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issue-24-rule-files .. issue-28-remote-log
Author SHA1 Message Date
clawbot b8cef7e88d Send every log line to a syslog server as well (closes #28)
check / check (push) Waiting to run
Details 
With SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL set (syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls),
every line on stdout is also sent as the message of an RFC 5424 record,
octet-counted over TCP and TLS, from a bounded buffer that drops its
oldest line when full, so a slow or unreachable server holds up nothing.
Failed connections are retried with backoff; lines sent, dropped and
waiting are metrics. At a stop the lines still waiting get at most two
seconds. Standard library only: log/syslog writes only the older format.

Deviation: SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME defaults to the host's name until
SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME exists.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-10-06 15:14:02 +00:00
38 changed files with 1723 additions and 3541 deletions
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Dockerfile
-4
View File
@@ -167,10 +167,6 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 smallwebwaf \
# smallwebwaf user at each start.
RUN mkdir /var/lib/smallwebwaf
# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where an app's
# Dockerfile can copy rule files of its own beside it.
COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules
# runsvinit starts runit's runsvdir on /etc/service, where Ubuntu's sv
# looks too.
COPY --chmod=755 share/smallwebwaf.run /etc/service/smallwebwaf/run
README.md
+168 -304
View File
@@ -13,26 +13,23 @@ JSON log line for every request.
Status: the first two milestones are built
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/13 and
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/14), and so are eight parts of
milestone 3: the static lists, the bans that broken rate limits lead to, the
JSON state files with your edits taken in while it runs and the paths the rate
limits do not count, which come next in the build order, `observe` mode and the
rest of the request log's fields, which come a little later, and the metrics
https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/14), and so are six parts of
milestone 3: the static lists, the bans that broken rate limits lead to and the
JSON state files with your edits taken in while it runs, which come next in the
build order, `observe` mode, which comes a little later, and the metrics
endpoint and the header size and the idle time as settings, which come last in
it. So are the rule files, the first part of the stage after it, with the bans
for a clear sign of attack. `smallwebwaf` passes each request to the app and the
app's answer back, unchanged, within its timeouts and size limits, works out
each client's address, bans a client that sends too many requests, not counting
those for the paths you choose, refuses a client that comes from a country you
refuse or from a network you refuse, lets the networks you choose through,
checks each request against the rule files and bans a client whose request is a
clear sign of attack, keeps its bans, each client's counters and history, and
GeoJS's answers in JSON files across restarts, takes in your edits of those
files and of the rule files while it runs, writes a JSON log line for every
request, serves Prometheus metrics to a scraper that holds the metrics token,
and in `observe` mode passes on the requests it would refuse, logging what it
would have done with them. It comes as the image the app's own image is built
on. The rest of the design comes after that, in the order of the build order in
it; and, from the stage after it, remote log sending. `smallwebwaf` passes each
request to the app and the app's answer back, unchanged, within its timeouts and
size limits, works out each client's address, bans a client that sends too many
requests, refuses a client that comes from a country you refuse or from a
network you refuse, lets the networks you choose through, keeps its bans, each
client's counters and history, and GeoJS's answers in JSON files across
restarts, takes in your edits of those files while it runs, writes a JSON log
line for every request, sends its log lines to a syslog server too if you name
one, serves Prometheus metrics to a scraper that holds the metrics token, and in
`observe` mode passes on the requests it would refuse, logging what it would
have done with them. It comes as the image the app's own image is built on. The
rest of the design comes after that, in the order of the build order in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md). The survey of existing tools that led to the design is in
[`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md).
@@ -57,8 +54,7 @@ works.
To work on the code, `make build` builds the binary alone, with Go installed,
and `make run` builds and runs it, listening on port 8080 in front of an app at
`SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL`, by default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`, with its state files
in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
`share/rules.d` unless `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` is set.
in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set.
## What it does so far
@@ -72,9 +68,7 @@ in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
address outside `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is the client; if every address in it
is inside, the leftmost is, and with no header the peer is. The app sees what
it would see from traefik directly: the same `Host`, the same
`X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-For` with the peer added at the end. It
also gets the request's id in `X-Request-ID`, the same id as in the request's
log line (see `request_id` in "Request log" below).
`X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-For` with the peer added at the end.
- Enforces the timeouts and the size limits below. A limit passed before the
response has started gets `smallwebwaf`'s own answer: `408` for a client too
slow to send its request, `413` for a request body that is too large, `504`
@@ -88,15 +82,12 @@ in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
- Counts each client's requests over a minute, an hour and a day. A request that
takes the client over one of the rate limits below is refused with
`SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, `403` by default, before anything reaches the app, and
bans the client. A request whose path starts with one of
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS`, as that setting below describes, is neither
counted nor refused by the rate limits; the static lists, bans, the country
lists and the rule files still apply to it. A client is one IPv4 address, or
one IPv6 /64, since one abuser usually holds a whole /64. Each window is
counted in two fixed buckets, the earlier one weighted by how much of it the
window still covers. At most 20,000 clients are kept, the least recently seen
dropped first, with their history, and a restart gives no client a fresh
allowance (see "State files" below).
bans the client. A client is one IPv4 address, or one IPv6 /64, since one
abuser usually holds a whole /64. Each window is counted in two fixed buckets,
the earlier one weighted by how much of it the window still covers. At most
20,000 clients are kept, the least recently seen dropped first, with their
history, and a restart gives no client a fresh allowance (see "State files"
below).
- Bans a client that breaks a rate limit, as "Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)
describes: the first ban lasts an hour, and a limit broken again within a day
of a ban ending bans for three times as long as that ban, so 1, 3, 9, 27 and
@@ -110,26 +101,11 @@ in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
window and the requests counted in it, the request that broke it, the client's
country when it was looked up, the netblock's requests since it was first
seen, how many of them the ban has refused, and how many bans the netblock had
before, for a broken limit, for a clear sign of attack and without a cause. At
most `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` bans are kept, past, active and permanent; past that,
the earliest ban of the netblock that has gone longest without a request is
dropped first. `bans.json` shows the bans and their notes, a restart lifts
none, and you add or lift a ban by editing it (see "State files" below).
- Checks each request against the rules of the rule files (see "Rule files"
below) after the rate limits, and before its body is read. A `log` rule that
matches is noted in the log line; a `block` rule refuses the request with
`403`, and bans no one; a `ban` rule refuses it with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` and
bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack. Matching stops at the
first rule that refuses. A client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` is not checked.
- Bans a client for a clear sign of attack, as "Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)
describes: the first such ban lasts `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION`, seven days by
default, and any request from the netblock while it lasts makes it permanent.
Once it has run out, the netblock is served like any other, but its next clear
sign of attack bans it permanently at once. Such a ban covers the same
netblock as a ban for a broken rate limit, does not set the client's counters
back to zero, and does not make the netblock's next ban for a broken limit
longer. Its notes give the id and the target of the rule that matched in place
of the limit.
before. At most `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` bans are kept, past, active and permanent;
past that, the earliest ban of the netblock that has gone longest without a
request is dropped first. `bans.json` shows the bans and their notes, a
restart lifts none, and you add or lift a ban by editing it (see "State files"
below).
- Refuses a request from a country you refuse with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, as soon
as the client's country is known and before its body is read; such a request
is not counted for the rate limits. While one of the country lists below is
@@ -140,26 +116,25 @@ in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`, and `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` does not refuse it.
- Checks the client's own address against the static lists, the three netblock
settings below, before anything else, its country included. A client in
`SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips bans, the country lists, the rate limits and the rule
files, and is not looked up; the timeouts and size limits still apply. A
client in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` before its
body is read, and the request is not counted for the rate limits; an address
in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` too is let through. A client in
`SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips bans, the country lists and the rate limits, and is
not looked up; the timeouts and size limits still apply. A client in
`SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` before its body is
read, and the request is not counted for the rate limits; an address in
`SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` too is let through. A client in
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` is neither counted nor refused by the rate
limits; the country lists, the rule files and bans still apply to it.
limits; the country lists and bans still apply to it.
- In `observe` mode, with `SWWAF_MODE=observe`, refuses none of the requests
that `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban, the country lists, a rate limit or a rule would
refuse: it passes them to the app, and their log lines name what `enforce`
mode would have done (see `would_action` in "Request log" below). The checks
run, and requests are counted, as in `enforce` mode, with three differences:
neither a broken rate limit nor a `ban` rule makes a ban; a broken rate limit
does not set the client's counters back to zero, so each request over the
limit is logged as one that would be refused; and a request under a ban does
not make it permanent. The bans in `bans.json` are kept, and refuse requests
again when `smallwebwaf` next runs in `enforce` mode, as long as they last.
The timeouts and size limits still apply, since they protect `smallwebwaf` and
the app themselves, and a request for the metrics without the token is still
answered `401`. It is for trying a configuration before enforcing it.
that `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban, the country lists or a rate limit would refuse:
it passes them to the app, and their log lines name what `enforce` mode would
have done (see `would_action` in "Request log" below). The checks run, and
requests are counted, as in `enforce` mode, but a broken rate limit makes no
ban and does not set the client's counters back to zero, so each request over
the limit is logged as one that would be refused. The bans in `bans.json` are
kept, and refuse requests again when `smallwebwaf` next runs in `enforce`
mode, as long as they last. The timeouts and size limits still apply, since
they protect `smallwebwaf` and the app themselves, and a request for the
metrics without the token is still answered `401`. It is for trying a
configuration before enforcing it.
- Answers `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz` itself with `200` and `ok`, before any
check and without asking the app, for the image's health check.
- Answers `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` with its metrics (see "Metrics" below) for
@@ -171,6 +146,9 @@ in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
passed to the app: a banned client stays refused, and each counts toward the
client's rate limits. None of them reaches the app.
- Writes a line in the request log for each request (see "Request log" below).
- Sends every line it writes on stdout to a syslog server as well, while
`SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` names one (see "Sending the log to a syslog server"
below).
## Settings
@@ -181,11 +159,6 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
- `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `smallwebwaf` listens.
- `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app, as `http` or
`https`, a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
- `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the host's name, which docker sets to the
first 12 characters of the container's id unless the deployment names one):
the name each request log line gives as `instance`. Set it, for example to
`fsn1app1/gitea`, for a name that stays the same when a deploy replaces the
container, and that tells instances apart when several log to one place.
- `SWWAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce`, or `observe` to pass on the
requests `smallwebwaf` would refuse and log what it would have done (see "What
it does so far" above).
@@ -214,8 +187,8 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
- `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` (default `100M`): the largest request body.
- `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `5G`): the largest response body.
- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients skip bans, the
country lists, the rate limits and the rule files, such as your monitoring or
your own networks.
country lists and the rate limits, such as your monitoring or your own
networks.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients the
rate limits do not apply to, such as a machine that talks to the app all day.
- `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are always refused.
@@ -224,20 +197,6 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
requests a client may make in a minute, an hour and a day. The defaults are
several times what one busy person produces, since a browser loading a heavy
page makes a few hundred requests and several people often share one address.
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes whose requests
the rate limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/` for static
assets; each starts with `/`. A request whose path, percent-decoded, contains
`..` anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an encoded slash
(`%2F` or `%2f`), is never exempt, since the app may act on it as a path
outside every prefix: `/assets/..%2Flogin` as `/login`. Any other request is
exempt when its path as sent, the path the app receives, before any query
string and not percent-decoded, starts with a prefix, character for character.
`/assets/` matches `/assets/app.js` and `/assets/`, but not `/assets`,
`/Assets/app.js`, `/%61ssets/app.js`, `/static/assets/app.js`,
`/static/../assets/app.js` or `/assets%2Fapp.js`. A character the client sends
percent-encoded, such as a space, is written percent-encoded in a prefix, as
in `/my%20files/`, and there are no wildcards: `*` is a character like any
other.
- `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): countries whose clients are refused,
for example `cn,ru,kp`.
- `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
@@ -245,20 +204,16 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
country cannot be found is refused too, so that new clients are not let in
whenever GeoJS stops answering.
- `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): how a refused client is answered, one
that is banned, breaks a rate limit, matches a `ban` rule, is in
`SWWAF_DENY_NETS` or comes from a refused country: `403`, `429`, or `close` to
close the connection without an answer. Behind traefik, `close` does not leave
the client unanswered: traefik answers `502`, as it does whenever its backend
drops a connection. A `block` rule always answers `403`.
that is banned, breaks a rate limit, is in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` or comes from a
refused country: `403`, `429`, or `close` to close the connection without an
answer. Behind traefik, `close` does not leave the client unanswered: traefik
answers `502`, as it does whenever its backend drops a connection.
- `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken rate
limit.
- `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): a rate limit broken again
within this time after a ban ended, other than one for a clear sign of attack,
bans for three times as long as that ban.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): a ban for a broken rate limit that
would be longer is permanent instead.
- `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
attack.
within this time after a ban ended bans for three times as long as that ban.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): a ban that would be longer is
permanent instead.
- `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): the most bans kept, past, active and
permanent.
- `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): the length of the netblock around
@@ -271,23 +226,29 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
`bans.json` is written, with every ban made in between.
- `SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
written.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
`accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
request headers whose values the request log gives, in either case.
`Authorization`, `Cookie` and `Set-Cookie` are never logged, even when listed
(see "Request log" below). An entry naming `Host` or `Transfer-Encoding` stops
the start, since Go's HTTP server takes both out of the request; the request's
host is the field `host`.
- `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token a scraper sends for the
metrics, a long random value. While it is unset the metrics are off; one
shorter than 32 characters stops the start. The settings logged at start show
`********` in its place.
- `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many countries get series of their
own in the metrics by country; the others are counted as `other`.
- `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d`): the directory of the
rule files. A directory that does not exist stops the start.
- `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file, and checks
no request against one.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that every line on
stdout is also sent to, as `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`
with a host and a port, such as `syslog+tls://logs.example:6514`. Unset or
empty, nothing is sent.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates,
which the certificate of a `syslog+tls` server must chain to instead of the
host's own. A file that cannot be read or holds no certificate stops the
start.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they
wait to be sent.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility the lines
are sent with: `kern`, `user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`,
`news`, `uucp`, `cron`, `authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default the host's name): the app name the lines
are sent with, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. While
`SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set, a default that is not such a name stops the
start too.
Durations are in Go's syntax, with `d` for days (`90s`, `15m`, `7d`). Sizes are
bytes, with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, which are powers of 1024 (`1K` is 1024
@@ -297,8 +258,8 @@ ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and `xk` for Kosovo, in either case (`de` and `DE` are
the same); any other code, such as `nk` (North Korea is `kp`) or the withdrawn
`su`, stops the start, and so does a code on both country lists. `off` switches
a timeout, a size limit or a rate limit off;
`SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`, the ban settings, the state settings
and `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` cannot be off.
`SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`, the ban settings, the state settings,
`SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` and `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` cannot be off.
Several limits are fixed rather than settings. At most 20,000 clients are kept,
with their counters and history, and an IPv6 client is counted by its /64. A new
@@ -311,70 +272,33 @@ GeoJS are kept, for 7 days each.
refused ones included:
```
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1app1/gitea","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"response_content_type":"text/html; charset=utf-8","upstream_status":200,"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40},"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_upstream_connect":0.052,"duration_upstream_first_byte":2.874,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","country":"DE","method":"GET","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"upstream_status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","action":"forward","duration_total":3.217,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
```
A field that does not apply to a request is left out of its line, apart from
`type`, the fields from `time` to `user_agent`, `request_id`, `peer_ip`,
`client_group`, `country`, `action` and `duration_total`, which every line has.
- `time` is when the request arrived, in UTC. `instance` is
`SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `scheme` is the `X-Forwarded-Proto` a trusted proxy
sent, and otherwise `http`. `path` and `query` are as the client sent them.
- `request_id` is the `X-Request-ID` a trusted proxy sent, or a new random one
of 26 letters and digits when it sent none, or when the peer is not a trusted
proxy. A request passed to the app takes it there in `X-Request-ID`.
- `peer_ip` is the TCP peer, normally traefik. `forwarded_for` is the
`X-Forwarded-For` header as received, several lines of it joined with `, `.
`client_group` is the client as the rate limits count it: its IPv4 address as
a /32, or the /64 of its IPv6 address.
- `time` is when the request arrived, in UTC. `peer_ip` is the TCP peer,
normally traefik. `path` and `query` are as the client sent them.
- `country` is the client's country as GeoJS places it. It is empty with neither
country list set, for a client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, for
a client on a private, loopback or link-local address, when GeoJS cannot place
the client or has not answered in time, and for a request whose client a ban
covers, even when the client's country is known.
- `content_type` is the request's `Content-Type`, and `content_length` the
length the request announced for its body, which is left out for none or zero.
- `request_headers` are the request's headers that `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`
names, by name in lower case, several lines of one joined with `, `.
`Authorization`, `Cookie` and `Set-Cookie` are never among them, whatever the
setting says: `has_authorization` and `has_cookie` are there instead, and
true, when the request has an `Authorization` or a `Cookie` header.
- `websocket` is there, and true, when the app switched the connection to
another protocol, as it does for a WebSocket.
- `status` is what the client was sent, `0` if nothing was; `upstream_status` is
what the app answered, and is left out when the app did not answer.
- `response_content_type`, `cache_control` and `location` are the
`Content-Type`, `Cache-Control` and `Location` headers of the answer: the
app's, as passed on, or those of `smallwebwaf`'s own answer.
- `request_bytes` and `response_bytes` count body bytes.
- `action` is `forward` for a request passed to the app, `denied` for one
refused because its client is in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, `banned` for one refused
because a ban covers its client or because it matched a `ban` rule, which bans
its client, `country_denied` for one refused for its client's country,
`rate_limited` for one that broke a rate limit and banned its client,
`rule_blocked` for one a `block` rule refused, `too_large` for a request or
response over its size limit, `timed_out` for one that ran out of time,
`upstream_error` when the app could not be reached or its answer broke off,
and `admin` for one `smallwebwaf` answered at its own endpoint.
because a ban covers its client, `country_denied` for one refused for its
client's country, `rate_limited` for one that broke a rate limit and banned
its client, `too_large` for a request or response over its size limit,
`timed_out` for one that ran out of time, `upstream_error` when the app could
not be reached or its answer broke off, and `admin` for one `smallwebwaf`
answered at its own endpoint.
- `would_action` is there in `observe` mode for a request that
`SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban, the country lists, a rate limit or a rule would have
refused in `enforce` mode, and names the action that refusal would have had:
`denied`, `banned`, `country_denied`, `rate_limited` or `rule_blocked`.
`action` then names what was done: `forward` for a request passed to the app,
and another action, such as `too_large`, for one a size or time limit refused.
- `counts` gives the client's requests in the minute, the hour and the day as
the rate limits count them, this request included: in each window, those in
the bucket under way and a share of those in the bucket before, so a count can
have a fraction. For a request that broke a limit, they are the counts that
broke it. It is left out for a request the rate limits do not count: the
health check, one from a client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`, one for a path that
`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` exempts, and one that `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban
or the country lists refuse, or would refuse in `observe` mode. The byte
totals come with the byte limits.
- `rule_ids` is there for a request that matched rules of the rule files, and
lists their ids in the order they matched, up to the one that refused it.
`SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban, the country lists or a rate limit would have refused
in `enforce` mode, and names the action that refusal would have had: `denied`,
`banned`, `country_denied` or `rate_limited`. `action` then names what was
done: `forward` for a request passed to the app, and another action, such as
`too_large`, for one a size or time limit refused.
- `limit_hit` is there for a request that broke a rate limit, and names the
window whose limit it went over: `minute`, `hour` or `day`, the shortest if it
went over several. `offence` is then `limit`.
@@ -382,19 +306,10 @@ A field that does not apply to a request is left out of its line, apart from
or in `observe` mode would have been refused under one, and gives when the ban
ends, in the same form as `time`, or `permanent`.
- `aborted` is there, and true, when the client went away early.
- The timings are in milliseconds, to the microsecond. `duration_total` runs
from when the request's headers had been read to when its line is written, and
`duration_checks` over the same start to when the checks were done; the health
check runs none, and its line has no `duration_checks`.
`duration_upstream_connect`, `duration_upstream_first_byte` and
`duration_upstream_total` are there for a request passed to the app, and run
from when it was handed to the app: until there was a connection to it, new or
kept open from an earlier request, until the first byte of its answer arrived,
and until the end. The first two are left out when that never happened, as for
an app that cannot be reached.
- `duration_total` and `duration_upstream_total` are in milliseconds.
No body is logged, and no header but those above. `smallwebwaf`'s own messages
(start, the settings, stop, errors) share the stream as JSON lines marked
No body and no other header is logged. `smallwebwaf`'s own messages (start, the
settings, stop, errors) share the stream as JSON lines marked
`"type":"process"`.
Go's HTTP server, on which `smallwebwaf` is built, reads a request's line and
@@ -404,6 +319,30 @@ which it answers `431`, headers slower than `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT`,
whose connection it closes without an answer, and requests it cannot read at
all, which it answers itself, mostly with `400`.
### Sending the log to a syslog server
While `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set, every line `smallwebwaf` writes on stdout,
request lines and its own, is also sent to that syslog server, as the message of
an RFC 5424 record: one record to a datagram over UDP, and over TCP and TLS each
record after its length in bytes and a space. A record gives the facility
`SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` names, the severity informational, the time the line
was written, in the same form as a request line's `time`, the host's name, and
the app name `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` gives. stdout is unchanged.
The lines wait in a buffer of `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` lines and are sent from
there, so a server that is slow or cannot be reached never holds up a request or
stdout. When the buffer is full, its oldest line is dropped to make room. A line
whose sending fails is dropped too, and the connection is made again at once. A
failed attempt to connect is logged and followed by the next a second later,
twice as long after each further failure up to a minute, and a second again once
a connection is made. UDP gives no sign of what arrives, and over TCP and TLS a
line sent on a connection the server has just closed can be lost before a
failure shows; such a loss is not counted.
As `smallwebwaf` stops, it sends the lines still waiting, on the connection open
or a new one, for at most two seconds, and gives up the rest; stdout has carried
them.
