Bans an admin makes or lifts: the admin cause, a reason, lifted bans kept (closes #86)

A bans.json entry without a cause gets the cause admin, written back so.
Bans whose cause is admin are never dropped and do not count toward
SWWAF_MAX_BANS, so setting a ban's cause to admin keeps it. Bans
smallwebwaf makes get a reason: the limit broken or the rule matched. A
lifted ban refuses nothing, is kept, and makes no later ban longer.
smallwebwaf_bans_made_total counts admin bans an edit adds while running;
earlier_bans counts admin in place of without_cause.

Judgement call: lifted lifts at once, whatever time it gives.
Judgement call: a lifted ban still counts in earlier_bans.
Known gap: a ban dropped from behind an admin's ban on its netblock leaves that netblock's later earlier_bans.

Model: opus-5-5

.dockerignore

@@ -13,9 +13,21 @@
 # `/myapp`, never `**/myapp`, which also matches `cmd/myapp/` and
 # deletes the package directory from the context.
 
-# Excluding .git means `git describe` cannot run in any build stage and
-# fails quietly there; pass the version in with --build-arg VERSION.
-.git
+# .git is sent without its config. Without a VERSION build argument the
+# stage that compiles runs `git describe --tags --always` on .git, which
+# does not need .git/config; that file can hold a credential, such as a
+# password in a remote URL or the token the CI checkout step stores there.
+# Each submodule keeps a config with the same exposure in its git directory
+# under .git/modules/, nested again for a submodule's own submodules, or in
+# its own .git directory when it keeps one.
+# KNOWN GAP: a submodule whose name has a `config` segment (`config`,
+# `deploy/config`, `config/lib`) loses its whole git directory, because
+# `**/.git/modules/**/config` also matches that segment's directory
+# under .git/modules/. Go's version stamping then fails the build;
+# nothing leaks. Name such a submodule without that segment:
+# `git submodule add --name`.
+**/.git/config
+**/.git/modules/**/config
 
 # Agent scratch: one full checkout of the repo per in-flight agent.
 # Anchored because it occurs once where agents run at the repo root.
@@ -39,14 +51,13 @@
 **/[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
 **/[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
 **/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
+**/[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]_[sS][kK]
 **/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
+**/[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519_[sS][kK]
 
 # Dependencies: restored inside the image, never copied in.
 **/node_modules
 
-# The binary `make build` writes on the host; the image builds its own.
-/bin
-
 # OS metadata.
 **/.DS_Store
 **/Thumbs.db
@@ -59,3 +70,6 @@
 **/.idea
 **/.vscode
 **/*.sublime-*
+
+# The binary `make build` writes on the host; the image builds its own.
+/bin

.gitignore

@@ -20,11 +20,31 @@ Thumbs.db
 # Node
 node_modules/
 
-# Environment / secrets
-.env
-.env.*
-*.pem
-*.key
+# Secrets. Unanchored like every entry above, so each matches at every
+# depth. Matching is case-sensitive on Linux, so names use character
+# ranges rather than a lowercase form that misses `Server.Key`.
+
+# Environment files. `*.env` covers bare `.env` and the `prod.env`
+# convention. Only the templates `example.env` and `sample.env` are
+# re-included below. A repository that commits any other template adds
+# its own negation after these lines, for example `!.env.example`.
+*.[eE][nN][vV]
+.[eE][nN][vV].*
+.[eE][nN][vV][rR][cC]
+!example.env
+!sample.env
+
+# Private keys and the bundles carrying them.
+*.[pP][eE][mM]
+*.[kK][eE][yY]
+*.[pP]12
+*.[pP][fF][xX]
+[iI][dD]_[rR][sS][aA]
+[iI][dD]_[dD][sS][aA]
+[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]
+[iI][dD]_[eE][cC][dD][sS][aA]_[sS][kK]
+[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519
+[iI][dD]_[eE][dD]25519_[sS][kK]
 
 # Go: the binary `make build` writes, test binaries, profiles and logs
 /bin/

.golangci.yml

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ linters:
   disable:
     # Genuinely incompatible with project patterns
     - exhaustruct      # Requires all struct fields
+    - exhaustruct_v5   # Requires all struct fields (successor to exhaustruct)
     - godot            # Requires comments to end with periods
     - wrapcheck        # Too verbose for internal packages
     - varnamelen       # Short names like db, id are idiomatic Go

Dockerfile

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 # lint` or `script/lint`, which are themselves a docker build and would
 # recurse into a daemon that does not exist in a build step.
 #
-# golangci/golangci-lint v2.12.2 (built with go1.26.2), 2026-05-06
-FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240 AS lint
+# golangci/golangci-lint v2.14.0 (built with go1.27.0), 2026-09-24
+FROM golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f AS lint
 
 WORKDIR /src
 
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ COPY . .
 # Go's build cache is kept on a tmpfs, out of the image: nothing uses it
 # after this step, and writing it into the image takes seconds.
 RUN --mount=type=tmpfs,target=/root/.cache/go-build \
-    go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
+    go test -timeout 90s -race -cover ./... || \
     { echo "--- Rerunning with -v for details ---"; \
-      go test -count=1 -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
+      go test -timeout 90s -race -v ./...; exit 1; }
 
 # Build stage. Nothing is wanted from the two phases above; the copies
 # are what make BuildKit build them first, so the image, which needs this
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ FROM golang@sha256:3b77fc618ec235a1ab412de7737f120dd507c57e8d87de4cbb7994fb94275
 COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
 COPY --from=test /src/go.sum /dev/null
 
+# This image has git. A tar-stream context keeps the sender's file
+# owners, which git refuses.
+RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
+
 WORKDIR /src
 
 COPY go.mod go.sum ./
@@ -53,12 +57,21 @@ RUN go mod download
 
 COPY . .
 
-# The version is computed on the host and passed in, because
-# .dockerignore excludes .git.
-ARG VERSION=dev
-RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-    -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-    -o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
+# The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
+# `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
+# .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
+# build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
+ARG VERSION
+RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
+    if [ -e .git ]; then \
+        case "$VERSION" in ""|dev|unknown) \
+            echo "version is '$VERSION' although .git is present" >&2; \
+            exit 1 ;; \
+        esac; \
+    fi; \
+    CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
+        -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
+        -o /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf ./cmd/smallwebwaf
 
 # runsvinit, the image's entrypoint, built at the last commit of its
 # archived repository. It has no go.mod, and `go build` of its directory
@@ -149,6 +162,15 @@ RUN groupadd --system --gid 65532 smallwebwaf \
         --gid smallwebwaf --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin \
         smallwebwaf
 
+# The state files' directory, SWWAF_STATE_DIR by default, where a volume
+# is mounted to keep them across deploys. The run script gives it to the
+# smallwebwaf user at each start.
+RUN mkdir /var/lib/smallwebwaf
+
+# The default rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR by default, where an app's
+# Dockerfile can copy rule files of its own beside it.
+COPY share/rules.d/00-default.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/00-default.rules
+
 # runsvinit starts runit's runsvdir on /etc/service, where Ubuntu's sv
 # looks too.
 COPY --chmod=755 share/smallwebwaf.run /etc/service/smallwebwaf/run

README.md

@@ -13,15 +13,30 @@ JSON log line for every request.
 
 Status: the first two milestones are built
 (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/13 and
-https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/14), and so are the static lists,
-which come next in the build order. `smallwebwaf` passes each request to the app
+https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/smallwebwaf/issues/14), and so are nine parts of
+milestone 3: the static lists, the bans that broken rate limits lead to, the ban
+ledger with the bans you make, keep and lift, the JSON state files with your
+edits taken in while it runs and the paths the rate limits do not count, which
+come next in the build order, `observe` mode and the rest of the request log's
+fields, which come a little later, and the metrics endpoint and the header size
+and the idle time as settings, which come last in it. So are two parts of the
+stage after it: the rule files, the first part, with the bans for a clear sign
+of attack, and remote log sending. `smallwebwaf` passes each request to the app
 and the app's answer back, unchanged, within its timeouts and size limits, works
-out each client's address, refuses a client that sends too many requests, comes
-from a country you refuse or from a network you refuse, lets the networks you
-choose through, and writes a JSON log line for every request. It comes as the
-image the app's own image is built on. The rest of the design comes after that,
-in the order of the build order in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md). The survey of existing
-tools that led to the design is in [`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md).
+out each client's address, bans a client that sends too many requests, not
+counting those for the paths you choose, refuses a client that comes from a
+country you refuse or from a network you refuse, lets the networks you choose
+through, checks each request against the rule files and bans a client whose
+request is a clear sign of attack, keeps its bans, each client's counters and
+history, and GeoJS's answers in JSON files across restarts, takes in your edits
+of those files, such as a ban you make, keep or lift, and of the rule files
+while it runs, writes a JSON log line for every request, sends its log lines to
+a syslog server too if you name one, serves Prometheus metrics to a scraper that
+holds the metrics token, and in `observe` mode passes on the requests it would
+refuse, logging what it would have done with them. It comes as the image the
+app's own image is built on. The rest of the design comes after that, in the
+order of the build order in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md). The survey of existing tools
+that led to the design is in [`EVALUATION.md`](EVALUATION.md).
 
 ## Getting started
 
@@ -43,7 +58,9 @@ works.
 
 To work on the code, `make build` builds the binary alone, with Go installed,
 and `make run` builds and runs it, listening on port 8080 in front of an app at
-`SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL`, by default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`.
+`SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL`, by default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`, with its state files
+in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the default rule file of
+`share/rules.d` unless `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` is set.
 
