testSneakAgePublicKey, testIntegrationAgePublicKey},
 			wantErr:    false,
 		},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			err := baseConfig(tt.recipients).Validate()
 			if !tt.wantErr {
 				if err != nil {
 					t.Fatalf("Validate() unexpected error: %v", err)
 				}
 				return
 			}
 			if err == nil {
 				t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil, want error")
 			}
 			// The entry itself must never appear in the error, since a
 			// recipient string can be a secret key.
 			for _, recipient := range tt.recipients {
 				if strings.Contains(err.Error(), recipient) {
 					t.Fatalf("Validate() error echoed the recipient value: %v", err)
 				}
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // TestAgeSecretKeySourceName checks the name reported for the configured
 // age secret key: the recorded source when Load set one, and the
 // config-file field name for a Config built directly (as in tests).
 func TestAgeSecretKeySourceName(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	tests := []struct {
 		name   string
 		source string
 		want   string
 	}{
 		{
 			name:   "unset defaults to config field",
 			source: "",
 			want:   ageSecretKeySourceConfig,
 		},
 		{
 			name:   "environment source",
 			source: ageSecretKeySourceEnv,
 			want:   ageSecretKeySourceEnv,
 		},
 		{
 			name:   "config-file source",
 			source: ageSecretKeySourceConfig,
 			want:   ageSecretKeySourceConfig,
 		},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			cfg := &Config{AgeSecretKeySource: tt.source}
 			if got := cfg.AgeSecretKeySourceName(); got != tt.want {
 				t.Errorf("AgeSecretKeySourceName() = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // loadReadableConfig writes configYAML to a file that others can read,
 // loads it, and returns what the logger wrote to stderr meanwhile. The
 // logger writes to the os.Stderr it finds when it is initialized, so
 // os.Stderr is pointed at a file first. Not parallel-safe: os.Stderr and
 // the logger are process-global.
 func loadReadableConfig(t *testing.T, configYAML string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	configPath := filepath.Join(dir, "config.yml")
 	stderrPath := filepath.Join(dir, "stderr")
 	err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(configYAML), 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("writing config: %v", err)
 	}
 	//nolint:gosec // G302: the test needs a config file others can read
 	err = os.Chmod(configPath, 0o644)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("chmod config: %v", err)
 	}
 	stderrFile, err := os.Create(stderrPath) //nolint:gosec // G304: test temp path
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("creating stderr file: %v", err)
 	}
 	previous := os.Stderr
 	os.Stderr = stderrFile
 	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
 	_, loadErr := Load(configPath)
 	os.Stderr = previous
 	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
 	_ = stderrFile.Close()
 	if loadErr != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v", loadErr)
 	}
 	captured, err := os.ReadFile(stderrPath) //nolint:gosec // G304: test temp path
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("reading stderr file: %v", err)
 	}
 	return string(captured)
 }
 // TestLoadWarnsReadableConfigWithoutS3Credentials checks that a config
 // file others can read, holding no S3 credentials, is warned about
 // without a claim that it holds them.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // loadReadableConfig replaces os.Stderr
 func TestLoadWarnsReadableConfigWithoutS3Credentials(t *testing.T) {
 	stderr := loadReadableConfig(t, `
 storage_url: file:///var/backups/vaultik
 snapshots:
  home:
    paths:
      - /home
 `)
 	if !strings.Contains(stderr, "Config file is readable by others") {
 		t.Errorf("expected a warning that the file is readable by others, got %q",
 			stderr)
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(stderr, "S3 credentials") {
 		t.Errorf("warning names S3 credentials the file does not set: %q", stderr)
 	}
 }
 // TestLoadWarnsReadableConfigWithS3Credentials checks that a config file
 // others can read and that sets S3 credentials, as values or as ${ENV:...}
 // references, is warned about as one that may contain them.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // loadReadableConfig replaces os.Stderr
 func TestLoadWarnsReadableConfigWithS3Credentials(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("VAULTIK_TEST_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "test-access-key")
 	t.Setenv("VAULTIK_TEST_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "test-secret-key")
 	configs := map[string]string{
 		"values": `
 storage_url: s3://bucket/prefix?endpoint=s3.example.com
 s3:
  access_key_id: test-access-key
  secret_access_key: test-secret-key
 snapshots:
  home:
    paths:
      - /home
 `,
 		"references": `
 storage_url: s3://bucket/prefix?endpoint=s3.example.com
 s3:
  access_key_id: ${ENV:VAULTIK_TEST_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
  secret_access_key: ${ENV:VAULTIK_TEST_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
 snapshots:
  home:
    paths:
      - /home
 `,
 	}
 	for name, configYAML := range configs {
 		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			stderr := loadReadableConfig(t, configYAML)
 			if !strings.Contains(stderr,
 				"Config file is readable by others and may contain S3 credentials") {
 				t.Errorf("expected a warning naming the S3 credentials, got %q",
 					stderr)
 			}
 		})
 	}
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ var (
 // Size represents a byte size that can be specified in configuration files.
 // It can unmarshal from both numeric values (interpreted as bytes) and
 // human-readable strings like "10MB", "2.5GB", or "1TB".
 //
 //nolint:recvcheck // UnmarshalYAML requires a pointer; String/Int64 are value reads
 type Size int64
 // UnmarshalYAML implements yaml.Unmarshaler for Size, allowing it to be
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
 // Package crypto provides thread-safe age encryption and decryption
 // helpers used to protect blob and metadata content.
 package crypto //nolint:revive,nolintlint // stdlib crypto unused; see #76
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"sync"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"go.uber.org/fx"
 )
 // ErrNoRecipients is returned when an encryptor is created or updated
 // without any recipient public keys.
 var ErrNoRecipients = errors.New("at least one recipient is required")
 // Encryptor provides thread-safe encryption using the age encryption library.
 // It supports encrypting data for multiple recipients simultaneously, allowing
 // any of the corresponding private keys to decrypt the data. This is useful
 // for backup scenarios where multiple parties should be able to decrypt the data.
 type Encryptor struct {
 	recipients []age.Recipient
 	mu         sync.RWMutex
 }
 // NewEncryptor creates a new encryptor with the given age public keys.
 // Each public key should be a valid age X25519 recipient string (e.g., "age1...")
 // At least one recipient must be provided. Returns an error if any of the
 // public keys are invalid or if no recipients are specified.
 func NewEncryptor(publicKeys []string) (*Encryptor, error) {
 	if len(publicKeys) == 0 {
 		return nil, ErrNoRecipients
 	}
 	recipients := make([]age.Recipient, 0, len(publicKeys))
 	for _, key := range publicKeys {
 		recipient, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(key)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing age recipient %s: %w", key, err)
 		}
 		recipients = append(recipients, recipient)
 	}
 	return &Encryptor{
 		recipients: recipients,
 	}, nil
 }
 // Encrypt encrypts data using age encryption for all configured recipients.
 // The encrypted data can be decrypted by any of the corresponding private keys.
 // This method is suitable for small to medium amounts of data that fit in memory.
 // For large data streams, use EncryptStream or EncryptWriter instead.
 func (e *Encryptor) Encrypt(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 	e.mu.RLock()
 	recipients := e.recipients
 	e.mu.RUnlock()
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	// Create encrypted writer for all recipients
 	w, err := age.Encrypt(&buf, recipients...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating encrypted writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Write data
 	_, err = w.Write(data)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("writing encrypted data: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Close to flush
 	err = w.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("closing encrypted writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	return buf.Bytes(), nil
 }
 // EncryptStream encrypts data from reader to writer using age encryption.
 // This method is suitable for encrypting large files or streams as it processes
 // data in a streaming fashion without loading everything into memory.
 // The encrypted data is written directly to the destination writer.
 func (e *Encryptor) EncryptStream(dst io.Writer, src io.Reader) error {
 	e.mu.RLock()
 	recipients := e.recipients
 	e.mu.RUnlock()
 	// Create encrypted writer for all recipients
 	w, err := age.Encrypt(dst, recipients...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("creating encrypted writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Copy data
 	_, err = io.Copy(w, src)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("copying encrypted data: %w", err)
 	}
 	// Close to flush
 	err = w.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("closing encrypted writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // EncryptWriter creates a writer that encrypts data written to it.
 // All data written to the returned WriteCloser will be encrypted and written
 // to the destination writer. The caller must call Close() on the returned
 // writer to ensure all encrypted data is properly flushed and finalized.
 // This is useful for integrating encryption into existing writer-based pipelines.
 func (e *Encryptor) EncryptWriter(dst io.Writer) (io.WriteCloser, error) {
 	e.mu.RLock()
 	recipients := e.recipients
 	e.mu.RUnlock()
 	// Create encrypted writer for all recipients
 	w, err := age.Encrypt(dst, recipients...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating encrypted writer: %w", err)
 	}
 	return w, nil
 }
 // UpdateRecipients updates the recipients for future encryption operations.
 // This method is thread-safe and can be called while other encryption operations
 // are in progress. Existing encryption operations will continue with the old
 // recipients. At least one recipient must be provided. Returns an error if any
 // of the public keys are invalid or if no recipients are specified.
 func (e *Encryptor) UpdateRecipients(publicKeys []string) error {
 	if len(publicKeys) == 0 {
 		return ErrNoRecipients
 	}
 	recipients := make([]age.Recipient, 0, len(publicKeys))
 	for _, key := range publicKeys {
 		recipient, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(key)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("parsing age recipient %s: %w", key, err)
 		}
 		recipients = append(recipients, recipient)
 	}
 	e.mu.Lock()
 	e.recipients = recipients
 	e.mu.Unlock()
 	return nil
 }
 // Decryptor provides thread-safe decryption using the age encryption library.
 // It uses a private key to decrypt data that was encrypted for the corresponding
 // public key.
 type Decryptor struct {
 	identity age.Identity
 	mu       sync.RWMutex
 }
 // NewDecryptor creates a new decryptor with the given age private key.
 // The private key should be a valid age X25519 identity string.
 // Returns an error if the private key is invalid.
 func NewDecryptor(privateKey string) (*Decryptor, error) {
 	identity, err := age.ParseX25519Identity(privateKey)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing age identity: %w", err)
 	}
 	return &Decryptor{
 		identity: identity,
 	}, nil
 }
 // Decrypt decrypts data using age decryption.
 // This method is suitable for small to medium amounts of data that fit in memory.
 // For large data streams, use DecryptStream instead.
 func (d *Decryptor) Decrypt(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 	d.mu.RLock()
 	identity := d.identity
 	d.mu.RUnlock()
 	r, err := age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(data), identity)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating decrypted reader: %w", err)
 	}
 	decrypted, err := io.ReadAll(r)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading decrypted data: %w", err)
 	}
 	return decrypted, nil
 }
 // DecryptStream returns a reader that decrypts data from the provided reader.
 // This method is suitable for decrypting large files or streams as it processes
 // data in a streaming fashion without loading everything into memory.
 // The caller should close the input reader when done.
 func (d *Decryptor) DecryptStream(src io.Reader) (io.Reader, error) {
 	d.mu.RLock()
 	identity := d.identity
 	d.mu.RUnlock()
 	r, err := age.Decrypt(src, identity)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating decrypted reader: %w", err)
 	}
 	return r, nil
 }
 // Module exports the crypto module for fx dependency injection.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // fx module definitions are package globals
 var Module = fx.Module("crypto")
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
 package crypto_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"testing"
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/crypto"
 )
 func TestEncryptor(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// Generate a test key pair
 	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to generate identity: %v", err)
 	}
 	publicKey := identity.Recipient().String()
 	// Create encryptor
 	enc, err := crypto.NewEncryptor([]string{publicKey})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to create encryptor: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Test data
 	plaintext := []byte("Hello, World! This is a test message.")