## State files
`smallwebwaf` keeps its state in memory and a copy of it in three JSON files in
@@ -412,8 +351,7 @@ all, which it answers itself, mostly with `400`.
entries by client address, with times in UTC.
- `bans.json`: every ban with its notes, indented to be read; a permanent ban's
`expires` is `null`, and a ban `smallwebwaf` made has the `cause` `limit` for
a broken rate limit or `attack` for a clear sign of attack.
`expires` is `null`.
- `clients.json`: each client's two buckets in the minute, the hour and the day,
and its history: when it was first and last seen, its country as last looked
up and when, its requests, how many were forwarded and how many refused (one
@@ -424,13 +362,12 @@ entries by client address, with times in UTC.
- `lookups.json`: GeoJS's answers, one to a line, with when GeoJS gave each and
when it was last used.
`bans.json` is written `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` after a ban is made or made
permanent, with every such change in between, and every file every
`SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` and when `smallwebwaf` stops. Each write goes to
a temporary file in the same directory, which then replaces the file, so a crash
leaves the old file or the new one, whole. A write that fails is logged, and
tried again at the next write. A hard kill loses what changed since the last
write.
`bans.json` is written `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` after a ban is made, with every
ban made in between, and every file every `SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` and
when `smallwebwaf` stops. Each write goes to a temporary file in the same
directory, which then replaces the file, so a crash leaves the old file or the
new one, whole. A write that fails is logged, and tried again at the next write.
A hard kill loses what changed since the last write.
At start the files are read back: each client keeps its counts, so a restart
gives it no fresh allowance, and each ban keeps refusing every client in its
@@ -445,8 +382,7 @@ without a field it needs, named with the entry's place in the file: a ban's
`netblock`, `start` or `expires`, which is `null` for a permanent ban; a
client's `client`, or the `start` of a window in which it has requests; an
answer's `client`, `country`, which is `""` for a client GeoJS cannot place, or
`answered`. So does a ban whose `cause` is neither `limit` nor `attack`. The AS
number and AS name come with their lookup.
`answered`. The AS number and AS name come with their lookup.
While it runs, `smallwebwaf` watches `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` and takes in your edit of
a state file as soon as you save it: what the file then holds replaces what
@@ -455,19 +391,17 @@ yours by comparing the file with what it last read or wrote, and before it
writes a file it takes in any edit made since, so your edit is not overwritten;
a change `smallwebwaf` made after you opened the file, such as a new ban, is
lost when you save over it. An edit that would stop the start, because it does
not parse, has another `version`, leaves out a field an entry needs or gives a
ban another `cause`, does not stop the running `smallwebwaf`: it keeps what it
holds, and at the file's next write renames your file to `<name>.bad`, such as
`bans.json.bad`, writes the file again from memory, and logs the file and where
the error is. It waits for that write because an editor's file can be read
before the editor has finished writing it. Mend the `.bad` file and move it
back. A file you remove is written again at its next write.
not parse, has another `version` or leaves out a field an entry needs, does not
stop the running `smallwebwaf`: it keeps what it holds, and at the file's next
write renames your file to `<name>.bad`, such as `bans.json.bad`, writes the
file again from memory, and logs the file and where the error is. It waits for
that write because an editor's file can be read before the editor has finished
writing it. Mend the `.bad` file and move it back. A file you remove is written
again at its next write.
To ban a netblock, add an entry to `bans.json` with its `netblock`, its `start`
and its `expires`, `null` for a ban that never ends; its `cause` and its `notes`
may be left out. A ban whose `cause` is `attack` becomes permanent at the first
request it refuses; one without a cause does not. This `bans.json` bans
`203.0.113.0/24` for good:
and its `expires`, `null` for a ban that never ends; its `notes` may be left
out. This `bans.json` bans `203.0.113.0/24` for good:
```json
{
@@ -485,77 +419,6 @@ request it refuses; one without a cause does not. This `bans.json` bans
To lift a ban, delete its entry. `smallwebwaf` then forgets the ban, so it does
not make the netblock's next ban longer.
## Rule files
`smallwebwaf` reads every `*.rules` file in `SWWAF_RULES_DIR`,
`/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` by default, in the order of their names, and checks
each request against their rules in that order, as "Rule files" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) describes. A file whose name starts with `.`, such as an
editor's lock file `.#50-app.rules`, is not a rule file, as a shell's `*.rules`
would not match it. A rule is a line of four fields separated by spaces or tabs:
an id, a target, an action and a regex, which runs to the end of the line. Blank
lines and lines that start with `#` are ignored.
```
# id target action regex
env-file path ban (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
scanner-agent user_agent ban (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|wpscan)\b
```
- The id is letters, digits, `-` and `_`, and no two rules share one. The
request log, the metrics and a ban's notes name the rule by it.
- The target is what the regex is matched against: `path` or `query`, as the
client sent it, before any decoding; `uri`, the path and the query together,
both as sent and once percent-decoded, so that an encoded probe does not slip
past; `method`; `host`; `user_agent`; `referer`; or `header:<Name>`, any one
request header but `Host` and `Transfer-Encoding`, which Go's HTTP server
takes out of every request; the request's host is the target `host`. A header
sent more than once is matched with its values joined by `, `, and one not
sent as empty text. No body is read.
- The action is `log`, `block` or `ban` (see "What it does so far" above). Keep
`ban` for requests no real visitor sends, and anchor a path at the site root
with `^/`: a file of the same name deeper in a site can be ordinary content,
such as a file in a repository on a code forge.
- The regex is in Go's syntax, RE2, which has no backreferences or lookaround,
and takes time linear in the text it reads. It matches anywhere in the target
unless anchored with `^` and `$`; `(?i)` at its front makes it ignore case.
A line that is not a rule, a rule for the `Host` or the `Transfer-Encoding`
header, a regex that does not compile or an id used twice stops the start with a
message naming the file and the line, and so does a `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` that does
not exist. An empty directory is no error, and the log says that it holds no
rules. While it runs, `smallwebwaf` watches the directory, and reads the rule
files again once the directory has had no change for 2 seconds after one is
edited, added or removed, so that a file saved in place, appended to or copied
in with `scp` is read only once whole, unless its writing stops for longer. It
also reads them 2 seconds after it starts watching, so that an edit saved while
it started is not missed. If they then hold one of those errors, the rules stay
as they were, the earlier version of the edited file included, the log names the
file and the line, and the files are read again after the next change.
The image ships one rule file, `share/rules.d/00-default.rules` here: rules that
ban probes no real visitor sends, for secrets, version control directories,
backups, logs and web shells at the site root, and the user agents of common
scanners; one that blocks `../` twice in a row in the path or the query; and one
that only notes a request without a user agent. An app's Dockerfile adds rules
of its own in a file beside it, named to sort after it, such as this
`50-gitea.rules` for an app that serves no WordPress:
```
wp-probe path ban (?i)^/(wp-login\.php|xmlrpc\.php|wp-admin/)
```
```dockerfile
COPY 50-gitea.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-gitea.rules
```
A directory mounted over `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` replaces the default file,
and single files mounted into it add to it. Docker does not show a single
mounted file being replaced, which is how many editors save, so rules to be
edited while `smallwebwaf` runs belong in a mounted directory, with a copy of
`00-default.rules` if its rules are to stay. To run without rules, mount an
empty directory or set `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED=false`.
## Metrics
`GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with the metrics in the Prometheus text
@@ -573,11 +436,8 @@ other request. No metric carries a client's address.
- `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total` by `window`,
`smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total` by `limit`, the setting whose
limit was passed, `smallwebwaf_offences_total` by `kind`, and
`smallwebwaf_bans_made_total` by `cause`, `limit` or `attack`;
`smallwebwaf_active_bans` and `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans`.
- `smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total`: the requests that matched each rule, by
`rule_id` and `action`, the rule's own; and `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded`: the
rules read from the rule files.
`smallwebwaf_bans_made_total` by `cause`; `smallwebwaf_active_bans` and
`smallwebwaf_permanent_bans`.
- `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total`,
`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total`,
`smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total`, and
@@ -600,11 +460,16 @@ other request. No metric carries a client's address.
`smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_taken_in_total`: your edits taken in, and
`smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_set_aside_total`: those renamed to `<name>.bad`
because they would stop the start.
- While `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set,
`smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total`: the lines sent to it;
`smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total`: those dropped, from a full
buffer or because their sending failed; and
`smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth`: those waiting in the buffer.
- Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
The requests Go's HTTP server ends before `smallwebwaf` sees them (see "Request
log") are not counted. The metrics of the features still to come, such as the
Core Rule Set, come with them.
rule files, come with them.
## Why
@@ -878,29 +743,25 @@ addresses are never sent to GeoJS.
## How the code is laid out
- `cmd/smallwebwaf`: the binary, which only calls `internal/smallwebwaf`.
- `internal/smallwebwaf`: the process: it reads the settings, the rule files and
the state files, listens, serves requests until `SIGTERM` or `SIGINT`, and
stops, writing the state files. Run as `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the
image's health check instead.
- `internal/smallwebwaf`: the process: it reads the settings and the state
files, listens, serves requests until `SIGTERM` or `SIGINT`, and stops,
writing the state files. Run as `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the image's
health check instead.
- `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
- `internal/proxy`: what happens to each request: it works out the client, runs
the checks, passes the request to the app and the answer back with the
standard library's `httputil.ReverseProxy` within the timeouts and size
limits, and writes the request's log line. Its `check` method is where a
request is refused before anything reaches the app: for `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, for
a ban, for the country lists, for a rate limit, which bans the client, for a
`block` or `ban` rule, the latter banning the client, and for an announced
body over the size limit; in `observe` mode, only for the size limit, with
what it would have refused for noted in the log line. A request under
`/_smallwebwaf/` that `check` lets through is answered by `answerAdmin`
a ban, for the country lists, for a rate limit, which bans the client, and for
an announced body over the size limit; in `observe` mode, only for the size
limit, with what it would have refused for noted in the log line. A request
under `/_smallwebwaf/` that `check` lets through is answered by `answerAdmin`
instead of reaching the app.
- `internal/metrics`: the metrics, counted as the other parts tell it what
happened, and served in the Prometheus text format.
- `internal/bans`: the ban ledger: each netblock's bans with their notes, how
long a new ban lasts, when a ban for a clear sign of attack becomes permanent,
and which ban is dropped when `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` are held.
- `internal/rules`: reads the rule files at start and again as they change, and
tells which of their rules a request matches.
long a new ban lasts, and which ban is dropped when `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` are held.
- `internal/lookup`: looks up each client's country through GeoJS, and keeps the
answers.
- `internal/ratelimit`: the table of clients: counts each client's requests,
@@ -909,10 +770,13 @@ addresses are never sent to GeoJS.
one while running, and writes them when they are due and at the stop.
- `internal/requestlog`: the lines on stdout: the request log line and the
process's own messages.
- `internal/remotelog`: sends the lines on stdout to `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL`,
each as a syslog record, from a buffer of its own. It is written with the
standard library alone, whose `log/syslog` writes only the older syslog
format.
- `Dockerfile`: the lint and test phases, then the image, whose last stage
installs Ubuntu's packages, nixpkgs, `runsvinit` and `smallwebwaf`, with
`share/smallwebwaf.run` as runit's `run` script for `smallwebwaf` and
`share/rules.d/00-default.rules` as its default rule file.
`share/smallwebwaf.run` as runit's `run` script for `smallwebwaf`.
- `deploy/example-app`: an app built on the image, which `script/example-app`
checks.
@@ -920,8 +784,8 @@ Besides the Go standard library, `github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2` keeps the
table of clients to 20,000, the GeoJS answers to 100,000 and the banned
netblocks to `SWWAF_MAX_BANS`, dropping the least recently seen, and
`github.com/prometheus/client_golang` keeps the metrics and serves them, and
`github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify` tells `smallwebwaf` when a state file or a rule
file is saved. The country codes are the list in `internal/config/config.go`.
`github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify` tells `smallwebwaf` when a state file is saved.
The country codes are the list in `internal/config/config.go`.
## Entrypoints
@@ -951,21 +815,21 @@ so that they run in minimal containers.
- `script/build`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` on the host, with Go installed, for
working on the code by hand; `make build` runs it.
- `script/run`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` with `script/build` and runs it, with
its state files in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the rule
files of `share/rules.d` unless `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` is set; `make run` runs it.
its state files in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set; `make run`
runs it.
- `script/example-app`: builds the image and, on it, the example app in
`deploy/example-app`, runs it with a volume for the state files, and checks
that the health check passes, that a request reaches the app through
`smallwebwaf`, that a second request in a minute bans the client, that a probe
for `/.env` bans another client, whose next request makes the ban permanent,
that `sv stop` and `docker stop` stop it in order, and that a new container on
the same volume still refuses the banned client; then removes the containers,
the volume and both images. It needs network access, for nixpkgs' binary
cache, and `script/check` does not run it; `make example-app` does.
`smallwebwaf`, that a second request in a minute bans the client, that
`sv stop` and `docker stop` stop it in order, and that a new container on the
same volume still refuses the banned client; then removes the containers, the
volume and both images. It needs network access, for nixpkgs' binary cache,
and `script/check` does not run it; `make example-app` does.
## TODO
- The rest of the design, in the order of the build order in
- The rest of milestone 3: exemptions and the rest of the request log's fields;
then the rest of the design, in the order of the build order in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
## Documents
internal/bans/bans.go
+81 -181
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit or show a clear sign of
// attack, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes.
// The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and read from it
// by the state package.
// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, with their notes, as the
// "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in memory, and
// written to bans.json and read from it by the state package.
package bans
import (
@@ -15,15 +14,6 @@ import (
"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
)
// The causes of the bans smallwebwaf makes. A ban an admin adds to
// bans.json may have no cause.
const (
// CauseLimit is a ban for a broken limit.
CauseLimit = "limit"
// CauseAttack is a ban for a clear sign of attack.
CauseAttack = "attack"
)
// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
// for a limit broken again within the repeat window lasts.
const repeatFactor = 3
@@ -31,36 +21,31 @@ const repeatFactor = 3
// maxTextBytes is how much of each text in a ban's notes is kept.
const maxTextBytes = 256
// Rules are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
// Rules are how long a ban for a broken limit lasts, and how many bans
// are held.
type Rules struct {
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban lasts.
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a
// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for repeatFactor times as
// long as that ban.
// ban that ended last a broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans
// for repeatFactor times as long as that ban.
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would
// be longer is permanent instead.
// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban; a ban that would be longer is
// permanent instead.
MaxBanDuration time.Duration
// AttackBanDuration is how long a first ban for a clear sign of attack
// lasts.
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
// MaxBans is the most bans held, at least one. Past it, the earliest
// ban of the netblock that has gone longest without a request is
// dropped.
MaxBans int
}
// Ban is a ban on a netblock.
// Ban is a ban on a netblock for a broken limit, the only kind of ban
// smallwebwaf makes so far.
type Ban struct {
Netblock netip.Prefix
Start time.Time
// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
Expires time.Time
// Cause is CauseLimit or CauseAttack, or "" for a ban an admin added
// without one.
Cause string
Notes Notes
}
@@ -81,39 +66,23 @@ func (b Ban) ActiveAt(now time.Time) bool {
type Notes struct {
// Country is the client's country, when it was looked up.
Country string `json:"country"`
// Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit, the limit
// that was broken, its window, "minute", "hour" or "day", and the
// count reached: the client's requests in the window, the one that
// broke the limit included. These are the requests that counted
// toward the ban, and the window is the time over which they came.
Limit int64 `json:"limit,omitempty"`
Window string `json:"window,omitempty"`
Count float64 `json:"count,omitempty"`
// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target.
RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
// Request is the request that broke the limit, or that was the clear
// sign of attack.
// Limit, Window and Count are the limit that was broken, its window,
// "minute", "hour" or "day", and the count reached: the client's
// requests in the window, the one that broke the limit included.
// These are the requests that counted toward the ban, and the window
// is the time over which they came.
Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
Window string `json:"window"`
Count float64 `json:"count"`
// Request is the request that broke the limit.
Request Request `json:"request"`
// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
// far. Both go up with each request the ban refuses.
Requests int64 `json:"requests"`
Refused int64 `json:"refused"`
// EarlierBans is how many bans the netblock had before this one, by
// cause.
EarlierBans EarlierBans `json:"earlier_bans"`
}
// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
type EarlierBans struct {
Limit int `json:"limit"`
Attack int `json:"attack"`
// WithoutCause counts the bans an admin added without a cause.
WithoutCause int `json:"without_cause"`
// EarlierBans is how many bans the netblock had before this one.
EarlierBans int `json:"earlier_bans"`
}
// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
@@ -143,8 +112,8 @@ type Ledger struct {
netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
// held is how many bans netblocks holds, at most rules.MaxBans.
held int
// made is how many bans the ledger has made since the start, by cause.
made map[string]int
// made is how many bans BanForLimit has made since the start.
made int
// v4Lengths and v6Lengths are the lengths of the IPv4 and IPv6
// netblocks that have been banned. Check looks for a ban at each of
// them, so that a ban read from bans.json refuses every client in its
@@ -166,21 +135,18 @@ func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
rules: rules,
changed: make(chan struct{}, 1),
netblocks: netblocks,
made: map[string]int{},
}
}
// Changed receives a value after a ban is made or made permanent, so that
// bans.json can be written. Several changes before it is read leave one
// value.
// Changed receives a value after a ban is made, so that bans.json can be
// written. Several bans made before it is read leave one value.
func (l *Ledger) Changed() <-chan struct{} {
return l.changed
}
// Check is called for a request from client, at now. It reports whether
// a ban on a netblock client is in is active, and returns that ban, with
// the request counted among those it refused. A ban for a clear sign of
// attack is made permanent by the request: the netblock is malicious.
// the request counted among those it refused.
func (l *Ledger) Check(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -193,12 +159,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) Check(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool) {
ban.Notes.Requests++
ban.Notes.Refused++
if ban.Cause == CauseAttack && !ban.Permanent() {
ban.Expires = time.Time{}
l.markChanged()
}
return *ban, true
}
@@ -232,22 +192,54 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
// returns the ban. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban made within
// LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended last, other
// than one for a clear sign of attack, lasts repeatFactor times as long as
// that one. A ban that would be longer than MaxBanDuration is permanent
// instead. If a ban on netblock is still active, as when two of its
// requests break a limit at once, that ban is returned and no other is
// made. The ledger fills in the notes' Refused and EarlierBans itself.
// LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended last lasts
// repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer
// than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
// active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
// returned and no other is made. The ledger fills in the notes' Refused
// and EarlierBans itself.
func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes) Ban {
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, notes)
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
var last *Ban
bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netblock)
if found {
active := activeBan(*bans, now)
if active != nil {
return *active
}
// BanForAttack bans netblock at now for a clear sign of attack, with
// notes, and returns the ban, as BanForLimit does. A first ban lasts
// AttackBanDuration; once the netblock has had one, the next is
// permanent.
func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes) Ban {
return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, notes)
// No ban is active, so each has an end. A ban an admin adds to
// bans.json can start after another and end before it, so the
// ban that ended last is looked for among them all.
ended := slices.MaxFunc(*bans, func(a, b Ban) int {
return a.Expires.Compare(b.Expires)
})
last = &ended
// The netblock's first ban held counts the bans it had before that
// one, since dropped to make room, and each ban held adds one.
notes.EarlierBans = (*bans)[0].Notes.EarlierBans + len(*bans)
}
notes.Request = notes.Request.cut()
ban := Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: now,
Expires: l.expiry(last, now),
Notes: notes,
}
l.add(ban)
l.made++
select {
case l.changed <- struct{}{}:
default: // a value is waiting already
}
return ban
}
// Bans returns the bans held on netblock, oldest first. It is not a
@@ -264,13 +256,13 @@ func (l *Ledger) Bans(netblock netip.Prefix) []Ban {
return slices.Clone(*bans)
}
// Made returns how many bans for cause the ledger has made since the
// start; bans read from bans.json are not among them.
func (l *Ledger) Made(cause string) int {
// Made returns how many bans the ledger has made since the start; bans
// read from bans.json are not among them.
func (l *Ledger) Made() int {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
return l.made[cause]
return l.made
}
// Count returns how many of the bans held are active at now, and how many
@@ -340,73 +332,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
}
}
// ban bans netblock at now for cause, with notes, as BanForLimit and
// BanForAttack describe, and returns the ban.
func (l *Ledger) ban(
netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string, notes Notes,
) Ban {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
// held are the netblock's bans, none of them active.
var held []Ban
bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netblock)
if found {
active := activeBan(*bans, now)
if active != nil {
return *active
}
held = *bans
notes.EarlierBans = earlierBans(held)
}
notes.Request = notes.Request.cut()
ban := Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: now, Cause: cause, Notes: notes}
if cause == CauseAttack {
ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
} else {
ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
}
l.add(ban)
l.made[cause]++
l.markChanged()
return ban
}
// earlierBans returns how many bans a netblock with the bans held, oldest
// first, has had, by cause: the first ban held counts the bans the
// netblock had before that one, since dropped to make room, and each ban
// held adds one.
func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
earlier := held[0].Notes.EarlierBans
for _, ban := range held {
switch ban.Cause {
case CauseLimit:
earlier.Limit++
case CauseAttack:
earlier.Attack++
default:
earlier.WithoutCause++
}
}
return earlier
}
// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
func (l *Ledger) markChanged() {
select {
case l.changed <- struct{}{}:
default: // a value is waiting already
}
}
// active returns the ban active at now on a netblock client is in, or
// nil.
func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
@@ -458,23 +383,12 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
}
}
// limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
// zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
// active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
// sign of attack, can make the new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to
// bans.json can start after another and end before it, so that one is
// looked for among them all.
func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
// expiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or zero
// when it is permanent. last is the netblock's ban that ended last, or nil
// when it has none.
