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| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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828af271a6 |
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@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@ RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
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{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
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go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
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# Second pass: the recorded requests, too slow for make test under -race.
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RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
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go test -tags no_fs_access,recorded -timeout 90s -cover ./internal/coreruleset/... || \
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{ echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
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go test -tags no_fs_access,recorded -timeout 90s -v ./internal/coreruleset/...; exit 1; }
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# Tidy stage: `go mod tidy` in the test phase's Go, so that the files it
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# writes pass the test phase's check. Nothing else depends on it, so only
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# script/tidy, which names the stage after it, builds it.
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@@ -220,123 +220,124 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
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Every setting the code reads, with its default:
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
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| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
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| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
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| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
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| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
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| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
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| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
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| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
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| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
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| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
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| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
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| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
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| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
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| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
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| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
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| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
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| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
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| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
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| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
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| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
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| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
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| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
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| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
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| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
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| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
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| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
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| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
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| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
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| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
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| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
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| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
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| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
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| `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
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| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
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| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
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| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
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| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
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| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
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| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
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| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
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| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
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| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
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| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
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| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
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| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
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| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
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| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
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| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
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| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
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| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
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| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
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| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
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| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
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| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
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| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
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| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
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| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
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| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
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| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
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| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
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| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
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| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
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| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
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| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
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| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
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| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
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| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
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| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
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| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
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| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
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| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
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| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
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| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
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| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
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| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
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| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
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| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
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| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
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| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
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| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
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| Variable | Default | What it does |
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| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
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| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
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| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
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| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
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| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
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| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`. The visitor gets `502` in place of a larger one, or it is cut off if it has already started. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | Two time limits, each this long, in milliseconds or `off`: one for the visitor to send its request line and headers, then one for the whole request to reach the app. |
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| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
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| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
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| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
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| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
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| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
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| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
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| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
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| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
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||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits. |
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||||
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
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||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
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||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; the next request is refused and bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes counted for a client in a minute, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes counted for a client in an hour, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes counted for a client in a day, a size or `off`. `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` says which bytes count: response bodies, request bodies or both. The request that passes the limit is not cut off, and the client is banned when its response ends. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | What the byte limits and the byte anomaly thresholds count: `response`, the app's response bodies; `request`, the visitors' request bodies; or `both`. What the visitor sent over a WebSocket counts as request bytes, and what the app sent as response bytes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals a client may get in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or `off`. The next one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A client that breaks a limit again within this time after its last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
|
||||
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs` (a web service), `file` (a local database) or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LISTS` | empty | Address lists that each add a tag to their clients' requests, as `name=URL` pairs, such as `torexit=https://example.com/tor.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_DENY` | empty | Tags whose requests are refused, such as `torexit,country=CN`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | Tags whose clients get a percentage, from 1 to 99, of every request and byte limit, such as `vpn:50,asn=14061:25`; the lowest applies. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` | unset | The URL of a routewatch instance, which gives each client's `asn=` and `prefix=` tags. Unset, nothing asks routewatch. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `asn=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `country=` tag's percentage. |
|
||||
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; each line counts as an `asn=` tag in `SWW_TAG_LIMIT_PERCENT` (the lowest wins). |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
|
||||
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
|
||||
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
|
||||
| `SWW_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, `drupal`, `gitea`, `mastodon`, `mediawiki`, `nextcloud`, `vaultwarden` or `wordpress`, such as `git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`; only those apps' fixes apply there. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
|
||||
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
|
||||
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
|
||||
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
|
||||
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
|
||||
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,core_rule_set_match,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the netblock around a client in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for one AS number in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for the whole service in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in a minute, a size. |
|
||||
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when more than this many bytes, as `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` counts them, are counted for a watched netblock in an hour, a size. |
|
||||
|
||||
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
|
||||
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
|
||||
@@ -581,27 +582,31 @@ client's limits by tag. See "Request tags" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
|
||||
headers of every request, and no body unless `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
|
||||
front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
|
||||
rules take for attacks.
|
||||
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in fourteen ways so that ordinary
|
||||
requests get through to the apps listed below. No setting undoes the changes;
|
||||
"Attack detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
|
||||
- These apps work out of the box at the default settings, and their recorded
|
||||
ordinary requests pass the Core Rule Set:
|
||||
- gitea: git over HTTP and sign-in through Git Credential Manager get
|
||||
through. On gitea's own paths, its searches, file names and branch names
|
||||
do too.
|
||||
- WordPress: saving a post from the block editor gets through. On
|
||||
WordPress's own paths, its searches, names and file names do too.
|
||||
- Drupal: on Drupal's own paths, the page to return to, its searches and its
|
||||
names get through.
|
||||
- MediaWiki: on MediaWiki's own paths, its searches, page titles, names and
|
||||
wikitext get through.
|
||||
- Mastodon: on Mastodon's own paths, its searches, names, email addresses,
|
||||
posts and deliveries from other servers get through.
|
||||
- Vaultwarden: on Vaultwarden's own paths, its names, password hints, email
|
||||
addresses and encrypted file names get through.
|
||||
- Nextcloud: its sync client gets through. On Nextcloud's own paths, its
|
||||
WebDAV methods, searches, file names, account names, comments and
|
||||
documents do too.
|
||||
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in six ways so that it lets ordinary
|
||||
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
|
||||
Git Credential Manager. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack detection" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
|
||||
- Each supported app also has its own fixes, which let its ordinary requests
|
||||
through. Its recorded ordinary requests pass the Core Rule Set at the default
|
||||
settings. The supported apps, by their names in `SWW_APPS`, are:
|
||||
- `gitea`, whose fixes let its searches, file names and branch names
|
||||
through;
|
||||
- `wordpress`, whose fixes let through its searches, its names, its file
|
||||
names and a post saved from the block editor;
|
||||
- `drupal`, whose fixes let through the page to return to, its searches and
|
||||
its names;
|
||||
- `mediawiki`, whose fixes let through its searches, its page titles, its
|
||||
names and its wikitext;
|
||||
- `mastodon`, whose fixes let through its searches, its names, its email
|
||||
addresses, its posts and deliveries from other servers;
|
||||
- `vaultwarden`, whose fixes let through its names, its password hints, its
|
||||
email addresses and its encrypted file names;
|
||||
- `nextcloud`, whose fixes let through its sync client, its WebDAV methods,
|
||||
its searches, its file names, its account names, its comments and its
|
||||
documents.
|
||||
- `SWW_APPS` names the apps each hostname serves. A hostname gets only its own
|
||||
apps' fixes, and a hostname it does not list gets none. Unset, every app's
|
||||
fixes apply to every hostname.
|
||||
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's own
|
||||
fields or paths.
|
||||
- Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
|
||||
@@ -695,8 +700,7 @@ on the host.
|
||||
- `script/projectname`: prints `smallwebwaf`, which the other scripts tag their
|
||||
images with.
|
||||
- `script/test`: checks that `go.mod` and `go.sum` are tidy, then runs the
|
||||
tests, as the `test` phase of the `Dockerfile`. It runs them twice: once with
|
||||
the race detector, and once without it for the recorded requests. `make test`.
|
||||
tests, as the `test` phase of the `Dockerfile`. `make test`.
|
||||
- `script/tidy`: writes `go.mod` and `go.sum` as `go mod tidy` writes them, in
|
||||
the `tidy` stage of the `Dockerfile`. `make tidy`.