 ## What it does so far
 
@@ -57,46 +74,110 @@ and `make run` builds and runs it, listening on port 8080 in front of an app at
   address outside `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` is the client; if every address in it
   is inside, the leftmost is, and with no header the peer is. The app sees what
   it would see from traefik directly: the same `Host`, the same
-  `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-For` with the peer added at the end.
-- Enforces the four timeouts and the two size limits below. A limit passed
-  before the response has started gets `smallwebwaf`'s own answer: `408` for a
-  client too slow to send its request, `413` for a request body that is too
-  large, `504` for an app too slow to answer, and `502` for a response that is
-  too large or an app that cannot be reached. A request that announces a body
-  over the limit is refused before anything reaches the app. While a request
-  body is still on its way, a request timeout that runs out answers `408` if
-  `smallwebwaf` was waiting for the client to send more, and `504` if it was
-  waiting for the app to take what it had. Once the response has started, a
-  limit can only cut the connection.
+  `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-For` with the peer added at the end. It
+  also gets the request's id in `X-Request-ID`, the same id as in the request's
+  log line (see `request_id` in "Request log" below).
+- Enforces the timeouts and the size limits below. A limit passed before the
+  response has started gets `smallwebwaf`'s own answer: `408` for a client too
+  slow to send its request, `413` for a request body that is too large, `504`
+  for an app too slow to answer, and `502` for a response that is too large or
+  an app that cannot be reached. A request that announces a body over the limit
+  is refused before anything reaches the app. While a request body is still on
+  its way, a request timeout that runs out answers `408` if `smallwebwaf` was
+  waiting for the client to send more, and `504` if it was waiting for the app
+  to take what it had. Once the response has started, a limit can only cut the
+  connection.
 - Counts each client's requests over a minute, an hour and a day. A request that
-  takes the client over one of the rate limits below is refused with `429`
-  before anything reaches the app, and so is each request after it until the
-  client is back under every limit. A client is one IPv4 address, or one IPv6
-  /64, since one abuser usually holds a whole /64. Refused requests count too,
-  so a client that keeps sending too fast stays refused until it slows down.
-  Each window is counted in two fixed buckets, the earlier one weighted by how
-  much of it the window still covers. At most 20,000 clients are kept, the least
-  recently seen dropped first, and only in memory: a restart starts every client
-  afresh.
-- Refuses a request from a country you refuse with `403`, as soon as the
-  client's country is known and before its body is read; such a request is not
-  counted for the rate limits. While one of the country lists below is set, each
-  client's country is looked up through GeoJS (see "Country and AS number
-  lookup" below); with neither set, no visitor's address leaves the host. A
-  client on a private, loopback or link-local address has no country and is
+  takes the client over one of the rate limits below is refused with
+  `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, `403` by default, before anything reaches the app, and
+  bans the client. A request whose path starts with one of
+  `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS`, as that setting below describes, is neither
+  counted nor refused by the rate limits; the static lists, bans, the country
+  lists and the rule files still apply to it. A client is one IPv4 address, or
+  one IPv6 /64, since one abuser usually holds a whole /64. Each window is
+  counted in two fixed buckets, the earlier one weighted by how much of it the
+  window still covers. At most 20,000 clients are kept, the least recently seen
+  dropped first, with their history, and a restart gives no client a fresh
+  allowance (see "State files" below).
+- Bans a client that breaks a rate limit, as "Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)
+  describes: the first ban lasts an hour, and a limit broken again within a day
+  of a ban ending bans for three times as long as that ban, so 1, 3, 9, 27 and
+  81 hours; a ban that would last longer than seven days is permanent instead. A
+  ban covers the client's netblock: its IPv4 address, or the netblock around it
+  that `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` sets, or its IPv6 /64. While it lasts, every
+  request from the netblock is refused with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` after the
+  static lists and before the country lists, so the client is not looked up, and
+  is not counted for the rate limits. A ban sets the client's counters back to
+  zero. Each ban carries notes for deciding whether to lift it: the limit, its
+  window and the requests counted in it, the request that broke it, the client's
+  country when it was looked up, the netblock's requests since it was first
+  seen, how many of them the ban has refused, and how many bans the netblock had
+  before, for a broken limit, for a clear sign of attack and by an admin. At
+  most `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` bans `smallwebwaf` made are kept, past, active and
+  permanent; past that, the earliest such ban of the netblock that has gone
+  longest without a request is dropped first. The bans whose cause is `admin`,
+  those you make or keep, are kept besides, and never dropped. `bans.json` shows
+  the bans and their notes, a restart lifts none, and you make, keep or lift a
+  ban by editing it (see "State files" below).
+- Checks each request against the rules of the rule files (see "Rule files"
+  below) after the rate limits, and before its body is read. A `log` rule that
+  matches is noted in the log line; a `block` rule refuses the request with
+  `403`, and bans no one; a `ban` rule refuses it with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` and
+  bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack. Matching stops at the
+  first rule that refuses. A client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` is not checked.
+- Bans a client for a clear sign of attack, as "Bans" in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)
+  describes: the first such ban lasts `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION`, seven days by
+  default, and any request from the netblock while it lasts makes it permanent.
+  Once it has run out, the netblock is served like any other, but its next clear
+  sign of attack bans it permanently at once. Such a ban covers the same
+  netblock as a ban for a broken rate limit, does not set the client's counters
+  back to zero, and does not make the netblock's next ban for a broken limit
+  longer. Its notes give the id and the target of the rule that matched in place
+  of the limit.
+- Refuses a request from a country you refuse with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE`, as soon
+  as the client's country is known and before its body is read; such a request
+  is not counted for the rate limits. While one of the country lists below is
+  set, each client's country is looked up through GeoJS (see "Country and AS
+  number lookup" below); with neither set, no visitor's address leaves the host.
+  A client on a private, loopback or link-local address has no country and is
   never looked up: `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refuses it unless it is
   in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`, and `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` does not refuse it.
 - Checks the client's own address against the static lists, the three netblock
   settings below, before anything else, its country included. A client in
-  `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips the country lists and the rate limits, and is not
-  looked up; the timeouts and size limits still apply. A client in
-  `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused with `403` before its body is read, and the
-  request is not counted for the rate limits; an address in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS`
-  too is let through. A client in `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` is neither
-  counted nor refused by the rate limits; the country lists still apply to it.
+  `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` skips bans, the country lists, the rate limits and the rule
+  files, and is not looked up; the timeouts and size limits still apply. A
+  client in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is refused with `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` before its
+  body is read, and the request is not counted for the rate limits; an address
+  in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` too is let through. A client in
+  `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` is neither counted nor refused by the rate
+  limits; the country lists, the rule files and bans still apply to it.
+- In `observe` mode, with `SWWAF_MODE=observe`, refuses none of the requests
+  that `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban, the country lists, a rate limit or a rule would
+  refuse: it passes them to the app, and their log lines name what `enforce`
+  mode would have done (see `would_action` in "Request log" below). The checks
+  run, and requests are counted, as in `enforce` mode, with three differences:
+  neither a broken rate limit nor a `ban` rule makes a ban; a broken rate limit
+  does not set the client's counters back to zero, so each request over the
+  limit is logged as one that would be refused; and a request under a ban does
+  not make it permanent. The bans in `bans.json` are kept, and refuse requests
+  again when `smallwebwaf` next runs in `enforce` mode, as long as they last.
+  The timeouts and size limits still apply, since they protect `smallwebwaf` and
+  the app themselves, and a request for the metrics without the token is still
+  answered `401`. It is for trying a configuration before enforcing it.
 - Answers `GET /_smallwebwaf/healthz` itself with `200` and `ok`, before any
   check and without asking the app, for the image's health check.
+- Answers `GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` with its metrics (see "Metrics" below) for
+  a request that carries `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` as
+  `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, and with `401` for one that does not. While
+  the token is unset the metrics answer `404`, as does any other request under
+  `/_smallwebwaf/`. Unlike the health check, such a request goes through every
+  check any other request goes through, and is answered where another would be
+  passed to the app: a banned client stays refused, and each counts toward the
+  client's rate limits. None of them reaches the app.
 - Writes a line in the request log for each request (see "Request log" below).
+- Sends every line it writes on stdout to a syslog server as well, while
+  `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` names one (see "Sending the log to a syslog server"
+  below).
 
 ## Settings
 
@@ -107,12 +188,30 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
 - `SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR` (default `:8080`): where `smallwebwaf` listens.
 - `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL` (default `http://127.0.0.1:8081`): the app, as `http` or
   `https`, a host and an optional port, and nothing more.
+- `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` (default: the host's name, which docker sets to the
+  first 12 characters of the container's id unless the deployment names one):
+  the name each request log line gives as `instance`. Set it, for example to
+  `fsn1app1/gitea`, for a name that stays the same when a deploy replaces the
+  container, and that tells instances apart when several log to one place.
+- `SWWAF_MODE` (default `enforce`): `enforce`, or `observe` to pass on the
+  requests `smallwebwaf` would refuse and log what it would have done (see "What
+  it does so far" above).
 - `SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (default `10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16`,
   the private address ranges): the netblocks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is
   believed. A list given replaces the default; set but empty, it trusts nothing.
 - `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` (default `60s`): how long a client may take to
   send its request line and headers, and then, from the end of the headers, its
   body.
+- `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` (default `32K`): the largest request
+  line and headers a client may send. Over it, the answer is `431` and nothing
+  reaches the app. It must be more than `4K`, and cannot be `off`: Go's HTTP
+  server always has such a limit, and reads 4 KiB past the one it is given
+  before it refuses.
+- `SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default `120s`): how long a kept-open connection
+  may wait for its next request before `smallwebwaf` closes it. The default is
+  longer than the 90 seconds after which traefik closes a connection it is not
+  using, so traefik never sends a request on a connection `smallwebwaf` is
+  closing.
 - `SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT` (default `30m`): how long the response may
   take to reach the client, from the end of the request to the last byte.
 - `SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` (default `60s`): how long connecting to the
@@ -121,8 +220,9 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
   to send its whole answer, from the end of the request to the last byte.
 - `SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES` (default `100M`): the largest request body.
 - `SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES` (default `5G`): the largest response body.
-- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients skip the country
-  lists and the rate limits, such as your monitoring or your own networks.
+- `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients skip bans, the
+  country lists, the rate limits and the rule files, such as your monitoring or
+  your own networks.
 - `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients the
   rate limits do not apply to, such as a machine that talks to the app all day.
 - `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` (default empty): netblocks whose clients are always refused.
@@ -131,12 +231,87 @@ it, and the effective settings are logged at start.
   requests a client may make in a minute, an hour and a day. The defaults are
   several times what one busy person produces, since a browser loading a heavy
   page makes a few hundred requests and several people often share one address.
+- `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` (default empty): path prefixes whose requests
+  the rate limits neither count nor refuse, such as `/assets/` for static
+  assets; each starts with `/`. A request whose path, percent-decoded, contains
+  `..` anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an encoded slash
+  (`%2F` or `%2f`), is never exempt, since the app may act on it as a path
+  outside every prefix: `/assets/..%2Flogin` as `/login`. Any other request is
+  exempt when its path as sent, the path the app receives, before any query
+  string and not percent-decoded, starts with a prefix, character for character.
+  `/assets/` matches `/assets/app.js` and `/assets/`, but not `/assets`,
+  `/Assets/app.js`, `/%61ssets/app.js`, `/static/assets/app.js`,
+  `/static/../assets/app.js` or `/assets%2Fapp.js`. A character the client sends
+  percent-encoded, such as a space, is written percent-encoded in a prefix, as
+  in `/my%20files/`, and there are no wildcards: `*` is a character like any
+  other.
 - `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): countries whose clients are refused,
   for example `cn,ru,kp`.
 - `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` (default empty): when set, the only
   countries whose clients get through, for example `us,de`. A client whose
   country cannot be found is refused too, so that new clients are not let in
   whenever GeoJS stops answering.
+- `SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): how a refused client is answered, one
+  that is banned, breaks a rate limit, matches a `ban` rule, is in
+  `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` or comes from a refused country: `403`, `429`, or `close` to
+  close the connection without an answer. Behind traefik, `close` does not leave
+  the client unanswered: traefik answers `502`, as it does whenever its backend
+  drops a connection. A `block` rule always answers `403`.
+- `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION` (default `1h`): the ban for a first broken rate
+  limit.
+- `SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW` (default `24h`): a rate limit broken again
+  within this time after a ban ended, other than one for a clear sign of attack,
+  bans for three times as long as that ban.
+- `SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): a ban for a broken rate limit that
+  would be longer is permanent instead.
+- `SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
+  attack.
+- `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): the most bans `smallwebwaf` made that are
+  kept, past, active and permanent. The bans you make or keep are kept besides.
+- `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): the length of the netblock around
+  an IPv4 client that a ban covers, such as `24` to ban the surrounding /24. An
+  IPv6 ban covers the client's /64.
+- `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` (default `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`): the directory of the state
+  files, an absolute path. A directory `smallwebwaf` cannot write stops the
+  start.
+- `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` (default `10s`): how long after a ban is made
+  `bans.json` is written, with every ban made in between.
+- `SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often every state file is
+  written.
+- `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS` (default
+  `accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range`): the
+  request headers whose values the request log gives, in either case.
+  `Authorization`, `Cookie` and `Set-Cookie` are never logged, even when listed
+  (see "Request log" below). An entry naming `Host` or `Transfer-Encoding` stops
+  the start, since Go's HTTP server takes both out of the request; the request's
+  host is the field `host`.
+- `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN` (default unset): the token a scraper sends for the
+  metrics, a long random value. While it is unset the metrics are off; one
+  shorter than 32 characters stops the start. The settings logged at start show
+  `********` in its place.
+- `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` (default `50`): how many countries get series of their
+  own in the metrics by country; the others are counted as `other`.
+- `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` (default `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d`): the directory of the
+  rule files. A directory that does not exist stops the start.
+- `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED` (default `true`): `false` reads no rule file, and checks
+  no request against one.
+- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` (default unset): a syslog server that every line on
+  stdout is also sent to, as `syslog+udp://`, `syslog+tcp://` or `syslog+tls://`
+  with a host and a port, such as `syslog+tls://logs.example:6514`. Unset or
+  empty, nothing is sent.
+- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE` (default unset): a file of PEM certificates,
+  which the certificate of a `syslog+tls` server must chain to instead of the
+  host's own. A file that cannot be read or holds no certificate stops the
+  start.
+- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` (default `10000`): the most lines held while they
+  wait to be sent.
+- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` (default `local0`): the syslog facility the lines
+  are sent with: `kern`, `user`, `mail`, `daemon`, `auth`, `syslog`, `lpr`,
+  `news`, `uucp`, `cron`, `authpriv`, `ftp`, or `local0` to `local7`.
+- `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` (default `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`): the app name the
+  lines are sent with, 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space. While
+  `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set, an `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME` that is not such a
+  name stops the start too, unless this setting gives one that is.
 