func (l *Ledger) expiry(last *Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
var last *Ban
for i, ban := range held {
if ban.Cause != CauseAttack && (last == nil || ban.Expires.After(last.Expires)) {
last = &held[i]
}
}
if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.rules.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
lastLength := last.Expires.Sub(last.Start)
// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > MaxBanDuration, written so
@@ -493,20 +407,6 @@ func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
return now.Add(length)
}
// attackExpiry returns when a ban for a clear sign of attack made at now
// ends. held are the netblock's bans, none of them active: if one of them
// is for a clear sign of attack too, the new ban is permanent, and its
// end zero; otherwise it ends AttackBanDuration later.
func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
for _, ban := range held {
if ban.Cause == CauseAttack {
return time.Time{}
}
}
return now.Add(l.rules.AttackBanDuration)
}
// dropOne drops the earliest ban of the netblock that has gone longest
// without a request, and the netblock with it if that was its only ban.
func (l *Ledger) dropOne() {
internal/bans/bans_test.go
+7 -103
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,8 @@ func TestRepeatsTripleUntilPermanent(t *testing.T) {
ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
length := time.Duration(hours) * time.Hour
if !ban.Expires.Equal(now.Add(length)) ||
ban.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: i}) {
t.Fatalf("ban %d lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want %d hours and %d for a limit",
if !ban.Expires.Equal(now.Add(length)) || ban.Notes.EarlierBans != i {
t.Fatalf("ban %d lasts %s with %d earlier bans, want %d hours and %d",
i+1, ban.Expires.Sub(now), ban.Notes.EarlierBans, hours, i)
}
@@ -67,9 +66,8 @@ func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
first := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
second := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires.Add(tc.gap), bans.Notes{})
if second.Expires.Sub(second.Start) != tc.want ||
second.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
t.Errorf("second ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want %s and 1 for a limit",
if second.Expires.Sub(second.Start) != tc.want || second.Notes.EarlierBans != 1 {
t.Errorf("second ban lasts %s with %d earlier bans, want %s and 1",
second.Expires.Sub(second.Start), second.Notes.EarlierBans, tc.want)
}
})
@@ -237,102 +235,9 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
second := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != second ||
held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, "+
"with 1 earlier ban for a limit", held)
}
}
func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
notes := bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"}
ban := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), notes)
if !ban.Expires.Equal(midnight().Add(7*day)) || ban.Cause != bans.CauseAttack ||
ban.Notes.RuleID != "env-file" || ledger.Made(bans.CauseAttack) != 1 ||
ledger.Made(bans.CauseLimit) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the ban is %+v, with %d made for an attack and %d for a limit, "+
"want one for an attack, of seven days", ban,
ledger.Made(bans.CauseAttack), ledger.Made(bans.CauseLimit))
}
wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
// In observe mode the ban refuses nothing, and stays as it is.
got, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(time.Hour))
if got.Permanent() {
t.Fatal("a request found under the ban made it permanent")
}
// A request it refuses makes it permanent, and bans.json due.
got, _ = ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(time.Hour))
if !got.Permanent() || !ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Permanent() {
t.Fatalf("after a request during the ban, it is %+v, want it permanent", got)
}
wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
_, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(100*365*day))
if !banned {
t.Error("the permanent ban ended")
}
}
func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// A ban for a broken limit before does not count.
first := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
second := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if second.Expires.Sub(second.Start) != 7*day {
t.Fatalf("the first ban for an attack lasts %s, want 7 days",
second.Expires.Sub(second.Start))
}
// Once that has run out without a request, the netblock is served, and
// its next clear sign of attack bans it for good.
_, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), second.Expires)
if banned {
t.Fatal("the ban did not end")
}
// Its notes show the earlier ban for an attack that makes it permanent,
// beside the one for a limit.
third := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, second.Expires.Add(30*day), bans.Notes{})
if !third.Permanent() ||
third.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1, Attack: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the next ban for an attack is %+v, want a permanent one, "+
"with 1 earlier ban for a limit and 1 for an attack", third)
}
}
func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
// Three times the seven days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
// ban for an attack ends bans for an hour, as a first broken limit does.
attack := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
limit := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, attack.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour || limit.Cause != bans.CauseLimit {
t.Errorf("the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour", limit)
}
// And a request during the ban for a limit leaves it as it is.
got, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), limit.Start)
if got.Permanent() {
t.Error("a request during a ban for a limit made it permanent")
if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != second || held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != 1 {
t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, with 1 earlier ban",
held)
}
}
@@ -364,7 +269,6 @@ func defaultRules() bans.Rules {
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * day,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * day,
MaxBans: 5000,
}
}
internal/bans/snapshot_test.go
+6 -11
View File
@@ -82,9 +82,8 @@ func TestLoadedBansCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
}
again := after.BanForLimit(netblock, ban.Expires, bans.Notes{})
if again.Expires.Sub(again.Start) != 3*time.Hour ||
again.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want 3h and 1 for a limit",
if again.Expires.Sub(again.Start) != 3*time.Hour || again.Notes.EarlierBans != 1 {
t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with %d earlier bans, want 3h and 1",
again.Expires.Sub(again.Start), again.Notes.EarlierBans)
}
}
@@ -179,8 +178,7 @@ func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
Netblock: netblock,
Start: midnight(),
Expires: midnight().Add(9 * time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
Notes: bans.Notes{EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 2}},
Notes: bans.Notes{EarlierBans: 2},
}
admins := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
@@ -193,13 +191,10 @@ func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
// Once both have ended, a limit broken within the repeat window bans
// for three times the 9 hours, and the notes count the two bans
// before the 9-hour one and it, for a limit, and the admin's, without
// a cause.
// before the 9-hour one, it, and the admin's.
ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, nineHours.Expires.Add(time.Hour), bans.Notes{})
if ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start) != 27*time.Hour ||
ban.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 3, WithoutCause: 1}) {
t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, "+
"want 27h, 3 for a limit and 1 without a cause",
if ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start) != 27*time.Hour || ban.Notes.EarlierBans != 4 {
t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with %d earlier bans, want 27h and 4",
ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start), ban.Notes.EarlierBans)
}
}
internal/config/config.go
+158 -120
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
package config
import (
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
@@ -19,6 +20,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
)
// Config is smallwebwaf's settings. A timeout, size or rate limit of zero
@@ -28,14 +31,10 @@ type Config struct {
ListenAddr string
// UpstreamURL is the app (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL).
UpstreamURL *url.URL
// InstanceName is the name each request log line gives as instance
// (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME), by default the host's name, which docker sets
// to the first 12 characters of the container's id.
InstanceName string
// Observe is true in observe mode, when SWWAF_MODE is observe rather
// than enforce: a request that SWWAF_DENY_NETS, a ban, the country
// lists, a rate limit or a rule would refuse is passed to the app
// instead, and no ban is made.
// lists or a rate limit would refuse is passed to the app instead, and
// no ban is made.
Observe bool
// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is
// believed (SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
@@ -80,10 +79,6 @@ type Config struct {
RateLimitPerMinute int64
RateLimitPerHour int64
RateLimitPerDay int64
// RateLimitExemptPaths are the path prefixes whose requests the rate
// limits neither count nor refuse (SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS).
// Each starts with /.
RateLimitExemptPaths []string
// DeniedCountries are the countries whose clients are refused
// (SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES). ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, when not
// empty, are the only countries whose clients are let through
@@ -94,8 +89,7 @@ type Config struct {
// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
// (SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
// breaks a rate limit or matches a ban rule, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the
// country lists.
// breaks a rate limit, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the country lists.
BanResponse int
// LimitBanDuration is the ban for a first broken rate limit
// (SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION). A limit broken again within
@@ -106,9 +100,6 @@ type Config struct {
LimitBanDuration time.Duration
LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
MaxBanDuration time.Duration
// AttackBanDuration is the ban for a first clear sign of attack
// (SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION). It cannot be off.
AttackBanDuration time.Duration
// MaxBans is the most bans held (SWWAF_MAX_BANS).
MaxBans int
// BanScopeV4Prefix is the length of the netblock around an IPv4
@@ -122,19 +113,26 @@ type Config struct {
StateDir string
StateWriteDelay time.Duration
StateCounterInterval time.Duration
// LogRequestHeaders are the request headers whose values the request
// log gives, in lower case (SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS).
LogRequestHeaders []string
// MetricsToken is the bearer token a scraper sends for the metrics
// (SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN), "" while it is unset and the metrics are off.
// MetricsTopN is how many countries get series of their own in the
// metrics (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N).
MetricsToken string
MetricsTopN int
// RulesDir is the directory of the rule files (SWWAF_RULES_DIR), read
// unless RulesEnabled is false (SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED).
RulesDir string
RulesEnabled bool
// LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent.
// LogRemoteTLSCAs are the certificates a syslog+tls endpoint's
// certificate must chain to (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil while
// it is unset and the host's own are used. LogRemoteBuffer is the most
// lines held while they wait to be sent (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
// LogRemoteFacility is the number of the syslog facility
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and LogRemoteAppName the APP-NAME
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME), of the records the lines are sent in.
LogRemoteURL *url.URL
LogRemoteTLSCAs *x509.CertPool
LogRemoteBuffer int
LogRemoteFacility int
LogRemoteAppName string
// settings are the values read, as given or by default, for the
// log line at start.
@@ -175,11 +173,6 @@ var (
"such as http://127.0.0.1:8081")
errNotCountry = errors.New(
"is not a two-letter country code such as de or kp")
errNotHeaderName = errors.New(
"is not a header name such as accept-language")
errHeaderTakenOut = errors.New(
"is taken out of every request by Go's HTTP server, so it can never " +
"be logged")
errOnBothLists = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
errNotOver4K = errors.New("is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K")
errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New(
@@ -193,9 +186,13 @@ var (
"is not an absolute path, such as /var/lib/smallwebwaf")
errShortToken = errors.New("is shorter than 32 characters")
errNotMode = errors.New("is not enforce or observe")
errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
errNotBoolean = errors.New("is not true or false")
errNotLogRemoteURL = errors.New(
"is not syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls with a host and a port, " +
"and nothing more, such as syslog+tls://logs.example:6514")
errNoCertificate = errors.New("holds no PEM certificate")
errNotFacility = errors.New("is not a syslog facility such as local0 or daemon")
errNotAppName = errors.New(
"is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space, such as gitea")
)
// FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally
@@ -203,11 +200,9 @@ var (
// that is set but invalid is an error that names it.
func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
cfg := &Config{
ListenAddr: env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8080"),
UpstreamURL: env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8081"),
InstanceName: env.value("SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME", hostname),
Observe: env.observe("SWWAF_MODE", "enforce"),
TrustedProxies: env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
ClientRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
@@ -225,7 +220,6 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
RateLimitPerMinute: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "1000"),
RateLimitPerHour: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "10000"),
RateLimitPerDay: env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50000"),
RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
DeniedCountries: env.countries("SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES", ""),
ExclusivelyAllowedCountries: env.countries(
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", ""),
@@ -233,20 +227,23 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
LimitBanDuration: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION", "1h"),
LimitBanRepeatWindow: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW", "24h"),
MaxBanDuration: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION", "7d"),
AttackBanDuration: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION", "7d"),
MaxBans: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_BANS", "5000"),
BanScopeV4Prefix: env.v4Prefix("SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX", "32"),
StateDir: env.absolutePath("SWWAF_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/smallwebwaf"),
StateWriteDelay: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY", "10s"),
StateCounterInterval: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL", "15m"),
LogRequestHeaders: env.headerNames("SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS",
"accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range"),
MetricsToken: env.token("SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN"),
MetricsTopN: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"),
RulesDir: env.value("SWWAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d"),
RulesEnabled: env.boolean("SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
LogRemoteTLSCAs: env.certificates("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"),
LogRemoteBuffer: env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER", "10000"),
LogRemoteFacility: env.facility("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY", "local0"),
}
hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
cfg.LogRemoteAppName = env.appName("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME", hostname,
cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil)
for _, country := range cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries {
if slices.Contains(cfg.DeniedCountries, country) {
env.check("SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES",
@@ -328,16 +325,6 @@ func (e *environment) observe(name, defaultValue string) bool {
return mode == "observe"
}
// boolean reads a setting that is true or false.
func (e *environment) boolean(name, defaultValue string) bool {
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if value != "true" && value != "false" {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotBoolean))
}
return value == "true"
}
// netblocks reads a setting that is a list of netblocks.
func (e *environment) netblocks(name, defaultValue string) []netip.Prefix {
netblocks, err := parseNetblocks(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -379,14 +366,6 @@ func (e *environment) count(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
return count
}
// pathPrefixes reads a setting that is a list of path prefixes.
func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
prefixes, err := parsePathPrefixes(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return prefixes
}
// countries reads a setting that is a list of countries.
func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string {
countries, err := parseCountries(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -395,15 +374,6 @@ func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string {
return countries
}
// headerNames reads a setting that is a list of header names, and
// returns them in lower case.
func (e *environment) headerNames(name, defaultValue string) []string {
headers, err := parseHeaderNames(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return headers
}
// durationNotOff reads a setting that is a duration and, unlike a
// timeout, cannot be off.
func (e *environment) durationNotOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
@@ -468,6 +438,68 @@ func (e *environment) token(name string) string {
return value
}
// logRemoteURL reads the setting that is where every log line is also
// sent. Unset or empty, it is nil, and nothing is sent.
func (e *environment) logRemoteURL(name string) *url.URL {
value := e.value(name, "")
if value == "" {
return nil
}
remote, err := parseLogRemoteURL(value)
e.check(name, err)
return remote
}
// certificates reads a setting that is the path of a file of PEM
// certificates. Unset or empty, it is nil.
func (e *environment) certificates(name string) *x509.CertPool {
path := e.value(name, "")
if path == "" {
return nil
}
pem, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a file the admin names
if err != nil {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("cannot be read: %w", err))
return nil
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", path, errNoCertificate))
return nil
}
return pool
}
// facility reads a setting that is a syslog facility, and returns its
// number.
func (e *environment) facility(name, defaultValue string) int {
number, err := parseFacility(e.value(name, defaultValue))
e.check(name, err)
return number
}
// appName reads the setting that is the APP-NAME of the records the log
// lines are sent in. Its value is checked when it is set, and while lines
// are sent, when they would be sent with its default.
func (e *environment) appName(name, defaultValue string, sending bool) string {
_, set := e.lookupEnv(name)
value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
if (set || sending) && !isAppName(value) {
e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotAppName))
}
return value
}
// parseDuration reads a duration in Go's syntax, such as 90s or 15m, a
// whole number of days such as 7d, or off.
func parseDuration(value string) (time.Duration, error) {
@@ -674,23 +706,6 @@ func parseNetblock(value string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen()), nil
}
// parsePathPrefixes reads a comma-separated list of path prefixes, each
// starting with /.
func parsePathPrefixes(value string) ([]string, error) {
prefixes, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
if !strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "/") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", prefix, errNotPathPrefix)
}
}
return prefixes, nil
}
// countryCodes are the two-letter codes ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and XK,
// the code in common use for Kosovo. golang.org/x/text/language cannot
// check them: it also takes withdrawn codes such as su, and reserved ones
@@ -747,44 +762,6 @@ func parseCountries(value string) ([]string, error) {
return countries, nil
}
// headerNameChars are the characters RFC 9110 allows in a header name:
// letters, digits and these marks.
const headerNameChars = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" +
"0123456789!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~"
// parseHeaderNames reads a comma-separated list of header names in either
// case, and returns them in lower case. Host and Transfer-Encoding are
// refused: Go's HTTP server takes them out of the request's headers.
func parseHeaderNames(value string) ([]string, error) {
items, err := parseList(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
headers := make([]string, 0, len(items))
for _, item := range items {
for _, char := range item {
if !strings.ContainsRune(headerNameChars, char) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errNotHeaderName)
}
}
header := strings.ToLower(item)
switch header {
case "host":
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w; the request's host is the field host",
item, errHeaderTakenOut)
case "transfer-encoding":
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errHeaderTakenOut)
}
headers = append(headers, header)
}
return headers, nil
}
// parseListenAddr checks an address to listen on: an optional host and a
// port number.
func parseListenAddr(value string) (string, error) {
@@ -827,3 +804,64 @@ func parseUpstreamURL(value string) (*url.URL, error) {
return upstream, nil
}
// parseLogRemoteURL reads where every log line is also sent:
// syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls, a host and a port from 1 to
// 65535, and nothing else.
func parseLogRemoteURL(value string) (*url.URL, error) {
remote, err := url.Parse(value)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLogRemoteURL)
}
schemes := []string{remotelog.SchemeUDP, remotelog.SchemeTCP, remotelog.SchemeTLS}
port, err := strconv.ParseUint(remote.Port(), 10, 16)
onlySchemeHostAndPort := slices.Contains(schemes, remote.Scheme) &&
remote.Hostname() != "" && err == nil && port != 0 &&
remote.User == nil && remote.Opaque == "" &&
(remote.Path == "" || remote.Path == "/") &&
remote.RawQuery == "" && remote.Fragment == ""
if !onlySchemeHostAndPort {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLogRemoteURL)
}
return remote, nil
}
// parseFacility reads the name of a syslog facility, and returns its
// number, as RFC 5424 numbers them.
func parseFacility(value string) (int, error) {
//nolint:mnd // the facilities' numbers in RFC 5424
number, known := map[string]int{
"kern": 0, "user": 1, "mail": 2, "daemon": 3, "auth": 4, "syslog": 5,
"lpr": 6, "news": 7, "uucp": 8, "cron": 9, "authpriv": 10, "ftp": 11,
"local0": 16, "local1": 17, "local2": 18, "local3": 19,
"local4": 20, "local5": 21, "local6": 22, "local7": 23,
}[value]
if !known {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotFacility)
}
return number, nil
}
// appNameMaxLength is the most characters RFC 5424 allows in an
// APP-NAME.
const appNameMaxLength = 48
// isAppName reports whether value can be an APP-NAME: 1 to
// appNameMaxLength printable ASCII characters, none of them a space.
func isAppName(value string) bool {
if value == "" || len(value) > appNameMaxLength {
return false
}
for _, char := range []byte(value) {
if char < '!' || char > '~' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
internal/config/config_test.go
+146 -119
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@ package config_test
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -35,14 +37,12 @@ const (
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerHour = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
limitBanDuration = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
stateDir = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
@@ -50,15 +50,26 @@ const (
stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
metricsToken = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
metricsTopN = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
rulesEnabled = "SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED"
logRemoteURL = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
logRemoteTLSCAFile = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
logRemoteBuffer = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
logRemoteFacility = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
logRemoteAppName = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
)
// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
const defaultLogRequestHeaders = "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding," +
"content-type,origin,range"
// testCA is a CA certificate, of which only that it reads matters here.
const testCA = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
`
// token is a token of 32 characters, the shortest allowed.