|
||||
- `script/lint`: runs golangci-lint, as the `lint` phase of the `Dockerfile`.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -255,6 +255,31 @@ the request first.
|
||||
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
|
||||
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
|
||||
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
|
||||
- `SWW_APPS` (default unset): the apps each hostname serves. A request gets the
|
||||
fixes of its hostname's apps only (see "Attack detection" in
|
||||
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
|
||||
- Entries are separated by semicolons. Each is a hostname, a colon, then one
|
||||
or more apps separated by commas, for example
|
||||
`git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com:wordpress`.
|
||||
- The supported apps are:
|
||||
- `drupal`;
|
||||
- `gitea`;
|
||||
- `mastodon`;
|
||||
- `mediawiki`;
|
||||
- `nextcloud`;
|
||||
- `vaultwarden`;
|
||||
- `wordpress`.
|
||||
- The request's `Host` is matched by exact name, without its port and
|
||||
without regard to case. There are no wildcards.
|
||||
- A hostname not listed gets no app's fixes, so every rule checks it in
|
||||
full. Set empty, `SWW_APPS` lists no hostname.
|
||||
- Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname.
|
||||
- Any of these mistakes stops the start:
|
||||
- an unknown app;
|
||||
- a hostname that is not a DNS name, such as `*.example.com`;
|
||||
- a hostname listed twice;
|
||||
- an app listed twice for one hostname;
|
||||
- an entry without a colon.
|
||||
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals a client may get
|
||||
in a minute from a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set, a count or
|
||||
`off`. The next one bans the client (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,6 +236,11 @@ type Config struct {
|
||||
WAFExemptPaths []string
|
||||
WAFBodyLimit int64
|
||||
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
|
||||
// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
|
||||
// lowercase (SWW_APPS): a request gets only its hostname's apps' fixes
|
||||
// to the Core Rule Set. Apps is nil while SWW_APPS is unset, and every
|
||||
// request gets every app's fixes.
|
||||
Apps map[string][]string
|
||||
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
|
||||
// attack (SWW_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
|
||||
TrapPaths []string
|
||||
@@ -404,6 +410,11 @@ var (
|
||||
errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errNotAppsEntry = errors.New(
|
||||
"is not a hostname, : and a list of apps, such as git.example.com:gitea",
|
||||
)
|
||||
errNotHostname = errors.New("is not a DNS name such as git.example.com")
|
||||
errNotApp = errors.New("is not an app sww has fixes for; the apps are")
|
||||
errNotWAFMode = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
|
||||
errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
|
||||
errNotRuleID = errors.New(
|
||||
@@ -577,6 +588,7 @@ func FromEnvironment(
|
||||
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
|
||||
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: env.filePath(
|
||||
"SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"),
|
||||
Apps: env.apps("SWW_APPS"),
|
||||
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWW_TRAP_PATHS"),
|
||||
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count("SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
|
||||
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
|
||||
@@ -832,6 +844,25 @@ func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
|
||||
return prefixes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// apps reads the setting that is the apps each hostname serves. It is nil
|
||||
// while the setting is unset, and logged as null, unlike a setting set
|
||||
// empty.
|
||||
func (e *environment) apps(name string) map[string][]string {
|
||||
value, set := e.lookup(name)
|
||||
if !set {
|
||||
e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.Any(name, nil))
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, value))
|
||||
|
||||
apps, err := parseApps(value)
|
||||
e.check(name, err)
|
||||
|
||||
return apps
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// trapPaths reads the setting that is the list of trap paths. It is empty
|
||||
// by default.
|
||||
func (e *environment) trapPaths(name string) []string {
|
||||
@@ -1849,6 +1880,65 @@ func parseTrapPaths(value string) ([]string, error) {
|
||||
return paths, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseApps reads the apps each hostname serves: entries separated by
|
||||
// semicolons, each a hostname, a colon, and a comma-separated list of the
|
||||
// names coreruleset.AppNames returns, such as
|
||||
// git.example.com:gitea;cloud.example.com:nextcloud,wordpress. Each
|
||||
// hostname is a DNS name, without a wildcard. It returns them by hostname
|
||||
// in lowercase, since a hostname is matched without regard to case. An
|
||||
// empty value lists no hostname.
|
||||
func parseApps(value string) (map[string][]string, error) {
|
||||
apps := map[string][]string{}
|
||||
|
||||
if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
|
||||
return apps, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
|
||||
hostname, list, found := strings.Cut(entry, ":")
|
||||
if !found {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostname = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(hostname))
|
||||
if hostname == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !isZone(hostname) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", hostname, errNotHostname)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if _, listed := apps[hostname]; listed {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", hostname, errListedTwice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
names, err := parseList(list)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(names) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for i, name := range names {
|
||||
if !slices.Contains(coreruleset.AppNames(), name) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w %s", name, errNotApp,
|
||||
strings.Join(coreruleset.AppNames(), ", "))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if slices.Contains(names[:i], name) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", name, errListedTwice)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
apps[hostname] = names
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return apps, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseRuleIDs reads a comma-separated list of the ids of Core Rule Set
|
||||
// rules, each a whole number above zero and outside firstSetupRuleID to
|
||||
// lastSetupRuleID.
|
||||
@@ -2455,7 +2545,8 @@ func MaskZoneKey(zone string) string {
|
||||
return masked + "." + rest
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it.
|
||||
// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it. It
|
||||
// also checks the hostnames of SWW_APPS, which are DNS names too.
|
||||
func isZone(zone string) bool {
|
||||
for label := range strings.SplitSeq(zone, ".") {
|
||||
badChar := strings.ContainsFunc(label, func(char rune) bool {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ const (
|
||||
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
|
||||
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
|
||||
exclusionsFile = "SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
|
||||
apps = "SWW_APPS"
|
||||
trapPaths = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
|
||||
errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
|
||||
logRemoteURL = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
|
||||
@@ -582,6 +583,101 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// gitea is gitea's name in SWW_APPS.
|
||||
const gitea = "gitea"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestApps(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
env environment
|
||||
want map[string][]string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{environment{}, nil},
|
||||
{environment{apps: ""}, map[string][]string{}},
|
||||
{
|
||||
environment{apps: "Git.Example.com:gitea; cloud.example.com : gitea "},
|
||||
map[string][]string{
|
||||
"git.example.com": {gitea}, "cloud.example.com": {gitea},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
environment{apps: "cloud.example.com:gitea,wordpress"},
|
||||
map[string][]string{"cloud.example.com": {gitea, "wordpress"}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, tc.env)
|
||||
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cfg.Apps, tc.want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%v gave %#v, want %#v", tc.env, cfg.Apps, tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Unset and set empty, SWW_APPS has opposite effects, so it logs differently.
|
||||
func TestUnsetAndEmptyAppsAreLoggedDifferently(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||
env environment
|
||||
want string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{environment{}, `"` + apps + `":null`},
|
||||
{environment{apps: ""}, `"` + apps + `":""`},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
var out bytes.Buffer
|
||||
|
||||
slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).