 	// Encrypt
 	ciphertext, err := enc.Encrypt(plaintext)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to encrypt: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Verify it's actually encrypted (should be larger and different)
 	if bytes.Equal(plaintext, ciphertext) {
 		t.Error("ciphertext equals plaintext")
 	}
 	// Decrypt to verify
 	r, err := age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext), identity)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to decrypt: %v", err)
 	}
 	var decrypted bytes.Buffer
 	_, err = decrypted.ReadFrom(r)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to read decrypted data: %v", err)
 	}
 	if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, decrypted.Bytes()) {
 		t.Error("decrypted data doesn't match original")
 	}
 }
 func TestEncryptorMultipleRecipients(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// Generate three test key pairs
 	identity1, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to generate identity1: %v", err)
 	}
 	identity2, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to generate identity2: %v", err)
 	}
 	identity3, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to generate identity3: %v", err)
 	}
 	publicKeys := []string{
 		identity1.Recipient().String(),
 		identity2.Recipient().String(),
 		identity3.Recipient().String(),
 	}
 	// Create encryptor with multiple recipients
 	enc, err := crypto.NewEncryptor(publicKeys)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to create encryptor: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Test data
 	plaintext := []byte("Secret message for multiple recipients")
 	// Encrypt
 	ciphertext, err := enc.Encrypt(plaintext)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to encrypt: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Verify each recipient can decrypt
 	identities := []age.Identity{identity1, identity2, identity3}
 	for i, identity := range identities {
 		r, err := age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext), identity)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("recipient %d failed to decrypt: %v", i+1, err)
 		}
 		var decrypted bytes.Buffer
 		_, err = decrypted.ReadFrom(r)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("recipient %d failed to read decrypted data: %v", i+1, err)
 		}
 		if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, decrypted.Bytes()) {
 			t.Errorf("recipient %d: decrypted data doesn't match original", i+1)
 		}
 	}
 }
 func TestEncryptorUpdateRecipients(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// Generate two identities
 	identity1, _ := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	identity2, _ := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
 	publicKey1 := identity1.Recipient().String()
 	publicKey2 := identity2.Recipient().String()
 	// Create encryptor with first key
 	enc, err := crypto.NewEncryptor([]string{publicKey1})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to create encryptor: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Encrypt with first key
 	plaintext := []byte("test data")
 	ciphertext1, err := enc.Encrypt(plaintext)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to encrypt: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Update to second key
 	err = enc.UpdateRecipients([]string{publicKey2})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to update recipients: %v", err)
 	}
 	// Encrypt with second key
 	ciphertext2, err := enc.Encrypt(plaintext)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to encrypt: %v", err)
 	}
 	// First ciphertext should only decrypt with first identity
 	_, err = age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext1), identity1)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Error("failed to decrypt with identity1")
 	}
 	_, err = age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext1), identity2)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Error("should not decrypt with identity2")
 	}
 	// Second ciphertext should only decrypt with second identity
 	_, err = age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext2), identity2)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Error("failed to decrypt with identity2")
 	}
 	_, err = age.Decrypt(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext2), identity1)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Error("should not decrypt with identity1")
 	}
 }
@@ -208,30 +208,6 @@ func (r *BlobRepository) DeleteOrphaned(ctx context.Context) error {
 	return nil
 }
 // DeleteUnuploaded deletes blob rows whose upload never completed
 // (uploaded_ts IS NULL) and returns how many were removed. Their
 // blob_chunks rows are removed by the ON DELETE CASCADE foreign key.
 // A blob is only ever attached to a snapshot once its upload has been
 // recorded, so an un-uploaded blob is never referenced by a completed
 // snapshot: dropping it discards chunk rows that point at data which
 // was never stored remotely, so the affected content is re-chunked and
 // re-uploaded on the next run.
 func (r *BlobRepository) DeleteUnuploaded(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
 	query := `DELETE FROM blobs WHERE uploaded_ts IS NULL`
 	result, err := r.db.ExecWithLog(ctx, query)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("deleting un-uploaded blobs: %w", err)
 	}
 	rowsAffected, _ := result.RowsAffected()
 	if rowsAffected > 0 {
 		log.Debug("Deleted un-uploaded blobs", "count", rowsAffected)
 	}
 	return rowsAffected, nil
 }
 // getOne fetches a single blob row matched on the given column, or
 // (nil, nil) when no row matches.
 func (r *BlobRepository) getOne(
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ func (r *ChunkFileRepository) CreateBatch(
 				cf.ChunkHash.String(), cf.FileID.String(), cf.FileOffset, cf.Length)
 		}
-		query += querySb183.String()
+		query += querySb183.String() //nolint:gosec // G202: appends "?" placeholders only
 		query += " ON CONFLICT(chunk_hash, file_id) DO NOTHING"
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ func (r *ChunkRepository) GetByHashes(
 		args[i] = hash
 	}
-	query += querySb75.String()
+	query += querySb75.String() //nolint:gosec // G202: appends "?" placeholders only
 	query += ") ORDER BY chunk_hash"
@@ -7,32 +7,12 @@ import (
 // List returns every chunk in the index, ordered by chunk hash.
 func (r *ChunkRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*Chunk, error) {
-	return r.list(ctx, `
+	query := `
 		SELECT chunk_hash, size
 		FROM chunks
 		ORDER BY chunk_hash
-	`)
+	`
 }
 // ListInUploadedBlobs returns the chunks that are stored in a blob whose
 // upload has completed (uploaded_ts set), ordered by chunk hash. These
 // are the only chunks a backup may safely deduplicate against: a chunk
 // recorded solely in a blob that was never uploaded refers to data that
 // is not in remote storage, so trusting it would silently drop that data
 // from later snapshots.
 func (r *ChunkRepository) ListInUploadedBlobs(ctx context.Context) ([]*Chunk, error) {
 	return r.list(ctx, `
 		SELECT DISTINCT c.chunk_hash, c.size
 		FROM chunks c
 		JOIN blob_chunks bc ON c.chunk_hash = bc.chunk_hash
 		JOIN blobs b ON bc.blob_id = b.id
 		WHERE b.uploaded_ts IS NOT NULL
 		ORDER BY c.chunk_hash
 	`)
 }
 // list runs a chunk-selecting query and scans the (chunk_hash, size) rows.
 func (r *ChunkRepository) list(ctx context.Context, query string) ([]*Chunk, error) {
 	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying chunks: %w", err)
@@ -3,10 +3,8 @@
 //
 // Blobs in Vaultik are the final storage units uploaded to S3. Each blob is a
 // large (up to 10GB) file containing many compressed and encrypted chunks from
-// multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed: the filename in S3 is
+// multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed, meaning their filename
-// hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed from the chunk data
+// is derived from their SHA256 hash after compression and encryption.
 // before compression and encryption (not from the stored bytes). See
 // blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md.
 //
 // Schema is managed via numbered SQL migrations embedded in the schema/
 // directory. Migration 000.sql bootstraps the schema_migrations tracking
@@ -19,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"embed"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"sort"
@@ -42,10 +39,6 @@ var schemaFS embed.FS
 // table itself. It is applied before the normal migration loop.
 const bootstrapVersion = 0
 // busyTimeoutMs is how long a connection to the index waits for another
 // connection's lock before failing with "database is locked".
 const busyTimeoutMs = 10000
 // DB represents the Vaultik local index database connection.
 // It uses SQLite to track file metadata, content-defined chunks, and blob associations.
 // The database enables incremental backups by detecting changed files and
@@ -98,27 +91,10 @@ func ParseMigrationVersion(filename string) (int, error) {
 	return version, nil
 }
 // indexDSN returns the driver DSN that opens the database at path. The
 // driver runs each _pragma parameter on every connection it opens and drops
 // any parameter it does not know without an error, so a setting written in
 // another form silently does nothing. In WAL mode one connection can write
 // while others read; the busy timeout makes a connection wait for a lock
 // instead of failing at once.
 func indexDSN(path string) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf(
 		"%s?_pragma=busy_timeout(%d)&_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)"+
 			"&_pragma=synchronous(NORMAL)&_pragma=foreign_keys(1)",
 		path, busyTimeoutMs)
 }
 // New creates a new database connection at the specified path.
-// It creates the schema if needed. Every connection runs in WAL mode with
+// It creates the schema if needed and configures SQLite with WAL mode for
-// a busy timeout and foreign keys on (see indexDSN), so a read-only command
+// better concurrency. SQLite handles crash recovery automatically when
-// can read the index while a backup writes to it. Committed rows can sit in
+// opening a database with journal/WAL files present.
 // the -wal file beside the database until a checkpoint, so a copy of the
 // database file alone may miss them.
 // SQLite handles crash recovery automatically when opening a database with
 // journal/WAL files present.
 // The path parameter can be a file path for persistent storage or ":memory:"
 // for an in-memory database (useful for testing).
 func New(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
@@ -131,7 +107,11 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
 	// First attempt with standard WAL mode
 	log.Debug("Attempting to open database with WAL mode", "path", path)
-	conn, err := sql.Open("sqlite", indexDSN(path))
+	conn, err := sql.Open(
 		"sqlite",
 		path+"?_journal_mode=WAL&_synchronous=NORMAL&_busy_timeout=10000"+
 			"&_locking_mode=NORMAL&_foreign_keys=ON",
 	)
 	if err == nil {
 		configureConnPool(conn)
@@ -151,8 +131,8 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 	}
-	// If the first attempt failed, try once more
+	// If first attempt failed, try with TRUNCATE mode to clear any locks
-	return retryOpen(ctx, path)
+	return openWithRecovery(ctx, path)
 }
 // configureConnPool serializes all database access through one connection.
@@ -164,12 +144,18 @@ func configureConnPool(conn *sql.DB) {
 	conn.SetMaxIdleConns(1)
 }
-// finishOpen wraps the connection and applies any pending migrations. On
+// finishOpen enables foreign keys, wraps the connection, and applies any
-// migration failure the connection is closed.
+// pending migrations. On migration failure the connection is closed.
 func finishOpen(ctx context.Context, conn *sql.DB, path string) (*DB, error) {
 	// Enable foreign keys explicitly
 	_, err := conn.ExecContext(ctx, "PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warn("Failed to enable foreign keys", "path", path, "error", err)
 	}
 	db := &DB{conn: conn, path: path}
-	err := applyMigrations(ctx, conn)
+	err = applyMigrations(ctx, conn)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = conn.Close()
@@ -179,15 +165,21 @@ func finishOpen(ctx context.Context, conn *sql.DB, path string) (*DB, error) {
 	return db, nil
 }
-// retryOpen makes a second attempt to open the database, with the same
+// openWithRecovery retries opening the database in TRUNCATE journal mode to
-// settings, after the first attempt failed, for example because another
+// clear stale locks, then switches back to WAL mode.
-// process held a lock for longer than the busy timeout.