const token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
@@ -111,7 +122,6 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000,
BanScopeV4Prefix: 32,
StateDir: "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
@@ -119,8 +129,6 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
StateCounterInterval: 15 * time.Minute,
MetricsToken: "",
MetricsTopN: 50,
RulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
RulesEnabled: true,
})
if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "http://127.0.0.1:8081" {
@@ -134,22 +142,6 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets)
wantCountries(t, deniedCountries, cfg.DeniedCountries)
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries)
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil || hostname == "" || cfg.InstanceName != hostname {
t.Errorf("%s is %q, want the host's name %q (%v)", instanceName,
cfg.InstanceName, hostname, err)
}
wantHeaders := strings.Split(defaultLogRequestHeaders, ",")
if !slices.Equal(cfg.LogRequestHeaders, wantHeaders) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want %v", logRequestHeaders, cfg.LogRequestHeaders,
wantHeaders)
}
if len(cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want none", rateLimitExemptPaths, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
}
}
func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
@@ -180,7 +172,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
limitBanDuration: "15m",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "2d",
maxBanDuration: "30d",
attackBanDuration: "1d",
maxBans: "100",
banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
stateDir: "/srv/waf-state",
@@ -188,8 +179,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
stateCounterInterval: "1h",
metricsToken: token,
metricsTopN: "10",
rulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
rulesEnabled: "false",
})
wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
@@ -210,7 +199,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
LimitBanDuration: 15 * time.Minute,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 48 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 30 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 100,
BanScopeV4Prefix: 24,
StateDir: "/srv/waf-state",
@@ -218,8 +206,6 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
StateCounterInterval: time.Hour,
MetricsToken: token,
MetricsTopN: 10,
RulesDir: "/srv/waf-rules",
RulesEnabled: false,
})
if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "https://app.internal:8443/" {
@@ -234,42 +220,128 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, "DE")
}
func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
func TestRemoteLogSettingsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/, /favicon.ico"})
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
if !slices.Equal(cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths, []string{"/assets/", "/favicon.ico"}) {
t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want /assets/ and /favicon.ico",
rateLimitExemptPaths, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil || cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs != nil ||
cfg.LogRemoteBuffer != 10000 || cfg.LogRemoteFacility != 16 ||
cfg.LogRemoteAppName != hostname {
t.Errorf("remote log settings %v, %v, %d, %d and %q, want no URL, no "+
"certificates, 10000, 16 and %q", cfg.LogRemoteURL, cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
cfg.LogRemoteBuffer, cfg.LogRemoteFacility, cfg.LogRemoteAppName, hostname)
}
}
func TestPathPrefixNotStartingWithSlashStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
func TestRemoteLogSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(
environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/favicon.ico,assets/"}.lookupEnv)
caFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ca.pem")
want := rateLimitExemptPaths + `: "assets/" is not a path prefix ` +
`starting with /, such as /assets/`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
err := os.WriteFile(caFile, []byte(testCA), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", caFile, err)
}
}
func TestInstanceNameAndLoggedHeadersAsSet(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
instanceName: "fsn1app1/gitea",
logRequestHeaders: " Accept , X-Custom",
logRemoteURL: "syslog+tls://logs.example:6514",
logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile,
logRemoteBuffer: "500",
logRemoteFacility: "daemon",
logRemoteAppName: "fsn1app1/gitea",
})
if cfg.InstanceName != "fsn1app1/gitea" ||
!slices.Equal(cfg.LogRequestHeaders, []string{"accept", "x-custom"}) {
t.Errorf("%s is %q and %s gives %v", instanceName, cfg.InstanceName,
logRequestHeaders, cfg.LogRequestHeaders)
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
roots.AppendCertsFromPEM([]byte(testCA))
if cfg.LogRemoteURL.String() != "syslog+tls://logs.example:6514" ||
!roots.Equal(cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs) || cfg.LogRemoteBuffer != 500 ||
cfg.LogRemoteFacility != 3 || cfg.LogRemoteAppName != "fsn1app1/gitea" {
t.Errorf("remote log settings %v, %v, %d, %d and %q", cfg.LogRemoteURL,
cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs, cfg.LogRemoteBuffer, cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
cfg.LogRemoteAppName)
}
}
func TestRemoteLogURLForms(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, value := range []string{
"syslog+udp://192.0.2.1:514",
"syslog+tcp://[2001:db8::1]:514",
"syslog+tls://logs.example:6514/",
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logRemoteURL: value})
if cfg.LogRemoteURL.String() != value {
t.Errorf("%s read as %v", value, cfg.LogRemoteURL)
}
}
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logRemoteURL: ""})
if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
t.Errorf("set but empty, %s read as %v", logRemoteURL, cfg.LogRemoteURL)
}
}
func TestRemoteLogFacilitiesByNumber(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for name, number := range map[string]int{
"kern": 0, "user": 1, "auth": 4, "authpriv": 10, "ftp": 11,
"local0": 16, "local5": 21, "local7": 23,
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logRemoteFacility: name})
if cfg.LogRemoteFacility != number {
t.Errorf("%s read as %d, want %d", name, cfg.LogRemoteFacility, number)
}
}
}
func TestInvalidRemoteLogSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value string }{
{logRemoteURL, "logs.example:514"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog://logs.example:514"},
{logRemoteURL, "http://logs.example:514"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+udp://logs.example"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://:514"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://logs.example:0"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tls://logs.example:65536"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tls://user@logs.example:6514"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://logs.example:514/app"},
{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://logs.example:514?tls=1"},
{logRemoteTLSCAFile, "/nonexistent/ca.pem"},
{logRemoteBuffer, off}, {logRemoteBuffer, "0"}, {logRemoteBuffer, "10K"},
{logRemoteFacility, "local8"}, {logRemoteFacility, "LOCAL0"},
{logRemoteFacility, "16"}, {logRemoteFacility, ""},
{logRemoteAppName, ""}, {logRemoteAppName, "my app"},
{logRemoteAppName, "gitéa"}, {logRemoteAppName, strings.Repeat("a", 49)},
} {
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
t.Errorf("%s=%q: error %v, want one naming it", tc.name, tc.value, err)
}
}
}
func TestRemoteLogCAFileWithoutCertificateStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
caFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ca.pem")
err := os.WriteFile(caFile, []byte("not a certificate\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", caFile, err)
}
_, err = config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile}.lookupEnv)
want := logRemoteTLSCAFile + `: "` + caFile + `" holds no PEM certificate`
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
@@ -373,8 +445,10 @@ func TestTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantStartStopped(t, []struct{ name, value string }{
{listenAddr, "8080"}, {listenAddr, ":http"}, {listenAddr, ":65536"},
for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value string }{
{listenAddr, "8080"},
{listenAddr, ":http"},
{listenAddr, ":65536"},
{upstreamURL, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
{upstreamURL, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
{upstreamURL, "http://"},
@@ -392,7 +466,8 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{allowNets, "192.0.2.0/24,monitoring"},
{rateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/129"},
{denyNets, "198.51.100.0/24,"},
{clientRequestTimeout, "60"}, {clientRequestTimeout, ""},
{clientRequestTimeout, "60"},
{clientRequestTimeout, ""},
{clientIdleTimeout, "0s"},
{clientIdleTimeout, "2 minutes"},
{clientResponseTimeout, "1y"},
@@ -409,8 +484,8 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{rateLimitPerMinute, "1K"},
{rateLimitPerHour, "0"},
{rateLimitPerHour, "1.5"},
{rateLimitPerDay, "-1"}, {rateLimitPerDay, "lots"},
{rateLimitExemptPaths, "/assets/,,/static/"},
{rateLimitPerDay, "-1"},
{rateLimitPerDay, "lots"},
{deniedCountries, "nk"},
{deniedCountries, "kp,,ir"},
{deniedCountries, "prk"},
@@ -423,37 +498,17 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
{allowedCountries, "uk"},
{allowedCountries, "zz"},
{allowedCountries, "de,germany"},
{metricsTopN, off}, {metricsTopN, "0"}, {metricsTopN, "-1"},
{logRequestHeaders, "accept,,origin"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept;origin"},
{logRequestHeaders, "accept language"}, {logRequestHeaders, "x-foo:"},
{logRequestHeaders, "host"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept,Host"},
{logRequestHeaders, "transfer-encoding"}, {logRequestHeaders, "TRANSFER-ENCODING"},
{rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"},
})
}
func TestInvalidBanOrStateValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantStartStopped(t, []struct{ name, value string }{
{banResponse, "404"}, {banResponse, "drop"}, {banResponse, ""},
{limitBanDuration, off}, {limitBanDuration, "0s"}, {limitBanDuration, "1"},
{limitBanRepeatWindow, off}, {limitBanRepeatWindow, "-1h"},
{maxBanDuration, off}, {maxBanDuration, "1w"}, {attackBanDuration, off},
{maxBanDuration, off}, {maxBanDuration, "1w"},
{maxBans, off}, {maxBans, "0"}, {maxBans, "5K"},
{banScopeV4Prefix, "33"}, {banScopeV4Prefix, "-1"}, {banScopeV4Prefix, "/24"},
{stateDir, ""}, {stateDir, "state"}, {stateDir, "./var/lib/smallwebwaf"},
{stateWriteDelay, off}, {stateWriteDelay, "0s"},
{stateCounterInterval, off}, {stateCounterInterval, "15"},
})
}
// wantStartStopped checks that each setting, set to its value, stops the
// start with an error that names the setting.
func wantStartStopped(t *testing.T, invalid []struct{ name, value string }) {
t.Helper()
for _, tc := range invalid {
{metricsTopN, off}, {metricsTopN, "0"}, {metricsTopN, "-1"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -469,27 +524,6 @@ func wantStartStopped(t *testing.T, invalid []struct{ name, value string }) {
}
}
func TestHostOrTransferEncodingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Only Host's message points to the field host.
for value, want := range map[string]string{
"Host": `"Host" is taken out of every request by Go's HTTP server, ` +
"so it can never be logged; the request's host is the field host",
"transfer-encoding": `"transfer-encoding" is taken out of every ` +
"request by Go's HTTP server, so it can never be logged",
} {
t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRequestHeaders: value}.lookupEnv)
if err == nil || err.Error() != logRequestHeaders+": "+want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s: %s", err, logRequestHeaders, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestShortTokenStopsTheStartWithoutShowingIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -562,14 +596,12 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
rateLimitPerMinute: "1000",
rateLimitPerHour: "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
deniedCountries: "",
allowedCountries: "",
banResponse: "403",
limitBanDuration: "1h",
limitBanRepeatWindow: "24h",
maxBanDuration: "7d",
attackBanDuration: "7d",
maxBans: "5000",
banScopeV4Prefix: "32",
stateDir: "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
@@ -577,10 +609,11 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
stateCounterInterval: "15m",
metricsToken: "",
metricsTopN: "50",
instanceName: hostname,
logRequestHeaders: defaultLogRequestHeaders,
rulesDir: "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
rulesEnabled: "true",
logRemoteURL: "",
logRemoteTLSCAFile: "",
logRemoteBuffer: "10000",
logRemoteFacility: "local0",
logRemoteAppName: hostname,
}
if !maps.Equal(line.Settings, want) {
t.Errorf("logged settings\n%v\nwant\n%v", line.Settings, want)
@@ -610,8 +643,8 @@ func wantSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
wantBanSettings(t, got, want)
}
// wantBanSettings checks the settings for bans, the state files, the
// metrics and the rule files.
// wantBanSettings checks the settings for bans, the state files and the
// metrics.
func wantBanSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
t.Helper()
@@ -619,17 +652,11 @@ func wantBanSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
got.LimitBanDuration != want.LimitBanDuration ||
got.LimitBanRepeatWindow != want.LimitBanRepeatWindow ||
got.MaxBanDuration != want.MaxBanDuration ||
got.AttackBanDuration != want.AttackBanDuration ||
got.MaxBans != want.MaxBans ||
got.BanScopeV4Prefix != want.BanScopeV4Prefix {
t.Errorf("ban settings\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
if got.RulesDir != want.RulesDir || got.RulesEnabled != want.RulesEnabled {
t.Errorf("rule files in %q, on: %t, want %q, %t",
got.RulesDir, got.RulesEnabled, want.RulesDir, want.RulesEnabled)
}
if got.StateDir != want.StateDir ||
got.StateWriteDelay != want.StateWriteDelay ||
got.StateCounterInterval != want.StateCounterInterval {
internal/metrics/metrics.go
+32 -34
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ import (
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// Metrics are smallwebwaf's metrics. They are safe for concurrent use.
@@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ type Metrics struct {
rateLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
offences *prometheus.CounterVec
// ruleMatches are made by AddRules.
ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
countries *countries
// GeoJSRequests are the requests to GeoJS, and GeoJSFailures those
@@ -138,22 +136,19 @@ func New(topN int) *Metrics {
// AddBansAndClients adds the metrics read from the ledger and the table
// of clients as the metrics are asked for: the bans made since the start,
// by cause, the bans active and permanent at now, and the clients in the
// table.
// the bans active and permanent at now, and the clients in the table.
func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
) {
for _, cause := range []string{bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack} {
m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
m.registry.MustRegister(
// Every ban smallwebwaf makes so far is for a broken limit.
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total",
Help: "Bans made, by cause.",
ConstLabels: prometheus.Labels{"cause": cause},
ConstLabels: prometheus.Labels{"cause": "limit"},
}, func() float64 {
return float64(ledger.Made(cause))
}))
}
m.registry.MustRegister(
return float64(ledger.Made())
}),
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_active_bans",
Help: "Bans active now, the permanent ones included.",
@@ -179,22 +174,31 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
)
}
// AddRules adds the metrics of the rule files: the requests that matched
// each rule, which RuleMatched counts, and the rules loaded from
// ruleFiles, read as the metrics are asked for. It is called once, before
// RuleMatched.
func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
m.ruleMatches = counterVec("smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total",
"Requests that matched a rule of the rule files, by its id and action.",
[]string{"rule_id", "action"})
m.registry.MustRegister(m.ruleMatches,
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_rules_loaded",
Help: "Rules loaded from the rule files.",
// AddRemoteLog adds the metrics of sending the log lines to
// SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
// lines sent, those dropped, and those waiting in the buffer.
func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
m.registry.MustRegister(
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
Help: "Log lines sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
}, func() float64 {
return float64(ruleFiles.Len())
}))
return float64(remote.Sent())
}),
prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total",
Help: "Log lines dropped: the oldest in a full buffer, and those " +
"whose sending failed.",
}, func() float64 {
return float64(remote.Dropped())
}),
prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth",
Help: "Log lines in the buffer, waiting to be sent.",
}, func() float64 {
return float64(remote.Depth())
}),
)
}
// ServeHTTP answers with the metrics in the Prometheus text format.
@@ -243,12 +247,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
}
}
// RuleMatched counts a request that matched the rule id, whose action is
// action.
func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
}
// StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
// that ended with err.
func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
internal/proxy/bans.go
+13 -43
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
@@ -31,17 +30,14 @@ func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
return banned
}
// limitBroken counts the request for the rate limits at now, notes the
// client's counts for the log line, and reports whether the request takes
// the client over a limit. In enforce mode such a request bans the
// client's netblock, and sets the client's counters back to zero; in
// observe mode it does neither.
// limitBroken counts the request for the rate limits at now, and reports
// whether it takes the client over one. In enforce mode such a request
// bans the client's netblock, and sets the client's counters back to
// zero; in observe mode it does neither.
func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
group := clientGroup(rq.client)
counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(group, now)
rq.line.Counts = counts
hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(group, now)
if !over {
return false
}
@@ -59,47 +55,21 @@ func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
Limit: hit.Limit,
Window: hit.Window,
Count: hit.Requests,
Request: rq.noted(now),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
})
rq.h.limiter.Reset(group)
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
return true
}
// banForAttack bans the client's netblock at now for a clear sign of
// attack, the match of rule, a ban rule.
func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, rule rules.Rule) {
netblock := rq.netblock()
ban := rq.h.ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, bans.Notes{
Country: rq.line.Country,
RuleID: rule.ID,
Target: rule.Target,
Request: rq.noted(now),
Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
})
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
}
// noted is the request, refused at now with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, as the
// notes of the ban it makes keep it.
func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time) bans.Request {
return bans.Request{
Request: bans.Request{
Time: now,
Method: rq.in.Method,
Host: rq.in.Host,
Path: rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
Status: rq.h.config.BanResponse,
UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
}
}
},
// The histories count this request only once it has ended.
Requests: rq.h.limiter.Requests(netblock) + 1,
})
rq.h.limiter.Reset(group)
rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
// netblockRequests is how many requests netblock has sent since it was
// first seen, this one included: the histories count it only once it has
// ended.
func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
return rq.h.limiter.Requests(netblock) + 1
return true
}
// netblock is the netblock a ban on the client covers: its IPv4 address,
internal/proxy/bans_test.go
+3 -4
View File
@@ -278,7 +278,6 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
Netblock: netblock,
Start: start,
Expires: start.Add(time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
Notes: bans.Notes{
Country: "DE",
Limit: 1,
@@ -296,7 +295,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
// refused under the ban.
Requests: 4,
Refused: 2,
EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{},
EarlierBans: 0,
},
}
@@ -313,8 +312,8 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
got = ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want two, the second with one earlier ban for a limit", got)
if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != 1 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want two, the second with one earlier ban", got)
}
}
internal/proxy/client.go
-28
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package proxy
import (
"crypto/rand"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"slices"
@@ -49,33 +48,6 @@ func clientAddress(
return client
}
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from traefik and to the app.
const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// requestID is the request's id: the one a trusted proxy sent, or a new
// random one. A peer outside the trusted proxies did not come through
// traefik, so the id it sends is its own claim, and is replaced.
func requestID(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
if !peerTrusted || id == "" {
id = rand.Text()
}
return id
}
// scheme is how the client reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme smallwebwaf
// serves.
func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
if !peerTrusted || proto == "" {
return "http"
}
return proto
}
// ipv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client.
const ipv6GroupPrefix = 64
internal/proxy/client_test.go
+6 -10
View File
@@ -14,14 +14,10 @@ const (
appHost = "app.example"
// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
client = "203.0.113.9"
// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies.
forwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the
// one smallwebwaf serves.
// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with.
secure = "https"
plain = "http"
)
// appHeaders is what the app tells about the headers it received.
@@ -71,11 +67,11 @@ func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
forged := http.Header{
forwardedFor: {client},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {"forged.example"},
forwardedProto: {secure},
"X-Forwarded-Proto": {secure},
"X-Real-Ip": {client},
}
replaced := appHeaders{
ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: plain,
ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: "http",
}
return []clientAddressCase{{
@@ -93,7 +89,7 @@ func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
header: http.Header{
forwardedFor: {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {appHost},
forwardedProto: {secure},
"X-Forwarded-Proto": {secure},
"X-Real-Ip": {client},
},
wantClient: client,
@@ -142,7 +138,7 @@ func requestWithHeaders(
Host: r.Host,
ForwardedFor: r.Header.Get(forwardedFor),
ForwardedHost: r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"),
ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get(forwardedProto),
ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"),
RealIP: r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
})
})
internal/proxy/health_test.go
+3 -12
View File
@@ -21,18 +21,14 @@ func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
// the last one would have it refused.
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
const (
healthChecks = 3
contentType = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
)
const healthChecks = 3
for range healthChecks {
got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
if string(got.body) != "ok\n" {
t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q, want ok", got.body)
}
}
@@ -41,11 +37,6 @@ func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
lines := out.requestLines(t, healthChecks+1)
for _, line := range lines[:healthChecks] {
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
}
}
wantLine(t, lines[healthChecks], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
internal/proxy/passthrough_test.go
+15 -30
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
@@ -16,7 +14,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -118,34 +115,27 @@ func wantAnswer(t *testing.T, got answer, body []byte) {
}
}
// wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request. Its
// time, its id and its timings are checked only for being there.
// wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request.
func wantRequestFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, host string, sent, received int) {
t.Helper()
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: hostname,
ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPatch, Scheme: plain, Host: host,
Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery, Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
want := requestlog.Line{
Type: "request", Time: line.Time, ClientIP: localhost, PeerIP: localhost,
Method: http.MethodPatch, Host: host, Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery,
Protocol: "HTTP/1.1", Status: http.StatusTeapot,
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
ResponseBytes: int64(received), UserAgent: "test-agent",
RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
ContentLength: int64(sent), ResponseContentType: "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
Counts: ratelimit.Counts{Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1},
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
Action: requestlog.ActionForward, DurationTotal: line.DurationTotal,
DurationUpstreamTotal: line.DurationUpstreamTotal,
}
if line.Line != want {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
}
_, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, line.Time)
if err != nil || line.RequestID == "" || line.DurationTotal <= 0 ||
line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil || *line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has time %q, request_id %q and durations %v and %v",
line.Time, line.RequestID, line.DurationTotal,
line.fields["duration_upstream_total"])
if err != nil || line.DurationTotal <= 0 || line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
t.Errorf("log line has time %q and durations %v and %v",
line.Time, line.DurationTotal, line.DurationUpstreamTotal)
}
}
@@ -381,13 +371,8 @@ func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppCannotBeReached(t *testing.T) {
addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", nil)
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
line := out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
// There never was a connection to the app, nor an answer from it.
wantTimings(t, line, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_total")
wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusBadGateway,
requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
logged := slices.ContainsFunc(out.lines(t), func(line map[string]any) bool {
return line["type"] == "process" && line["msg"] == "request to the app failed"
internal/proxy/proxy.go
-13
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests.
@@ -52,9 +51,6 @@ type Params struct {
// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
Now func() time.Time
// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
// against.
Rules *rules.Files
}
// Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy
@@ -94,7 +90,6 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
LimitBanDuration: params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
MaxBanDuration: params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
AttackBanDuration: params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
MaxBans: params.Config.MaxBans,
}),
geojs: lookup.New(lookup.Params{
@@ -103,10 +98,8 @@ func New(params Params) *Server {
ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
Metrics: m,
}),
rules: params.Rules,
}
m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
m.AddRules(params.Rules)
return &Server{
Server: &http.Server{
@@ -141,7 +134,6 @@ type handler struct {
limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
ledger *bans.Ledger
geojs *lookup.GeoJS
rules *rules.Files
}
// newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
@@ -168,9 +160,6 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// a health checker is never refused. It does not ask the app.
if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
return
@@ -180,8 +169,6 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer rq.addToHistory()
refused := rq.check(r.Context())
rq.checked = time.Now()
if refused != nil {
rq.answer(*refused)
internal/proxy/proxy_test.go
+4 -33
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
const (
@@ -36,10 +35,6 @@ const (
// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address
// smallwebwaf sees each test's requests come from.
localhost = "127.0.0.1"
// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
requestType = "request"
// protocol is the protocol of every test's requests.
protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
)
// shortTimeoutSetting is shortTimeout as a setting's value.
@@ -64,7 +59,6 @@ const (
denyNets = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
rateLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
deniedCountries = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
allowedCountries = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
banResponse = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
@@ -73,10 +67,6 @@ const (
maxBanDuration = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
maxBans = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
banScopeV4Prefix = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
instanceName = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
logRequestHeaders = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
attackBanDuration = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
)
// output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
@@ -93,14 +83,6 @@ func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
return o.buf.Write(p)
}
// text returns everything written so far.
func (o *output) text() string {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
return o.buf.String()
}
// lines returns every line written so far, decoded.
func (o *output) lines(t *testing.T) []map[string]any {
t.Helper()
@@ -140,7 +122,7 @@ func (o *output) requestLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
var found []logLine
for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
if fields["type"] == requestType {
if fields["type"] == "request" {
found = append(found, decodeLine(t, fields))
}
}
@@ -215,15 +197,14 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
}
// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well. Unless
// env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty directory, of no rules.
// bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well.
func startProxyWithClock(
t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
env map[string]string,
) (string, *output, *proxy.Server) {
t.Helper()
settings := map[string]string{"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir()}
settings := map[string]string{"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL}
maps.Copy(settings, env)
cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
@@ -236,22 +217,12 @@ func startProxyWithClock(
}
out := &output{}
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out)
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rule files: %v", err)
}
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: out,
ProcessLog: processLog,
ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out),
GeoJSURL: geojsURL,
Now: now,
Rules: ruleFiles,
})
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
internal/proxy/ratelimits_test.go
-88
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -71,89 +69,3 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want 4", calls.Load())
}
}
func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/,/favicon.ico",
denyNets: denied,
deniedCountries: "kp",
})
// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
// GeoJS.
server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
keptAnswer(client, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"),
})
// With a limit of one request a minute, the requests for paths under a
// prefix are not counted, so client's first request for / is within
// the limit; and once client has reached it, they are not refused.
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, "/favicon.ico?v=2", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line := s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
if line.LimitHit != "" || line.Counts != (ratelimit.Counts{}) {
t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and counts %+v, want neither",
line.LimitHit, line.Counts)
}
// A path outside every prefix is counted: /assets is not under
// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
// A ban, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
// under a prefix.
s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
}
func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, sent := range []string{
// A prefix matches only at the start of the path.
"/static/assets/app.js",
// A prefix matches the path as sent: a router that matches the
// path as received does not take /%61ssets/x for a path under
// /assets/.
"/%61ssets/x",
// .. once percent-decoded: an app may act on these as /login, the
// last as a path under /sneak/app/ or as /assets/x.
