Route direct-stdout command output through internal/ui (closes #149)

version, info, remote info, config, and database delete wrote plain text straight to stdout, so they were unstyled and ignored --quiet. Output is now governed by internal/ui in two buckets. Status lines and confirmations (config init, config set, the database delete prompt) go through the ui message methods and are silenced by --quiet. The data a command exists to produce is written plain -- the version/info/remote-info reports, the snapshot list table, config get values, and the --json documents -- and is never suppressed, since a script depends on it and a marker would corrupt a table or document. The database delete confirmation prompt is always shown. Pure-cli commands reach ui through a small commandUI helper.

Model: opus-4-8

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -74,16 +74,16 @@ Maps files to their constituent chunks:
 #### Blob (`database.Blob`)
 The final storage unit uploaded to S3. Contains many compressed and encrypted chunks:
 - `ID`: UUID assigned at creation
-- `Hash`: SHA256 of final compressed+encrypted content
+- `Hash`: `hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))`, computed before compression and encryption (see [docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#blobs-directory-blobs))
 - `UncompressedSize`: Total raw chunk data before compression
 - `CompressedSize`: Size after zstd compression and age encryption
 - `CreatedTS`, `FinishedTS`, `UploadedTS`: Lifecycle timestamps
 
 Blob creation process:
 1. Chunks are accumulated (up to MaxBlobSize, typically 10GB)
-2. Compressed with zstd
+2. As each chunk is added, its uncompressed bytes are fed to a running SHA-256
-3. Encrypted with age (recipients configured in config)
+3. Concurrently, the same bytes are compressed with zstd, then encrypted with age (recipients configured in config), and streamed to storage
-4. SHA256 hash computed → becomes filename in S3
+4. On finalize, the blob's name is the double SHA-256 of the uncompressed contents — `hex(SHA256(SHA256(...)))` — not a hash of the compressed, encrypted bytes
 5. Uploaded to `blobs/{hash[0:2]}/{hash[2:4]}/{hash}`
 
 #### BlobChunk (`database.BlobChunk`)
@@ -284,8 +284,10 @@ Manages snapshot lifecycle and metadata export.
 
 Key methods:
 - `CreateSnapshot(ctx, hostname, version, commit)` → Create snapshot record
-- `CompleteSnapshot(ctx, snapshotID)` → Mark snapshot complete
+- `PopulateSnapshotBlobs(ctx, snapshotID)` → Record every blob the snapshot references
 - `ExportSnapshotMetadata(ctx, dbPath, snapshotID)` → Export to S3
+- `MarkSnapshotComplete(ctx, snapshotID)` → Record completion, only after a successful export
+- `CompleteSnapshot(ctx, snapshotID)` → Convenience: populate blobs, then mark complete (no export between)
 
 ### `internal/database`
 SQLite database for local index. Single-writer mode for thread safety.
@@ -335,16 +337,18 @@ CreateSnapshot(opts)
     │
     ├─► SnapshotManager.UpdateSnapshotStatsExtended()
     │
-    ├─► SnapshotManager.CompleteSnapshot()
+    ├─► SnapshotManager.PopulateSnapshotBlobs()   // record referenced blobs
     │
-    └─► SnapshotManager.ExportSnapshotMetadata()
+    ├─► SnapshotManager.ExportSnapshotMetadata()
+    │       │
+    │       ├─► Copy database to temp file
+    │       ├─► Clean to only current snapshot data (VACUUM)
+    │       ├─► Compress binary SQLite with zstd
+    │       ├─► Encrypt with age
+    │       ├─► Upload db.zst.age to storage
+    │       └─► Upload manifest.json.zst to storage
     │
-            ├─► Copy database to temp file
+    └─► SnapshotManager.MarkSnapshotComplete()   // only after the export succeeds
-            ├─► Clean to only current snapshot data (VACUUM)
-            ├─► Compress binary SQLite with zstd
-            ├─► Encrypt with age
-            ├─► Upload db.zst.age to storage
-            └─► Upload manifest.json.zst to storage
 ```
 
 ## Deduplication Strategy

README.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ vaultik snapshot list
 
 Features:
 
-* modern encryption ([age](https://age-encryption.org/), X25519 + XChaCha20-Poly1305)
+* modern encryption ([age](https://age-encryption.org/), X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305)
 * content-defined chunking with deduplication (FastCDC)
 * incremental backups (only changed files are re-chunked)
 * multithreaded zstd compression at configurable levels
@@ -74,11 +74,18 @@ Requirements that no existing tool meets:
 # verify a snapshot (shallow: checks all blobs are present with the listed size)
 vaultik snapshot verify <snapshot-id>
 
-# deep verify (downloads and cryptographically verifies every blob)
+# put the private key file in the environment (reading it from the file
-VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' vaultik snapshot verify --deep <snapshot-id>
+# keeps the key out of your shell history); the whole age-keygen file,
+# with one or more identities, is accepted
+export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"
 
-# restore (requires the private key)
+# deep verify (downloads every blob, decrypts it, and re-hashes it to
-VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' vaultik snapshot restore <snapshot-id> /tmp/restored
+# detect corruption — this checks integrity, not who wrote the blob)
+vaultik snapshot verify --deep <snapshot-id>
+
+# restore (requires the private key). Restore into a new directory you own,
+# writable only by you — not a shared location like /tmp
+vaultik snapshot restore <snapshot-id> ~/vaultik-restore
 
 # daily cron job: back up, keep a 4-week rolling window of snapshots
 # 0 3 * * * vaultik snapshot create --cron --prune --keep-newer-than 4w
@@ -119,14 +126,17 @@ Use that remote key — the hex printed inside `<remote only:...>`, or the
 full `remote_key` from `snapshot list --json` — to restore and verify:
 
 ```sh
-# restore everything to /tmp/restored, then check every restored file's
+# put the private key file in the environment (reading it from the file
-# chunk hashes
+# keeps the key out of your shell history)
-VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' \
+export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"
-  vaultik snapshot restore --verify <remote-key> /tmp/restored
 
-# optionally, deep-verify the snapshot against the store (downloads and
+# restore everything to a new directory you own (writable only by you, not a
-# cryptographically checks every blob)
+# shared location like /tmp), then check every restored file's chunk hashes
-VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...' \
+vaultik snapshot restore --verify <remote-key> ~/vaultik-restore
+
+# optionally, deep-verify the snapshot against the store (downloads every
+# blob, decrypts it, and re-hashes it to detect corruption — this checks
+# integrity, not who wrote the blob)
 vaultik snapshot verify --deep <remote-key>
 ```
 
@@ -217,7 +227,7 @@ and `vaultik prune --json | jq .` both work as written.
 
 ### environment variables
 
-* `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY`: Age private key for decryption (required for `snapshot restore` and `snapshot verify --deep`)
+* `VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY`: Age private key for decryption (required for `snapshot restore` and `snapshot verify --deep`). May hold the whole `age-keygen` file — comments and every identity in it are accepted. Set it from the file, e.g. `export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"`, so the key is not typed into your shell history.
 * `VAULTIK_CONFIG`: Path to config file (overridden by `--config`)
 * `VAULTIK_INDEX_PATH`: Override local SQLite index path
 * `VAULTIK_CPUPROFILE`: Write a CPU profile to this path for the duration of the run (development/debugging)
@@ -442,14 +452,19 @@ Snapshot IDs follow the human-readable format
 `<hostname>_<snapshot-name>_<RFC3339-timestamp>` (e.g.
 `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`), but this ID is never written to the
 destination store in plaintext. Each snapshot's metadata directory is named
-with its `<remote-key>`, a one-way double SHA-256 hash of the ID, so a listing
+with its `<remote-key>`, a one-way double SHA-256 hash of the ID, so a plain
-of the store reveals no hostname or snapshot name. The backup time is not
+listing of the store shows no hostname or snapshot name. The hash uses no
-hidden: manifest.json.zst carries a plaintext timestamp, and object
+secret, though, so an observer who guesses a candidate hostname and snapshot
+name can hash it and confirm the snapshot is present; the remote key keeps
+names out of a listing but does not hide them from a guess. The backup time is
+not hidden either: manifest.json.zst carries a plaintext timestamp, and object
 modification times are visible at the storage layer regardless. For example,
 `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z` is stored under
 `metadata/17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa/`.
 See [docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation) for the
-derivation.
+derivation, and [Security Considerations](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#security-considerations)
+(including [Accepted Risks](docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md#accepted-risks)) for what the
+format does and does not protect.
 
 ### data flow
 
@@ -490,7 +505,7 @@ derivation.
 
 ### encryption
 
-* Asymmetric encryption using age (X25519 + XChaCha20-Poly1305)
+* Asymmetric encryption using age (X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305)
 * Only the public key is needed on the source host
 * Each blob and each metadata database is encrypted independently
 * Multiple recipients supported (encrypt to multiple keys)
@@ -630,17 +645,26 @@ priority.
 
 ## output style
 
-The operational narration of the long-running commands — the Begin,
+Every command's user-facing output is governed by `internal/ui`, in one
-Complete, Progress, and status lines of `snapshot create`, `prune`,
+of two ways. Color is enabled when stdout is a TTY and the `NO_COLOR`
-`snapshot restore`, and the like — goes through helpers in `internal/ui`
+environment variable is unset (https://no-color.org/).
-and conforms to the uniform style below. Some commands instead write
+
-plain text straight to stdout (`version`, `info`, `config`, the
+* **Status, progress, warnings, and errors** go through the `internal/ui`
-`database delete` prompt, and the `snapshot list` table); that output is
+  message methods below: marker-prefixed, colored on a TTY, and — except
-unstyled and does not honor `--quiet`. Routing it through `internal/ui`
+  warnings and errors — silenced by `--quiet`. This is the operational
-is tracked in
+  narration of the long-running commands (`snapshot create`, `prune`,
-[issue #149](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/149). Color is
+  `snapshot restore`, and the like) and the confirmations of
-enabled when stdout is a TTY and the `NO_COLOR` environment variable is
+  `config init`, `config set`, and `database delete`.
-unset (https://no-color.org/).
+* **The data a command exists to produce** is written plain, with no
+  marker and no color, because a marker would corrupt a table or a
+  parsed document. This covers the `version`, `info`, and `remote info`
+  reports, the `snapshot list` table, `config get` values, and every
+  `--json` document. `--quiet` silences the human reports and tables
+  (`version`, `info`, `remote info`, `snapshot list`) but never the
+  machine-consumed `config get` value or the `--json` documents, which a
+  script depends on. The `database delete` confirmation prompt is also
+  written this way and always shown: it is an interactive exchange the
+  operator must see.
 
 `internal/ui` writes to stdout; it is the output the user asked for.
 Structured log records are a different thing and go through

TODO.md

@@ -25,6 +25,21 @@ release" is exactly the contradiction
 
 # Completed Steps
 
+- 2026-09-22: Routed the last direct-to-stdout command output through
+  `internal/ui`
+  ([issue #149](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/149)). The
+  `version`, `info`, `remote info`, `config`, and `database delete`
+  commands wrote plain text straight to stdout, so they were unstyled and
+  ignored `--quiet`. Output now falls in two buckets, both governed by
+  `internal/ui`: status lines and confirmations go through its message
+  methods (styled, and `--quiet` silences them), while the data a command
+  exists to produce — the reports, the `snapshot list` table, `config get`
+  values, and the `--json` documents — is written plain. `--quiet`
+  silences the human reports and tables but never the `config get` value
+  or the `--json` documents, which a script depends on, and the
+  `database delete` confirmation prompt is always shown. The README
+  output-style section now states this rule.
+
 - 2026-09-22: Validated blob hashes, offsets and lengths read back from
   the destination before using them
   ([issue #155](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/155)). A blob

config.example.yml

@@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ storage_url: "rclone://myremote/path/to/backups"
 # Multiple chunks are packed into blobs up to this size
 # Must be at least four times chunk_size (the largest chunk the chunker can
 # emit); a smaller limit would let a single-chunk blob exceed it.
+# Chunking uses no secret (the FastCDC parameters are fixed and public). At a
+# large limit a blob holds hundreds of chunks, so individual chunk lengths are
+# not visible in its size; lowering the limit toward chunk_size exposes them.
 # Supports: 1GB, 10G, 500MB, 1GiB, etc.
 # Default: 10GB
 #blob_size_limit: 10GB

docs/DATAMODEL.md

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Stores information about packed, compressed, and encrypted blob files.
 
 **Columns:**
 - `id` (TEXT PRIMARY KEY) - UUID assigned when blob creation starts
-- `blob_hash` (TEXT UNIQUE) - SHA256 hash of final blob (NULL until finalized)
+- `blob_hash` (TEXT UNIQUE) - `hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))`, computed before compression and encryption (NULL until finalized); see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#blobs-directory-blobs)
 - `created_ts` (INTEGER NOT NULL) - Creation timestamp
 - `finished_ts` (INTEGER) - Finalization timestamp (NULL if in progress)
 - `uncompressed_size` (INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0) - Total size of chunks before compression
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ After a snapshot is completed:
 5. Upload to S3 as `metadata/{remote-key}/db.zst.age`
 6. Generate blob manifest and upload as `metadata/{remote-key}/manifest.json.zst`
 
-The `{remote-key}` directory name is a one-way hash of the human snapshot ID, so the ID is never written to the store in plaintext; see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation).
+The `{remote-key}` directory name is a one-way hash of the human snapshot ID, so the ID is never written to the store in plaintext. The hash uses no secret, so a guessed hostname and snapshot name can still be confirmed against a listing; see [REPOSTRUCTURE.md](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#remote-key-derivation) and its [Accepted Risks](REPOSTRUCTURE.md#accepted-risks).
 
 ### 4. Restore Process
 

docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The metadata subdirectory is named with the **remote key**, a one-way hash of th
 - **What it contains**: Packed collections of content-defined chunks from files
 - **Format**: Zstandard compressed, then Age encrypted
 - **Encryption**: Always encrypted with Age using the configured recipients
-- **Naming**: Content-addressed using SHA256 hash of the encrypted blob
+- **Naming**: Content-addressed. The blob's name is `hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))` — the double SHA-256 of the concatenated chunk data, computed before compression and encryption, not a hash of the stored (compressed, encrypted) bytes. One consequence: only a holder of the age private key can check a stored blob's integrity, because matching a blob to its name means decrypting and decompressing it first — which is what `restore` and `verify --deep` do. Implemented in `internal/blobgen` (`DoubleSHA256`). This is the canonical description of blob naming; other documents and comments point here.
 
 ### Why Encrypted
 Blobs contain the actual file data from backups and must be encrypted for security. The content-addressing ensures deduplication while the encryption ensures privacy.
@@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ This ID reveals the hostname, the configured snapshot name, and the backup time,
 
 ### Remote Key Derivation
 
-The remote key is `hex(SHA256(SHA256("vaultik|" + snapshot-id)))`: a double SHA-256 over the snapshot ID, with a `vaultik|` domain-separation prefix. The result is a 64-character hex string with no structure a remote observer can reverse. Implemented in `internal/snapshot/remotekey.go`.
+The remote key is `hex(SHA256(SHA256("vaultik|" + snapshot-id)))`: a double SHA-256 over the snapshot ID, with a `vaultik|` domain-separation prefix. The result is a 64-character hex string. The hash is not reversible, but it uses no secret: an observer who guesses a candidate hostname and snapshot name can hash it the same way and confirm whether that snapshot is present. The remote key keeps names out of a plain listing; it does not hide them from a guess. Implemented in `internal/snapshot/remotekey.go`.
 
 Worked example:
 - Snapshot ID: `server1_home_2025-06-01T12:00:00Z`
 - Remote key: `17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa`
 - Directory: `metadata/17f97bcde958748af076b926af59823943db59e80ce7170b40f124dfa28f64aa/`
 
-Because the hash is one-way, a listing of the destination store reveals neither the hostname nor the snapshot name of any backup. The same remote key is stored in the manifest's `snapshot_id` field.
+A plain listing of the destination store therefore shows only these hashes, not the hostname or snapshot name of any backup — but because the hash uses no secret, a guessed hostname and snapshot name can be hashed and confirmed against the listing. The same remote key is stored in the manifest's `snapshot_id` field.
 
 ### Files in Each Snapshot Directory
 
@@ -124,23 +124,36 @@ From the unencrypted data, an observer of the destination store can determine:
 - **When each backup was taken** — not from the directory name, which is a one-way hash, but from the plaintext `timestamp` field in manifest.json.zst, which is published in the clear
 - How many blobs each snapshot references, and the total compressed size
 - The compressed size of each blob, and which blobs are shared between snapshots (deduplication patterns)
+- **Whether a guessed hostname and snapshot name are present** — the remote key is an unkeyed hash, so an observer holding candidate names can hash each one and match it against the directory listing. The human ID is never published, so it cannot be read off directly, but it can be confirmed by guessing.
 
 Together these give an observer a timing-and-size profile of every snapshot. This is an accepted, documented property of the format, not a defect: the manifest is unencrypted so that pruning can run without the private key, and the timing channel could not be closed by encrypting it anyway — object creation times and per-object sizes stay visible at the storage layer on both `s3://` and `file://` destinations regardless.