+func openWithRecovery(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
-func retryOpen(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
+	log.Info(
-	log.Info("Database appears locked, retrying open", "path", path)
+		"Database appears locked, attempting recovery with TRUNCATE mode",
 		"path", path,
 	)
-	conn, err := sql.Open("sqlite", indexDSN(path))
+	conn, err := sql.Open(
 		"sqlite",
 		path+"?_journal_mode=TRUNCATE&_synchronous=NORMAL&_busy_timeout=10000"+
 			"&_foreign_keys=ON",
 	)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening database on retry: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening database in recovery mode: %w", err)
 	}
 	configureConnPool(conn)
@@ -195,18 +187,28 @@ func retryOpen(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
 	err = conn.PingContext(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debug(
-			"Failed to ping database on retry, closing",
+			"Failed to ping database in recovery mode, closing",
 			"path", path, "error", err,
 		)
 		_ = conn.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf(
-			"database still locked on retry: %w",
+			"database still locked after recovery attempt: %w",
 			err,
 		)
 	}
 	log.Debug("Database opened in TRUNCATE mode", "path", path)
 	// Switch back to WAL mode
 	log.Debug("Switching database back to WAL mode", "path", path)
 	_, err = conn.ExecContext(ctx, "PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warn("Failed to switch back to WAL mode", "path", path, "error", err)
 	}
 	db, err := finishOpen(ctx, conn, path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -217,135 +219,6 @@ func retryOpen(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
 	return db, nil
 }
 // errUntrustedSnapshotSchema is returned when a downloaded snapshot
 // database carries schema objects the real schema never defines, or is
 // missing a table the restore and deep-verify queries read.
 var errUntrustedSnapshotSchema = errors.New(
 	"downloaded snapshot database has an untrusted schema")
 // snapshotReadOnlyDSN builds the driver DSN that opens a materialized
 // snapshot database file read-only. mode=ro opens the file read-only at
 // the OS level, query_only rejects any write the engine is asked to make,
 // and trusted_schema=OFF refuses to run application code named in the
 // schema. The file: URI form is required for the driver to honour the
 // mode parameter.
 func snapshotReadOnlyDSN(path string) string {
 	u := url.URL{
 		Scheme:   "file",
 		Path:     path,
 		RawQuery: "mode=ro&_pragma=query_only(true)&_pragma=trusted_schema(false)",
 	}
 	return u.String()
 }
 // OpenReadOnly opens an already-materialized SQLite file for read-only
 // querying of a snapshot database downloaded from the store, used by
 // restore and deep verify. Unlike New it never applies schema migrations
 // and never writes: the connection is opened read-only with query_only
 // and trusted_schema=OFF. It refuses any file whose schema carries a
 // trigger, view or virtual table, or lacks an expected table, so a forged
 // file cannot redefine what the restore queries return. The caller owns
 // the file and must remove it.
 func OpenReadOnly(ctx context.Context, path string) (*DB, error) {
 	conn, err := sql.Open("sqlite", snapshotReadOnlyDSN(path))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening read-only database: %w", err)
 	}
 	configureConnPool(conn)
 	err = conn.PingContext(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening read-only database: %w", err)
 	}
 	err = verifySnapshotSchema(ctx, conn)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	return &DB{conn: conn, path: path}, nil
 }
 // verifySnapshotSchema rejects a downloaded database whose schema is not
 // the plain table set the real schema defines. Any trigger, view or
 // virtual table, or a missing expected table, fails the open.
 func verifySnapshotSchema(ctx context.Context, conn *sql.DB) error {
 	// expectedSnapshotTables are the tables the restore and deep-verify
 	// queries read. A downloaded database missing any of them is not a
 	// genuine snapshot database and is refused.
 	expectedSnapshotTables := []string{
 		"blob_chunks",
 		"blobs",
 		"chunks",
 		"file_chunks",
 		"files",
 	}
 	rows, err := conn.QueryContext(
 		ctx, "SELECT type, name, sql FROM sqlite_master")
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("reading snapshot schema: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer func() { _ = rows.Close() }()
 	present := make(map[string]struct{})
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var objType, name string
 		var objSQL sql.NullString
 		err = rows.Scan(&objType, &name, &objSQL)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("reading snapshot schema: %w", err)
 		}
 		switch objType {
 		case "trigger", "view":
 			return fmt.Errorf(
 				"%w: unexpected %s %q", errUntrustedSnapshotSchema, objType, name)
 		case "table":
 			if isVirtualTableSQL(objSQL.String) {
 				return fmt.Errorf(
 					"%w: unexpected virtual table %q",
 					errUntrustedSnapshotSchema, name)
 			}
 			present[name] = struct{}{}
 		}
 	}
 	err = rows.Err()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("reading snapshot schema: %w", err)
 	}
 	for _, table := range expectedSnapshotTables {
 		if _, ok := present[table]; !ok {
 			return fmt.Errorf(
 				"%w: missing table %q", errUntrustedSnapshotSchema, table)
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // isVirtualTableSQL reports whether a sqlite_master row's SQL defines a
 // virtual table. Virtual tables are recorded with type 'table' but a
 // "CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE" definition and can run module code, so they are
 // refused alongside triggers and views.
 func isVirtualTableSQL(createSQL string) bool {
 	return strings.HasPrefix(
 		strings.ToUpper(strings.TrimSpace(createSQL)), "CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE")
 }
 // NewTestDB creates an in-memory SQLite database for testing purposes.
 // The database is automatically initialized with the schema and is ready
 // for use. Each call creates a new independent database instance.
@@ -120,89 +120,6 @@ func TestDatabaseConcurrentAccess(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // TestNewSetsJournalModeAndBusyTimeout checks that the connection settings
 // New passes reach SQLite. The driver drops a setting it does not recognise
 // without an error, so only reading the value back shows it took effect.
 func TestNewSetsJournalModeAndBusyTimeout(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	db, err := New(ctx, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "index.db"))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to create database: %v", err)
 	}
 	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
 	var journalMode string
 	err = db.conn.QueryRowContext(ctx, "PRAGMA journal_mode").Scan(&journalMode)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("reading journal_mode: %v", err)
 	}
 	if journalMode != "wal" {
 		t.Errorf("journal_mode = %q, want %q", journalMode, "wal")
 	}
 	var busyTimeout int
 	err = db.conn.QueryRowContext(ctx, "PRAGMA busy_timeout").Scan(&busyTimeout)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("reading busy_timeout: %v", err)
 	}
 	if busyTimeout != busyTimeoutMs {
 		t.Errorf("busy_timeout = %d, want %d", busyTimeout, busyTimeoutMs)
 	}
 }
 // TestNewWriteSucceedsWhileAnotherHandleReads opens the same index twice,
 // as a read-only command does while a backup runs, and checks that a write
 // on one handle commits while the other is in the middle of a read.
 func TestNewWriteSucceedsWhileAnotherHandleReads(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	dbPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "index.db")
 	reader, err := New(ctx, dbPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to open reading handle: %v", err)
 	}
 	defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
 	writer, err := New(ctx, dbPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to open writing handle: %v", err)
 	}
 	defer func() { _ = writer.Close() }()
 	// The read lock taken by the SELECT is held until the transaction ends.
 	readTx, err := reader.BeginTx(ctx, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("beginning read transaction: %v", err)
 	}
 	defer func() { _ = readTx.Rollback() }()
 	var count int
 	err = readTx.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM chunks").Scan(&count)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("reading chunks: %v", err)
 	}
 	_, err = writer.ExecWithLog(ctx,
 		"INSERT INTO chunks (chunk_hash, size) VALUES (?, ?)", "hash", 1024)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write while another handle reads: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 func TestParseMigrationVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ func (r *FileChunkRepository) CreateBatch(
 			args = append(args, fc.FileID.String(), fc.Idx, fc.ChunkHash.String())
 		}
-		query += querySb211.String()
+		query += querySb211.String() //nolint:gosec // G202: appends "?" placeholders only
 		query += " ON CONFLICT(file_id, idx) DO NOTHING"
@@ -33,13 +33,11 @@ func (r *FileRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, file *File) err
 	}
 	query := `
-		INSERT INTO files
+		INSERT INTO files (id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target)
-			(id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target)
+		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
 		VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
 		ON CONFLICT(path) DO UPDATE SET
 			source_path = excluded.source_path,
 			mtime = excluded.mtime,
 			mtime_nsec = excluded.mtime_nsec,
 			size = excluded.size,
 			mode = excluded.mode,
 			uid = excluded.uid,
@@ -56,19 +54,16 @@ func (r *FileRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, file *File) err
 	if tx != nil {
 		LogSQL("Execute", query,
 			file.ID.String(), file.Path.String(), file.SourcePath.String(),
-			file.MTime.Unix(), file.MTime.Nanosecond(),
+			file.MTime.Unix(), file.Size, file.Mode, file.UID, file.GID,
 			file.Size, file.Mode, file.UID, file.GID,
 			file.LinkTarget.String())
 		err = tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, query,
 			file.ID.String(), file.Path.String(), file.SourcePath.String(),
-			file.MTime.Unix(), file.MTime.Nanosecond(),
+			file.MTime.Unix(), file.Size, file.Mode, file.UID, file.GID,
 			file.Size, file.Mode, file.UID, file.GID,
 			file.LinkTarget.String()).Scan(&idStr)
 	} else {
 		err = r.db.QueryRowWithLog(ctx, query,
 			file.ID.String(), file.Path.String(), file.SourcePath.String(),
-			file.MTime.Unix(), file.MTime.Nanosecond(),
+			file.MTime.Unix(), file.Size, file.Mode, file.UID, file.GID,
 			file.Size, file.Mode, file.UID, file.GID,
 			file.LinkTarget.String()).Scan(&idStr)
 	}
@@ -89,7 +84,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, file *File) err
 // in the index.
 func (r *FileRepository) GetByPath(ctx context.Context, path string) (*File, error) {
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
+		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
 		FROM files
 		WHERE path = ?
 	`
@@ -109,7 +104,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) GetByPath(ctx context.Context, path string) (*File, err
 // GetByID retrieves a file by its UUID
 func (r *FileRepository) GetByID(ctx context.Context, id types.FileID) (*File, error) {
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
+		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
 		FROM files
 		WHERE id = ?
 	`
@@ -132,7 +127,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) GetByPathTx(
 	ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, path string,
 ) (*File, error) {
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
+		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
 		FROM files
 		WHERE path = ?
 	`
@@ -163,14 +158,13 @@ func (r *FileRepository) ListModifiedSince(
 	ctx context.Context, since time.Time,
 ) ([]*File, error) {
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
+		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
 		FROM files
-		WHERE (mtime, mtime_nsec) >= (?, ?)
+		WHERE mtime >= ?
 		ORDER BY path
 	`
-	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query,
+	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query, since.Unix())
 		since.Unix(), since.Nanosecond())
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying files: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -234,24 +228,19 @@ func (r *FileRepository) DeleteByID(
 	return nil
 }
-// ListUnderPath returns the file at path and every file beneath it,
+// ListByPrefix returns all files whose path starts with prefix, ordered by
-// ordered by path. Paths are compared case-sensitively, and a trailing
+// path.
-// slash on path is ignored, so "/" lists every file.
+func (r *FileRepository) ListByPrefix(
-func (r *FileRepository) ListUnderPath(
+	ctx context.Context, prefix string,
 	ctx context.Context, path string,
 ) ([]*File, error) {
 	path = strings.TrimRight(path, "/")
 	dirPrefix := path + "/"
 	// LIKE would ignore ASCII case and treat _ and % in path as wildcards.
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
+		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
 		FROM files
-		WHERE path = ? OR substr(path, 1, length(?)) = ?