 Durations are in Go's syntax, with `d` for days (`90s`, `15m`, `7d`). Sizes are
 bytes, with an optional `K`, `M` or `G`, which are powers of 1024 (`1K` is 1024
@@ -145,16 +320,14 @@ and a bare address stands for itself alone. Countries are the two-letter codes
 ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and `xk` for Kosovo, in either case (`de` and `DE` are
 the same); any other code, such as `nk` (North Korea is `kp`) or the withdrawn
 `su`, stops the start, and so does a code on both country lists. `off` switches
-a timeout, a size limit or a rate limit off.
+a timeout, a size limit or a rate limit off;
+`SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`, the ban settings, the state settings,
+`SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` and `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` cannot be off.
 
-Several limits are fixed rather than settings. The request line and headers may
-take up to 32 KiB, above which the answer is `431` and nothing reaches the app.
-A kept-open connection that sends nothing for 120 seconds is closed. That is
-longer than the 90 seconds after which traefik closes a connection it is not
-using, so traefik never sends a request on a connection `smallwebwaf` is
-closing. At most 20,000 clients are kept for the rate limits, and an IPv6 client
-is counted by its /64. A new client waits at most a second for its country, and
-at most 100,000 answers from GeoJS are kept, for 7 days each.
+Several limits are fixed rather than settings. At most 20,000 clients are kept,
+with their counters and history, and an IPv6 client is counted by its /64. A new
+client waits at most a second for its country, and at most 100,000 answers from
+GeoJS are kept, for 7 days each.
 
 ## Request log
 
@@ -162,41 +335,352 @@ at most 100,000 answers from GeoJS are kept, for 7 days each.
 refused ones included:
 
 ```
-{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","country":"DE","method":"GET","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"upstream_status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","action":"forward","duration_total":3.217,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
+{"type":"request","time":"2026-10-03T12:00:00.123Z","instance":"fsn1app1/gitea","client_ip":"203.0.113.9","method":"GET","scheme":"https","host":"app.example","path":"/","query":"","protocol":"HTTP/1.1","status":200,"request_bytes":0,"response_bytes":5120,"referer":"","user_agent":"curl/8.9.1","request_id":"7Q2NHZ4KJ3VXW5YB6R3MEFTD2A","peer_ip":"172.18.0.2","forwarded_for":"203.0.113.9","client_group":"203.0.113.9/32","country":"DE","request_headers":{"accept":"*/*"},"response_content_type":"text/html; charset=utf-8","upstream_status":200,"action":"forward","counts":{"minute":1,"hour":12,"day":40},"duration_total":3.217,"duration_checks":0.041,"duration_upstream_connect":0.052,"duration_upstream_first_byte":2.874,"duration_upstream_total":3.104}
 ```
 
-- `time` is when the request arrived, in UTC. `peer_ip` is the TCP peer,
-  normally traefik. `path` and `query` are as the client sent them.
-- `country` is the client's country as GeoJS places it, and empty when it is not
-  known: with neither country list set, for a client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or
-  `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, for a client on a private, loopback or link-local address,
-  and when GeoJS cannot place the client or has not answered in time.
+A field that does not apply to a request is left out of its line, apart from
+`type`, the fields from `time` to `user_agent`, `request_id`, `peer_ip`,
+`client_group`, `country`, `action` and `duration_total`, which every line has.
+
+- `time` is when the request arrived, in UTC. `instance` is
+  `SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME`. `scheme` is the `X-Forwarded-Proto` a trusted proxy
+  sent, and otherwise `http`. `path` and `query` are as the client sent them.
+- `request_id` is the `X-Request-ID` a trusted proxy sent, or a new random one
+  of 26 letters and digits when it sent none, or when the peer is not a trusted
+  proxy. A request passed to the app takes it there in `X-Request-ID`.
+- `peer_ip` is the TCP peer, normally traefik. `forwarded_for` is the
+  `X-Forwarded-For` header as received, several lines of it joined with `, `.
+  `client_group` is the client as the rate limits count it: its IPv4 address as
+  a /32, or the /64 of its IPv6 address.
+- `country` is the client's country as GeoJS places it. It is empty with neither
+  country list set, for a client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, for
+  a client on a private, loopback or link-local address, when GeoJS cannot place
+  the client or has not answered in time, and for a request whose client a ban
+  covers, even when the client's country is known.
+- `content_type` is the request's `Content-Type`, and `content_length` the
+  length the request announced for its body, which is left out for none or zero.
+- `request_headers` are the request's headers that `SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS`
+  names, by name in lower case, several lines of one joined with `, `.
+  `Authorization`, `Cookie` and `Set-Cookie` are never among them, whatever the
+  setting says: `has_authorization` and `has_cookie` are there instead, and
+  true, when the request has an `Authorization` or a `Cookie` header.
+- `websocket` is there, and true, when the app switched the connection to
+  another protocol, as it does for a WebSocket.
 - `status` is what the client was sent, `0` if nothing was; `upstream_status` is
   what the app answered, and is left out when the app did not answer.
+- `response_content_type`, `cache_control` and `location` are the
+  `Content-Type`, `Cache-Control` and `Location` headers of the answer: the
+  app's, as passed on, or those of `smallwebwaf`'s own answer.
 - `request_bytes` and `response_bytes` count body bytes.
 - `action` is `forward` for a request passed to the app, `denied` for one
-  refused because its client is in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, `country_denied` for one
-  refused for its client's country, `rate_limited` for one refused for a rate
-  limit, `too_large` for a request or response over its size limit, `timed_out`
-  for one that ran out of time, `upstream_error` when the app could not be
-  reached or its answer broke off, and `admin` for one `smallwebwaf` answered at
-  its own endpoint.
-- `limit_hit` is there for a request refused for a rate limit, and names the
+  refused because its client is in `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, `banned` for one refused
+  because a ban covers its client or because it matched a `ban` rule, which bans
+  its client, `country_denied` for one refused for its client's country,
+  `rate_limited` for one that broke a rate limit and banned its client,
+  `rule_blocked` for one a `block` rule refused, `too_large` for a request or
+  response over its size limit, `timed_out` for one that ran out of time,
+  `upstream_error` when the app could not be reached or its answer broke off,
+  and `admin` for one `smallwebwaf` answered at its own endpoint.
+- `would_action` is there in `observe` mode for a request that
+  `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban, the country lists, a rate limit or a rule would have
+  refused in `enforce` mode, and names the action that refusal would have had:
+  `denied`, `banned`, `country_denied`, `rate_limited` or `rule_blocked`.
+  `action` then names what was done: `forward` for a request passed to the app,
+  and another action, such as `too_large`, for one a size or time limit refused.
+- `counts` gives the client's requests in the minute, the hour and the day as
+  the rate limits count them, this request included: in each window, those in
+  the bucket under way and a share of those in the bucket before, so a count can
+  have a fraction. For a request that broke a limit, they are the counts that
+  broke it. It is left out for a request the rate limits do not count: the
+  health check, one from a client in `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or
+  `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS`, one for a path that
+  `SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS` exempts, and one that `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, a ban
+  or the country lists refuse, or would refuse in `observe` mode. The byte
+  totals come with the byte limits.
+- `rule_ids` is there for a request that matched rules of the rule files, and
+  lists their ids in the order they matched, up to the one that refused it.
+- `limit_hit` is there for a request that broke a rate limit, and names the
   window whose limit it went over: `minute`, `hour` or `day`, the shortest if it
-  went over several.
+  went over several. `offence` is then `limit`.
+- `ban_expires` is there for a request that made a ban or was refused under one,
+  or in `observe` mode would have been refused under one, and gives when the ban
+  ends, in the same form as `time`, or `permanent`.
 - `aborted` is there, and true, when the client went away early.
-- `duration_total` and `duration_upstream_total` are in milliseconds.
+- The timings are in milliseconds, to the microsecond. `duration_total` runs
+  from when the request's headers had been read to when its line is written, and
+  `duration_checks` over the same start to when the checks were done; the health
+  check runs none, and its line has no `duration_checks`.
+  `duration_upstream_connect`, `duration_upstream_first_byte` and
+  `duration_upstream_total` are there for a request passed to the app, and run
+  from when it was handed to the app: until there was a connection to it, new or
+  kept open from an earlier request, until the first byte of its answer arrived,
+  and until the end. The first two are left out when that never happened, as for
+  an app that cannot be reached.
 
-No body and no other header is logged. `smallwebwaf`'s own messages (start, the
-settings, stop, errors) share the stream as JSON lines marked
+No body is logged, and no header but those above. `smallwebwaf`'s own messages
+(start, the settings, stop, errors) share the stream as JSON lines marked
 `"type":"process"`.
 
