Rename internal/proxy to internal/servewaf (closes #173 )

The package passes nothing to an app since rproxy took that over, so it is named after the command it serves. Its constructor is New, like rproxy's. The rproxy tests call their stand-in for servewaf standIn, since a local servewaf would hide the package. No change of behaviour. Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-06 18:29:22 +00:00
47 changed files with 585 additions and 1738 deletions
@@ -133,11 +133,32 @@ RUN mkdir /etc/sysusers.d \
    && echo 'u  _runit-log  -  "runit svlogd user"  /nonexistent  /sbin/nologin' \
        > /etc/sysusers.d/runit.conf
-# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive. apt fetches
+# ca-certificates, nix-bin and runit, from Ubuntu's archive as it was at
-# them over plain HTTP and checks each one against the archive's signed
+# the snapshot moment, which is never earlier than the Ubuntu image above.
-# package lists, so no CA certificates are needed.
+# apt checks every package against the snapshot's InRelease files, and
-RUN apt-get update \
+# this step checks those against the hashes named here, which are those
 # of the amd64 archive: other architectures use Ubuntu's ports archive.
 # apt also fetches the live archive's InRelease files, which change daily
 # and which the install does not use. The snapshot service is HTTPS only
 # and this image has no CA certificates yet, so this step uses the Go
 # image's. The snapshot service answers 503 at times; apt retries a
 # failed download, waiting twice as long before each retry, and this
 # step gives it five retries, about half a minute in all, where its
 # default of three gives up after seven seconds.
 RUN --mount=type=bind,from=builder,source=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt,target=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
    apt-get update --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
        -o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
        -o Acquire::Retries=5 \
    && printf '%s\n' \
        '45f95ce276cdba3e41870516a130e03c58b8b7a79e9546b0efe9e526d255740c  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute_InRelease' \
        '802e675dd9de4c7f3916434a95e7c1d8eec0e82886622d7805ab19a2c6fe0365  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-updates_InRelease' \
        '64b3353f0bd4970b4f7271962245bcea9ff24d4cc7bea16b433f8a60e42ca3dd  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-backports_InRelease' \
        '1d5041572116a8b23aabf79ac7439ad8af83d57ad3fb0f9aa0d4523ec10c5908  snapshot.ubuntu.com_ubuntu_20261001T000000Z_dists_resolute-security_InRelease' \
        | (cd /var/lib/apt/lists && sha256sum --check --strict) \
    && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install --yes --no-install-recommends \
        --snapshot 20261001T000000Z \
        -o Acquire::https::CaInfo=/tmp/go-image-ca.crt \
        -o Acquire::Retries=5 \
        ca-certificates nix-bin runit \
    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
 .PHONY: bootstrap setup test lint fmt fmt-check tidy check docker hooks build \
-	run example-app gitea-requests gitea-setup
+	run example-app gitea-requests
 # Makefile targets are thin shims; the implementations live in script/
 # per the scripts-to-rule-them-all pattern (see the Entrypoints section
 # of README.md). tidy writes go.mod and go.sum as `go mod tidy` does,
 # which test checks. build and run are for working on the code by hand;
 # example-app checks the image with an app built on it; gitea-requests
-# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults;
+# reports the gitea requests the Core Rule Set refuses at the defaults.
 # gitea-setup checks the setup in deploy/gitea.
 bootstrap:
 	@script/bootstrap
@@ -50,6 +49,3 @@ example-app:
 gitea-requests:
 	@script/gitea-requests
 gitea-setup:
 	@script/gitea-setup
@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ It protects against:
 - Scrapers that fetch every page of a site, all day. Each client gets a limit on
  requests and on bytes per minute, per hour and per day. The defaults leave
-  room for a person reading a site for hours. They catch a scraper that keeps up
+  room for programmatic use of an API, such as an automation fleet, and catch a
-  one request every 2 seconds. A client over a limit is refused and banned: for
+  client firing requests as fast as it can within seconds. A client over a limit
-  a while at first, for three times as long at each repeat, and permanently when
+  is refused and banned: for a while at first, for three times as long at each
-  it keeps at it.
+  repeat, and permanently when it keeps at it.
 - Scanners that probe for secrets, such as `/.env` or `/.git/config`. The
  default rule file bans such a client at its first probe, and its next request
  during the ban makes the ban permanent. Your own rules, or a list of trap
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ Not built, and not planned:
 ### The image
 No image is published. Build it from a clone. `make docker` runs the tests and
-the linter, then builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`.
+the linter, then builds the image, tagged `smallwebwaf`. It builds for amd64, on
 an amd64 host only.
 ```sh
 git clone https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf.git
@@ -236,13 +237,13 @@ Every setting the code reads, with its default:
 | `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`                         | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients skip every check, such as your monitoring.                                                                                                  |
 | `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`             | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse.                                                                                       |
 | `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`                          | empty                                                                          | Netblocks whose clients are refused.                                                                                                                                |
-| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`              | `120`                                                                          | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                |
+| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`              | `500`                                                                          | The most requests a client may make in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                |
-| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`                | `1500`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                 |
+| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`                | `20000`                                                                        | The most requests a client may make in an hour, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                 |
-| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                 | `6000`                                                                         | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                   |
+| `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                 | `300000`                                                                       | The most requests a client may make in a day, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                                                                   |
 | `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS`            | empty                                                                          | Path prefixes whose requests the request and byte limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/`.                                                              |
-| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`             | `off`                                                                          | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it.                             |
+| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`             | `4G`                                                                           | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a minute, a size or `off`; the request that takes a client past any byte limit bans it.                             |
-| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`               | `50G`                                                                          | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`.                                                                                           |
+| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`               | `20G`                                                                          | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in an hour, a size or `off`.                                                                                           |
-| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                | `100G`                                                                         | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`.                                                                                             |
+| `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY`                | `200G`                                                                         | The most bytes a client's requests may carry in a day, a size or `off`.                                                                                             |
 | `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT`                        | `both`                                                                         | Which body bytes the byte limits count: `response`, `request` or `both`.                                                                                            |
 | `SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`              | `30`                                                                           | The most refusals by a rule file, a trap path or the Core Rule Set a client may get in a minute, a count or `off`; one more bans it.                                |
 | `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`                       | `403`                                                                          | How a refused client is answered: `403`, `429` or `close`, which drops the connection.                                                                              |
@@ -407,10 +408,10 @@ services:
            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 203.0.113.0/24,198.51.100.7
            # A netblock that sends nothing wanted.
            SWWAF_DENY_NETS: 198.51.100.128/25
-            # Tighter limits for everyone else: a small static site.
+            # Tighter limits for everyone else: a site with no API.
-            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "60"
+            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: "120"
-            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "600"
+            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: "3000"
-            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "3000"
+            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY: "30000"
            # Hosting networks and one country get a share of those limits.
            SWWAF_ASN_LIMIT_PERCENT: AS14061:50,AS16276:25
            SWWAF_COUNTRY_LIMIT_PERCENT: cn:25
@@ -431,9 +432,10 @@ volumes:
 gitea behind traefik, set up for a code forge:
 - the upload limits raised, in size and in time;
- the response size limit raised, for clones over 1 GiB;
+- the response size limit and the byte limits raised, for clones over 1 GiB;
 - the Actions runners exempt from counting;
- the default request and byte limits kept.
+- the default request limits kept, since they already leave room for API
  clients.
 `traefik` is the network traefik is on, made outside this file.
@@ -487,6 +489,11 @@ services:
            SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME: fsn1/servewaf
            # The Actions runners ask for work all day; never count them.
            SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS: 10.0.4.0/24
            # Raised with rproxy's response limit, to four times the default
            # each, so that one clone of that size breaks no byte limit.
            SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE: 16G
            SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR: 80G
            SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY: 800G
            # gitea never serves these; a request for one bans the client.
            SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: /wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php,/wp-admin/
        volumes:
@@ -504,9 +511,8 @@ volumes:
    servewaf-state:
 ```
-`deploy/gitea` holds a complete setup of gitea, traefik included, as a Docker
+[`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) records what the defaults do in front of gitea,
-Compose file. [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) explains it, and records what the
+request by request.
 defaults do in front of gitea, request by request.
 ### `rproxy` beside the app
@@ -656,8 +662,8 @@ aside as `<name>.bad`, and never stops the running process (see
 ### The image and its processes
- The image is built on Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest. Its Ubuntu packages
+- The image is built on Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest, with its packages
-  come from Ubuntu's archive, and nixpkgs is fixed at one release. An app's
+  from a snapshot of Ubuntu's archive and nixpkgs fixed at one release. An app's
  `Dockerfile` installs a package with `nix-env -iA nixpkgs.<name>` and gets the
  same package each time it is built (see [`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md)).
 - runit, a service supervisor, runs `smallwebwaf` as the `smallwebwaf` user (uid
@@ -779,10 +785,6 @@ on the host.
  Core Rule Set is known to refuse, and prints what `servewaf` did with each.
  Needs network access, and a docker daemon that pushes to a registry on
  `localhost` over plain HTTP. `make gitea-requests`.
 - `script/gitea-setup`: builds the image, brings up the setup in `deploy/gitea`,
  and checks it as [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md) describes. Then it removes
  the containers, the network, the volumes and the image it built. Needs network
  access. `make gitea-setup`.
 ## TODO
@@ -806,8 +808,7 @@ on the host.
 - [`docs/state-files.md`](docs/state-files.md): the state files and what each
  holds.
 - [`docs/image.md`](docs/image.md): what the image holds and how it is pinned.
- [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md): `smallwebwaf` in front of gitea: the setup
+- [`docs/gitea.md`](docs/gitea.md): `smallwebwaf` in front of gitea.
  in `deploy/gitea`, and what the defaults do there.
 ## License
@@ -123,9 +123,7 @@ runs steps 3 to 13, and does the counting of step 15. The first step that
 produces a final answer ends the checks. Step 15 runs for each request
 `servewaf` answers with `allow`, `deny` or `close`. `rproxy`'s size and time
 limits apply to the whole exchange. Each step names the section that holds its
-rules. Each check is a heuristic. Its name, in parentheses below, is the value
+rules.
 of the request log's `heuristic` field. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give
 theirs in `after_answer_heuristic` instead.
 1. `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz` is answered at once by `rproxy`, before any
   check, so a health checker never needs an exemption and is never refused.
@@ -143,9 +141,9 @@ theirs in `after_answer_heuristic` instead.
      around its address, a /64 by default, since one abuser usually controls a
      whole /64. A client is therefore one IPv4 address or one IPv6 group.
 3. The static lists. A client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 4 to 12, the
-   byte limits and the error burst. A client in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused
+   byte limits and the error burst. A client in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused; a
-   (`deny_nets`); a client in both lists is let through.
+   client in both lists is let through.
-4. Bans. A client under a ban is refused (`active_ban`; see "Bans").
+4. Bans. A client under a ban is refused (see "Bans").
 5. The lookup, unless `SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off` (see "Lookup of AS number
   and country"). The request goes on at once. It waits for the first GeoJS
   answer, up to `SWWAF_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`, only when one of these needs it:
@@ -155,26 +153,22 @@ theirs in `after_answer_heuristic` instead.
    A request that ends before the answer comes is logged without it.
-6. The country lists (`countries`; see "Country lists").
+6. The country lists (see "Country lists").
-7. The reputation sources (see "Reputation"), in this order:
+7. The reputation sources (see "Reputation"). A client on a fetched blocklist
-    - A client on a fetched blocklist gets `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION`
+   gets `SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION`. A client on the CrowdSec decision list is
-      (`blocklists`).
+   banned. A client listed by a DNS blocklist, or scored at least
-    - A client on the CrowdSec decision list is banned (`crowdsec`).
+   `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` by AbuseIPDB, gets `SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION`.
    - A client listed by a DNS blocklist gets `SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION`
      (`dnsbl`).