+		WHERE path LIKE ? || '%'
 		ORDER BY path
 	`
-	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query, path, dirPrefix, dirPrefix)
+	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query, prefix)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying files: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -277,60 +266,10 @@ func (r *FileRepository) ListUnderPath(
 	return files, rows.Err()
 }
 // ListIDsWithChunksNotInUploadedBlobs returns the IDs of the files whose
 // path starts with prefix and that list at least one chunk held by no
 // blob whose upload has completed (uploaded_ts set). A new snapshot
 // cannot reference such a chunk, so a backup must not treat the file as
 // unchanged even when its metadata matches the file on disk.
 func (r *FileRepository) ListIDsWithChunksNotInUploadedBlobs(
 	ctx context.Context, prefix string,
 ) ([]types.FileID, error) {
 	query := `
 		SELECT DISTINCT f.id
 		FROM files f
 		JOIN file_chunks fc ON fc.file_id = f.id
 		WHERE f.path LIKE ? || '%'
 		  AND NOT EXISTS (
 			SELECT 1
 			FROM blob_chunks bc
 			JOIN blobs b ON bc.blob_id = b.id
 			WHERE bc.chunk_hash = fc.chunk_hash
 			  AND b.uploaded_ts IS NOT NULL
 		  )
 	`
 	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query, prefix)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying files: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		err := rows.Close()
 		if err != nil {
 			Fatalf("failed to close rows: %v", err)
 		}
 	}()
 	var ids []types.FileID
 	for rows.Next() {
 		var id types.FileID
 		err := rows.Scan(&id)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("scanning file ID: %w", err)
 		}
 		ids = append(ids, id)
 	}
 	return ids, rows.Err()
 }
 // ListAll returns all files in the database
 func (r *FileRepository) ListAll(ctx context.Context) ([]*File, error) {
 	query := `
-		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
+		SELECT id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target
 		FROM files
 		ORDER BY path
 	`
@@ -371,7 +310,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) CreateBatch(
 	}
 	// Each files row binds this many SQL variables.
-	const fileCols = 10
+	const fileCols = 9
 	// Batch at 100 rows to be safe with SQLite's variable limit.
 	const batchSize = 100
@@ -382,7 +321,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) CreateBatch(
 		batch := files[i:end]
 		query := `INSERT INTO files
-			(id, path, source_path, mtime, mtime_nsec, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target)
+			(id, path, source_path, mtime, size, mode, uid, gid, link_target)
 			VALUES `
 		args := make([]any, 0, len(batch)*fileCols)
@@ -394,21 +333,19 @@ func (r *FileRepository) CreateBatch(
 				querySb325.WriteString(", ")
 			}
-			querySb325.WriteString("(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)")
+			querySb325.WriteString("(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)")
 			args = append(args,
 				f.ID.String(), f.Path.String(), f.SourcePath.String(),
-				f.MTime.Unix(), f.MTime.Nanosecond(),
+				f.MTime.Unix(), f.Size, f.Mode, f.UID, f.GID,
 				f.Size, f.Mode, f.UID, f.GID,
 				f.LinkTarget.String())
 		}
-		query += querySb325.String()
+		query += querySb325.String() //nolint:gosec // G202: appends "?" placeholders only
 		query += ` ON CONFLICT(path) DO UPDATE SET
 			source_path = excluded.source_path,
 			mtime = excluded.mtime,
 			mtime_nsec = excluded.mtime_nsec,
 			size = excluded.size,
 			mode = excluded.mode,
 			uid = excluded.uid,
@@ -468,7 +405,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) scanFileFrom(row fileRowScanner) (*File, error) {
 	var (
 		file                          File
 		idStr, pathStr, sourcePathStr string
-		mtimeUnix, mtimeNsec          int64
+		mtimeUnix                     int64
 		linkTarget                    sql.NullString
 	)
@@ -477,7 +414,6 @@ func (r *FileRepository) scanFileFrom(row fileRowScanner) (*File, error) {
 		&pathStr,
 		&sourcePathStr,
 		&mtimeUnix,
 		&mtimeNsec,
 		&file.Size,
 		&file.Mode,
 		&file.UID,
@@ -496,7 +432,7 @@ func (r *FileRepository) scanFileFrom(row fileRowScanner) (*File, error) {
 	file.Path = types.FilePath(pathStr)
 	file.SourcePath = types.SourcePath(sourcePathStr)
-	file.MTime = time.Unix(mtimeUnix, mtimeNsec).UTC()
+	file.MTime = time.Unix(mtimeUnix, 0).UTC()
 	if linkTarget.Valid {
 		file.LinkTarget = types.FilePath(linkTarget.String)
 	}
@@ -5,12 +5,10 @@ import (
 	"database/sql"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
 	"slices"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
 )
 // errTestRollback is the sentinel returned from transaction bodies to
@@ -136,82 +134,6 @@ func TestFileRepositoryListDelete(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestFileRepositoryListUnderPath(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db, cleanup := setupTestDB(t)
 	defer cleanup()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	repo := database.NewFileRepository(db)
 	const (
 		docDir  = "/home/u/doc"
 		docFile = "/home/u/doc/a.txt"
 	)
 	// In path order, so the root case can expect all of them as listed.
 	paths := []string{
 		"/home/u/50%/x.txt",
 		"/home/u/50percent/y.txt",
 		"/home/u/DOC/c.txt",
 		"/home/u/a_b/x.txt",
 		"/home/u/axb/y.txt",
 		docDir,
 		"/home/u/doc.txt.bak",
 		docFile,
 		"/home/u/doc/sub/b.txt",
 		"/home/u/doc2/b.txt",
 	}
 	for _, path := range paths {
 		err := repo.Create(ctx, nil, &database.File{
 			Path:  types.FilePath(path),
 			MTime: time.Now().Truncate(time.Second),
 			Mode:  0644,
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("failed to create %s: %v", path, err)
 		}
 	}
 	docTree := []string{docDir, docFile, "/home/u/doc/sub/b.txt"}
 	tests := []struct {
 		name string
 		path string
 		want []string
 	}{
 		{"directory", docDir, docTree},
 		{"directory with trailing slash", docDir + "/", docTree},
 		{"directory differing only in case", "/home/u/DOC",
 			[]string{"/home/u/DOC/c.txt"}},
 		{"file", docFile, []string{docFile}},
 		{"underscore is literal", "/home/u/a_b",
 			[]string{"/home/u/a_b/x.txt"}},
 		{"percent is literal", "/home/u/50%",
 			[]string{"/home/u/50%/x.txt"}},
 		{"root", "/", paths},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		files, err := repo.ListUnderPath(ctx, tt.path)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: failed to list files: %v", tt.name, err)
 		}
 		got := make([]string, 0, len(files))
 		for _, f := range files {
 			got = append(got, f.Path.String())
 		}
 		if !slices.Equal(got, tt.want) {
 			t.Errorf("%s: listing %q got %q, want %q",
 				tt.name, tt.path, got, tt.want)
 		}
 	}
 }
 func TestFileRepositorySymlink(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -252,115 +174,6 @@ func TestFileRepositorySymlink(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // An mtime after 2262 or before 1678 does not fit in int64 nanoseconds
 // since the epoch, and must still come back from the database unchanged.
 func TestFileRepositoryMTimeOutsideInt64NanosecondRange(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db, cleanup := setupTestDB(t)
 	defer cleanup()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	repo := database.NewFileRepository(db)
 	mtimes := []time.Time{
 		time.Date(2300, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 123456789, time.UTC),
 		time.Date(1601, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 987654321, time.UTC),
 	}
 	for _, mtime := range mtimes {
 		created := &database.File{
 			Path:  types.FilePath("/created-" + mtime.Format(time.RFC3339Nano)),
 			MTime: mtime,
 		}
 		err := repo.Create(ctx, nil, created)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("failed to create file: %v", err)
 		}
 		batched := &database.File{
 			ID:    types.NewFileID(),
 			Path:  types.FilePath("/batched-" + mtime.Format(time.RFC3339Nano)),
 			MTime: mtime,
 		}
 		err = repo.CreateBatch(ctx, nil, []*database.File{batched})
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("failed to batch create file: %v", err)
 		}
 		for _, path := range []types.FilePath{created.Path, batched.Path} {
 			retrieved, err := repo.GetByPath(ctx, path.String())
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("failed to get file: %v", err)
 			}
 			if !retrieved.MTime.Equal(mtime) {
 				t.Errorf("%s: mtime got %v, want %v",
 					path, retrieved.MTime, mtime)
 			}
 		}
 	}
 }
 // A file already in the index and rewritten within the same second must get
 // its new nanoseconds stored, through both Create and CreateBatch.
 func TestFileRepositoryUpsertMTimeInSameSecond(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db, cleanup := setupTestDB(t)
 	defer cleanup()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	repo := database.NewFileRepository(db)
 	indexed := time.Date(2026, time.October, 7, 12, 0, 0, 100000000, time.UTC)
 	rewritten := indexed.Add(800 * time.Millisecond)
 	tests := []struct {
 		name   string
 		upsert func(file *database.File) error
 	}{
 		{"Create", func(file *database.File) error {
 			return repo.Create(ctx, nil, file)
 		}},
 		{"CreateBatch", func(file *database.File) error {
 			return repo.CreateBatch(ctx, nil, []*database.File{file})
 		}},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		file := &database.File{
 			ID:    types.NewFileID(),
 			Path:  types.FilePath("/" + tt.name),
 			MTime: indexed,
 		}
 		err := tt.upsert(file)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: failed to create file: %v", tt.name, err)
 		}
 		file.MTime = rewritten
 		err = tt.upsert(file)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: failed to update file: %v", tt.name, err)
 		}
 		retrieved, err := repo.GetByPath(ctx, file.Path.String())
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: failed to get file: %v", tt.name, err)
 		}
 		if !retrieved.MTime.Equal(rewritten) {
 			t.Errorf("%s: mtime got %v, want %v",
 				tt.name, retrieved.MTime, rewritten)
 		}
 	}
 }
 func TestFileRepositoryTransaction(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ type File struct {
 	ID   types.FileID   // UUID primary key
 	Path types.FilePath // Absolute path of the file
-	// SourcePath is the source directory this file came from.
+	// SourcePath is the source directory this file came from (used for
 	// restore path stripping).
 	SourcePath types.SourcePath
 	MTime      time.Time
 	Size       int64
@@ -50,15 +51,15 @@ type Chunk struct {
 // Blob represents a blob record in the database.
 // A blob is Vaultik's final storage unit - a large file (up to 10GB) containing
 // many compressed and encrypted chunks from multiple source files.
-// Blobs are content-addressed: the filename in S3 is
+// Blobs are content-addressed, meaning their filename in S3 is derived from
-// hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed from the chunk data
+// the SHA256 hash of their compressed and encrypted content.
-// before compression and encryption (not from the stored bytes). See
+// The blob creation process is: chunks are accumulated -> compressed with zstd
-// blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md.
+// -> encrypted with age -> hashed -> uploaded to S3 with the hash as filename.
 type Blob struct {
 	ID types.BlobID // UUID assigned when blob creation starts
-	// Hash is hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))
+	// Hash is the SHA256 of the final compressed+encrypted content
-	// (empty until finalized); see the type comment above.
+	// (empty until finalized).
