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merge into: sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname
sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-222-quiet-update-alternatives-man-warnings sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:publish-image sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-195-heuristic-modules sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
..
pull from: sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels
sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-222-quiet-update-alternatives-man-warnings sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-220-apps-by-hostname sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-216-oci-labels sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-211-viper-config sneak/smallwebwaf:next sneak/smallwebwaf:publish-image sneak/smallwebwaf:main sneak/smallwebwaf:issue-195-heuristic-modules sneak/smallwebwaf:readme-rewrite-155
sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc2 sneak/smallwebwaf:v1.0.0-rc1
1 Commits
issue-220-apps-by-hostname .. issue-216-oci-labels
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 6d78846014 Set the images' own OCI labels instead of Ubuntu's (closes #216)
check / check (push) Failing after 3m38s
Details 
The image sets title, description, version, created, revision and
source; the last three known only at build time come from build
arguments that default to unknown, and script/docker and
script/cibuild pass them. The example app sets its own title and
description.

Model: opus-5-5
 2026-11-07 12:39:34 +00:00
14 changed files with 262 additions and 637 deletions
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Dockerfile
+14
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@@ -124,6 +124,20 @@ RUN git checkout --quiet --detach b4b2c785308b1ce785b6155c7fe5f16879080193 \
# ubuntu 26.04, 2026-09-27
FROM ubuntu@sha256:f144425ff09be612d6d9ad965196e9cdc23dae1f42110a8a11a3e9a8198759f7
# The image's own labels, in place of the ones it would inherit from
# Ubuntu's. script/docker and script/cibuild pass the build arguments;
# a build that passes none labels the image unknown rather than leave
# Ubuntu's values.
ARG VERSION=unknown
ARG CREATED=unknown
ARG REVISION=unknown
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="smallwebwaf" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="A web application firewall for self-hosted web apps: sww rproxy in front of an app, and sww discriminator, which decides." \
org.opencontainers.image.version="${VERSION}" \
org.opencontainers.image.created="${CREATED}" \
org.opencontainers.image.revision="${REVISION}" \
org.opencontainers.image.source="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf"
# runit's install creates its _runit-log user with minsysusers, which
# reads this file in place of runit's /usr/lib/sysusers.d/runit.conf.
# runit's line leaves out the shell, and minsysusers prints a Perl
README.md
+120 -125
View File
@@ -215,123 +215,122 @@ account, a key, a token or an alert destination stays off until you give one.
Every setting the code reads, with its default:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` | empty | Countries whose clients are refused, such as `cn,ru`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | AS numbers whose clients get a percentage of every request and byte limit, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:25`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | The same by country, such as `cn:25`. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; where it and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` both give a percentage, the lower applies. |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_APPS` | unset | The apps each hostname serves, such as `git.example.com:gitea;cloud.example.com:gitea`; only those apps' fixes apply there. Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| Variable | Default | What it does |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `SWW_COMMAND` | `rproxy` | Which command the image runs, and its health check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator`. |
| `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` | required | `discriminator`'s URL, such as `http://discriminator:8080`. |
| `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` | `http://127.0.0.1:8081` | The app's URL: a scheme, a host and an optional port, nothing more. |
| `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `rproxy` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16` | The netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` `rproxy` believes; set but empty, it believes none. |
| `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `2000` | How long `rproxy` waits for `discriminator`'s answer to a question and to a report, in milliseconds. |
| `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` | `allow` | What `rproxy` does with a request when `discriminator` cannot be reached or does not answer in time: `allow` passes it to the app, `deny` answers `503`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` | `100M` | The largest request body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `413`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` | `1G` | The largest response body, a size or `off`; a larger one is answered `502`, or cut off once it has started. |
| `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` | `60000` | How long the visitor may take to send its request line and headers, and then the whole request to reach the app, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` | `1800000` | How long the answer may take, from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor, in milliseconds or `off`. |
| `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` | `:8080` | Where `discriminator` listens; leave the host part empty. |
| `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | the container's host name | The name in every line `discriminator` logs, and in every alert and metric, such as `fsn1/discriminator`. |
| `SWW_MODE` | `enforce` | `observe` refuses nothing and makes no ban; each log line says what `enforce` would have done. |
| `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` | `64` | The prefix length of the IPv6 netblock that counts as one client, from 32 to 128. |
| `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` | `20000` | The most clients kept, in memory and in `clients.json`; the least recently seen is dropped first. |
| `SWW_MAX_BANS` | `5000` | The most bans `discriminator` keeps of its own; bans an admin made do not count. |
| `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse. |
| `SWW_DENY_NETS` | empty | Netblocks whose clients are refused. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `120` | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `1500` | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `6000` | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` | `50G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` | `100G` | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`. |
| `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` | `both` | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`. |
| `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` | `30` | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it. |
| `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` | `403` | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` | `1h` | The ban for a first broken limit. |
| `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` | `24h` | A limit broken again within this time after the last such ban ended gets a ban three times as long. |
| `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | A ban for a broken limit that would be longer than this is permanent instead. |
| `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` | `7d` | The ban for a first clear sign of attack: a `ban` rule or a trap path. |
| `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` | `32` | The prefix length of the netblock a ban on an IPv4 client covers, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` | `geojs` | Where each client's AS number and country come from: `geojs`, a web service, `file`, or `off`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` | empty | The IPinfo Lite database file, in its `.mmdb` form, read while the source is `file`. |
| `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` | `800ms` | How long a request waits for its client's first GeoJS answer when a setting needs it, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. |
| `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` | `false` | `true` passes the app the client's AS number and country in `X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country`. |
| `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` | empty | Countries whose clients are refused, such as `cn,ru`. |
| `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` | empty | When set, the only countries whose clients get through; a client the lookup cannot place is refused too. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | AS numbers whose clients get a percentage of every request and byte limit, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:25`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` | empty | The same by country, such as `cn:25`. |