    - A client scored at least `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE` by AbuseIPDB gets
      `SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION` (`abuseipdb`).
 8. The client's limit percentage (see "Biased thresholds").
-9. Rate limiting (`rate_limits`; see "Request rate limits, per client"). A
+9. Rate limiting (see "Request rate limits, per client"). A request over a limit
-   request over a limit times the percentage is refused and bans the client.
+   times the percentage is refused and bans the client.
-10. The trap paths (`trap_paths`; see "Attack detection"). A request for one is
+10. The trap paths (see "Attack detection"). A request for one is refused and
-    refused and bans the client.
+    bans the client.
-11. The rule files (`rule_files`; see "Rule files"). Matching stops at the first
+11. The rule files (see "Rule files"). Matching stops at the first rule that
-    rule that refuses.
+    refuses.
-12. The header limits (`header_limits`; see "Answering in time"), and then the
+12. The header limits (see "Answering in time"), and then the Core Rule Set (see
-    Core Rule Set (`core_rule_set`; see "Attack detection"). A Core Rule Set
+    "Attack detection"). A Core Rule Set match is refused with `403` while
-    match is refused with `403` while `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is `block`, and only
+    `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is `block`, and only logged and alerted while it is
-    logged and alerted while it is `detect`.
+    `detect`.
 13. A path under `/_smallwebwaf/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees
    that prefix.
 14. `rproxy` passes the request to `SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL`, streaming (see "Passing
@@ -188,14 +182,14 @@ theirs in `after_answer_heuristic` instead.
      are added to the byte counters, as `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` says. For a
      WebSocket, what it carried each way counts once it closes. A client whose
      total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that limit and
-      is banned (`byte_limits`). The response in progress is not cut off.
+      is banned. The response in progress is not cut off.
    - For a request it allowed, the client's history and the anomaly counters
      are updated, and the alert thresholds are evaluated.
    For a request it refused, `servewaf` adds nothing to the byte limits. It
    updates the history and the anomaly counters at its decision. It counts the
-    refusals the error burst counts at the decision too (`refusal_limit`; see
+    refusals the error burst counts at the decision too (see "Attack
-    "Attack detection").
+    detection").
 In `SWWAF_MODE=observe`, every refusal above is logged as what would have
 happened, nothing is refused, and `servewaf` makes no ban of its own. A path
@@ -403,31 +397,32 @@ Conventions:
 ### Request rate limits, per client
-Breaking one bans the client. The defaults let people read a site and stop
+Breaking one bans the client. The defaults suit programmatic use of an API, such
-scrapers that send many requests slowly over hours or days. The hour limit is
+as an automation fleet on another host, and still stop abusive bots. A fleet of
-the main one.
+20 agents, each making a request every 10 seconds at its busiest, makes 120
 requests a minute and 7,200 an hour. Working around the clock, it makes 172,800
 a day. It stays under all three limits.
- Per minute: 120, 2 requests a second. It leaves room for a person opening two
+- Per minute: 500, about 8 requests a second. It leaves room for the fleet's 120
-  pages at once with an empty cache. A gitea page opened with an empty cache
+  a minute and a few quick first visits with an empty cache. A gitea page opened
-  loads 20 to 60 files, and a handful once cached.
+  with an empty cache loads about 40 files. A client firing requests as fast as
- Per hour: 1,500. A person reading code in gitea for a whole hour, a page every
+  it can passes the limit within seconds.
-  20 seconds, makes about 900 requests. A scraper making one request every 2
+- Per hour: 20,000, about 5.5 requests a second for a whole hour. A client that
-  seconds makes 1,800 an hour, more than the limit.
+  keeps up 6 a second makes 21,600 in an hour, and passes it, at 360 a minute,
- Per day: 6,000, four hours at the hour limit. A scraper making one request
+  under the minute limit. The fleet's 7,200 an hour is about a third of it.
-  every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the limit.
+- Per day: 300,000, about 3.5 requests a second around the clock. A scraper that
  keeps up 4 a second makes 345,600 a day, and passes it. At 240 a minute and
  14,400 an hour, it stays under the other two limits.
-Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits, about 4
+Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits, such as one
-requests a minute around the clock. Only the other checks can catch an abuser
+that keeps up 3 requests a second. Only the other checks can catch an abuser
 that slow. They include the trap paths, the rule files, the Core Rule Set and
-the blocklists. An abuser that trips none of them is not caught.
+the blocklists. An abuser that trips none of them is not caught. A machine that
-
+keeps up more than 500 requests a minute passes the minute limit. One that keeps
-Some legitimate clients pass the limits:
+up more than about 5.5 a second for an hour passes the hour limit. One that
-
+keeps up more than about 3.5 a second all day passes the day limit, as two busy
- An Actions runner asks gitea for work all day and can pass the limits.
+Actions runners on one address do. Such a machine's address belongs in
- Everyone behind one shared address, such as an office, shares one client's
+`SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
  limits.
 Their addresses belong in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
 `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` takes path prefixes out of the count, such as
 static assets or health checks; their bytes are not counted either. A prefix is
@@ -440,10 +435,12 @@ matched the same way.
 ### Byte limits, per client
-By default there is no minute limit, so a client can download in a burst at full
+The hour and day limits sit about twice above what 40 people busy with heavy web
-speed. The hour limit defaults to 50 GiB and the day limit to 100 GiB. They
+apps move together on one address. Each moves about 256 MiB an hour, for ten
-allow several downloads of a few GiB each. A response's bytes are counted when
+hours a day. A response's bytes are counted when it ends (see step 15). So the
-it ends (see step 15).
+minute limit holds three of the largest responses, with their requests, ending
 in the same minute. No single download then breaks a limit. An operator who
 raises `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` must raise the byte limits too.
 ### Lookup of AS number and country
@@ -1547,11 +1544,20 @@ It sets no `ENTRYPOINT` or `USER` of its own. The container must start
 - The image is Ubuntu's newest long-term support release, pinned by digest, and
  moves to the next LTS release when that ships. Its packages come from Ubuntu's
-  archive, whose packages change with every update.
+  snapshot service, the archive as it was at the moment the Dockerfile names,
  rather than the live archive, whose packages change with every update. The
  snapshot is never older than the pinned Ubuntu image, since older packages can
  need older versions of packages the image holds, and it moves forward with the
  image's digest. The Dockerfile names the hash of each of the snapshot's
  `InRelease` files, which cover every package list and so every package, and
  the build checks them before installing. The live archive's `InRelease` files,
  which `apt-get update` also fetches and the install does not use, are left out
  of the check. The hashes are the amd64 archive's, so the image is built for
  amd64 only.
 - The Ubuntu image has no CA certificates. Without them Nix cannot download
  packages and `servewaf` cannot reach GeoJS, so `ca-certificates` is installed
-  by name. apt fetches the packages over plain HTTP and checks each one against
+  by name. The snapshot itself is fetched over HTTPS with the CA certificates of
-  the archive's signed package lists, so the install needs no CA certificates.
+  the Go image that builds `smallwebwaf`, itself pinned by digest.
 - nixpkgs comes from a release file on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
  hash, not from a GitHub archive, whose bytes can change. Root uses Nix
  directly; no Nix daemon runs. `nix-bin` creates no build users, so
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
 # Gitea behind traefik, with rproxy and servewaf in front of it.
 # docs/gitea.md says what each setting here does and why. Before starting it:
 #   - set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image, named by digest;
 #   - replace git.example.org with the site's host name;
 #   - replace each 10.99.0 with the first three numbers of a /24 subnet that
 #     no other network on the host uses. The /24 must lie inside 10.0.0.0/8,
 #     172.16.0.0/12 or 192.168.0.0/16, because rproxy believes
 #     X-Forwarded-For only from those by default. Replace each fd10:99 with
 #     the first two hextets of an unused /64 subnet whose third and fourth
 #     hextets are 0, as in fd10:99::/64;
 #   - set GITEA_SECRET_KEY to the output of
 #     `docker run --rm <gitea's image below> gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY`,
 #     once per install, and keep it.
 # Then run `docker compose up --detach` in this directory.
 # script/gitea-setup checks this setup.
 name: gitea
 x-logging: &logging
    driver: json-file
    options:
        max-size: 10m
        max-file: "5"
 services:
    traefik:
        # traefik v3.7.17, 2026-11-03
        image: traefik@sha256:68ae5fe5b64ca166704b746a9e8afcd385e36b3f569a5691401bf652d57b3748
        # traefik replaces the X-Forwarded-For header a visitor sends. Keep it
        # so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network,
        # and skip servewaf's checks.
        command:
            - --providers.docker.exposedbydefault=false
            - --entrypoints.web.address=:80
            - --entrypoints.web.http.redirections.entrypoint.to=websecure
            - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:443
            # Until a certificate resolver is added here, as for your other
            # sites, traefik answers with a certificate it made itself.
            - --entrypoints.websecure.http.tls=true
            # traefik's own limit of 60 seconds for a whole request would cut
            # off an upload long before rproxy's limit of 30 minutes.
            - --entrypoints.websecure.transport.respondingTimeouts.readTimeout=30m
        ports:
            - 80:80
            - 443:443
        volumes:
            - /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock:ro
        networks:
            shared:
                # Containers on the shared network find traefik under the
                # site's name, and so reach it from their own address.
                aliases:
                    - git.example.org
        restart: unless-stopped
    gitea:
        # gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
        image: gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef
        environment:
            GITEA__server__ROOT_URL: https://git.example.org/
            # Gitea starts at its defaults, with SQLite, instead of showing its
            # install page to whoever opens it first.
            GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK: "true"
            GITEA__security__SECRET_KEY: ${GITEA_SECRET_KEY:?set GITEA_SECRET_KEY, see docs/gitea.md}
            # Accounts are made with `gitea admin user create`.
            GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION: "true"
            # rproxy's addresses. Gitea then takes each visitor's address from
            # the X-Real-Ip header traefik sets and rproxy passes on.
            GITEA__security__REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES: 10.99.0.2,fd10:99::2
        volumes:
            - gitea-data:/data
        networks:
            - shared
        restart: unless-stopped
    rproxy:
        image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
        environment:
            SWRP_WAF_BACKEND: http://servewaf:8080
            SWRP_UPSTREAM_URL: http://gitea:3000
            # Pushes, LFS objects, packages and release attachments of up to
            # 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes.
            SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE: 2G
            SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS: "1800000"
            # 15 minutes for a clone or a download, half the default.
            SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS: "900000"
        labels:
            traefik.enable: "true"
            traefik.http.routers.gitea.rule: Host(`git.example.org`)
            traefik.http.routers.gitea.entrypoints: websecure
            traefik.http.services.gitea.loadbalancer.server.port: "8080"
        networks:
            shared:
                ipv4_address: 10.99.0.2
                ipv6_address: fd10:99::2
        logging: *logging
        restart: unless-stopped
    servewaf:
        image: ${SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE:?set SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE to the smallwebwaf image}
        environment:
            SMALLWEBWAF_COMMAND: servewaf
            # The containers on the shared network skip the checks. Add the
            # address of an automation fleet on another host here too; without
            # that, it is counted like any client.
            SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS: 10.99.0.128/25,fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65
            # In block mode the Core Rule Set refuses everyday Gitea searches
            # and file names, and 31 refusals in a minute ban the address.
            SWWAF_WAF_MODE: detect
        volumes:
            - servewaf-state:/var/lib/smallwebwaf
        networks:
            - shared
        logging: *logging
        restart: unless-stopped
 networks:
    # The network traefik and Gitea share. Its containers get addresses in the
    # upper half of each subnet, which servewaf lets skip the checks. Each
    # subnet's gateway, the host's own address on it, stays out of that half:
    # requests docker passes on from a published port can come from it.
    shared:
        enable_ipv6: true
        ipam:
            config:
                - subnet: 10.99.0.0/24
                  ip_range: 10.99.0.128/25
                  gateway: 10.99.0.1
                - subnet: fd10:99::/64
                  ip_range: fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65
                  gateway: fd10:99::1
 volumes:
    gitea-data:
    servewaf-state:
@@ -1,177 +1,51 @@
 # smallwebwaf in front of gitea
-`deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` runs gitea behind traefik, with `rproxy` and
+These notes record what `smallwebwaf` does in front of gitea at the default
-`servewaf` in front of it. This document says what that setup sets and why, and
+settings. They are observations, not requirements; the requirements are in
-what the defaults would do without it. [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md) says how
+[`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md). `script/gitea-requests` runs gitea behind `rproxy` and
-`smallwebwaf` behaves.