 Go's HTTP server, on which `smallwebwaf` is built, reads a request's line and
 headers before `smallwebwaf` sees the request, and some requests end there,
-without a line in the log: headers over 32 KiB, which it answers `431`, headers
-slower than `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT`, whose connection it closes without
-an answer, and requests it cannot read at all, which it answers itself, mostly
-with `400`.
+without a line in the log: headers over `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`,
+which it answers `431`, headers slower than `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT`,
+whose connection it closes without an answer, and requests it cannot read at
+all, which it answers itself, mostly with `400`.
+
+### Sending the log to a syslog server
+
+While `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set, every line `smallwebwaf` writes on stdout,
+request lines and its own, is also sent to that syslog server, as the message of
+an RFC 5424 record: one record to a datagram over UDP, and over TCP and TLS each
+record after its length in bytes and a space. A record gives the facility
+`SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY` names, the severity informational, the time the line
+was written, in the same form as a request line's `time`, the host's name, and
+the app name `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME` gives. stdout is unchanged.
+
+The lines wait in a buffer of `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER` lines and are sent from
+there, so a server that is slow or cannot be reached never holds up a request or
+stdout. When the buffer is full, its oldest line is dropped to make room. A line
+whose sending fails is dropped too, and the connection closed. That failure,
+like a failed attempt to connect, is logged and followed by the next attempt to
+connect a second later, twice as long after each further failure up to a minute,
+and a second again after a connection that stayed up for a minute before it
+failed. A line too long for one UDP datagram is dropped alone, with no wait and
+nothing logged. UDP gives no sign of what arrives, and over TCP and TLS a line
+sent on a connection the server has just closed can be lost before a failure
+shows; such a loss is not counted.
+
+As `smallwebwaf` stops, it sends the lines still waiting, on the connection open
+or a new one, for at most two seconds, and gives up the rest; stdout has carried
+them.
+
+## State files
+
+`smallwebwaf` keeps its state in memory and a copy of it in three JSON files in
+`SWWAF_STATE_DIR`, `/var/lib/smallwebwaf` by default, as "Persistent state" in
+[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) describes. Each has a top-level `version`, 1, and lists its
+entries by client address, with times in UTC.
+
+- `bans.json`: every ban with its notes, indented to be read. A permanent ban's
+  `expires` is `null`. A ban's `cause` is `limit` for a broken rate limit or
+  `attack` for a clear sign of attack, for a ban `smallwebwaf` made, and `admin`
+  for one you made or keep. Its `reason` is a short text: for a ban
+  `smallwebwaf` made, the limit broken, such as
+  `requests per minute over the limit of 1000`, or the rule that matched, such
+  as `matched the rule env-file`; for yours, what you wrote. Its `lifted` is
+  when you lifted it, and is left out until you do.
+- `clients.json`: each client's two buckets in the minute, the hour and the day,
+  and its history: when it was first and last seen, its country as last looked
+  up and when, its requests, how many were forwarded and how many refused (one
+  `smallwebwaf` answered at its own endpoints is neither, unless it was refused
+  with `401` for a missing or wrong token), the body bytes in each direction,
+  its responses by status class and its offences by kind. Each client is on a
+  line of its own, so `grep` shows everything about one.
+- `lookups.json`: GeoJS's answers, one to a line, with when GeoJS gave each and
+  when it was last used.
+
+`bans.json` is written `SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY` after a ban is made or made
+permanent, with every such change in between, and every file every
+`SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` and when `smallwebwaf` stops. Each write goes to
+a temporary file in the same directory, which then replaces the file, so a crash
+leaves the old file or the new one, whole. A write that fails is logged, and
+tried again at the next write. A hard kill loses what changed since the last
+write.
+
+At start the files are read back: each client keeps its counts, so a restart
+gives it no fresh allowance, and each ban keeps refusing every client in its
+netblock until it ends, even after `SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` has changed. A
+netblock whose address has bits past its length, such as `203.0.113.9/24`, is
+read as the netblock it is in, `203.0.113.0/24`. Buckets and answers whose time
+has passed are dropped. A missing file is empty state, as on a first start. A
+file that does not parse, or has another `version`, stops the start with a
+message naming the file, and the line and column where Go's JSON decoder gives
+them; so does a state directory `smallwebwaf` cannot write. So does an entry
+without a field it needs, named with the entry's place in the file: a ban's
+`netblock`, `start` or `expires`, which is `null` for a permanent ban; a
+client's `client`, or the `start` of a window in which it has requests; an
+answer's `client`, `country`, which is `""` for a client GeoJS cannot place, or
+`answered`. So does a ban whose `cause` is not `limit`, `attack` or `admin`. The
+AS number and AS name come with their lookup.
+
+While it runs, `smallwebwaf` watches `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` and takes in your edit of
+a state file as soon as you save it: what the file then holds replaces what
+`smallwebwaf` held for it, as if read at start. It tells its own writes from
+yours by comparing the file with what it last read or wrote, and before it
+writes a file it takes in any edit made since, so your edit is not overwritten;
+a change `smallwebwaf` made after you opened the file, such as a new ban, is
+lost when you save over it. An edit that would stop the start, because it does
+not parse, has another `version`, leaves out a field an entry needs or gives a
+ban another `cause`, does not stop the running `smallwebwaf`: it keeps what it
+holds, and at the file's next write renames your file to `<name>.bad`, such as
+`bans.json.bad`, writes the file again from memory, and logs the file and where
+the error is. It waits for that write because an editor's file can be read
+before the editor has finished writing it. Mend the `.bad` file and move it
+back. A file you remove is written again at its next write.
+
+To ban a netblock, add an entry to `bans.json` with its `netblock`, its `start`
+and its `expires`, `null` for a ban that never ends; its `reason` and its
+`notes` may be left out, and so may its `cause`, which is then `admin`, and is
+written so at the file's next write. A ban whose `cause` is `admin` is never
+dropped and does not count toward `SWWAF_MAX_BANS`. A ban whose `cause` is
+`attack` becomes permanent at the first request it refuses; one whose `cause` is
+`admin` does not. This `bans.json` bans `203.0.113.0/24` for good:
+
+```json
+{
+    "version": 1,
+    "bans": [
+        {
+            "netblock": "203.0.113.0/24",
+            "start": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
+            "expires": null,
+            "reason": "probes for logins"
+        }
+    ]
+}
+```
+
+To keep a ban `smallwebwaf` made, so that it is never dropped, set its `cause`
+to `admin`: `"cause": "admin"`.
+
+To lift a ban, add `lifted` to its entry, with the time you lift it, such as
+`"lifted": "2026-10-06T13:00:00Z"`. From when the edit is taken in, the ban
+refuses nothing, whatever time `lifted` gives, and does not make the netblock's
+next ban longer; it is kept in `bans.json` with its notes, as any other ban is.
+To forget a ban altogether, delete its entry: it then refuses nothing either,
+and does not make the netblock's next ban longer.
+
+## Rule files
+
+`smallwebwaf` reads every `*.rules` file in `SWWAF_RULES_DIR`,
+`/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` by default, in the order of their names, and checks
+each request against their rules in that order, as "Rule files" in
+[`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md) describes. A file whose name starts with `.`, such as an
+editor's lock file `.#50-app.rules`, is not a rule file, as a shell's `*.rules`
+would not match it. A rule is a line of four fields separated by spaces or tabs:
+an id, a target, an action and a regex, which runs to the end of the line.
+Spaces and tabs at the end of a line are not part of its regex, so a line with
+only those after its action has no regex, and is not a rule. Blank lines and
+lines that start with `#` are ignored.
+
+```
+# id           target      action  regex
+env-file       path        ban     (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
+scanner-agent  user_agent  ban     (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|wpscan)\b
+```
+
+- The id is letters, digits, `-` and `_`, and no two rules share one. The
+  request log, the metrics and a ban's notes name the rule by it.
+- The target is what the regex is matched against: `path` or `query`, as the
+  client sent it, before any decoding; `uri`, the path and the query together,
+  both as sent and once percent-decoded, so that an encoded probe does not slip
+  past; `method`; `host`; `user_agent`; `referer`; or `header:<Name>`, any one
+  request header but `Host` and `Transfer-Encoding`, which Go's HTTP server
+  takes out of every request; the request's host is the target `host`. A header
+  sent more than once is matched with its values joined by `, `, and one not
+  sent as empty text. No body is read.
+- The action is `log`, `block` or `ban` (see "What it does so far" above). Keep
+  `ban` for requests no real visitor sends, and anchor a path at the site root
+  with `^/`: a file of the same name deeper in a site can be ordinary content,
+  such as a file in a repository on a code forge.
+- The regex is in Go's syntax, RE2, which has no backreferences or lookaround,
+  and takes time linear in the text it reads. It matches anywhere in the target
+  unless anchored with `^` and `$`; `(?i)` at its front makes it ignore case.
+
+A line that is not a rule, a `header:` name with a character no header name can
+have, such as `header:User-Agent:`, a rule for the `Host` or the
+`Transfer-Encoding` header, a regex that does not compile or an id used twice
+stops the start with a message naming the file and the line, and so does a
+`SWWAF_RULES_DIR` that does not exist. An empty directory is no error, and the
+log says that it holds no rules. While it runs, `smallwebwaf` watches the
+directory, and reads the rule files again once the directory has had no change
+for 2 seconds after one is edited, added or removed, so that a file saved in
+place, appended to or copied in with `scp` is read only once whole, unless its
+writing stops for longer. It also reads them 2 seconds after it starts watching,
+so that an edit saved while it started is not missed. If they then hold one of
+those errors, the rules stay as they were, the earlier version of the edited
+file included, the log names the file and the line, and the files are read again
+after the next change.
+
+The image ships one rule file, `share/rules.d/00-default.rules` here: rules that
+ban probes no real visitor sends, for secrets, version control directories,
+backups, logs and web shells at the site root, and the user agents of common
+scanners; one that blocks `../` twice in a row in the path or the query; and one
+that only notes a request without a user agent. An app's Dockerfile adds rules
+of its own in a file beside it, named to sort after it, such as this
+`50-gitea.rules` for an app that serves no WordPress:
+
+```
+wp-probe  path  ban  (?i)^/(wp-login\.php|xmlrpc\.php|wp-admin/)
+```
+
+```dockerfile
+COPY 50-gitea.rules /etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d/50-gitea.rules
+```
+
+A directory mounted over `/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d` replaces the default file,
+and single files mounted into it add to it. Docker does not show a single
+mounted file being replaced, which is how many editors save, so rules to be
+edited while `smallwebwaf` runs belong in a mounted directory, with a copy of
+`00-default.rules` if its rules are to stay. To run without rules, mount an
+empty directory or set `SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED=false`.
+
+## Metrics
+
+`GET /_smallwebwaf/metrics` answers with the metrics in the Prometheus text
+format, for a scraper that sends `SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN`, through traefik like any
+other request. No metric carries a client's address.
+
+- `smallwebwaf_requests_total`, `smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total` and
+  `smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total`: requests, and their body bytes each way,
+  by `status_class`, such as `2xx`, or `none` when nothing was sent, and by
+  `action`, as the request log names it.
+- `smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds`: how long requests took, and
+  `smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds`: how long those passed to the app took
+  from then on, as histograms; `smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight`: the requests
+  under way.
+- `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total` by `window`,
+  `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total` by `limit`, the setting whose
+  limit was passed, `smallwebwaf_offences_total` by `kind`, and
+  `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total` by `cause`, `limit`, `attack` or `admin`, the
+  last for the bans whose `cause` is `admin` that you add to `bans.json` while
+  `smallwebwaf` runs; `smallwebwaf_active_bans` and
+  `smallwebwaf_permanent_bans`, neither of which counts a lifted ban.
+- `smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total`: the requests that matched each rule, by
+  `rule_id` and `action`, the rule's own; and `smallwebwaf_rules_loaded`: the
+  rules read from the rule files.
+- `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total`,
+  `smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total`,
+  `smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total`, and
+  `smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total`, the requests the country lists
+  refused, by `country`, for the requests whose client's country is known. The
+  `SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N` countries with the most requests since the start have
+  series of their own, and the others are counted as `other`. A country that
+  drops out of them loses its series, and its later requests count as `other`;
+  one that comes into them gets a series that counts from then on.
+- `smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total`: the requests to GeoJS;
+  `smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total`: those that failed, an answer that leaves
+  out an address asked about included; and `smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total`:
+  the requests whose client counted as coming from an unknown country because
+  GeoJS had not answered about it in time.
+- `smallwebwaf_tracked_clients`: the clients in the table of clients.
+- `smallwebwaf_state_file_writes_total`,
+  `smallwebwaf_state_file_write_failures_total`,
+  `smallwebwaf_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds` and
+  `smallwebwaf_state_file_size_bytes`, by `file`; and, by `file` too,
+  `smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_taken_in_total`: your edits taken in, and
+  `smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_set_aside_total`: those renamed to `<name>.bad`
+  because they would stop the start.
+- While `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL` is set,
+  `smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total`: the lines sent to it;
+  `smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total`: those dropped, from a full
+  buffer or because their sending failed; and
+  `smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth`: those waiting in the buffer.
+- Go's own `go_` metrics and the process's `process_` metrics.
+
+The requests Go's HTTP server ends before `smallwebwaf` sees them (see "Request
+log") are not counted. The metrics of the features still to come, such as the
+Core Rule Set, come with them.
 