 
 An observer cannot determine:
-- The hostname or snapshot name of any backup (the directory name and the manifest `snapshot_id` are one-way hashes of the human ID)
+- The hostname or snapshot name of any backup by reading it off the store — the directory name and the manifest `snapshot_id` are unkeyed hashes of the human ID, so the text is never published (though a guessed name can be confirmed, as above)
 - File names or paths
 - File contents
 - File permissions or ownership
 - Directory structure
 - Which chunks belong to which files
 
+### Accepted Risks
+
+These are known, deliberate properties of the format and the tooling, recorded so an operator can weigh them rather than discover them.
+
+1. **No proof of authorship.** Restore and `verify --deep` prove that data decrypts with the age private key and matches its unkeyed content hashes. They do not prove who wrote it: anyone who knows a recipient public key and can replace objects on the destination can substitute a snapshot they built. The recipient string is not stored at the destination, but a compromised backed-up host has it. Defences live on the destination side — bucket versioning or object lock, credentials for the source host that cannot delete or overwrite existing versions, and pruning from a trusted host. Note that S3 `PutObject` overwrites an existing key, so PUT permission alone is not append-only.
+2. **Compression reveals sizes.** Blobs and `db.zst.age` are zstd-compressed then age-encrypted; the manifest is compressed only. age does not pad, so an object's size is the exact compressed length of its contents. All new chunks packed into one blob share a single zstd stream (8 MiB window, 4 MiB at compression levels 1-2), and a blob is closed at `blob_size_limit` and at the end of each configured path. Because a stored chunk is never packed again, someone who can write into a backed-up file and watch blob sizes learns something only when their controlled data and a secret land in the same chunk of a file that keeps changing. Advice: back up any outsider-writable directory as its own snapshot.
+3. **Chunking uses no secret.** The FastCDC parameters are fixed and public. The default 10 MB average yields chunks between 2.5 MB and 40 MB, and any file of 2.5 MB or less is a single chunk. At the default 10 GB `blob_size_limit` a blob holds hundreds of chunks, so individual chunk lengths are not visible in the blob's size; lowering the limit toward the chunk size begins to expose them.
+4. **Decrypted data on local disk.** Several commands stage plaintext under `$TMPDIR`: `snapshot restore` writes decrypted blobs under `vaultik-blobcache-*/` (no size cap) and the decrypted metadata database at `vaultik-restore-*/snapshot.db`; `verify --deep` writes that database at `vaultik-verify-*/snapshot.db`; `snapshot create` keeps a plaintext copy of the index at `vaultik-snapshot-*/snapshot.db`. These files are created `0600` and removed on success, but a `kill -9` or a power loss leaves them behind — delete any leftover `vaultik-*` directory under `$TMPDIR` by hand. `$TMPDIR` should be trusted to the same degree as the restore target.
+5. **Store permissions differ per command.** The backed-up host needs only PUT to run `snapshot create`: it writes blobs and metadata and neither reads nor deletes them. Other commands need more — `snapshot verify`, `snapshot restore`, and `prune` list and read; `prune`, `snapshot purge`, `snapshot remove`, and `remote nuke` also delete. The recommended cron line uses `--prune`, which runs `prune` on the backed-up host, so granting that host `--prune` gives it credentials that can delete its own backups. To keep the source host to PUT only, prune from a separate trusted host instead.
+6. **Changing recipients does not re-encrypt existing data.** Deduplicated chunks and same-named blobs already on the destination stay encrypted to the recipients in force when they were written. A new snapshot that reuses them cannot be restored with a newly added recipient's key alone, because those reused objects were never encrypted to it. To make everything readable by a new key, run `vaultik database delete` and take a full backup to a fresh destination or prefix.
+7. **X25519 recipients only.** vaultik rejects age ssh and plugin recipients. Long-lived ciphertext held by a third party (the destination operator) has no fallback if X25519 is ever broken: there is no second recipient type and no post-quantum option.
+
 ## Consistency Guarantees
 
 1. **Blobs are immutable** - Once written, a blob is never modified
 2. **Blobs are written before metadata** - A snapshot's metadata is only written after all its blobs are successfully uploaded
 3. **Metadata is written atomically** - Both db.zst.age and manifest.json.zst are written as complete files
-4. **Snapshots are marked complete in local DB only after metadata upload** - Ensures consistency between local and remote state
+4. **A snapshot is marked complete in the local DB only after its metadata is uploaded** - `finalizeSnapshotMetadata` runs `ExportSnapshotMetadata` first and records completion (`MarkSnapshotComplete`) only once the export succeeds (see the backup data flow in [ARCHITECTURE.md](../ARCHITECTURE.md)). A crash during the export therefore leaves the snapshot incomplete, so the next backup's `PruneDatabase` drops it and re-backs-up its data, rather than leaving a completed-looking row in the local index with no matching metadata on the destination store. (A crash in the brief moment after the export succeeds but before completion is recorded leaves a fully-restorable snapshot on the destination that the local index drops as incomplete on the next run; `snapshot list` then reports it honestly as remote-only, which is the safe direction: the destination copy stays restorable.)
 
 ## Pruning Safety
 

internal/blob/packer.go

@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
 // Package blob handles the creation of blobs - the final storage units for Vaultik.
 // A blob is a large file (up to 10GB) containing many compressed and encrypted chunks
-// from multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed, meaning their filename
+// from multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed: a blob's filename is
-// is derived from the SHA256 hash of their compressed and encrypted content.
+// hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed from the concatenated
+// chunk data before compression and encryption, not from the stored bytes. See
+// blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md.
 //
 // The blob creation process:
 //  1. Chunks are accumulated from multiple files
-// 2. The collection is compressed using zstd
+//  2. Each chunk's uncompressed bytes are fed to a running SHA-256 and, in the same
-// 3. The compressed data is encrypted using age
+//     pass, compressed with zstd and encrypted with age into the temp file
-// 4. The encrypted blob is hashed to create its content-addressed name
+//  3. On finalize, the name is the double SHA-256 of that uncompressed content
-// 5. The blob is uploaded to S3 using the hash as the filename
+//  4. The blob is uploaded to S3 using the name as the filename
 //
 // This design optimizes storage efficiency by batching many small chunks into
 // larger blobs, reducing the number of S3 operations and associated costs.

internal/blobgen/limit.go

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+package blobgen
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+)
+
+// ErrOutputTooLarge is returned by a reader from LimitReader once it has
+// been asked for more than its limit. It bounds how far an untrusted
+// compressed stream may expand, so a small, highly compressible object
+// from the store cannot decompress without limit.
+var ErrOutputTooLarge = errors.New("output exceeds size limit")
+
+// LimitReader returns a reader that yields at most limit bytes from r and
+// then fails with ErrOutputTooLarge. Unlike io.LimitReader, which reports
+// a silent io.EOF at the limit (indistinguishable from a stream that
+// simply ended), this fails, so a caller decoding or copying the stream
+// sees an error rather than a truncated value. A stream of exactly limit
+// bytes reads back cleanly to EOF; the first byte beyond it is the error.
+func LimitReader(r io.Reader, limit int64) io.Reader {
+	// remaining counts down from limit+1: the extra byte is the one that,
+	// if it ever arrives, proves the stream is longer than the limit.
+	return &limitReader{r: r, remaining: limit + 1}
+}
+
+type limitReader struct {
+	r         io.Reader
+	remaining int64
+}
+
+func (l *limitReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	if l.remaining <= 0 {
+		return 0, ErrOutputTooLarge
+	}
+
+	if int64(len(p)) > l.remaining {
+		p = p[:l.remaining]
+	}
+
+	n, err := l.r.Read(p)
+	l.remaining -= int64(n)
+
+	if l.remaining <= 0 {
+		// The (limit+1)th byte was just read: the stream is too long.
+		return n, ErrOutputTooLarge
+	}
+
+	return n, err
+}

internal/blobgen/limit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package blobgen_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
+)
+
+// TestLimitReaderPassesExactSize checks that a stream of exactly the limit
+// reads back cleanly to EOF: the bound must not reject a legitimate blob
+// whose plaintext equals its recorded size.
+func TestLimitReaderPassesExactSize(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const n = 1000
+
+	r := blobgen.LimitReader(bytes.NewReader(bytes.Repeat([]byte("a"), n)), n)
+
+	got, err := io.ReadAll(r)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, got, n)
+}
+
+// TestLimitReaderFailsPastLimit feeds a large, highly compressible run of
+// zeros — the decompressed output a zip bomb would produce — through a
+// small limit and checks it fails within the bound rather than passing
+// the whole stream through.
+func TestLimitReaderFailsPastLimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const limit = 1000
+
+	r := blobgen.LimitReader(
+		bytes.NewReader(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, limit*1000)), limit)
+
+	n, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, r)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge)
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, n, int64(limit)+1,
+		"reader must stop within one byte of the limit")
+}

internal/blobgen/reader.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package blobgen
 
 import (
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"hash"
 	"io"
@@ -20,10 +21,12 @@ type Reader struct {
 	bytesRead    int64
 }
 
-// NewReader creates a new Reader that decrypts, decompresses, and verifies data
+// NewReader creates a new Reader that decrypts, decompresses, and verifies
-func NewReader(r io.Reader, identity age.Identity) (*Reader, error) {
+// data. Every supplied identity is offered to age.Decrypt, so a blob
+// encrypted to any one of them can be read.
+func NewReader(r io.Reader, identities ...age.Identity) (*Reader, error) {
 	// Create decryption reader
-	decReader, err := age.Decrypt(r, identity)
+	decReader, err := age.Decrypt(r, identities...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating decryption reader: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -54,6 +57,22 @@ func (r *Reader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	n, err := r.teeReader.Read(p)
 	r.bytesRead += int64(n)
 
+	// When the ciphertext is cut right after the age header plus its
+	// 16-byte nonce, the age reader's first read fails with
+	// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, and the zstd decoder maps that to a clean
+	// io.EOF at frame start. That makes a truncated stream look like a
+	// valid empty one. Distinguish the two: on EOF, read once more from
+	// the age reader. A genuine end leaves it at (0, io.EOF); a truncated
+	// stream leaves its stored io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, which we surface.
+	if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		var probe [1]byte
+
+		m, ageErr := r.decryptor.Read(probe[:])
+		if m != 0 || !errors.Is(ageErr, io.EOF) {
+			return n, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
+		}
+	}
+
 	return n, err
 }
 

internal/blobgen/truncation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package blobgen_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"filippo.io/age"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
+)
+
+// TestReaderRejectsHeaderNonceTruncation guards against a stream cut right
+// after the age header plus its 16-byte nonce. age.Decrypt still succeeds on
+// such an object, and the zstd decoder maps the age reader's
+// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF to a clean io.EOF at frame start, so without the extra
+// check the truncated stream would read as a valid empty one. Reading it must
+// now fail.
+func TestReaderRejectsHeaderNonceTruncation(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Encrypting empty plaintext yields header + nonce(16) + a single
+	// 16-byte final chunk tag. Dropping the trailing tag leaves exactly the
+	// age header plus its nonce — the truncation point that triggers the bug.
+	var full bytes.Buffer
+
+	w, err := age.Encrypt(&full, identity.Recipient())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
+
+	truncated := full.Bytes()[:full.Len()-16]
+
+	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(truncated), identity)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
+
+	_, err = io.ReadAll(reader)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
+}
+
+// TestReaderReadsGenuinelyEmptyBlob confirms the truncation check does not
+// reject a legitimately empty payload: a blob written with no data must round
+// trip back to zero bytes with no error.
+func TestReaderReadsGenuinelyEmptyBlob(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var encrypted bytes.Buffer
+
+	writer, err := blobgen.NewWriter(
+		&encrypted, 3, []string{identity.Recipient().String()})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, writer.Close())
+
+	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(encrypted.Bytes()), identity)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
+
+	data, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Empty(t, data)
+}

internal/blobgen/writer.go

@@ -16,11 +16,17 @@ import (
 )
 
 // DoubleSHA256 returns the double SHA-256 of content whose single SHA-256
-// digest is sum: it hashes that digest once more. Stored objects are named by
+// digest is sum: it hashes that digest once more. Stored objects — a blob, and
-// this second hash so that a name never reveals whether known content is
+// the metadata database export — are named by this second hash.
-// present — an attacker who knows a plaintext, and thus its SHA-256, still
+//
-// cannot derive the stored name without hashing the digest again. Both a blob
+// The second hash does not hide whether known content is stored: an attacker
-// and the metadata database export are named this way.
+// who can reproduce an object's entire plaintext computes the same name simply
+// by hashing twice, exactly as this code does. What limits that is blob
+// packing, not the double hash — a blob's name covers all of its concatenated
+// chunk plaintext, so a name can be confirmed only by someone who can
+// reproduce the whole blob (a snapshot made entirely of known content, or a
+// known file large enough to fill blobs on its own). An ordinary file that
+// shares a blob with other, unknown data cannot be confirmed this way.
 func DoubleSHA256(sum []byte) []byte {
 	h := sha256.Sum256(sum)
 
@@ -147,8 +153,8 @@ func (w *Writer) Close() error {
 
 // ContentID returns the double SHA-256 of the uncompressed input data: the
 // name under which this content is stored. It is the second hash of the
-// running SHA-256, via DoubleSHA256; see that function for why content is
+// running SHA-256, via DoubleSHA256; see that function for what naming content
-// named this way rather than by its plain SHA-256.
+// this way does and does not hide.
 func (w *Writer) ContentID() []byte {
 	return DoubleSHA256(w.hasher.Sum(nil))
 }

internal/cli/config.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -13,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 
 // configFileMode is the permission set for freshly written config files;
@@ -46,8 +46,11 @@ const defaultConfigTemplate = `# vaultik configuration
 # ─── REQUIRED ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 # Age recipient public keys for encryption.
-# Backups are encrypted to ALL listed recipients. Any one of the corresponding
+# Backups are encrypted to ALL listed recipients; any one of the corresponding
-# private keys can decrypt. Generate a keypair with:
+# private keys can decrypt. Adding a recipient later does not re-encrypt data
+# already stored: deduplicated chunks and existing blobs stay encrypted to the
+# earlier recipients, so a newly added key cannot restore them on its own (see
+# docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md, Accepted Risks). Generate a keypair with:
 #   age-keygen -o vaultik_backup_private_key.txt
 #   grep 'public key' vaultik_backup_private_key.txt
 age_recipients:
@@ -262,7 +265,7 @@ The config is written to the path from --config, $VAULTIK_CONFIG, or
 the platform default config directory (e.g. ~/Library/Application Support/
 on macOS, ~/.config/ on Linux, /etc/vaultik/ as root).`,
 		Args: cobra.NoArgs,
-		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 			path := configPathForInit()
 
 			_, err := os.Stat(path)
@@ -282,8 +285,11 @@ on macOS, ~/.config/ on Linux, /etc/vaultik/ as root).`,
 				return fmt.Errorf("writing config file: %w", err)
 			}
 
-			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "Config written to %s\n", path)
+			// A written-confirmation, not scriptable output: route it
-			_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout,
+			// through the UI so it is styled and --quiet silences it.
+			out := commandUI(cmd)
+			out.Infof("Config written to %s.", path)
+			out.Infof(
 				"Edit it to set your age_recipients, snapshots, and storage_url.")
 
 			return nil
@@ -325,7 +331,7 @@ func newConfigGetCommand() *cobra.Command {
 		Use:   "get <key>",
 		Short: "Print a config value by dotted path (e.g. storage_url, compression_level)",
 		Args:  cobra.ExactArgs(1),
-		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			path, err := ResolveConfigPath()
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
@@ -341,8 +347,13 @@ func newConfigGetCommand() *cobra.Command {
 				return err
 			}
 
+			// The value is scriptable output: it must stay machine-plain
+			// (no marker, no color) and is never silenced by --quiet, so it
+			// is written straight to stdout rather than through the UI.
+			w := cmd.OutOrStdout()
+
 			if node.Kind == yaml.ScalarNode {
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, node.Value)
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, node.Value)
 
 				return nil
 			}
@@ -352,7 +363,7 @@ func newConfigGetCommand() *cobra.Command {
 				return fmt.Errorf("marshaling value: %w", err)
 			}
 
-			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(os.Stdout, string(out))
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, string(out))
 
 			return nil
 		},
@@ -374,23 +385,23 @@ Examples:
   vaultik config set compression_level 9
   vaultik config set s3.bucket mybucket  # legacy S3 fields still supported`,
 		Args: cobra.ExactArgs(configSetArgs),
-		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			path, err := ResolveConfigPath()
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 
-			return writeConfigSet(os.Stdout, path, args[0], args[1])
+			return writeConfigSet(commandUI(cmd), path, args[0], args[1])
 		},
 	}
 }
 
 // writeConfigSet applies key=value to the config at path, writes it back
-// owner-only, and confirms the write by printing just the key name to w.
+// owner-only, and confirms the write by naming just the key through the
-// The value is never echoed: it may be a secret such as
+// UI writer (styled, and silenced by --quiet). The value is never
-// s3.secret_access_key, and captured stdout or a pasted terminal would
+// echoed: it may be a secret such as s3.secret_access_key, and captured
-// then leak it.
+// stdout or a pasted terminal would then leak it.