| `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the AS numbers listed, in place of their `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` | empty | A percentage of the byte limits alone for the countries listed, in place of their `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT`. |
| `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` | `100` | The percentage of every limit a client without a country gets. |
| `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` | unset | The URL of a text file of `AS<number>:<percent>` lines, fetched like a blocklist; where it and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` both give a percentage, the lower applies. |
| `SWW_RULES_DIR` | `/etc/sww/rules.d` | The directory of the rule files, read at start and again when a file there changes. |
| `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` | `true` | `false` reads no rule file. |
| `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` | empty | Paths only scanners ask for, such as `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`; a request for one bans the client. |
| `SWW_WAF_MODE` | `block` | What the Core Rule Set does with a match: `block` refuses it with `403`, `detect` only logs and alerts it, `off` runs no rule. |
| `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` | `1` | The Core Rule Set's paranoia level, from 1 to 4; each level up finds more attacks and takes more ordinary requests for attacks. |
| `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` | `5` | The Core Rule Set score at which a request is a match, a whole number or `off`; one critical rule scores 5. |
| `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` | `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140` | Core Rule Set rule ids switched off; a list you give replaces the default, so repeat these six to keep them off. |
| `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` | empty | Path prefixes the Core Rule Set does not inspect. |
| `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` | `off` | How much of a request body the Core Rule Set reads, a size up to `64K`; `off` reads none. |
| `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` | unset | A file of Core Rule Set exclusions, as Coraza directives, that switch rules off for some fields or paths only. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` | empty | Blocklists to fetch, text files of addresses and netblocks one to a line, such as `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` | `24h` | How long after a list was last tried it is fetched again, `1h` or more. |
| `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` | `deny` | What a client on a blocklist gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` of every limit, or `log`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` | empty | DNS blocklists asked about each new client in the background, such as `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. |
| `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` | unset | The resolver the zones are asked through, an IP address with an optional port; unset, the host's resolver is used. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` | unset | The key of your AbuseIPDB account; set, a client that has committed an offence is checked in the background. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` | `75` | The least AbuseIPDB abuse confidence score, from 0 to 100, that is a hit. |
| `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` | `900` | The most AbuseIPDB checks made in a day. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` | unset | The local API of a CrowdSec engine you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`; its decision list is fetched every minute, and a listed client is banned. |
| `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` | unset | The key the engine gave for `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it; set with the URL, never alone. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` | `limit:25` | What a client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored a hit by AbuseIPDB, gets: `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` | `24h` | How long a DNS blocklist verdict or an AbuseIPDB score is used. |
| `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` | `2s` | How long a DNS blocklist query or an AbuseIPDB check may take. |
| `SWW_STATE_DIR` | `/var/lib/sww` | The directory of the state files, an absolute path. |
| `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` | `10s` | How long `bans.json` waits to be written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. |
| `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` | `15m` | How often every state file is written. |
| `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | The least severe of `discriminator`'s own messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`; request lines are always written. |
| `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` | `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range` | The request headers whose values the request log records; `Authorization` and `Cookie` are never recorded. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` | unset | A syslog server that also gets every line `discriminator` writes: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://` with a host and a port. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` | unset | A file of PEM certificates a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` | `10000` | The most lines held while they wait to be sent; past it, the oldest is dropped. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` | `local0` | The syslog facility of each record sent. |
| `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` | `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` | The app name in each syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. |
| `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for the ban and client endpoints, at least 32 characters; unset, they answer `404`. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` | unset | The bearer token for `/_sww/metrics`, at least 32 characters; unset, the metrics are off. |
| `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` | `50` | How many AS numbers and how many countries get metric series of their own; the rest are summed as `other`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A webhook each alert is posted to as a JSON object. |
| `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` | empty | Headers sent with each post, a list of `Name:value`, such as `Authorization:Bearer <token>`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` | unset | A Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a message. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` | unset | An ntfy topic each alert is published to, as its full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` | unset | An ntfy access token sent with each alert. |
| `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` | `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error` | The events alerts are sent for; the hourly `summary` is sent whatever it says. |
| `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` | `15m` | How long after an alert its repeats are held back and counted, a duration or `off`. |
| `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` | `60` | The most alerts sent in an hour, a number or `off`; the rest are counted in the hour's `summary`. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one client's requests carry more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the netblock around a client carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` | `24` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv4 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 32. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` | `48` | The prefix length of the netblock around an IPv6 client that the `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_` thresholds count, from 0 to 128. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when one AS number carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service gets more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when the whole service carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_NETS` | empty | Named netblocks the `SWW_WATCH_` thresholds count each as a whole, such as `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in a minute, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock makes more requests than this in an hour, a count. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_MINUTE` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in a minute, a size. |
| `SWW_WATCH_BYTES_PER_HOUR` | `off` | Alert when a watched netblock carries more bytes than this in an hour, a size. |
[`docs/settings.md`](docs/settings.md) gives the values each setting takes in
full, and the limits that are fixed rather than settings.