"/assets/../login",
"/assets/%2e%2e/login",
"/assets/..%2Flogin",
"/assets/..;/login",
"/sneak/app/src/branch/main/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fassets/x",
// Not under /assets/ as sent: Go's router takes /assets%2Fx for one
// path segment, not a path under /assets/.
"/assets%2Fx",
"/assets%2fx",
// Under /assets/ as sent, but holding an encoded slash, in either
// case, or a backslash: never exempt, whatever the prefix.
"/assets/x%2Fy",
"/assets/x%2fy",
`/assets/x\y`,
} {
t.Run(sent, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/",
})
// Counted, the second request breaks the limit of one request
// a minute.
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
})
}
}
internal/proxy/request.go
+23 -146
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ import (
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/http/httputil"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
@@ -49,9 +46,7 @@ type request struct {
peer netip.Addr
peerTrusted bool
start time.Time
// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
// request was handed to the app.
checked time.Time
// upstreamStart is when the request was handed to the app.
upstreamStart time.Time
// cancel ends the request to the app.
cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -61,34 +56,26 @@ type request struct {
complete bool
// mu guards what follows. The timeouts run on goroutines of their
// own, and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times
// below, from its own; once timersStopped is set, none of the timeouts
// acts any more.
// own, and the transport starts and stops them from its own; once
// timersStopped is set, none of them acts any more.
mu sync.Mutex
timersStopped bool
clientRequestTimer *time.Timer
upstreamRequestTimer *time.Timer
upstreamResponseTimer *time.Timer
// connected is when there was a connection to the app, requestSent
// when the app had been sent the whole request, and answerStarted
// when the first byte of its answer arrived.
connected time.Time
// requestSent is when the app had been sent the whole request.
requestSent time.Time
answerStarted time.Time
}
// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, counts the request as
// under way, works out the client, and starts the log line with what is
// known of the request.
// under way, and works out the client.
func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
h.metrics.RequestStarted()
start := time.Now()
peer := peerAddress(r)
trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
peerTrusted := isInside(peer, trusted)
forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
client := clientAddress(peer, forwardedFor, trusted)
client := clientAddress(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), trusted)
rq := &request{
h: h,
@@ -97,37 +84,22 @@ func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
out: &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
client: client,
peer: peer,
peerTrusted: peerTrusted,
peerTrusted: isInside(peer, trusted),
start: start,
line: requestlog.Line{
Time: requestlog.FormatTime(start),
Instance: h.config.InstanceName,
ClientIP: client.String(),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
Method: r.Method,
Scheme: scheme(r, peerTrusted),
Host: r.Host,
Path: r.URL.EscapedPath(),
Query: r.URL.RawQuery,
Protocol: r.Proto,
Referer: r.Referer(),
UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
RequestID: requestID(r, peerTrusted),
PeerIP: peer.String(),
ForwardedFor: strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
ClientGroup: clientGroup(client).String(),
ContentType: r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
RequestHeaders: requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
HasCookie: len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
},
}
// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
if r.ContentLength > 0 {
rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
}
if r.Body != http.NoBody {
rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.RequestMaxBytes), rq: rq}
}
@@ -135,47 +107,23 @@ func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
return rq
}
// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
headers := map[string]string{}
for _, name := range names {
switch name {
case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
continue
}
values := r.Header.Values(name)
if len(values) > 0 {
headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
}
}
return headers
}
// check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client
// is known, before its body is read or anything reaches the app. It
// returns nil to let the request through. The checks of checkClient come
// first, answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule, and
// then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted
// even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request
// checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. ctx is
// the request's own context.
// first, answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and then the size limit, so
// that a request the rate limits count is counted even when it is
// refused for its size. In observe mode a request checkClient refuses
// goes on to the size limit like any other. ctx is the request's own
// context.
func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
if action != "" {
if !rq.h.config.Observe {
return rq.banResponse(action)
}
switch {
case action == "":
case rq.h.config.Observe:
// The log line names what enforce mode would have done.
rq.line.WouldAction = action
case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked:
return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
default:
return rq.banResponse(action)
}
maxBytes := rq.h.config.RequestMaxBytes
@@ -197,9 +145,8 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
// client either refuses is not looked up, and then the country lists; a
// request any of them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then
// come the rate limits, unless the client is in
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the request's path is exempt under
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that every other request is counted,
// and last the rule files. ctx is the request's own context.
// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, so that every other request is counted.
// ctx is the request's own context.
func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
cfg := rq.h.config
if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
@@ -220,37 +167,11 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
}
exempt := isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) ||
pathExempt(rq.in.URL, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
if !exempt && rq.limitBroken(now) {
if !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) && rq.limitBroken(now) {
return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
}
return rq.checkRules(now)
}
// pathExempt reports whether the rate limits leave out a request for u
// because of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its path as sent, the
// path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts with one of
// prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an app whose
// router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded path
// contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
// as one path segment, as Go's router does.
func pathExempt(u *url.URL, prefixes []string) bool {
decoded := u.Path
// EscapedPath is the path as the app receives it, not decoded.
sent := u.EscapedPath()
if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
return false
}
return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
})
return ""
}
// forward passes the request to the app and the app's answer back. ctx
@@ -261,9 +182,7 @@ func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
rq.cancel = cancel
ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
GotConn: rq.gotConn,
WroteRequest: rq.wroteRequest,
GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
})
out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
@@ -286,8 +205,7 @@ func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
}
// rewrite makes the request the app receives: the client's request,
// unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and
// the request's id set.
// unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers set.
func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
@@ -296,7 +214,6 @@ func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
// the query as the client sent it.
pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.line.RequestID)
}
// modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it
@@ -310,7 +227,6 @@ func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
// connection it takes over, not through rq.out.
rq.stopTimers()
rq.out.status = res.StatusCode
rq.line.Websocket = true
return nil
}
@@ -406,10 +322,6 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
line := &rq.line
line.Status = rq.out.status
line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
header := rq.out.Header()
line.ResponseContentType = header.Get("Content-Type")
line.CacheControl = header.Get("Cache-Control")
line.Location = header.Get("Location")
if rq.body != nil {
line.RequestBytes = rq.body.bytes.Load()
@@ -434,18 +346,12 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
now := time.Now()
duration := now.Sub(rq.start)
line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
var upstreamDuration time.Duration
if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
upstreamDuration = now.Sub(rq.upstreamStart)
line.DurationUpstreamTotal = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(upstreamDuration))
rq.mu.Lock()
line.DurationUpstreamConnect = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.connected)
line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.answerStarted)
rq.mu.Unlock()
line.DurationUpstreamTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(upstreamDuration)
}
// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
@@ -458,17 +364,6 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
}
}
// timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
// log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
// happened.
func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
if end.IsZero() {
return nil
}
return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
}
// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
// history.
func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
@@ -578,24 +473,6 @@ func (rq *request) bodyReceived() {
stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
}
// gotConn is called once there is a connection to the app, a new one or
// one kept open from an earlier request.
func (rq *request) gotConn(httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.connected = time.Now()
}
// gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer
// has arrived.
func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
rq.mu.Lock()
defer rq.mu.Unlock()
rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
}
// wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
// the request timeouts end and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT starts.
func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
internal/proxy/requestlog_test.go
-368
View File
@@ -1,368 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"io"
"maps"
"math"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
const (
// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
// instance is the SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
instance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
// limits count it as.
ipv6Client = "2001:db8::7"
ipv6Group = "2001:db8::/64"
)
func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
received := make(chan string, 2) // the request ids the app received
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
if r.URL.Path != "/full" {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "moved")
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
rateLimitExemptNets: localhost,
instanceName: instance,
logRequestHeaders: "Accept,x-custom,Authorization,cookie,SET-COOKIE",
})
// This request comes from ipv6Client through a trusted proxy, with a
// body and each header the log line looks at, and is answered with a
// redirect.
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /full HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
forwardedFor+": 198.51.100.7, "+ipv6Client+"\r\n"+
forwardedProto+": "+secure+"\r\n"+requestIDHeader+": from-traefik\r\n"+
"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n"+
"Accept: text/html\r\nX-Custom: one\r\nX-Custom: two\r\n"+
"Authorization: Bearer secret-token\r\nCookie: session=secret-cookie\r\n"+
"Set-Cookie: secret-set-cookie\r\n\r\na=b")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusFound)
// A request's log line can come after its answer: each is waited for
// before the next request, so that the lines are in order.
full := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
// This one comes from 127.0.0.1, which the rate limits do not count,
// with a body of 4 bytes whose length it does not announce, so that its
// request_bytes is not its content_length, and no header the log line
// looks at, and is answered with 204 and no header.
conn = dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "POST /bare HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusNoContent)
bare := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
wantFullLine(t, full)
wantBareLine(t, bare)
for _, line := range []logLine{full, bare} {
got := <-received
if got != line.RequestID {
t.Errorf("the app received request id %q, the log line has %q",
got, line.RequestID)
}
}
if strings.Contains(out.text(), "secret") {
t.Errorf("a value of Authorization, Cookie or Set-Cookie is logged:\n%s",
out.text())
}
}
// wantFullLine checks the log line of the request with every header the
// line looks at. Its timings are checked by TestTimingsAreInOrder.
func wantFullLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
t.Helper()
headers := map[string]string{"accept": "text/html", "x-custom": "one, two"}
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
ClientIP: ipv6Client, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: secure,
Host: appHost, Path: "/full", Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusFound, RequestBytes: 3, ResponseBytes: 5,
RequestID: "from-traefik", PeerIP: localhost,
ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + ipv6Client, ClientGroup: ipv6Group,
ContentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", ContentLength: 3,
RequestHeaders: headers, HasAuthorization: true, HasCookie: true,
ResponseContentType: "text/html", UpstreamStatus: http.StatusFound,
CacheControl: "no-store", Location: "/elsewhere",
Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
Counts: ratelimit.Counts{Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1},
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
}
}
// wantBareLine checks the log line of the request with none of them, and
// that the fields that do not apply to it are left out.
func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
t.Helper()
want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: plain,
Host: appHost, Path: "/bare", Protocol: protocol,
Status: http.StatusNoContent, RequestBytes: 4, RequestID: line.RequestID,
PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
UpstreamStatus: http.StatusNoContent, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
})
if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "" {
t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a request id", line.Line, want)
}
for _, name := range []string{
"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
"cache_control", "location", "counts",
} {
_, present := line.fields[name]
if present {
t.Errorf("log line has %s, which does not apply", name)
}
}
}
// withTimings returns want with the timings of line.
func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
want.DurationUpstreamConnect = line.DurationUpstreamConnect
want.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte
want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
return want
}
func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const hasAuthorization, hasCookie = "has_authorization", "has_cookie"
for _, tc := range []struct{ header, field, other string }{
{"Authorization", hasAuthorization, hasCookie},
{"Cookie", hasCookie, hasAuthorization},
} {
t.Run("only "+tc.header, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(tc.header, "secret")
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.requestLine(t)
_, otherPresent := line.fields[tc.other]
if line.fields[tc.field] != true || otherPresent {
t.Errorf("log line has %s %v and %s %v, want true and none",
tc.field, line.fields[tc.field], tc.other, line.fields[tc.other])
}
})
}
}
func TestRequestIDAndSchemeComeOnlyFromATrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const sentID = "from-traefik"
sent := http.Header{requestIDHeader: {sentID}, forwardedProto: {secure}}
trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
env map[string]string
header http.Header
// wantID is the request id logged, "" for a new one.
wantID, wantScheme string
}{
{"a trusted proxy's are kept", trusted, sent, sentID, secure},
{"without them, the id is new and the scheme http", trusted, nil, "", plain},
{"another peer's are replaced", nil, sent, "", plain},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
received := make(chan string, 2)
app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
// Two requests, so that two new ids can be told apart.
ids := make([]string, 0, 2)
for i := range 2 {
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
ids = append(ids, line.RequestID)
got := <-received
if line.RequestID != got || line.Scheme != tc.wantScheme {
t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q and scheme %q, and the "+
"app received id %q; want the same id and scheme %q",
line.RequestID, line.Scheme, got, tc.wantScheme)
}
}
switch {
case tc.wantID != "" && (ids[0] != tc.wantID || ids[1] != tc.wantID):
t.Errorf("request ids %q, want %q", ids, tc.wantID)
case tc.wantID == "" && (slices.Contains(ids, sentID) ||
slices.Contains(ids, "") || ids[0] == ids[1]):
t.Errorf("request ids %q, want two new ones", ids)
}
})
}
}
func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
// The pauses set the times apart; a hold-up of the test only
// lengthens them.
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "done")
})
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
denyNets: denied,
})
// Each log line is waited for before the next request, so that the
// lines are in order.
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
forwarded := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
refused := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
health := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2]
// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
"duration_upstream_total")
wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
if t.Failed() {
return
}
// In whole microseconds, as they are logged, so that the sum below is
// exact.
total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
connect := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamConnect)
firstByte := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamFirstByte)
upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
// The checks end before the request is handed to the app, and the
// connection comes before the answer, which the app ends after a
// pause.
if checks+upstream > total || connect >= firstByte || firstByte >= upstream {
t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, connect %d, "+
"first byte %d, upstream total %d", total, checks, connect, firstByte,
upstream)
}
if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
t.Errorf("refused request's checks took %v of %v milliseconds",
*refused.DurationChecks, refused.DurationTotal)
}
}
// wantTimings checks that the timings named are the only ones line has.
func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
var got []string
for name := range line.fields {
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "duration_") {
got = append(got, name)
}
}
slices.Sort(got)
slices.Sort(want)
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("log line of %s has timings %v, want %v", line.Path, got, want)
}
}
// microseconds is a timing in whole microseconds.
func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
}
func TestLogsAnUpgradedConnection(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
conn := dial(t, addr)
send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
_ = conn.Close()
line := out.requestLine(t)
if line.fields["websocket"] != true {
t.Errorf("log line has websocket %v, want true", line.fields["websocket"])
}
}
internal/proxy/rulefiles_test.go
-232
View File
@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
package proxy_test
import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"testing"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// testRules are the rules most tests here load: a block rule for
// /blocked and a ban rule for /.env.
const testRules = `
blocked path block ^/blocked$
probe path ban ^/\.env$
`
func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"+testRules),
banResponse: "429",
})
start := clk.Now()
// A log rule notes its match, and lets the request through.
line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted")
// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
// bans no one.
line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
// A ban rule refuses with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
// seven days, the default.
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want seven days on", line.BanExpires)
}
netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
want := bans.Ban{
Netblock: netblock,
Start: start,
Expires: start.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
Cause: bans.CauseAttack,
Notes: bans.Notes{
RuleID: "probe",
Target: "path",
Request: bans.Request{
Time: start,
Method: http.MethodGet,
Host: appHost,
Path: "/.env",
Status: http.StatusTooManyRequests,
UserAgent: userAgent,
},
// The four requests up to and including the probe.
Requests: 4,
},
}
got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
}
// The next request is refused under the ban, without being checked
// against the rules, and makes the ban permanent.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
attackBanDuration: "1h",
})
// The first probe bans for SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
}
// Once that ban has run out without a request, the client is served,
// and its next probe bans it for good.
clk.advance(time.Hour)
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
if line.BanExpires != permanent {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
}
}
func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
exempt = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
)
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
allowNets: allowed,
rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
line := s.request(allowed, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
// A probe over the rate limit breaks the limit before any rule sees
// it.
s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
wantRuleIDs(t, line)
limitBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
if len(limitBan) != 1 || limitBan[0].Cause != bans.CauseLimit {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want one for a broken limit", limitBan)
}
// A client the rate limits do not apply to is still checked.
s.get(exempt, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
}
func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
mode: observe,
})
line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "blocked")
line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
wantRuleIDs(t, line, "probe")
if line.BanExpires != "" {
t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want none", line.BanExpires)
}
// No ban was made.
line = s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantWouldAction(t, line, "")
if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", got)
}
}
func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
metricsToken: token,
})
s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="block",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="ban",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_rules_loaded", 2)
wantMetric(t, metrics,
`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack"}`, 1)
wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit"}`, 0)
wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans", 1)
}
// writeRules writes content as a rule file into a new directory, and
// returns the directory.
func writeRules(t *testing.T, content string) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "test.rules"), []byte(content), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write the rule file: %v", err)
}
return dir
}
// wantRuleIDs checks the request log line's rule_ids.
func wantRuleIDs(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
if !slices.Equal(line.RuleIDs, want) {
t.Errorf("log line has rule_ids %v, want %v", line.RuleIDs, want)
}
}
internal/proxy/rules.go
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
// checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
// now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
// action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
// and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. In enforce mode
// a ban rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack.
func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
for _, rule := range matched {
rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
}
if len(matched) == 0 {
return ""
}
// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
case rules.ActionBlock:
return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
case rules.ActionBan:
if !rq.h.config.Observe {
rq.banForAttack(now, last)
}
return requestlog.ActionBanned
default:
return ""
}
}
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go
+9 -22
View File
@@ -149,39 +149,26 @@ type Hit struct {
Requests float64
}
// Counts are a client's requests in the minute, the hour and the day that
// end at a request, that request included.
type Counts struct {
Minute float64 `json:"minute"`
Hour float64 `json:"hour"`
Day float64 `json:"day"`
}
// Count counts a request from client at now, in every window, whether or
// not it is refused, and returns the client's requests in each window. It
// reports whether the request takes the client over a limit, and the
// window whose limit it goes over, the shortest if it is over several.
func (l *Limiter) Count(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) (Counts, Hit, bool) {
// not it is refused. It reports whether the request takes the client over
// a limit, and the window whose limit it goes over, the shortest if it is
// over several.
func (l *Limiter) Count(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) (Hit, bool) {
l.mu.Lock()
defer l.mu.Unlock()
var (
requests [3]float64
hit Hit
)
var hit Hit
for i, b := range l.get(client).buckets() {
w := l.windows[i]
requests[i] = b.add(now, w.length)
if hit.Window == "" && w.limit > 0 && requests[i] > float64(w.limit) {
hit = Hit{Window: w.name, Limit: w.limit, Requests: requests[i]}
requests := b.add(now, w.length)
if hit.Window == "" && w.limit > 0 && requests > float64(w.limit) {
hit = Hit{Window: w.name, Limit: w.limit, Requests: requests}
}
}
counts := Counts{Minute: requests[0], Hour: requests[1], Day: requests[2]}
return counts, hit, hit.Window != ""
return hit, hit.Window != ""
}
// Reset sets client's counts in every window back to zero. Its history
internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go
+3 -26
View File
@@ -62,14 +62,14 @@ func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
start := midnight()
for range limit {
_, _, over := limiter.Count(client, start)
_, over := limiter.Count(client, start)
if over {
t.Fatal("a request within the limit is over it")
}
}
// Over both limits; the minute's is named, with the four requests.
_, hit, over := limiter.Count(client, start)
hit, over := limiter.Count(client, start)
want := ratelimit.Hit{Window: minute, Limit: limit, Requests: limit + 1}
if !over || hit != want {
@@ -78,29 +78,6 @@ func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
start := midnight()
for range 3 {
limiter.Count(client, start)
}
// A quarter into the next hour, the minute has only this request. The
// hour still covers three quarters of the bucket before, with its three
// requests, which count 2.25, and this one: 3.25. The day covers all
// four.
counts, _, _ := limiter.Count(client, start.Add(time.Hour+time.Hour/4))
want := ratelimit.Counts{Minute: 1, Hour: 3.25, Day: 4}
if counts != want {
t.Errorf("counts %+v, want %+v", counts, want)
}
}
func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -261,7 +238,7 @@ func wantCount(
) {
t.Helper()
_, hit, _ := limiter.Count(client, now)
hit, _ := limiter.Count(client, now)
if hit.Window != want {
t.Errorf("request from %s at %s is over %q, want %q",
client, now.Format(time.RFC3339), hit.Window, want)
internal/remotelog/remotelog.go
+296
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
// Package remotelog sends the lines smallwebwaf writes on stdout to the
// remote log endpoint, SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
// of SPEC.md describes: each line as the message of an RFC 5424 syslog
// record, over UDP, TCP or TLS. Lines wait in a bounded buffer, so a slow
// or unreachable endpoint never holds up a request or stdout.
package remotelog
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
// The forms of SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
const (
SchemeUDP = "syslog+udp"
SchemeTCP = "syslog+tcp"
SchemeTLS = "syslog+tls"
)
// A record's priority is the number of its facility times the number of
// severities there are, plus the number of its severity. Every record's
// severity is informational.
const (
severities = 8
informational = 6
)
const (
// dialTimeout bounds connecting to the endpoint, the TLS handshake
// included.
dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
// After a failed attempt to connect, the next is made a second later,
// and retryDelayFactor times as long after each further failure in a
// row, up to a minute.
firstRetryDelay = time.Second
retryDelayFactor = 2
maxRetryDelay = time.Minute
)
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
// URL is the endpoint (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
// SchemeTLS, a host and a port.