+`servewaf`, and sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the
 ## The setup
 Four containers share one Docker network, the shared network:
 - traefik, which routes the site's HTTPS requests to `rproxy`, and redirects
  plain HTTP to HTTPS;
 - `rproxy`, in front of gitea;
 - gitea 1.27.3, as its image comes;
 - `servewaf`, with a volume for its state files.
 To start it:
 1. In `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml`, replace `git.example.org` with the site's
   host name.
 2. Replace each `10.99.0` with the first three numbers of a `/24` subnet that no
   other network on the host uses. The `/24` must lie inside `10.0.0.0/8`,
   `172.16.0.0/12` or `192.168.0.0/16`, because `rproxy` believes
   `X-Forwarded-For` only from those by default. Replace each `fd10:99` with the
   first two hextets of an unused `/64` subnet whose third and fourth hextets
   are 0, as in `fd10:99::/64`.
 3. Set `SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE` to the `smallwebwaf` image, named by digest.
 4. Set `GITEA_SECRET_KEY` to the output of
   `docker run --rm <gitea's image> gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY`, with
   gitea's image as `deploy/gitea/compose.yaml` names it. Do this once per
   install, and keep the key.
 5. Run `docker compose up --detach` in `deploy/gitea`.
 6. Make gitea's first user with `gitea admin user create`, in gitea's container,
   as the user `git`.
 Sign-up is off: accounts are made with `gitea admin user create`. gitea starts
 at its defaults, with SQLite. traefik answers with a certificate it made itself
 until you add a certificate resolver, as for your other sites. SSH to gitea does
 not pass through `smallwebwaf`; publish gitea's SSH port yourself if you use it.
 `make gitea-setup` checks the setup. It builds the image, brings the setup up
 under a name of its own, and checks:
 - that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
  `rproxy`, and that `servewaf` checks them;
 - that gitea logs the visitor's address, not `rproxy`'s;
 - that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
 - that with `servewaf` stopped, gitea still answers through `rproxy`.
 ## Uploads and downloads
 An upload is a request:
 - a git push;
 - an LFS object;
 - a container image layer;
 - a package file;
 - a release attachment.
 The setup lets an upload of up to 2 GiB, sent in up to 30 minutes, through:
 - `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` is `2G`. At the default, an upload over 100 MiB is cut
  off.
 - `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS` is `1800000`, 30 minutes. At the default, an upload
  that takes over 60 seconds is cut off.
 - traefik's `readTimeout` is 30 minutes. traefik's own default of 60 seconds for
  a whole request would cut off an upload first.
 A clone or a download is a response:
 - `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_TIME_MS` is `900000`, 15 minutes, half the default. A clone
  or download that takes longer is cut off.
 - `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` stays at its default, 1 GiB. A repository whose clone
  is larger needs it raised.
 The byte limits stay at their defaults: no minute limit, 50 GiB an hour and 100
 GiB a day.
 ## The checks
 `SWWAF_WAF_MODE` is `detect`. The Core Rule Set then logs a match, with its rule
 ids, and refuses nothing. In `block` mode, the default, it refuses everyday
 gitea searches and file names. The section "What the Core Rule Set refuses in
 `block` mode" below lists them. Each such refusal counts toward the error burst,
 so 31 in one minute ban the address.
 Every other check stays at its default. A client may make 120 requests a minute,
 1,500 an hour and 6,000 a day. Archive downloads and blame and history pages are
 what scrapers hammer, and these limits do most of the work there.
 ## The shared network
 Containers on the shared network skip `servewaf`'s checks:
 - The shared network's subnets are `10.99.0.0/24` and `fd10:99::/64`. Docker
  gives its containers addresses in the upper half of each, `10.99.0.128/25` and
  `fd10:99:0:0:8000::/65`, which `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` names.
 - traefik is known on the shared network by the site's host name. So a container
  there that asks for the site reaches traefik from its own address. An
  automation fleet in such a container skips the checks.
 - Each subnet's gateway, `10.99.0.1` and `fd10:99::1`, is the host's own address
  on it. Requests docker passes on from a published port can come from the
  gateway, so the gateways are left out of `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`. The network has
  IPv6, so a visitor over IPv6 reaches traefik from its own address, and
  `servewaf` checks it as itself.
 - A container on the shared network that asks for the site at the host's public
  address arrives from the gateway. It is checked like any visitor.
 - A fleet on another host can have its address added to `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`.
  Without that, it is counted like any client.
 - traefik replaces the `X-Forwarded-For` a visitor sends, by default. Keep it
  so: otherwise a visitor could name an address on the shared network, and skip
  the checks.
 - Anything on the shared network can reach gitea and `servewaf` around `rproxy`.
  Put only containers you trust on it.
 ## gitea's settings
 - `REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES` names `rproxy`'s fixed addresses, `10.99.0.2`
  and `fd10:99::2`. gitea then takes each visitor's address from the `X-Real-Ip`
  header, which traefik sets and `rproxy` passes on. Without it, gitea logs
  every visitor as `rproxy`.
 - `INSTALL_LOCK` is `true`, as "The setup" above says.
 ## Methods
 `rproxy` passes on only these methods: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `OPTIONS`, `PUT`,
 `DELETE`, `PATCH` and `QUERY`. gitea 1.27.3 needs no other. Its routes use:
 - pages and the API: `GET`, `HEAD`, `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
 - git's push, clone and fetch over HTTP: `GET`, `POST` and `OPTIONS`;
 - LFS: `GET`, `POST` and `PUT`;
 - the container registry and the other package registries: `GET`, `HEAD`,
  `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE`;
 - Actions runners: `POST`.
 ## The log
 `rproxy` and `servewaf` write each query string to the log whole. A token sent
 in the query string, as `?token=`, is then in the log. Send it in the
 `Authorization` header instead.
 ## Actions runners
 A runner on the shared network skips the checks. One on another host is counted
 like any client. A runner older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work
 every 2 seconds, 1,800 requests an hour. While it runs a job, it reports the
 job's log and state every second instead, two requests a second.
 So one idle runner makes 1,800 requests an hour, more than the hour limit of
 1,500. A busy one, at two requests a second, passes the minute limit of 120
 within two minutes. Its address is then banned, its running jobs fail, and each
 repeat within a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less often.
 Put the runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
 ## What the Core Rule Set refuses in `block` mode
 These notes record what the Core Rule Set does in front of gitea in `block`
 mode, at the other defaults. They are observations, not requirements.
 `script/gitea-requests` runs gitea behind `rproxy` and `servewaf` at the
 defaults. It sends through them a sample of gitea's ordinary use and the
 requests named below. It reports each request the Core Rule Set refuses, so that
 these notes can be checked again when gitea or the Core Rule Set changes
-version. In `detect` mode, as the setup runs it, the same requests are logged
+version.
 with their rule ids, and pass.
-Each refusal answers only that request ("Bans" in `SPEC.md` says what it counts
+## What the defaults cover
 toward). The request log names the rule in `waf_rule_ids`, which
 `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` can switch off.
-### What it lets through
+- SSH access to gitea does not pass through `smallwebwaf` and is not protected
  by it.
 - A clone is a response. It fits the defaults of 30 minutes and 1 GiB unless the
  repository is large or the link slow. A repository whose clone is larger than
  1 GiB needs `SWRP_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE` raised, and the byte limits with it
  ("Byte limits, per client" in `SPEC.md`).
 - A push is a request, and so is every other upload:
    - a git push;
    - an LFS object;
    - a container image layer;
    - a package file;
    - a release attachment.
-The Core Rule Set lets gitea's ordinary use through, apart from the refusals in
+    At the defaults, an upload larger than 100 MiB or taking more than 60
-the sections after this one:
+    seconds is cut off ("`rproxy`'s limits" in `SPEC.md`). A gitea that takes
    large uploads needs `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE` and `SWRP_MAX_REQUEST_TIME_MS`
    raised to fit.
 - Archive download and blame or history pages are what scrapers hammer. The
  request limits do most of the work there.
 - An Actions runner that reaches gitea through `smallwebwaf` sends requests all
  day. One older than version 0.4 (April 2026) asks for work every 2 seconds,
  43,200 requests a day. While it runs a job, it reports the job's log and state
  every second instead, two requests a second. So one runner busy all day sends
  120 requests a minute and 172,800 a day, under the request limits. Two such
  runners on one address, each busy all day, make 345,600 and pass the day limit
  of 300,000. Three busy at once make 21,600 an hour and pass the hour limit of
  20,000. Five busy at once make 600 a minute and pass the minute limit of 500.
  Their address is then banned, their running jobs fail, and each repeat within
  a day makes the ban longer. Newer runners ask for work less often. Put the
  runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`.
 ## What the Core Rule Set lets through
 At the defaults, the Core Rule Set lets gitea's ordinary use through, apart from
 the refusals in the next section:
 - browsing and views of files in a repository, with their history, blame and the
  file tree;
@@ -186,6 +60,12 @@ the sections after this one:
  editor, code included, since no body is read;
 - the page gitea shows after a change, with its message naming what was done.
 ## What the Core Rule Set still refuses
 Each refusal answers only that request ("Bans" in `SPEC.md` says what it counts
 toward). The request log names the rule in `waf_rule_ids`, which
 `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES` can switch off.
 ### A query string that reads as an attack
 Most often this is a search. A search term is a query parameter, which the Core
@@ -303,7 +183,7 @@ the runner. The error burst ("Attack detection" in `SPEC.md`) bans it after more
 than 30 such refusals from its address in a minute, as when many jobs upload at
 once. `actions/upload-artifact@v4` does not send the header.
-### What body inspection refuses
+## What body inspection refuses
 With `SWWAF_WAF_BODY_LIMIT` set, the Core Rule Set reads request bodies too. In
 front of gitea it then refuses these, until their rule ids, named in the request
@@ -315,7 +195,7 @@ log, are added to `SWWAF_WAF_DISABLED_RULES`:
 - PyPI uploads (922130);
 - attachments named like `debug.log` or `config.yml` (932180).
-### What `script/gitea-requests` sends
+## What `script/gitea-requests` sends
 Of the requests above, the script sends:
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ is pinned that way.
 ## Contents
 - Ubuntu 26.04 LTS, pinned by digest.
- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu's archive.
+- `ca-certificates`, `nix-bin` and `runit` from Ubuntu, from the snapshot of its
  archive at `20261001T000000Z`.
 - Nix, with nixpkgs `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` set up for root as
  `nixpkgs`. No Nix daemon; `build-users-group =` in `/etc/nix/nix.conf`. Root's
  Nix profile, `/nix/var/nix/profiles/default/bin`, last on the `PATH`.
@@ -25,8 +26,10 @@ is pinned that way.
 ## Pins
- Ubuntu's packages are not pinned: they come from the live archive, whose
+- Ubuntu's packages: the snapshot service, `--snapshot 20261001T000000Z` on both
-  packages change with every update.
+  `apt-get update` and `apt-get install`. The SHA-256 hash of each of the
  snapshot's `InRelease` files is named in the `Dockerfile` and checked after
  `apt-get update`. The hashes are the amd64 archive's.
 - nixpkgs: the release file `nixexprs.tar.xz` of
  `nixos-26.05.11045.774debe7a0d1` on `releases.nixos.org`, named with its
  SHA-256 hash.