@@ -556,15 +555,11 @@ status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
headers of every request, and no body unless `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` is set. In
front of a code forge, bodies carry what people write and publish, which the
rules take for attacks.
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in six ways so that it lets ordinary
- `smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set in eight ways so that it lets ordinary
requests to a code forge through, such as git over HTTP and sign-in through
Git Credential Manager. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack detection" in
[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
- Each supported app also has its own fixes, which let its ordinary requests
through. gitea's let its searches, file names and branch names through.
`SWW_APPS` names the apps each hostname serves. A hostname gets only its own
apps' fixes, and a hostname it does not list gets none. Unset, every app's
fixes apply to every hostname.
Git Credential Manager. On gitea's own paths, its searches, file names and
branch names get through too. No setting undoes the changes; "Attack
detection" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) lists them.
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` switches single rules off for an app's own
fields or paths.
- Rule files are plain text, one rule to a line, edited by hand and read again
SPEC.md
+46 -69
View File
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ to them.
of bans is full.
- `internal/rules`: reads the rule files at start and again when they
change, and tells which rules a request matches.
- `internal/waf`: the Core Rule Set, with the six changes and the apps'
fixes listed under "Attack detection", as Coraza directives.
- `internal/waf`: the Core Rule Set, with the eight changes listed under
"Attack detection", as Coraza directives.
- `internal/lookup`: looks clients up through GeoJS or in the lookup
database.
- `internal/reputation`: fetches the lists, asks the DNS blocklists and
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
- `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` names a file of exclusions, written as
Coraza directives. An exclusion switches one rule off for some fields or paths
only, where `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` switches it off everywhere. The file
holds an app's own exclusions; gitea's fixes below hold gitea's.
holds an app's own exclusions; the eighth change below holds gitea's.
- `discriminator` loads the file after `smallwebwaf`'s own setup rules and
before the Core Rule Set's rules. The Core Rule Set loads its own
`REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS.conf` at the same point.
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ files, the limits and the bans still apply to the client that sends it.
scanner from an ordinary client. In front of a code forge, registry and git
clients get `404` and `401` by design, hundreds of times a minute.
`smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 in six ways, since in front of
`smallwebwaf` changes the Core Rule Set 4.25.0 in eight ways, since in front of
gitea it would otherwise refuse ordinary requests. The changes hold in front of
every app, and no setting undoes them:
@@ -649,52 +649,8 @@ every app, and no setting undoes them:
and tea, which gitea registers for OAuth sign-in, ask to be sent back to
`http://127.0.0.1` on the user's own machine. The server never fetches that
address.
4. `Referer` is not checked for a Unix command given without arguments (932340),
for Java starting a process (944110) or for a Java class name (944130).
`Referer` names the page a request comes from, on everything that page loads
and on every link followed from it. The Core Rule Set takes some page
addresses for attacks:
- a search for `env`;
- OpenJDK's `Runtime.java`, whose path holds both `runtime` and `java.`;
- a file named `java.lang.String.md`.
Every request from such a page would be refused. `Referer` keeps the other
rules, except after some gitea searches (gitea's fixes). An app that passes
`Referer` to a shell must check it itself.
5. Responses are not inspected. A raw file from a repository, such as a shell
script, looks to the response rules like source code leaking from the server.
6. The `from` parameter of a container registry's upload path,
`/v2/<image>/blobs/uploads/`, is not checked for command names (932260). When
a push reuses a layer, `from` names the image the layer comes from. An image
such as `owner/python3-app` would have that push refused.
Each supported app also has its own fixes, which let its ordinary requests
through. An app's fixes hold for the hostnames `SWW_APPS` lists the app for:
- `SWW_APPS` holds entries separated by semicolons. Each is a hostname, a colon,
then one or more apps separated by commas, for example
`git.example.com:gitea;code.example.com:gitea`.
- The request's `Host` is matched by exact name, without its port and without
regard to case. There are no wildcards.
- A hostname not listed gets no app's fixes, so every rule checks it in full.
Set empty, `SWW_APPS` lists no hostname.
- Unset, every app's fixes hold for every hostname. An app's fixes then weaken
the check of any other app that serves the same paths or fields.
- Any of these mistakes stops the start:
- an unknown app;
- a hostname that is not a DNS name, such as `*.example.com`;
- a hostname listed twice;
- an app listed twice for one hostname;
- an entry without a colon.
`gitea` is the only app supported. Each app's fixes are in one file, such as
`internal/waf/gitea.conf`, and one entry of `apps` in `internal/waf/waf.go`.
gitea's fixes are:
1. Ten query parameters are not checked against the Core Rule Set's lists of
system files (930120), shell paths (932160) and command names (932260), on
any path:
4. Ten query parameters are not checked against the Core Rule Set's lists of
system files (930120), shell paths (932160) and command names (932260):
- `path`, `files`, `skip-to` and `sub_path`;
- `ref`, `sha`, `branch` and `workflow`;
- `artifactName` and `redirect_to`.
@@ -707,18 +663,41 @@ gitea's fixes are:
catch reaches the app, such as the command `|cat /etc/passwd`. Path
traversal, SQL and script injection, and PHP, Java and Node.js code are
still refused there. Other parameters keep all three rules, except on the
gitea paths the third fix names.
gitea paths the eighth change names. An app that uses one of these
parameters as a file on the server, or passes it to a shell, must check the
value itself. A rule file can refuse it instead.