|
||||
Info("starting", "settings", fromEnvironment(t, tc.env))
|
||||
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(out.String(), tc.want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%v logged %s, want %s in it", tc.env, out.String(), tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestInvalidAppsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
notEntry = " is not a hostname, : and a list of apps, " +
|
||||
"such as git.example.com:gitea"
|
||||
notHostname = " is not a DNS name such as git.example.com"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, tc := range []struct{ value, want string }{
|
||||
{"git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com", `"blog.example.com"` + notEntry},
|
||||
{"git.example.com:gitea;", `""` + notEntry},
|
||||
{":gitea", `":gitea"` + notEntry},
|
||||
{"git.example.com:", `"git.example.com:"` + notEntry},
|
||||
{"*.example.com:gitea", `"*.example.com"` + notHostname},
|
||||
{"git.example.com/:gitea", `"git.example.com/"` + notHostname},
|
||||
{"git example.com:gitea", `"git example.com"` + notHostname},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"git.example.com:gitea,jellyfin",
|
||||
`"jellyfin" is not an app sww has fixes for; ` +
|
||||
`the apps are drupal, gitea, mastodon, mediawiki, nextcloud, ` +
|
||||
`vaultwarden, wordpress`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"git.example.com:gitea;GIT.example.com:gitea",
|
||||
`"git.example.com" is listed twice`,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{"git.example.com:gitea,gitea", `"gitea" is listed twice`},
|
||||
{"git.example.com:gitea,", `"gitea," has an empty item in its list`},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{apps: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
|
||||
|
||||
want := apps + ": " + tc.want
|
||||
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWAFBodyLimitOf64K(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2589,6 +2685,7 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
wafExemptPaths: "",
|
||||
wafBodyLimit: off,
|
||||
exclusionsFile: "",
|
||||
apps: "", // logged as null, which decodes as ""
|
||||
trapPaths: "",
|
||||
errorBurstThreshold: "30",
|
||||
logRemoteURL: "",
|
||||
|
||||
+115
-110
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
// Package coreruleset runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
|
||||
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
|
||||
// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the fourteen changes sww
|
||||
// makes to it and the exclusions in SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
|
||||
// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
|
||||
// response.
|
||||
// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes sww
|
||||
// makes to it, the fixes for the apps SWW_APPS names, and the exclusions in
|
||||
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as "Attack detection" under "Settings"
|
||||
// in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// sww writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
|
||||
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"maps"
|
||||
"net"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/netip"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
@@ -32,11 +34,8 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
// directives are the Core Rule Set as sww runs it, with the
|
||||
// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second,
|
||||
// giteaExclusions for the third, wordpressExclusions for the fourth,
|
||||
// drupalExclusions for the fifth, mediawikiExclusions for the sixth,
|
||||
// mastodonExclusions for the seventh, vaultwardenExclusions for the eighth,
|
||||
// and nextcloudExclusions for the ninth.
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and the
|
||||
// directives of every app in apps for the third.
|
||||
// Each rule sww adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
|
||||
// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
|
||||
// SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
|
||||
@@ -84,62 +83,28 @@ SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
|
||||
# before the rules of phase 1 too.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# The eighth change comes before the rules for the same reason.
|
||||
# The apps' fixes come before the rules for the same reason.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# The ninth change comes before the rules for the same reason.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# So does the tenth.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# So does the eleventh.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# So does the twelfth.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# So does the thirteenth.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# And the fourteenth.
|
||||
%s
|
||||
|
||||
# The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
|
||||
# The fifth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
|
||||
# inspected.
|
||||
Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
|
||||
|
||||
# The third: redirect_uri is not checked for a URL naming an IP address or
|
||||
# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here, and in the fourth,
|
||||
# without regard to case. ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart
|
||||
# body Coraza reads as well as the query parameters, so a field of one of
|
||||
# these names is left out too.
|
||||
# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here without regard to case.
|
||||
# ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart body Coraza reads as
|
||||
# well as the query parameters, so a field of this name is left out too.
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 931100 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 934110 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
|
||||
|
||||
# The fourth: the query parameters in which gitea sends names within a
|
||||
# repository or its own records, or a page of its own site, are not
|
||||
# checked against the lists of system files, shell paths and command
|
||||
# names. Coraza takes one rule id per directive.
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 930120 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
|
||||
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
|
||||
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932160 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
|
||||
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
|
||||
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
|
||||
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
|
||||
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
|
||||
|
||||
# The fifth, for Referer: it is not checked for a Unix command without
|
||||
# arguments, for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130
|
||||
# refused every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md. The
|
||||
# cookies are left out in Inspect.
|
||||
# The fourth: Referer is not checked for a Unix command without arguments,
|
||||
# for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130 refused
|
||||
# every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md.
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
|
||||
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944130 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
|
||||
|
||||
# The seventh: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
|
||||
# The sixth: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
|
||||
# it takes the layer from in the query parameter from, which is not
|
||||
# checked for command names. 932260 refused the push of a layer from
|
||||
# owner/python3-app.
|
||||
@@ -189,61 +154,61 @@ SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:900450,phase:2,pass,\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
|
||||
`
|
||||
|
||||
// giteaExclusions are the eighth change: the fields of gitea's own
|
||||
// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
|
||||
// directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// app is an app whose ordinary requests the Core Rule Set would refuse,
|
||||
// with the fixes that let them pass.
|
||||
type app struct {
|
||||
// directives are Coraza exclusions, loaded before the Core Rule Set's
|
||||
// rules. Their first rule skips to the marker they end with, unless
|
||||
// Inspect sets the transaction variable named for the app, such as
|
||||
// app_gitea. The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase
|
||||
// must check that variable itself.
|
||||
directives string
|
||||
// cookies are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request without.
|
||||
cookies []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//go:embed gitea.conf
|
||||
var giteaExclusions string
|
||||
var giteaDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// wordpressExclusions are the ninth change: the fields of WordPress's own
|
||||
// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
|
||||
// directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:embed wordpress.conf
|
||||
var wordpressExclusions string
|
||||
var wordpressDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// drupalExclusions are the tenth change: the fields of Drupal's own
|
||||
// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
|
||||
// directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:embed drupal.conf
|
||||
var drupalExclusions string
|
||||
var drupalDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// mediawikiExclusions are the eleventh change: the fields of MediaWiki's
|
||||
// own requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
|
||||
// directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:embed mediawiki.conf
|
||||
var mediawikiExclusions string
|
||||
var mediawikiDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// mastodonExclusions are the twelfth change: the fields of Mastodon's own
|
||||
// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
|
||||
// directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:embed mastodon.conf
|
||||
var mastodonExclusions string
|
||||
var mastodonDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// vaultwardenExclusions are the thirteenth change: the fields of
|
||||
// Vaultwarden's own requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as
|
||||
// Coraza directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:embed vaultwarden.conf
|
||||
var vaultwardenExclusions string
|
||||
var vaultwardenDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// nextcloudExclusions are the fourteenth change: the fields of Nextcloud's
|
||||
// own requests that skip the rules that refused them there, the WebDAV
|
||||
// methods it uses, its cookie of the account's name, and its uploads,
|
||||
// whose bodies are not read, as Coraza directives.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//go:embed nextcloud.conf
|
||||
var nextcloudExclusions string
|
||||
var nextcloudDirectives string
|
||||
|
||||
// cookiesNotRead are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request
|
||||
// without, the rest of the fifth change.
