Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
2de79a0897 |
+5
-5
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ RUN [ -n "$CHECK_EPOCH" ] || exit 1
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# running, and exits 0 reporting `0 issues.` on a tree the real config
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# fails. Demonstrated on this repo at this pin, recorded on
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# https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/pulls/114: with a planted
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# over-length line, `script/lint` exits 1 naming the `revive` finding
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# with `linters:` and exits 0 with `linterz:`. A set-but-ineffective
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# config quietly falling back to defaults is precisely the false-green
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# class this gate exists to eliminate, so it must not sit in the gate's
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# own configuration.
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# over-length line, `script/lint` exits 1 naming the `lll` finding with
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# `linters:` and exits 0 with `linterz:`. A set-but-ineffective config
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# quietly falling back to defaults is precisely the false-green class
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# this gate exists to eliminate, so it must not sit in the gate's own
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# configuration.
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#
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# `config verify` catches it, and it does so OFFLINE at this pinned
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# version -- verified, not assumed. Under `docker run --network none`
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@@ -34,15 +34,6 @@ release" is exactly the contradiction
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is distinguishable from one that could not be queried. The counts have
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no `--json` representation — under `--json` the summary is suppressed
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entirely — so nothing there can show a false `0`.
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- 2026-09-21: Fixed `verify --deep` reporting healthy snapshots as
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corrupt. Its final blob-integrity check hashed the encrypted
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downloaded bytes with a single SHA256 and compared that to the blob
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ID, which is the double SHA256 of the plaintext, so the two could
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never match. It now hashes the decompressed plaintext and compares the
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double SHA256. Added a test that backs up a real snapshot, deep-verifies
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it, then flips a byte in one stored blob and confirms deep verification
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then fails
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([issue #131](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/131)).
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- 2026-09-21: Made `snapshot create` VACUUM the per-snapshot metadata
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database through the `modernc.org/sqlite` driver instead of shelling
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@@ -97,11 +88,10 @@ release" is exactly the contradiction
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into each check command, and a fresh `$(date +%s%N)$$` per invocation
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computed as a bare assignment. `cmd/vaultik/lintdocker_test.go`
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parses both Dockerfiles and both scripts and fails if any part of
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that is dropped, because every way of losing it is silent. No test
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asserts that no script runs the host linter: `script/lint` is the one
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lint entry point and runs `golangci-lint` only inside the container,
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and keeping it that way is a review matter, not something a test
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proves.
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that is dropped, because every way of losing it is silent. Its
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host-lint assertion is structural — no script runs `golangci-lint`
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except through `docker` — rather than a search for the one retired
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variable name, which nothing could ever reintroduce.
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The product `Dockerfile` lost its lint stage rather than gaining a
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second linter pin: `make lint` is now `docker build`, so the stage
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@@ -28,11 +28,6 @@ import (
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// -- that a real finding actually fails the build -- is verified by
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// hand against a deliberately broken tree, recorded on the pull
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// request.
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//
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// One property is deliberately NOT tested here: that no script runs the
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// linter on the host. script/lint is the only lint entry point, and it
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// runs golangci-lint only inside the container; keeping it that way is a
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// review matter, not something a test in this file establishes.
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// The files under guard, relative to the repository root.
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const (
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@@ -42,8 +37,9 @@ const (
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cibuildScript = "script/cibuild"
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)
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// linterBinary is the linter's command name, used to locate the
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// config-verify and lint steps in Dockerfile.lint.
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// linterBinary is the linter's command name. Every occurrence of it in
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// executable shell in this repo must be inside a docker invocation; see
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// TestNoHostLintPathRemains.
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const linterBinary = "golangci-lint"
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// checkEpochARG is the declaration, with no default value. A default
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@@ -223,6 +219,90 @@ func TestCibuildBuildsBothDockerfilesWithFreshEpochs(t *testing.T) {
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"%s must build %s", cibuildScript, lintDockerfile)
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}
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// TestNoHostLintPathRemains fails if any escape hatch to a host linter
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// comes back. The owner's ruling is that every lint run happens inside
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// a container; a PATH binary that happens to match the pinned version
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// is a different build reached by a different code path, and admitting
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// it is what lets a local pass disagree with CI.
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//
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// This asserts the PROPERTY -- no script invokes the linter except
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// through docker -- rather than the absence of any particular variable
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// name. An earlier version of this test looked only for the literal
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// VAULTIK_LINT_IN_CONTAINER, the name of the hatch that was removed
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// alongside it, so nothing could ever trip it again: a hatch under any
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// other name left it passing. A structural test that passes on a broken
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// tree is worse than no test, because it is what a later reader trusts
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// instead of re-deriving the invariant.
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//
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// script/lint-fix is not exempted. It is the one script that runs the
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// linter as a container rather than as a build step, but it still runs
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// it in one, so the same property holds of it.