2. The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `gitea_flash` and
`redirect_to` cookies. gitea puts a message naming what was just done into
`gitea_flash`. It puts into `redirect_to` the page to return to after signing
in. The Core Rule Set takes file names in them, such as `package.json`, for
attacks. A browser sends such a cookie with every request until gitea
replaces it. gitea cannot replace it while those requests are refused, so one
refusal would keep the browser out of the whole site. gitea shows the message
with any script removed and returns only to its own pages. Every other cookie
is read in full.
3. On gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea
5. Two cookies are left out, and `Referer` keeps fewer rules:
- The Core Rule Set reads the request without the `gitea_flash` and
`redirect_to` cookies. gitea puts a message naming what was just done into
`gitea_flash`. It puts into `redirect_to` the page to return to after
signing in. The Core Rule Set takes file names in them, such as
`package.json`, for attacks. A browser sends such a cookie with every
request until gitea replaces it. gitea cannot replace it while those
requests are refused, so one refusal would keep the browser out of the
whole site. gitea shows the message with any script removed and returns
only to its own pages. Every other cookie is read in full. An app that
reads a cookie of either name must check it itself.
- `Referer` is not checked for a Unix command given without arguments
(932340), for Java starting a process (944110) or for a Java class name
(944130). `Referer` names the page a request comes from, on everything
that page loads and on every link followed from it. The Core Rule Set
takes some page addresses for attacks:
- a search for `env`;
- OpenJDK's `Runtime.java`, whose path holds both `runtime` and `java.`;
- a file named `java.lang.String.md`.
Every request from such a page would be refused. `Referer` keeps the
other rules, except after some gitea searches (the eighth change). An
app that passes `Referer` to a shell must check it itself.
6. Responses are not inspected. A raw file from a repository, such as a shell
script, looks to the response rules like source code leaking from the server.
7. The `from` parameter of a container registry's upload path,
`/v2/<image>/blobs/uploads/`, is not checked for command names (932260). When
a push reuses a layer, `from` names the image the layer comes from. An image
such as `owner/python3-app` would have that push refused.
8. On gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea
requests there. They are the fields where gitea sends a search, a file name
or a branch name. `internal/waf/gitea.conf` lists each rule and the request
it refused. The fields are:
@@ -736,7 +715,8 @@ gitea's fixes are:
- packages.
A user's or an organisation's page is any path of one segment, so on
every such path `q` skips these three rules, for example on `/search`.
every such path, on any app, `q` skips these three rules, for example on
`/search`.
Some of these searches also skip the rule for Java class names (944130),
which refused `org.apache.commons.logging`.
@@ -774,14 +754,11 @@ gitea's fixes are:
`actions/upload-artifact@v3` (920450).
Elsewhere these fields keep every rule. The paths are those of gitea at the
site root.
site root. An app other than gitea that serves one of them must check these
fields itself.
On a hostname that gets gitea's fixes, an app other than gitea must check these
fields and cookies itself. Listing each hostname's own apps in `SWW_APPS` keeps
the full check for the others.
The parameter and cookie names in these changes and fixes are matched without
regard to case, as Coraza matches them.
The parameter and cookie names in these changes are matched without regard to
case, as Coraza matches them.
### Ban lengths, response and scope
deploy/example-app/Dockerfile
+4
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
ARG SWW_IMAGE=smallwebwaf
FROM ${SWW_IMAGE}
# Its own title and description, in place of the smallwebwaf image's.
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="smallwebwaf-example-app" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="An example app built on the smallwebwaf image."
# Packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image.
RUN nix-env -iA nixpkgs.busybox
docs/settings.md
-18
View File
@@ -198,24 +198,6 @@ between the two (see "The image's command" below).
a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
- `SWW_APPS` (default unset): the apps each hostname serves. A request gets the
fixes of its hostname's apps only (see "Attack detection" in
[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
- Entries are separated by semicolons. Each is a hostname, a colon, then one
or more apps separated by commas, for example
`git.example.com:gitea;code.example.com:gitea`.
- `gitea` is the only app supported.
- The request's `Host` is matched by exact name, without its port and
without regard to case. There are no wildcards.
- A hostname not listed gets no app's fixes, so every rule checks it in
full. Set empty, it lists no hostname.
- Unset, every app's fixes apply to every hostname.
- Any of these mistakes stops the start:
- an unknown app;
- a hostname that is not a DNS name, such as `*.example.com`;
- a hostname listed twice;
- an app listed twice for one hostname;
- an entry without a colon.
- `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
internal/config/config.go
+1 -88
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
)
// Config is the settings of `sww discriminator`. A time or size limit of
@@ -231,11 +230,6 @@ type Config struct {
WAFExemptPaths []string
WAFBodyLimit int64
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile string
// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
// lowercase (SWW_APPS): a request gets only its hostname's apps' fixes
// to the Core Rule Set. Apps is nil while SWW_APPS is unset, and every
// request gets every app's fixes.
Apps map[string][]string
// TrapPaths are the paths a request for which is a clear sign of
// attack (SWW_TRAP_PATHS), each starting with / and without a ?.