URL *url.URL
// RootCAs are the certificates a SchemeTLS endpoint's certificate
// must chain to (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
// Buffer is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
Buffer int
// Facility is the number of the records' syslog facility
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
Facility int
AppName string
}
// Sender sends lines to the endpoint. Write puts them in its buffer, and
// Run sends them from there.
type Sender struct {
url *url.URL
tlsConfig *tls.Config
// beforeTime and afterTime are the parts of every record's header
// before and after its time, as RFC 5424 lays the header out.
beforeTime string
afterTime string
// records is the buffer: each line's record, framed to be sent.
records chan []byte
sent atomic.Int64
dropped atomic.Int64
}
// New returns a Sender for the endpoint params.URL.
func New(params Params) *Sender {
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil || hostname == "" {
hostname = "-" // RFC 5424's value for a field that has none
}
priority := params.Facility*severities + informational
return &Sender{
url: params.URL,
tlsConfig: &tls.Config{
RootCAs: params.RootCAs,
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
},
// The 1 is the version of the format. The process id, the message
// id and the structured data have no value.
beforeTime: "<" + strconv.Itoa(priority) + ">1 ",
afterTime: " " + hostname + " " + params.AppName + " - - - ",
records: make(chan []byte, params.Buffer),
}
}
// Write puts each line in p in the buffer, as the message of a record of
// its own, and never waits: when the buffer is full, the oldest record in
// it is dropped to make room. It is safe for concurrent use.
func (s *Sender) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
at := requestlog.FormatTime(time.Now())
for line := range bytes.Lines(p) {
line = bytes.TrimSuffix(line, []byte("\n"))
if len(line) > 0 {
s.put(s.record(at, line))
}
}
return len(p), nil
}
// Sent is how many records have been sent.
func (s *Sender) Sent() int64 {
return s.sent.Load()
}
// Dropped is how many records were dropped: the oldest in a full buffer,
// and those whose sending failed.
func (s *Sender) Dropped() int64 {
return s.dropped.Load()
}
// Depth is how many records are in the buffer.
func (s *Sender) Depth() int {
return len(s.records)
}
// Run connects to the endpoint and sends each record as it comes into the
// buffer, until ctx is done. Then it sends the records still in the buffer,
// on the connection open at that time or, if there is none, on a new one,
// until none is left or one fails, and returns. How long it may take over
// that is for the caller to bound.
//
// A connection on which a record fails is closed, the record dropped, and
// a new one made at once. A failed attempt to connect is logged to
// processLog and followed by the next after firstRetryDelay,
// retryDelayFactor times as long after each further failure in a row up
// to maxRetryDelay. Meanwhile the records wait in the buffer.
func (s *Sender) Run(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) {
conn := s.send(ctx, processLog)
if conn == nil && len(s.records) > 0 {
conn, _ = s.dial(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
}
if conn == nil {
return
}
defer func() {
_ = conn.Close()
}()
for {
select {
case record := <-s.records:
if s.write(conn, record) != nil {
return
}
default:
return
}
}
}
// record returns line as an RFC 5424 record made at the time at, framed
// for the endpoint: on its own over UDP, since each datagram holds one,
// and over TCP and TLS after its length in bytes and a space, the
// octet-counted framing of RFC 6587 and RFC 5425.
func (s *Sender) record(at string, line []byte) []byte {
record := make([]byte, 0, len(s.beforeTime)+len(at)+len(s.afterTime)+len(line))
record = append(record, s.beforeTime...)
record = append(record, at...)
record = append(record, s.afterTime...)
record = append(record, line...)
if s.url.Scheme == SchemeUDP {
return record
}
return append([]byte(strconv.Itoa(len(record))+" "), record...)
}
// put adds record to the buffer, first dropping the oldest record in it
// while it is full.
func (s *Sender) put(record []byte) {
for {
select {
case s.records <- record:
return
default:
}
select {
case <-s.records:
s.dropped.Add(1)
default:
}
}
}
// send connects to the endpoint and sends each record as it comes into
// the buffer, until ctx is done, and returns the connection then open, or
// nil.
func (s *Sender) send(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) net.Conn {
delay := firstRetryDelay
for {
conn, err := s.dial(ctx)
switch {
case ctx.Err() != nil:
return conn
case err != nil:
processLog.Warn("connecting to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
"error", err.Error(), "connecting_again_in", delay.String())
select {
case <-time.After(delay):
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil
}
delay = min(retryDelayFactor*delay, maxRetryDelay)
continue
}
delay = firstRetryDelay
err = s.sendOn(ctx, conn)
if err == nil {
return conn
}
_ = conn.Close()
}
}
// sendOn sends each record on conn as it comes into the buffer, until one
// fails, whose error it returns, or ctx is done.
func (s *Sender) sendOn(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn) error {
for {
select {
case record := <-s.records:
err := s.write(conn, record)
if err != nil {
return err
}
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil
}
}
}
// write sends record on conn, and counts it as sent or, if that fails,
// as dropped.
func (s *Sender) write(conn net.Conn, record []byte) error {
_, err := conn.Write(record)
if err != nil {
s.dropped.Add(1)
return fmt.Errorf("send a record: %w", err)
}
s.sent.Add(1)
return nil
}
// dial connects to the endpoint.
func (s *Sender) dial(ctx context.Context) (net.Conn, error) {
dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: dialTimeout}
switch s.url.Scheme {
case SchemeUDP:
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, "udp", s.url.Host)
case SchemeTLS:
tlsDialer := &tls.Dialer{NetDialer: dialer, Config: s.tlsConfig}
return tlsDialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", s.url.Host)
default:
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", s.url.Host)
}
}
internal/remotelog/remotelog_test.go
+458
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
package remotelog_test
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/url"
"os"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
)
// The tests run in a synctest bubble, where the time package runs on a
// clock of the test's own, which starts at 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z: a wait
// lasts exactly as long as it should, however slowly the test process
// runs, and synctest.Wait returns once the sender has done all it can
// before time passes. The endpoint is a listener on the loopback address.
// A test reads from it only once the records are on their way, and checks
// the sender's counts first, since a goroutine of the bubble that waits on
// the network keeps that clock from moving on.
const (
// started is the time a record made as a test starts gives.
started = "2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
appName = "fsn1app1/gitea"
// local0 is the number of the default facility, and local0Info the
// priority of its records.
local0 = 16
local0Info = "<134>"
// loopback is where the endpoints listen.
loopback = "127.0.0.1:0"
)
func TestRecordsOverUDPGoOnePerDatagram(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", loopback)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = endpoint.Close() })
sender, _, _ := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeUDP, endpoint.LocalAddr()))
_, _ = sender.Write([]byte(`{"type":"request"}` + "\n" + `{"type":"process"}` + "\n"))
synctest.Wait()
wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
for _, line := range []string{`{"type":"request"}`, `{"type":"process"}`} {
datagram := make([]byte, 1024)
n, _, err := endpoint.ReadFrom(datagram)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
}
want := record(t, local0Info, appName, line)
if string(datagram[:n]) != want {
t.Errorf("datagram %q, want %q", datagram[:n], want)
}
}
})
}
func TestRecordsOverTCPAreOctetCountedWithTheirFacility(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
endpoint := listen(t, loopback)
endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, endpoint.Addr())
endpointParams.Facility = 19 // local3
endpointParams.AppName = "gitea"
sender, _, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("first\nsecond\n"))
synctest.Wait()
wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
frames := bufio.NewReader(accept(t, endpoint))
wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "gitea", "first"))
wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "gitea", "second"))
})
}
func TestStalledEndpointHoldsUpNoWriteAndOldestRecordsAreDropped(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
certificate, roots := testCertificate(t)
endpoint := listen(t, loopback)
endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTLS, endpoint.Addr())
endpointParams.RootCAs = roots
endpointParams.Buffer = 3
sender, _, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
// The sender connects, and its TLS handshake waits for an answer
// the endpoint does not give yet.
conn := accept(t, endpoint)
var stdout bytes.Buffer
out := io.MultiWriter(&stdout, sender)
for i := range 5 {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "line %d\n", i+1)
}
if stdout.String() != "line 1\nline 2\nline 3\nline 4\nline 5\n" {
t.Errorf("stdout has %q", stdout.String())
}
wantCounts(t, sender, 0, 2, 3)
// Once the endpoint answers, the three newest records are sent.
server := tls.Server(conn, &tls.Config{
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{certificate},
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
})
err := server.HandshakeContext(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("handshake: %v", err)
}
synctest.Wait()
wantCounts(t, sender, 3, 2, 0)
frames := bufio.NewReader(server)
for _, line := range []string{"line 3", "line 4", "line 5"} {
wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, local0Info, appName, line))
}
})
}
func TestReconnectsWithBackoffAfterTheEndpointGoesAway(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
endpoint := listen(t, loopback)
addr := endpoint.Addr()
sender, logged, _ := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, addr))
_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("one\n"))
synctest.Wait()
wantCounts(t, sender, 1, 0, 0)
conn := accept(t, endpoint)
wantFrame(t, bufio.NewReader(conn), record(t, local0Info, appName, "one"))
// The endpoint goes away. The sender notices when a record fails,
// and tries to connect again at once, then a second later, then two
// seconds after that.
_ = conn.Close()
_ = endpoint.Close()
writeUntilDropped(t, sender, 1)
sent := sender.Sent()
_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("two\n"))
time.Sleep(time.Second)
synctest.Wait()
endpoint = listen(t, addr.String())
time.Sleep(2*time.Second - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantCounts(t, sender, sent, 1, 1)
// The endpoint is back, and the record waiting is sent.
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantCounts(t, sender, sent+1, 1, 0)
conn = accept(t, endpoint)
wantFrame(t, bufio.NewReader(conn), record(t, local0Info, appName, "two"))
wantRetries(t, logged, "1s", "2s")
// Having connected, the sender waits a second again after the
// next failure.
_ = conn.Close()
_ = endpoint.Close()
writeUntilDropped(t, sender, 2)
wantRetries(t, logged, "1s", "2s", "1s")
})
}
func TestRecordsWaitingAtTheStopAreSent(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
// Nothing listens at addr when the sender starts: it fails to
// connect, and waits a second to try again.
endpoint := listen(t, loopback)
addr := endpoint.Addr()
_ = endpoint.Close()
sender, logged, stop := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, addr))
synctest.Wait()
wantRetries(t, logged, "1s")
_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("one\ntwo\n"))
endpoint = listen(t, addr.String())
// Stopped before that second is over, it connects to send them.
stop()
wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
frames := bufio.NewReader(accept(t, endpoint))
wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, local0Info, appName, "one"))
wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, local0Info, appName, "two"))
})
}
// output collects what the sender logs.
type output struct {
mu sync.Mutex
buf bytes.Buffer
}
// Write adds lines the sender logs.
func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
return o.buf.Write(p)
}
// text returns everything logged so far.
func (o *output) text() string {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
return o.buf.String()
}
// params returns the settings of a Sender for the endpoint at addr, in
// the form scheme names: room for ten lines, the default facility, and
// appName.
func params(scheme string, addr net.Addr) remotelog.Params {
return remotelog.Params{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: scheme, Host: addr.String()},
Buffer: 10,
Facility: local0,
AppName: appName,
}
}
// run runs a Sender with settings until the test ends or the function
// it returns is called, which waits for Run to return. It returns the
// Sender, and what it logs.
func run(t *testing.T, settings remotelog.Params) (*remotelog.Sender, *output, func()) {
t.Helper()
sender := remotelog.New(settings)
logged := &output{}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
ran := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
sender.Run(ctx, slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(logged, nil)))
close(ran)
}()
stop := func() {
cancel()
<-ran
}
t.Cleanup(stop)
return sender, logged, stop
}
// listen returns a TCP listener at addr, closed when the test ends.
func listen(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Listener {
t.Helper()
listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = listener.Close() })
return listener
}
// accept returns the next connection to listener, closed when the test
// ends.
func accept(t *testing.T, listener net.Listener) net.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("accept: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
return conn
}
// record returns the record of line made as the test started, with the
// priority and the app name given.
func record(t *testing.T, priority, app, line string) string {
t.Helper()
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil || hostname == "" {
hostname = "-"
}
return priority + "1 " + started + " " + hostname + " " + app + " - - - " + line
}
// wantFrame reads the next octet-counted frame from frames, and checks
// that it holds want.
func wantFrame(t *testing.T, frames *bufio.Reader, want string) {
t.Helper()
count, err := frames.ReadString(' ')
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read a frame's length: %v", err)
}
length, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSuffix(count, " "))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("frame starts %q, not with its length", count)
}
got := make([]byte, length)
_, err = io.ReadFull(frames, got)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read a frame: %v", err)
}
if string(got) != want {
t.Errorf("frame %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
// wantCounts checks the records sender has sent, dropped and holds in
// its buffer.
func wantCounts(
t *testing.T, sender *remotelog.Sender, sent, dropped int64, depth int,
) {
t.Helper()
if sender.Sent() != sent || sender.Dropped() != dropped || sender.Depth() != depth {
t.Fatalf("sent %d, dropped %d, %d in the buffer; want %d, %d and %d",
sender.Sent(), sender.Dropped(), sender.Depth(), sent, dropped, depth)
}
}
// writeUntilDropped writes a line at a time until the count of records
// sender has dropped reaches dropped. The records it sends on a
// connection the endpoint has closed are lost before one fails; how many
// depends on when the endpoint's host answers that the connection is
// gone.
func writeUntilDropped(t *testing.T, sender *remotelog.Sender, dropped int64) {
t.Helper()
for sender.Dropped() < dropped {
_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("lost\n"))
synctest.Wait()
}
}
// wantRetries checks that the sender logged a failed attempt to connect
// for each of delays, the time until the next attempt, in order, and
// logged nothing else.
func wantRetries(t *testing.T, logged *output, delays ...string) {
t.Helper()
var got []string
for line := range strings.Lines(logged.text()) {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "connecting to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
t.Fatalf("logged %q", line)
}
delay, _ := fields["connecting_again_in"].(string)
got = append(got, delay)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, delays) {
t.Errorf("logged failures to connect again in %v, want %v", got, delays)
}
}
// testCertificate returns a certificate for 127.0.0.1 that is its own
// CA, and a pool that holds it.
func testCertificate(t *testing.T) (tls.Certificate, *x509.CertPool) {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate a key: %v", err)
}
template := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "smallwebwaf test CA"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
IsCA: true,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
IPAddresses: []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template,
&key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create a certificate: %v", err)
}
certificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse the certificate: %v", err)
}
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
roots.AddCert(certificate)
return tls.Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{der}, PrivateKey: key}, roots
}
internal/requestlog/requestlog.go
+11 -66
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import (
"io"
"log/slog"
"time"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
)
// The action a request line names: what smallwebwaf did with the
@@ -28,12 +26,8 @@ const (
// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
// or because it matched a ban rule, which bans the client.
// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client.
ActionBanned = "banned"
// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
// rule.
ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
// SWWAF_DENY_NETS.
ActionDenied = "denied"
@@ -51,74 +45,32 @@ const OffenceLimit = "limit"
// timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds.
const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
// Line is one request's line in the request log. The field names, and
// their order, are those of the "Request log" section of SPEC.md. A field
// that may not apply to a request is left out of its line when it does
// not.
// Line is one request's line in the request log. The field names are
// those of the "Request log" section of SPEC.md.
//
//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
type Line struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached
// smallwebwaf, or the trusted proxy in front of it.
Time string `json:"time"`
Instance string `json:"instance"`
ClientIP string `json:"client_ip"`
PeerIP string `json:"peer_ip"`
Country string `json:"country"`
Method string `json:"method"`
Scheme string `json:"scheme"`
Host string `json:"host"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Query string `json:"query"`
Protocol string `json:"protocol"`
Status int `json:"status"`
UpstreamStatus int `json:"upstream_status,omitempty"`
RequestBytes int64 `json:"request_bytes"`
ResponseBytes int64 `json:"response_bytes"`
Referer string `json:"referer"`
UserAgent string `json:"user_agent"`
// Request detail. RequestID is the X-Request-ID a trusted proxy sent,
// or a new one, and is sent on to the app. ForwardedFor is the
// X-Forwarded-For header as received. ClientGroup is the netblock the
// client is counted as.
RequestID string `json:"request_id"`
PeerIP string `json:"peer_ip"`
ForwardedFor string `json:"forwarded_for,omitempty"`
ClientGroup string `json:"client_group"`
Country string `json:"country"`
ContentType string `json:"content_type,omitempty"`
// ContentLength is the length of its body the request announced.
ContentLength int64 `json:"content_length,omitempty"`
// RequestHeaders are the headers SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS names that
// the request carried, by name in lower case.
RequestHeaders map[string]string `json:"request_headers,omitempty"`
HasAuthorization bool `json:"has_authorization,omitempty"`
HasCookie bool `json:"has_cookie,omitempty"`
// Websocket is true when the connection was upgraded, as for a
// WebSocket.
Websocket bool `json:"websocket,omitempty"`
// Response detail, from the headers of the answer: the app's, as
// passed on, or those of smallwebwaf's own. Aborted is true when the
// client went away early.
ResponseContentType string `json:"response_content_type,omitempty"`
UpstreamStatus int `json:"upstream_status,omitempty"`
CacheControl string `json:"cache_control,omitempty"`
Location string `json:"location,omitempty"`
Aborted bool `json:"aborted,omitempty"`
// The decision.
Action string `json:"action"`
// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited or
// ActionRuleBlocked.
// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied or ActionRateLimited.
WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
// Counts are the client's requests as the rate limits counted them
// with this one, for a request they counted.
Counts ratelimit.Counts `json:"counts,omitzero"`
// RuleIDs are the ids of the rule file rules the request matched.
RuleIDs []string `json:"rule_ids,omitempty"`
// LimitHit is the window whose rate limit the request went over:
// minute, hour or day.
LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
@@ -127,18 +79,11 @@ type Line struct {
// BanExpires is when the ban the request made, or was refused under,
// ends: a time, or "permanent".
BanExpires string `json:"ban_expires,omitempty"`
// The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the
// checks were done. DurationUpstreamConnect, DurationUpstreamFirstByte
// and DurationUpstreamTotal run from when the request was handed to the
// app: until there was a connection to it, until the first byte of its
// answer arrived, and until the end. Each but DurationTotal is nil for
// a request that did not get that far.
// Aborted is true when the client went away early.
Aborted bool `json:"aborted,omitempty"`
// DurationTotal and DurationUpstreamTotal are in milliseconds.
DurationTotal float64 `json:"duration_total"`
DurationChecks *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamConnect *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_connect,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamFirstByte *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_first_byte,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
}
// Write writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".
internal/requestlog/requestlog_test.go
+1 -5
View File
@@ -50,11 +50,7 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
}
unset := []string{
"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
"upstream_status", "cache_control", "location", "aborted", "counts",
"limit_hit", "offence", "ban_expires", "duration_checks",
"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
"upstream_status", "limit_hit", "offence", "ban_expires", "aborted",
"duration_upstream_total",
}
for _, name := range unset {
internal/rules/rules.go
-459
View File
@@ -1,459 +0,0 @@
// Package rules reads the rule files: the plain text files in
// SWWAF_RULES_DIR, one rule to a line, that each request is checked
// against, as the "Rule files" section of SPEC.md describes. They are read
// at start, and again once the directory has had no change for a short
// time after one is edited, added or removed.
package rules
import (
"context"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"
)
// The actions a rule takes when it matches.
const (
// ActionLog notes the match in the request log, and does nothing else.
ActionLog = "log"
// ActionBlock refuses the request with 403.
ActionBlock = "block"
// ActionBan refuses the request and bans the client's netblock: the
// request is a clear sign of attack.
ActionBan = "ban"
)
// extension ends the name of every rule file.
const extension = ".rules"
// quietTime is how long SWWAF_RULES_DIR must go without a change before
// the rule files are read again, so that a file still being written, such
// as one saved in place, appended to or copied in with scp, is read only
// once whole.
const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
// headerTarget starts the target that is one request header,
// header:<Name>.
const headerTarget = "header:"
// escapeLength is the length of a percent escape, such as %2e.
const escapeLength = 3
var (
// ruleLine is a rule: four fields separated by spaces or tabs, of
// which the fourth, the regex, runs to the end of the line.
ruleLine = regexp.MustCompile(`^([^ \t]+)[ \t]+([^ \t]+)[ \t]+([^ \t]+)[ \t]+(.+)$`)
// idChars are the characters of a rule's id.
idChars = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`)
)
var (
errNotRule = errors.New(
"is not a rule: an id, a target, an action and a regex, " +
"separated by spaces or tabs")
errNotID = errors.New("is not an id of letters, digits, - and _")
errNotTarget = errors.New(
"is not path, query, uri, method, host, user_agent, referer or header:<Name>")
errHeaderTakenOut = errors.New(
"names a header that Go's HTTP server takes out of every request, " +
"so a rule never sees it")
errNotAction = errors.New("is not log, block or ban")
errNotRegex = errors.New("does not compile")
errUsedTwice = errors.New("is already the id of the rule at")
)
// Rule is one rule of a rule file.
type Rule struct {
// ID names the rule in the request log, the metrics and ban notes.
ID string
// Target is what the regex is matched against, such as path or
// header:Accept.
Target string
// Action is ActionLog, ActionBlock or ActionBan.
Action string
regex *regexp.Regexp
}
// Params are what Load needs.
type Params struct {
// Dir is the directory of the rule files (SWWAF_RULES_DIR).
Dir string
// Enabled is SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED: while it is false, no file is read
// and no rule loaded.
Enabled bool
// ProcessLog receives how many rules were read, and the error in a
// rule file edited while smallwebwaf runs.
ProcessLog *slog.Logger
}
// Files are the rule files of a running smallwebwaf, and the rules read
// from them. They are safe for concurrent use.
type Files struct {
params Params
// rules are the rules loaded, in the order of their files' names, and
// then of their lines.
rules atomic.Pointer[[]Rule]
}
// Load reads the rules of every *.rules file in Dir, in the order of the
// files' names, unless Enabled is false. A Dir that cannot be read is an
// error, and so is a line that is not a rule, a rule for the Host or the
// Transfer-Encoding header, which Go's HTTP server takes out of every
// request, a regex that does not compile and an id used twice, each named
// with its file and line.
func Load(params Params) (*Files, error) {
f := &Files{params: params}
f.rules.Store(&[]Rule{})
if !params.Enabled {
return f, nil
}
rules, err := read(params.Dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
f.rules.Store(&rules)
f.logRead(len(rules))
return f, nil
}
// Match checks r against the rules, in order, and returns those it
// matches, up to the first whose action refuses it, block or ban, which
// is then the last one returned.
func (f *Files) Match(r *http.Request) []Rule {
var matched []Rule
for _, rule := range *f.rules.Load() {
if !rule.matches(r) {
continue
}
matched = append(matched, rule)
if rule.Action != ActionLog {
break
}
}
return matched
}
// Len returns how many rules are loaded.
func (f *Files) Len() int {
return len(*f.rules.Load())
}
// Watch watches Dir until ctx is done, and reads the rule files again
// once Dir has had no change for quietTime, after one is edited, added or
// removed, and after Watch starts watching. If they then hold an error,
// the rules stay as they were, the error is logged with its file and
// line, and the files are read again after the next change. If Dir cannot
// be watched, that is logged, and the rules stay as they were loaded.