 ## Why
 
@@ -299,9 +783,9 @@ goes through the candidates one by one.
   readable JSON files, written regularly and at every stop, so a restart loses
   nothing. Edit a file, or add a rule file, and the running `smallwebwaf` picks
   up the change. Nothing is read from disk while serving a request. The files
-  come in milestone 3 or later (see the build order in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md));
-  until then the rate counters and the GeoJS answers are kept in memory only,
-  and a restart loses them.
+  for the bans, the clients and the GeoJS answers are built, with an edit taken
+  in while running (see "State files" above); the others come with their
+  features.
 - Health checks, the metrics, and listing, adding and lifting bans or asking why
   a given address was refused, all on the one port every request uses: under
   `/_smallwebwaf/` on the app's own address, through traefik like any other
@@ -397,8 +881,9 @@ main "$@"
   the health check on `127.0.0.1`.
 - `smallwebwaf` keeps its state files in `/var/lib/smallwebwaf`. Mount a volume
   there to keep bans and client history when a deploy replaces the container;
-  without one, it still starts. The state files come in milestone 3 or later;
-  until then it writes nothing to disk and needs no volume.
+  without one, it still starts. At each start the `run` script of `smallwebwaf`
+  gives that directory and every file in it to the `smallwebwaf` user, so a host
+  directory mounted there needs no change of owner.
 - `docker stop` has runit stop both processes. `smallwebwaf` then stops taking
   requests and gives those in progress five seconds to finish.
 
@@ -418,28 +903,27 @@ the metrics, failure behaviour and the build order.
 
 So far `smallwebwaf` looks up only the country, only through GeoJS, and only
 while `SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES` or `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` is set:
-then the address of every new visitor outside `SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` and
-`SWWAF_DENY_NETS` is sent to GeoJS, and with neither set, none is. An IPv6
-visitor is asked about by the first address of its /64. A new visitor waits at
-most a second for its answer, and without one counts as coming from an unknown
-country until the answer arrives. The addresses waiting are asked about
-together, up to 200 in one request, one request at a time; at most 10,000
-visitors wait, and one more counts as coming from an unknown country until there
-is room. While GeoJS fails, visitors with a kept answer are unaffected and new
-ones count as coming from an unknown country. GeoJS is then left alone for a
-second, twice as long after each further failure up to five minutes, and asked
-again by the next request that needs it.
+then the address of every new visitor is sent to GeoJS, except a visitor in
+`SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS` or `SWWAF_DENY_NETS` and one whose netblock a ban covers, and
+with neither set, none is. An IPv6 visitor is asked about by the first address
+of its /64. A new visitor waits at most a second for its answer, and without one
+counts as coming from an unknown country until the answer arrives. The addresses
+waiting are asked about together, up to 200 in one request, one request at a
+time; at most 10,000 visitors wait, and one more counts as coming from an
+unknown country until there is room. While GeoJS fails, visitors with a kept
+answer are unaffected and new ones count as coming from an unknown country.
+GeoJS is then left alone for a second, twice as long after each further failure
+up to five minutes, and asked again by the next request that needs it.
 
 In the full design, `smallwebwaf` looks up the AS number and country of every
 client, for the request log, the metrics and the ban notes, and for the country
 lists and biased limits when you set them. It works with no setup: by default it
 asks the free GeoJS web service, which needs no account and no file. This means
 that, by default, the address of every new visitor is sent to GeoJS. Each answer
-is kept in memory for seven days, and many addresses are asked about in one
-request; writing the answers to disk, so that they survive a restart, comes in
-milestone 3 or later (see the build order in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md)). GeoJS
-publishes no rate limit but may block a caller it thinks asks too much; while it
-is not answering, new visitors count as coming from an unknown country, which
+is kept for seven days, in memory and in `lookups.json`, so that it survives a
+restart, and many addresses are asked about in one request. GeoJS publishes no
+rate limit but may block a caller it thinks asks too much; while it is not
+answering, new visitors count as coming from an unknown country, which
 `SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refuses.
 
 To keep your visitors' addresses on your own host, set
@@ -470,32 +954,55 @@ addresses are never sent to GeoJS.
 ## How the code is laid out
 
 - `cmd/smallwebwaf`: the binary, which only calls `internal/smallwebwaf`.
-- `internal/smallwebwaf`: the process: it reads the settings, listens, serves
-  requests until `SIGTERM` or `SIGINT`, and stops. Run as
-  `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the image's health check instead.
+- `internal/smallwebwaf`: the process: it reads the settings, the rule files and
+  the state files, listens, serves requests until `SIGTERM` or `SIGINT`, and
+  stops, writing the state files. Run as `smallwebwaf healthcheck`, it is the
+  image's health check instead.
 - `internal/config`: reads the settings, the one place they are read.
 - `internal/proxy`: what happens to each request: it works out the client, runs
   the checks, passes the request to the app and the answer back with the
   standard library's `httputil.ReverseProxy` within the timeouts and size
   limits, and writes the request's log line. Its `check` method is where a
   request is refused before anything reaches the app: for `SWWAF_DENY_NETS`, for
-  the country lists, for a rate limit, and for an announced body over the size
-  limit.
+  a ban, for the country lists, for a rate limit, which bans the client, for a
+  `block` or `ban` rule, the latter banning the client, and for an announced
+  body over the size limit; in `observe` mode, only for the size limit, with
+  what it would have refused for noted in the log line. A request under
+  `/_smallwebwaf/` that `check` lets through is answered by `answerAdmin`
+  instead of reaching the app.
+- `internal/metrics`: the metrics, counted as the other parts tell it what
+  happened, and served in the Prometheus text format.
+- `internal/bans`: the ban ledger: each netblock's bans with their notes, how
+  long a new ban lasts, when a ban for a clear sign of attack becomes permanent,
+  and which ban `smallwebwaf` made is dropped when `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` are held.
+- `internal/rules`: reads the rule files at start and again as they change, and
+  tells which of their rules a request matches.
 - `internal/lookup`: looks up each client's country through GeoJS, and keeps the
   answers.
-- `internal/ratelimit`: counts each client's requests and tells when one takes
-  it over a rate limit.
+- `internal/ratelimit`: the table of clients: counts each client's requests,
+  tells when one takes it over a rate limit, and keeps each client's history.
+- `internal/state`: reads the state files at start, takes in an admin's edit of
+  one while running, and writes them when they are due and at the stop.
 - `internal/requestlog`: the lines on stdout: the request log line and the
   process's own messages.
+- `internal/remotelog`: sends the lines on stdout to `SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL`,
+  each as a syslog record, from a buffer of its own. It is written with the
+  standard library alone, whose `log/syslog` writes only the older syslog
+  format.
 - `Dockerfile`: the lint and test phases, then the image, whose last stage
   installs Ubuntu's packages, nixpkgs, `runsvinit` and `smallwebwaf`, with
-  `share/smallwebwaf.run` as runit's `run` script for `smallwebwaf`.
+  `share/smallwebwaf.run` as runit's `run` script for `smallwebwaf` and
+  `share/rules.d/00-default.rules` as its default rule file.
 - `deploy/example-app`: an app built on the image, which `script/example-app`
   checks.
 
 Besides the Go standard library, `github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2` keeps the
 table of clients to 20,000 and the GeoJS answers to 100,000, dropping the least
-recently seen. The country codes are the list in `internal/config/config.go`.
+recently seen, and the banned netblocks in the order they were last seen, from
+which the ledger picks the ban to drop past `SWWAF_MAX_BANS`, and
+`github.com/prometheus/client_golang` keeps the metrics and serves them, and
+`github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify` tells `smallwebwaf` when a state file or a rule
+file is saved. The country codes are the list in `internal/config/config.go`.
 
 ## Entrypoints
 
@@ -524,19 +1031,23 @@ so that they run in minimal containers.
 - `script/install-precommit`: installs that hook; `make hooks` runs it.
 - `script/build`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` on the host, with Go installed, for
   working on the code by hand; `make build` runs it.
-- `script/run`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` with `script/build` and runs it;
-  `make run` runs it.
+- `script/run`: builds `bin/smallwebwaf` with `script/build` and runs it, with
+  its state files in `bin/state` unless `SWWAF_STATE_DIR` is set, and the rule
+  files of `share/rules.d` unless `SWWAF_RULES_DIR` is set; `make run` runs it.
 - `script/example-app`: builds the image and, on it, the example app in
-  `deploy/example-app`, runs it, and checks that the health check passes, that a
-  request reaches the app through `smallwebwaf`, and that `sv stop` and
-  `docker stop` stop it in order; then removes the container and both images. It
-  needs network access, for nixpkgs' binary cache, and `script/check` does not
-  run it; `make example-app` does.
+  `deploy/example-app`, runs it with a volume for the state files, and checks
+  that the health check passes, that a request reaches the app through
+  `smallwebwaf`, that a second request in a minute bans the client, that a probe
+  for `/.env` bans another client, whose next request makes the ban permanent,
+  that `sv stop` and `docker stop` stop it in order, and that a new container on
+  the same volume still refuses the banned client; then removes the containers,
+  the volume and both images. It needs network access, for nixpkgs' binary
+  cache, and `script/check` does not run it; `make example-app` does.
 