TrapPaths []string
@@ -404,10 +398,6 @@ var (
"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
errNotTrapPath = errors.New(
"is not a path starting with / and without a ?, such as /wp-login.php")
errNotAppsEntry = errors.New(
"is not a hostname, : and a list of apps, such as git.example.com:gitea")
errNotHostname = errors.New("is not a DNS name such as git.example.com")
errNotApp = errors.New("is not an app sww has fixes for; the apps are")
errNotWAFMode = errors.New("is not off, detect or block")
errNotParanoiaLevel = errors.New("is not a paranoia level, from 1 to 4")
errNotRuleID = errors.New(
@@ -540,7 +530,6 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
WAFBodyLimit: env.wafBodyLimit("SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT", off),
CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile: env.filePath(
"SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"),
Apps: env.apps("SWW_APPS"),
TrapPaths: env.trapPaths("SWW_TRAP_PATHS"),
ErrorBurstThreshold: env.count("SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD", "30"),
LogRemoteURL: env.logRemoteURL("SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
@@ -791,22 +780,6 @@ func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
return prefixes
}
// apps reads the setting that is the apps each hostname serves. It is nil
// while the setting is unset.
func (e *environment) apps(name string) map[string][]string {
value, set := e.lookup(name)
e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, value))
if !set {
return nil
}
apps, err := parseApps(value)
e.check(name, err)
return apps
}
// trapPaths reads the setting that is the list of trap paths. It is empty
// by default.
func (e *environment) trapPaths(name string) []string {
@@ -1673,65 +1646,6 @@ func parseTrapPaths(value string) ([]string, error) {
return paths, nil
}
// parseApps reads the apps each hostname serves: entries separated by
// semicolons, each a hostname, a colon, and a comma-separated list of the
// names waf.AppNames returns, such as
// git.example.com:gitea;cloud.example.com:nextcloud,wordpress. Each
// hostname is a DNS name, without a wildcard. It returns them by hostname
// in lowercase, since a hostname is matched without regard to case. An
// empty value lists no hostname.
func parseApps(value string) (map[string][]string, error) {
apps := map[string][]string{}
if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
return apps, nil
}
for entry := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
hostname, list, found := strings.Cut(entry, ":")
if !found {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
}
hostname = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(hostname))
if hostname == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
}
if !isZone(hostname) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", hostname, errNotHostname)
}
if _, listed := apps[hostname]; listed {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", hostname, errListedTwice)
}
names, err := parseList(list)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(names) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", entry, errNotAppsEntry)
}
for i, name := range names {
if !slices.Contains(waf.AppNames(), name) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w %s", name, errNotApp,
strings.Join(waf.AppNames(), ", "))
}
if slices.Contains(names[:i], name) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", name, errListedTwice)
}
}
apps[hostname] = names
}
return apps, nil
}
// parseRuleIDs reads a comma-separated list of the ids of Core Rule Set
// rules, each a whole number above zero and outside firstSetupRuleID to
// lastSetupRuleID.
@@ -2158,8 +2072,7 @@ func MaskZoneKey(zone string) string {
return masked + "." + rest
}
// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it. It
// also checks the hostnames of SWW_APPS, which are DNS names too.
// isZone reports whether each label of zone is as parseZones takes it.
func isZone(zone string) bool {
for label := range strings.SplitSeq(zone, ".") {
badChar := strings.ContainsFunc(label, func(char rune) bool {
internal/config/config_test.go
-66
View File
@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ const (
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
exclusionsFile = "SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE"
apps = "SWW_APPS"
trapPaths = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
logRemoteURL = "SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
@@ -577,70 +576,6 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetSettings(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestApps(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tc := range []struct {
env environment
want map[string][]string
}{
{environment{}, nil},
{environment{apps: ""}, map[string][]string{}},
{
environment{apps: "Git.Example.com:gitea; cloud.example.com : gitea "},
map[string][]string{
"git.example.com": {"gitea"}, "cloud.example.com": {"gitea"},
},
},
} {
cfg := fromEnvironment(t, tc.env)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(cfg.Apps, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("%v gave %#v, want %#v", tc.env, cfg.Apps, tc.want)
}
}
}
func TestInvalidAppsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
notEntry = " is not a hostname, : and a list of apps, " +
"such as git.example.com:gitea"
notHostname = " is not a DNS name such as git.example.com"
)
for _, tc := range []struct{ value, want string }{
{"git.example.com:gitea;blog.example.com", `"blog.example.com"` + notEntry},
{"git.example.com:gitea;", `""` + notEntry},
{":gitea", `":gitea"` + notEntry},
{"git.example.com:", `"git.example.com:"` + notEntry},
{"*.example.com:gitea", `"*.example.com"` + notHostname},
{"git.example.com/:gitea", `"git.example.com/"` + notHostname},
{"git example.com:gitea", `"git example.com"` + notHostname},
{
"git.example.com:gitea,nextcloud",
`"nextcloud" is not an app sww has fixes for; the apps are gitea`,
},
{
"git.example.com:gitea;GIT.example.com:gitea",
`"git.example.com" is listed twice`,
},
{"git.example.com:gitea,gitea", `"gitea" is listed twice`},
{"git.example.com:gitea,", `"gitea," has an empty item in its list`},
} {
t.Run(tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{apps: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
want := apps + ": " + tc.want
if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestWAFBodyLimitOf64K(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -2397,7 +2332,6 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
wafExemptPaths: "",
wafBodyLimit: off,
exclusionsFile: "",
apps: "",
trapPaths: "",
errorBurstThreshold: "30",
logRemoteURL: "",
internal/discriminator/coreruleset_test.go
-23
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
)
@@ -22,7 +21,6 @@ const (
wafDisabledRules = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
wafExemptPaths = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
wafBodyLimit = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
apps = "SWW_APPS"
block = "block"
detect = "detect"
)
@@ -239,27 +237,6 @@ func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestGiteasFixesApplyOnlyToAHostnameThatServesGitea(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Only gitea's fixes let a file name through in path, a parameter
// gitea sends file names in.