@@ -107,35 +107,6 @@ Every one of these lines has:
 - `would_action`: in `observe` mode, what `enforce` mode would have done with a
  request it would have refused. `action` then names what was done, normally
  `forward`.
 - `heuristic`: the heuristic that refused the request, in `observe` mode too. It
  is left out when none did.
 - `heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic acted on. Each
  heuristic and its figures:
    - `deny_nets`: `netblock`, the entry of `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` the client is in;
    - `active_ban`: `netblock`, the ban's netblock, and `ban_expires`;
    - `countries`: `country`, and `setting`, the country list that refused it;
    - `blocklists`: `lists`, the blocklist URLs that list the client;
    - `crowdsec`: `scenario`, the decision's scenario, and `expires`, when the
      decision ends;
    - `dnsbl`: `zones`, the DNS blocklist zones that list the client, their keys
      masked;
    - `abuseipdb`: `score`, and `min_score`, `SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE`;
    - `rate_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`;
    - `trap_paths`: `path`, the trap path asked for;
    - `rule_files`: `rule_id` and `rule_action`, of the rule that refused it;
    - `header_limits`: `fields`, `fields_limit`, `cookies` and `cookies_limit`;
    - `core_rule_set`: `score`, and `threshold`, `SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD`;
    - `refusal_limit`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, of the error burst;
    - `byte_limits`: `window`, `count` and `limit`, the count in bytes.
 - `after_answer_heuristic`: the heuristic that banned the client after
  `servewaf` answered the request, in `observe` mode too: `refusal_limit` or
  `byte_limits`.
 - `after_answer_heuristic_figures`: an object of the figures that heuristic
  acted on, as listed above.
    `byte_limits` bans when the report comes, so only the `report` line names
    it.
 - `limit_percent` and `limit_percent_setting`: the client's percentage of the
  rate limits and the setting that lowered it, when one did. `bytes_percent` and
  `bytes_percent_setting` do the same for the byte limits.
@@ -99,22 +99,19 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
 ## Request rate limits, per client
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `120`, 2 a second): the most requests a
+- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `500`, about 8 a second): the most
-  client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default leaves room for a
+  requests a client may make in a minute. A count or `off`. The default catches,
-  person opening two gitea pages at once with an empty cache, up to 60 files
+  within seconds, a client firing requests as fast as it can. It leaves room for
-  each.
+  a fleet of about 20 agents at its busiest, about 120 requests a minute. It
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `1500`): the most requests a client may
+  also leaves room for a few quick first visits to gitea with an empty cache,
-  make in an hour. A count or `off`. It is the main limit against scrapers. A
+  about 40 files each.
-  person reading code in gitea for an hour, a page every 20 seconds, makes
+- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR` (default `20000`, about 5.5 a second): the most
-  about 900. A scraper making one request every 2 seconds makes 1,800 an hour,
+  requests a client may make in an hour. A count or `off`. The default leaves
-  more than the limit.
+  room for an automation fleet at work. It catches a client that keeps up more
- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `6000`): the most requests a client may
+  than about 5.5 a second for an hour.
-  make in a day. A count or `off`. The default is four hours at the hour limit.
+- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `300000`, about 3.5 a second): the most
-  A scraper making one request every 10 seconds makes 8,640 a day, more than the
+  requests a client may make in a day. A count or `off`. The default catches a
-  limit.
+  scraper that keeps up 4 a second around the clock.
 - An Actions runner asks gitea for work all day and can pass the limits. Put the
  runners' addresses in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`. Do the same for a
  network where many people share one address, such as an office.
 - Counting cannot catch a client that stays under all three limits (see "Request
  rate limits, per client" in [`SPEC.md`](../SPEC.md)).
 - `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes exempt from
@@ -122,8 +119,8 @@ chooses between the two (see "The image's command" below).
 ## Byte limits, per client
- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `off`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
+- `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` (default `4G`), `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR`
-  (default `50G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `100G`): the most
+  (default `20G`) and `SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY` (default `200G`): the most
  bytes counted for a client in each window. A size or `off`.
 - `SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT` (default `both`): which body bytes the byte limits count:
  `response`, `request` or `both`.
@@ -468,13 +468,13 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
 		AllowNets:            env.netblocks("SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS", ""),
 		RateLimitExemptNets:  env.netblocks("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS", ""),
 		DenyNets:             env.netblocks("SWWAF_DENY_NETS", ""),
-		RateLimitPerMinute:   env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "120"),
+		RateLimitPerMinute:   env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "500"),
-		RateLimitPerHour:     env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "1500"),
+		RateLimitPerHour:     env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20000"),
-		RateLimitPerDay:      env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "6000"),
+		RateLimitPerDay:      env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "300000"),
 		RateLimitExemptPaths: env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
-		BytesLimitPerMinute:  env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "off"),
+		BytesLimitPerMinute:  env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "4G"),
-		BytesLimitPerHour:    env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "50G"),
+		BytesLimitPerHour:    env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "20G"),
-		BytesLimitPerDay:     env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "100G"),
+		BytesLimitPerDay:     env.size("SWWAF_BYTES_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "200G"),
 		BytesCount:           env.bytesCount("SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT", "both"),
 		LookupSource:         env.lookupSource("SWWAF_LOOKUP_SOURCE", "geojs"),
 		LookupDBPath:         env.value("SWWAF_LOOKUP_DB_PATH", ""),
@@ -244,9 +244,9 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
 		ListenAddr:           ":8080",
 		Observe:              false,
-		RateLimitPerMinute:   120,
+		RateLimitPerMinute:   500,
-		RateLimitPerHour:     1500,
+		RateLimitPerHour:     20000,
-		RateLimitPerDay:      6000,
+		RateLimitPerDay:      300000,
 		BanResponse:          403,
 		LimitBanDuration:     time.Hour,
 		LimitBanRepeatWindow: 24 * time.Hour,
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 		LookupSource: defaultLookupSource, LookupTimeout: 800 * time.Millisecond,
 	})
 	wantByteLimitSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
-		BytesLimitPerMinute: 0, BytesLimitPerHour: 50 << 30,
+		BytesLimitPerMinute: 4 << 30, BytesLimitPerHour: 20 << 30,
-		BytesLimitPerDay: 100 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
+		BytesLimitPerDay: 200 << 30, BytesCount: "both",
 	})
 	wantNetblocks(t, cfg.AllowNets)
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ func TestNoSingleRequestBreaksAByteLimitAtTheDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, limit := range []int64{
 		cfg.BytesLimitPerMinute, cfg.BytesLimitPerHour, cfg.BytesLimitPerDay,
 	} {
-		if limit != 0 && largest > limit { // 0 is off
+		if largest > limit {
 			t.Errorf("a request of %d bytes breaks the byte limit of %d", largest, limit)
 		}
 	}
@@ -2271,12 +2271,12 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
 		rateLimitExemptNets:  "",
 		denyNets:             "",
 		rateLimitPerMinute:   "45",
-		rateLimitPerHour:     "1500",
+		rateLimitPerHour:     "20000",
-		rateLimitPerDay:      "6000",
+		rateLimitPerDay:      "300000",
 		rateLimitExemptPaths: "",
-		bytesLimitPerMinute:  "off",
+		bytesLimitPerMinute:  "4G",
-		bytesLimitPerHour:    "50G",
+		bytesLimitPerHour:    "20G",
-		bytesLimitPerDay:     "100G",
+		bytesLimitPerDay:     "200G",
 		bytesCount:           "both",
 		lookupSource:         defaultLookupSource,
 		lookupDBPath:         "",
@@ -131,16 +131,6 @@ type Line struct {
 	// ActionRuleBlocked, ActionWAFBlocked, or, in servewaf, ActionTooLarge
 	// for the header limits.
 	WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
 	// Heuristic is the name of the heuristic that refused the request, in
 	// observe mode too, and HeuristicFigures are the figures it acted on, by
 	// name.
 	Heuristic        string         `json:"heuristic,omitempty"`
 	HeuristicFigures map[string]any `json:"heuristic_figures,omitempty"`
 	// AfterAnswerHeuristic and AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures are the same for
 	// the heuristic that banned the client after servewaf answered the
 	// request.
 	AfterAnswerHeuristic        string         `json:"after_answer_heuristic,omitempty"`
 	AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures map[string]any `json:"after_answer_heuristic_figures,omitempty"` //nolint:lll // a struct tag cannot be split
 	// LimitPercent and LimitPercentSetting are, for a request the rate
 	// limits counted whose client a biased threshold gives a percentage of
 	// the rate limits below 100, that percentage and the setting that gave
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic abuseipdb. It reads SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY,
 // SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE and SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // abuseIPDB notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with the score, when its score
 // of the client is a hit, and refuses the request when SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION
 // is deny, as dnsbl does for a zone. While SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does
 // nothing. A client without a score is checked in the background, by the
 // request's address, if its history counts an offence, and the request does
 // not wait for the answer. The score is then used for each address of the
 // client. Its figures are the score and SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE.
 type abuseIPDB struct{}
 func (abuseIPDB) name() string { return "abuseipdb" }
 func (abuseIPDB) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
 	held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
 	offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
 	score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
 	if !hit {
 		return nil
 	}
 	rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
 		"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
 	if rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return &verdict{
 		action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			figureScore: score, "min_score": rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBMinScore,
 		},
 	}
 }
@@ -91,18 +91,6 @@ func TestSixteenThousandCookiesAreRefusedWellWithinTheTimeLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestHeaderLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountsAndLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s := startServeWAF(t, "", nil)
 	req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
 	fillHeaders(req, headerFieldLimit+1)
 	do(t, req)
 	wantHeuristic(t, s.out.requestLine(t), "header_limits",
 		`{"fields": 101, "fields_limit": 100, "cookies": 0, "cookies_limit": 50}`)
 }
 func TestEachHeaderLimitRefusesARequestOverIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic active_ban, and the code that makes bans, which several
 // heuristics share. active_ban reads SWWAF_MODE; the bans are the ban ledger's.
 import (
-	"context"
+	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"time"
@@ -21,15 +18,11 @@ func (rq *request) banResponse(action string) *refusal {
 	return &refusal{status: rq.h.config.BanResponse, action: action}
 }
-// activeBan refuses a client a ban covers: a ban on a netblock the client is
+// banned reports whether a ban on a netblock the client is in covers the
-// in, in force at now. It notes for the log line when that ban ends. A request
+// request at now, and notes for the log line when that ban ends. A
-// that makes the ban permanent, or in observe mode would have, raises the alert
+// request that makes the ban permanent, or in observe mode would have,
-// for it. Its figures are the ban's netblock and when it ends.
+// raises the alert for it.
-type activeBan struct{}
+func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
 func (activeBan) name() string { return "active_ban" }
 func (activeBan) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	check := rq.h.ledger.Check
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		check = rq.h.ledger.Find // the ban refuses nothing, and stays as it is
@@ -45,24 +38,85 @@ func (activeBan) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 		rq.alertBan(ban)
 	}
-	if !banned {
+	return banned
-		return nil
+}
 // limitBroken counts the request for the rate limits at now, notes the
 // client's counts for the log line, and reports whether the request takes
 // the client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, which
 // breaks it.
 func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
 	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		rq.limitPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts = counts
 	if over {
 		rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
 	}
-	return &verdict{
+	return over
-		action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
+}
-		figures: map[string]any{
+
-			figureNetblock: ban.Netblock.String(), "ban_expires": rq.line.BanExpires,
+// countBytes counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for
-		},
+// the byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals
 // for the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them.
 // Only an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits
 // counted; in observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes
 // that take the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte
 // limits lowers it, break it; the response was passed on whole.
 func (rq *request) countBytes() {
 	if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
 		return
 	}
 	now := rq.h.now()
 	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes
 	if over {
 		rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
 	}
 }
-// limitFigures are the figures of a heuristic that broke hit, a limit: its
+// countRefusal counts the request for the error burst once it has been
-// window, the count and the limit.