 ## TODO
 
-- The rest of milestone 3, after the static lists, and the rest of the design,
-  in the order of the build order in [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
+- The rest of the design, in the order of the build order in
+  [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md).
 
 ## Documents
 

REPO_POLICIES.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 title: Repository Policies
-last_modified: 2026-09-08
+last_modified: 2026-10-04
 ---
 
 This document covers repository structure, tooling, and workflow standards. Code
@@ -104,10 +104,14 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   `lint` phase and a `test` phase, with the final stage depending on both so the
   image cannot be built unless they pass. For non-server repos the final stage
   brings up a development environment; for server repos it is the runtime image.
-  Dockerfiles install development prerequisites by running `script/bootstrap`
-  rather than duplicating installs inline; COPY `script/` and the dependency
-  manifests (`package.json` + `yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before
-  running it.
+  The gate phases and the build stage start from their pinned base images and
+  install what those images lack either inline, as the canonical Go `Dockerfile`
+  below does for `git`, or by running `script/bootstrap`, as the `prompts`
+  repo's own `Dockerfile` does for its yarn packages. The development
+  environment stage installs development prerequisites by running
+  `script/bootstrap` rather than duplicating its installs inline. A stage that
+  runs `script/bootstrap` COPYs `script/` and the dependency manifests
+  (`package.json` + `yarn.lock`, `go.mod` + `go.sum`, etc.) before running it.
 
 - **Linting and testing run in Docker, as phases of the `Dockerfile`.** There is
   no separate lint file. `script/lint` and `script/test` each build one phase
@@ -156,11 +160,14 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   not evidence that anything ran: a sub-second build reporting success is a
   cache hit, not a result. Never invalidate by pruning — `docker builder prune`
   and friends destroy a build cache shared with every other build on the host.
+  When a check is added or changed, prove it works by planting a defect it must
+  catch and watching the run fail on it, then revert the defect. A green run
+  alone shows neither that the check ran nor that it covers what it should.
 
 - **The gate phases are separate stages, and the build stage depends on both.**
   The lint phase is based on the `golangci/golangci-lint` image (pinned by
   hash), so lint failures surface in seconds rather than after a full compile,
-  and the test phase is based on the Go image. The canonical Go repo
+  and the test phase is based on the Debian Go image. The canonical Go repo
   `Dockerfile`:
 
     ```dockerfile
@@ -173,8 +180,9 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
     COPY . .
     RUN golangci-lint run --config .golangci.yml ./...
 
-    # Test phase
-    # golang:1.x-alpine, YYYY-MM-DD
+    # Test phase. -race needs cgo and so a C compiler, which the Debian Go
+    # image ships and the alpine one does not.
+    # golang:1.x, YYYY-MM-DD
     FROM golang@sha256:... AS test
     WORKDIR /src
     COPY go.mod go.sum ./
@@ -191,15 +199,29 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
     FROM golang@sha256:... AS builder
     COPY --from=lint /src/go.sum /dev/null
     COPY --from=test /src/go.sum /dev/null
+    RUN apk add --no-cache git
+    # A tar-stream context keeps the sender's file owners, which git refuses.
+    RUN git config --system --add safe.directory /src
     WORKDIR /src
     COPY go.mod go.sum ./
     RUN go mod download
     COPY . .
 
-    ARG VERSION=dev
-    RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
-        -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
-        -o /app ./cmd/app/
+    # The VERSION build arg when one is given, otherwise
+    # `git describe --tags --always` on the .git in the build context. With
+    # .git present, a version that is still empty, dev or unknown fails the
+    # build: git is missing or could not read the checkout.
+    ARG VERSION
+    RUN VERSION="${VERSION:-$(git describe --tags --always)}"; \
+        if [ -e .git ]; then \
+            case "$VERSION" in ""|dev|unknown) \
+                echo "version is '$VERSION' although .git is present" >&2; \
+                exit 1 ;; \
+            esac; \
+        fi; \
+        CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath \
+            -ldflags="-s -w -X main.Version=${VERSION}" \
+            -o /app ./cmd/app/
 