const fileName = "/?path=.gitignore"
s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{
wafMode: block, apps: siteA + ":gitea",
})
wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteA, client, fileName)),
http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
wantDisposition(t, do(t, s.question(siteB, client, fileName)),
http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[0], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
}
func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
internal/discriminator/proxy.go
+1 -3
View File
@@ -210,8 +210,7 @@ func newReputation(
// NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
// without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
// up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE and the fixes of the apps in SWW_APPS,
// or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
// reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
// QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
// JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that waf.New refuses is
@@ -226,7 +225,6 @@ func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
BodyLimit: min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
Apps: cfg.Apps,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
internal/waf/gitea.conf
+7 -52
View File
@@ -1,51 +1,8 @@
# gitea's fixes: some fields skip the rules that refused ordinary gitea requests.
# They are the fields where gitea sends a search, a file name or a branch name.
# Each exclusion runs with the request, before the rules it switches off, those
# of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules.
# Each comment names a request the rule refused.
# A request whose hostname SWW_APPS does not list gitea for skips every rule
# below. Inspect sets tx.app_gitea on the others.
SecRule &TX:app_gitea "@eq 0" \
"id:900590,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END_GITEA"
# The query parameters in which gitea sends names within a repository or its
# own records, or a page of its own site, are not checked against the lists of
# system files, shell paths and command names, on any path:
# 930120: .gitignore
# 932160: bin/docker-entrypoint
# 932260: docker-build
SecAction "id:900591,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:path,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:files,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:skip-to,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:sub_path,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:ref,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:sha,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:branch,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:workflow,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:artifactName,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:redirect_to,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:path,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:files,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:skip-to,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:sub_path,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:ref,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:sha,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:branch,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:workflow,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:artifactName,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932160;ARGS:redirect_to,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:path,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:files,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:skip-to,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:sub_path,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:ref,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:sha,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:branch,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:workflow,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:artifactName,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932260;ARGS:redirect_to"
# The eighth change: on gitea's paths, some fields skip the rules that refused
# ordinary gitea requests there. They are the fields where gitea sends a search,
# a file name or a branch name. Each exclusion runs with the request, before the
# rules it switches off, those of phase 1 included, so this file is loaded before
# the Core Rule Set's rules. Each comment names a request the rule refused.
# gitea's searches of code, of issues and pull requests, and of commits send the
# text searched for in q, which skips these rules there:
@@ -198,8 +155,8 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
# 942140: information_schema.sql
# 944110: java/lang/Runtime.java
# 944130: java.lang.String.md
# Each request skips the rules that refused it. Rule 900591 already has path and
# redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
# Each request skips the rules that refused it. The fourth change already has
# path and redirect_to skip 930120, 932160 and 932260 on every path.
# A file's commit graph, in file.
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/[^/]+/[^/]+/graph$" \
@@ -324,5 +281,3 @@ SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME \
"@rx ^/api/actions_pipeline/_apis/pipelines/workflows/[0-9]+/artifacts/[^/]+/upload$" \
"id:900640,phase:1,pass,nolog,\
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920450;REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES:Content-Range"
SecMarker END_GITEA
internal/waf/waf.go
+57 -101
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
// Package waf runs the OWASP Core Rule Set 4.25.0, through Coraza, on the
// method, the URL with its query and the headers of a request, and on its
// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the six changes sww
// makes to it, the fixes for the apps SWW_APPS names, and the exclusions in
// SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as "Attack detection" under "Settings"
// in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no response.
// body while SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, with the eight changes sww
// makes to it and the exclusions in SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, as
// "Attack detection" under "Settings" in SPEC.md describes them. It reads no
// response.
//
// sww writes only to its state directory, so Coraza is built with
// its no_fs_access tag, as the Dockerfile and script/build build it: of a
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
@@ -34,8 +32,8 @@ import (
// directives are the Core Rule Set as sww runs it, with the
// paranoia level for %d, bodyDirectives for the first %s while
// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and the
// directives of every app in apps for the third.
// SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT is set, the exclusions file for the second, and
// giteaExclusions for the third.
// Each rule sww adds has an id from 900000 to 900999, the ids the
// Core Rule Set keeps for the rules that set it up, which
// SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES and the exclusions file refuse, so that no
@@ -83,28 +81,44 @@ SecRule ARGUMENTS_LIMIT_REACHED "@eq 1" "id:900300,phase:2,pass,\
# before the rules of phase 1 too.
%s
# The apps' fixes come before the rules for the same reason.
# The eighth change comes before the rules for the same reason.
%s
# The fifth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
# The sixth: only the rules for requests are loaded, and no response is
# inspected.
Include @owasp_crs/REQUEST-*.conf
# The third: redirect_uri is not checked for a URL naming an IP address or
# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here without regard to case.
# ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart body Coraza reads as
# well as the query parameters, so a field of this name is left out too.
# localhost. Coraza matches a parameter name here, and in the fourth,
# without regard to case. ARGS holds the fields of a form data or multipart
# body Coraza reads as well as the query parameters, so a field of one of
# these names is left out too.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 931100 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 934110 "!ARGS:redirect_uri"
# The fourth: Referer is not checked for a Unix command without arguments,
# for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130 refused
# every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md.
# The fourth: the query parameters in which gitea sends names within a
# repository or its own records, or a page of its own site, are not
# checked against the lists of system files, shell paths and command
# names. Coraza takes one rule id per directive.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 930120 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932160 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932260 "!ARGS:path|!ARGS:files|!ARGS:skip-to|\
!ARGS:sub_path|!ARGS:ref|!ARGS:sha|!ARGS:branch|!ARGS:workflow|\
!ARGS:artifactName|!ARGS:redirect_to"
# The fifth, for Referer: it is not checked for a Unix command without
# arguments, for Java starting a process, or for a Java class name. 944130
# refused every page opened from the page of java.lang.String.md. The
# cookies are left out in Inspect.
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 932340 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944110 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
SecRuleUpdateTargetById 944130 "!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer"
# The sixth: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
# The seventh: a container image push that reuses a layer names the image
# it takes the layer from in the query parameter from, which is not
# checked for command names. 932260 refused the push of a layer from
# owner/python3-app.
@@ -154,36 +168,18 @@ SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:900450,phase:2,pass,\
severity:'CRITICAL',setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+5'"
`
// app is an app whose ordinary requests the Core Rule Set would refuse,
// with the fixes that let them pass.
type app struct {
// directives are Coraza exclusions, loaded before the Core Rule Set's
// rules. Their first rule skips the rest unless Inspect sets the
// transaction variable app_ and the app's name, and they end with the
// marker it skips to.
directives string
// cookies are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request without.
cookies []string
}
//go:embed gitea.conf
var giteaDirectives string
// apps are the apps whose fixes sww has, by the name SWW_APPS gives each.
// giteaExclusions are the eighth change: the fields of gitea's own
// requests that skip the rules that refused them there, as Coraza
// directives.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a map
var apps = map[string]app{
"gitea": {
directives: giteaDirectives,
cookies: []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"},
},
}
//go:embed gitea.conf
var giteaExclusions string
// AppNames returns the names of the apps whose fixes sww has, in
// alphabetical order.
func AppNames() []string {
return slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(apps))
}
// cookiesNotRead are the cookies the Core Rule Set reads a request
// without, the rest of the fifth change.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var cookiesNotRead = []string{"gitea_flash", "redirect_to"}
// Params are what New needs.
type Params struct {
@@ -199,10 +195,6 @@ type Params struct {
// Core Rule Set's rules (SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE), "" while
// there is none.
ExclusionsFile string
// Apps are the names of the apps each hostname serves, by hostname in
// lowercase (SWW_APPS). A request gets the fixes of its hostname's
// apps only, or of every app while Apps is nil.
Apps map[string][]string
}
// The ids of sww's own rules, which an exclusions file may not
@@ -294,15 +286,13 @@ func checkExclusions(exclusions string) error {
type CoreRuleSet struct {
waf coraza.WAF
bodyLimit int64
apps map[string][]string
}
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the six changes and the apps' fixes,
// at params' paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading
// request bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file
// loaded before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error
// if it cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses
// it.
// New returns the Core Rule Set with the eight changes, at params'
// paranoia level, without the rules it switches off, reading request
// bodies up to params' limit, and with params' exclusions file loaded
// before the Core Rule Set's rules. An exclusions file is an error if it
// cannot be read or does not parse, or if checkExclusions refuses it.
func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
body := ""
if params.BodyLimit > 0 {
@@ -325,13 +315,8 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
}
}
var fixes strings.Builder
for _, name := range AppNames() {
fixes.WriteString(apps[name].directives + "\n")
}
text := fmt.Sprintf(directives, params.ParanoiaLevel, body, exclusions,
fixes.String())
giteaExclusions)
if len(params.DisabledRules) > 0 {
ids := make([]string, len(params.DisabledRules))
@@ -349,7 +334,7 @@ func New(params Params) (*CoreRuleSet, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load the Core Rule Set: %w", err)
}
return &CoreRuleSet{waf: waf, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit, apps: params.Apps}, nil
return &CoreRuleSet{waf: waf, bodyLimit: params.BodyLimit}, nil
}
// Result is what the Core Rule Set found in a request.
@@ -361,12 +346,11 @@ type Result struct {
Score int
}
// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client, with the
// fixes of the apps appsFor names for r's hostname: on its method, its URL
// with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header without those apps'
// cookies, and on body, r's body as the caller has it, as readBody reads
// it. It returns what it found, what it read of body, and the error that
// ended the reading early, if one did.