-func writeConfigSet(w io.Writer, path, key, value string) error {
+func writeConfigSet(out *ui.Writer, path, key, value string) error {
 	root, err := loadYAMLFile(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -401,12 +412,12 @@ func writeConfigSet(w io.Writer, path, key, value string) error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	out, err := marshalConfigYAML(root)
+	data, err := marshalConfigYAML(root)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("marshaling config: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	err = os.WriteFile(path, out, configFileMode)
+	err = os.WriteFile(path, data, configFileMode)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("writing config file: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -422,7 +433,7 @@ func writeConfigSet(w io.Writer, path, key, value string) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, key)
+	out.Infof("Set %s.", key)
 
 	return nil
 }

internal/cli/config_test.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	"gopkg.in/yaml.v3"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 
 // TestDefaultConfigTemplateParses ensures the init template is valid YAML
@@ -246,19 +247,20 @@ func TestWriteConfigSetHidesSecret(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	var out bytes.Buffer
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
 
-	err = writeConfigSet(&out, path, "s3.secret_access_key", secret)
+	err = writeConfigSet(ui.NewWithColor(&buf, false), path,
+		"s3.secret_access_key", secret)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("writeConfigSet: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if strings.Contains(out.String(), secret) {
+	if strings.Contains(buf.String(), secret) {
-		t.Errorf("output echoed the secret value: %q", out.String())
+		t.Errorf("output echoed the secret value: %q", buf.String())
 	}
 
-	if !strings.Contains(out.String(), "s3.secret_access_key") {
+	if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "s3.secret_access_key") {
-		t.Errorf("output did not confirm the key name: %q", out.String())
+		t.Errorf("output did not confirm the key name: %q", buf.String())
 	}
 }
 
@@ -277,9 +279,10 @@ func TestWriteConfigSetTightensMode(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	var out bytes.Buffer
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
 
-	err = writeConfigSet(&out, path, "compression_level", "9")
+	err = writeConfigSet(ui.NewWithColor(&buf, false), path,
+		"compression_level", "9")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("writeConfigSet: %v", err)
 	}

internal/cli/database.go

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ storage destination on that run.
 
 Use --force to skip the confirmation prompt.`,
 		Args: cobra.NoArgs,
-		RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 			// Resolve config path
 			configPath, err := ResolveConfigPath()
 			if err != nil {
@@ -62,26 +62,31 @@ Use --force to skip the confirmation prompt.`,
 			}
 
 			dbPath := cfg.IndexPath
+			out := commandUI(cmd)
 
 			// Check if database exists
 			_, err = os.Stat(dbPath)
 			if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "Database does not exist: %s\n", dbPath)
+				out.Infof("Local state database does not exist: %s.", dbPath)
 
 				return nil
 			}
 
-			// Confirm unless --force
+			// Confirm unless --force. The prompt and its immediate result
+			// are an interactive exchange the operator must see, so they go
+			// straight to stdout rather than through the UI and --quiet does
+			// not silence them.
 			if !force {
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout,
+				w := cmd.OutOrStdout()
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w,
 					"This will delete the local state database at:\n  %s\n\n", dbPath)
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprint(os.Stdout, "Are you sure? Type 'yes' to confirm: ")
+				_, _ = fmt.Fprint(w, "Are you sure? Type 'yes' to confirm: ")
 
 				var confirm string
 
 				_, err = fmt.Scanln(&confirm)
 				if err != nil || confirm != "yes" {
-					_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(os.Stdout, "Aborted.")
+					_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, "Aborted.")
 
 					//nolint:nilerr // a failed/aborted confirmation is a clean abort
 					return nil
@@ -100,11 +105,7 @@ Use --force to skip the confirmation prompt.`,
 			_ = os.Remove(walPath) // Ignore errors - files may not exist
 			_ = os.Remove(shmPath)
 
-			rootFlags := GetRootFlags()
+			out.Infof("Local state database deleted: %s.", dbPath)
-			if !rootFlags.Quiet {
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(os.Stdout, "Database deleted: %s\n", dbPath)
-			}
-
 			log.Info("Local state database deleted", "path", dbPath)
 
 			return nil

internal/cli/quiet_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+package cli //nolint:testpackage // sets the unexported rootFlags directly
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+)
+
+// setRootFlags overrides the global rootFlags for the duration of one
+// test and restores it afterward. These tests must not run in parallel:
+// the flags are process-global, so the whole struct is saved and put
+// back rather than left mutated for the next test.
+func setRootFlags(t *testing.T, f RootFlags) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	old := rootFlags
+	rootFlags = f
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { rootFlags = old })
+}
+
+// seedFile writes content to a fresh file and returns its path.
+func seedFile(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seeding %s: %v", name, err)
+	}
+
+	return path
+}
+
+// mustExecute runs a command with its output captured and fails the test
+// if it errors, returning what the command printed.
+func mustExecute(t *testing.T, cmd *cobra.Command, args ...string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+
+	cmd.SetOut(&out)
+	cmd.SetArgs(args)
+
+	err := cmd.Execute()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("%s failed: %v", cmd.Name(), err)
+	}
+
+	return out.String()
+}
+
+// TestVersionQuietSuppressesReport checks that --quiet silences the whole
+// version report: it is human-facing output, not a scriptable value.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestVersionQuietSuppressesReport(t *testing.T) {
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, NewVersionCommand())
+
+	if out != "" {
+		t.Errorf("--quiet version printed %q, want nothing", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestConfigGetIgnoresQuiet checks that a config value is printed even
+// under --quiet: it is scriptable output a caller depends on, so --quiet
+// must not suppress it, and it stays machine-plain (no marker, no color).
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestConfigGetIgnoresQuiet(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", "storage_url: file:///mnt/x\n")
+
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: path})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigGetCommand(), "storage_url")
+
+	if out != "file:///mnt/x\n" {
+		t.Errorf("config get --quiet = %q, want the plain value", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestConfigSetQuietSuppressesConfirmation checks that --quiet silences
+// the confirmation line while still writing the value to the file.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestConfigSetQuietSuppressesConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", "compression_level: 3\n")
+
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: path})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigSetCommand(), "compression_level", "9")
+
+	if out != "" {
+		t.Errorf("--quiet config set printed %q, want nothing", out)
+	}
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // G304: test-controlled path
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reading config back: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if !strings.Contains(string(data), "compression_level: 9") {
+		t.Errorf("config set did not write the value under --quiet:\n%s", data)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestConfigSetConfirmsWhenNotQuiet checks that the confirmation names
+// the key (styled) when --quiet is not set.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestConfigSetConfirmsWhenNotQuiet(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", "compression_level: 3\n")
+
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{ConfigPath: path})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigSetCommand(), "compression_level", "9")
+
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "compression_level") {
+		t.Errorf("config set did not confirm the key: %q", out)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestConfigInitQuietSuppressesConfirmation checks that --quiet silences
+// the "config written" confirmation while still writing the file.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestConfigInitQuietSuppressesConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "new-config.yml")
+
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: path})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, newConfigInitCommand())
+
+	if out != "" {
+		t.Errorf("--quiet config init printed %q, want nothing", out)
+	}
+
+	_, err := os.Stat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("config init did not write the file under --quiet: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// seedDatabaseDeleteConfig writes a valid config whose index_path is a
+// seeded database file, and returns both paths.
+func seedDatabaseDeleteConfig(t *testing.T, dir string) (string, string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dbPath := seedFile(t, dir, "index.sqlite", "not-a-real-db")
+	cfg := fmt.Sprintf(hermeticConfig,
+		filepath.Join(dir, "source"), filepath.Join(dir, "store"), dbPath)
+	cfgPath := seedFile(t, dir, "config.yml", cfg)
+
+	return dbPath, cfgPath
+}
+
+// TestDatabaseDeleteQuietSuppressesMessage checks that --quiet silences
+// the "database deleted" line while still removing the file.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestDatabaseDeleteQuietSuppressesMessage(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	dbPath, cfgPath := seedDatabaseDeleteConfig(t, dir)
+
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{Quiet: true, ConfigPath: cfgPath})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, newDatabaseDeleteCommand(), "--force")
+
+	if out != "" {
+		t.Errorf("--quiet database delete printed %q, want nothing", out)
+	}
+
+	_, err := os.Stat(dbPath)
+	if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		t.Errorf("database delete did not remove the file: stat err = %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDatabaseDeleteReportsWhenNotQuiet checks that the deletion is
+// reported when --quiet is not set.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // mutates the process-global rootFlags
+func TestDatabaseDeleteReportsWhenNotQuiet(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	_, cfgPath := seedDatabaseDeleteConfig(t, dir)
+
+	setRootFlags(t, RootFlags{ConfigPath: cfgPath})
+
+	out := mustExecute(t, newDatabaseDeleteCommand(), "--force")
+
+	if !strings.Contains(out, "deleted") {
+		t.Errorf("database delete did not report the deletion: %q", out)
+	}
+}

internal/cli/root.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/adrg/xdg"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 
 // errConfigNotFound is wrapped by all config-resolution failures.
@@ -81,6 +82,20 @@ func GetRootFlags() RootFlags {
 	return rootFlags
 }
 
+// commandUI returns a UI writer for a command's stdout, in quiet mode
+// when the global --quiet flag is set. This is how the pure-cli
+// commands (version, config, database) reach internal/ui: color follows
+// the writer (a TTY gets color, a captured test buffer does not), and
+// --quiet silences the same message classes it silences everywhere else.
+func commandUI(cmd *cobra.Command) *ui.Writer {
+	w := ui.New(cmd.OutOrStdout())
+	if GetRootFlags().Quiet {
+		w.SetQuiet(true)
+	}
+
+	return w
+}
+
 // ResolveConfigPath resolves the config file path from flags, environment, or default.
 // Search order: --config flag, VAULTIK_CONFIG env, XDG config dir,
 // /etc/vaultik/config.yml.

internal/cli/snapshot.go

@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ func newSnapshotVerifyCommand() *cobra.Command {
 		Long: "Checks that every blob the snapshot's manifest lists is present\n" +
 			"in storage with the size the manifest records, and that the\n" +
 			"snapshot's encrypted database is present. It does not read blob\n" +
-			"contents; use --deep to download and cryptographically verify them.\n\n" +
+			"contents; use --deep to download, decrypt, and re-hash every blob\n" +
+			"to detect corruption -- integrity, not who wrote it.\n\n" +
 			"The snapshot may be named by its ID or, on a host with no local\n" +
 			"index, by the remote key that 'snapshot list' prints for a\n" +
 			"remote-only snapshot (an unambiguous leading part is enough).",

internal/cli/snapshot_restore.go

@@ -35,8 +35,12 @@ The snapshot may be named by its ID or, when restoring on a host with no
 local index, by the remote key that 'snapshot list' prints for a
 remote-only snapshot (an unambiguous leading part is enough).
 
-Requires the VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY environment variable to be set with
+Requires the age private key in the VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY environment
-the age private key.
+variable. The variable may hold the whole age-keygen file (comments and
+all of its identities are accepted); read it from the file rather than
+typing the key, so it does not land in your shell history:
+
+  export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY="$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)"
 
 Examples:
   # Restore entire snapshot

internal/cli/snapshot_restore_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package cli //nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported command constructor
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
+)
+
+// TestRestoreCommandDoesNotTakeKeyAsArgument guards the fix for the age
+// key being echoed on the command line: restore must take the key only
+// from the environment, never as a flag value, and its help must show the
+// file-based form rather than a literal key that would land in shell
+// history.
+func TestRestoreCommandDoesNotTakeKeyAsArgument(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cmd := newSnapshotRestoreCommand()
+
+	cmd.Flags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
+		lower := strings.ToLower(f.Name)
+		for _, banned := range []string{"key", "secret", "age", "identity"} {
+			if strings.Contains(lower, banned) {
+				t.Errorf("restore must not accept the key as a flag; found --%s", f.Name)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+
+	help := cmd.Long
+	if strings.Contains(help, "AGE-SECRET-KEY-") {
+		t.Error("restore help must not show a literal age private key to type")
+	}
+
+	if !strings.Contains(help, "$(cat ") {
+		t.Error("restore help should read the key from a file, e.g. $(cat ...)")
+	}
+}

internal/cli/version.go

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ package cli
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"runtime"
 
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
 )
 
 // NewVersionCommand creates the version command
@@ -17,16 +17,25 @@ func NewVersionCommand() *cobra.Command {
 		Long:  `Print version, git commit, and build information for vaultik.`,
 		Args:  cobra.NoArgs,
 		Run: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) {
-			writeVersion(cmd.OutOrStdout())
+			writeVersion(commandUI(cmd))
 		},
 	}
 
 	return cmd
 }
 
-// writeVersion prints the version report. It takes a writer rather than
+// writeVersion prints the version report through the UI writer. The
-// using os.Stdout directly so the output can be asserted on in tests.
+// report is the output this command exists to produce, so it is written
-func writeVersion(w io.Writer) {
+// plain (markers would corrupt the aligned report) via the writer's
+// underlying stdout; --quiet silences it like any other non-error
+// output.
+func writeVersion(out *ui.Writer) {
+	if out.Quiet() {
+		return
+	}
+
+	w := out.Out()
+
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "vaultik %s\n", globals.Version)
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "  commit:     %s\n", globals.Commit)
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "  build date: %s\n", globals.CommitDate)

internal/cli/version_test.go

@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ func runVersionCommand(t *testing.T) string {
 // the report is the version the binary was actually built with. The
 // test binary carries no -ldflags, so that is the "dev" default -- the
 // same string an untagged `make vaultik` build stamps a prefix of.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // executes a command that reads the global rootFlags
 func TestVersionCommandReportsBuildVersion(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
 	out := runVersionCommand(t)
 
 	wantFirst := "vaultik " + globals.Version
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ func TestVersionCommandReportsBuildVersion(t *testing.T) {
 // being exactly "dev", so once untagged builds started carrying their
 // commit sha it would have gone silent and an unreleased binary would
 // have looked like a release.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // executes a command that reads the global rootFlags
 func TestVersionCommandFlagsDevelopmentBuild(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
 	if !globals.IsDevVersion(globals.Version) {
 		t.Skipf("test binary was stamped with release version %q",
 			globals.Version)

internal/config/config.go

@@ -135,6 +135,26 @@ func (c *Config) SnapshotNames() []string {
 	return names
 }
 
+// Names of the two places the age secret key can be configured, used by
+// AgeSecretKeySourceName for error messages that must not echo the value.
+//
+//nolint:gosec // G101: these are the names of the config sources, not a key
+const (
+	ageSecretKeySourceEnv    = "VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY"
+	ageSecretKeySourceConfig = "age_secret_key"
+)
+
+// AgeSecretKeySourceName returns the human name of where AgeSecretKey was
+// configured. A Config built directly (as in tests) has no recorded
+// source, so it reports the config-file field name.
+func (c *Config) AgeSecretKeySourceName() string {
+	if c.AgeSecretKeySource != "" {
+		return c.AgeSecretKeySource
+	}
+
+	return ageSecretKeySourceConfig
+}
+
 // Config represents the application configuration for Vaultik.
 // It defines all settings for backup operations, including source directories,
 // encryption recipients, storage configuration, and performance tuning parameters.
@@ -144,6 +164,11 @@ func (c *Config) SnapshotNames() []string {
 type Config struct {
 	AgeRecipients []string `yaml:"age_recipients"`
 	AgeSecretKey  string   `yaml:"age_secret_key"`
+	// AgeSecretKeySource names where AgeSecretKey was configured
+	// ("VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY" or "age_secret_key") so a later parse
+	// failure can name the source without echoing the secret value. It is
+	// set by Load and never read from or written to the config file.
+	AgeSecretKeySource string `yaml:"-"`
 	BlobSizeLimit      Size   `yaml:"blob_size_limit"`
 	ChunkSize          Size   `yaml:"chunk_size"`
 	// Exclude holds global excludes applied to all snapshots.
@@ -254,10 +279,7 @@ func Load(path string) (*Config, error) {
 		cfg.IndexPath = expandTilde(envIndexPath)
 	}
 
-	// Check for environment variable override for AgeSecretKey
+	cfg.setAgeSecretKey()
-	if envAgeSecretKey := os.Getenv("VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY"); envAgeSecretKey != "" {
-		cfg.AgeSecretKey = extractAgeSecretKey(envAgeSecretKey)
-	}
 
 	// Get hostname if not set
 	if cfg.Hostname == "" {
@@ -379,6 +401,21 @@ func validateAgeRecipient(recipient string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// setAgeSecretKey records the age secret key and where it came from. The
+// value is stored raw and parsed only where decryption happens
+// (internal/vaultik), so backup, list and prune keep working whatever the
+// field holds. The environment variable overrides the config-file field.
+func (c *Config) setAgeSecretKey() {
+	if c.AgeSecretKey != "" {
+		c.AgeSecretKeySource = ageSecretKeySourceConfig
+	}
+
+	if env := os.Getenv("VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY"); env != "" {
+		c.AgeSecretKey = env
+		c.AgeSecretKeySource = ageSecretKeySourceEnv
+	}
+}
+
 // validateStorage validates storage configuration.
 // If StorageURL is set, it takes precedence. S3 URLs require credentials.
 // File URLs don't require any S3 configuration.