     # Runtime stage, and the last one
     FROM alpine@sha256:...
@@ -221,10 +243,41 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
       (e.g. a web frontend compiled in a separate stage), the lint phase must
       create placeholder files so the embed directives resolve. Example:
       `RUN mkdir -p web/dist && touch web/dist/index.html web/dist/style.css`.
-    - If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting (e.g.
-      `vips-dev`), install them in the lint phase with `apk add`.
-    - `ARG VERSION=dev` is declared in the stage that compiles and supplied by
-      `script/docker` and `script/cibuild`; no stage may call `git describe`.
+    - If the project requires CGO or system libraries for linting, install them
+      in the lint phase. The `golangci/golangci-lint` image is Debian-based and
+      has no `apk`, so install with `apt-get` under the Debian package name
+      (`libvips-dev`, where alpine says `vips-dev`), and delete the package
+      lists in the same `RUN`, so the layer does not keep them:
+
+        ```dockerfile
+        RUN apt-get update \
+            && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libvips-dev \
+            && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+        ```
+
+    - `.dockerignore` lets `.git` into the build context. It keeps out every git
+      `config` at any depth (`**/.git/config`, `**/.git/modules/**/config`): the
+      repository's own, each submodule's under `.git/modules/`, and that of a
+      submodule keeping its own `.git` directory. `git describe` does not need
+      them, and each can hold a credential: a password in a remote URL, or the
+      token the CI checkout step stores there. A submodule whose name has a
+      `config` segment (`config`, `deploy/config`, `config/lib`) loses its whole
+      git directory to `**/.git/modules/**/config`, and Go's version stamping
+      then fails the build: give it a name without that segment
+      (`git submodule add --name`). The stage that compiles has `git` (the
+      Debian Go image has it; an alpine one needs `apk add --no-cache git`) and
+      takes the version from the `VERSION` build argument when one is given,
+      otherwise from `git describe --tags --always`. That gives the tag on a
+      tagged commit; on a later commit, the tag, the number of commits since it
+      and the short commit (`v1.2.3-4-gabc1234`); and the short commit when no
+      tag is reachable. The stage that compiles also marks its working directory
+      safe for git (`git config --system --add safe.directory /src`): a context
+      sent as a tar stream keeps the sender's file owners, and git refuses a
+      checkout owned by another user, so the version would come out empty.
+      `ARG VERSION` has no default, and the build fails if the context carries
+      `.git` and the version still comes out empty, `dev` or `unknown`. A plain
+      `docker build .` with no build arguments must succeed; a Dockerfile that
+      refuses an empty build argument drops that refusal and keeps the argument.
 
 - Every repo should have a Gitea Actions workflow (`.gitea/workflows/`) that
   runs `script/cibuild` on push, and checks out the repo as its only other step.
@@ -233,7 +286,12 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   carry the same guarantee, because its gate phases may come from the cache. The
   image build is uncached and so runs the gate phases a second time. That is the
   price of the rule above, and it is worth paying: the image that ships is built
-  from a run of its own gates rather than from a cache entry.
+  from a run of its own gates rather than from a cache entry. A separate
+  workflow limited to `main` by a `branches` list under `on: push` cannot be
+  checked by review: to try a change to it, add the feature branch to that list
+  and push, then remove the branch from the list again before merging. Keep any
+  job in it that publishes behind `if: github.ref_name == 'main'`, so the run
+  from the feature branch publishes nothing.
 
 - Use platform-standard formatters: `black` for Python, `prettier` for
   JS/CSS/Markdown/HTML, `go fmt` for Go. Always use default configuration with
@@ -286,17 +344,19 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
     ```
 
     `-count=1` is required on both invocations: it defeats Go's test _result_
-    cache, so the target cannot report a pass it did not earn, and the rerun
-    reproduces a failure instead of replaying it. It leaves the build cache
-    alone, so it costs the runtime of the suite and no recompilation.
+    cache, so neither run can report a stored pass in place of running the
+    tests. It leaves the build cache alone, so it costs the runtime of the suite
+    and no recompilation.
 
-    Note that this is a second, independent cache, stacked below the Docker
-    layer cache that [issue #26](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/prompts/issues/26)
-    addresses. `CHECK_EPOCH` guarantees the `RUN make test` _step_ re-executes;
-    it does not guarantee `go test` inside that step does any work, because the
-    `GOCACHE` baked into earlier image layers survives into the re-executed
-    step. They are two separate defects requiring two separate fixes, and a fix
-    for one must not be recorded as covering the other.
+    That cache is Go's own, separate from Docker's layer cache. Go stores a
+    passing result in its cache directory (`GOCACHE`), and when the same tests
+    run again on unchanged code it prints that result, marked `(cached)`,
+    without running them. That matters on a developer's machine, where this
+    target runs and the directory lasts from one run to the next. The `test`
+    phase of the `Dockerfile` needs no `-count=1`: its base image holds no
+    result for this repo's tests and nothing before its `go test` step runs a
+    test, so there is nothing to replay. `--no-cache` (above) is what makes that
+    step run on an unchanged tree.
 
     Python example:
 
@@ -340,7 +400,7 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   — which is more dangerous than a short file with no secret patterns at all,
   because it reads as solved and stops anyone looking. Give every
   depth-independent pattern the `**/` prefix and leave only genuinely
-  root-anchored entries unprefixed: `.git`, and the repo's own host-built
+  root-anchored entries unprefixed: `.claude`, and the repo's own host-built
   binary, written `/myapp` and never `**/myapp`, which would also match
   `cmd/myapp/` and delete the package directory from the context. Matching is
   case-sensitive, and an ALL-CAPS twin per pattern still misses `Server.Key`, so
@@ -365,12 +425,13 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   directory, so a repo running agents in subdirectories still ships
   `services/api/.claude/` and must add its own anchored entry there.
 
-- **Excluding `.git` means `git describe` cannot run inside any build stage, and
-  it fails quietly there.** In a build stage there is no repository, so
-  `git describe` writes nothing to stdout, `-X main.Version=` comes out empty,
-  the binary reports no version at all, and the build still exits 0. Compute the
-  version on the host and thread it in as a build arg. `script/docker` and
-  `script/cibuild` do this, byte-identically across repos:
+- **A plain `docker build .` of a clone stamps the version that
+  `git describe --tags --always` gives**, derived from the `.git` in the build
+  context as the canonical `Dockerfile` above shows. Without its failure check,
+  a missing `git` or an unreadable checkout would leave `-X main.Version=` empty
+  and the build would still exit 0. `script/docker` and `script/cibuild` pass
+  the version they compute on the host; it takes precedence. They do this
+  byte-identically across repos:
 
     ```sh
     # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does not
@@ -387,7 +448,7 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
     fallback is applied — a live check that fires on a build from an export with
     no `.git` and on a repository with no commits yet. Do not fold it into the
     substitution as `|| echo unknown`, which makes the guard unreachable. The
-    Dockerfile's side is `ARG VERSION=dev` in the stage that compiles, declared
+    Dockerfile's side is `ARG VERSION` in the stage that compiles, declared
     there because `ARG` is stage-scoped; passing `VERSION` to a repo whose
     Dockerfile declares no such `ARG` is ignored and costs nothing, which is why
     the scripts stay byte-identical. One consequence for CI: the standard
@@ -426,12 +487,18 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   `test-support` depguard rule, where a repo names its own test-support packages
   by full import path. A repo adds entries there and changes nothing else, and a
   re-vendor carries its entries forward. The canonical golangci-lint version is
-  v2.12.2 (released 2026-05-06), pinned as the digest of the lint phase's base
+  v2.14.0 (released 2026-09-24), pinned as the digest of the lint phase's base
   image
-  (`golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:5cceeef04e53efe1470638d4b4b4f5ceefd574955ab3941b2d9a68a8c9ad5240`,
-  which reports `2.12.2 built with go1.26.2 from c0d3ddc9`). That digest is the
-  only pin, since no repo installs golangci-lint on the host: bumping the
-  version means changing it and nothing else.
+  (`golangci/golangci-lint@sha256:ad862ba6b3798cbe0fd9fd7408d498fd74fbd2623a92406b2fd3898faf0bf98f`,
+  which reports `2.14.0 built with go1.27.0 from 114493f9`). A module's `go`
+  directive must not name a newer Go minor version than the one golangci-lint
+  was built with, or golangci-lint refuses to lint it: this release lints
+  `go 1.27.1` but not `go 1.28`. That digest is the only pin, since no repo
+  installs golangci-lint on the host. A repo sets the lint phase digest to the
+  one named here and re-vendors `.golangci.yml` in the same commit, whichever of
+  the two prompted the change: the canonical copy can name linters that an older
+  golangci-lint rejects, and a newer golangci-lint can add linters that
+  `default: all` switches on until the canonical copy disables them.
 
 - **`script/bootstrap` installs a pinned tool by comparing versions, never by
   testing presence.** An `if ! command -v <tool>; then install; fi` guard tests
@@ -455,6 +522,11 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
 
     Keep it POSIX sh: no arrays, no `[[`, no `grep -P`.
 
+    A Go tool a repo needs on the host is installed with `go install` pinned to
+    a commit hash (`go install <package>@<commit hash>`). It is never tracked as
+    a `go.mod` tool dependency or through a `tools.go` file, either of which
+    pulls the tool's own dependencies into the repo's `go.mod` and `go.sum`.
+
 - When pinning images or packages by hash, add a comment above the reference
   with the version and date (YYYY-MM-DD).
 
@@ -567,10 +639,10 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
   settings.
 
 - Avoid putting files in the repo root unless necessary. Root should contain
-  only project-level config files (`README.md`, `Makefile`, `Dockerfile`,
-  `LICENSE`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`, `REPO_POLICIES.md`, and
-  language-specific config). Everything else goes in a subdirectory. Canonical
-  subdirectory names:
+  only project-level config files (`README.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `Makefile`,
+  `Dockerfile`, `LICENSE`, `.gitignore`, `.editorconfig`, `REPO_POLICIES.md`,
+  and language-specific config). Everything else goes in a subdirectory.
+  Canonical subdirectory names:
     - `bin/` — executable scripts and tools
     - `cmd/` — Go command entrypoints; thin only: one `main.go` per binary whose
       body is a single call into `internal/` or `pkg/`, no project logic in
@@ -601,3 +673,7 @@ style conventions are in separate documents:
     - Go: `go.mod`, `go.sum`, `.golangci.yml`
     - JS: `package.json`, `yarn.lock`, `.prettierrc`, `.prettierignore`
     - Python: `pyproject.toml`
+
+- Guidance for coding agents lives in one `AGENTS.md` at the repository root. It
+  is never committed under a file or directory named after one agent tool, such
+  as `CLAUDE.md` or `.claude/`, and never split into separate memory files.

SPEC.md

@@ -293,7 +293,8 @@ it.
   needs: an alert destination, an account key, a token.
 - Every setting's name starts with `SWWAF_`, since `smallwebwaf` shares its
   container, and so its environment variables, with the app it protects.
-- Any limit or threshold can be switched off with the value `off`.
+- Any limit or threshold can be switched off with the value `off`, except
+  `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES`.
 - A list set to an empty value is an empty list, and replaces the default.
 - Every setting may instead be given as a file holding the value, named by the
   setting's name with `_FILE` added, such as `SWWAF_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE`, for
@@ -413,7 +414,9 @@ The settings, by group:
       headers, its body.
     - `SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES` (default `32K`): the largest
       request line and headers a client may send. Over it, `smallwebwaf` answers
-      `431` and closes the connection, and nothing reaches the app.
+      `431` and closes the connection, and nothing reaches the app. It must be
+      more than `4K`, and cannot be `off`: Go's HTTP server always has such a
+      limit, and reads 4 KiB past the one it is given before it refuses.
     - `SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (default `120s`): how long a kept-open
       connection may wait for its next request before `smallwebwaf` closes it.
       It is longer than the 90 seconds after which traefik, by default, closes a
@@ -945,9 +948,9 @@ and the running `smallwebwaf` takes the edit in.
     - what was broken: the rule ids and target that matched, or the limit, its
       window, the count reached and the client's limit percentage with what set
       it; and any reputation sources that listed the client;
-    - the requests that caused the ban, up to the last ten: time, method, host,
-      path with its query string, status and user agent, each text cut to 256
-      bytes;
+    - the request that caused the ban, the one that broke the limit or carried
+      the clear sign of attack: time, method, host, path with its query string,
+      status and user agent, each text cut to 256 bytes;
     - how many requests counted toward the ban, and the time span over which
       they came;
     - the netblock's total requests since it was first seen, and the requests
@@ -958,13 +961,13 @@ and the running `smallwebwaf` takes the edit in.
       the table is full, so on a public service the file grows to the default
       `SWWAF_MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` of 20,000, about 20 MiB. Written every 15
       minutes, that is under 2 GiB of disk writes a day.
-    - `bans.json` takes about 2 KiB per ban and at most about 8 KiB, since the
-      texts in the notes are cut short. At the default `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` of 5,000
-      it is about 10 MiB, and never more than about 40 MiB, plus whatever bans
-      an admin made. It is written when a ban is made, lifted or made permanent,
-      at most once every 10 seconds, and otherwise with the 15-minute write, so
-      its writes follow the bans made: with a full file, a hundred new bans a
-      day come to about 1 GiB of disk writes.
+    - `bans.json` takes about 1.2 KiB per ban and at most about 2.5 KiB, since
+      the notes hold one request and their texts are cut short. At the default
+      `SWWAF_MAX_BANS` of 5,000 it is about 6 MiB, and never more than about 12
+      MiB, plus whatever bans an admin made. It is written when a ban is made,
+      lifted or made permanent, at most once every 10 seconds, and otherwise
+      with the 15-minute write, so its writes follow the bans made: with a full
+      file, a hundred new bans a day come to about 600 MiB of disk writes.
     - `lookups.json` takes about 150 bytes per answer, about 15 MiB when full.
       Written every 15 minutes, that is under 1.5 GiB of disk writes a day.
