Hash snapshot IDs at the storage boundary; make snapshot list resilient

Two related changes, both addressing leakage and brittleness around
the public bytes the destination store sees.

First, every remote storage path that previously embedded a human
snapshot ID (e.g. metadata/heraklion_berlin.sneak.fs.photos.2026.
catalog_2026-06-24T07:00:15Z/...) now uses the hashed remote key:

  RemoteSnapshotKey(id) = hex(SHA256(SHA256("vaultik|" + id)))

Applied at:

  * uploadSnapshotArtifacts (snapshot create write path)
  * the manifest.json.zst snapshot_id field — manifest is
    unencrypted, so the human ID would otherwise be readable to
    anyone with bucket-list permission
  * cleanupIncompleteSnapshots metadata-existence probe
  * snapshot restore / verify (downloadSnapshotDB,
    loadVerificationData)
  * downloadManifestByKey, deleteRemoteSnapshotByKey
  * CleanupLocalSnapshots reconciliation
  * the locally-driven removal paths (RemoveSnapshot,
    RemoveAllSnapshots, confirmAndExecutePurge)

The local index database keeps human IDs everywhere — the hash is a
boundary translation, not a rename. A directory listing of the
backup destination now looks like
"metadata/<64-hex>/{db.zst.age,manifest.json.zst}" with no host,
snapshot-name, or timestamp information visible.

Second, snapshot list no longer fails just because remote storage is
unreachable, and only consults the remote when the local machine can
plausibly decrypt:

  * Listing is always driven by the local index database — that's
    what holds the human IDs, timestamps, and per-snapshot stats
    that the table actually shows.
  * If no age secret key is configured, we skip remote listing
    entirely (the box is treated as a write-only backup machine —
    there's no value showing it remote-only keys it could never
    restore).
  * If a key IS configured, we try the remote listing; failures
    (volume unmounted, permission denied, network error) downgrade
    to a warning instead of aborting the command.
  * When the remote listing succeeds, we cross-reference by hashing
    each local human ID and diffing against the returned key set.
    Local-only snapshots get the existing "stale local record"
    cleanup hint; remote-only keys are surfaced as a single
    "NOTE: N remote snapshot(s) found in backup destination store
    but not in local database" line.

FileStorer construction also no longer does an eager mkdir — the
basePath is recorded and the directory is created lazily on first
write. A missing or unmounted destination during `snapshot list`
should NOT block the command, and now it doesn't.

RemoveAllSnapshots is rewritten to drive deletion from the local
index instead of from a remote listing, hashing each local ID to
find the corresponding remote key. Orphan remote keys (no matching
local snapshot) are handled separately and only deleted when
--remote is set. Existing tests are updated to hash storage paths
through the new RemoteSnapshotKey helper.

The hash format is a hard pre-1.0 break: existing remote snapshots
written under the human-ID path scheme are no longer readable; they
need to be either re-uploaded under the new scheme or manually
renamed. There is no fallback path; matching the project policy of
"no migrations pre-1.0."

internal/vaultik/verify.go

@@ -106,8 +106,11 @@ func (v *Vaultik) RunDeepVerify(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
 
 // loadVerificationData downloads manifest, database, and blob list for verification
 func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions, result *VerifyResult) (*snapshot.Manifest, *tempDB, []snapshot.BlobInfo, error) {
+	// All remote paths use the hashed key derived from the human ID.
+	remoteKey := snapshot.RemoteSnapshotKey(snapshotID)
+
 	// Download manifest
-	manifestPath := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/manifest.json.zst", snapshotID)
+	manifestPath := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/manifest.json.zst", remoteKey)
 	log.Info("Downloading manifest", "path", manifestPath)
 	if !opts.JSON {
 		v.printfStdout("Downloading manifest...\n")
@@ -136,7 +139,7 @@ func (v *Vaultik) loadVerificationData(snapshotID string, opts *VerifyOptions, r
 	}
 
 	// Download and decrypt database
-	dbPath := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/db.zst.age", snapshotID)
+	dbPath := fmt.Sprintf("metadata/%s/db.zst.age", remoteKey)
 	log.Info("Downloading encrypted database", "path", dbPath)
 	dbReader, err := v.Storage.Get(v.ctx, dbPath)
 	if err != nil {