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func TestNoHostLintPathRemains(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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root := repoRoot(t)
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entries, err := os.ReadDir(filepath.Join(root, "script"))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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require.NotEmpty(t, entries, "no scripts found to scan")
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for _, entry := range entries {
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if entry.IsDir() {
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continue
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}
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name := filepath.Join("script", entry.Name())
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for _, line := range shellCode(readRepoFile(t, name)) {
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assertLinterIsContainerised(t, name, line)
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}
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}
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}
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// assertLinterIsContainerised fails if the line runs the linter without
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// handing it to docker first. Position matters: docker has to come
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// before the binary, or the line is running the host linter and merely
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// mentioning docker afterwards.
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func assertLinterIsContainerised(t *testing.T, name, line string) {
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t.Helper()
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at := strings.Index(line, linterBinary)
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if at < 0 {
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return
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}
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docker := strings.Index(line, "docker")
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assert.True(t, docker >= 0 && docker < at,
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"%s runs %s on the host; every lint run happens in a container"+
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" (line: %s)", name, linterBinary, line)
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}
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// TestShellCodeSeesCodeAndNotProse keeps the scanner above honest. It
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// has to ignore comments and here-document bodies, because script/lint
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// and script/bootstrap both NAME golangci-lint in prose -- in comments,
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// and in the error text they print -- precisely to say that the host
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// binary is never used. A scanner that went blind, by over-eager
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// stripping or by failing to join continuation lines, would make
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// TestNoHostLintPathRemains pass on everything.
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func TestShellCodeSeesCodeAndNotProse(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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script := strings.Join([]string{
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"#!/bin/sh",
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"# a comment naming golangci-lint",
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"cat >&2 <<EOF",
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"prose naming golangci-lint, printed not executed",
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"EOF",
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"docker run --rm \\",
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" \"$image\" \\",
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" golangci-lint run ./...",
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}, "\n")
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assert.Equal(t,
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[]string{"cat >&2 <<EOF", `docker run --rm "$image" golangci-lint run ./...`},
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shellCode(script))
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}
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// assertEpochExpandedInto fails unless some instruction runs the named
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// command with the epoch expanded into it. Expansion, not mere
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// declaration: an ARG that no instruction references is not guaranteed
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@@ -327,6 +407,70 @@ func indexContaining(found []string, want string) int {
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return -1
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}
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// shellCode returns a POSIX shell script's executable lines: comments
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// dropped, here-document bodies dropped, and backslash continuations
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// joined so a multi-line command is a single string. Whitespace is
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// collapsed, as it is for Dockerfile instructions.
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//
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// Both exclusions are load-bearing rather than tidiness. The scripts
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// name golangci-lint in prose to state that the host binary is never
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// used, and joining continuations is what lets the one legitimate
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// container invocation -- script/lint-fix's `docker run`, whose linter
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// command sits several lines below the word `docker` -- be recognised
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// as containerised.
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func shellCode(contents string) []string {
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var (
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out []string
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joined string
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terminate string
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)
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for line := range strings.SplitSeq(contents, "\n") {
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
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if terminate != "" {
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if trimmed == terminate {
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terminate = ""
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}
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continue
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}
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if joined == "" && (trimmed == "" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#")) {
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continue
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}
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joined += strings.TrimSuffix(trimmed, `\`) + " "
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if strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, `\`) {
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continue
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}
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joined = strings.Join(strings.Fields(joined), " ")
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terminate = heredocTerminator(joined)
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out = append(out, joined)
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joined = ""
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}
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return out
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}
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// heredocTerminator returns the terminator of the here-document a
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// command opens, or "" if it opens none. Only the first on a line is
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// recognised; nothing in script/ opens two.
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func heredocTerminator(line string) string {
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_, after, opens := strings.Cut(line, "<<")
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if !opens {
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return ""
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}
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// `<<-` strips leading tabs from the body; the terminator word is
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// the same either way, and callers compare against trimmed lines.
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word, _, _ := strings.Cut(strings.TrimPrefix(after, "-"), " ")
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return strings.Trim(word, `'"`)
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}
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// readRepoFile reads a file by its path relative to the repository
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// root.
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func readRepoFile(t *testing.T, name string) string {
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@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
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package vaultik_test
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import (
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"context"
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"io"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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"github.com/spf13/afero"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
|
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
|
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"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
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||||
)
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|
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// TestDeepVerifyAcceptsHealthyAndRejectsCorruptBlob backs up a real
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// snapshot with the on-disk storage backend, runs deep verification on
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// it, then flips a byte inside one stored blob and runs deep
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||||
// verification again. A healthy snapshot must pass; a corrupted blob
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// must fail. The healthy case is the regression guard: deep
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||||
// verification used to hash the encrypted blob bytes and compare them
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// to the blob's ID (the double SHA256 of the plaintext), so it reported
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// every healthy blob as corrupt.
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func TestDeepVerifyAcceptsHealthyAndRejectsCorruptBlob(t *testing.T) {
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log.Initialize(log.Config{})
|
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t.Parallel()
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|
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fs := afero.NewOsFs()
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tempDir := t.TempDir()
|
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|
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dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "source")
|
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storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
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dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
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|
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chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
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maxBlobSize := int64(512 * 1024)
|
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|
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// One file large enough to span several chunks within a single blob.
