Hash-verify the Go toolchain in the release workflow (closes #105)
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The release workflow installed Go via actions/setup-go, which pins the
action but not the toolchain tarball it downloads at runtime -- the
compiler that produces the published binaries was the last external
input in the release path verified against nothing in the repo, against
REPO_POLICIES.md's hash-pin rule.

New script/install-go, modelled on script/install-goreleaser, downloads
the exact go.dev archive for go.mod's `go` directive and refuses it
unless its sha256 matches a value committed in the script. release.yml
calls it instead of setup-go and sets GOTOOLCHAIN=local so that exact
compiler builds the release. The version is not duplicated: go.mod owns
it and install-go fails when its committed GO_VERSION disagrees, so
bumping Go edits go.mod, the checksum, and the Dockerfile golang digest
together.

Model: opus-4-8
This commit is contained in:
clawbot
2026-09-21 16:59:31 +00:00
committed by sneak
parent d2a0510cb4
commit f3dc6e78a7
4 changed files with 196 additions and 25 deletions
+18 -25
View File
@@ -20,33 +20,21 @@ jobs:
# check.yml runs script/cibuild, which does all of its work inside
# the digest-pinned Dockerfile images -- so without this step the
# release either fails at the before-hook or, worse, ships binaries
# built by whatever unpinned Go the runner happens to carry.
# REPO_POLICIES.md requires every external reference to be pinned,
# and script/release already refuses a goreleaser that is not the
# pinned build; the compiler that actually produces the artifacts
# is the last thing that should be exempt from that.
# built by whatever Go the runner happens to carry.
#
# go-version-file rather than a literal: go.mod's `go 1.26.1` is
# the single source of truth for the toolchain, the same way the
# Dockerfile FROM line is the single source of truth for the
# linter version that script/lint enforces. It is a three-component
# version, so setup-go resolves it exactly -- no silent drift onto
# a newer patch release.
#
# actions/setup-go v5.6.0, 2025-12-15. Pinned by commit sha, like
# the checkout above. v5.x is a node20 action, matching the node20
# actions/checkout v4 already in use here; the v6/v7 line requires
# a node24 runner, which this Gitea runner has never been asked
# for and cannot be assumed to provide.
# actions/setup-go would pin the action by commit sha, but the Go
# tarball it downloads at runtime is verified against no value in
# this repo, and the action exposes no checksum input.
# REPO_POLICIES.md requires every external reference to be pinned
# by hash with no exceptions, and this is the compiler that
# produces the published binaries -- the input where a substituted
# artifact matters most. So Go is installed the way goreleaser is:
# script/install-go downloads the exact archive for go.mod's `go`
# directive and refuses it unless its sha256 matches the value
# committed in the script, then puts .tool/go/bin on PATH for the
# steps below.
- name: Install Go
uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff
with:
go-version-file: go.mod
# setup-go's module cache needs a runner-side cache backend.
# A release is cut rarely and a cold module download costs
# seconds; a release failing because a cache service is absent
# costs a re-tag. Off, deliberately.
cache: false
run: script/install-go
- name: Install goreleaser
run: script/install-goreleaser
- name: Release
@@ -58,3 +46,8 @@ jobs:
# It is deliberately not the runner's automatic token, which is
# not guaranteed to carry that scope.
GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TOKEN }}
# Build with the toolchain install-go just verified, never a
# different one auto-downloaded from a `toolchain` directive:
# the point of the hash pin is that this exact compiler makes
# the release.
GOTOOLCHAIN: local