@@ -435,22 +472,6 @@ func (c *Config) validateStorageURL() error {
 	}
 }
 
-// extractAgeSecretKey extracts the AGE-SECRET-KEY from the input using
-// the age library's parser, which handles comments and whitespace.
-func extractAgeSecretKey(input string) string {
-	identities, err := age.ParseIdentities(strings.NewReader(input))
-	if err != nil || len(identities) == 0 {
-		// Fall back to trimmed input if parsing fails
-		return strings.TrimSpace(input)
-	}
-	// Return the string representation of the first identity
-	if id, ok := identities[0].(*age.X25519Identity); ok {
-		return id.String()
-	}
-
-	return strings.TrimSpace(input)
-}
-
 // Module exports the config module for fx dependency injection.
 // It provides the Config type to other modules in the application.
 //

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package config //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported extractAgeSecretKey
+package config //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported source constants
 
 import (
 	"errors"
@@ -298,53 +298,31 @@ func TestValidateAgeRecipients(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestExtractAgeSecretKey tests extraction of AGE-SECRET-KEY from various inputs
+// TestAgeSecretKeySourceName checks the name reported for the configured
-func TestExtractAgeSecretKey(t *testing.T) {
+// age secret key: the recorded source when Load set one, and the
+// config-file field name for a Config built directly (as in tests).
+func TestAgeSecretKeySourceName(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	tests := []struct {
 		name   string
-		input    string
+		source string
-		expected string
+		want   string
 	}{
 		{
-			name:     "plain key",
+			name:   "unset defaults to config field",
-			input:    testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
+			source: "",
-			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
+			want:   ageSecretKeySourceConfig,
 		},
 		{
-			name:     "key with trailing newline",
+			name:   "environment source",
-			input:    testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "\n",
+			source: ageSecretKeySourceEnv,
-			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
+			want:   ageSecretKeySourceEnv,
 		},
 		{
-			name: "full age-keygen output",
+			name:   "config-file source",
-			input: "# created: 2025-01-14T12:00:00Z\n" +
+			source: ageSecretKeySourceConfig,
-				"# public key: " + testIntegrationAgePublicKey + "\n" +
+			want:   ageSecretKeySourceConfig,
-				testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "\n",
-			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
-		},
-		{
-			name: "age-keygen output with extra blank lines",
-			input: "# created: 2025-01-14T12:00:00Z\n" +
-				"# public key: " + testIntegrationAgePublicKey + "\n\n" +
-				testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "\n\n",
-			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "key with leading whitespace",
-			input:    "  " + testIntegrationAgePrivateKey + "  ",
-			expected: testIntegrationAgePrivateKey,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "empty input",
-			input:    "",
-			expected: "",
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "only comments",
-			input:    "# this is a comment\n# another comment",
-			expected: "# this is a comment\n# another comment",
 		},
 	}
 
@@ -352,10 +330,9 @@ func TestExtractAgeSecretKey(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 
-			result := extractAgeSecretKey(tt.input)
+			cfg := &Config{AgeSecretKeySource: tt.source}
-			if result != tt.expected {
+			if got := cfg.AgeSecretKeySourceName(); got != tt.want {
-				t.Errorf("extractAgeSecretKey(%q) = %q, want %q",
+				t.Errorf("AgeSecretKeySourceName() = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
-					tt.input, result, tt.expected)
 			}
 		})
 	}

internal/database/database.go

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@
 //
 // Blobs in Vaultik are the final storage units uploaded to S3. Each blob is a
 // large (up to 10GB) file containing many compressed and encrypted chunks from
-// multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed, meaning their filename
+// multiple source files. Blobs are content-addressed: the filename in S3 is
-// is derived from their SHA256 hash after compression and encryption.
+// hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed from the chunk data
+// before compression and encryption (not from the stored bytes). See
+// blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md.
 //
 // Schema is managed via numbered SQL migrations embedded in the schema/
 // directory. Migration 000.sql bootstraps the schema_migrations tracking

internal/database/models.go

@@ -51,15 +51,15 @@ type Chunk struct {
 // Blob represents a blob record in the database.
 // A blob is Vaultik's final storage unit - a large file (up to 10GB) containing
 // many compressed and encrypted chunks from multiple source files.
-// Blobs are content-addressed, meaning their filename in S3 is derived from
+// Blobs are content-addressed: the filename in S3 is
-// the SHA256 hash of their compressed and encrypted content.
+// hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed from the chunk data
-// The blob creation process is: chunks are accumulated -> compressed with zstd
+// before compression and encryption (not from the stored bytes). See
-// -> encrypted with age -> hashed -> uploaded to S3 with the hash as filename.
+// blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md.
 type Blob struct {
 	ID types.BlobID // UUID assigned when blob creation starts
 
-	// Hash is the SHA256 of the final compressed+encrypted content
+	// Hash is hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents)))
-	// (empty until finalized).
+	// (empty until finalized); see the type comment above.
 	Hash             types.BlobHash
 	CreatedTS        time.Time  // When blob creation started
 	FinishedTS       *time.Time // When blob was finalized (nil if still packing)

internal/database/snapshots.go

@@ -11,6 +11,18 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
 )
 
+// Sentinel errors for the single-snapshot invariant that an exported
+// per-snapshot metadata database must satisfy.
+var (
+	// ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase means the metadata database has no snapshot
+	// row at all.
+	ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase = errors.New("database contains no snapshot")
+	// ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase means the metadata database holds
+	// more than the single snapshot an export is supposed to contain.
+	ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase = errors.New(
+		"database contains more than one snapshot")
+)
+
 // SnapshotRepository provides access to the snapshots table and its
 // snapshot_files / snapshot_blobs association tables.
 type SnapshotRepository struct {
@@ -206,6 +218,48 @@ func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetByID(
 	return &snapshot, nil
 }
 
+// GetOnlySnapshot returns the sole snapshot in an exported per-snapshot
+// metadata database. The backup path writes each snapshot's database with
+// exactly one snapshot row (see cleanSnapshotDB), so restore and deep
+// verify expect exactly one. Zero rows return ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase and
+// more than one returns ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase; callers treat
+// either as a failed identity check on the downloaded database.
+func (r *SnapshotRepository) GetOnlySnapshot(ctx context.Context) (*Snapshot, error) {
+	query := `
+		SELECT id, hostname, vaultik_version, vaultik_git_revision,
+			started_at, completed_at, file_count, chunk_count, blob_count,
+			total_size, blob_size, compression_ratio
+		FROM snapshots
+		LIMIT 2
+	`
+
+	rows, err := r.db.conn.QueryContext(ctx, query)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("querying snapshots: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	defer func() {
+		err := rows.Close()
+		if err != nil {
+			Fatalf("failed to close rows: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	snapshots, err := r.scanSnapshotRows(rows)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	switch len(snapshots) {
+	case 1:
+		return snapshots[0], nil
+	case 0:
+		return nil, ErrNoSnapshotInDatabase
+	default:
+		return nil, ErrMultipleSnapshotsInDatabase
+	}
+}
+
 // ListRecent returns up to limit snapshots, most recently started first.
 func (r *SnapshotRepository) ListRecent(
 	ctx context.Context, limit int,

internal/log/tty_escape_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package log_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
+)
+
+// TestTTYHandlerEscapesControlCharacters logs a message and an attribute
+// value that each carry an ESC and a newline — the shape a crafted path or
+// storage error from the destination would take — and checks neither raw
+// byte reaches the output. The handler's own colour codes (ESC ... m) are
+// stripped first; any ESC left after that came from the untrusted value.
+func TestTTYHandlerEscapesControlCharacters(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+
+	logger := slog.New(log.NewTTYHandler(&buf, debugHandlerOptions()))
+	logger.Info("start\x1b[31mZAP\nend", "target", "a\x1b[31mZAP\nb")
+
+	out := buf.String()
+
+	// The only newline is the line terminator; the injected ones were escaped.
+	require.Equal(t, 1, strings.Count(out, "\n"),
+		"a newline in the message or a value must be escaped, not emitted raw")
+
+	// After the handler's own colour codes are removed, no ESC survives.
+	stripped := ansiEscape.ReplaceAllString(out, "")
+	require.NotContains(t, stripped, "\x1b",
+		"a raw ESC from the message or a value must not reach the terminal")
+
+	// The escaped form is what appears instead.
+	require.Contains(t, out, `\x1b`)
+}

internal/log/tty_handler.go

@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
+	"unicode"
 )
 
 // groupSeparator joins an open group path to an attribute key. This
@@ -116,11 +118,14 @@ func (h *TTYHandler) Handle(_ context.Context, r slog.Record) error {
 		levelColor = colorReset
 	}
 
-	// Print main message
+	// Print main message. The message is escaped before the colour codes
+	// are written around it: it can carry text from an untrusted source
+	// (a storage error, for one), and a raw control character would
+	// otherwise reach the terminal.
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(h.out, "%s%s%s %s%s%s %s%s%s",
 		colorGray, timestamp, colorReset,
 		levelColor, level, colorReset,
-		colorBold, r.Message, colorReset)
+		colorBold, sanitize(r.Message), colorReset)
 
 	// Attributes carried by the handler come first, then the record's
 	// own. Handler attributes were qualified when they were added; the
@@ -260,9 +265,29 @@ func (h *TTYHandler) writeAttr(a slog.Attr) {
 		// Future kinds also use the plain string form.
 	}
 
+	// Escape the key and value before the colour codes are written around
+	// them. Both can carry text from an untrusted source — a manifest
+	// timestamp, a storage error, a path or symlink target read back from
+	// the snapshot database — so a control character in one of them must
+	// be rendered as an escape sequence rather than reaching the terminal,
+	// where it could move the cursor or inject its own colours.
 	_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(h.out, " %s%s%s=%s%s%s",
-		colorCyan, a.Key, colorReset,
+		colorCyan, sanitize(a.Key), colorReset,
-		colorBlue, value, colorReset)
+		colorBlue, sanitize(value), colorReset)
+}
+
+// sanitize returns s unchanged when every rune in it is printable, and a
+// double-quoted, backslash-escaped form (\n, \x1b, …) otherwise. It is
+// applied to untrusted text before any colour code is written, so a
+// control character can never reach the terminal raw.
+func sanitize(s string) string {
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if !unicode.IsPrint(r) {
+			return strconv.Quote(s)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return s
 }
 
 // formatDuration formats a duration in a human-readable way

internal/snapshot/manifest.go

@@ -7,6 +7,19 @@ import (
 	"io"
 
 	"github.com/klauspost/compress/zstd"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
+)
+
+// Manifest size bounds. A manifest lists one small entry per blob, and
+// blobs are large (the default target is 10 GB), so even a manifest for a
+// petabyte-scale backup is a few megabytes. These caps are far above any
+// manifest the writer can emit, yet stop a crafted, highly compressible
+// manifest from expanding without limit when decoded: the manifest is
+// fetched from the store, which is not trusted, and json.Decode buffers
+// the whole value in memory.
+const (
+	manifestMaxCompressed   = 256 * 1024 * 1024  // 256 MiB
+	manifestMaxDecompressed = 1024 * 1024 * 1024 // 1 GiB
 )
 
 // Manifest represents the structure of a snapshot's blob manifest
@@ -28,19 +41,31 @@ type BlobInfo struct {
 	CompressedSize int64  `json:"compressed_size"`
 }
 
-// DecodeManifest decodes a manifest from a reader containing compressed JSON
+// DecodeManifest decodes a manifest from a reader containing compressed
+// JSON, reading through byte limits on both the compressed input and the
+// decompressed output so an untrusted manifest cannot exhaust memory.
 func DecodeManifest(r io.Reader) (*Manifest, error) {
-	// Decompress using zstd
+	return decodeManifest(r, manifestMaxCompressed, manifestMaxDecompressed)
-	zr, err := zstd.NewReader(r)
+}
+
+// decodeManifest is DecodeManifest with explicit limits, so tests can drive
+// the bounds with small inputs instead of gigabyte-scale ones.
+func decodeManifest(
+	r io.Reader, maxCompressed, maxDecompressed int64,
+) (*Manifest, error) {
+	// Decompress using zstd, bounding how many compressed bytes are read.
+	zr, err := zstd.NewReader(blobgen.LimitReader(r, maxCompressed))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating zstd reader: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer zr.Close()
 
-	// Decode JSON manifest
+	// Decode JSON manifest, bounding how far the compressed input may
+	// expand: json.Decode buffers the whole value, so without this a
+	// small, highly compressible manifest could expand to gigabytes.
 	var manifest Manifest
 
-	err = json.NewDecoder(zr).Decode(&manifest)
+	err = json.NewDecoder(blobgen.LimitReader(zr, maxDecompressed)).Decode(&manifest)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("decoding manifest: %w", err)
 	}

internal/snapshot/manifest_bound_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+//nolint:testpackage // exercises the unexported decodeManifest bounds
+package snapshot
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
+)
+
+// testSnapshotID is a stand-in snapshot ID reused across the bound cases.
+const testSnapshotID = "host_home_2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
+
+// TestDecodeManifestRoundTrip is the baseline: with generous bounds a
+// manifest the writer produced decodes back unchanged.
+func TestDecodeManifestRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	want := &Manifest{
+		SnapshotID:          testSnapshotID,
+		Timestamp:           "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+		BlobCount:           2,
+		TotalCompressedSize: 42,
+		Blobs: []BlobInfo{
+			{Hash: "aa", CompressedSize: 21},
+			{Hash: "bb", CompressedSize: 21},
+		},
+	}
+
+	compressed, err := EncodeManifest(want, 3)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	got, err := decodeManifest(
+		bytes.NewReader(compressed), manifestMaxCompressed, manifestMaxDecompressed)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, want, got)
+}
+
+// TestDecodeManifestBoundsDecompressedOutput feeds a valid but highly
+// compressible manifest — one whose timestamp is a megabyte of the same
+// character — through a small decompressed bound. The compressed form is
+// tiny, so only the decompressed bound stops it; decoding must fail within
+// that bound rather than expanding the value in memory.
+func TestDecodeManifestBoundsDecompressedOutput(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	bomb := &Manifest{
+		SnapshotID: testSnapshotID,
+		Timestamp:  strings.Repeat("a", 1<<20),
+	}
+
+	compressed, err := EncodeManifest(bomb, 3)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Less(t, len(compressed), 4096,
+		"the compressible manifest must be small compressed")
+
+	_, err = decodeManifest(bytes.NewReader(compressed), 1<<20, 4096)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge)
+}
+
+// TestDecodeManifestBoundsCompressedInput checks the compressed-input
+// bound fires independently: a valid manifest with a generous decompressed
+// bound but a tiny compressed bound still fails.
+func TestDecodeManifestBoundsCompressedInput(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	manifest := &Manifest{
+		SnapshotID: testSnapshotID,
+		Timestamp:  strings.Repeat("a", 4096),
+	}
+
+	compressed, err := EncodeManifest(manifest, 3)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = decodeManifest(bytes.NewReader(compressed), 8, manifestMaxDecompressed)
+	require.Error(t, err)
+}

internal/snapshot/scanner.go

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ type ScannerConfig struct {
 	Storage          storage.Storer
 	MaxBlobSize      int64
 	CompressionLevel int
-	AgeRecipients    []string   // Optional, empty means no encryption
+	AgeRecipients    []string   // required; output is always encrypted
 	EnableProgress   bool       // Enable the live progress reporter (ETAs, throughput)
 	UI               *ui.Writer // Where user-facing scanner messages go; nil = discard
 	Exclude          []string   // Glob patterns for files/directories to exclude

internal/snapshot/snapshot.go

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ package snapshot
 // 7. Close the temporary database
 // 8. VACUUM the database to remove deleted data and compact (security critical)
 // 9. Compress the binary database with zstd
-// 10. Encrypt the compressed database with age (if encryption is enabled)
+// 10. Encrypt the compressed database with age (always; recipients are required)
 // 11. Upload to S3 as: metadata/{snapshot-id}/db.zst.age
 // 12. Reopen the main database
 //
@@ -201,11 +201,14 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) UpdateSnapshotStatsExtended(
 	})
 }
 
-// CompleteSnapshot marks a snapshot as completed and ensures snapshot_blobs
+// PopulateSnapshotBlobs ensures snapshot_blobs holds an entry for every
-// is populated with every blob holding any chunk referenced by the
+// blob that stores a chunk referenced by the snapshot's files, including
-// snapshot's files (including deduplicated blobs uploaded by prior
+// blobs deduplicated from earlier snapshots. Without it, a fully
-// snapshots). Without this, fully-deduplicated snapshots are unrestorable.
+// deduplicated snapshot would record no blobs and be unrestorable.
-func (sm *SnapshotManager) CompleteSnapshot(
+//
+// This must run before ExportSnapshotMetadata: the blob manifest and the
+// trimmed metadata database are both built from snapshot_blobs.
+func (sm *SnapshotManager) PopulateSnapshotBlobs(
 	ctx context.Context, snapshotID string,
 ) error {
 	err := sm.repos.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
@@ -219,6 +222,25 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) CompleteSnapshot(
 				"snapshot_id", snapshotID, "added", added)
 		}
 
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("populating snapshot blobs: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// MarkSnapshotComplete records the snapshot's completion timestamp. On the
+// backup path this runs only after ExportSnapshotMetadata has succeeded, so
+// the local index never marks a snapshot complete while the destination
+// holds no manifest or database for it. A crash before this point leaves the
+// snapshot incomplete, and the next run's PruneDatabase drops it. See
+// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177.