// Inspect runs the Core Rule Set on r, a request from client: on its
// method, its URL with the query, and its headers, the Cookie header
// without the cookies in cookiesNotRead, and on body, r's body as the
// caller has it, as readBody reads it. It returns what it found, what it
// read of body, and the error that ended the reading early, if one did.
func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
r *http.Request, client netip.Addr, body io.Reader,
) (Result, []byte, error) {
@@ -374,24 +358,13 @@ func (c *CoreRuleSet) Inspect(
// Closing would remove the files Coraza wrote, and it writes none.
defer func() { _ = tx.Close() }()
// The transaction's variables are set only through Coraza's interface
// for plugins.
state := tx.(plugintypes.TransactionState) //nolint:forcetypeassert // every one is
var cookiesNotRead []string
for _, name := range c.appsFor(r.Host) {
state.Variables().TX().Set("app_"+name, []string{"1"})
cookiesNotRead = append(cookiesNotRead, apps[name].cookies...)
}
tx.ProcessConnection(client.String(), 0, "", 0)
tx.ProcessURI(r.URL.String(), r.Method, r.Proto)
for name, values := range r.Header {
for _, value := range values {
if name == "Cookie" {
value = withoutCookies(value, cookiesNotRead)
value = withoutCookiesNotRead(value)
if value == "" {
continue // it held those cookies alone
}
@@ -484,26 +457,9 @@ func score(tx types.Transaction) int {
return n
}
// appsFor returns the names of the apps whose fixes a request for host,
// its Host header, gets: every app while SWW_APPS is unset, and otherwise
// those SWW_APPS lists for host's name, without the port and in
// lowercase.
func (c *CoreRuleSet) appsFor(host string) []string {
if c.apps == nil {
return AppNames()
}
hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err != nil {
hostname = host // it has no port
}
return c.apps[strings.ToLower(hostname)]
}
// withoutCookies returns value, a Cookie header's, without the cookies
// named in cookiesNotRead.
func withoutCookies(value string, cookiesNotRead []string) string {
// withoutCookiesNotRead returns value, a Cookie header's, without the
// cookies in cookiesNotRead.
func withoutCookiesNotRead(value string) string {
var kept []string
for cookie := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
internal/waf/waf_test.go
+2 -92
View File
@@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ func atDefaults(t *testing.T) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
}
// wantChange checks that crs lets through passes, a gitea request one of
// the six changes or gitea's fixes are for, and still finds result in
// refused, a request like it that they are not for.
// the eight changes is for, and still finds result in refused, a request
// like it that the change is not for.
func wantChange(
t *testing.T, crs *waf.CoreRuleSet, passes, refused request, result waf.Result,
) {
@@ -381,96 +381,6 @@ func TestImagePushThatReusesALayerIsNotCheckedForCommandNames(t *testing.T) {
matched(930120, 932160))
}
// giteaFixed are gitea requests that only gitea's fixes let through, one
// for each kind of fix, each with what the Core Rule Set finds in it
// without them.
//
//nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot be a list
var giteaFixed = []struct {
request request
result waf.Result
}{
// A search of code, on the path of gitea's search.
{get("/explore/code?q=SELECT%20*%20FROM%20users%20WHERE"), matched(942100)},
// A file name, in a parameter gitea sends names in, on any path.
{get("/?path=.gitignore"), matched(930120)},
// A file name, in a cookie of gitea's.
{
get("/owner/repo", "Cookie: gitea_flash=success%3DFile%2Bpackage.json%2Bdeleted"),
matched(930120),
},
}
// The hostnames of the tests of SWW_APPS: the one that serves gitea, and
// one that serves another app.
const (
giteaHost = "git.example"
otherHost = "blog.example"
)
// withHost returns r sent to host.
func withHost(r request, host string) request {
return request{r.method, r.target, append([]string{"Host: " + host}, r.headers...)}
}
// servingApps returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with SWW_APPS
// giving apps.
func servingApps(t *testing.T, apps map[string][]string) *waf.CoreRuleSet {
t.Helper()
crs, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
ParanoiaLevel: 1, DisabledRules: defaultDisabledRules, Apps: apps,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load the Core Rule Set: %v", err)
}
return crs
}
func TestAppsUnsetGivesEveryHostnameEveryAppsFixes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := servingApps(t, nil)
for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
for _, host := range []string{giteaHost, otherHost} {
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), waf.Result{})
}
}
}
func TestListedHostnameGetsItsAppsFixes(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
crs := servingApps(t, map[string][]string{giteaHost: {"gitea"}})
// The hostname is matched without the port and without regard to case.
for _, host := range []string{giteaHost, "GIT.Example:8443"} {
for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), waf.Result{})
}
}
}
func TestUnlistedHostnameGetsTheFullCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, apps := range []map[string][]string{
{giteaHost: {"gitea"}},
// SWW_APPS set empty lists no hostname.
{},
} {
crs := servingApps(t, apps)
for _, host := range []string{otherHost, otherHost + ":8443", "git.example.org"} {
for _, fixed := range giteaFixed {
wantResult(t, crs, withHost(fixed.request, host), fixed.result)
}
}
}
}
// withExclusions returns the Core Rule Set at the defaults, with the
// exclusions file at path.
func withExclusions(path string) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
script/cibuild
+5
View File
@@ -20,8 +20,13 @@ main() {
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
revision="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$revision" ] || revision="unknown"
created="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
--build-arg REVISION="$revision" \
--build-arg CREATED="$created" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
}
script/docker
+5
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,13 @@ main() {
# the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
revision="$(git rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$revision" ] || revision="unknown"
created="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
docker build --no-cache \
--build-arg VERSION="$version" \
--build-arg REVISION="$revision" \
--build-arg CREATED="$created" \
-t "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")" .
}