 	Hash             types.BlobHash
 	CreatedTS        time.Time  // When blob creation started
 	FinishedTS       *time.Time // When blob was finalized (nil if still packing)
@@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ type Snapshot struct {
 	StartedAt          time.Time
 	CompletedAt        *time.Time // nil if still in progress
 	FileCount          int64
-	ChunkCount         int64 // Chunks this snapshot stored that were not stored before
+	ChunkCount         int64
-	BlobCount          int64 // Blobs this snapshot created
+	BlobCount          int64
 	TotalSize          int64 // Total size of all referenced files
 	// BlobSize is the total size of all referenced blobs (compressed and
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package database
 import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -16,44 +15,6 @@ import (
 // the index describes the backed-up file tree and must stay private.
 const indexDirPerm = 0o700
 // indexFilePerm restricts the index file to the owning user; it lists every
 // backed-up path and chunk hash and must stay private.
 const indexFilePerm = 0o600
 // ensureIndexFileMode makes the index file owner-only before the SQLite
 // driver opens it: it creates the file 0600 if absent, or chmods an existing
 // one to 0600. Doing this first matters because SQLite creates its -wal and
 // -shm side files with the mode of the main database file, so a private main
 // file yields private side files. The driver treats a zero-byte file as an
 // empty database, so pre-creating it here is safe.
 func ensureIndexFileMode(path string) error {
 	info, err := os.Stat(path)
 	switch {
 	case err == nil:
 		if info.Mode().Perm() == indexFilePerm {
 			return nil
 		}
 		err = os.Chmod(path, indexFilePerm)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("restricting index file permissions: %w", err)
 		}
 		return nil
 	case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist):
 		//nolint:gosec // G304: the index path is operator-configured by design
 		f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, indexFilePerm)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("creating index file: %w", err)
 		}
 		return f.Close()
 	default:
 		return fmt.Errorf("checking index file: %w", err)
 	}
 }
 // Module provides database dependencies
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // fx module definitions are package globals by convention
@@ -73,11 +34,6 @@ func provideDatabase(lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.Config) (*DB, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating index directory: %w", err)
 	}
 	err = ensureIndexFileMode(cfg.IndexPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	db, err := New(context.Background(), cfg.IndexPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening database: %w", err)
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
 package database
 import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"syscall"
 	"testing"
 	"go.uber.org/fx/fxtest"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
 )
 // TestProvideDatabaseFreshIndexMode verifies that provideDatabase creates a
 // missing index file owner-only (0600), even under a lenient 022 umask that
 // would otherwise leave a freshly created file world-readable.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // syscall.Umask is process-global; parallel tests would clash
 func TestProvideDatabaseFreshIndexMode(t *testing.T) {
 	restore := syscall.Umask(0o022)
 	defer syscall.Umask(restore)
 	indexPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "index.sqlite")
 	openIndex(t, indexPath)
 	assertPerm(t, indexPath, 0o600)
 }
 // TestProvideDatabaseExistingIndexMode verifies that provideDatabase tightens
 // an existing world-readable index (0644) in a group/other-readable directory
 // down to owner-only (0600).
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // syscall.Umask is process-global; parallel tests would clash
 func TestProvideDatabaseExistingIndexMode(t *testing.T) {
 	restore := syscall.Umask(0o022)
 	defer syscall.Umask(restore)
 	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "data")
 	//nolint:gosec // G301: the test intentionally uses a 0755 directory
 	err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("creating index directory: %v", err)
 	}
 	//nolint:gosec // G302: the test intentionally uses a 0755 directory
 	err = os.Chmod(dir, 0o755)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("relaxing index directory permissions: %v", err)
 	}
 	indexPath := filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite")
 	//nolint:gosec // G306: the test intentionally starts from a 0644 index
 	err = os.WriteFile(indexPath, nil, 0o644)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("creating pre-existing index: %v", err)
 	}
 	//nolint:gosec // G302: the test intentionally starts from a 0644 index
 	err = os.Chmod(indexPath, 0o644)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("relaxing pre-existing index permissions: %v", err)
 	}
 	openIndex(t, indexPath)
 	assertPerm(t, indexPath, 0o600)
 }
 // openIndex runs provideDatabase against indexPath and closes the resulting
 // database before returning.
 func openIndex(t *testing.T, indexPath string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	cfg := &config.Config{IndexPath: indexPath}
 	db, err := provideDatabase(fxtest.NewLifecycle(t), cfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("provideDatabase: %v", err)
 	}
 	err = db.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("closing database: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 // assertPerm fails the test unless path has exactly the given permission bits.
 func assertPerm(t *testing.T, path string, want os.FileMode) {
 	t.Helper()
 	info, err := os.Stat(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("stat %s: %v", path, err)
 	}
 	got := info.Mode().Perm()
 	if got != want {
 		t.Fatalf("permissions of %s = %#o, want %#o", path, got, want)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
 //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported read-only open internals
 package database
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
 	"errors"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 )
 // genuineSnapshotDB writes a real snapshot database (the full schema
 // applied) to a fresh file and returns its path.
 func genuineSnapshotDB(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "snapshot.db")
 	db, err := New(context.Background(), path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("creating snapshot database: %v", err)
 	}
 	err = db.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("closing snapshot database: %v", err)
 	}
 	return path
 }
 // forgedDB creates an empty database file and runs the given statements
 // against it read-write, so a test can plant schema objects the real
 // schema never defines.
 func forgedDB(t *testing.T, stmts ...string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "forged.db")
 	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("opening forged database: %v", err)
 	}
 	for _, stmt := range stmts {
 		_, err = db.ExecContext(context.Background(), stmt)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("executing %q: %v", stmt, err)
 		}
 	}
 	err = db.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("closing forged database: %v", err)
 	}
 	return path
 }
 func TestOpenReadOnlyAcceptsGenuineSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), genuineSnapshotDB(t))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("OpenReadOnly refused a genuine snapshot database: %v", err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
 }
 func TestOpenReadOnlyRefusesWrites(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), genuineSnapshotDB(t))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("OpenReadOnly: %v", err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = db.Close() })
 	// A schema write depends on no table columns, so the only reason it
 	// can fail is that the database is open read-only.
 	_, err = db.Conn().ExecContext(context.Background(),
 		"CREATE TABLE probe_readonly (x)")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected a write to a read-only snapshot database to fail")
 	}
 }
 func TestOpenReadOnlyRejectsView(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	path := forgedDB(t, "CREATE VIEW files AS SELECT 1 AS path")
 	_, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), path)
 	if !errors.Is(err, errUntrustedSnapshotSchema) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected a view named files to be refused, got %v", err)
 	}
 }
 func TestOpenReadOnlyRejectsTrigger(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	path := forgedDB(t,
 		"CREATE TABLE files (path TEXT)",
 		"CREATE TRIGGER t AFTER INSERT ON files BEGIN SELECT 1; END")
 	_, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), path)
 	if !errors.Is(err, errUntrustedSnapshotSchema) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected a trigger to be refused, got %v", err)
 	}
 }
 func TestOpenReadOnlyRejectsMissingTable(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// Only one of the expected tables is present.
 	path := forgedDB(t, "CREATE TABLE files (path TEXT)")
 	_, err := OpenReadOnly(context.Background(), path)
 	if !errors.Is(err, errUntrustedSnapshotSchema) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected a missing expected table to be refused, got %v", err)
 	}
 }
 func TestIsVirtualTableSQL(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cases := []struct {
 		sql  string
 		want bool
 	}{
 		{"CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE t USING fts5(x)", true},
 		{"  create virtual table t using fts5(x)", true},
 		{"CREATE TABLE t (x)", false},
 		{"CREATE VIEW t AS SELECT 1", false},
 		{"", false},
 	}
 	for _, c := range cases {
 		if got := isVirtualTableSQL(c.sql); got != c.want {
 			t.Errorf("isVirtualTableSQL(%q) = %v, want %v", c.sql, got, c.want)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ func TestTransactionIsolation(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	// Verify the file was not created (transaction rolled back)
-	files, err := repos.Files.ListUnderPath(ctx, "/tx-test.txt")
+	files, err := repos.Files.ListByPrefix(ctx, "/tx-test")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ func TestConcurrentOrphanedCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	// Verify correct files were deleted
-	files, err := repos.Files.ListAll(ctx)
+	files, err := repos.Files.ListByPrefix(ctx, "/concurrent-")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestOrphanedFileCleanupDebug(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Logf("Files count after cleanup: %d", count)
 	// List remaining files
-	files, err := repos.Files.ListUnderPath(ctx, "/")
+	files, err := repos.Files.ListByPrefix(ctx, "/")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package database
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
 	"fmt"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -368,7 +367,7 @@ func verifyBlobNullUploadTS(
 }
 // createLargeDatasetFiles creates fileCount files and adds every other
-// one to the snapshot, in one transaction as a backup writes them.
+// one to the snapshot.
 func createLargeDatasetFiles(
 	t *testing.T,
 	repos *Repositories,
@@ -377,38 +376,31 @@ func createLargeDatasetFiles(
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	start := time.Now()
-	err := repos.WithTx(context.Background(),
+	for i := range fileCount {
-		func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
+		file := &File{
-			for i := range fileCount {
+			Path:  types.FilePath(fmt.Sprintf("/large/file%05d.txt", i)),
-				file := &File{
+			MTime: time.Now(),
-					Path:  types.FilePath(fmt.Sprintf("/large/file%05d.txt", i)),
+			Size:  int64(i * 1024),
-					MTime: time.Now(),
+			Mode:  0644,
-					Size:  int64(i * 1024),
+			UID:   uint32(1000 + (i % 10)),
-					Mode:  0644,
+			GID:   uint32(1000 + (i % 10)),
-					UID:   uint32(1000 + (i % 10)),
+		}
 					GID:   uint32(1000 + (i % 10)),
 				}
-				err := repos.Files.Create(ctx, tx, file)
+		err := repos.Files.Create(ctx, nil, file)
-				if err != nil {
+		if err != nil {
-					return fmt.Errorf("creating file %d: %w", i, err)
+			t.Fatalf("failed to create file %d: %v", i, err)
-				}
+		}
-				// Add half to snapshot
+		// Add half to snapshot
-				if i%2 == 0 {
+		if i%2 == 0 {
-					err = repos.Snapshots.AddFileByID(ctx, tx, snapshotID, file.ID)
+			err = repos.Snapshots.AddFileByID(ctx, nil, snapshotID, file.ID)
-					if err != nil {
+			if err != nil {
-						return err
+				t.Fatal(err)
 					}
 				}
 			}
-
+		}
 			return nil
 		})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	t.Logf("Created %d files in %v", fileCount, time.Since(start))
@@ -450,12 +442,12 @@ func TestLargeDatasets(t *testing.T) {
 		createLargeDatasetFiles(t, repos, snapshot.ID.String(), fileCount)
 	})
-	// Test ListUnderPath performance
+	// Test ListByPrefix performance
 	//nolint:paralleltest // phases share one database and are order-dependent
-	t.Run("list under path performance", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("list by prefix performance", func(t *testing.T) {
 		start := time.Now()
-		files, err := repos.Files.ListUnderPath(ctx, "/large/")
+		files, err := repos.Files.ListByPrefix(ctx, "/large/")
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatal(err)
 		}
@@ -480,7 +472,7 @@ func TestLargeDatasets(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Logf("Cleaned up orphaned files in %v", time.Since(start))
 		// Verify correct number remain
-		files, err := repos.Files.ListUnderPath(ctx, "/large/")
+		files, err := repos.Files.ListByPrefix(ctx, "/large/")
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatal(err)
 		}
@@ -614,7 +606,8 @@ func TestTimezoneHandling(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("timezone not available")
 	}
-	nyTime := time.Now().In(loc)
+	// Use Truncate to remove sub-second precision since we store as Unix timestamps
 	nyTime := time.Now().In(loc).Truncate(time.Second)
 	file := &File{
 		Path:  "/timezone-test.txt",
 		MTime: nyTime,
@@ -5,9 +5,8 @@
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS files (
    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,  -- UUID
    path TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-    source_path TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',  -- The source directory this file came from
+    source_path TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',  -- The source directory this file came from (for restore path stripping)
-    mtime INTEGER NOT NULL,  -- whole seconds since the Unix epoch
+    mtime INTEGER NOT NULL,
    mtime_nsec INTEGER NOT NULL,  -- nanoseconds within that second, 0 to 999999999
    size INTEGER NOT NULL,
    mode INTEGER NOT NULL,
    uid INTEGER NOT NULL,
@@ -11,18 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
 )
 // Sentinel errors for the single-snapshot invariant that an exported
 // per-snapshot metadata database must satisfy.
 var (
 	// ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase means the metadata database has no snapshot
 	// row at all.