+func (sm *SnapshotManager) MarkSnapshotComplete(
+	ctx context.Context, snapshotID string,
+) error {
+	err := sm.repos.WithTx(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx) error {
 		return sm.repos.Snapshots.MarkComplete(ctx, tx, snapshotID)
 	})
 	if err != nil {
@@ -230,6 +252,22 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) CompleteSnapshot(
 	return nil
 }
 
+// CompleteSnapshot populates snapshot_blobs and then marks the snapshot
+// complete. The backup path (finalizeSnapshotMetadata) instead calls the two
+// halves separately, with the metadata export between them, so completion is
+// recorded only after a successful export. This convenience is for callers
+// that do not interleave an export.
+func (sm *SnapshotManager) CompleteSnapshot(
+	ctx context.Context, snapshotID string,
+) error {
+	err := sm.PopulateSnapshotBlobs(ctx, snapshotID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return sm.MarkSnapshotComplete(ctx, snapshotID)
+}
+
 // ExportSnapshotMetadata exports snapshot metadata to S3
 //
 // This method executes the complete snapshot metadata export process:
@@ -238,14 +276,12 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) CompleteSnapshot(
 // 3. Cleans the copy to contain only current snapshot data
 // 4. Dumps the cleaned database to SQL
 // 5. Compresses the SQL dump with zstd
-// 6. Encrypts the compressed data (if encryption is enabled)
+// 6. Encrypts the compressed data with age (always; recipients are required)
 // 7. Uploads to S3 at: snapshots/{snapshot-id}.sql.zst[.age]
 //
-// The caller is responsible for:
+// The only caller (finalizeSnapshotMetadata) does not close the main database
-// - Ensuring the main database is closed before calling this method
+// before calling this method: the index is copied at dbPath while it is still
-// - Reopening the main database after this method returns
+// open, and every step here operates on that copy, never on the live index.
-//
-// This ensures database consistency during the copy operation.
 func (sm *SnapshotManager) ExportSnapshotMetadata(
 	ctx context.Context, dbPath string, snapshotID string,
 ) error {
@@ -415,9 +451,11 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) prepareExportDB(
 // uploadSnapshotArtifacts uploads the database backup and blob manifest
 // to remote storage at metadata/<remote-key>/, where remote-key is the
 // double-SHA256 derivation of the snapshot ID (see RemoteSnapshotKey).
-// We never write the human-readable snapshot ID into any unencrypted
+// The human-readable snapshot ID is never written into an unencrypted part
-// part of remote storage so a listing of the destination bucket leaks
+// of remote storage, so a plain listing shows only the hashed key, not the
-// no host, configuration, or scheduling information.
+// hostname or snapshot name. The hash uses no secret, so a guessed hostname
+// and snapshot name can still be confirmed against a listing, and the backup
+// time is public: the manifest carries a plaintext timestamp.
 func (sm *SnapshotManager) uploadSnapshotArtifacts(
 	ctx context.Context, snapshotID string, dbData, manifestData []byte,
 ) error {
@@ -814,10 +852,11 @@ func (sm *SnapshotManager) generateBlobManifest(
 	}
 
 	// Create manifest. SnapshotID in the unencrypted manifest is the
-	// double-SHA256 remote key (see RemoteSnapshotKey), not the human ID,
+	// double-SHA256 remote key (see RemoteSnapshotKey), not the human ID, so
-	// so neither this field nor the directory name reveals the hostname or
+	// neither this field nor the directory name spells out the hostname or
-	// snapshot name. Timestamp below is written in the clear, so the backup
+	// snapshot name — but the key uses no secret, so a guessed hostname and
-	// time is observable to anyone who can read the manifest.
+	// snapshot name can be confirmed. Timestamp below is written in the clear,
+	// so the backup time is observable to anyone who can read the manifest.
 	manifest := &Manifest{
 		SnapshotID:          RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID),
 		Timestamp:           time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),

internal/types/types.go

@@ -146,8 +146,10 @@ type SnapshotID string
 // Used for content-addressing and deduplication of file chunks.
 type ChunkHash string
 
-// BlobHash is the SHA256 hash of a blob's compressed and encrypted content.
+// BlobHash is hex(SHA256(SHA256(uncompressed blob contents))), computed before
-// This is used as the filename in S3 storage for content-addressed retrieval.
+// compression and encryption (see blobgen.DoubleSHA256 and
+// docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md). It is used as the filename in S3 storage for
+// content-addressed retrieval.
 type BlobHash string
 
 // FilePath represents an absolute path to a file or directory.

internal/ui/ui.go

@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os"
+	"strconv"
 	"time"
+	"unicode"
 
 	"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
 	"golang.org/x/term"
@@ -225,17 +227,17 @@ func (w *Writer) Hex(s string) string {
 		short = s[:hexAbbrevLen] + "..."
 	}
 
-	return w.paint(ansiCyan, short)
+	return w.paint(ansiCyan, sanitize(short))
 }
 
 // Snapshot colorizes a snapshot ID (full, no abbreviation).
 func (w *Writer) Snapshot(id string) string {
-	return w.paint(ansiCyan+ansiBold, id)
+	return w.paint(ansiCyan+ansiBold, sanitize(id))
 }
 
 // Path colorizes a filesystem path.
 func (w *Writer) Path(p string) string {
-	return w.paint(ansiBlue, p)
+	return w.paint(ansiBlue, sanitize(p))
 }
 
 // Size colorizes a byte count using humanize.Bytes.
@@ -310,6 +312,23 @@ func (w *Writer) paint(color, s string) string {
 	return color + s + ansiReset
 }
 
+// sanitize returns s unchanged when every rune in it is printable, and a
+// double-quoted, backslash-escaped form (\n, \x1b, …) otherwise. The
+// string value formatters escape their argument through this before
+// painting: identifiers, paths and symlink targets they render come from
+// the snapshot database, which is not trusted, and escaping must happen
+// before colour is applied — the painted result already contains the
+// escape codes the raw text would otherwise be indistinguishable from.
+func sanitize(s string) string {
+	for _, r := range s {
+		if !unicode.IsPrint(r) {
+			return strconv.Quote(s)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return s
+}
+
 // emit writes "<prefix> <body>\n" with the prefix painted in prefixColor
 // and the body optionally painted in bodyColor (empty = no body color).
 func (w *Writer) emit(prefixColor, prefix, bodyColor, format string, args []any) {

internal/ui/ui_escape_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+package ui_test
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestValueFormattersEscapeControlCharacters checks that a path carrying an
+// ESC and a newline — the shape a symlink target read back from the
+// snapshot database could take — is escaped before it reaches the output.
+// Colour is off here, so the only way a control byte could appear is from
+// the value itself.
+func TestValueFormattersEscapeControlCharacters(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	w, buf := newTestWriter(false)
+	w.Infof("restoring %s", w.Path("a\x1b[31mZAP\nb"))
+
+	out := buf.String()
+
+	if strings.ContainsRune(out, '\x1b') {
+		t.Fatalf("raw ESC from a value survived in output: %q", out)
+	}
+
+	if strings.Count(out, "\n") != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("a newline in a value must be escaped, not emitted raw: %q", out)
+	}
+
+	if !strings.Contains(out, `\x1b`) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected the escaped form of ESC in output: %q", out)
+	}
+}

internal/vaultik/blob_fetch.go

@@ -6,11 +6,9 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"time"
 
 	"filippo.io/age"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
 )
 
 // errBlobHashMismatch is returned when a fetched blob's content hash does
@@ -30,13 +28,14 @@ var errBlobNotFullyRead = errors.New(
 // redundant SHA-256 computation.
 type hashVerifyReader struct {
 	reader   *blobgen.Reader // underlying decrypted blob reader (has internal hasher)
+	limited  io.Reader       // reader bounded to the blob's recorded plaintext size
 	fetcher  io.ReadCloser   // raw fetched stream (closed on Close)
 	blobHash string          // expected double-SHA-256 hex
 	done     bool            // EOF reached
 }
 
 func (h *hashVerifyReader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	n, err := h.reader.Read(p)
+	n, err := h.limited.Read(p)
 	if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
 		h.done = true
 	}
@@ -73,15 +72,22 @@ func (h *hashVerifyReader) Close() error {
 // returns a streaming reader that computes the double-SHA-256 hash on the fly.
 // The hash is verified when the returned reader is closed (after fully reading).
 // This avoids buffering the entire blob in memory.
+//
+// maxPlaintextSize is the blob's uncompressed_size as recorded in the
+// snapshot database. Decompression stops with blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge
+// once the plaintext exceeds it, so a tampered blob cannot expand without
+// limit — using the recorded size, not the restoring host's
+// blob_size_limit, since that config may differ from the backup host's.
 func (v *Vaultik) FetchAndDecryptBlob(
-	ctx context.Context, blobHash string, expectedSize int64, identity age.Identity,
+	ctx context.Context, blobHash string, maxPlaintextSize int64,
+	identities ...age.Identity,
 ) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
-	rc, _, err := v.FetchBlob(ctx, blobHash, expectedSize)
+	rc, err := v.FetchBlob(ctx, blobHash)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(rc, identity)
+	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(rc, identities...)
 	if err != nil {
 		_ = rc.Close()
 
@@ -90,52 +96,29 @@ func (v *Vaultik) FetchAndDecryptBlob(
 
 	return &hashVerifyReader{
 		reader:   reader,
+		limited:  blobgen.LimitReader(reader, maxPlaintextSize),
 		fetcher:  rc,
 		blobHash: blobHash,
 	}, nil
 }
 
 // FetchBlob downloads a blob and returns a reader for the encrypted data.
-// Times the Storage.Get and Storage.Stat round-trips separately at
-// debug level so we can see whether the size-only Stat (which is an
-// extra request on every fetch) is hurting throughput.
 func (v *Vaultik) FetchBlob(
-	ctx context.Context, blobHash string, expectedSize int64,
+	ctx context.Context, blobHash string,
-) (io.ReadCloser, int64, error) {
+) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
 	// blobHash reaches here from the snapshot database, which is not
 	// trusted. Reject a malformed hash before it is spliced into a storage
 	// path (blobHash[:2]/blobHash[2:4]) or a fetch is attempted.
 	if !isBlobHash(blobHash) {
-		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidBlobHash, shortHash(blobHash))
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errInvalidBlobHash, shortHash(blobHash))
 	}
 
 	blobPath := fmt.Sprintf("blobs/%s/%s/%s", blobHash[:2], blobHash[2:4], blobHash)
 
-	t0 := time.Now()
 	rc, err := v.Storage.Get(ctx, blobPath)
-	getDur := time.Since(t0)
-
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("downloading blob %s: %w", shortHash(blobHash), err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("downloading blob %s: %w", shortHash(blobHash), err)
 	}
 
-	t0 = time.Now()
+	return rc, nil
-	info, err := v.Storage.Stat(ctx, blobPath)
-	statDur := time.Since(t0)
-
-	if err != nil {
-		_ = rc.Close()
-
-		return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("stat blob %s: %w", shortHash(blobHash), err)
-	}
-
-	log.Debug("FetchBlob round-trips",
-		"hash", shortHash(blobHash),
-		"ms_storage_get", getDur.Milliseconds(),
-		"ms_storage_stat", statDur.Milliseconds(),
-		"expected_size", expectedSize,
-		"stat_size", info.Size,
-	)
-
-	return rc, info.Size, nil
 }

internal/vaultik/blob_fetch_bound_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+package vaultik_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"filippo.io/age"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
+)
+
+// TestFetchAndDecryptBlobBoundsPlaintext feeds a small, highly
+// compressible blob (256 KiB of zeros) whose decompressed size far exceeds
+// the plaintext bound passed to FetchAndDecryptBlob. Decompression must
+// stop with blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge within the bound rather than
+// expanding the whole blob into the restore cache.
+func TestFetchAndDecryptBlobBoundsPlaintext(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	plaintext := make([]byte, 256*1024)
+	encryptedData, correctHash := buildHashTestBlob(t, identity, plaintext)
+
+	mockStorage := NewMockStorer()
+	blobPath := "blobs/" + correctHash[:2] + "/" +
+		correctHash[2:4] + "/" + correctHash
+
+	mockStorage.mu.Lock()
+	mockStorage.data[blobPath] = encryptedData
+	mockStorage.mu.Unlock()
+
+	tv := vaultik.NewForTesting(mockStorage)
+
+	const maxPlaintext = 1024
+
+	rc, err := tv.FetchAndDecryptBlob(
+		context.Background(), correctHash, maxPlaintext, identity)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	n, copyErr := io.Copy(io.Discard, rc)
+	_ = rc.Close()
+
+	require.ErrorIs(t, copyErr, blobgen.ErrOutputTooLarge)
+	require.LessOrEqual(t, n, int64(maxPlaintext)+1,
+		"decompression must stop within the recorded plaintext bound")
+}

internal/vaultik/blob_fetch_hash_test.go

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ func TestFetchBlobRejectsMalformedHash(t *testing.T) {
 		strings.Repeat("A", 64), // uppercase hex is not accepted
 		strings.Repeat("g", 64), // not hex
 	} {
-		_, _, err := tv.FetchBlob(ctx, bad, 0)
+		_, err := tv.FetchBlob(ctx, bad)
 		if err == nil {
 			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed hash %q, got nil", bad)
 		}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestFetchAndDecryptBlobVerifiesHash(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Parallel()
 
 		rc, err := tv.FetchAndDecryptBlob(
-			ctx, correctHash, int64(len(encryptedData)), identity)
+			ctx, correctHash, int64(len(plaintext)), identity)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("expected success, got error: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func TestFetchAndDecryptBlobVerifiesHash(t *testing.T) {
 		mockStorage.mu.Unlock()
 
 		rc, err := tv.FetchAndDecryptBlob(
-			ctx, fakeHash, int64(len(encryptedData)), identity)
+			ctx, fakeHash, int64(len(plaintext)), identity)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("unexpected error opening stream: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ func TestFetchAndDecryptBlobCloseBeforeEOFFails(t *testing.T) {
 	tv := vaultik.NewForTesting(mockStorage)
 
 	rc, err := tv.FetchAndDecryptBlob(
-		context.Background(), correctHash, int64(len(encryptedData)), identity)
+		context.Background(), correctHash, int64(len(plaintext)), identity)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error opening stream: %v", err)
 	}

internal/vaultik/destination_validation_test.go

@@ -54,6 +54,51 @@ func TestBlobCacheRejectsKeyWithSeparator(t *testing.T) {
 		"cache wrote outside its directory at %s", target)
 }
 
+// TestBuildBlobIndexesRejectsHostileHash proves restore refuses a snapshot
+// database whose blob_hash escapes the cache directory. buildBlobIndexes is
+// the first place restore reads these hashes back, and it fails there, before
+// any blob is fetched or written, so a hash containing /../ cannot steer a
+// later write outside the cache directory.
+func TestBuildBlobIndexesRejectsHostileHash(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	db, err := database.New(ctx, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "index.sqlite"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer func() { _ = db.Close() }()
+
+	// A blob cache and a target file just outside it. The hostile hash is
+	// the relative path from the cache to that target, so an unguarded
+	// restore keyed by this hash would write there.
+	cache, err := newBlobDiskCache(1 << 20)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	defer func() { _ = cache.Close() }()
+
+	target := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "pwned")
+	hostile, err := filepath.Rel(cache.dir, target)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Contains(t, hostile, "..")
+
+	repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
+	require.NoError(t, repos.Blobs.Create(ctx, nil, &database.Blob{
+		ID:        types.NewBlobID(),
+		Hash:      types.BlobHash(hostile),
+		CreatedTS: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}))
+
+	v := NewForTesting(nil)
+	v.SetContext(ctx)
+
+	_, _, err = v.buildBlobIndexes(repos)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidBlobHash)
+
+	_, statErr := os.Stat(target)
+	require.Truef(t, os.IsNotExist(statErr),
+		"restore wrote outside the cache directory at %s", target)
+}
+
 // TestBlobCacheReadAtRejectsBadBounds proves a blob_chunks row cannot
 // drive an out-of-range or negative read. offset/length reach ReadAt
 // straight from the database.

internal/vaultik/fault_injection_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/globals"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
@@ -417,9 +418,10 @@ func TestBackupRetryAfterInterruptedUploadIsRestorable(t *testing.T) {
 // database is uploaded but before the manifest. The destination is left
 // with blobs and a database but no manifest. verify and snapshot list
 // must report the damage honestly rather than crashing or passing.
-// Automatic detection and repair of this partial state on the next run
+// Automatic detection and repair of this partial state on the next run is
-// is tracked in https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177 and is not
+// covered by TestBackupCompletesOnlyAfterMetadataExport
-// asserted here.
+// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177); this test exercises the
+// lower-level export path in isolation.