|
||||
// apps are the apps whose fixes sww has, by the name SWW_APPS gives each.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
|
||||
var cookiesNotRead = []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"}
|
||||
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a map
|
||||
var apps = map[string]app{
|
||||
"drupal": {directives: drupalDirectives},
|
||||
"gitea": {
|
||||
directives: giteaDirectives,
|
||||
cookies: []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mastodon": {directives: mastodonDirectives},
|
||||
"mediawiki": {directives: mediawikiDirectives},
|
||||
"nextcloud": {directives: nextcloudDirectives},
|
||||
"vaultwarden": {directives: vaultwardenDirectives},
|
||||
"wordpress": {directives: wordpressDirectives},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AppNames returns the names of the apps whose fixes sww has, in
|
||||
// alphabetical order.
|
||||
func AppNames() []string {
|
||||
return slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(apps))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Params are what New needs.
|
||||
type Params struct {
|
||||
@@ -259,6 +224,10 @@ type Params struct {
|
||||
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
|
||||
// there is none.
|
||||
ExclusionsFile string
|
||||
// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
|
||||
// lowercase (SWW_APPS). A request gets the fixes of its hostname's
|
||||
// apps only, or of every app while Apps is nil.
|
||||
Apps map[string][]string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The ids of sww's own rules, which an exclusions file may not
|
||||
@@ -350,13 +319,15 @@ func checkExclusions(exclusions string) error {
|
||||
type CoreRuleSet struct {
|
||||
engine coraza.WAF
|
||||
bodyLimit int64
|
||||
apps map[string][]string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the fourteen changes, at params'
|
||||
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading request
|
||||
// bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file loaded
|
||||
// before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error if it
|
||||
// cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses it.
|
||||
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes and the apps' fixes,
|
||||
// at params' paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading
|
||||
// request bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file
|
||||
// loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error
|
||||
// if it cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses
|
||||
// it.
|
||||
func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
body := ""
|
||||
if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
|
||||
@@ -379,10 +350,13 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var fixes strings.Builder
|
||||
for _, name := range AppNames() {
|
||||
fixes.WriteString(apps[name].directives + "\n")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body, exclusions,
|
||||
giteaExclusions, wordpressExclusions, drupalExclusions,
|
||||
mediawikiExclusions, mastodonExclusions, vaultwardenExclusions,
|
||||
nextcloudExclusions)
|
||||
fixes.String())
|
||||
|
||||
if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
|
||||
ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
|
||||
@@ -400,7 +374,9 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return &CoreRuleSet{engine: engine, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
|
||||
return &CoreRuleSet{
|
||||
engine: engine, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit, apps: params.Apps,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Result is what the Core Rule Set found in a request.
|
||||
@@ -412,11 +388,12 @@ type Result struct {
|
||||
Score int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client: on its
|
||||
// method, its URL with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header
|
||||
// without the cookies in cookiesNotRead, and on body, r's body as the
|
||||
// caller has it, as readBody reads it. It returns what it found, what it
|
||||
// read of body, and the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
|
||||
// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client, with the
|
||||
// fixes of the apps appsFor names for r's hostname: on its method, its URL
|
||||
// with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header without those apps'
|
||||
// cookies, and on body, r's body as the caller has it, as readBody reads
|
||||
// it. It returns what it found, what it read of body, and the error that
|
||||
// ended the reading early, if one did.
|
||||
func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
|
||||
r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
|
||||
) (Result, []byte, error) {
|
||||
@@ -424,13 +401,24 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
|
||||
// Closing would remove the files Coraza wrote, and it writes none.
|
||||
defer func() { _ = tx.Close() }()
|
||||
|
||||
// The transaction's variables are set only through Coraza's interface
|
||||
// for plugins.
|
||||
state := tx.(plugintypes.TransactionState) //nolint:forcetypeassert // every one is
|
||||
|
||||
var cookiesNotRead []string
|
||||
|
||||
for _, name := range c.appsFor(r.Host) {
|
||||
state.Variables().TX().Set("app_"+name, []string{"1"})
|
||||
cookiesNotRead = append(cookiesNotRead, apps[name].cookies...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tx.ProcessConnection(client.String(), 0, "", 0)
|
||||
tx.ProcessURI(r.URL.String(), r.Method, r.Proto)
|
||||
|
||||
for name, values := range r.Header {
|
||||
for _, value := range values {
|
||||
if name == "Cookie" {
|
||||
value = withoutCookiesNotRead(value)
|
||||
value = withoutCookies(value, cookiesNotRead)
|
||||
if value == "" {
|
||||
continue // it held those cookies alone
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -523,9 +511,26 @@ func score(tx types.Transaction) int {
|
||||
return n
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// withoutCookiesNotRead returns value, a Cookie header's, without the
|
||||
// cookies in cookiesNotRead.
|
||||
func withoutCookiesNotRead(value string) string {
|
||||
// appsFor returns the names of the apps whose fixes a request for host,
|
||||
// its Host header, gets: every app while SWW_APPS is unset, and otherwise
|
||||
// those SWW_APPS lists for host's name, without the port and in
|
||||
// lowercase.
|
||||
func (c *CoreRuleSet) appsFor(host string) []string {
|
||||
if c.apps == nil {
|
||||
return AppNames()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
hostname = host // it has no port
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return c.apps[strings.ToLower(hostname)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// withoutCookies returns value, a Cookie header's, without the cookies
|
||||
// named in cookiesNotRead.
|
||||
func withoutCookies(value string, cookiesNotRead []string) string {
|
||||
var kept []string
|
||||
|
||||
for cookie := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
package coreruleset_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"net/http/httptest"
|
||||
@@ -35,12 +36,14 @@ var loaded = struct {
|
||||
}{loaders: map[string]func() (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error){}}
|
||||
|
||||
// loaderFor returns the function that loads the Core Rule Set with params
|
||||
// once, making it the first time params are asked for.
|
||||
// once, making it the first time params are asked for. %#v writes a nil
|
||||
// Apps, which gives every app's fixes, apart from an empty one, which
|
||||
// gives none.
|
||||
func loaderFor(params coreruleset.Params) func() (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
loaded.Lock()
|
||||
defer loaded.Unlock()
|
||||
|
||||
settings := fmt.Sprintf("%+v", params)
|
||||
settings := fmt.Sprintf("%#v", params)
|
||||
|
||||
load, found := loaded.loaders[settings]
|
||||
if !found {
|
||||
@@ -154,9 +157,10 @@ func inspectBody(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, header := range r.headers {
|
||||
// Go's server keeps Host and Transfer-Encoding out of the headers.
|
||||
// Go's server keeps Host and Transfer-Encoding out of the headers,
|
||||
// whatever their case.
|
||||
name, value, _ := strings.Cut(header, ": ")
|
||||
switch name {
|
||||
switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name) {
|
||||
case "Host":
|
||||
req.Host = value
|
||||
case "Transfer-Encoding":
|
||||
@@ -201,8 +205,8 @@ func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a request one of the
|
||||
// fourteen changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request like
|
||||
// it that the change is not for.
|
||||
// six changes or an app's fixes are for, and still finds result in
|
||||
// refused, a request like it that they are not for.
|
||||
func wantChange(
|
||||
t *testing.T, crs *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request,
|
||||
result coreruleset.Result,
|
||||
@@ -463,6 +467,123 @@ func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
matched(930120, 932160))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// giteaFixed are gitea requests that only gitea's fixes let through, one
|
||||
// for each kind of fix, each with what the Core Rule Set finds in it
|
||||
// without them.
