Keep unreferenced blobs newer than prune_grace_period (closes #387)

A backup uploads its blobs before the manifest that lists them, and the
process lock covers one user on one machine, so a prune from another host
or user sharing the destination deleted a running backup's blobs.

Prune now deletes an unreferenced blob only once its listed time is older
than the new config key prune_grace_period (default 24h; a negative value
is refused). A newer blob, or one listed with no time, is kept and counted
(blobs_too_new). A backup uploads a blob already on the destination again
instead of skipping it, so it gets a fresh time. The rclone backend takes
each object's time from the listing (use_server_modtime).

Cost: after database delete, the next backup uploads all its data again.
Side effect: a rebuilt blob replaces the stored copy; if compression_level
or the recipients changed since, older snapshots listing it fail verify.

Model: opus-5-5

docs/REPOSTRUCTURE.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ These are known, deliberate properties of the format and the tooling, recorded s
 3. **Chunking uses no secret.** The FastCDC parameters are fixed and public. The default 10 MB average yields chunks between 2.5 MB and 40 MB, and any file of 2.5 MB or less is a single chunk. At the default 10 GB `blob_size_limit` a blob holds hundreds of chunks, so individual chunk lengths are not visible in the blob's size; lowering the limit toward the chunk size begins to expose them.
 4. **Decrypted data on local disk.** Several commands stage plaintext under `$TMPDIR`: `snapshot restore` writes decrypted blobs under `vaultik-blobcache-*/` (no size cap) and the decrypted metadata database at `vaultik-restore-*/snapshot.db`; `verify --deep` writes that database at `vaultik-verify-*/snapshot.db`; `snapshot create` keeps a plaintext copy of the index at `vaultik-snapshot-*/snapshot.db`. These files are created `0600` and removed on success, but a `kill -9` or a power loss leaves them behind — delete any leftover `vaultik-*` directory under `$TMPDIR` by hand. `$TMPDIR` should be trusted to the same degree as the restore target.
 5. **Store permissions differ per command.** The backed-up host needs only PUT to run `snapshot create`: it writes blobs and metadata and neither reads nor deletes them. Other commands need more — `snapshot verify`, `snapshot restore`, and `prune` list and read; `prune`, `snapshot purge`, `snapshot remove`, and `remote nuke` also delete. The recommended cron line uses `--prune`, which runs `prune` on the backed-up host, so granting that host `--prune` gives it credentials that can delete its own backups. To keep the source host to PUT only, prune from a separate trusted host instead.
-6. **Changing recipients does not re-encrypt existing data.** Deduplicated chunks and same-named blobs already on the destination stay encrypted to the recipients in force when they were written. A new snapshot that reuses them cannot be restored with a newly added recipient's key alone, because those reused objects were never encrypted to it. To make everything readable by a new key, run `vaultik database delete` and take a full backup to a fresh destination or prefix.
+6. **Changing recipients does not re-encrypt existing data.** Deduplicated chunks already on the destination stay encrypted to the recipients in force when they were written. A new snapshot that reuses them cannot be restored with a newly added recipient's key alone, because those reused objects were never encrypted to it. To make everything readable by a new key, run `vaultik database delete` and take a full backup to a fresh destination or prefix.
 7. **X25519 recipients only.** vaultik rejects age ssh and plugin recipients. Long-lived ciphertext held by a third party (the destination operator) has no fallback if X25519 is ever broken: there is no second recipient type and no post-quantum option.
 
 ## Consistency Guarantees
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ The prune operation is safe because:
 1. It keeps every blob listed in any snapshot's manifest and deletes only blobs that no manifest references
 2. Manifests are unencrypted and can be read without keys
 3. If any manifest cannot be downloaded or decoded, prune deletes nothing and exits with an error, rather than treating that snapshot's blobs as unreferenced
-4. Prune requires exclusive access to the destination: running it during a concurrent backup can race a snapshot whose manifest is not yet written, so do not prune while a backup is in progress
+4. It deletes an unreferenced blob only once the blob is older than `prune_grace_period` (default `24h`). A backup uploads its blobs before the manifest that lists them, so a prune running meanwhile, on this host or another sharing the destination, leaves them as long as no backup run takes longer than the grace period. `remote nuke` has no such check
 
 ## Restoration Requirements