// While Enabled is false, Watch returns at once.
func (f *Files) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
if !f.params.Enabled {
return
}
watcher, err := fsnotify.NewWatcher()
if err == nil {
defer func() {
_ = watcher.Close()
}()
err = watcher.Add(f.params.Dir)
}
if err != nil {
f.params.ProcessLog.Error("cannot watch the rule files for edits",
"error", err.Error())
return
}
f.params.ProcessLog.Info("watching the rule files for edits",
"directory", f.params.Dir)
f.readAfterChanges(ctx, watcher.Events, watcher.Errors)
}
// readAfterChanges reads the rule files again once quietTime has passed
// without a change from events, until ctx is done, and logs the errors
// from errs. The wait starts at once, as if for a change, so that an edit
// saved after Load read the files, and before Dir was watched, is taken
// in too.
func (f *Files) readAfterChanges(
ctx context.Context, events <-chan fsnotify.Event, errs <-chan error,
) {
quiet := time.NewTimer(quietTime)
defer quiet.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-events:
quiet.Reset(quietTime)
case <-quiet.C:
f.readAgain()
case err := <-errs:
f.params.ProcessLog.Warn("watching the rule files failed",
"error", err.Error())
}
}
}
// readAgain reads the rule files again, in place of the rules loaded, or
// logs the error that keeps the rules as they were.
func (f *Files) readAgain() {
rules, err := read(f.params.Dir)
if err != nil {
f.params.ProcessLog.Error(
"a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were",
"error", err.Error())
return
}
f.rules.Store(&rules)
f.logRead(len(rules))
}
// logRead logs that the rule files were read, and how many rules they
// hold, which can be none.
func (f *Files) logRead(count int) {
f.params.ProcessLog.Info("read the rule files",
"directory", f.params.Dir, "rules", count)
}
// read returns the rules of every rule file in dir, in the order of the
// files' names, and then of their lines. A file whose name starts with a
// dot, such as an editor's lock file .#50-app.rules, is not a rule file,
// as a shell's *.rules would not match it.
func read(dir string) ([]Rule, error) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: %w", err)
}
var rules []Rule
// places are where each id is, as "<file>, line <n>".
places := map[string]string{}
for _, entry := range entries {
name := entry.Name()
if entry.IsDir() || strings.HasPrefix(name, ".") || filepath.Ext(name) != extension {
continue
}
rules, err = readFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), rules, places)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return rules, nil
}
// readFile appends the rules of the rule file at path to rules. places
// are where each id read so far is, and gain those of the file.
func readFile(path string, rules []Rule, places map[string]string) ([]Rule, error) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
number := 0
for line := range strings.Lines(string(data)) {
number++
place := fmt.Sprintf("%s, line %d", path, number)
text := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), "\r")
rule, isRule, err := parse(text)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", place, err)
}
if !isRule {
continue
}
first, used := places[rule.ID]
if used {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: the id %q %w %s", place, rule.ID, errUsedTwice, first)
}
places[rule.ID] = place
rules = append(rules, rule)
}
return rules, nil
}
// parse reads a line of a rule file. It returns false for a blank line
// and for a comment, a line that starts with #.
func parse(line string) (Rule, bool, error) {
line = strings.TrimLeft(line, " \t")
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
return Rule{}, false, nil
}
fields := ruleLine.FindStringSubmatch(line)
if fields == nil {
return Rule{}, false, errNotRule
}
rule := Rule{ID: fields[1], Target: fields[2], Action: fields[3]}
switch {
case !idChars.MatchString(rule.ID):
return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the id %q %w", rule.ID, errNotID)
case !isTarget(rule.Target):
return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the target %q %w", rule.Target, errNotTarget)
case strings.EqualFold(rule.Target, headerTarget+"Host"):
return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
"the target %q %w; the request's host is the target host",
rule.Target, errHeaderTakenOut)
case strings.EqualFold(rule.Target, headerTarget+"Transfer-Encoding"):
return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the target %q %w", rule.Target, errHeaderTakenOut)
case !slices.Contains([]string{ActionLog, ActionBlock, ActionBan}, rule.Action):
return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the action %q %w", rule.Action, errNotAction)
}
regex, err := regexp.Compile(fields[4])
if err != nil {
return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the regex %w: %w", errNotRegex, err)
}
rule.regex = regex
return rule, true, nil
}
// isTarget reports whether target is one a rule may have.
func isTarget(target string) bool {
switch target {
case "path", "query", "uri", "method", "host", "user_agent", "referer":
return true
}
name, isHeader := strings.CutPrefix(target, headerTarget)
return isHeader && name != ""
}
// matches reports whether the rule's regex matches its target in r. For
// uri it is matched against the path and query as received, and against
// them once percent-decoded, so that an encoded probe cannot slip past.
func (rule Rule) matches(r *http.Request) bool {
if rule.Target == "uri" {
uri := pathAndQuery(r)
return rule.regex.MatchString(uri) || rule.regex.MatchString(decodeOnce(uri))
}
return rule.regex.MatchString(value(rule.Target, r))
}
// value returns what a rule with target, other than uri, is matched
// against in r: the path and the query as the client sent them, before
// any decoding or re-encoding, split at the first ?, and a header's values
// joined by ", ", as HTTP joins those of a header sent more than once.
func value(target string, r *http.Request) string {
switch target {
case "path":
path, _, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
return path
case "query":
_, query, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
return query
case "method":
return r.Method
case "host":
return r.Host
case "user_agent":
return header(r, "User-Agent")
case "referer":
return header(r, "Referer")
default:
return header(r, strings.TrimPrefix(target, headerTarget))
}
}
// pathAndQuery returns the target of r's request line, r.RequestURI, as
// the client sent it, less any scheme and host: a target with a scheme
// gives what follows the scheme and its :, and the host when // follows.
// So http://host/path, as a client sends it to a proxy, gives /path, and
// so does http:/path, which Go reads as a target with a scheme and no
// host. r.URL is not used: when the path holds a character it escapes,
// such as \ or a non-ASCII byte, it decodes the whole path and escapes it
// again, so that \ becomes %5C and %2e a dot.
func pathAndQuery(r *http.Request) string {
if !r.URL.IsAbs() {
return r.RequestURI
}
_, afterScheme, _ := strings.Cut(r.RequestURI, ":")
hostAndRest, hasHost := strings.CutPrefix(afterScheme, "//")
if !hasHost {
return afterScheme
}
start := strings.IndexAny(hostAndRest, "/?")
if start < 0 {
return ""
}
return hostAndRest[start:]
}
// header returns the values of r's header name joined by ", ", or "" if
// r has no such header.
func header(r *http.Request, name string) string {
return strings.Join(r.Header.Values(name), ", ")
}
// decodeOnce returns s with each percent escape, such as %2e, replaced by
// the byte it stands for. A % that is not followed by two hex digits is
// left as it is, so that a malformed escape cannot keep the rest of s
// from being decoded.
func decodeOnce(s string) string {
var decoded strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
if s[i] == '%' && i+escapeLength <= len(s) {
b, err := hex.DecodeString(s[i+1 : i+escapeLength])
if err == nil {
decoded.Write(b)
i += escapeLength - 1
continue
}
}
decoded.WriteByte(s[i])
}
return decoded.String()
}
internal/rules/rules_test.go
-633
View File
@@ -1,633 +0,0 @@
package rules_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strconv"
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
)
const (
// What the process log says once Watch watches the directory, after
// each reading of the rule files, and for one that has an error.
watching = "watching the rule files for edits"
read = "read the rule files"
hasError = "a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were"
// maxLogLines is how many lines of the process log wait for a test to
// read them.
maxLogLines = 64
// browser is the user agent of an ordinary visitor.
browser = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0"
// testFile is the rule file of a test that needs only one, and
// firstFile the first of a test's rule files.
testFile = "test.rules"
firstFile = "00-a.rules"
// userAgent is the header that carries the user agent.
userAgent = "User-Agent"
)
func TestEachTargetMatchesWhatItNames(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
rule string // its target, action and regex
uri string // the request's path and query
header http.Header
want bool
}{
{"path as received", `path log ^/%2eenv$`, "/%2eenv", nil, true},
{"path not decoded", `path log ^/\.env$`, "/%2eenv", nil, false},
{"path without the query", `path log ^/a$`, "/a?b=c", nil, true},
{"query as received", `query log ^b=%2e$`, "/a?b=%2e", nil, true},
{"uri as received", `uri log ^/a\?b=%2e$`, "/a?b=%2e", nil, true},
{"uri decoded", `uri log (\.\./){2}`, "/a?f=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f", nil, true},
{
"uri decoded past malformed escapes", `uri log (\.\./){2}&h=%$`,
"/a?g=%zz&f=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f&h=%", nil, true,
},
{"uri decoded only once", `uri log ^/a\.b$`, "/a%252eb", nil, false},
{"method", `method log ^PUT$`, "/", nil, true},
{"host", `host log ^app\.example$`, "/", nil, true},
{
"user_agent", `user_agent log ^sqlmap/`, "/",
http.Header{userAgent: {"sqlmap/1.8"}}, true,
},
{
"user_agent sent twice", `user_agent log ^curl/8, sqlmap/`, "/",
http.Header{userAgent: {"curl/8", "sqlmap/1.8"}}, true,
},
{"user_agent missing", `user_agent log ^$`, "/", nil, true},
{
"referer", `referer log ^https://spam\.example/`, "/",
http.Header{"Referer": {"https://spam.example/buy"}}, true,
},
{
"a header sent twice", `header:x-api-version log ^2, 3$`, "/",
http.Header{"X-Api-Version": {"2", "3"}}, true,
},
{"a header missing", `header:X-Api-Version log ^$`, "/", nil, true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "a-rule " + tc.rule + "\n"})
// Every request is a PUT, which the method rule looks for.
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPut,
"http://app.example"+tc.uri, nil)
maps.Copy(r.Header, tc.header)
got := len(files.Match(r)) == 1
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("%s matches %s: %t, want %t", tc.rule, tc.uri, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestPathMatchedAsTheClientSentIt(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Each path holds a character Go's URL type would escape again, \ or
// a non-ASCII byte, and each rule is written for the path as sent.
for _, tc := range []struct {
rule string // its target, action and regex
sent string // the path and query the client sent
}{
{`path log ^/\.\.\\\.\.\\windows\\win\.ini$`, `/..\..\windows\win.ini`},
{`path log ^/%2e%2e\\%2e%2e\\windows\\win\.ini$`, `/%2e%2e\%2e%2e\windows\win.ini`},
{`path log ^/café$`, "/café?x=1"},
{`uri log ^/%2e%2e\\%2e%2e\\boot\.ini\?x=1$`, `/%2e%2e\%2e%2e\boot.ini?x=1`},
} {
files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "as-sent " + tc.rule + "\n"})
// The target in origin form, as traefik sends it, in absolute form,
// as a client sends it to a proxy, and with a scheme but no host,
// which Go reads as absolute form with no host, sending the app
// the path.
for _, target := range []string{
tc.sent, "http://app.example" + tc.sent, "http:" + tc.sent, "foo:" + tc.sent,
} {
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil)
wantMatched(t, files, r, "as-sent")
}
}
}
func TestMatchingStopsAtTheFirstRuleThatRefuses(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: `
every-path path log ^/
no-path path log ^$
first-refusal path block ^/probe
later-ban path ban ^/probe
after path log ^/
`})
// Every log rule that matches is noted, and the block rule ends the
// matching.
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/probe"), "every-path", "first-refusal")
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/page"), "every-path", "after")
// A ban rule ends it too.
files = load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "ban path ban ^/\nlater path block ^/\n"})
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/"), "ban")
}
func TestFilesReadInNameOrderThenLineOrder(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
files := load(t, ruleFiles{
"50-b.rules": "b1 path log ^/\n\n# a comment\n # an indented one\nb2 path log ^/\n",
firstFile: "a1 path log ^/\r\n",
// None is a rule file.
"notes.txt": "notes, not rules\n",
"10-c.rules.bak": "an old copy\n",
"20-d.rules/keep": "a file in a directory\n",
})
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/"), "a1", "b1", "b2")
if files.Len() != 3 {
t.Errorf("%d rules loaded, want 3", files.Len())
}
}
func TestFileWhoseNameStartsWithADotIsNotARuleFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{firstFile: "probe path block ^/probe\n"})
// The lock file Emacs makes beside a file while it is edited: a link to
// nothing, which cannot be read.
err := os.Symlink("user@host.1234:1700000000", filepath.Join(dir, ".#"+firstFile))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
}
params, _ := newParams(dir)
files, err := rules.Load(params)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/probe"), "probe")
}
func TestFaultStopsTheStartNamingTheFileAndLine(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
content string
line int
want string
}{
{
"too few fields", "env-file path ban\n", 1,
"is not a rule: an id, a target, an action and a regex, " +
"separated by spaces or tabs",
},
{
"an id of other characters", "# ids\n\nenv.file path ban ^/\n", 3,
`the id "env.file" is not an id of letters, digits, - and _`,
},
{
"an unknown target", "env-file paths ban ^/\n", 1,
`the target "paths" is not path, query, uri, method, host, ` +
"user_agent, referer or header:<Name>",
},
{
"a header without a name", "env-file header: ban ^/\n", 1,
`the target "header:" is not path, query, uri, method, host, ` +
"user_agent, referer or header:<Name>",
},
{
"the Host header", "host-header header:host block ^$\n", 1,
`the target "header:host" names a header that Go's HTTP server ` +
"takes out of every request, so a rule never sees it; " +
"the request's host is the target host",
},
{
"the Transfer-Encoding header",
"# bodies sent in chunks\nchunked header:Transfer-Encoding block ^chunked$\n", 2,
`the target "header:Transfer-Encoding" names a header that Go's ` +
"HTTP server takes out of every request, so a rule never sees it",
},
{
"an unknown action", "env-file path deny ^/\n", 1,
`the action "deny" is not log, block or ban`,
},
{
"a regex that does not compile", "env-file path ban ^/(\n", 1,
"the regex does not compile: error parsing regexp: " +
"missing closing ): `^/(`",
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{"00-default.rules": tc.content})
path := filepath.Join(dir, "00-default.rules")
wantRefused(t, dir, path+", line "+strconv.Itoa(tc.line)+": "+tc.want)
})
}
}
func TestIDUsedTwiceStopsTheStartNamingBothPlaces(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{
"00-a.rules": "probe path log ^/a\n",
"50-b.rules": "other path log ^/b\nprobe path ban ^/c\n",
})
wantRefused(t, dir, filepath.Join(dir, "50-b.rules")+`, line 2: the id "probe" `+
"is already the id of the rule at "+filepath.Join(dir, "00-a.rules")+", line 1")
}
func TestDirectoryThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
wantRefused(t, dir, "SWWAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
": no such file or directory")
}
func TestEmptyDirectoryLoadsNoRulesAndSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
params, lines := newParams(writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{"00-default.rules": "# none\n"}))
files, err := rules.Load(params)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
line := lines.waitFor(t, read)
if files.Len() != 0 || line["rules"] != 0.0 {
t.Errorf("%d rules loaded, and the log says %v, want none", files.Len(), line)
}
}
func TestRuleFilesOffReadNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// SWWAF_RULES_DIR does not exist, which would stop the start.
params, _ := newParams(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d"))
params.Enabled = false
files, err := rules.Load(params)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
if files.Len() != 0 || files.Match(get(t, "/")) != nil {
t.Errorf("%d rules loaded with the rule files off", files.Len())
}
// It would watch until the test ends.
files.Watch(t.Context())
}
func TestEditsTakenInWhileRunning(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{firstFile: "first path block ^/first\n"})
files, lines := watch(t, dir)
// matches reports whether path matches a rule.
matches := func(path string) bool { return len(files.Match(get(t, path))) == 1 }
// A file added.
save(t, dir, "50-b.rules", "second path block ^/second\n")
lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return matches("/second") })
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/first"), "first")
// A file edited.
save(t, dir, firstFile, "first path block ^/edited\n")
lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return !matches("/first") })
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/edited"), "first")
// A file removed.
err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, "50-b.rules"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
}
lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return !matches("/second") })
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/edited"), "first")
}
func TestBrokenEditKeepsTheRulesAsTheyWere(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{firstFile: "first path block ^/first\n"})
files, lines := watch(t, dir)
// The edit's second line has an unknown action, so the rules stay as
// they were, the first line's earlier version included.
save(t, dir, firstFile, "first path block ^/edited\nsecond path bann ^/second\n")
line := lines.waitFor(t, hasError)
want := filepath.Join(dir, firstFile) +
`, line 2: the action "bann" is not log, block or ban`
if line["error"] != want || line["level"] != "ERROR" {
t.Errorf("logged %v, want an error %q", line, want)
}
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/first"), "first")
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/second"))
// Once mended, the file is read again.
save(t, dir, firstFile, "first path block ^/edited\nsecond path ban ^/second\n")
lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return len(files.Match(get(t, "/second"))) == 1 })
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/edited"), "first")
}
func TestDefaultFileBansProbesAtTheSiteRootAlone(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
params, _ := newParams(filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"))
files, err := rules.Load(params)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the default file: %v", err)
}
// Probes sent by a browser, by the rule that refuses them.
for rule, targets := range map[string][]string{
"env-file": {"/.env", "/.env.production", "/.ENV"},
"vcs-dir": {"/.git/config", "/.git", "/.svn/entries"},
"secrets-dir": {"/.aws/credentials", "/.ssh/id_rsa"},
"secret-file": {"/.htpasswd", "/.DS_Store", "/.git-credentials"},
"editor-dir": {"/.vscode/sftp.json"},
"backup-file": {
"/wp-config.php.bak", "/index.php~", "/dump.sql", "/backup.sql.gz",
},
"log-file": {"/debug.log"},
"compose-file": {"/docker-compose.yml", "/compose.yaml"},
"php-shell": {"/shell.php"},
"path-traversal": {
"/static/../../etc/passwd", "/f?f=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",
},
} {
for _, target := range targets {
wantRefusedBy(t, files, target, browser, rule)
}
}
// Scanners, by their user agents.
for _, scanner := range []string{
"sqlmap/1.8.4#stable (https://sqlmap.org)",
"Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Nuclei - Open-source project)",
} {
wantRefusedBy(t, files, "/", scanner, "scanner-agent")
}
// Ordinary requests to a code forge for files of those names deeper
// in its paths, and for other files at its root.
for _, target := range []string{
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.env.example",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.env",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.vscode/settings.json",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.htaccess",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docker-compose.yml",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/db/schema.sql",
"/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/debug.log",
"/owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docs/../README.md",
"/user/login?redirect_to=%2fowner%2frepo",
"/index.php",
"/.well-known/security.txt",
} {
r := get(t, target)
r.Header.Set(userAgent, browser)
matched := files.Match(r)
if len(matched) != 0 {
t.Errorf("%s matched %v, want no rule", target, ids(matched))
}
}
// A request without a user agent is only noted.
wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/"), "empty-agent")
}
// ruleFiles are files to write into a directory of rule files, by name.
type ruleFiles map[string]string
// writeFiles writes files into a new directory, and returns it.
func writeFiles(t *testing.T, files ruleFiles) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
for name, content := range files {
path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
err = os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", name, err)
}
}
return dir
}
// save writes content to the rule file name in dir as an editor that
// saves by renaming does, so that the file is never seen half written.
func save(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) {
t.Helper()
path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
err := os.WriteFile(path+".tmp", []byte(content), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", name, err)
}
err = os.Rename(path+".tmp", path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rename: %v", err)
}
}
// newParams returns Params for the rule files in dir, switched on, with
// the process log in the processLog returned.
func newParams(dir string) (rules.Params, processLog) {
lines := make(processLog, maxLogLines)
return rules.Params{
Dir: dir,
Enabled: true,
ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(lines, nil)),
}, lines
}
// load writes files into a new directory and loads the rules in it.
func load(t *testing.T, files ruleFiles) *rules.Files {
t.Helper()
params, _ := newParams(writeFiles(t, files))
params.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
loaded, err := rules.Load(params)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
return loaded
}
// watch loads the rules in dir, runs their Watch until the test ends, and
// waits until it watches the directory.
func watch(t *testing.T, dir string) (*rules.Files, processLog) {
t.Helper()
params, lines := newParams(dir)
files, err := rules.Load(params)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
files.Watch(ctx)
close(stopped)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
stop()
<-stopped
})
lines.waitFor(t, watching)
return files, lines
}
// wantRefused checks that loading the rule files in dir fails with the
// error want.
func wantRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
t.Helper()
params, _ := newParams(dir)
_, err := rules.Load(params)
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
}
// get returns a GET request for target, a path and an optional query, as
// smallwebwaf's server reads it, without a user agent.
func get(t *testing.T, target string) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
return httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://app.example"+target, nil)
}
// wantRefusedBy checks that a GET request for target with the user agent
// sent matches rule alone, and that rule refuses it.
func wantRefusedBy(t *testing.T, files *rules.Files, target, sent, rule string) {
t.Helper()
r := get(t, target)
r.Header.Set(userAgent, sent)
matched := files.Match(r)
if len(matched) != 1 || matched[0].ID != rule || matched[0].Action == rules.ActionLog {
t.Errorf("%s from %q matched %v, want %s alone, refusing it", target,
sent, ids(matched), rule)
}
}
// wantMatched checks the ids of the rules r matches, in order.
func wantMatched(t *testing.T, files *rules.Files, r *http.Request, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
got := ids(files.Match(r))
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("%s matched %v, want %v", r.URL, got, want)
}
}
// ids returns the ids of matched.
func ids(matched []rules.Rule) []string {
got := make([]string, 0, len(matched))
for _, rule := range matched {
got = append(got, rule.ID)
}
return got
}
// processLog receives the lines of a process log, each a JSON object, for
// a test to wait for.
