sneak
d31a052aff
check / check (push) Failing after 2m11s
The command is now `sww waf`, and the package is `internal/waf`. Types, functions, files, tests, comments, docs, the Dockerfile, the runit script, `script/`, compose examples, the log field `waf_line` and the `X-From-Waf` test header follow. No behaviour changes, and no setting changes name: rproxy already finds the waf through `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND`. Done with one `sed -i` (Discriminator and DISCRIMINATOR to WAF, discriminator to waf) over the files `git grep -i discriminator` listed, as sneak allowed for this rename, then `git mv` for the package and files. By hand afterwards: the header's spelling, which the linter requires, and the padding after `waf` in `sww`'s usage text. Model: opus-5-5
63 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
63 lines
1.9 KiB
Go
package waf
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// The heuristic rule_files. It reads the rules of the rule files, which
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// SWW_RULES_DIR and SWW_RULES_ENABLED name.
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import (
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"context"
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"time"
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"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
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"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
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"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
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"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
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)
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// ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
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// notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, adds the tag
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// exploitsignature when it matches any, and refuses the request
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// when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionBlockedByBlockRule for a
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// block rule, and for a ban rule with the action for the ban it makes. A ban
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// rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe
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// mode raises the alert for the ban
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// it would have made. Either rule's match is noted as an offence, for the
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// client's history. Its figures are the rule's id and action.
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type ruleFiles struct{}
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func (ruleFiles) name() string { return "rule_files" }
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func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
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matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
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for _, rule := range matched {
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rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
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rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
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}
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if len(matched) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
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// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
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last := matched[len(matched)-1]
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figures := map[string]any{"rule_id": last.ID, "rule_action": last.Action}
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switch last.Action {
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case rules.ActionBlock:
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rq.blockedByBlockRule = true
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return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule, figures: figures}
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case rules.ActionBan:
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rq.attack = true
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return &verdict{
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action: rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target}),
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figures: figures,
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}
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default:
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return nil
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}
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}
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