+// answered, if servewaf refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a
-func limitFigures(hit ratelimit.Hit) map[string]any {
+// Core Rule Set match, and in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
-	return map[string]any{
+// SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute
-		figureWindow: hit.Window, figureCount: hit.Count, figureLimit: hit.Limit,
+// break a limit. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the checks skip, is
 // not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
 func (rq *request) countRefusal() {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
 		return
 	}
 	if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
 		return
 	}
 	now := rq.h.now()
 	hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
 	if !over {
 		return
 	}
 	// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
 	status := rq.out.status
 	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
 	case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		status = http.StatusForbidden
 	case requestlog.ActionBanned:
 		status = cfg.BanResponse
 	}
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
 }
 // countedBytes returns the request's bytes, once it has ended, as the
@@ -228,22 +228,6 @@ func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestRefusalUnderABanNamesItsHeuristicNetblockAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		rateLimitPerMinute: "1", banScopeV4Prefix: "24",
 	})
 	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour))
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "active_ban",
 		`{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`", "ban_expires": "`+expires+`"}`)
 }
 func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic blocklists. It reads SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, and the blocklists
 // through the reputation lists.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // blocklists notes the blocklists that list the client, as noteListed does,
 // and refuses the request when SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny. Being limit, it
 // lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it
 // does nothing more. Its figure is the blocklists that list the client.
 type blocklists struct{}
 func (blocklists) name() string { return "blocklists" }
 func (blocklists) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	listedBy := rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)
 	rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
 	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
 	if !rq.refusedByBlocklists(listedBy) {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return &verdict{
 		action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{"lists": listedBy},
 	}
 }
 // refusedByBlocklists reports whether the heuristic blocklists refuses a
 // client, given listedBy, the blocklists that list it: it does when one lists
 // it and SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny.
 func (rq *request) refusedByBlocklists(listedBy []string) bool {
 	return len(listedBy) > 0 && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
 }
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic byte_limits. It reads SWWAF_BYTES_COUNT, and the byte limits
 // and biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // byteLimits counts the request's bytes, as countedBytes gives them, for the
 // byte limits, once its report has come, and notes the client's byte totals for
 // the log line; its requests stay there as the rate limits counted them. Only
 // an allowed request has them counted, and only one the rate limits counted; in
 // observe mode, not one that enforce mode would have refused. Bytes that take
 // the client over a byte limit, as its limit percentage for the byte limits
 // lowers it, break it, which bans the client; the response was passed on whole.
 // Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
 type byteLimits struct{}
 func (byteLimits) name() string { return "byte_limits" }
 func (byteLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	if !rq.counted || rq.line.WouldAction != "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountBytes(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		rq.countedBytes(), rq.bytesPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts.MinuteBytes = counts.MinuteBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.HourBytes = counts.HourBytes
 	rq.line.Counts.DayBytes = counts.DayBytes
 	if !over {
 		return nil
 	}
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.out.status)
 	return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
 }
@@ -98,21 +98,6 @@ func TestEachByteLimitBansOnceTheResponseHasEnded(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestByteLimitBanNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _ := startWithAnswers(t, map[string]string{bytesLimitPerMinute: byteLimit})
 	line, _ := s.download()
 	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
 	// Two answers of 70 bytes are over the limit of 99.
 	line, _ = s.download()
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
 	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "byte_limits",
 		`{"window": "minute", "count": 140, "limit": 99}`)
 }
 func TestResponseOverAByteLimitByItselfIsPassedOnWhole(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic core_rule_set. It reads SWWAF_WAF_MODE, SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS
 // and SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
@@ -13,21 +9,18 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/waf"
 )
-// coreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
+// checkCoreRuleSet inspects the request with the Core Rule Set, unless
 // SWWAF_WAF_MODE is off or SWWAF_WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS exempts its path, as
 // pathExempt decides, and notes the rules it matched and its score in the
 // log line, and the rules in the metrics. A score at or over
 // SWWAF_WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD is a match: it raises the waf_block alert,
-// and in block mode refuses the request with 403, which is an offence its
+// and in block mode refuses the request, which is an offence its client's
-// client's history counts. Its figures are the score and the threshold.
+// history counts, and so returns ActionWAFBlocked. It returns "" for a
-type coreRuleSet struct{}
+// request it does not refuse.
-
+func (rq *request) checkCoreRuleSet() string {
 func (coreRuleSet) name() string { return "core_rule_set" }
 func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeOff || pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.WAFExemptPaths) {
-		return nil
+		return ""
 	}
 	start := time.Now()
@@ -47,21 +40,18 @@ func (coreRuleSet) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	threshold := cfg.WAFAnomalyThreshold
 	if threshold == 0 || result.Score < threshold {
-		return nil
+		return ""
 	}
 	rq.alertWAFBlock(result)
 	if cfg.WAFMode == config.WAFModeDetect {
-		return nil
+		return ""
 	}
 	rq.wafBlocked = true
-	return &verdict{
+	return requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked
 		action:  requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked,
 		figures: map[string]any{figureScore: result.Score, "threshold": threshold},
 	}
 }
 // alertWAFBlock raises the waf_block alert for the request, which the Core
@@ -110,16 +110,6 @@ func TestCoreRuleSetRefusesAttacksInBlockModeAndOnlyLogsThemInDetectMode(t *test
 	}
 }
 func TestCoreRuleSetRefusalNamesItsHeuristicScoreAndThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{wafMode: block})
 	line := s.request(client, sqlInjection, http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "core_rule_set", `{"score": 5, "threshold": 5}`)
 }
 func TestOrdinaryRequestIsInspectedAndPassed(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,42 +1,21 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic countries. It reads SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES and
 // SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"slices"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
-// countries refuses a request by the client's country as it was looked up. A
+// countryDenied reports whether the country lists refuse the request, by
-// client without a country, or whose country cannot be found, is refused only
+// the client's country as it was looked up. A client without a country,
-// by SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES. Its figures are the country and the
+// or whose country cannot be found, is refused only by
-// setting that refused it.
+// SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES.
-type countries struct{}
+func (rq *request) countryDenied() bool {
 func (countries) name() string { return "countries" }
 func (countries) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	denied := rq.h.config.DeniedCountries
 	allowed := rq.h.config.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries
 	country := rq.line.Country
-	var setting string
+	if slices.Contains(denied, country) {
-
+		return true
 	switch {
 	case slices.Contains(denied, country):
 		setting = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
 	case len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, country):
 		setting = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
 	default:
 		return nil
 	}
-	return &verdict{
+	return len(allowed) > 0 && !slices.Contains(allowed, country)
 		action:  requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{"country": country, "setting": setting},
 	}
 }
@@ -90,23 +90,6 @@ func TestCountryLists(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestCountryRefusalNamesItsHeuristicCountryAndSetting(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
 		lookupTimeout: "1h", deniedCountries: "kp", allowedCountries: "de",
 	})
 	line := s.get(fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
 		`{"country": "KP", "setting": "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"}`)
 	line = s.get(unplaced, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "countries",
 		`{"country": "", "setting": "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"}`)
 }
 func TestCountryRefusalKeepsARequestFromTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic crowdsec. It reads SWWAF_CROWDSEC_LAPI_URL, and the decisions
 // through the reputation lists.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // crowdSec refuses a request when a decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
 // the client is in force at now. It then notes the list, as noteHit does, and
 // bans the client until that decision ends. Its figures are the decision's
 // scenario and when it ends.
 type crowdSec struct{}
 func (crowdSec) name() string { return "crowdsec" }
 func (crowdSec) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	decision, listed := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
 	if !listed {
 		return nil
 	}
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
 		"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
 	rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
 	return &verdict{
 		action: requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			"scenario": decision.Scenario,
 			"expires":  requestlog.FormatTime(decision.Expires),
 		},
 	}
 }
 // crowdSecDecisionInForce returns the decision of the CrowdSec decision list on
 // the client that is in force at now, and reports whether there is one, which
 // the heuristic crowdsec refuses the request for.
 func (rq *request) crowdSecDecisionInForce(
 	now time.Time,
 ) (reputation.Decision, bool) {
 	return rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
 }
@@ -95,21 +95,6 @@ func TestClientTheCrowdSecDecisionListListsIsBannedUntilTheDecisionEnds(t *testi
 		float64(fetched.Unix()))
 }
 func TestCrowdSecBanNamesItsHeuristicScenarioAndEnd(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, clk, server, _ := startWithAlerts(t, map[string]string{
 		crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey,
 	})
 	loadDecisions(t, server, clk.Now(), `[{"duration": "4h0m0s", `+
 		`"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", "scope": "Ip", "type": "ban", `+
 		`"value": "`+client+`"}]`)
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "crowdsec", `{"scenario": "crowdsecurity/ssh-bf", `+
 		`"expires": "`+requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(4*time.Hour))+`"}`)
 }
 func TestEndedCrowdSecDecisionNoLongerBansThoughTheCopyStillHoldsIt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic deny_nets. It reads SWWAF_DENY_NETS.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // denyNets refuses a client in SWWAF_DENY_NETS. Its figure is the netblock of
 // the setting the client is in.
 type denyNets struct{}
 func (denyNets) name() string { return "deny_nets" }
 func (denyNets) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	for _, netblock := range rq.h.config.DenyNets {
 		if netblock.Contains(rq.client) {
 			return &verdict{
 				action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 				figures: map[string]any{figureNetblock: netblock.String()},
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic dnsbl. It reads SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, and the DNSBL zones'
 // verdicts through the DNSBL checker.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // dnsbl notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as noteListed
 // does, and refuses the request when SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION is deny. Being
 // limit, it lowers the client's limits instead (see limitPercentages), and
 // being log, it does nothing more. A zone without a verdict on the client is
 // asked about it in the background, and the request does not wait for the
 // answer. Its figure is the zones that list the client, their keys masked.
 type dnsbl struct{}
 func (dnsbl) name() string { return "dnsbl" }
 func (dnsbl) check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	listedBy := rq.h.dnsbl.ListedBy(ctx, rq.client)
 	rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
 	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
 	if !rq.dnsblListed || rq.h.config.ReputationAction != deny {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return &verdict{
 		action:  requestlog.ActionDenied,
 		figures: map[string]any{"zones": listedBy},
 	}
 }
@@ -106,25 +106,6 @@ func TestErrorBurstBreaksAtOneOverTheThreshold(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestRefusalLimitBanNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startForErrorBurst(t, "1", nil)
 	const ruleFigures = `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`
 	line := blockRule.send(s, client)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", ruleFigures)
 	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "", "null")
 	// The second refusal is the request refusal_limit bans for, and the line
 	// names both.
 	line = blockRule.send(s, client)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", ruleFigures)
 	wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t, line, "refusal_limit",
 		`{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
 }
 func TestErrorBurstBanNotesHistoryAndMetrics(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic header_limits. It reads no setting: its limits are fixed.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
 // when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
 const (
 	maxCookies      = 50
 	maxHeaderFields = 100
 )
 // headerLimits refuses a request over the header limits, with 431. Its figures
 // are the request's header fields and cookies, and the limit of each.
 type headerLimits struct{}
 func (headerLimits) name() string { return "header_limits" }
 func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
 	fields, cookies := rq.headerCounts()
 	if !overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies) {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return &verdict{
 		action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
 		figures: map[string]any{
 			"fields": fields, "fields_limit": maxHeaderFields,
 			"cookies": cookies, "cookies_limit": maxCookies,
 		},
 	}
 }
 // overHeaderLimits reports whether a request with these counts of header fields
 // and cookies, as headerCounts counts them, is over the header limits: it has
 // more than maxHeaderFields fields or more than maxCookies cookies.
 func overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies int) bool {
 	return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
 }
 // headerCounts returns the request's header fields, each value of a header sent
 // twice being one, and its cookies, each part of a Cookie header between
 // semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The Core
 // Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
 // cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
 // characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
 // spaces is a cookie to it.
 func (rq *request) headerCounts() (int, int) {
 	fields, cookies := 0, 0
 	for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
 		fields += len(values)
 	}
 	for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
 		for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
 			if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
 				cookies++
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	return fields, cookies
 }
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 )
 // To add a heuristic, write one file with a type that implements heuristic,
 // and add one line for it to one of the lists below. Its settings go in
 // config.Config, and the comment at the top of its file names them.