|
||||
//
|
||||
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
|
||||
var giteaFixed = []struct {
|
||||
request request
|
||||
result coreruleset.Result
|
||||
}{
|
||||
// A search of code, on the path of gitea's search.
|
||||
{get("/explore/code?q=SELECT%20*%20FROM%20users%20WHERE"), matched(942100)},
|
||||
// A file name, in a parameter gitea sends names in, on any path.
|
||||
{get("/?path=.gitignore"), matched(930120)},
|
||||
// A file name, in a cookie of gitea's.
|
||||
{
|
||||
get("/owner/repo", "Cookie: gitea_flash=success%3DFile%2Bpackage.json%2Bdeleted"),
|
||||
matched(930120),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The hostnames of the tests of SWW_APPS: the one that serves gitea, and
|
||||
// one that serves another app.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
giteaHost = "git.example"
|
||||
otherHost = "blog.example"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// gitea is gitea's name in SWW_APPS.
|
||||
const gitea = "gitea"
|
||||
|
||||
// wordpress is WordPress's name in SWW_APPS.
|
||||
const wordpress = "wordpress"
|
||||
|
||||
// withHost returns r sent to host.
|
||||
func withHost(r request, host string) request {
|
||||
return request{r.method, r.target, append([]string{"Host: " + host}, r.headers...)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// servingApps returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with SWW_APPS
|
||||
// giving apps.
|
||||
func servingApps(t *testing.T, apps map[string][]string) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
return shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, Apps: apps,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAppsUnsetGivesEveryHostnameEveryAppsFixes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
|
||||
for _, host := range []string{giteaHost, otherHost} {
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestListedHostnameGetsItsAppsFixes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{giteaHost: {gitea}})
|
||||
|
||||
// The hostname is matched without the port and without regard to case.
|
||||
for _, host := range []string{giteaHost, "GIT.Example:8443"} {
|
||||
for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnlistedHostnameGetsTheFullCheck(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
for _, apps := range []map[string][]string{
|
||||
{giteaHost: {gitea}},
|
||||
// SWW_APPS set empty lists no hostname.
|
||||
{},
|
||||
} {
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, apps)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, host := range []string{otherHost, otherHost + ":8443", "git.example.org"} {
|
||||
for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), fixed.result)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWordPressFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesWordPress(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {wordpress},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// A search, which only WordPress's fixes let through.
|
||||
search := get("/?s=python3")
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, giteaHost), matched(932260))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestHostnameListingTwoAppsGetsTheFixesOfBoth(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{giteaHost: {gitea, wordpress}})
|
||||
|
||||
// A file name that only gitea's fixes let through, and a search that only
|
||||
// WordPress's fixes let through.
|
||||
for _, target := range []string{"/?path=.gitignore", "/?s=python3"} {
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(get(target), giteaHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
|
||||
// exclusions file at path.
|
||||
func withExclusions(path string) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
@@ -572,6 +693,38 @@ func TestExclusionsFileThatCannotBeUsedIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// giteaRequests returns the recorded ordinary gitea requests in testdata.
|
||||
// Each has the Referer of a page that names the same, as a page opened
|
||||
// from it has.
|
||||
func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
text, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "gitea-requests.txt"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var requests []request
|
||||
|
||||
for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
|
||||
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
|
||||
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
target, header, _ := strings.Cut(line, " ")
|
||||
|
||||
headers := []string{"Referer: http://git.example" + target}
|
||||
if header != "" {
|
||||
headers = append(headers, header)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
requests = append(requests, get(target, headers...))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return requests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// An SQL injection, a script injection and a shell command after a ";", as
|
||||
// query values. Every app's tests check that its fields still refuse the
|
||||
// first two.
|
||||
@@ -591,13 +744,71 @@ const passwordField = "password="
|
||||
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
|
||||
var hardValues = []string{"python3", "powershell", "ls%20-la", ".htaccess"}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGiteaAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// wantRecordedRequestsPass checks that none of the recorded ordinary
|
||||
// requests in the file name in testdata is refused on example.com, where
|
||||
// they were recorded, while SWW_APPS lists only app for it. They are
|
||||
// checked at the defaults and while bodies are read. With SWW_APPS unset,
|
||||
// every app's fixes apply. These only switch checks off, so the requests
|
||||
// pass then too. A request with neither a body nor a Content-Type header is
|
||||
// checked only at the defaults: with neither, the set that reads bodies has
|
||||
// nothing more to check. Each request runs as its own parallel subtest.
|
||||
func wantRecordedRequestsPass(t *testing.T, name, app string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
apps := map[string][]string{"example.com": {app}}
|
||||
defaults := servingApps(t, apps)
|
||||
bodies := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
|
||||
Apps: apps,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for _, recorded := range recordedRequests(t, name) {
|
||||
t.Run(recorded.Method+" "+recorded.Target, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
r := request{recorded.Method, recorded.Target, recorded.Headers}
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ := inspectBody(t, defaults, r, recorded.Body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %s refused: %+v", r.method, r.target, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
typed := slices.ContainsFunc(recorded.Headers, func(header string) bool {
|
||||
name, _, _ := strings.Cut(header, ":")
|
||||
|
||||
return strings.EqualFold(name, "Content-Type")
|
||||
})
|
||||
if recorded.Body == "" && !typed {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ = inspectBody(t, bodies, r, recorded.Body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %s %.200q refused while bodies are read: %+v",
|
||||
r.method, r.target, recorded.Body, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryGiteaRequestsPassAndAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
// The recorded requests pass on giteaHost with gitea's fixes alone. The
|
||||
// attacks are refused at the defaults, where every app's fixes apply.
|
||||
giteaOnly := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{giteaHost: {gitea}})
|
||||
crs := atDefaults(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, r := range giteaRequests(t) {
|
||||
if got := inspect(t, giteaOnly, withHost(r, giteaHost)); got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %q refused: %+v", r.target, r.headers[1:], got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// In q too, off gitea's search pages.
|
||||
for _, parameter := range []string{"id", "q"} {
|
||||
for _, attack := range []string{
|
||||
@@ -650,6 +861,46 @@ const (
|
||||
wpTags = "/wp-json/wp/v2/tags"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// recordedRequest is a line of a file of recorded requests in testdata.
|
||||
type recordedRequest struct {
|
||||
Method string `json:"method"`
|
||||
Target string `json:"target"`
|
||||
Headers []string `json:"headers"`
|
||||
Body string `json:"body"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// recordedRequests returns the recorded ordinary requests in the file name
|
||||
// in testdata, each with its body.
|
||||
func recordedRequests(t *testing.T, name string) []recordedRequest {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
path := filepath.Join("testdata", name)
|
||||
|
||||
text, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a file in testdata
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var requests []recordedRequest
|
||||
|
||||
for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var r recordedRequest
|
||||
|
||||
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%q: %v", line, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
requests = append(requests, r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return requests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// readingBodiesUpTo64K returns the Core Rule Set as sww runs it by default,
|
||||
// but reading bodies up to the largest SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT.