 	ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase = errors.New("database contains no snapshot")
 	// ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase means the metadata database holds
 	// more than the single snapshot an export is supposed to contain.
 	ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase = errors.New(
 		"database contains more than one snapshot")
 )
 // SnapshotRepository provides access to the snapshots table and its
 // snapshot_files / snapshot_blobs association tables.
 type SnapshotRepository struct {
@@ -127,7 +115,6 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) UpdateExtendedStats(
 	snapshotID string,
 	blobUncompressedSize int64,
 	compressionLevel int,
 	uploadBytes int64,
 	uploadDurationMs int64,
 ) error {
 	compressionRatio, err := r.extendedCompressionRatio(
@@ -142,7 +129,7 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) UpdateExtendedStats(
 		SET blob_uncompressed_size = ?,
 		    compression_ratio = ?,
 		    compression_level = ?,
-		    upload_bytes = ?,
+		    upload_bytes = blob_size,
 		    upload_duration_ms = ?
 		WHERE id = ?
 	`
@@ -150,11 +137,11 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) UpdateExtendedStats(
 	if tx != nil {
 		_, err = tx.ExecContext(ctx, query,
 			blobUncompressedSize, compressionRatio, compressionLevel,
-			uploadBytes, uploadDurationMs, snapshotID)
+			uploadDurationMs, snapshotID)
 	} else {
 		_, err = r.db.ExecWithLog(ctx, query,
 			blobUncompressedSize, compressionRatio, compressionLevel,
-			uploadBytes, uploadDurationMs, snapshotID)
+			uploadDurationMs, snapshotID)
 	}
 	if err != nil {
@@ -219,48 +206,6 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetByID(
 	return &snapshot, nil
 }
 // GetOnlySnapshot returns the sole snapshot in an exported per-snapshot
 // metadata database. The backup path writes each snapshot's database with
 // exactly one snapshot row (see cleanSnapshotDB), so restore and deep
 // verify expect exactly one. Zero rows return ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase and
 // more than one returns ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase; callers treat
 // either as a failed identity check on the downloaded database.
 func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetOnlySnapshot(ctx context.Context) (*Snapshot, error) {
 	query := `
 		SELECT id, hostname, vaultik_version, vaultik_git_revision,
 			started_at, completed_at, file_count, chunk_count, blob_count,
 			total_size, blob_size, compression_ratio
 		FROM snapshots
 		LIMIT 2
 	`
 	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying snapshots: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		err := rows.Close()
 		if err != nil {
 			Fatalf("failed to close rows: %v", err)
 		}
 	}()
 	snapshots, err := r.scanSnapshotRows(rows)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	switch len(snapshots) {
 	case 1:
 		return snapshots[0], nil
 	case 0:
 		return nil, ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase
 	default:
 		return nil, ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase
 	}
 }
 // ListRecent returns up to limit snapshots, most recently started first.
 func (r *SnapshotRepository) ListRecent(
 	ctx context.Context, limit int,
@@ -396,7 +341,7 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) AddFilesByIDBatch(
 			args = append(args, snapshotID, fileID.String())
 		}
-		query += querySb312.String()
+		query += querySb312.String() //nolint:gosec // G202: appends "?" placeholders only
 		var err error
 		if tx != nil {
@@ -544,30 +489,6 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetSnapshotTotalCompressedSize(
 	return totalSize, nil
 }
 // GetSnapshotBlobSizes returns the total compressed and uncompressed sizes
 // of all blobs referenced by a snapshot.
 func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetSnapshotBlobSizes(
 	ctx context.Context, snapshotID string,
 ) (int64, int64, error) {
 	query := `
 		SELECT COALESCE(SUM(b.compressed_size), 0),
 			COALESCE(SUM(b.uncompressed_size), 0)
 		FROM snapshot_blobs sb
 		JOIN blobs b ON sb.blob_hash = b.blob_hash
 		WHERE sb.snapshot_id = ?
 	`
 	var compressed, uncompressed int64
 	err := r.db.conn.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, snapshotID).Scan(
 		&compressed, &uncompressed)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("querying snapshot blob sizes: %w", err)
 	}
 	return compressed, uncompressed, nil
 }
 // GetSnapshotUncompressedChunkSize returns the sum of plaintext sizes of all unique
 // chunks referenced by a snapshot (via snapshot_files → file_chunks → chunks).
 func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetSnapshotUncompressedChunkSize(
@@ -145,65 +145,6 @@ func TestSnapshotRepositoryUpdateCounts(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 // GetSnapshotBlobSizes totals the blobs the snapshot references, and only
 // those.
 func TestSnapshotRepositoryGetSnapshotBlobSizes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	db, cleanup := setupTestDB(t)
 	defer cleanup()
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
 	snapshot := &database.Snapshot{
 		ID:             "2024-01-03T12:00:00Z",
 		Hostname:       testHostname,
 		VaultikVersion: testVersion,
 		StartedAt:      time.Now().Truncate(time.Second),
 	}
 	err := repos.Snapshots.Create(ctx, nil, snapshot)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to create snapshot: %v", err)
 	}
 	blobs := []*database.Blob{
 		{Hash: "referenced-1", CompressedSize: 10, UncompressedSize: 100},
 		{Hash: "referenced-2", CompressedSize: 20, UncompressedSize: 200},
 		{Hash: "unreferenced", CompressedSize: 40, UncompressedSize: 400},
 	}
 	for _, blob := range blobs {
 		blob.ID = types.NewBlobID()
 		blob.CreatedTS = time.Now().Truncate(time.Second)
 		err = repos.Blobs.Create(ctx, nil, blob)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("failed to create blob %s: %v", blob.Hash, err)
 		}
 	}
 	for _, blob := range blobs[:2] {
 		err = repos.Snapshots.AddBlob(ctx, nil, snapshot.ID.String(),
 			blob.ID, blob.Hash)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("failed to add blob %s to snapshot: %v", blob.Hash, err)
 		}
 	}
 	compressed, uncompressed, err := repos.Snapshots.GetSnapshotBlobSizes(
 		ctx, snapshot.ID.String())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to get snapshot blob sizes: %v", err)
 	}
 	if compressed != 30 || uncompressed != 300 {
 		t.Errorf("blob sizes: got %d and %d, want 30 and 300",
 			compressed, uncompressed)
 	}
 }
 func TestSnapshotRepositoryListRecent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -158,3 +158,19 @@ type UploadStats struct {
 	MinDurationMs int64
 	MaxDurationMs int64
 }
 // GetCountBySnapshot returns the count of uploads for a specific snapshot
 func (r *UploadRepository) GetCountBySnapshot(
 	ctx context.Context, snapshotID string,
 ) (int64, error) {
 	query := `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM uploads WHERE snapshot_id = ?`
 	var count int64
 	err := r.conn.QueryRowContext(ctx, query, snapshotID).Scan(&count)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, err
 	}
 	return count, nil
 }
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 package globals
 import (
 	"regexp"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -11,26 +10,22 @@ import (
 // Appname is the application name, populated from main().
 var Appname = "vaultik" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set via -ldflags at build time
-// DevVersion is the version a binary reports when it was built without
+// DevVersion is the version a binary reports when it was not built
-// git metadata: script/version emits it outside a git checkout, and an
+// from a tagged commit. script/version emits either this exact string
-// unstamped `go build` keeps it. goreleaser's snapshot template stamps
+// (outside a git checkout) or this string followed by "-" and the
-// it followed by "-" and the commit it was built from. It is
+// commit it was built from, and goreleaser's snapshot template matches
-// deliberately not a number.
+// that shape. It is deliberately not a number: a build that is not a
 // release must not name itself like one.
 const DevVersion = "dev"
 // Unknown is what Commit and CommitDate hold when the build did not
 // stamp them, and the version script/docker and script/cibuild stamp
 // when the host has no git checkout.
 const Unknown = "unknown"
 // Version is the application version, populated from main().
 var Version = DevVersion //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set via -ldflags at build time
 // Commit is the git commit hash, populated from main().
-var Commit = Unknown //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set via -ldflags at build time
+var Commit = "unknown" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set via -ldflags at build time
 // CommitDate is the ISO-8601 date of the commit, populated from main().
-var CommitDate = Unknown //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set via -ldflags at build time
+var CommitDate = "unknown" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // set via -ldflags at build time
 // Author identifies the upstream author of vaultik.
 const Author = "Jeffrey Paul <sneak@sneak.berlin>"
@@ -65,28 +60,18 @@ func New() (*Globals, error) {
 }
 // IsDevVersion reports whether v names a development build rather than
-// a release. "dev" and goreleaser's snapshot "dev-<sha>" count, and so
+// a release. Both "dev" and "dev-<sha>" (and its "-dirty" variant)
-// does what `git describe --tags --always --dirty` gives a make or
+// count: a caller that compares against "dev" exactly would treat every
-// docker build of an untagged commit: the bare short commit, or
+// commit-stamped development build as a release.
 // tag-N-gHASH on a commit after a tag. Any version ending in "-dirty"
 // counts, a modified checkout of a tag ("v1.0.0-dirty") included.
 // A plain tag such as "v1.0.0" or "1.0.0" is a release.
 //
 // The empty string counts too. Nothing that knows its version reports
 // no version, so an empty Version means the stamping failed, and the
 // safe reading of "we could not establish that this is a release" is
 // that it is not one. The Makefile refuses to build at all in that
 // case; this is the second line of defence, for a binary linked by
-// something other than the Makefile. Unknown counts for the same
+// something other than the Makefile.
 // reason.
 func IsDevVersion(v string) bool {
-	if v == "" || v == Unknown || v == DevVersion ||
+	return v == "" || v == DevVersion || strings.HasPrefix(v, DevVersion+"-")
 		strings.HasPrefix(v, DevVersion+"-") ||
 		strings.HasSuffix(v, "-dirty") {
 		return true
 	}
 	return regexp.MustCompile(`^(.+-[0-9]+-g)?[0-9a-f]+$`).MatchString(v)
 }
 // shortCommitLen is the number of commit-hash characters ShortCommit keeps.
@@ -34,11 +34,10 @@ func TestGlobalsNew(t *testing.T) {
 }
 // TestIsDevVersion covers the boundary that matters: everything
-// script/version, a plain docker build and goreleaser's snapshot
+// script/version and goreleaser's snapshot template can emit for an
-// template can emit for an untagged build must be recognised as a
+// untagged build must be recognised as a development build, and a real
-// development build, and a real tag must not be. A plain equality check
+// tag must not be. A plain equality check against "dev" used to decide
-// against "dev" used to decide this, which classified every
+// this, which classified every commit-stamped dev build as a release.