 //
 //nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
 func TestBackupSurvivesMetadataExportInterruption(t *testing.T) {
@@ -496,6 +498,186 @@ func TestBackupSurvivesMetadataExportInterruption(t *testing.T) {
 		"snapshot list must tolerate a partially-exported snapshot")
 }
 
+// Scenario 2, repair: the process dies during the metadata export of a
+// full backup run. Because completion is recorded only after the export
+// succeeds (finalizeSnapshotMetadata), the interrupted snapshot is left
+// incomplete rather than silently marked complete without metadata at the
+// destination. Rerunning the backup must then prune the incomplete
+// snapshot, produce a snapshot whose destination metadata and local index
+// agree, and restore. See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177.
+//
+//nolint:paralleltest // installs the global logger via log.Initialize
+func TestBackupCompletesOnlyAfterMetadataExport(t *testing.T) {
+	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
+
+	fs := afero.NewOsFs()
+	tempDir := t.TempDir()
+	dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "src")
+	storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
+	restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	testFiles := writeFaultSourceTree(t, fs, dataDir)
+
+	// A full-backup config: the fault-test defaults plus the fields the
+	// production create path reads (index location, chunk size, and the
+	// named snapshot to back up).
+	cfg := faultTestConfig()
+	cfg.IndexPath = dbPath
+	cfg.ChunkSize = config.Size(faultChunkSize)
+	cfg.Snapshots = map[string]config.SnapshotConfig{
+		"data": {Paths: []string{dataDir}},
+	}
+
+	inner, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
+
+	// failManifest is on for the first backup and off for the retry, so the
+	// manifest upload fails once — interrupting the export mid-way — then
+	// succeeds.
+	failManifest := true
+	store := faultstore.New(inner)
+	store.OnPut = func(key string) faultstore.PutAction {
+		if failManifest && strings.HasSuffix(key, "manifest.json.zst") {
+			return faultstore.PutFail
+		}
+
+		return faultstore.PutNormal
+	}
+
+	v := newBackupVaultik(ctx, cfg, store, repos, db, fs)
+	opts := &vaultik.SnapshotCreateOptions{Cron: true}
+
+	// First run: the export fails at the manifest upload, so the whole
+	// create fails and the snapshot is left incomplete.
+	require.Error(t, v.CreateSnapshot(opts),
+		"backup must fail when the metadata export is interrupted")
+
+	incompletes, err := repos.Snapshots.GetIncompleteSnapshots(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, incompletes, 1,
+		"an interrupted export must leave exactly one incomplete snapshot")
+
+	afterFirst, err := repos.Snapshots.ListRecent(ctx, listRecentTestLimit)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	for _, s := range afterFirst {
+		require.Nil(t, s.CompletedAt,
+			"no snapshot may be marked complete before its metadata is exported")
+	}
+
+	// Second run on the same index and destination: the retry succeeds.
+	failManifest = false
+
+	require.NoError(t, v.CreateSnapshot(opts),
+		"a retry after an interrupted export must succeed")
+
+	assertRetryConsistentAndRestorable(
+		ctx, t, cfg, inner, repos, db, fs, restoreDir, testFiles)
+}
+
+// assertRetryConsistentAndRestorable checks the end state after the retry
+// backup in TestBackupCompletesOnlyAfterMetadataExport: the interrupted
+// snapshot is pruned, exactly one completed snapshot remains, its metadata
+// is at the destination, and it restores to the original tree.
+func assertRetryConsistentAndRestorable(
+	ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cfg *config.Config,
+	inner storage.Storer, repos *database.Repositories, db *database.DB,
+	fs afero.Fs, restoreDir string, testFiles map[string][]byte,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	incompletes, err := repos.Snapshots.GetIncompleteSnapshots(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Empty(t, incompletes,
+		"the next run's prune must drop the interrupted snapshot")
+
+	local, err := repos.Snapshots.ListRecent(ctx, listRecentTestLimit)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, local, 1, "exactly one snapshot must remain after the retry")
+
+	final := local[0]
+	require.NotNil(t, final.CompletedAt, "the retry's snapshot must be complete")
+
+	// The destination and the local index agree: the completed snapshot has
+	// both its metadata objects at the destination.
+	key := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(final.ID.String())
+	_, err = inner.Stat(ctx, "metadata/"+key+"/manifest.json.zst")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "the completed snapshot's manifest must be at the destination")
+	_, err = inner.Stat(ctx, "metadata/"+key+"/db.zst.age")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "the completed snapshot's database must be at the destination")
+
+	require.NoError(t, db.Close())
+
+	// The snapshot restores from the destination alone.
+	reader := newReaderVaultik(ctx, cfg, inner, nil, fs)
+	require.NoError(t, reader.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
+		SnapshotID: final.ID.String(),
+		TargetDir:  restoreDir,
+		Verify:     true,
+	}), "the retry's snapshot must be restorable")
+
+	assertRestoredTree(t, fs, restoreDir, testFiles)
+}
+
+// listRecentTestLimit is a generous cap for the handful of snapshots these
+// tests create when reading the local index directly.
+const listRecentTestLimit = 100
+
+// newBackupVaultik builds a Vaultik that runs the full create path
+// (CreateSnapshot) writing through storer, wiring the same scanner factory
+// and snapshot manager the production dependency graph provides.
+func newBackupVaultik(
+	ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, storer storage.Storer,
+	repos *database.Repositories, db *database.DB, fs afero.Fs,
+) *vaultik.Vaultik {
+	v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
+		Globals:         &globals.Globals{Version: "v", Commit: "g"},
+		Config:          cfg,
+		DB:              db,
+		Repositories:    repos,
+		Storage:         storer,
+		SnapshotManager: newFaultSnapshotManager(fs, storer, cfg, repos),
+		ScannerFactory:  faultScannerFactory(cfg, repos, storer),
+		Fs:              fs,
+		Stdout:          io.Discard,
+		Stderr:          io.Discard,
+		UI:              ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
+	}
+	v.SetContext(ctx)
+
+	return v
+}
+
+// faultScannerFactory mirrors the production provideScannerFactory, binding
+// the scanner to the given store, repositories, and config so a full
+// create-path backup writes through the fault-injecting store.
+func faultScannerFactory(
+	cfg *config.Config, repos *database.Repositories, storer storage.Storer,
+) snapshot.ScannerFactory {
+	return func(params snapshot.ScannerParams) *snapshot.Scanner {
+		return snapshot.NewScanner(snapshot.ScannerConfig{
+			FS:               params.Fs,
+			Storage:          storer,
+			ChunkSize:        faultChunkSize,
+			MaxBlobSize:      faultMaxBlobSize,
+			CompressionLevel: cfg.CompressionLevel,
+			AgeRecipients:    cfg.AgeRecipients,
+			Repositories:     repos,
+			EnableProgress:   params.EnableProgress,
+			UI:               params.UI,
+			Exclude:          params.Exclude,
+			SkipErrors:       params.SkipErrors,
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // Scenario 5: the restore target runs out of space mid-file. Restore
 // must fail with an out-of-space error, and must not leave a truncated
 // file at the target path presenting as a complete restore. Restore

internal/vaultik/info.go

@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ import (
 
 // ShowInfo displays system and configuration information
 func (v *Vaultik) ShowInfo() error {
+	// The info report is the output this command exists to produce, so it
+	// is written plain (markers would corrupt the aligned report) through
+	// the UI writer's stdout; --quiet silences it like any other
+	// non-error output.
+	if v.UI.Quiet() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	// System Information
 	v.stdoutf("=== System Information ===\n")
 	v.stdoutf("OS/Architecture: %s/%s\n", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
@@ -213,7 +221,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RemoteInfo(jsonOutput bool) error {
 	result.StorageType = storageInfo.Type
 	result.StorageLocation = storageInfo.Location
 
-	if !jsonOutput {
+	// The human report is written only when it is neither the --json
+	// document (which needs stdout to itself) nor silenced by --quiet. The
+	// scan still runs in both cases so --json still gets a full result.
+	showText := !jsonOutput && !v.UI.Quiet()
+
+	if showText {
 		v.stdoutf("=== Remote Storage ===\n")
 		v.stdoutf("Type:     %s\n", storageInfo.Type)
 		v.stdoutf("Location: %s\n", storageInfo.Location)
@@ -226,7 +239,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RemoteInfo(jsonOutput bool) error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	if !jsonOutput {
+	if showText {
 		v.stdoutf("Downloading %d manifest(s)...\n", len(snapshotIDs))
 	}
 
@@ -234,7 +247,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RemoteInfo(jsonOutput bool) error {
 
 	v.populateRemoteInfoResult(result, snapshotMetadata, snapshotIDs, referencedBlobs)
 
-	err = v.scanRemoteBlobStorage(result, referencedBlobs, jsonOutput)
+	err = v.scanRemoteBlobStorage(result, referencedBlobs, showText)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -252,7 +265,9 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RemoteInfo(jsonOutput bool) error {
 		return enc.Encode(result)
 	}
 
+	if showText {
 		v.printRemoteInfoTable(result)
+	}
 
 	return nil
 }
@@ -362,11 +377,13 @@ func (v *Vaultik) populateRemoteInfoResult(
 	}
 }
 
-// scanRemoteBlobStorage lists all blobs on remote and computes orphan stats
+// scanRemoteBlobStorage lists all blobs on remote and computes orphan
+// stats. showText is true only when the human report is being printed
+// (not --json, not --quiet), gating the progress line.
 func (v *Vaultik) scanRemoteBlobStorage(
-	result *RemoteInfoResult, referencedBlobs map[string]int64, jsonOutput bool,
+	result *RemoteInfoResult, referencedBlobs map[string]int64, showText bool,
 ) error {
-	if !jsonOutput {
+	if showText {
 		v.stdoutf("Scanning blobs...\n")
 	}
 

internal/vaultik/info_quiet_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+package vaultik_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
+)
+
+// TestShowInfo_QuietSuppressesReport checks that --quiet silences the
+// whole info report. The report is human-facing status, not a scriptable
+// value, so under --quiet the command produces nothing (and touches none
+// of its dependencies, which is why this minimal instance suffices).
+func TestShowInfo_QuietSuppressesReport(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+
+	v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
+		Stdout: &out,
+		UI:     ui.NewWithColor(&out, false),
+	}
+	v.UI.SetQuiet(true)
+
+	require.NoError(t, v.ShowInfo())
+	require.Empty(t, out.String(),
+		"the info report must be suppressed under --quiet")
+}

internal/vaultik/restore.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package vaultik
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
@@ -19,6 +18,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/types"
 )
 
@@ -29,8 +29,13 @@ var (
 	errDecryptionKeyRequired = errors.New(
 		"decryption key required for restore\n\n" +
 			"Set the VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY environment variable to your " +
-			"age private key:\n" +
+			"age private key file:\n" +
-			"  export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY='AGE-SECRET-KEY-...'")
+			"  export VAULTIK_AGE_SECRET_KEY=\"$(cat vaultik_backup_private_key.txt)\"")
+	// errInvalidAgeSecretKey is returned when the configured key does not
+	// parse as any age identity. It names the source but never the value,
+	// which is secret, so the message is safe to print and log.
+	errInvalidAgeSecretKey = errors.New(
+		"configured age secret key holds no usable age identity")
 	errBlobMissingFromIndex     = errors.New("blob hash missing from blob index")
 	errChunkNotInAnyBlob        = errors.New("chunk not found in any blob")
 	errBlobIDNotInHashIndex     = errors.New("blob id missing from hash index")
@@ -41,6 +46,12 @@ var (
 		"restored file has trailing data after its last chunk")
 	errRestoreIncomplete = errors.New(
 		"restore loop ended with files still pending")
+	errSnapshotDBMismatch = errors.New(
+		"decrypted database is not the requested snapshot")
+	// errEmptySnapshotDB is returned when the decrypted metadata database has
+	// zero length, which happens when the object was truncated or replaced
+	// with an empty payload. Rejected before any schema is built on it.
+	errEmptySnapshotDB = errors.New("decrypted snapshot database is empty")
 )
 
 // snapshotDBFilename is the name the decrypted snapshot database is
@@ -94,7 +105,7 @@ type RestoreResult struct {
 func (v *Vaultik) Restore(opts *RestoreOptions) error {
 	startTime := time.Now()
 
-	identity, err := v.prepareRestoreIdentity()
+	identities, err := v.restoreIdentities()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -108,7 +119,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) Restore(opts *RestoreOptions) error {
 	// Step 1: Download and decrypt the snapshot metadata database
 	log.Info("Downloading snapshot metadata...")
 
-	tempDB, tempDir, err := v.downloadSnapshotDB(opts.SnapshotID, identity)
+	tempDB, tempDir, err := v.downloadSnapshotDB(opts.SnapshotID, identities)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("downloading snapshot database: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -157,7 +168,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) Restore(opts *RestoreOptions) error {
 	}
 
 	// Step 5: Restore files
-	result, err := v.restoreAllFiles(files, repos, opts, identity, chunkToBlobMap)
+	result, err := v.restoreAllFiles(files, repos, opts, identities, chunkToBlobMap)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -218,21 +229,28 @@ func (v *Vaultik) finishRestore(
 	return nil
 }
 
-// prepareRestoreIdentity validates that an age secret key is configured
+// restoreIdentities parses the configured age secret key once into every
-// and parses it.
+// identity it contains. The value may be a single key line or a whole
-//
+// age-keygen file with several identities; all of them are returned so
-//nolint:ireturn // age.Identity is the decryption abstraction by design
+// blobgen (via age.Decrypt) can read a blob encrypted to any of their
-func (v *Vaultik) prepareRestoreIdentity() (age.Identity, error) {
+// recipients. This is the first step of both restore and deep verify, so
+// a missing or unparseable key fails before anything is downloaded. The
+// error names the configuration source but never the key value.
+func (v *Vaultik) restoreIdentities() ([]age.Identity, error) {
 	if v.Config.AgeSecretKey == "" {
 		return nil, errDecryptionKeyRequired
 	}
 
-	identity, err := age.ParseX25519Identity(v.Config.AgeSecretKey)
+	// age.ParseIdentities skips comment and blank lines and rejects a
+	// malformed key. Its error can quote the offending line, so it is not
+	// wrapped here — that would leak the secret into the message.
+	identities, err := age.ParseIdentities(strings.NewReader(v.Config.AgeSecretKey))
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing age secret key: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w (source: %s)",
+			errInvalidAgeSecretKey, v.Config.AgeSecretKeySourceName())
 	}
 
-	return identity, nil
+	return identities, nil
 }
 
 // restoreAllFiles processes files in blob-locality order: drain every
@@ -245,7 +263,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) restoreAllFiles(
 	files []*database.File,
 	repos *database.Repositories,
 	opts *RestoreOptions,
-	identity age.Identity,
+	identities []age.Identity,
 	chunkToBlobMap map[string]*database.BlobChunk,
 ) (*RestoreResult, error) {
 	result := &RestoreResult{}
@@ -299,7 +317,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) restoreAllFiles(
 		ctx:            v.ctx,
 		repos:          repos,
 		opts:           opts,
-		identity:       identity,
+		identities:     identities,
 		chunkToBlobMap: chunkToBlobMap,
 		blobByHash:     blobByHash,
 		blobIDToHash:   blobIDToHash,
@@ -410,12 +428,12 @@ func (s *restoreSession) downloadNextBlobSet(plan *restorePlan) (bool, error) {
 
 		blob, ok := s.blobByHash[hash]
 		if !ok {
-			return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errBlobMissingFromIndex, hash[:16])
+			return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errBlobMissingFromIndex, shortHash(hash))
 		}
 
-		err := s.downloadBlobToCache(hash, blob.CompressedSize)
+		err := s.downloadBlobToCache(hash, blob.CompressedSize, blob.UncompressedSize)
 		if err != nil {
-			return false, fmt.Errorf("downloading blob %s: %w", hash[:16], err)
+			return false, fmt.Errorf("downloading blob %s: %w", shortHash(hash), err)
 		}
 
 		s.result.BlobsDownloaded++
@@ -459,6 +477,16 @@ func (v *Vaultik) buildBlobIndexes(
 	blobByHash := make(map[string]*database.Blob, len(blobsByID))
 	for id, blob := range blobsByID {
 		hash := blob.Hash.String()
+
+		// The snapshot database is untrusted. A hash that is not 64
+		// lowercase hex characters could steer a later fetch to a path
+		// outside the cache directory, so reject it here, before any
+		// blob is downloaded.
+		if !isBlobHash(hash) {
+			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(
+				"%w: %s", errInvalidBlobHash, shortHash(hash))
+		}
+
 		blobIDToHash[id] = hash
 		blobByHash[hash] = blob
 	}
@@ -613,7 +641,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) handleRestoreVerification(
 // for a remote-only snapshot) is used as-is, so a host with no local
 // index can restore the snapshots it can only see on the store.
 func (v *Vaultik) downloadSnapshotDB(
-	snapshotID string, identity age.Identity,
+	snapshotID string, identities []age.Identity,
 ) (*database.DB, string, error) {
 	remoteKey, err := v.resolveSnapshotRemoteKey(snapshotID)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -630,41 +658,75 @@ func (v *Vaultik) downloadSnapshotDB(
 
 	defer func() { _ = reader.Close() }()
 
-	// Read all data
+	// Decrypt and decompress straight from the storage stream, then stream
-	encryptedData, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+	// the plaintext to a temp file. Neither the encrypted bytes nor the
-	if err != nil {
+	// decrypted database is ever held whole in memory; a snapshot database
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("reading encrypted data: %w", err)
+	// can be large.