 // heuristic is one of the checks that decide what servewaf does with a request.
 type heuristic interface {
 	// name is the heuristic's name, which the log line gives.
 	name() string
 	// check looks at the request at now, and returns nil to let it through.
 	// ctx is the request's own context.
 	check(ctx context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict
 }
 // verdict is a heuristic refusing a request, or banning its client: the action
 // the log line names, one of requestlog's Action constants, and the figures the
 // heuristic acted on, by name, such as the count and the limit.
 type verdict struct {
 	action  string
 	figures map[string]any
 }
 // The names of the figures that more than one heuristic gives.
 const (
 	figureWindow   = "window"
 	figureCount    = "count"
 	figureLimit    = "limit"
 	figureScore    = "score"
 	figureNetblock = "netblock"
 )
 // The lists of heuristics, each in the order its heuristics run. A client in
 // SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all.
 // beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and
 // country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up.
 func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
 	return []heuristic{
 		denyNets{},
 		activeBan{},
 	}
 }
 // afterLookup are the heuristics that run once the lookup has been made.
 func afterLookup() []heuristic {
 	return []heuristic{
 		countries{},
 		blocklists{},
 		crowdSec{},
 		dnsbl{},
 		abuseIPDB{},
 		rateLimits{},
 		trapPaths{},
 		ruleFiles{},
 		headerLimits{},
 		coreRuleSet{},
 	}
 }
 // afterAnswer are the heuristics that run on a request once servewaf has
 // answered it, before its decision line is written. They ban the client, and do
 // not change what the request got: their verdict's action is not used.
 func afterAnswer() []heuristic {
 	return []heuristic{
 		refusalLimit{},
 	}
 }
 // onReport are the heuristics that run on an allowed request when rproxy's
 // report of it comes, before its report line is written. Like afterAnswer, they
 // only ban.
 func onReport() []heuristic {
 	return []heuristic{
 		byteLimits{},
 	}
 }
 // runAfterAnswer runs the heuristics of afterAnswer on the request, at the time
 // it is called.
 func (rq *request) runAfterAnswer(ctx context.Context) {
 	rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, afterAnswer())
 }
 // runHeuristics runs list, beforeLookup or afterLookup, on the request at now,
 // and returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. The log line's
 // heuristic and heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave it, and give its
 // figures. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) runHeuristics(
 	ctx context.Context, list []heuristic, now time.Time,
 ) *verdict {
 	name, v := rq.firstVerdict(ctx, list, now)
 	if v != nil {
 		rq.line.Heuristic = name
 		rq.line.HeuristicFigures = v.figures
 	}
 	return v
 }
 // runBanningHeuristics runs list, afterAnswer or onReport, on the request at
 // the time it is called. The log line's after_answer_heuristic and
 // after_answer_heuristic_figures name the heuristic that gave a verdict, and
 // give its figures, so that heuristic and heuristic_figures still name the one
 // that refused the request. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) runBanningHeuristics(ctx context.Context, list []heuristic) {
 	name, v := rq.firstVerdict(ctx, list, rq.h.now())
 	if v != nil {
 		rq.line.AfterAnswerHeuristic = name
 		rq.line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures = v.figures
 	}
 }
 // firstVerdict runs list on the request at now, in order, until a heuristic
 // gives a verdict, and returns that heuristic's name and its verdict, or "" and
 // nil when none gives one. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) firstVerdict(
 	ctx context.Context, list []heuristic, now time.Time,
 ) (string, *verdict) {
 	for _, each := range list {
 		v := each.check(ctx, rq, now)
 		if v != nil {
 			return each.name(), v
 		}
 	}
 	return "", nil
 }
@@ -14,18 +14,6 @@ import (
 // observe is the value of SWWAF_MODE for observe mode.
 const observe = "observe"
 func TestObserveModeNamesTheHeuristicThatWouldHaveRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		mode: observe, denyNets: client,
 	})
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+client+`/32"}`)
 }
 func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic rate_limits. It reads SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS,
 // SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS and SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and the rate limits and
 // biased thresholds through the limiter and limitPercentages.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // rateLimits counts the request for the rate limits, unless
 // countedByRateLimits exempts it, by the client's limit percentages, which it
 // notes for the log line with the client's counts. A request that takes the
 // client over a rate limit, as its limit percentage lowers it, breaks it: it is
 // refused, and bans the client. A request exempt from the rate limits is exempt
 // from the byte limits too. Its figures are the window, the count and the
 // limit.
 type rateLimits struct{}
 func (rateLimits) name() string { return "rate_limits" }
 func (rateLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
 	if !rq.counted {
 		return nil
 	}
 	rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
 	rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
 	rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
 	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		rq.limitPercent.percent)
 	rq.line.Counts = counts
 	if !over {
 		return nil
 	}
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, rq.h.config.BanResponse)
 	return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
 }
 // overAWholeRateLimit reports whether the heuristic rate_limits will refuse the
 // request at now, whatever its client's limit percentages: the rate limits
 // count it, and one more request from its client takes it over a whole rate
 // limit. It counts nothing.
 func (rq *request) overAWholeRateLimit(now time.Time) bool {
 	return rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
 		rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now)
 }
 // countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
 // client is not in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
 // under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
 func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
 		!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
 }
@@ -72,17 +72,6 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestRateLimitRefusalNamesItsHeuristicWindowCountAndLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
 	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rate_limits", `{"window": "minute", "count": 2, "limit": 1}`)
 }
 func TestIPv6GroupPrefixSetsTheClientTheLimitsCount(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic refusal_limit. It reads SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD and
 // SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 // refusalLimit counts the request once it has been answered, if servewaf
 // refused it after a rule file match, a trap path or a Core Rule Set match, and
 // in observe mode if enforce mode would have: more than
 // SWWAF_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD such refusals of the client within a minute break
 // a limit, which bans the client. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS, which the
 // heuristics skip, is not counted, and nothing is while the threshold is off.
 // Its figures are the window, the count and the limit.
 type refusalLimit struct{}
 func (refusalLimit) name() string { return "refusal_limit" }
 func (refusalLimit) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
 	if !rq.attack && !rq.ruleBlocked && !rq.wafBlocked {
 		return nil
 	}
 	hit, over := rq.h.limiter.CountRefusal(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now,
 		cfg.ErrorBurstThreshold)
 	if !over {
 		return nil
 	}
 	// What the client was sent, or in observe mode would have been.
 	status := rq.out.status
 	switch rq.line.WouldAction {
 	case requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, requestlog.ActionWAFBlocked:
 		status = http.StatusForbidden
 	case requestlog.ActionBanned:
 		status = cfg.BanResponse
 	}
 	rq.banForLimit(now, hit, status)
 	return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: limitFigures(hit)}
 }
@@ -1,17 +1,91 @@
 package servewaf
 // What the reputation heuristics share: blocklists, crowdsec, dnsbl and
 // abuseipdb.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/alerts"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
 )
 // deny is the SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION and the SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION that
 // refuses the requests of a client a source lists.
 const deny = "deny"
 // blocklistDenied notes the blocklists that list the client, as
 // noteListed does, and reports whether SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION, being deny,
 // refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits instead
 // (see limitPercentages), and being log, it does nothing more.
 func (rq *request) blocklistDenied() bool {
 	listedBy := rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)
 	rq.blocklisted = len(listedBy) > 0
 	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a blocklist")
 	return rq.blocklisted && rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny
 }
 // crowdSecBanned reports whether a decision of the CrowdSec decision list
 // on the client is in force at now. If one is, it notes the list, as
 // noteHit does, and bans the client until that decision ends.
 func (rq *request) crowdSecBanned(now time.Time) bool {
 	decision, listed := rq.h.lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
 	if !listed {
 		return false
 	}
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: rq.h.config.CrowdSecDecisionsURL},
 		"listed by the CrowdSec decision list")
 	rq.banForCrowdSec(now, decision)
 	return true
 }
 // dnsblDenied notes the DNSBL zones whose verdict lists the client, as
 // noteListed does, and reports whether SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, being
 // deny, refuses the request. Being limit, it lowers the client's limits
 // instead (see limitPercentages), and being log, it does nothing more. A
 // zone without a verdict on the client is asked about it in the
 // background, and the request does not wait for the answer. ctx is the
 // request's own context.
 func (rq *request) dnsblDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
 	listedBy := rq.h.dnsbl.ListedBy(ctx, rq.client)
 	rq.dnsblListed = len(listedBy) > 0
 	rq.noteListed(listedBy, "listed by a DNSBL zone")
 	return rq.dnsblListed && rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
 }
 // abuseIPDBDenied notes AbuseIPDB, as noteHit does, with the score, when
 // its score of the client is a hit, and reports whether
 // SWWAF_REPUTATION_ACTION, being deny, refuses the request, as dnsblDenied
 // does for a zone. While SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is unset it does nothing. A
 // client without a score is checked in the background, by the request's
 // address, if its history counts an offence, and the request does not
 // wait for the answer. The score is then used for each address of the
 // client. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) abuseIPDBDenied(ctx context.Context) bool {
 	if rq.h.config.AbuseIPDBKey == "" {
 		return false
 	}
 	client := rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client)
 	held, _ := rq.h.limiter.Client(client)
 	offender := held.History.Offences != ratelimit.Offences{}
 	score, hit := rq.h.abuseIPDB.Hit(ctx, client, rq.client, offender)
 	if !hit {
 		return false
 	}
 	rq.abuseIPDBHit = true
 	rq.noteHit(bans.ReputationHit{Source: reputation.AbuseIPDBSource, Score: &score},
 		"scored by AbuseIPDB at or over SWWAF_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE")
 	return rq.h.config.ReputationAction == deny
 }
 // noteListed notes each of sources, the URLs of the blocklists or the
 // DNSBL zones, their keys masked, that list the client, as noteHit does,
 // with reason.
@@ -118,56 +118,6 @@ func TestEachBlocklistActionForAListedAddressAndAListedNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestReputationRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndWhatListedTheClient(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		heuristic string
 		env       map[string]string
 		load      func(*testing.T, *servewaf.Server)
 		figures   string
 	}{
 		{
 			"blocklists",
 			map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL, blocklistAction: actionDeny},
 			func(t *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server) {
 				t.Helper()
 				loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{dropURL: {client}})
 			},
 			`{"lists": ["` + dropURL + `"]}`,
 		},
 		{
 			"dnsbl",
 			map[string]string{
 				dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver,
 				reputationAction: actionDeny,
 			},
 			func(_ *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server) {
 				loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
 			},
 			`{"zones": ["` + dnsblZone + `"]}`,
 		},
 		{
 			"abuseipdb",
 			map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionDeny},
 			func(_ *testing.T, server *servewaf.Server) {
 				loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: 80})
 			},
 			`{"score": 80, "min_score": 75}`,
 		},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.heuristic, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 			s, server, _ := startWithLookups(t, tc.env)
 			tc.load(t, server)
 			line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 			wantHeuristic(t, line, tc.heuristic, tc.figures)
 		})
 	}
 }
 func TestBlocklistsComeAfterTheCountryListsAndSkipAllowNets(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -160,20 +160,16 @@ func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
 }
 // check is the one place where a request can be refused. It returns nil to let
-// the request through. The heuristics of checkClient decide: a request they
+// the request through. The checks of checkClient decide: a request they refuse
-// refuse is answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core
+// is answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, 403 for a block rule or the Core Rule Set,
-// Rule Set, or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused,
+// or 431 for the header limits. In observe mode nothing is refused, and the log
-// and the log line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the
+// line names what enforce mode would have done. ctx is the request's own context.