 // commit-stamped dev build as a release.
 func TestIsDevVersion(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -50,17 +49,8 @@ func TestIsDevVersion(t *testing.T) {
 		{"dev", true},
 		{"dev-b6e4a218a39e", true},
 		{"dev-b6e4a218a39e-dirty", true},
-		// What `git describe --tags --always --dirty` produces with no
+		// What a tagged build produces (script/version strips the
-		// tag reachable, and on a commit after a tag.
+		// leading "v", matching goreleaser's .Version).
 		{"877eb2f", true},
 		{"877eb2f-dirty", true},
 		{"v1.0.0-3-g877eb2f", true},
 		{"v1.0.0-3-g877eb2f-dirty", true},
 		{"1.0.0-rc.1-12-g877eb2f", true},
 		// A tagged commit with uncommitted changes is not that tag.
 		{"v1.0.0-dirty", true},
 		// What a tagged build produces (goreleaser's .Version strips
 		// the leading "v"; script/version keeps it).
 		{"1.0.0", false},
 		{"0.1.0", false},
 		{"1.0.0-rc.1", false},
@@ -74,9 +64,6 @@ func TestIsDevVersion(t *testing.T) {
 		// as one. The Makefile refuses to build when script/version
 		// yields nothing; this covers a binary linked some other way.
 		{"", true},
 		// What script/docker and script/cibuild stamp when the host
 		// has no git checkout.
 		{"unknown", true},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
@@ -14,18 +14,8 @@ var Module = fx.Module("log",
 )
 // New creates a new logger configuration from provided options.
 //
 // JSON is intentionally not carried into Config: a command emitting a
 // JSON document on stdout must keep its stderr log level under
 // --verbose/--debug, so --json must not lower it (issue #112). JSON
 // silences the stdout UI in setupGlobals instead.
 func New(opts Options) Config {
-	return Config{
+	return Config(opts)
 		Verbose: opts.Verbose,
 		Debug:   opts.Debug,
 		Cron:    opts.Cron,
 		Quiet:   opts.Quiet,
 	}
 }
 // Options are provided by the CLI.
@@ -34,8 +24,4 @@ type Options struct {
 	Debug   bool
 	Cron    bool
 	Quiet   bool
 	// JSON marks a command whose stdout carries a machine-readable
 	// document. It silences the human UI on stdout (see setupGlobals),
 	// but unlike Quiet it leaves the stderr log level alone.
 	JSON bool
 }
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
 package log_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"log/slog"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
 )
 // TestTTYHandlerEscapesControlCharacters logs a message and an attribute
 // value that each carry an ESC and a newline — the shape a crafted path or
 // storage error from the destination would take — and checks neither raw
 // byte reaches the output. The handler's own colour codes (ESC ... m) are
 // stripped first; any ESC left after that came from the untrusted value.
 func TestTTYHandlerEscapesControlCharacters(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	logger := slog.New(log.NewTTYHandler(&buf, debugHandlerOptions()))
 	logger.Info("start\x1b[31mZAP\nend", "target", "a\x1b[31mZAP\nb")
 	out := buf.String()
 	// The only newline is the line terminator; the injected ones were escaped.
 	require.Equal(t, 1, strings.Count(out, "\n"),
 		"a newline in the message or a value must be escaped, not emitted raw")
 	// After the handler's own colour codes are removed, no ESC survives.
 	stripped := ansiEscape.ReplaceAllString(out, "")
 	require.NotContains(t, stripped, "\x1b",
 		"a raw ESC from the message or a value must not reach the terminal")
 	// The escaped form is what appears instead.
 	require.Contains(t, out, `\x1b`)
 }
@@ -5,11 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 	"unicode"
 )
 // groupSeparator joins an open group path to an attribute key. This
@@ -118,14 +116,11 @@ func (h *TTYHandler) Handle(_ context.Context, r slog.Record) error {
 		levelColor = colorReset
 	}
-	// Print main message. The message is escaped before the colour codes
+	// Print main message
 	// are written around it: it can carry text from an untrusted source
 	// (a storage error, for one), and a raw control character would
 	// otherwise reach the terminal.
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(h.out, "%s%s%s %s%s%s %s%s%s",
 		colorGray, timestamp, colorReset,
 		levelColor, level, colorReset,
-		colorBold, sanitize(r.Message), colorReset)
+		colorBold, r.Message, colorReset)
 	// Attributes carried by the handler come first, then the record's
 	// own. Handler attributes were qualified when they were added; the
@@ -265,29 +260,9 @@ func (h *TTYHandler) writeAttr(a slog.Attr) {
 		// Future kinds also use the plain string form.
 	}
 	// Escape the key and value before the colour codes are written around
 	// them. Both can carry text from an untrusted source — a manifest
 	// timestamp, a storage error, a path or symlink target read back from
 	// the snapshot database — so a control character in one of them must
 	// be rendered as an escape sequence rather than reaching the terminal,
 	// where it could move the cursor or inject its own colours.
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(h.out, " %s%s%s=%s%s%s",
-		colorCyan, sanitize(a.Key), colorReset,
+		colorCyan, a.Key, colorReset,
-		colorBlue, sanitize(value), colorReset)
+		colorBlue, value, colorReset)
 }
 // sanitize returns s unchanged when every rune in it is printable, and a
 // double-quoted, backslash-escaped form (\n, \x1b, …) otherwise. It is
 // applied to untrusted text before any colour code is written, so a
 // control character can never reach the terminal raw.
 func sanitize(s string) string {
 	for _, r := range s {
 		if !unicode.IsPrint(r) {
 			return strconv.Quote(s)
 		}
 	}
 	return s
 }
 // formatDuration formats a duration in a human-readable way
@@ -10,18 +10,15 @@ import (
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
-
+	"syscall"
 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
 )
 // ErrAlreadyRunning indicates another vaultik instance is running.
 var ErrAlreadyRunning = errors.New("another vaultik instance is already running")
-// Lock represents an acquired PID lock: an flock(2) on the PID file,
+// Lock represents an acquired PID lock.
 // held while the file stays open. The kernel drops it when the process
 // exits, however it exits, so a crashed run never leaves the lock held.
 type Lock struct {
-	file *os.File
+	path string
 }
 const (
@@ -32,9 +29,10 @@ const (
 )
 // Acquire attempts to acquire a PID lock in the specified directory.
-// If another process holds the lock, it returns ErrAlreadyRunning with
+// If the lock file exists and the process is still running, it returns
-// that process's PID. On success, it writes the current PID to the lock
+// ErrAlreadyRunning with details about the existing process.
-// file and returns a Lock that must be released with Release().
+// On success, it writes the current PID to the lock file and returns
 // a Lock that must be released with Release().
 func Acquire(lockDir string) (*Lock, error) {
 	// Ensure lock directory exists
 	err := os.MkdirAll(lockDir, lockDirPerm)
@@ -44,82 +42,56 @@ func Acquire(lockDir string) (*Lock, error) {
 	lockPath := filepath.Join(lockDir, "vaultik.pid")
-	// No O_TRUNC: the file may hold the PID of the process that has the
+	// Check for existing lock
-	// lock, which the error below reports.
+	existingPID, err := readPIDFile(lockPath)
-	file, err := os.OpenFile( //nolint:gosec // G304: path is our own lock file
+	if err == nil {
-		lockPath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, pidFilePerm)
+		// Lock file exists, check if process is running
-	if err != nil {
+		if isProcessRunning(existingPID) {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("opening PID file: %w", err)
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w (PID %d)", ErrAlreadyRunning, existingPID)
 	}
 	err = unix.Flock(int(file.Fd()), unix.LOCK_EX|unix.LOCK_NB)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = file.Close()
 		if errors.Is(err, unix.EWOULDBLOCK) {
 			return nil, alreadyRunningError(lockPath)
 		}
-
+		// Process is not running, stale lock file - we can take over
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("locking PID file: %w", err)
 	}
-	err = writePID(file)
+	// Write our PID
 	pid := os.Getpid()
 	err = os.WriteFile(lockPath, []byte(strconv.Itoa(pid)), pidFilePerm)
 	if err != nil {
-		_ = file.Close()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("writing PID file: %w", err)
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	return &Lock{file: file}, nil
+	return &Lock{path: lockPath}, nil
 }
-// Release empties the PID file and closes it, which drops the lock.
+// Release removes the PID lock file.
 // It is safe to call Release multiple times.
 func (l *Lock) Release() error {
-	if l == nil || l.file == nil {
+	if l == nil || l.path == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
-	file := l.file
+	// Verify we still own the lock (our PID is in the file)
-	l.file = nil
+	existingPID, err := readPIDFile(l.path)
 	// Do not remove the file here. A process that opened it a moment
 	// earlier could then lock the removed file while another creates and
 	// locks a new one, and both would run.
 	truncateErr := file.Truncate(0)
 	closeErr := file.Close()
 	return errors.Join(truncateErr, closeErr)
 }
 // writePID replaces the contents of the locked PID file with the current
 // PID.
 func writePID(file *os.File) error {
 	err := file.Truncate(0)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("truncating PID file: %w", err)
+		// File already gone or unreadable - that's fine
 		return nil //nolint:nilerr // unreadable lock file means nothing to release
 	}
-	_, err = file.WriteAt([]byte(strconv.Itoa(os.Getpid())), 0)
+	if existingPID != os.Getpid() {
-	if err != nil {
+		// Someone else wrote to our lock file - don't remove it
-		return fmt.Errorf("writing PID file: %w", err)
+		return nil
 	}
 	err = os.Remove(l.path)
 	if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("removing PID file: %w", err)
 	}
 	l.path = "" // Prevent double-release
 	return nil
 }
 // alreadyRunningError reports that another process holds the lock,
 // naming its PID when the file holds one. The holder writes its PID just
 // after it locks, so the file can briefly be empty.
 func alreadyRunningError(lockPath string) error {
 	pid, err := readPIDFile(lockPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ErrAlreadyRunning
 	}
 	return fmt.Errorf("%w (PID %d)", ErrAlreadyRunning, pid)
 }
 // readPIDFile reads and parses the PID from a lock file.
 func readPIDFile(path string) (int, error) {
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // G304: path is our own lock file
@@ -134,3 +106,16 @@ func readPIDFile(path string) (int, error) {
 	return pid, nil
 }
 // isProcessRunning checks if a process with the given PID is running.
 func isProcessRunning(pid int) bool {
 	process, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false
 	}
 	// On Unix, FindProcess always succeeds. We need to send signal 0 to check.
 	err = process.Signal(syscall.Signal(0))
 	return err == nil
 }
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -34,10 +33,9 @@ func TestAcquireAndRelease(t *testing.T) {
 	err = lock.Release()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	// Verify PID file is empty
+	// Verify PID file is gone
-	data, err = os.ReadFile(pidPath) //nolint:gosec // G304: test's own temp file
+	_, err = os.Stat(pidPath)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err))
 	assert.Empty(t, data)
 }
 func TestAcquireBlocksSecondInstance(t *testing.T) {
@@ -57,64 +55,6 @@ func TestAcquireBlocksSecondInstance(t *testing.T) {
 	lock2, err := pidlock.Acquire(tmpDir)
 	require.ErrorIs(t, err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning)
 	assert.Nil(t, lock2)
 	// Once the first lock is released, the next Acquire succeeds
 	require.NoError(t, lock1.Release())
 	lock3, err := pidlock.Acquire(tmpDir)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NoError(t, lock3.Release())
 }
 // TestConcurrentAcquireAdmitsOne starts many Acquire calls at the same
 // moment, as two cron entries firing together would, and checks that
 // exactly one of them gets the lock.
 func TestConcurrentAcquireAdmitsOne(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const callers = 50
 	tmpDir := t.TempDir()
 	start := make(chan struct{})
 	var (
 		mu       sync.Mutex
 		acquired []*pidlock.Lock
 		failures []error
 		wg       sync.WaitGroup
 	)
 	for range callers {
 		wg.Go(func() {
 			<-start
 			lock, err := pidlock.Acquire(tmpDir)
 			mu.Lock()
 			defer mu.Unlock()
 			if err != nil {
 				failures = append(failures, err)
 				return
 			}
 			acquired = append(acquired, lock)
 		})
 	}
 	close(start)
 	wg.Wait()
 	for _, lock := range acquired {
 		require.NoError(t, lock.Release())
 	}
 	assert.Len(t, acquired, 1, "exactly one caller should hold the lock")
 	for _, err := range failures {
 		require.ErrorIs(t, err, pidlock.ErrAlreadyRunning)
 	}
 }
 func TestAcquireWithStaleLock(t *testing.T) {
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
@@ -27,14 +26,10 @@ type Client struct {
 	bucket   string
 	prefix   string
 	endpoint string
 	partSize int64
 }
 // Config contains S3 client configuration.