-	}
+	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(reader, identities...)
-
-	log.Debug("Downloaded encrypted database",
-		"size", ubytes(int64(len(encryptedData))))
-
-	// Decrypt and decompress using blobgen.Reader
-	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(encryptedData), identity)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("creating decryption reader: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	defer func() { _ = blobReader.Close() }()
 
-	// Read the binary SQLite database
+	db, tempDir, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB(blobReader)
-	dbData, err := io.ReadAll(blobReader)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("decrypting and decompressing: %w", err)
+		return nil, "", err
 	}
 
-	log.Debug("Decrypted database", "size", ubytes(int64(len(dbData))))
+	// Confirm the decrypted database really is the snapshot named by
+	// remoteKey before any files are read from it. On mismatch, close the
+	// database and remove its private directory so nothing is left behind.
+	err = v.verifySnapshotDBIdentity(db, snapshotID, remoteKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = db.Close()
+		_ = v.Fs.RemoveAll(tempDir)
 
-	return v.materializeSnapshotDB(dbData)
+		return nil, "", err
 	}
 
-// materializeSnapshotDB writes the decrypted snapshot database bytes into
+	return db, tempDir, nil
-// a fresh private (0700) temp directory and opens the file read-only. On
+}
-// any failure it removes the directory before returning, so no decrypted
+
-// metadata is left on disk when the open is interrupted or the payload is
+// verifySnapshotDBIdentity confirms the decrypted metadata database really
-// damaged. On success the returned directory is the caller's to remove.
+// is the snapshot named by remoteKey. age decryption proves the database
+// is readable, not that the object served at
+// metadata/<remoteKey>/db.zst.age is the snapshot that was requested: an
+// attacker who swaps in another valid db.zst.age (which needs no key
+// material) would otherwise redirect restore and deep verify to a
+// different snapshot's contents. The exported per-snapshot database holds
+// exactly one snapshot row, and a snapshot's remote key is derived from
+// that row's ID, so the database is the requested one exactly when its
+// sole snapshot hashes back to remoteKey. Comparing the requested
+// identifier directly would not do: it may be a remote-key prefix a
+// recovery host uses in place of a human snapshot ID it cannot know.
+func (v *Vaultik) verifySnapshotDBIdentity(
+	db *database.DB, requested, remoteKey string,
+) error {
+	repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
+
+	snap, err := repos.Snapshots.GetOnlySnapshot(v.ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("checking identity of database for %s: %w", requested, err)
+	}
+
+	if snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snap.ID.String()) != remoteKey {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w: requested %s but the database is snapshot %s",
+			errSnapshotDBMismatch, requested, snap.ID)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// materializeSnapshotDB streams the decrypted snapshot database into a
+// fresh private (0700) temp directory and opens the file read-only. The
+// database is copied through an io.Copy buffer rather than read whole into
+// memory. On any failure it removes the directory before returning, so no
+// decrypted metadata is left on disk when the copy is interrupted or the
+// payload is damaged. On success the returned directory is the caller's to
+// remove.
 func (v *Vaultik) materializeSnapshotDB(
-	dbData []byte,
+	dbReader io.Reader,
 ) (*database.DB, string, error) {
 	tempDir, err := afero.TempDir(v.Fs, "", "vaultik-restore-")
 	if err != nil {
@@ -681,12 +743,29 @@ func (v *Vaultik) materializeSnapshotDB(
 
 	dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, snapshotDBFilename)
 
-	err = afero.WriteFile(v.Fs, dbPath, dbData, restoreFileMode)
+	dbFile, err := v.Fs.OpenFile(
+		dbPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_EXCL|os.O_WRONLY, restoreFileMode)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("writing database file: %w", err)
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("creating database file: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	log.Debug("Created restore database", "path", dbPath)
+	written, copyErr := io.Copy(dbFile, dbReader)
+	closeErr := dbFile.Close()
+
+	if copyErr != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("writing database file: %w", copyErr)
+	}
+
+	if closeErr != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("closing database file: %w", closeErr)
+	}
+
+	log.Debug("Created restore database", "path", dbPath, "size", ubytes(written))
+
+	// Reject an empty database before OpenReadOnly builds a schema on it.
+	if written == 0 {
+		return nil, "", errEmptySnapshotDB
+	}
 
 	db, err := database.OpenReadOnly(v.ctx, dbPath)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -784,7 +863,7 @@ type restoreSession struct {
 	ctx            context.Context //nolint:containedctx // per-restore state by design
 	repos          *database.Repositories
 	opts           *RestoreOptions
-	identity       age.Identity
+	identities     []age.Identity
 	chunkToBlobMap map[string]*database.BlobChunk
 	blobByHash     map[string]*database.Blob
 	blobIDToHash   map[string]string
@@ -1141,12 +1220,12 @@ func (s *restoreSession) writeFileChunks(
 // size, which is what makes multi-GB blobs tractable on machines with
 // less RAM than the blob.
 func (s *restoreSession) downloadBlobToCache(
-	blobHash string, expectedSize int64,
+	blobHash string, compressedSize, uncompressedSize int64,
 ) error {
 	start := time.Now()
 
 	t0 := time.Now()
-	rc, err := s.v.FetchAndDecryptBlob(s.ctx, blobHash, expectedSize, s.identity)
+	rc, err := s.v.FetchAndDecryptBlob(s.ctx, blobHash, uncompressedSize, s.identities...)
 	fetchSetupDur := time.Since(t0)
 
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1176,7 +1255,7 @@ func (s *restoreSession) downloadBlobToCache(
 
 	log.Debug("Streamed blob into disk cache",
 		"hash", blobHash[:16],
-		"compressed_bytes", expectedSize,
+		"compressed_bytes", compressedSize,
 		"plaintext_bytes", written,
 		"ms_total", time.Since(start).Milliseconds(),
 		"ms_fetch_setup", fetchSetupDur.Milliseconds(),

internal/vaultik/restore_identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // exercises unexported restoreIdentities
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"filippo.io/age"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
+)
+
+// encryptBlobTo returns a blobgen blob of plaintext encrypted to exactly
+// one recipient, so a decryptor succeeds only if it holds that recipient's
+// identity.
+func encryptBlobTo(t *testing.T, recipient string, plaintext []byte) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+
+	writer, err := blobgen.NewWriter(&buf, 1, []string{recipient})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = writer.Write(plaintext)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, writer.Close())
+
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+// decryptBlobWith reads a blob back through the identities and returns its
+// plaintext.
+func decryptBlobWith(t *testing.T, blob []byte, identities []age.Identity) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	reader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(blob), identities...)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	plaintext, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, reader.Close())
+
+	return plaintext
+}
+
+// TestRestoreIdentitiesAcceptsEveryIdentity proves a key file holding two
+// identities yields both, so a blob encrypted only to the second
+// recipient — the one the previous single-identity parse dropped — still
+// decrypts.
+func TestRestoreIdentitiesAcceptsEveryIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	first, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	second, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// A whole age-keygen-style file: comment lines plus two identity lines.
+	keyFile := "# public key: " + first.Recipient().String() + "\n" +
+		first.String() + "\n" +
+		"# public key: " + second.Recipient().String() + "\n" +
+		second.String() + "\n"
+
+	v := &Vaultik{Config: &config.Config{AgeSecretKey: keyFile}}
+
+	identities, err := v.restoreIdentities()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, identities, 2)
+
+	plaintext := []byte("payload encrypted only to the second identity")
+	blob := encryptBlobTo(t, second.Recipient().String(), plaintext)
+
+	require.Equal(t, plaintext, decryptBlobWith(t, blob, identities))
+}
+
+// TestRestoreIdentitiesAcceptsTrailingNewline mirrors a YAML
+// age_secret_key value that carries a trailing newline: it must still
+// parse to its one identity and decrypt a blob encrypted to it.
+func TestRestoreIdentitiesAcceptsTrailingNewline(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	id, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	v := &Vaultik{Config: &config.Config{AgeSecretKey: id.String() + "\n"}}
+
+	identities, err := v.restoreIdentities()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, identities, 1)
+
+	plaintext := []byte("value with a trailing newline")
+	blob := encryptBlobTo(t, id.Recipient().String(), plaintext)
+
+	require.Equal(t, plaintext, decryptBlobWith(t, blob, identities))
+}
+
+// TestRestoreIdentitiesMissingKey reports the dedicated missing-key error
+// rather than a parse failure, so the user is told to set the key.
+func TestRestoreIdentitiesMissingKey(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	v := &Vaultik{Config: &config.Config{}}
+
+	_, err := v.restoreIdentities()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, errDecryptionKeyRequired)
+}

internal/vaultik/restore_malformed_key_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package vaultik_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
+)
+
+// TestRestoreRejectsMalformedKeyBeforeDownload verifies that a malformed
+// age secret key stops restore at the parse step: nothing is fetched from
+// the store, and the error does not echo the key value (which is secret).
+func TestRestoreRejectsMalformedKeyBeforeDownload(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const malformed = "this-is-not-a-valid-age-key"
+
+	mock := NewMockStorer()
+
+	v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
+		Config:  &config.Config{AgeSecretKey: malformed},
+		Storage: mock,
+		Stdout:  io.Discard,
+		Stderr:  io.Discard,
+		UI:      ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
+	}
+	v.SetContext(context.Background())
+
+	err := v.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
+		SnapshotID: "any-snapshot",
+		TargetDir:  t.TempDir(),
+	})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.NotContains(t, err.Error(), malformed,
+		"error must not echo the key value")
+	require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "age_secret_key",
+		"error should name the configuration source")
+	require.Empty(t, mock.GetCalls(),
+		"a malformed key must fail before anything is fetched")
+}

internal/vaultik/restore_snapshot_identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+package vaultik_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/afero"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/config"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/storage"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
+)
+
+// TestRestoreAndDeepVerifyRejectSwappedDatabase proves that swapping two
+// snapshots' encrypted databases on the store is caught. age decryption
+// alone proves only that a database is readable; without an identity check
+// restore would happily write the wrong snapshot's files and deep verify
+// would report success. After the swap, restore and deep verify of A both
+// fail, and the error names the snapshot the database actually holds (B).
+func TestRestoreAndDeepVerifyRejectSwappedDatabase(t *testing.T) {
+	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	fs := afero.NewOsFs()
+	tempDir := t.TempDir()
+	storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
+
+	chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
+
+	storer, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Two snapshots with different content, backed up into one shared
+	// store. Different names give them different remote keys, so their
+	// metadata directories are distinct and can be tampered with alone.
+	dataA := filepath.Join(tempDir, "srcA")
+	require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataA, 0o755))
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, filepath.Join(dataA, "a.bin"),
+		bytesPattern("alpha-", int(chunkSize*2)), 0o644))
+
+	dataB := filepath.Join(tempDir, "srcB")
+	require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataB, 0o755))
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, filepath.Join(dataB, "b.bin"),
+		bytesPattern("beta-", int(chunkSize*2)), 0o644))
+
+	idA := backupNamedSnapshotToStore(ctx, t, fs, dataA, storer,
+		filepath.Join(tempDir, "idxA.sqlite"), "alpha")
+	idB := backupNamedSnapshotToStore(ctx, t, fs, dataB, storer,
+		filepath.Join(tempDir, "idxB.sqlite"), "beta")
+	require.NotEqual(t, idA, idB)
+
+	keyA := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(idA)
+	keyB := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(idB)
+	require.NotEqual(t, keyA, keyB)
+
+	// Baseline: each snapshot verifies against its own intact metadata.
+	require.NoError(t, newStoreClient(ctx, t, fs, storer).RunDeepVerify(
+		idA, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, newStoreClient(ctx, t, fs, storer).RunDeepVerify(
+		idB, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true}))
+
+	// Swap the two snapshots' encrypted databases on the store.
+	swapStoreFiles(t, fs,
+		filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata", keyA, "db.zst.age"),
+		filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata", keyB, "db.zst.age"))
+
+	// Restore of A now decrypts B's database; the identity check must
+	// reject it and name the snapshot it actually found.
+	restoreErr := newStoreClient(ctx, t, fs, storer).Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
+		SnapshotID: idA,
+		TargetDir:  filepath.Join(tempDir, "restoreA"),
+	})
+	require.Error(t, restoreErr)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, restoreErr, idB)
+
+	// Deep verify of A must reject the swapped database for the same reason.
+	verifyErr := newStoreClient(ctx, t, fs, storer).RunDeepVerify(
+		idA, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true})
+	require.Error(t, verifyErr)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, verifyErr, idB)
+}
+
+// TestDeepVerifyRejectsSwappedDatabaseWithEmptyManifest covers the case the
+// issue calls out: swapping in a database whose blob set is empty and
+// pairing it with an equally empty manifest. The manifest then agrees with
+// the database, so every blob-level check passes and deep verify used to
+// report success with zero blobs verified. The identity check rejects it
+// before any blob check runs.
+func TestDeepVerifyRejectsSwappedDatabaseWithEmptyManifest(t *testing.T) {
+	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	fs := afero.NewOsFs()
+	tempDir := t.TempDir()
+	storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
+
+	chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
+
+	storer, err := storage.NewFileStorer(storeDir)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Snapshot A: real content, so its manifest lists blobs.
+	dataA := filepath.Join(tempDir, "srcA")
+	require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataA, 0o755))
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, filepath.Join(dataA, "a.bin"),
+		bytesPattern("alpha-", int(chunkSize*2)), 0o644))
+	idA := backupNamedSnapshotToStore(ctx, t, fs, dataA, storer,
+		filepath.Join(tempDir, "idxA.sqlite"), "alpha")
+
+	// Snapshot C: a single empty file, so it references no blobs and its
+	// manifest is empty. This is the database/manifest pair an attacker
+	// would swap in to make the blob checks vacuously pass.
+	dataC := filepath.Join(tempDir, "srcC")
+	require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(dataC, 0o755))
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs,
+		filepath.Join(dataC, "empty.bin"), []byte{}, 0o644))
+	idC := backupNamedSnapshotToStore(ctx, t, fs, dataC, storer,
+		filepath.Join(tempDir, "idxC.sqlite"), "charlie")
+
+	keyA := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(idA)
+	keyC := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(idC)
+
+	// Replace A's database and manifest with C's empty pair.
+	copyStoreFile(t, fs,
+		filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata", keyC, "db.zst.age"),
+		filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata", keyA, "db.zst.age"))
+	copyStoreFile(t, fs,
+		filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata", keyC, "manifest.json.zst"),
+		filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata", keyA, "manifest.json.zst"))
+
+	verifyErr := newStoreClient(ctx, t, fs, storer).RunDeepVerify(
+		idA, &vaultik.VerifyOptions{Deep: true})
+	require.Error(t, verifyErr)
+	require.ErrorContains(t, verifyErr, idC)
+}
+
+// backupNamedSnapshotToStore backs up dataDir into the shared storer under
+// the given snapshot name and returns the human snapshot ID. Two snapshots
+// backed up under different names get different remote keys, so their
+// metadata directories on the store are distinct.
+func backupNamedSnapshotToStore(
+	ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs,
+	dataDir string, storer storage.Storer, dbPath, name string,
+) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	const (
+		chunkSize   = int64(64 * 1024)
+		maxBlobSize = int64(512 * 1024)
+	)
+
+	cfg := &config.Config{
+		AgeRecipients:    []string{testAgePublicKey},
+		AgeSecretKey:     testAgeSecretKey,
+		CompressionLevel: 3,
+		Hostname:         testHostname,
+	}
+
+	db, err := database.New(ctx, dbPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	repos := database.NewRepositories(db)
+
+	sm := snapshot.NewSnapshotManager(snapshot.SnapshotManagerParams{
+		Repos:   repos,
+		Storage: storer,
+		Config:  cfg,
+	})
+	sm.SetFilesystem(fs)
+
+	scanner := snapshot.NewScanner(snapshot.ScannerConfig{
+		FS:               fs,
+		Storage:          storer,
+		ChunkSize:        chunkSize,
+		MaxBlobSize:      maxBlobSize,
+		CompressionLevel: cfg.CompressionLevel,
+		AgeRecipients:    cfg.AgeRecipients,
+		Repositories:     repos,
+	})
+
+	snapshotID, err := sm.CreateSnapshotWithName(
+		ctx, cfg.Hostname, name, "test-version", "test-git")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = scanner.Scan(ctx, dataDir, snapshotID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, sm.CompleteSnapshot(ctx, snapshotID))
+	require.NoError(t, sm.ExportSnapshotMetadata(ctx, dbPath, snapshotID))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Close())
+
+	return snapshotID
+}
+
+// newStoreClient builds a Vaultik that reads only from the store: the
+// secret key, the storer, and a filesystem, with no local index. This is
+// what restore and deep verify need.
+func newStoreClient(
+	ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, storer storage.Storer,
+) *vaultik.Vaultik {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	v := &vaultik.Vaultik{
+		Config: &config.Config{
+			AgeSecretKey: testAgeSecretKey,
+			Hostname:     testHostname,
+		},
+		Storage: storer,
+		Fs:      fs,
+		Stdout:  io.Discard,
+		Stderr:  io.Discard,
+		UI:      ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
+	}
+	v.SetContext(ctx)
+
+	return v
+}
+
+// swapStoreFiles exchanges the contents of two files on the store.