type processLog chan string
// Write receives a line of the process log.
func (l processLog) Write(line []byte) (int, error) {
l <- string(line)
return len(line), nil
}
// waitFor returns the next line of the process log whose message is msg,
// passing over the lines before it. It waits as long as that takes, so
// that a slow test process cannot fail the test.
func (l processLog) waitFor(t *testing.T, msg string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
for line := range l {
var fields map[string]any
err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("process log line %q is not JSON: %v", line, err)
}
if fields["msg"] == msg {
return fields
}
}
return nil
}
// waitUntil waits for the rule files to be read until done reports true,
// as it does once they have been read after the test's last change. They
// can be read before then too, as they are once Watch starts watching.
func (l processLog) waitUntil(t *testing.T, done func() bool) {
t.Helper()
for !done() {
l.waitFor(t, read)
}
}
internal/rules/watch_internal_test.go
-162
View File
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
package rules
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
"github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"
)
// The tests below run readAfterChanges in a synctest bubble, where time is
// a clock of the test's own: time.Sleep moves it on at once, and
// synctest.Wait returns once readAfterChanges waits again, so that every
// reading due by then is done. The test sends the changes itself, as the
// watch of a directory cannot run in a bubble.
func TestFileWrittenInTwoPartsTakenInOnlyWhole(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "50-app.rules")
writeFile(t, path, "first path block ^/first\n")
files := load(t, dir)
changes := run(t, files)
file, err := os.Create(path) //nolint:gosec // a file the test wrote
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = file.Close()
}()
// The first part ends in the middle of a ban rule's regex, which,
// read then, would ban every request.
write(t, file, "first path block ^/first\nprobe path ban ^/")
changes <- fsnotify.Event{Name: path, Op: fsnotify.Write}
time.Sleep(quietTime - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantMatched(t, files, "/anything")
// The second part starts the wait again.
write(t, file, `\.env$`+"\n")
changes <- fsnotify.Event{Name: path, Op: fsnotify.Write}
time.Sleep(quietTime - time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantMatched(t, files, "/.env")
time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
synctest.Wait()
wantMatched(t, files, "/.env", "probe")
wantMatched(t, files, "/anything")
})
}
func TestEditSavedBeforeTheWatchStartsTakenIn(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "50-app.rules")
writeFile(t, path, "first path block ^/first\n")
files := load(t, dir)
// Saved after Load read the files, and before the directory was
// watched, so that no change is seen for it.
writeFile(t, path, "first path block ^/edited\n")
run(t, files)
time.Sleep(quietTime)
synctest.Wait()
wantMatched(t, files, "/edited", "first")
})
}
// load loads the rules in dir.
func load(t *testing.T, dir string) *Files {
t.Helper()
files, err := Load(Params{
Dir: dir, Enabled: true, ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
return files
}
// run runs files' readAfterChanges until the test ends, and returns the
// channel that sends it changes.
func run(t *testing.T, files *Files) chan<- fsnotify.Event {
t.Helper()
changes := make(chan fsnotify.Event)
ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
stopped := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
files.readAfterChanges(ctx, changes, nil)
close(stopped)
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
stop()
<-stopped
})
return changes
}
// writeFile writes content to the file at path.
func writeFile(t *testing.T, path, content string) {
t.Helper()
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
// write writes text to the end of file.
func write(t *testing.T, file *os.File, text string) {
t.Helper()
_, err := file.WriteString(text)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
}
// wantMatched checks the ids of the rules that a GET request for path
// matches, in order.
func wantMatched(t *testing.T, files *Files, path string, want ...string) {
t.Helper()
r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
"http://app.example"+path, nil)
matched := files.Match(r)
got := make([]string, 0, len(matched))
for _, rule := range matched {
got = append(got, rule.ID)
}
if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("%s matched %v, want %v", path, got, want)
}
}
internal/smallwebwaf/healthcheck_test.go
-1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: app.URL,
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}
go func() {
internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf.go
+64 -29
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process: it reads the settings,
// the rule files and the state files, serves requests until it is told to
// stop, and then stops in an orderly way, writing the state files.
// Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process: it reads the settings
// and the state files, serves requests until it is told to stop, and then
// stops in an orderly way, writing the state files.
package smallwebwaf
import (
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
)
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ import (
// runit and docker wait a little longer before they kill the process.
const shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as smallwebwaf stops, the log lines
// still waiting are sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given
// up. stdout has carried them.
const remoteLogStopTimeout = 2 * time.Second
// Params are what Run needs from the process.
type Params struct {
// Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built.
@@ -57,9 +62,9 @@ func Main(version string) int {
})
}
// Run reads the settings, the rule files and the state files, then serves
// requests until ctx is done. It returns the process's exit status, 1
// when smallwebwaf cannot start.
// Run reads the settings and the state files, then serves requests until
// ctx is done. It returns the process's exit status, 1 when smallwebwaf
// cannot start.
func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout)
@@ -70,15 +75,25 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
return 1
}
ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
Dir: cfg.RulesDir,
Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled,
ProcessLog: processLog,
})
if err != nil {
processLog.Error("cannot use the rule files", "error", err.Error())
// While SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL is set, every line on stdout from here on
// is sent there too.
stdout := params.Stdout
return 1
var remote *remotelog.Sender
if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
remote = remotelog.New(remotelog.Params{
URL: cfg.LogRemoteURL,
RootCAs: cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
Buffer: cfg.LogRemoteBuffer,
Facility: cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
AppName: cfg.LogRemoteAppName,
})
stdout = io.MultiWriter(params.Stdout, remote)
processLog = requestlog.NewProcessLogger(stdout)
stopSending := startSending(ctx, remote, processLog)
defer stopSending()
}
// The state files give times in UTC.
@@ -86,12 +101,14 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
Config: cfg,
RequestLog: params.Stdout,
RequestLog: stdout,
ProcessLog: processLog,
GeoJSURL: lookup.URL,
Now: now,
Rules: ruleFiles,
})
if remote != nil {
server.Metrics.AddRemoteLog(remote)
}
files, err := state.Load(state.Params{
Dir: cfg.StateDir,
@@ -123,16 +140,41 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
"address", listener.Addr().String(),
"settings", cfg)
return serve(ctx, server.Server, listener, files, ruleFiles, processLog)
return serve(ctx, server.Server, listener, files, processLog)
}
// startSending runs remote until the function it returns is called, which
// then waits at most remoteLogStopTimeout for the lines still waiting to
// be sent. Sending goes on after ctx is done, so that the lines written
// while smallwebwaf stops are sent too.
func startSending(
ctx context.Context, remote *remotelog.Sender, processLog *slog.Logger,
) func() {
sending, stop := context.WithCancel(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
sent := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
remote.Run(sending, processLog)
close(sent)
}()
return func() {
stop()
select {
case <-sent:
case <-time.After(remoteLogStopTimeout):
}
}
}
// serve serves requests on listener, writes the state files as they are
// due, takes in an admin's edits of them, and reads the rule files again
// as they change, until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in
// progress shutdownTimeout to finish, and writes every state file.
// due, and takes in an admin's edits of them, until ctx is done. Then it
// gives the requests in progress shutdownTimeout to finish, and writes
// every state file.
func serve(
ctx context.Context, server *http.Server, listener net.Listener,
files *state.Files, ruleFiles *rules.Files, processLog *slog.Logger,
files *state.Files, processLog *slog.Logger,
) int {
served := make(chan error, 1)
@@ -145,7 +187,6 @@ func serve(
written := make(chan struct{})
watched := make(chan struct{})
rulesWatched := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
files.Run(writing)
@@ -157,11 +198,6 @@ func serve(
close(watched)
}()
go func() {
ruleFiles.Watch(writing)
close(rulesWatched)
}()
select {
case err := <-served:
processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
@@ -200,7 +236,6 @@ func serve(
// missing from clients.json.
<-written
<-watched
<-rulesWatched
err = files.WriteAll()
if err != nil {
internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf_test.go
+152 -81
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
@@ -34,7 +36,6 @@ const (
stateWriteDelay = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
rateLimitPerDay = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
rulesDir = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
// greeting is what the tests' app answers.
greeting = "hello from the app"
)
@@ -164,7 +165,6 @@ func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
listenAddr: taken.Addr().String(),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
@@ -188,15 +188,9 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: appURL,
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
}, out)
}()
// The default rule file is read.
if rules := out.line(t, "msg", "read the rule files")["rules"]; rules != 12.0 {
t.Errorf("read %v rules from the default rule file, want 12", rules)
}
starting := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
wantStartingLine(t, starting, appURL, dir)
@@ -225,7 +219,6 @@ func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
rateLimitPerDay: "2",
// Neither comes due in the test: the files are written as
// smallwebwaf stops.
@@ -262,7 +255,6 @@ func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
rateLimitPerDay: "1",
scope: "24",
@@ -310,7 +302,6 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedByEditingBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: dir,
rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
// No write comes due in the test, so only the watch on the
// directory can take the edits in.
@@ -327,62 +318,108 @@ func TestBanAddedAndLiftedByEditingBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
func TestEveryLineIsAlsoSentToTheRemoteLogEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = endpoint.Close()
}()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
rulesDir: dir,
// The requests sent until the rule takes effect must not break a
// rate limit, whose ban would refuse them too.
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "off",
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tcp://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantGreeting(t, url)
})
out.line(t, "type", "request")
// smallwebwaf connected as it started, and closes the connection once
// it has sent the lines written as it stopped.
conn, err := endpoint.Accept()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("accept: %v", err)
}
received, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
_ = conn.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
}
// Lines written at once by several goroutines may reach stdout and
// the endpoint in different orders.
sent := messages(t, string(received))
written := slices.Collect(strings.Lines(out.text()))
slices.Sort(sent)
slices.Sort(written)
if !slices.Equal(sent, written) {
t.Errorf("sent\n%v\nwrote\n%v", sent, written)
}
}
func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
// The endpoint takes connections and never answers, so the TLS
// handshake of each waits on it, and no line is ever sent.
endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
_ = endpoint.Close()
}()
env := map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0",
upstreamURL: startApp(t),
stateDir: t.TempDir(),
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tls://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER": "1",
"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN": token,
}
out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
wantGreeting(t, url)
// Written once: each change would start the rule files' wait
// again. A file written before smallwebwaf watches the directory is
// read once it does.
err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "50-app.rules"),
[]byte("everything path block ^/\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write the rule file: %v", err)
// More than one line has been written, and the buffer holds the
// last.
metrics := metricsText(t, url+"_smallwebwaf/metrics", token)
for _, series := range []string{
"smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total 0",
"smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth 1",
} {
if !strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+"\n") {
t.Errorf("no %q in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
}
}
// As long as that takes, so that a slow test process cannot fail
// the test.
for statusFrom(t, url, "203.0.113.9") != http.StatusForbidden {
time.Sleep(pollInterval)
if strings.Contains(metrics, "\nsmallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total 0\n") ||
!strings.Contains(metrics, "\nsmallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total ") {
t.Errorf("no line dropped in the metrics:\n%s", metrics)
}
// Closed, the endpoint refuses the connection made to send the
// lines still waiting at the stop, which then does not wait.
_ = endpoint.Close()
})
out.line(t, "action", "rule_blocked")
}
func TestRuleFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "00-default.rules")
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("# probes\nenv-file path bann ^/\\.env$\n"), 0o600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write the rule file: %v", err)
}
wantRulesRefused(t, dir, path+`, line 2: the action "bann" is not log, block or ban`)
}
func TestRulesDirThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
wantRulesRefused(t, dir, "SWWAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
": no such file or directory")
out.line(t, "type", "request")
}
func TestStateFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
@@ -418,9 +455,7 @@ func wantStartRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
out := &output{}
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: dir, rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
}, out)
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: dir}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
@@ -433,30 +468,6 @@ func wantStartRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
}
}
// wantRulesRefused runs smallwebwaf with its rule files in dir, and
// checks that it stops at start, with the error want. If it starts
// instead, it is stopped after waitLimit.
func wantRulesRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
t.Helper()
ctx, stop := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), waitLimit)
defer stop()
out := &output{}
status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: dir,
}, out)
if status != 1 {
t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
}
line := out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the rule files")
if line["error"] != want || line["level"] != "ERROR" {
t.Errorf("start refused with %v, want the error %q", line, want)
}
}
// startApp starts an app that answers every request with greeting, and
// returns its URL.
func startApp(t *testing.T) string {
@@ -531,17 +542,14 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL, dir string) {
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "1000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR": "10000",
rateLimitPerDay: "50000",
"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS": "",
"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
"SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE": "403",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION": "1h",
"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW": "24h",
"SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION": "7d",
"SWWAF_MAX_BANS": "5000",
"SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX": "32",
"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED": "true",
}
for name, value := range want {
@@ -581,6 +589,69 @@ func wantGreeting(t *testing.T, url string) {
}
}
// messages returns the message of each record in received, octet-counted
// frames of RFC 5424 records with the default facility and app name, each
// with the newline that ends a line on stdout.
func messages(t *testing.T, received string) []string {
t.Helper()
hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
header := " " + hostname + " " + hostname + " - - - "
var found []string
for received != "" {
count, rest, _ := strings.Cut(received, " ")
length, err := strconv.Atoi(count)
if err != nil || length > len(rest) {
t.Fatalf("no frame at %q", received)
}
record := rest[:length]
received = rest[length:]
_, message, ok := strings.Cut(record, header)
if !ok || !strings.HasPrefix(record, "<134>1 ") {
t.Fatalf("record %q, want priority <134> and header %q", record, header)
}
found = append(found, message+"\n")
}
return found
}
// metricsText asks for the metrics at url with token, and returns them.
func metricsText(t *testing.T, url, token string) string {
t.Helper()
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
http.NoBody)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
transport := &http.Transport{}
defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
_ = res.Body.Close()
if err != nil || res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("metrics answered %d (%v)", res.StatusCode, err)
}
return string(body)
}
// wantRefused checks that a request to url is refused with 403, the
// default SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
func wantRefused(t *testing.T, url string) {
internal/state/state.go
+4 -12
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ var (
errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
errMissing = errors.New("has no")
errCause = errors.New("is not limit or attack")
)
// Params are what Load needs.
@@ -96,12 +95,11 @@ type bansFile struct {
}
// banEntry is a ban as bans.json holds it: a permanent ban's expires is
// null, and a ban an admin added may have no cause.
// null.
type banEntry struct {
Netblock netip.Prefix `json:"netblock"`
Start time.Time `json:"start"`
Expires *time.Time `json:"expires"`
Cause string `json:"cause,omitempty"`
Notes bans.Notes `json:"notes"`
}
@@ -446,9 +444,7 @@ func (f *Files) encode(name string) ([]byte, error) {
// newBanEntry returns ban as bans.json holds it.
func newBanEntry(ban bans.Ban) banEntry {
entry := banEntry{
Netblock: ban.Netblock, Start: ban.Start, Cause: ban.Cause, Notes: ban.Notes,
}
entry := banEntry{Netblock: ban.Netblock, Start: ban.Start, Notes: ban.Notes}
if !ban.Permanent() {
entry.Expires = &ban.Expires
}
@@ -458,7 +454,7 @@ func newBanEntry(ban bans.Ban) banEntry {
// ban returns the ban an entry of bans.json holds.
func (e banEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
ban := bans.Ban{Netblock: e.Netblock, Start: e.Start, Cause: e.Cause, Notes: e.Notes}
ban := bans.Ban{Netblock: e.Netblock, Start: e.Start, Notes: e.Notes}
if e.Expires != nil {
ban.Expires = *e.Expires
}
@@ -470,8 +466,7 @@ func (e banEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
// client, a start, from which the length of the netblock's next ban is
// worked out, or an expires, which would make it permanent. A permanent
// ban's expires is null, which Bans cannot tell from a missing one, so
// each expires is read again as written. A cause other than limit or
// attack, most likely misspelt, is refused too.
// each expires is read again as written.
func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
var written struct {
Bans []struct {
@@ -492,9 +487,6 @@ func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
return missing(i, "start")
case written.Bans[i].Expires == nil:
return missing(i, "expires")
case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack:
return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's cause %q %w", i+1, entry.Cause, errCause)
}
}
internal/state/state_test.go
+4 -23
View File
@@ -63,11 +63,7 @@ const permanentBansJSON = `{
},
"requests": 1500,
"refused": 3,
"earlier_bans": {
"limit": 3,
"attack": 1,
"without_cause": 1
}
"earlier_bans": 5
}
}
]
@@ -267,17 +263,6 @@ func TestEntryWithoutAFieldItNeedsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestBanWithACauseSmallwebwafDoesNotGiveStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
wantRefused(t, bansJSON, `{"version": 1, "bans": [`+
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": null, "cause": "attack"}, `+
`{"netblock": "203.0.113.10/32", "start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", `+
`"expires": null, "cause": "atack"}]}`,
`: entry 2's cause "atack" is not limit or attack`)
}
func TestUnknownVersionStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -896,7 +881,6 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
LimitBanDuration: time.Hour,
LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
AttackBanDuration: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
MaxBans: 5000,
}),
Limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}),
@@ -909,17 +893,14 @@ func newParams(dir string) state.Params {
}
}
// fill puts a permanent ban without a cause, as an admin adds one, a ban
// for a broken limit and one for a clear sign of attack, clients with
// counts and histories, and GeoJS answers into the parts of params.
// fill puts a ban that ends and one that does not, clients with counts
// and histories, and GeoJS answers into the parts of params.
func fill(params state.Params) {
now := midnight()
client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
params.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{permanentBan()})
params.Ledger.BanForLimit(client, now, bans.Notes{Country: "DE", Limit: 1})
params.Ledger.BanForAttack(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"), now,
bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"})
for _, c := range []string{"2001:db8::/64", "203.0.113.9/32", "192.0.2.1/32"} {
params.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(c), now)
@@ -958,7 +939,7 @@ func permanentBan() bans.Ban {
},
Requests: 1500,
Refused: 3,
EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 3, Attack: 1, WithoutCause: 1},
EarlierBans: 5,
},
}
}
script/example-app
+5 -27
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,9 @@
# deploy/example-app, then run the app's container with a volume for the
# state files and check that the health check passes, that a request is
# served through smallwebwaf, that a second one in a minute bans the
# client, that a probe for /.env bans another client, which its next
# request bans for good, that `sv stop` stops smallwebwaf in order, that
# `docker stop` stops the container without having to kill it, and that
# a new container on the same volume still refuses the banned client. The
# client, that `sv stop` stops smallwebwaf in order, that `docker stop`
# stops the container without having to kill it, and that a new
# container on the same volume still refuses the banned client. The
# containers, the volume and both images are removed however the script
# ends. Building the app needs network access, for nixpkgs' binary cache.
# script/check does not run this.
@@ -53,13 +52,9 @@ healthy() {
[ "$status" = healthy ]
}
# logged <text>...: a line of the container's output holds every text,
# in any order.
# logged <text>: the container's output holds text.
logged() {
lines="$(docker logs "$CONTAINER" 2>&1)"
for text in "$@"; do
lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F "$text")" || return 1
done
docker logs "$CONTAINER" 2>&1 | grep -qF "$1"
}
# start_container: run the app's container, with the state files on the
@@ -82,15 +77,6 @@ refused() {
[ "$code" = 403 ]
}
# refused_from <client> <path>: a request for path from client, as
# X-Forwarded-For names it, gets 403. smallwebwaf believes the header
# from docker's gateway, a private address.
refused_from() {
code="$(curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' \
--max-time 10 --header "X-Forwarded-For: $1" "http://$address$2")" || true
[ "$code" = 403 ]
}
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
trap cleanup EXIT
@@ -114,14 +100,6 @@ main() {
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no ban" logged '"action":"rate_limited"'
echo "example-app: a second request in a minute bans the client"
refused_from 203.0.113.9 /.env || fail "a probe for /.env was not refused"
wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no ban for the probe" \
logged '"action":"banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
refused_from 203.0.113.9 / || fail "the client of the probe was let through"
wait_for "the client's next request did not make its ban permanent" \
logged '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
echo "example-app: a probe for /.env bans the client, its next request for good"
docker exec "$CONTAINER" sv stop smallwebwaf >/dev/null ||
fail "sv stop smallwebwaf failed"
wait_for "smallwebwaf did not stop in order" logged '"msg":"stopped"'
script/run
+1 -7
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
# script/run: build bin/smallwebwaf with script/build and run it, with
# the settings in the environment. Unless SWWAF_STATE_DIR is set, the
# state files go in bin/state, beside the binary, and unless
# SWWAF_RULES_DIR is set, the rule files are those of share/rules.d,
# which the image ships.
# state files go in bin/state, beside the binary.
set -eu
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -16,10 +14,6 @@ main() {
export SWWAF_STATE_DIR
mkdir -p "$SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
fi
if [ -z "${SWWAF_RULES_DIR+set}" ]; then
SWWAF_RULES_DIR="$ROOT/share/rules.d"
export SWWAF_RULES_DIR
fi
exec "$ROOT/bin/smallwebwaf"
}
share/rules.d/00-default.rules
-15
View File
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
# 00-default.rules: probes no real visitor sends, anchored at the site root
# id target action regex
env-file path ban (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
vcs-dir path ban (?i)^/\.(git|svn|hg|bzr)(/|$)
secrets-dir path ban (?i)^/\.(aws|ssh|docker|kube)/
secret-file path ban (?i)^/\.(htpasswd|htaccess|npmrc|netrc|pgpass|git-credentials|bash_history|DS_Store)$
editor-dir path ban (?i)^/\.(vscode|idea)/
backup-file path ban (?i)^/[^/]+\.(php(\.[a-z0-9]+|~)|sql(\.[a-z0-9]+)?)$
log-file path ban (?i)^/(debug|error|access)\.log$
compose-file path ban (?i)^/(docker-)?compose\.ya?ml$
php-shell path ban (?i)^/(shell|c99|r57|wso|alfa)\.php$
scanner-agent user_agent ban (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|masscan|zgrab|wpscan)\b
path-traversal uri block (\.\./){2,}
empty-agent user_agent log ^$