|
||||
func readingBodiesUpTo64K(t *testing.T) *coreruleset.CoreRuleSet {
|
||||
@@ -715,11 +966,51 @@ func wordpressAttackTargets(attack string) []string {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestWordPressAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// wantWordPressRequestsPass checks that the recorded ordinary WordPress
|
||||
// requests pass on otherHost, where they were recorded, while SWW_APPS lists
|
||||
// only wordpress for it. They pass at the defaults, and those with a body
|
||||
// pass while bodies up to 64 KiB are read too. Every app's fixes only switch
|
||||
// checks off, so the requests pass with SWW_APPS unset too.
|
||||
func wantWordPressRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
apps := map[string][]string{otherHost: {wordpress}}
|
||||
defaults := servingApps(t, apps)
|
||||
bodies := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: 64<<10 - 1,
|
||||
Apps: apps,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
for _, recorded := range recordedRequests(t, "wordpress-requests.txt") {
|
||||
t.Run(recorded.Method+" "+recorded.Target, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
r := request{recorded.Method, recorded.Target, recorded.Headers}
|
||||
|
||||
crsSets := []*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet{defaults}
|
||||
if recorded.Body != "" {
|
||||
crsSets = append(crsSets, bodies)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, crs := range crsSets {
|
||||
got, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, recorded.Body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %s %.200q refused: %+v", r.method, r.target, recorded.Body, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryWordPressRequestsPassAndAttacksAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
wantWordPressRequestsPass(t)
|
||||
|
||||
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, attack := range []string{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# The tenth change: on Drupal's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
|
||||
# Drupal's fixes: on Drupal's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
|
||||
# ordinary Drupal requests there. They are the fields where Drupal sends a
|
||||
# search, a name, a file name or an address. Each exclusion runs with the
|
||||
# request, before the rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@
|
||||
# 932230: ls -la
|
||||
# 932235: python3
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists drupal for the request's hostname, every rule below is
|
||||
# skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_drupal when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_drupal itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_drupal "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900790,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_DRUPAL"
|
||||
|
||||
# Every admin page's filters and autocompletes, and the page to return to:
|
||||
# title: /admin/content?title=python3
|
||||
# name: /admin/content/media?name=python3
|
||||
@@ -237,3 +244,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^(?:/[a-z]{2,3}(?:-[a-z]+)?)?/user/password$" \
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS_GET:json.mail "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:json.mail,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:json.mail"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_DRUPAL
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/url"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// drupalThreshold is SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +33,26 @@ const drupalEditAccount = "/user/2/edit"
|
||||
// drupalName is the field for a person's name, as the start of a form body.
|
||||
const drupalName = "name="
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryDrupalRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "drupal-requests.txt", "drupal")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestDrupalFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesDrupal(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {"drupal"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// A search, which only Drupal's fixes let through.
|
||||
search := get("/search?keys=python3")
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, giteaHost), matched(932260))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// drupalAttacks are an SQL injection, a path traversal and a script
|
||||
// injection, as a query value.
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,55 @@
|
||||
# The eighth change: on gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
|
||||
# ordinary gitea requests there. They are the fields where gitea sends a search,
|
||||
# a file name or a branch name. Each exclusion runs with the request, before the
|
||||
# rules it switches off, those of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before
|
||||
# the Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request the rule refused.
|
||||
# gitea's fixes: some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea requests.
|
||||
# They are the fields where gitea sends a search, a file name or a branch name.
|
||||
# Each exclusion runs with the request, before the rules it switches off, those
|
||||
# of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules.
|
||||
# Each comment names a request the rule refused.
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists gitea for the request's hostname, every rule below is
|
||||
# skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_gitea when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_gitea itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_gitea "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900590,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_GITEA"
|
||||
|
||||
# The query parameters in which gitea sends names within a repository or its
|
||||
# own records, or a page of its own site, are not checked against the lists of
|
||||
# system files, shell paths and command names, on any path:
|
||||
# 930120: .gitignore
|
||||
# 932160: bin/docker-entrypoint
|
||||
# 932260: docker-build
|
||||
# ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart body Coraza reads as well
|
||||
# as the query parameters, so a field of these names is left out too.
|
||||
SecAction "id:900591,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:path,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:files,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:skip-to,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:sub_path,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:ref,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:sha,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:branch,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:workflow,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:artifactName,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:redirect_to,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:path,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:files,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:skip-to,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:sub_path,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:ref,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:sha,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:branch,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:workflow,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:artifactName,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:redirect_to,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:path,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:files,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:skip-to,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:sub_path,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:ref,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:sha,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:branch,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:workflow,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:artifactName,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:redirect_to"
|
||||
|
||||
# gitea's searches of code, of issues and pull requests, and of commits send the
|
||||
# text searched for in q, which skips these rules there:
|
||||
@@ -163,8 +210,8 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
|
||||
# 942140: information_schema.sql
|
||||
# 944110: java/lang/Runtime.java
|
||||
# 944130: java.lang.String.md
|
||||
# Each request skips the rules that refused it. The fourth change already has
|
||||
# path and redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
|
||||
# Each request skips the rules that refused it. Rule 900591 already has path and
|
||||
# redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
|
||||
|
||||
# A file's commit graph, in file.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/graph$" \
|
||||
@@ -289,3 +336,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
|
||||
"@rx ^/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/[0-9]+/artifacts/[^/]+/upload$" \
|
||||
"id:900640,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920450;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES:Content-Range"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_GITEA
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# The twelfth change: on Mastodon's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# Mastodon's fixes: on Mastodon's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# refused ordinary Mastodon requests there. They are the fields where Mastodon
|
||||
# sends a search, a name, a title, a file name, an address or free text. Each
|
||||
# exclusion runs with the request, before the rules it switches off, so this
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@
|
||||
# 932250: ls -la
|
||||
# 932260: python3
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists mastodon for the request's hostname, every rule below is
|
||||
# skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_mastodon when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_mastodon itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_mastodon "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900940,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_MASTODON"
|
||||
|
||||
# The API's searches and names, in the query:
|
||||
# q: /api/v2/search?q=python3, /api/v1/accounts/search?q=ls+-la
|
||||
# acct: /api/v1/accounts/lookup?acct=python3
|
||||
@@ -216,3 +223,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/auth(?:/|$)" \
|
||||
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:/^user\[email\]$/,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932120;ARGS:/^user\[email\]$/,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:/^user\[email\]$/"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_MASTODON
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +54,26 @@ const (
|
||||
mastodonStatus = "status="
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryMastodonRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "mastodon-requests.txt", "mastodon")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMastodonFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesMastodon(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {"mastodon"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// A search, which only Mastodon's fixes let through.
|
||||
search := get("/api/v2/search?q=python3")
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, giteaHost), matched(932260))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mastodonQueryFields sends each field that skips 930120, 932120, 932250
|
||||
// and 932260 in the query, on a path where it skips them, ending in "=".