 // request's own context.
 func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
-	v := rq.checkClient(ctx)
+	action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
 	if v == nil {
 		return nil
 	}
 	action := v.action
 	switch {
 	case action == "":
 		return nil
 	case rq.h.config.Observe:
 		rq.line.WouldAction = action
@@ -187,21 +183,35 @@ func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
 	}
 }
-// checkClient runs the heuristics of beforeLookup on the request, then looks
+// checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
-// up the client's AS number and country, then runs those of afterLookup. It
+// action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
-// returns the first verdict, or nil when none gives one. A client in
+// client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them, and is not looked up. For any
-// SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them all, and is not looked up. ctx is the request's
+// other client, SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock,
-// own context.
+// so that a client either refuses is not looked up, then the lookup of
-func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
+// its AS number and country, then the country lists, then the blocklists,
-	if isInside(rq.client, rq.h.config.AllowNets) {
+// then the CrowdSec decision list, which bans the client it lists, then
-		return nil
+// the DNSBL zones' verdicts, and then AbuseIPDB's score; a request any of
 // them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then come the
 // rate limits, unless the client is in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the
 // request's path is exempt under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that
 // every other request is counted, each of them by the client's limit
 // percentages, then SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS, then the rule files, then the header
 // limits, and last the Core Rule Set. A request exempt from the rate limits
 // is exempt from the byte limits too. ctx is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
 		return ""
 	}
 	now := rq.h.now()
-	v := rq.runHeuristics(ctx, beforeLookup(), now)
+	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
-	if v != nil {
+		return requestlog.ActionDenied
-		return v
+	}
 	if rq.banned(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	rq.lookUp(ctx, now)
@@ -210,7 +220,59 @@ func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) *verdict {
 	// again: a request counted at the time it arrived could be counted
 	// after a later one of its client's, which the rate limits would take
 	// for the clock set back.
-	return rq.runHeuristics(ctx, afterLookup(), rq.h.now())
+	now = rq.h.now()
 	if rq.countryDenied() {
 		return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
 	}
 	if rq.blocklistDenied() {
 		return requestlog.ActionDenied
 	}
 	if rq.crowdSecBanned(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	if rq.dnsblDenied(ctx) || rq.abuseIPDBDenied(ctx) {
 		return requestlog.ActionDenied
 	}
 	rq.counted = rq.countedByRateLimits()
 	if rq.counted {
 		rq.limitPercent, rq.bytesPercent = rq.limitPercentages()
 		rq.line.LimitPercent, rq.line.LimitPercentSetting = rq.limitPercent.logged()
 		rq.line.BytesPercent, rq.line.BytesPercentSetting = rq.bytesPercent.logged()
 	}
 	if rq.counted && rq.limitBroken(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
 	}
 	if rq.trapPath(now) {
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	}
 	action := rq.checkRules(now)
 	if action != "" {
 		return action
 	}
 	if rq.overHeaderLimits() {
 		return requestlog.ActionTooLarge
 	}
 	return rq.checkCoreRuleSet()
 }
 // countedByRateLimits reports whether the rate limits count the request: its
 // client is not in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, and its path is not exempt
 // under SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS.
 func (rq *request) countedByRateLimits() bool {
 	cfg := rq.h.config
 	return !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) &&
 		!pathExempt(rq.in, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
 }
 // pathExempt reports whether r is exempt under prefixes,
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package servewaf_test
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"io"
 	"math"
 	"net/http"
@@ -273,48 +272,6 @@ func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
 	}
 }
 // wantHeuristic checks that line names heuristic as the one that refused the
 // request, with figures, a JSON object. A heuristic of "" with figures "null" is
 // a line that names none.
 func wantHeuristic(t *testing.T, line logLine, heuristic, figures string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if line.Heuristic != heuristic ||
 		!reflect.DeepEqual(line.HeuristicFigures, decodeFigures(t, figures)) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has heuristic %q with heuristic_figures %v, want %q with %s",
 			line.Heuristic, line.HeuristicFigures, heuristic, figures)
 	}
 }
 // wantAfterAnswerHeuristic checks after_answer_heuristic and
 // after_answer_heuristic_figures as wantHeuristic checks heuristic and
 // heuristic_figures.
 func wantAfterAnswerHeuristic(t *testing.T, line logLine, heuristic, figures string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if line.AfterAnswerHeuristic != heuristic ||
 		!reflect.DeepEqual(line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures, decodeFigures(t, figures)) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has after_answer_heuristic %q with "+
 			"after_answer_heuristic_figures %v, want %q with %s",
 			line.AfterAnswerHeuristic, line.AfterAnswerHeuristicFigures, heuristic, figures)
 	}
 }
 // decodeFigures decodes figures, a JSON object of a heuristic's figures, as
 // the log line's figures are decoded.
 func decodeFigures(t *testing.T, figures string) map[string]any {
 	t.Helper()
 	var decoded map[string]any
 	err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(figures), &decoded)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", figures, err)
 	}
 	return decoded
 }
 // microseconds is a timing in whole microseconds.
 func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
 	return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic rule_files. It reads the rules of the rule files, which
 // SWWAF_RULES_DIR and SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED name.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // ruleFiles checks the request against the rules of the rule files at now,
 // notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and refuses the request
 // when the last rule it matches refuses it: with ActionRuleBlocked for a block
 // rule, and ActionBanned for a ban rule. A ban rule bans the client's netblock
 // for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban
 // it would have made. Either rule's match is noted as an offence, for the
 // client's history. Its figures are the rule's id and action.
 type ruleFiles struct{}
 func (ruleFiles) name() string { return "rule_files" }
 func (ruleFiles) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
 	for _, rule := range matched {
 		rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
 		rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
 	}
 	if len(matched) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
 	// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
 	last := matched[len(matched)-1]
 	figures := map[string]any{"rule_id": last.ID, "rule_action": last.Action}
 	switch last.Action {
 	case rules.ActionBlock:
 		rq.ruleBlocked = true
 		return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked, figures: figures}
 	case rules.ActionBan:
 		rq.attack = true
 		rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
 		return &verdict{action: requestlog.ActionBanned, figures: figures}
 	default:
 		return nil
 	}
 }
@@ -93,21 +93,6 @@ func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
 	s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 }
 func TestRuleRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndTheRule(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
 		rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"+testRules),
 	})
 	line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "blocked", "rule_action": "block"}`)
 	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "rule_files", `{"rule_id": "probe", "rule_action": "ban"}`)
 }
 func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
 package servewaf
 import (
 	"slices"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // trapPath reports whether the request asks for a path in
 // SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a path rule sees it, without the query,
 // as sent or once percent-decoded, is one of them. Such a request is a
 // clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is: it bans the client's
 // netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the ban it would have
 // made. The ban's notes give the path as sent.
 func (rq *request) trapPath(now time.Time) bool {
 	path := rules.Path(rq.in)
 	if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
 		!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
 		return false
 	}
 	rq.attack = true
 	rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
 	return true
 }
 // checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
 // now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
 // action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
 // and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. A ban rule bans
 // the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack, or in observe mode
 // raises the alert for the ban it would have made. Either rule's match
 // is noted as an offence, for the client's history.
 func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
 	matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
 	for _, rule := range matched {
 		rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
 		rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
 	}
 	if len(matched) == 0 {
 		return ""
 	}
 	// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
 	switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
 	case rules.ActionBlock:
 		rq.ruleBlocked = true
 		return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
 	case rules.ActionBan:
 		rq.attack = true
 		rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{RuleID: last.ID, Target: last.Target})
 		return requestlog.ActionBanned
 	default:
 		return ""
 	}
 }
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package servewaf
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -53,6 +52,13 @@ const ReportPath = "/_smallwebwaf/report"
 // QuestionBodyMaxBytes is the most of a visitor's body a question carries.
 const QuestionBodyMaxBytes = 64 << 10
 // The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
 // when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
 const (
 	maxCookies      = 50
 	maxHeaderFields = 100
 )
 const (
 	// maxAwaitingReport is the most answered requests held until their
 	// reports come. Past it, the request answered longest ago is dropped.
@@ -141,20 +147,48 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 // refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
 // for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
-// its client: the heuristic crowdsec, header_limits, blocklists or rate_limits
+// its client: it is over the header limits, a blocklist lists its client while
-// will refuse it, as a function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode,
+// SWWAF_BLOCKLIST_ACTION is deny, the CrowdSec decision list lists it, or it is
-// which refuses nothing, none is. rproxy lets a request through when servewaf
+// over a whole rate limit. In observe mode, which refuses nothing, none is.
-// answers too late.
+// rproxy lets a request through when servewaf answers too late.
 func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
 	if rq.h.config.Observe {
 		return false
 	}
-	_, decided := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
+	lists := rq.h.lists
 	_, decided := lists.CrowdSecDecision(rq.client, now)
-	return decided || overHeaderLimits(rq.headerCounts()) ||
+	return decided || rq.overHeaderLimits() ||
-		rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) ||
+		(rq.h.config.BlocklistAction == deny && len(lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) > 0) ||
-		rq.overAWholeRateLimit(now)
+		(rq.countedByRateLimits() &&
 			rq.h.limiter.OverARateLimit(rq.h.clientGroup(rq.client), now))
 }
 // overHeaderLimits reports whether servewaf refuses the request for its
 // headers: it has more than maxHeaderFields fields, each value of a header sent
 // twice being one, or more than maxCookies cookies, each part of a Cookie header
 // between semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The
 // Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so that thousands of small
 // cookies keep it busy for over a second. It trims only spaces and control
 // characters, of which a header value can hold only tabs, so a part of Unicode
 // spaces is a cookie to it.
 func (rq *request) overHeaderLimits() bool {
 	fields, cookies := 0, 0
 	for _, values := range rq.in.Header {
 		fields += len(values)
 	}
 	for _, value := range rq.in.Header.Values("Cookie") {
 		for part := range strings.SplitSeq(value, ";") {
 			if strings.Trim(part, " \t") != "" {
 				cookies++
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
 }
 // answerQuestion runs the checks on the visitor's request a question
@@ -185,18 +219,18 @@ func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	if refused == nil && !underOwnPrefix {
 		// In observe mode, what enforce mode would have refused counts here.
-		defer rq.runAfterAnswer(r.Context())
+		defer rq.countRefusal()
 		rq.allow()
 		return
 	}
-	// The last deferred runs first: runAfterAnswer before addToHistory, so that
+	// The last deferred runs first: countRefusal before addToHistory, so that a
-	// a broken refusal limit is in the client's history.
+	// broken error burst is in the client's history.
 	defer rq.addToHistory()
 	defer rq.countAnomalies()
-	defer rq.runAfterAnswer(r.Context())
+	defer rq.countRefusal()
 	if refused != nil {
 		rq.deny(*refused)
@@ -378,7 +412,7 @@ func (h *handler) takeReport(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// Remove reports true to one report only, of several that name the id. A
 	// question still being handled is held as nil.
 	if found && held != nil && h.awaitingReport.Remove(report.RequestID) {
-		h.finishWith(r.Context(), held, report)
+		h.finishWith(held, report)
 	}
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
@@ -441,11 +475,11 @@ func (report *Report) checkRanges() error {
 // finishWith finishes a request with what its report says, and writes the
 // request's last log line, which holds its decision's fields and the report's.
-// For an allowed request it first runs the heuristics of onReport, and adds the
+// For an allowed request it first counts the request's bytes, and adds it to its
-// request to its client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with
+// client's history, the anomaly counters and the metrics, with the status and
-// the status and bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was
+// bytes the report gives. A denied request's counting was finished at its
-// finished at its decision. ctx is the report's own context.