-// All fields are required except Prefix, which defaults to an empty string,
+// All fields are required except Prefix, which defaults to an empty string.
 // and PartSize, where zero means the SDK default of 5 MiB.
 // A non-empty Prefix is joined to every key with one "/", whether or not
 // it ends with one.
 // The Endpoint field should include the protocol (http:// or https://).
 type Config struct {
 	Endpoint        string
@@ -43,9 +38,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	AccessKeyID     string
 	SecretAccessKey string
 	Region          string
 	// PartSize is the size in bytes of each part of a multipart upload.
 	// An upload too large for S3's limit of 10,000 parts gets larger parts.
 	PartSize int64
 }
 // nopLogger is a logger that discards all output.
@@ -83,19 +75,11 @@ func NewClient(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) (*Client, error) {
 	s3Client := s3.NewFromConfig(awsCfg, s3Opts)
 	// Every method below builds a key as prefix + key, so the prefix
 	// must carry its own trailing "/".
 	prefix := strings.TrimRight(cfg.Prefix, "/")
 	if prefix != "" {
 		prefix += "/"
 	}
 	return &Client{
 		s3Client: s3Client,
 		bucket:   cfg.Bucket,
-		prefix:   prefix,
+		prefix:   cfg.Prefix,
 		endpoint: cfg.Endpoint,
 		partSize: cfg.PartSize,
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -129,9 +113,12 @@ func (c *Client) PutObjectWithProgress(
 ) error {
 	fullKey := c.prefix + key
 	// uploadPartSize is 10MB for better progress granularity.
 	const uploadPartSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024
 	// Create an uploader with the S3 client
 	uploader := manager.NewUploader(c.s3Client, func(u *manager.Uploader) {
-		u.PartSize = uploadPartSize(c.partSize, size)
+		u.PartSize = uploadPartSize
 	})
 	// Create a progress reader that tracks upload progress
@@ -152,21 +139,6 @@ func (c *Client) PutObjectWithProgress(
 	return err
 }
 // uploadPartSize returns the part size for an upload of size bytes: the
 // configured part size (the SDK default when zero), raised where needed so
 // the upload fits in S3's limit of 10,000 parts. The uploader cannot raise
 // it itself, because it cannot seek the progress reader to learn its size.
 func uploadPartSize(configured, size int64) int64 {
 	if configured == 0 {
 		configured = manager.DefaultUploadPartSize
 	}
 	maxParts := int64(manager.MaxUploadParts)
 	smallestThatFits := (size + maxParts - 1) / maxParts // rounded up
 	return max(configured, smallestThatFits)
 }
 // GetObject downloads an object from S3 with the specified key.
 // The key is automatically prefixed with the configured prefix.
 // Returns a ReadCloser containing the object data. The caller must
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
 package s3
 import "testing"
 // TestUploadPartSize checks that an upload too large for 10,000 parts of the
 // configured size gets parts just large enough to fit in 10,000.
 func TestUploadPartSize(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const mib = 1024 * 1024
 	tests := []struct {
 		name       string
 		configured int64
 		size       int64
 		want       int64
 	}{
 		{
 			name:       "an upload that fits keeps the configured size",
 			configured: 5 * mib,
 			size:       10 * 1024 * mib,
 			want:       5 * mib,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "exactly 10,000 parts keeps the configured size",
 			configured: 6 * mib,
 			size:       10_000 * 6 * mib,
 			want:       6 * mib,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "one byte more than 10,000 parts adds a byte to each",
 			configured: 6 * mib,
 			size:       10_000*6*mib + 1,
 			want:       6*mib + 1,
 		},
 		{
 			name:       "zero means the SDK default of 5MiB",
 			configured: 0,
 			size:       1,
 			want:       5 * mib,
 		},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			got := uploadPartSize(tt.configured, tt.size)
 			if got != tt.want {
 				t.Errorf("uploadPartSize(%d, %d) = %d, want %d",
 					tt.configured, tt.size, got, tt.want)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ func provideClient(lc fx.Lifecycle, cfg *config.Config) (*Client, error) {
 		AccessKeyID:     cfg.S3.AccessKeyID,
 		SecretAccessKey: cfg.S3.SecretAccessKey,
 		Region:          cfg.S3.Region,
 		PartSize:        cfg.S3.PartSize.Int64(),
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func verifyBackupFiles(
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
-	files, err := repos.Files.ListAll(ctx)
+	files, err := repos.Files.ListByPrefix(ctx, "")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Failed to list files: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 //nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported copyDatabase helper
 package snapshot
 import (
 	"context"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"syscall"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/spf13/afero"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
 )
 // TestCopyDatabaseExportCopyMode verifies that the exported snapshot
 // database copy is created owner-only (0600), even under a lenient 022
 // umask that would otherwise leave a fresh file world-readable.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // syscall.Umask is process-global; parallel tests would clash
 func TestCopyDatabaseExportCopyMode(t *testing.T) {
 	restore := syscall.Umask(0o022)
 	defer syscall.Umask(restore)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	src := filepath.Join(dir, "index.sqlite")
 	db, err := database.New(ctx, src)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("creating source index: %v", err)
 	}
 	err = db.Close()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("closing source index: %v", err)
 	}
 	dst := filepath.Join(dir, "snapshot.db")
 	sm := &SnapshotManager{fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
 	err = sm.copyDatabase(ctx, src, dst)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("copyDatabase: %v", err)
 	}
 	info, err := os.Stat(dst)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("stat export copy: %v", err)
 	}
 	got := info.Mode().Perm()
 	if got != 0o600 {
 		t.Fatalf("export copy permissions = %#o, want %#o", got, 0o600)
 	}
 }
@@ -7,19 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // Manifest size bounds. A manifest lists one small entry per blob, and
 // blobs are large (the default target is 10 GB), so even a manifest for a
 // petabyte-scale backup is a few megabytes. These caps are far above any
 // manifest the writer can emit, yet stop a crafted, highly compressible
 // manifest from expanding without limit when decoded: the manifest is
 // fetched from the store, which is not trusted, and json.Decode buffers
 // the whole value in memory.
 const (
 	manifestMaxCompressed   = 256 * 1024 * 1024  // 256 MiB
 	manifestMaxDecompressed = 1024 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 GiB
 )
 // Manifest represents the structure of a snapshot's blob manifest
@@ -41,31 +28,19 @@ type BlobInfo struct {
 	CompressedSize int64  `json:"compressed_size"`
 }
-// DecodeManifest decodes a manifest from a reader containing compressed
+// DecodeManifest decodes a manifest from a reader containing compressed JSON
 // JSON, reading through byte limits on both the compressed input and the
 // decompressed output so an untrusted manifest cannot exhaust memory.
 func DecodeManifest(r io.Reader) (*Manifest, error) {
-	return decodeManifest(r, manifestMaxCompressed, manifestMaxDecompressed)
+	// Decompress using zstd
-}
+	zr, err := zstd.NewReader(r)
 // decodeManifest is DecodeManifest with explicit limits, so tests can drive
 // the bounds with small inputs instead of gigabyte-scale ones.
 func decodeManifest(
 	r io.Reader, maxCompressed, maxDecompressed int64,
 ) (*Manifest, error) {
 	// Decompress using zstd, bounding how many compressed bytes are read.
 	zr, err := zstd.NewReader(blobgen.LimitReader(r, maxCompressed))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating zstd reader: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer zr.Close()
-	// Decode JSON manifest, bounding how far the compressed input may
+	// Decode JSON manifest
 	// expand: json.Decode buffers the whole value, so without this a
 	// small, highly compressible manifest could expand to gigabytes.
 	var manifest Manifest
-	err = json.NewDecoder(blobgen.LimitReader(zr, maxDecompressed)).Decode(&manifest)
+	err = json.NewDecoder(zr).Decode(&manifest)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding manifest: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
 //nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported decodeManifest bounds
 package snapshot
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 )
 // testSnapshotID is a stand-in snapshot ID reused across the bound cases.
 const testSnapshotID = "host_home_2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
 // TestDecodeManifestRoundTrip is the baseline: with generous bounds a
 // manifest the writer produced decodes back unchanged.
 func TestDecodeManifestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	want := &Manifest{
 		SnapshotID:          testSnapshotID,
 		Timestamp:           "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
 		BlobCount:           2,
 		TotalCompressedSize: 42,
 		Blobs: []BlobInfo{
 			{Hash: "aa", CompressedSize: 21},
 			{Hash: "bb", CompressedSize: 21},
 		},
 	}
 	compressed, err := EncodeManifest(want, 3)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	got, err := decodeManifest(
 		bytes.NewReader(compressed), manifestMaxCompressed, manifestMaxDecompressed)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.Equal(t, want, got)
 }
 // TestDecodeManifestBoundsDecompressedOutput feeds a valid but highly
 // compressible manifest — one whose timestamp is a megabyte of the same
 // character — through a small decompressed bound. The compressed form is
 // tiny, so only the decompressed bound stops it; decoding must fail within
 // that bound rather than expanding the value in memory.
 func TestDecodeManifestBoundsDecompressedOutput(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	bomb := &Manifest{
 		SnapshotID: testSnapshotID,
 		Timestamp:  strings.Repeat("a", 1<<20),
 	}
 	compressed, err := EncodeManifest(bomb, 3)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.Less(t, len(compressed), 4096,
 		"the compressible manifest must be small compressed")
 	_, err = decodeManifest(bytes.NewReader(compressed), 1<<20, 4096)
 	require.ErrorIs(t, err, blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge)
 }
 // TestDecodeManifestBoundsCompressedInput checks the compressed-input
 // bound fires independently: a valid manifest with a generous decompressed
 // bound but a tiny compressed bound still fails.
 func TestDecodeManifestBoundsCompressedInput(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	manifest := &Manifest{
 		SnapshotID: testSnapshotID,
 		Timestamp:  strings.Repeat("a", 4096),
 	}
 	compressed, err := EncodeManifest(manifest, 3)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	_, err = decodeManifest(bytes.NewReader(compressed), 8, manifestMaxDecompressed)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 }
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More