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# The eleventh change: on MediaWiki's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# MediaWiki's fixes: on MediaWiki's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# refused ordinary MediaWiki requests there. They are the fields where MediaWiki
|
||||
# sends a search, a title, a name, a file name, an address, a summary or a
|
||||
# reason, and the fields that hold wikitext. Each exclusion runs with the
|
||||
@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@
|
||||
# 932250: ls -la
|
||||
# 932260: python3
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists mediawiki for the request's hostname, every rule below
|
||||
# is skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_mediawiki when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_mediawiki itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_mediawiki "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900890,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_MEDIAWIKI"
|
||||
|
||||
# The pages and their titles, the searches, and the special pages' fields
|
||||
# for a page, a user, a file or an address:
|
||||
# title: /index.php?title=Python3_notes&action=history
|
||||
@@ -198,10 +205,12 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:w/)?index\.php(?:$|/.)|^/wiki/" \
|
||||
# This rule is in phase 2, because a phase 1 rule runs before the body is read
|
||||
# and cannot see what wpTitles holds. It checks that the body sends wpTitles
|
||||
# once, since it would otherwise skip these rules for a second wpTitles
|
||||
# holding a command.
|
||||
# holding a command. It checks tx.app_mediawiki, since the skip above does not
|
||||
# reach phase 2.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:w/)?index\.php(?:$|/.)|^/wiki/" \
|
||||
"id:900916,phase:2,pass,nolog,chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_GET_NAMES "@rx ^/(?:w/)?index\.php/.|^/wiki/|^title$" "chain"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_mediawiki "@eq 1" "chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS_GET:wpTitles "@eq 0" "chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS_POST:wpTitles "@eq 1" "chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_POST:wpTitles "!@rx [;|&`{]" \
|
||||
@@ -210,3 +219,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:w/)?index\.php(?:$|/.)|^/wiki/" \
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932235;ARGS:wpTitles,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:wpTitles,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932380;ARGS:wpTitles"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_MEDIAWIKI
|
||||
@@ -4,11 +4,16 @@ import (
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// mediawikiThreshold is SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
|
||||
const mediawikiThreshold = 5
|
||||
|
||||
// mediawiki is MediaWiki's name in SWW_APPS.
|
||||
const mediawiki = "mediawiki"
|
||||
|
||||
// mediawikiEdit is the address MediaWiki's edit form posts to.
|
||||
const mediawikiEdit = "/index.php?title=Example&action=submit"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +47,49 @@ const (
|
||||
mediawikiUploadPage = "/index.php/Special:Upload"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryMediaWikiRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "mediawiki-requests.txt", mediawiki)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMediaWikiFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesMediaWiki(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {mediawiki},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// A search, which only MediaWiki's fixes let through.
|
||||
search := get("/index.php?title=Special:Search&search=python3")
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, giteaHost), matched(932260))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMediaWikiWatchlistFixAppliesOnlyToAHostnameThatServesMediaWiki(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := shared(t, coreruleset.Params{
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, BodyLimit: bodyLimit,
|
||||
Apps: map[string][]string{giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {mediawiki}},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// A watchlist that only the phase 2 rule 900916 lets through.
|
||||
r := request{http.MethodPost, mediawikiWatchlist.target, []string{formData}}
|
||||
body := mediawikiWatchlist.field + "Lighthouse%20notes%0D%0APython3%20notes"
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, withHost(r, otherHost), body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= mediawikiThreshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("POST %s %s on %s refused: %+v", r.target, body, otherHost, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ = inspectBody(t, crs, withHost(r, giteaHost), body)
|
||||
if got.Score < mediawikiThreshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("POST %s %s on %s let through: %+v", r.target, body, giteaHost, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mediawikiQueryFields and mediawikiBodyFields together hold every field that
|
||||
// skips 930120, 932120, 932250 and 932260, other than wikitext, wpTitles and
|
||||
// the JSON fields of /rest.php/. mediawikiQueryFields sends each in the query, on a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# The fourteenth change: on Nextcloud's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# Nextcloud's fixes: on Nextcloud's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# refused ordinary Nextcloud requests there. They are the fields where Nextcloud
|
||||
# sends a search, a name, a file name, a folder, a comment, a note, a status or
|
||||
# a document's text. Each exclusion runs with the request, before the rules it
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@
|
||||
# "; wget http://example.com/x.sh" reaches Nextcloud in these fields. SQL
|
||||
# injection, path traversal and script injection are still refused there.
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists nextcloud for the request's hostname, every rule below
|
||||
# is skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_nextcloud when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_nextcloud itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_nextcloud "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900090,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_NEXTCLOUD"
|
||||
|
||||
# The sync client and the Files app use these WebDAV methods besides those
|
||||
# the first change allows, on /remote.php/dav/ and /public.php/dav/ and on the
|
||||
# older /remote.php/webdav/ and /public.php/webdav/. 911100 refused each:
|
||||
@@ -306,3 +313,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/remote\.php/dav/addressbooks/" \
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq MKCOL" \
|
||||
"ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932125;XML:/*,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932230;XML:/*"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_NEXTCLOUD
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +48,49 @@ const (
|
||||
// nextcloudOther is a JSON field no exclusion names.
|
||||
const nextcloudOther = `{"other":"python3"}`
|
||||
|
||||
// nextcloud is Nextcloud's name in SWW_APPS.
|
||||
const nextcloud = "nextcloud"
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryNextcloudRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "nextcloud-requests.txt", nextcloud)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNextcloudFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesNextcloud(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {nextcloud},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// A search, which only Nextcloud's fixes let through.
|
||||
search := get(nextcloudUsers + "?search=python3")
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(search, giteaHost), matched(932260))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNextcloudWebDAVMethodsPassOnlyOnHostnamesThatServeNextcloud(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {nextcloud},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// Listing a folder, as the sync client does.
|
||||
list := request{nextcloudPropFind, nextcloudFiles, nil}
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(list, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(list, giteaHost), matched(911100))
|
||||
|
||||
// Making a calendar, as a CalDAV client does.
|
||||
calendar := request{nextcloudMkcalendar, nextcloudCalendars + "work/", nil}
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(calendar, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(calendar, giteaHost), matched(911100))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// nextcloudQueryFields are the query fields that skip 930120, 932120, 932250
|
||||
// and 932260, each on a path where it skips them, ending in "=".
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
|
||||
//go:build recorded
|
||||
|
||||
// The tests that check the apps' recorded requests in testdata. The recorded
|
||||
// tag keeps them out of the test phase's pass with the race detector, and
|
||||
// its second pass, without the race detector, runs them.
|
||||
|
||||
package coreruleset_test
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"path/filepath"
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// giteaRequests returns the recorded ordinary gitea requests in testdata.
|
||||
// Each has the Referer of a page that names the same, as a page opened
|
||||
// from it has.
|
||||
func giteaRequests(t *testing.T) []request {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
text, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "gitea-requests.txt"))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var requests []request
|
||||
|
||||
for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
|
||||
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
|
||||
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
target, header, _ := strings.Cut(line, " ")
|
||||
|
||||
headers := []string{"Referer: http://git.example" + target}
|
||||
if header != "" {
|
||||
headers = append(headers, header)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
requests = append(requests, get(target, headers...))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return requests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryGiteaRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
crs := atDefaults(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, r := range giteaRequests(t) {
|
||||
if got := inspect(t, crs, r); got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %q refused: %+v", r.target, r.headers[1:], got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// recordedRequest is a line of a file of recorded requests in testdata.
|
||||
type recordedRequest struct {
|
||||
Method string `json:"method"`
|
||||
Target string `json:"target"`
|
||||
Headers []string `json:"headers"`
|
||||
Body string `json:"body"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// recordedRequests returns the recorded ordinary requests in the file name
|
||||
// in testdata, each with its body.