+// decision.
-func (h *handler) finishWith(ctx context.Context, held *decision, report Report) {
+func (h *handler) finishWith(held *decision, report Report) {
 	rq := &request{
 		decision:     *held,
 		h:            h,
@@ -462,7 +496,7 @@ func (h *handler) finishWith(ctx context.Context, held *decision, report Report)
 	if rq.allowed {
 		rq.line.DurationUpstreamTotal = &report.DurationUpstreamTotal
-		rq.runBanningHeuristics(ctx, onReport())
+		rq.countBytes()
 		rq.countAnomalies()
 		rq.addToHistory()
@@ -104,15 +104,6 @@ func TestDenyNetsRefuseBeforeTheLookup(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestDenyNetsRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndNetblock(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{denyNets: clientsNet})
 	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "deny_nets", `{"netblock": "`+clientsNet+`"}`)
 }
 func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
 package servewaf
 // The heuristic trap_paths. It reads SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS.
 import (
 	"context"
 	"slices"
 	"time"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 // trapPaths refuses a request for a path in SWWAF_TRAP_PATHS: its path as a
 // path rule sees it, without the query, as sent or once percent-decoded, is one
 // of them. Such a request is a clear sign of attack, as a ban rule's match is:
 // it bans the client's netblock, or in observe mode raises the alert for the
 // ban it would have made. The ban's notes give the path as sent, and so does
 // its figure.
 type trapPaths struct{}
 func (trapPaths) name() string { return "trap_paths" }
 func (trapPaths) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, now time.Time) *verdict {
 	path := rules.Path(rq.in)
 	if !slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, path) &&
 		!slices.Contains(rq.h.config.TrapPaths, rules.DecodeOnce(path)) {
 		return nil
 	}
 	rq.attack = true
 	rq.banForAttack(now, bans.Notes{TrapPath: path})
 	return &verdict{
 		action:  requestlog.ActionBanned,
 		figures: map[string]any{"path": path},
 	}
 }
@@ -83,16 +83,6 @@ func TestTrapPathBansAsABanRuleDoes(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 func TestTrapPathRefusalNamesItsHeuristicAndPath(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList})
 	line := s.request(client, "/wp-login.php?redirect_to=x", http.StatusForbidden,
 		requestlog.ActionBanned)
 	wantHeuristic(t, line, "trap_paths", `{"path": "/wp-login.php"}`)
 }
 func TestTrapPathMatchesThePathDecodedOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
@@ -1225,9 +1225,9 @@ func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, dir string) {
 		"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS":                    "",
 		rateLimitExemptNets:                   "",
 		"SWWAF_DENY_NETS":                     "",
-		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE":         "120",
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE":         "500",
-		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR":           "1500",
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR":           "20000",
-		rateLimitPerDay:                       "6000",
+		rateLimitPerDay:                       "300000",
 		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS":       "",
 		"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES":              "",
 		"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/gitea-setup: build the image, bring up deploy/gitea under a project
 # name of its own, and check it:
 #   - that a page load, a push and a clone sent through traefik pass through
 #     rproxy, and that servewaf checks them;
 #   - that gitea logs the visitor's address, not rproxy's;
 #   - that a request from a container on the shared network skips the checks;
 #   - that with servewaf stopped, gitea still answers through rproxy.
 # It publishes no port of traefik's, since this host's ports 80 and 443 may be
 # taken. It reaches traefik at its address on the shared network instead, so
 # its own requests come from the network's gateway, which servewaf checks like
 # any visitor. Two runs at once on one docker host cannot both start, since
 # both would use the subnet compose.yaml names. The containers, the network,
 # the volumes, the image and the files the script makes are removed however it
 # ends; the gitea and traefik images stay, as the base images of a build do.
 # It needs network access. script/check does not run this.
 set -eu
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
 ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
 # Named after this run, so that runs in other clones on the same host
 # never touch each other's.
 NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-gitea-setup-$$"
 IMAGE="$NAME-image"
 NETWORK="${NAME}_shared"
 VISITOR="$NAME-visitor"
 # The site's host name and gitea's image, as deploy/gitea/compose.yaml names
 # them. gitea's image also runs the container on the shared network.
 SITE="git.example.org"
 # gitea 1.27.3, 2026-08-29
 GITEA_IMAGE="gitea/gitea@sha256:87a67ee09d3ae0d1df5fda5dcda3e2a1f9236a45b0a59025d6e00e46adc43bef"
 # gitea's one user, who owns the repository.
 PASSWORD="owner-password"
 # The files the script makes, gitea's secret key for this run, and traefik's
 # and the gateway's addresses on the shared network once the setup runs.
 WORK=""
 secret_key=""
 traefik=""
 gateway=""
 cleanup() {
    # So that a signal cannot stop it partway through.
    trap '' HUP INT TERM
    docker rm --force "$VISITOR" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
    if [ -n "$WORK" ]; then
        compose down --volumes --remove-orphans --timeout 5 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
        rm -rf "$WORK"
    fi
    docker rmi --force "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
 }
 # compose <argument>...: docker compose on the setup, under this run's project
 # name, with the image built here, this run's secret key and no port of
 # traefik's published.
 compose() {
    SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE="$IMAGE" GITEA_SECRET_KEY="$secret_key" \
        docker compose --project-name "$NAME" \
        --file "$ROOT/deploy/gitea/compose.yaml" --file "$WORK/no-ports.yaml" "$@"
 }
 fail() {
    echo "gitea-setup: $*; the last lines of each container's output:" >&2
    compose logs --no-color --tail 30 >&2 || true
    exit 1
 }
 # wait_for <what fails> <command>...: run the command every second until
 # it succeeds, for at most a minute.
 wait_for() {
    failure="$1"
    shift
    tries=0
    until "$@"; do
        tries=$((tries + 1))
        [ "$tries" -lt 60 ] || fail "$failure"
        sleep 1
    done
 }
 # logged <service> <text>...: a line of the service's output holds every text,
 # in any order.
 logged() {
    lines="$(compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix "$1" 2>&1)"
    shift
    for text in "$@"; do
        lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F -e "$text")" || return 1
    done
 }
 # send <path> <curl option>...: send a request for path to the site, at
 # traefik's address, and print the status of the answer, 000 for none. traefik
 # answers with a certificate it made itself, since the setup names no
 # certificate resolver.
 send() {
    path="$1"
    shift
    curl --silent --show-error --insecure --max-time 30 --output /dev/null \
        --write-out '%{http_code}' --resolve "$SITE:443:$traefik" "$@" \
        "https://$SITE$path" || true
 }
 # routed: traefik passes a request for the site's front page on to gitea.
 routed() {
    [ "$(send / 2>/dev/null)" = 200 ]
 }
 # site_git <git argument>...: run git as the owner, without the host's own git
 # settings, reaching the site at traefik's address. git gives up on a transfer
 # slower than 1000 bytes a second for 30 seconds.
 site_git() {
    GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1 git \
        -c user.name=owner -c user.email=owner@example.invalid \
        -c http.sslVerify=false -c "http.curloptResolve=$SITE:443:$traefik" \
        -c http.lowSpeedLimit=1000 -c http.lowSpeedTime=30 "$@"
 }
 # address_of <service>: print the service's address on the shared network.
 address_of() {
    docker inspect --format "{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks \"$NETWORK\").IPAddress}}" \
        "$(compose ps --quiet "$1")"
 }
 # passed_through <method> <path>: rproxy passed a request from the gateway for
 # path to gitea on servewaf's allow, and servewaf checked it: its report line
 # gives the client's counts and the Core Rule Set's score.
 passed_through() {
    wait_for "rproxy logged no $1 $2 that servewaf allowed" logged rproxy \
        "\"method\":\"$1\"" "\"path\":\"$2\"" "\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\"" \
        '"disposition":"allow"'
    wait_for "servewaf logged no check of $1 $2" logged servewaf \
        '"servewaf_line":"report"' "\"method\":\"$1\"" "\"path\":\"$2\"" \
        "\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\"" '"action":"forward"' '"counts":' '"waf_score":'
 }
 main() {
    cd "$ROOT"
    trap cleanup EXIT
    trap 'exit 1' HUP INT TERM
    WORK="$(mktemp -d)"
    printf 'services:\n    traefik:\n        ports: !reset []\n' >"$WORK/no-ports.yaml"
    docker build --no-cache -t "$IMAGE" .
    secret_key="$(docker run --rm "$GITEA_IMAGE" gitea generate secret SECRET_KEY)"
    # rproxy is healthy once gitea takes connections.
    compose up --detach --quiet-pull --wait --wait-timeout 120 ||
        fail "the setup did not start"
    traefik="$(address_of traefik)"
    gateway="$(docker network inspect --format '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}' "$NETWORK")"
    wait_for "traefik did not route the site to rproxy" routed
    compose exec --user git gitea gitea admin user create --admin \
        --username owner --password "$PASSWORD" --email owner@example.invalid \
        --must-change-password=false >/dev/null || fail "creating gitea's user failed"
    status="$(send /api/v1/user/repos --user "owner:$PASSWORD" \
        --header "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"name":"repo"}')"
    [ "$status" = 201 ] || fail "creating the repository was answered $status"
    status="$(send /owner/repo)"
    [ "$status" = 200 ] || fail "the repository's page was answered $status"
    passed_through GET /owner/repo
    echo "gitea-setup: a page load passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
    wait_for "gitea did not log the visitor's address" logged gitea \
        "GET /owner/repo for $gateway:"
    echo "gitea-setup: gitea logs the visitor's address, not rproxy's"
    site_git init --quiet --initial-branch=main "$WORK/repo"
    echo "hello" >"$WORK/repo/README.md"
    site_git -C "$WORK/repo" add README.md
    site_git -C "$WORK/repo" commit --quiet --message "Add a README"
    site_git -C "$WORK/repo" push --quiet \
        "https://owner:$PASSWORD@$SITE/owner/repo.git" main ||
        fail "the push failed"
    passed_through POST /owner/repo.git/git-receive-pack
    echo "gitea-setup: a push passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
    site_git clone --quiet "https://owner:$PASSWORD@$SITE/owner/repo.git" \
        "$WORK/clone" || fail "the clone failed"
    [ "$(cat "$WORK/clone/README.md")" = hello ] || fail "the clone lacks the README"
    passed_through POST /owner/repo.git/git-upload-pack
    echo "gitea-setup: a clone passes through rproxy, and servewaf checks it"
    # A container on the shared network, as sandcastle is, asks for the site
    # by its name, and so reaches traefik from its own address.
    status="$(docker run --rm --name "$VISITOR" --network "$NETWORK" \
        --entrypoint curl "$GITEA_IMAGE" --silent --insecure --max-time 30 \
        --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' "https://$SITE/api/v1/version" ||
        true)"
    [ "$status" = 200 ] || fail "the request from the shared network was answered $status"
    wait_for "servewaf logged no request from the shared network" logged servewaf \
        '"servewaf_line":"report"' '"path":"/api/v1/version"' '"action":"forward"'
    line="$(compose logs --no-color --no-log-prefix servewaf |
        grep -F '"servewaf_line":"report"' | grep -F '"path":"/api/v1/version"')"
    case "$line" in
        *"\"client_ip\":\"$gateway\""*)
            fail "the request from the shared network came from the gateway" ;;
        *'"counts":'* | *'"waf_score":'*)
            fail "servewaf checked the request from the shared network" ;;
    esac
    echo "gitea-setup: a request from the shared network skips the checks"
    compose stop servewaf >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "servewaf did not stop"
    status="$(send /owner/repo)"
    [ "$status" = 200 ] ||
        fail "with servewaf stopped, the repository's page was answered $status"
    wait_for "rproxy logged no request SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION decided" \
        logged rproxy '"path":"/owner/repo"' '"default_disposition":true'
    echo "gitea-setup: with servewaf stopped, gitea answers through rproxy"
 }
 main "$@"