+func swapStoreFiles(t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, a, b string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dataA, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, a)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	dataB, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, b)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, a, dataB, 0o644))
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, b, dataA, 0o644))
+}
+
+// copyStoreFile overwrites dst with the contents of src on the store.
+func copyStoreFile(t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, src, dst string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	data, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, src)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, dst, data, 0o644))
+}

internal/vaultik/restore_snapshotdb_test.go

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
 package vaultik //nolint:testpackage // inspects unexported snapshot-db materialization
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"testing"
 
+	"filippo.io/age"
 	"github.com/spf13/afero"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/blobgen"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/database"
 )
 
@@ -37,7 +40,7 @@ func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBPrivateDir(t *testing.T) {
 
 	v := &Vaultik{ctx: context.Background(), Fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
 
-	db, dir, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB(dbData)
+	db, dir, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB(bytes.NewReader(dbData))
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
@@ -55,6 +58,37 @@ func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBPrivateDir(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Error(t, err, "materialized snapshot database must be read-only")
 }
 
+// TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRejectsCompleteEmptyStream proves the written == 0
+// guard rejects a genuinely empty but complete metadata object: a real age
+// header, nonce, and final tag encrypting zero plaintext bytes. The truncation
+// case is stopped earlier by the reader (io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) and never reaches
+// this branch, so it needs its own input. This complete stream decrypts to zero
+// bytes with a clean EOF, passes the reader, and must be refused as empty rather
+// than accepted as a valid zero-table database. Reverting the guard lets the
+// empty file open as a fresh schema and the test fails.
+func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRejectsCompleteEmptyStream(t *testing.T) {
+	identity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var stream bytes.Buffer
+
+	w, err := age.Encrypt(&stream, identity.Recipient())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
+
+	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(stream.Bytes()), identity)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = blobReader.Close() })
+
+	t.Setenv("TMPDIR", t.TempDir())
+
+	v := &Vaultik{ctx: context.Background(), Fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
+
+	_, _, err = v.materializeSnapshotDB(blobReader)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, errEmptySnapshotDB)
+}
+
 // TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRemovesDirOnOpenFailure proves a failed open
 // leaves no temp directory behind.
 func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRemovesDirOnOpenFailure(t *testing.T) {
@@ -64,7 +98,8 @@ func TestMaterializeSnapshotDBRemovesDirOnOpenFailure(t *testing.T) {
 
 	v := &Vaultik{ctx: context.Background(), Fs: afero.NewOsFs()}
 
-	_, _, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB([]byte("this is not a sqlite database"))
+	_, _, err := v.materializeSnapshotDB(
+		bytes.NewReader([]byte("this is not a sqlite database")))
 	require.Error(t, err)
 
 	entries, rerr := os.ReadDir(base)

internal/vaultik/restore_truncated_db_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+package vaultik_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"io"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"filippo.io/age"
+	"github.com/spf13/afero"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/snapshot"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/ui"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/vaultik"
+)
+
+// TestRestoreRejectsTruncatedMetadataDB backs up a real tree, then replaces
+// the snapshot's db.zst.age with a stream cut right after the age header and
+// its 16-byte nonce. age.Decrypt still accepts such an object and the zstd
+// decoder turns the truncated read into a clean EOF, so before the fix restore
+// built a fresh empty schema and reported success. Restore must now fail with
+// io.ErrUnexpectedEOF, the error the reader raises for a truncated object.
+// Asserting that specific error pins the reader fix: without it the truncation
+// yields an empty database, which the identity check rejects for an unrelated
+// reason, and this test would pass anyway.
+func TestRestoreRejectsTruncatedMetadataDB(t *testing.T) {
+	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	fs := afero.NewOsFs()
+	tempDir := t.TempDir()
+
+	dataDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "source")
+	storeDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "remote")
+	restoreDir := filepath.Join(tempDir, "restored")
+	dbPath := filepath.Join(tempDir, "index.sqlite")
+
+	chunkSize := int64(64 * 1024)
+	maxBlobSize := int64(512 * 1024)
+
+	setupE2ESourceTree(t, fs, dataDir, chunkSize)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	cfg, storer, snapshotID := runFileStorageBackup(
+		ctx, t, fs, dataDir, storeDir, dbPath, chunkSize, maxBlobSize)
+
+	// Encrypting empty plaintext to the snapshot recipient yields
+	// header + nonce(16) + a single 16-byte final chunk tag. Dropping the
+	// trailing tag leaves exactly the age header plus its nonce — the
+	// truncation an attacker can write over metadata without any key.
+	recipient, err := age.ParseX25519Recipient(testAgePublicKey)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var full bytes.Buffer
+
+	w, err := age.Encrypt(&full, recipient)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, w.Close())
+
+	truncated := full.Bytes()[:full.Len()-16]
+
+	dbKeyPath := filepath.Join(storeDir, "metadata",
+		snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID), "db.zst.age")
+	require.NoError(t, afero.WriteFile(fs, dbKeyPath, truncated, 0o644))
+
+	restoreVaultik := &vaultik.Vaultik{
+		Config:  cfg,
+		Storage: storer,
+		Fs:      fs,
+		Stdout:  io.Discard,
+		Stderr:  io.Discard,
+		UI:      ui.NewWithColor(io.Discard, false),
+	}
+	restoreVaultik.SetContext(ctx)
+
+	err = restoreVaultik.Restore(&vaultik.RestoreOptions{
+		SnapshotID: snapshotID,
+		TargetDir:  restoreDir,
+		Verify:     true,
+	})
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF)
+}

internal/vaultik/snapshot.go

@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ func (v *Vaultik) CreateSnapshot(opts *SnapshotCreateOptions) error {
 	// Prune the database before starting: delete incomplete snapshots and orphaned data.
 	// This ensures the database is consistent before we start a new snapshot.
 	// Since we use locking, only one vaultik instance accesses the DB at a time.
+	// A snapshot whose metadata export was interrupted is left incomplete by
+	// finalizeSnapshotMetadata, so it is among the incomplete snapshots dropped
+	// here (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177).
 	_, err = v.PruneDatabase()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("prune database: %w", err)
@@ -324,7 +327,12 @@ func (v *Vaultik) collectUploadStats(scanner *snapshot.Scanner, stats *snapshotS
 	}
 }
 
-// finalizeSnapshotMetadata updates stats, marks complete, and exports metadata
+// finalizeSnapshotMetadata updates stats, exports metadata, and only then
+// marks the snapshot complete. Recording completion last is deliberate: an
+// export interrupted by a crash leaves the snapshot incomplete rather than
+// looking complete with no manifest or database at the destination. The next
+// run's PruneDatabase drops the incomplete snapshot and re-backs-up its data.
+// See https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/vaultik/issues/177.
 func (v *Vaultik) finalizeSnapshotMetadata(
 	snapshotID string, stats *snapshotStats,
 ) error {
@@ -346,9 +354,11 @@ func (v *Vaultik) finalizeSnapshotMetadata(
 		return fmt.Errorf("updating snapshot stats: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	err = v.SnapshotManager.CompleteSnapshot(v.ctx, snapshotID)
+	// snapshot_blobs must be populated before the export, which builds the
+	// manifest and the trimmed metadata database from it.
+	err = v.SnapshotManager.PopulateSnapshotBlobs(v.ctx, snapshotID)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("completing snapshot: %w", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("populating snapshot blobs: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	err = v.SnapshotManager.ExportSnapshotMetadata(
@@ -357,6 +367,13 @@ func (v *Vaultik) finalizeSnapshotMetadata(
 		return fmt.Errorf("exporting snapshot metadata: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// Record completion last, so an interrupted export never leaves a
+	// snapshot marked complete without its metadata at the destination.
+	err = v.SnapshotManager.MarkSnapshotComplete(v.ctx, snapshotID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("marking snapshot complete: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	return nil
 }
 

internal/vaultik/snapshot_list.go

@@ -114,10 +114,16 @@ func (v *Vaultik) ListSnapshots(jsonOutput bool) error {
 		return encoder.Encode(snapshots)
 	}
 
+	// The table is the output this command exists to produce, so it is
+	// written plain (markers would corrupt the columns) to the UI writer's
+	// stdout; --quiet silences it. Reconciliation notes below go through
+	// the UI methods, so their warnings still emit under --quiet.
+	if !v.UI.Quiet() {
 		err = v.printSnapshotTable(snapshots)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+	}
 
 	if remoteErr == nil {
 		v.reportListDrift(snapshots, listing)

internal/vaultik/snapshot_list_quiet_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+package vaultik_test
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/vaultik/internal/log"
+)
+
+// TestListSnapshots_QuietSuppressesTableNotJSON is the --quiet contract
+// for `snapshot list`: the human table is silenced, but the --json
+// document a script depends on still emits. A local snapshot with its
+// remote counterpart present is used so there are no drift notes, whose
+// warnings would emit even under --quiet.
+func TestListSnapshots_QuietSuppressesTableNotJSON(t *testing.T) {
+	log.Initialize(log.Config{})
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := newListEnv(t)
+
+	ts := time.Date(2026, 3, 1, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+	env.addLocal(t, listLocalID, ts)
+	env.addRemote(t, listLocalID, ts)
+
+	env.v.UI.SetQuiet(true)
+
+	// Table mode: nothing on stdout.
+	require.NoError(t, env.v.ListSnapshots(false))
+	require.Empty(t, env.stdout.String(),
+		"the table must be suppressed under --quiet")
+
+	// JSON mode: the document is still written despite the quiet UI.
+	env.stdout.Reset()
+	require.NoError(t, env.v.ListSnapshots(true))
+
+	rows := decodeListJSON(t, env.stdout.String())
+	require.Len(t, rows, 1)
+	require.Equal(t, listLocalID, rows[0].ID,
+		"the --json document must still emit under --quiet")
+}

internal/vaultik/vaultik.go

@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ func NewForTesting(storage storage.Storer) *TestVaultik {
 			Stdout:  stdout,
 			Stderr:  stderr,
 			Stdin:   stdin,
+			UI:      ui.NewWithColor(stdout, false),
 		},
 		Stdout: stdout,
 		Stderr: stderr,

internal/vaultik/verify.go

@@ -95,11 +95,10 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RunDeepVerify(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
 	}
 
 	// Parse the age secret key once, the same way restore does, and reuse
-	// the identity for the database and every blob.
+	// the identities for the database and every blob.
-	identity, err := v.prepareRestoreIdentity()
+	identities, err := v.restoreIdentities()
 	if err != nil {
-		return v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts,
+		return v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts, err.Error(), err)
-			fmt.Sprintf("parsing age secret key: %v", err), err)
 	}
 
 	log.Info("Starting snapshot verification", "snapshot_id", snapshotID, "mode", "deep")
@@ -109,7 +108,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RunDeepVerify(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
 	}
 
 	manifest, tempDB, dbBlobs, err := v.loadVerificationData(
-		snapshotID, opts, result, identity)
+		snapshotID, opts, result, identities)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -130,7 +129,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RunDeepVerify(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
 	result.TotalSize = totalSize
 
 	err = v.runVerificationSteps(
-		manifest, dbBlobs, tempDB, opts, result, totalSize, identity)
+		manifest, dbBlobs, tempDB, opts, result, totalSize, identities)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -155,7 +154,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RunDeepVerify(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
 // loadVerificationData downloads manifest, database, and blob list for verification
 func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(
 	snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions, result *VerifyResult,
-	identity age.Identity,
+	identities []age.Identity,
 ) (*snapshot.Manifest, *tempDB, []snapshot.BlobInfo, error) {
 	// Resolve the identifier to the snapshot's remote key. A human ID is
 	// hashed; a remote key (or its abbreviation, as printed for a
@@ -192,24 +191,10 @@ func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(
 		v.stdoutf("Downloading and decrypting database...\n")
 	}
 
-	// Download and decrypt database
+	tdb, err := v.downloadVerifiedSnapshotDB(
-	dbPath := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/db.zst.age", remoteKey)
+		snapshotID, remoteKey, opts, result, identities)
-	log.Info("Downloading encrypted database", "path", dbPath)
-
-	dbReader, err := v.Storage.Get(v.ctx, dbPath)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts,
+		return nil, nil, nil, err
-			fmt.Sprintf("failed to download database: %v", err),
-			fmt.Errorf("failed to download database: %w", err))
-	}
-
-	defer func() { _ = dbReader.Close() }()
-
-	tdb, err := v.decryptAndLoadDatabase(dbReader, identity)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, nil, v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts,
-			fmt.Sprintf("failed to decrypt database: %v", err),
-			fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt database: %w", err))
 	}
 
 	dbBlobs, err := v.getBlobsFromDatabase(tdb.db.Conn())
@@ -238,6 +223,45 @@ func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(
 	return manifest, tdb, dbBlobs, nil
 }
 
+// downloadVerifiedSnapshotDB downloads and decrypts the snapshot metadata
+// database and confirms it really is the snapshot named by remoteKey
+// before any of its rows are trusted (see verifySnapshotDBIdentity). On
+// any failure it records the failure in result and returns the error the
+// caller should propagate; the temp database is closed on a rejected
+// identity so nothing is left on disk.
+func (v *Vaultik) downloadVerifiedSnapshotDB(
+	snapshotID, remoteKey string, opts *VerifyOptions, result *VerifyResult,
+	identities []age.Identity,
+) (*tempDB, error) {
+	dbPath := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/db.zst.age", remoteKey)
+	log.Info("Downloading encrypted database", "path", dbPath)
+
+	dbReader, err := v.Storage.Get(v.ctx, dbPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts,
+			fmt.Sprintf("failed to download database: %v", err),
+			fmt.Errorf("failed to download database: %w", err))
+	}
+
+	defer func() { _ = dbReader.Close() }()
+
+	tdb, err := v.decryptAndLoadDatabase(dbReader, identities)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts,
+			fmt.Sprintf("failed to decrypt database: %v", err),
+			fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt database: %w", err))
+	}
+
+	err = v.verifySnapshotDBIdentity(tdb.db, snapshotID, remoteKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = tdb.Close()
+
+		return nil, v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts, err.Error(), err)
+	}
+
+	return tdb, nil
+}
+
 // runVerificationSteps executes manifest verification, blob existence
 // check, and deep content verification.
 func (v *Vaultik) runVerificationSteps(
@@ -247,7 +271,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) runVerificationSteps(
 	opts *VerifyOptions,
 	result *VerifyResult,
 	totalSize int64,
-	identity age.Identity,
+	identities []age.Identity,
 ) error {
 	if !opts.JSON {
 		v.stdoutf("Verifying manifest against database...\n")
@@ -274,7 +298,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) runVerificationSteps(
 			len(dbBlobs), ubytes(totalSize))
 	}
 
-	err = v.performDeepVerificationFromDB(dbBlobs, tdb.db.Conn(), opts, identity)
+	err = v.performDeepVerificationFromDB(dbBlobs, tdb.db.Conn(), opts, identities)
 	if err != nil {
 		return v.deepVerifyFailure(result, opts, err.Error(), err)
 	}
@@ -302,10 +326,10 @@ func (t *tempDB) Close() error {
 // from the encrypted stream. It reads through the same blobgen reader restore
 // uses, streaming the decrypted, decompressed database to a temp file.
 func (v *Vaultik) decryptAndLoadDatabase(
-	reader io.ReadCloser, identity age.Identity,
+	reader io.ReadCloser, identities []age.Identity,
 ) (*tempDB, error) {
 	// Decrypt and decompress through the shared blobgen reader.
-	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(reader, identity)
+	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(reader, identities...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create decryption reader: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -366,10 +390,10 @@ func (v *Vaultik) decryptAndLoadDatabase(
 
 // verifyBlob downloads and verifies a single blob
 func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlob(
-	blobInfo snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB, identity age.Identity,
+	blobInfo snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB, identities []age.Identity,
 ) error {
 	// Download blob using shared fetch method
-	reader, _, err := v.FetchBlob(v.ctx, blobInfo.Hash, blobInfo.CompressedSize)
+	reader, err := v.FetchBlob(v.ctx, blobInfo.Hash)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to download: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -380,7 +404,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlob(
 	// the plaintext as it is read. A blob's hash — its remote name — is the
 	// double SHA-256 of that plaintext (see blobgen.DoubleSHA256), not of the
 	// encrypted bytes.
-	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(reader, identity)
+	blobReader, err := blobgen.NewReader(reader, identities...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to create blob reader: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -673,7 +697,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) verifyBlobExistenceFromDB(blobs []snapshot.BlobInfo) error {
 // each blob using the database as source.
 func (v *Vaultik) performDeepVerificationFromDB(
 	blobs []snapshot.BlobInfo, db *sql.DB, opts *VerifyOptions,
-	identity age.Identity,
+	identities []age.Identity,
 ) error {
 	// Calculate total bytes for ETA
 	var totalBytesExpected int64
@@ -691,7 +715,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) performDeepVerificationFromDB(
 
 	for i, blobInfo := range blobs {
 		// Verify individual blob
-		err := v.verifyBlob(blobInfo, db, identity)
+		err := v.verifyBlob(blobInfo, db, identities)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("blob %s verification failed: %w", blobInfo.Hash, err)
 		}