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require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0o755))
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require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
|
||||
filepath.Join(dataDir, "data.bin"),
|
||||
bytesPattern("deep-", int(chunkSize*3)), 0o644))
|
||||
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
// runFileStorageBackup writes a real snapshot to storeDir and closes
|
||||
// the source index, so verification runs from remote bytes only.
|
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cfg, storer, snapshotID := runFileStorageBackup(
|
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ctx, t, fs, dataDir, storeDir, dbPath, chunkSize, maxBlobSize)
|
||||
|
||||
newVerifier := func() *vaultik.Vaultik {
|
||||
v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
|
||||
Config: cfg,
|
||||
Storage: storer,
|
||||
Fs: fs,
|
||||
Stdout: io.Discard,
|
||||
Stderr: io.Discard,
|
||||
UI: ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
|
||||
}
|
||||
v.SetContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
return v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
require.NoError(t,
|
||||
newVerifier().RunDeepVerify(snapshotID, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}),
|
||||
"deep verify should pass on a healthy snapshot")
|
||||
|
||||
// Flip a byte inside one blob without changing its length, so the
|
||||
// blob-existence and size checks still pass and verification reaches
|
||||
// the blob-content stage.
|
||||
corruptOneBlob(t, fs, filepath.Join(storeDir, "blobs"))
|
||||
|
||||
require.Error(t,
|
||||
newVerifier().RunDeepVerify(snapshotID, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}),
|
||||
"deep verify should fail on a corrupted blob")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// corruptOneBlob flips a middle byte of the first blob file found under
|
||||
// blobsDir, leaving the file length unchanged.
|
||||
func corruptOneBlob(t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, blobsDir string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
var blobPath string
|
||||
|
||||
err := afero.Walk(fs, blobsDir,
|
||||
func(path string, info os.FileInfo, err error) error {
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if blobPath == "" && !info.IsDir() {
|
||||
blobPath = path
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotEmpty(t, blobPath, "expected at least one blob on disk")
|
||||
|
||||
data, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, blobPath)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotEmpty(t, data)
|
||||
|
||||
data[len(data)/2] ^= 0xff
|
||||
require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, blobPath, data, 0o644))
|
||||
}
|
||||
+14
-19
@@ -344,8 +344,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlob(blobInfo snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB) error {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get decryptor: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt blob
|
||||
decryptedReader, err := decryptor.DecryptStream(reader)
|
||||
// Hash the encrypted blob data as it streams through to decryption
|
||||
blobHasher := sha256.New()
|
||||
teeReader := io.TeeReader(reader, blobHasher)
|
||||
|
||||
// Decrypt blob (reading through teeReader to hash encrypted data)
|
||||
decryptedReader, err := decryptor.DecryptStream(teeReader)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -357,19 +361,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlob(blobInfo snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB) error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer decompressor.Close()
|
||||
|
||||
// A blob's hash — its remote name — is the double SHA256 of its
|
||||
// decompressed plaintext (see blobgen.Writer.Sum256), not of the
|
||||
// encrypted bytes. Hash the plaintext as chunk verification streams
|
||||
// it, then compare on completion.
|
||||
plaintextHasher := sha256.New()
|
||||
hashedStream := io.TeeReader(decompressor, plaintextHasher)
|
||||
|
||||
chunkCount, err := v.verifyBlobChunks(db, blobInfo.Hash, hashedStream)
|
||||
chunkCount, err := v.verifyBlobChunks(db, blobInfo.Hash, decompressor)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err = v.verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(hashedStream, plaintextHasher, blobInfo.Hash)
|
||||
err = v.verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(decompressor, blobHasher, blobInfo.Hash)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -473,13 +470,14 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobChunks(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// verifyBlobFinalIntegrity checks that no trailing data exists in the
|
||||
// decompressed stream and that the blob hash matches the expected value.
|
||||
// decompressed stream and that the encrypted blob hash matches the
|
||||
// expected value.
|
||||
func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(
|
||||
plaintext io.Reader, plaintextHasher hash.Hash, expectedHash string,
|
||||
decompressor io.Reader, blobHasher hash.Hash, expectedHash string,
|
||||
) error {
|
||||
// Verify no remaining data in blob - if the chunk list is accurate,
|
||||
// the blob should be fully consumed.
|
||||
remaining, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, plaintext)
|
||||
remaining, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, decompressor)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check for remaining blob data: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -488,11 +486,8 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobFinalIntegrity(
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %d bytes", errTrailingBlobData, remaining)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The blob hash is the double SHA256 of its plaintext content.
|
||||
firstHash := plaintextHasher.Sum(nil)
|
||||
secondHash := sha256.Sum256(firstHash)
|
||||
calculatedBlobHash := hex.EncodeToString(secondHash[:])
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify blob hash matches the encrypted data we downloaded
|
||||
calculatedBlobHash := hex.EncodeToString(blobHasher.Sum(nil))
|
||||
if calculatedBlobHash != expectedHash {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("%w: calculated %s, expected %s",
|
||||
errBlobHashMismatch, calculatedBlobHash, expectedHash)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user