|
||||
func recordedRequests(t *testing.T, name string) []recordedRequest {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
path := filepath.Join("testdata", name)
|
||||
|
||||
text, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a file in testdata
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal(err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var requests []recordedRequest
|
||||
|
||||
for line := range strings.Lines(string(text)) {
|
||||
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var r recordedRequest
|
||||
|
||||
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &r)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("%q: %v", line, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
requests = append(requests, r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return requests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// wantRecordedRequestsPass checks that none of the recorded ordinary
|
||||
// requests in the file name in testdata is refused, at the defaults and
|
||||
// while bodies are read. A request with neither a body nor a Content-Type
|
||||
// header is checked only at the defaults: with neither, the set that reads
|
||||
// bodies has nothing more to check. Each request runs as its own parallel
|
||||
// subtest.
|
||||
func wantRecordedRequestsPass(t *testing.T, name string) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodies(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, recorded := range recordedRequests(t, name) {
|
||||
t.Run(recorded.Method+" "+recorded.Target, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
r := request{recorded.Method, recorded.Target, recorded.Headers}
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ := inspectBody(t, defaults, r, recorded.Body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %s refused: %+v", r.method, r.target, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
typed := slices.ContainsFunc(recorded.Headers, func(header string) bool {
|
||||
name, _, _ := strings.Cut(header, ":")
|
||||
|
||||
return strings.EqualFold(name, "Content-Type")
|
||||
})
|
||||
if recorded.Body == "" && !typed {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
got, _ = inspectBody(t, bodies, r, recorded.Body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %s %.200q refused while bodies are read: %+v",
|
||||
r.method, r.target, recorded.Body, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryDrupalRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "drupal-requests.txt")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryMastodonRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "mastodon-requests.txt")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryMediaWikiRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "mediawiki-requests.txt")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryNextcloudRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "nextcloud-requests.txt")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryVaultwardenRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "vaultwarden-requests.txt")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryWordPressRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
const threshold = 5 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default
|
||||
|
||||
defaults, bodies := atDefaults(t), readingBodiesUpTo64K(t)
|
||||
|
||||
for _, recorded := range recordedRequests(t, "wordpress-requests.txt") {
|
||||
t.Run(recorded.Method+" "+recorded.Target, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
r := request{recorded.Method, recorded.Target, recorded.Headers}
|
||||
|
||||
crsSets := []*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet{defaults}
|
||||
if recorded.Body != "" {
|
||||
crsSets = append(crsSets, bodies)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, crs := range crsSets {
|
||||
got, _ := inspectBody(t, crs, r, recorded.Body)
|
||||
if got.Score >= threshold {
|
||||
t.Errorf("%s %s %.200q refused: %+v", r.method, r.target, recorded.Body, got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
# The thirteenth change: on Vaultwarden's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# Vaultwarden's fixes: on Vaultwarden's paths, some fields skip the rules that
|
||||
# refused ordinary Vaultwarden requests there. They are the fields where
|
||||
# Vaultwarden receives a name, a password hint or an email address in plain
|
||||
# text, and the names of uploaded files. Each exclusion runs with the request,
|
||||
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@
|
||||
# 932250: ls -la
|
||||
# 932260: python3
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists vaultwarden for the request's hostname, every rule below
|
||||
# is skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_vaultwarden when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_vaultwarden itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_vaultwarden "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900140,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_VAULTWARDEN"
|
||||
|
||||
# Names and password hints, in JSON bodies, skip the four rules:
|
||||
# name: signing up, editing the account's profile, and creating or renaming
|
||||
# an organization or a group, "python3 .htaccess team"
|
||||
@@ -82,3 +89,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/hibp/breach$" \
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/api/ciphers/[0-9a-f-]{36}/attachment(?:-admin|/[0-9a-f]+(?:/share)?)?$|^/api/sends/[0-9a-f-]{36}/file/[0-9a-f]+$" \
|
||||
"id:900153,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920120;FILES"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_VAULTWARDEN
|
||||
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import (
|
||||
"slices"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/coreruleset"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// vaultwardenThreshold is SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD's default.
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +29,27 @@ const (
|
||||
// vaultwardenEmail is a JSON body that sends an address in email.
|
||||
const vaultwardenEmail = `{"email":"VALUE"}`
|
||||
|
||||
func TestOrdinaryVaultwardenRequestsPass(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
wantRecordedRequestsPass(t, "vaultwarden-requests.txt", "vaultwarden")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestVaultwardenFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesVaultwarden(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{
|
||||
giteaHost: {gitea}, otherHost: {"vaultwarden"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// An address for the data breach report, which only Vaultwarden's fixes
|
||||
// let through.
|
||||
report := get(vaultwardenBreachReport + "python3%40example.com")
|
||||
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(report, otherHost), coreruleset.Result{})
|
||||
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(report, giteaHost), matched(932260))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// vaultwardenField is a field Vaultwarden receives in plain text: the
|
||||
// request that sends it, and its body, with VALUE where the field's value
|
||||
// goes.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@
|
||||
# The ninth change: on WordPress's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
|
||||
# WordPress's fixes: on WordPress's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
|
||||
# ordinary WordPress requests there. Each exclusion runs with the request, before
|
||||
# the rules it switches off, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's
|
||||
# rules. Each comment names a request the rule refused. An exclusion on a field
|
||||
# of a body applies only when the query has no parameter of that name, so it
|
||||
# matters only while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set.
|
||||
|
||||
# Unless SWW_APPS lists wordpress for the request's hostname, every rule below is
|
||||
# skipped. Inspect sets tx.app_wordpress when it does.
|
||||
# The skip reaches only phase 1, so a rule of a later phase must check
|
||||
# tx.app_wordpress itself.
|
||||
SecRule &TX:app_wordpress "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:900690,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_WORDPRESS"
|
||||
|
||||
# WordPress takes a call to its REST API at any of four addresses:
|
||||
# /wp-json/wp/v2/posts/1
|
||||
# /index.php/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/1
|
||||
@@ -195,3 +202,5 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/(?:(?:index\.php/)?page/[0-9]+/?|index\.php)?$"
|
||||
# so skips 932340 there.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /wp-admin/upload.php" \
|
||||
"id:900711,phase:1,pass,nolog,ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932340;ARGS:_wp_http_referer"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker END_WORDPRESS
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
|
||||
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ const (
|
||||
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
|
||||
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
|
||||
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
|
||||
apps = "SWW_APPS"
|
||||
block = "block"
|
||||
detect = "detect"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -290,6 +292,27 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestGiteasFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesGitea(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
// Only gitea's fixes let a file name through in path, a parameter
|
||||
// gitea sends file names in.
|
||||
const fileName = "/?path=.gitignore"
|
||||
|
||||
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{
|
||||
wafMode: block, apps: siteA + ":gitea",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteA, client, fileName)),
|
||||
http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
|
||||
wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteB, client, fileName)),
|
||||
http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
|
||||
|
||||
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
|
||||
wantLine(t, lines[0], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
|
||||
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBlockedByCoreRuleSet)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Parallel()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ func newReputation(
|
||||
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
|
||||
// without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
|
||||
// up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
|
||||
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
|
||||
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE and the fixes of the apps in SWW_APPS,
|
||||
// or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
|
||||
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
|
||||
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
|
||||
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that coreruleset.New refuses is
|
||||
@@ -236,6 +237,7 @@ func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*coreruleset.CoreRuleSet, error) {
|
||||
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
|
||||
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
|
||||
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
|
||||
Apps: cfg.Apps,
|
||||
})
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user