     - `reputation.json` and `alerts.json` are usually a few MiB or less.

go.mod

@@ -2,4 +2,20 @@ module sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf
 
 go 1.26.0
 
-require github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
+require (
+	github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1
+	github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7
+	github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1
+)
+
+require (
+	github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 // indirect
+	github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 // indirect
+	github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 // indirect
+	github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 // indirect
+	github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 // indirect
+	github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 // indirect
+	github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 // indirect
+	golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 // indirect
+	google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 // indirect
+)

go.sum

@@ -1,2 +1,40 @@
+github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1 h1:VlbKKnNfV8bJzeqoa4cOKqO6bYr3WgKZxO8Z16+hsOM=
+github.com/beorn7/perks v1.0.1/go.mod h1:G2ZrVWU2WbWT9wwq4/hrbKbnv/1ERSJQ0ibhJ6rlkpw=
+github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0 h1:UL815xU9SqsFlibzuggzjXhog7bL6oX9BbNZnL2UFvs=
+github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2 v2.3.0/go.mod h1:VGX0DQ3Q6kWi7AoAeZDth3/j3BFtOZR5XLFGgcrjCOs=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
+github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
+github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1 h1:b0/UzAf9yR5rhf3RPm9gf3ehBPpf0oZKIjtpKrx59Ho=
+github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.10.1/go.mod h1:TLheqan6HD6GBK6PrDWyDPBaEV8LspOxvPSjC+bVfgo=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU=
 github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7 h1:a+bsQ5rvGLjzHuww6tVxozPZFVghXaHOwFs4luLUK2k=
 github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2 v2.0.7/go.mod h1:QeFd9opnmA6QUJc5vARoKUSoFhyfM2/ZepoAG6RGpeM=
+github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1 h1:VsB4HPswih7mmZ8WleSFQ75c/Ui1M4trX5oAsJnhSlk=
+github.com/klauspost/compress v1.19.1/go.mod h1:cwPg85FWrGar70rWktvGQj8/hthj3wpl0PGDogxkrSQ=
+github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0 h1:RPNrshWIDI6G2gRW9EHilWtl7Z6Sb1BR0xunSBf0SNc=
+github.com/kylelemons/godebug v1.1.0/go.mod h1:9/0rRGxNHcop5bhtWyNeEfOS8JIWk580+fNqagV/RAw=
+github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
+github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
+github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
+github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1 h1:JnJkREXzWxUdCuPFpIWZiPispT9xVV59uiuyR2bPlnU=
+github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.24.1/go.mod h1:F+oSRECHg4sse5ucfYpYDeIv/hu68Zo0uoHKetWnzcE=
+github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2 h1:oBsgwpGs7iVziMvrGhE53c/GrLUsZdHnqNwqPLxwZyk=
+github.com/prometheus/client_model v0.6.2/go.mod h1:y3m2F6Gdpfy6Ut/GBsUqTWZqCUvMVzSfMLjcu6wAwpE=
+github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1 h1:1HvjP4D5oL3t8RsPlwxA9onvvStjtIHYE5XuuwOi/PY=
+github.com/prometheus/common v0.70.1/go.mod h1:VdFUQDMZK3VLkurFUVhia6uys/0suUp86TJz5qbJRhc=
+github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1 h1:GljZCt+zSTS+NZq88cyQ1LjZ+RCHp3uVuabBWA5+OJI=
+github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.21.1/go.mod h1:aB55Cww9pdSJVHk0hUf0inxWyyjPogFIjmHKYgMKmtY=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1:7s2iGBzp5EwR7/aIZr8ao5+dra3wiQyKjjFuvgVKu7U=
+github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1/go.mod h1:wZwfW3scLgRK+23gO65QZefKpKQRnfz6sD981Nm4B6U=
+go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0 h1:2K3zAYmnTNqV73imy9J1T3WC+gmCePx2hEGkimedGto=
+go.uber.org/goleak v1.3.0/go.mod h1:CoHD4mav9JJNrW/WLlf7HGZPjdw8EucARQHekz1X6bE=
+go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4 h1:tuyd0P+2Ont/d6e2rl3be67goVK4R6deVxCUX5vyPaQ=
+go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.4/go.mod h1:gMZqIpDtDqOfM0uNfy0SkpRhvUryYH0Z6wdMYcacYXQ=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
+golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
+google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11 h1:fV6ZwhNocDyBLK0dj+fg8ektcVegBBuEolpbTQyBNVE=
+google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11/go.mod h1:HTf+CrKn2C3g5S8VImy6tdcUvCska2kB7j23XfzDpco=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
+gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=

internal/bans/admin_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+package bans_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+)
+
+func TestBanWithoutACauseIsAnAdmins(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{Netblock: netblock, Start: midnight()}})
+
+	if got := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Cause; got != bans.CauseAdmin {
+		t.Errorf("the ban's cause is %q, want admin", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAdminsBansAreNeverDroppedAndDoNotCountTowardMaxBans(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.MaxBans = 1
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	adminsOnly := netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")
+	both := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
+	second := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
+	third := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")
+
+	// Seen longest ago, a netblock with two of an admin's bans alone, and
+	// then one with an admin's ban before a ban smallwebwaf made: the one
+	// ban counted toward MaxBans.
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
+		{Netblock: adminsOnly, Start: midnight().Add(-3 * time.Hour), Cause: bans.CauseAdmin},
+		{Netblock: adminsOnly, Start: midnight().Add(-2 * time.Hour), Cause: bans.CauseAdmin},
+		{Netblock: both, Start: midnight().Add(-time.Hour), Cause: bans.CauseAdmin},
+		{
+			Netblock: both,
+			Start:    midnight(),
+			Expires:  midnight().Add(time.Hour),
+			Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+		},
+	})
+	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 2})
+
+	// A new ban drops the ban smallwebwaf made, and only that one.
+	ledger.BanForLimit(second, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 1, second: 1})
+
+	if ledger.Bans(both)[0].Cause != bans.CauseAdmin {
+		t.Errorf("%s kept %+v, want the admin's ban", both, ledger.Bans(both))
+	}
+
+	// And the next drops that one.
+	ledger.BanForLimit(third, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{adminsOnly: 2, both: 1, second: 0, third: 1})
+}
+
+func TestReasonOfTheBansSmallwebwafMakes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+
+	limit := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
+		bans.Notes{Limit: 1000, Window: "minute"})
+	attack := ledger.BanForAttack(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32"), midnight(),
+		bans.Notes{RuleID: "git-dir", Target: "path"})
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ got, want string }{
+		{limit.Reason, "requests per minute over the limit of 1000"},
+		{attack.Reason, "matched the rule git-dir"},
+	} {
+		if tc.got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("the reason is %q, want %q", tc.got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLiftedBanForALimitRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// An hour's ban lifted ten minutes after it started.
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	lifted := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Expires:  midnight().Add(time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+		Lifted:   midnight().Add(10 * time.Minute),
+	}
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{lifted})
+
+	// While it would still last, it refuses nothing, and a limit broken
+	// bans for an hour, as a first broken limit does; the lifted ban is
+	// kept, and counted among the earlier bans.
+	now := midnight().Add(30 * time.Minute)
+
+	_, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), now)
+	if banned {
+		t.Error("the lifted ban refuses")
+	}
+
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+	if ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start) != time.Hour ||
+		ban.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want 1h and 1 for a limit",
+			ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start), ban.Notes.EarlierBans)
+	}
+
+	held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
+	if len(held) != 2 || held[0] != lifted {
+		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want the lifted ban and the new one", held)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLiftedBanForAnAttackRefusesNothingAndMakesNoBanLonger(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// A permanent ban for a clear sign of attack, lifted.
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseAttack,
+		Lifted:   midnight().Add(time.Hour),
+	}})
+
+	now := midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour)
+
+	_, banned := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), now)
+	if banned {
+		t.Error("the lifted ban refuses")
+	}
+
+	active, permanent := ledger.Count(now)
+	if active != 0 || permanent != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("%d bans are active and %d permanent, want none", active, permanent)
+	}
+
+	// The next clear sign of attack bans for seven days, as a first does.
+	ban := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+	if ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start) != 7*day {
+		t.Errorf("the next ban for an attack ends at %s, want seven days on", ban.Expires)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadEditCountsTheBansAnAdminMade(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	made := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), midnight(),
+		bans.Notes{})
+	atStart := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32"),
+		Start:    midnight(),
+	}
+
+	// The bans read at the start were made before it.
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{made, atStart})
+
+	if got := ledger.Made(bans.CauseAdmin); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d bans made by an admin after the start's, want none", got)
+	}
+
+	// The admin keeps the ban smallwebwaf made, keeps the one read at the
+	// start, and adds one without a cause: that one alone is made.
+	kept := made
+	kept.Cause = bans.CauseAdmin
+	added := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32"),
+		Start:    midnight(),
+	}
+	ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{kept, atStart, added})
+
+	if ledger.Made(bans.CauseAdmin) != 1 || ledger.Made(bans.CauseLimit) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("%d bans made by an admin and %d for a limit, want 1 of each",
+			ledger.Made(bans.CauseAdmin), ledger.Made(bans.CauseLimit))
+	}
+}

internal/bans/bans.go

@@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
+// Package bans is the ban ledger: the bans smallwebwaf makes on the
+// netblocks of clients that break a rate limit or show a clear sign of
+// attack, and those an admin makes, with their notes, as the "Bans"
+// section of SPEC.md describes. The bans are kept in memory, and written
+// to bans.json and read from it by the state package.
+package bans
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"math"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
+)
+
+// The causes of bans.
+const (
+	// CauseLimit is a ban smallwebwaf made for a broken limit.
+	CauseLimit = "limit"
+	// CauseAttack is a ban smallwebwaf made for a clear sign of attack.
+	CauseAttack = "attack"
+	// CauseAdmin is a ban an admin made, or one smallwebwaf made that an
+	// admin keeps. It is never dropped.
+	CauseAdmin = "admin"
+)
+
+// repeatFactor is how many times as long as the netblock's last ban a ban
+// for a limit broken again within the repeat window lasts.
+const repeatFactor = 3
+
+// maxTextBytes is how much of each text in a ban's notes is kept.
+const maxTextBytes = 256
+
+// Rules are how long a ban lasts, and how many bans are held.
+type Rules struct {
+	// LimitBanDuration is how long a first ban for a broken limit lasts.
+	LimitBanDuration time.Duration
+	// LimitBanRepeatWindow is how soon after the end of the netblock's
+	// ban that ended last, other than one for a clear sign of attack, a
+	// broken limit counts as a repeat, which bans for repeatFactor times as
+	// long as that ban.
+	LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
+	// MaxBanDuration is the longest ban for a broken limit; one that would
+	// be longer is permanent instead.
+	MaxBanDuration time.Duration
+	// AttackBanDuration is how long a first ban for a clear sign of attack
+	// lasts.
+	AttackBanDuration time.Duration
+	// MaxBans is the most bans held whose cause is not CauseAdmin, at
+	// least one. Past it, the earliest such ban of the netblock that has
+	// gone longest without a request is dropped. Bans whose cause is
+	// CauseAdmin are held besides, and never dropped.
+	MaxBans int
+}
+
+// Ban is a ban on a netblock.
+type Ban struct {
+	Netblock netip.Prefix
+	Start    time.Time
+	// Expires is when the ban ends, zero for a permanent ban.
+	Expires time.Time
+	// Cause is CauseLimit, CauseAttack or CauseAdmin.
+	Cause string
+	// Reason is a short text: for a ban smallwebwaf made, the limit broken
+	// or the rule that matched; for an admin's, what the admin wrote.
+	Reason string
+	// Lifted is when an admin lifted the ban, zero while no admin has. A
+	// lifted ban refuses nothing, and does not make the netblock's next
+	// ban longer.
+	Lifted time.Time
+	Notes  Notes
+}
+
+// Permanent reports whether the ban never runs out.
+func (b Ban) Permanent() bool {
+	return b.Expires.IsZero()
+}
+
+// ActiveAt reports whether the ban refuses requests at now: it has not
+// been lifted, and has not run out.
+func (b Ban) ActiveAt(now time.Time) bool {
+	return b.Lifted.IsZero() && (b.Permanent() || now.Before(b.Expires))
+}
+
+// Notes are what an admin needs to decide whether to lift a ban. The
+// JSON names are those of bans.json.
+//
+//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
+type Notes struct {
+	// Country is the client's country, when it was looked up.
+	Country string `json:"country"`
+	// Limit, Window and Count are, for a ban for a broken limit, the limit
+	// that was broken, its window, "minute", "hour" or "day", and the
+	// count reached: the client's requests in the window, the one that
+	// broke the limit included. These are the requests that counted
+	// toward the ban, and the window is the time over which they came.
+	Limit  int64   `json:"limit,omitempty"`
+	Window string  `json:"window,omitempty"`
+	Count  float64 `json:"count,omitempty"`
+	// RuleID and Target are, for a ban for a clear sign of attack, the id
+	// of the rule file rule that matched, and its target.
+	RuleID string `json:"rule_id,omitempty"`
+	Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
+	// Request is the request that broke the limit, or that was the clear
+	// sign of attack.
+	Request Request `json:"request"`
+	// Requests is how many requests the netblock has sent since it was
+	// first seen, and Refused how many of them the ban has refused so
+	// far. Both go up with each request the ban refuses.
+	Requests int64 `json:"requests"`
+	Refused  int64 `json:"refused"`
+	// EarlierBans is how many bans the netblock had before this one, by
+	// cause.
+	EarlierBans EarlierBans `json:"earlier_bans"`
+}
+
+// EarlierBans counts a netblock's bans before a ban, by cause.
+type EarlierBans struct {
+	Limit  int `json:"limit"`
+	Attack int `json:"attack"`
+	Admin  int `json:"admin"`
+}
+
+// Request is a request in a ban's notes. Each text is cut to 256 bytes.
+//
+//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
+type Request struct {
+	Time   time.Time `json:"time"`
+	Method string    `json:"method"`
+	Host   string    `json:"host"`
+	// Path is the path with its query string.
+	Path string `json:"path"`
+	// Status is what the client was sent, 0 if nothing was.
+	Status    int    `json:"status"`
+	UserAgent string `json:"user_agent"`
+}
+
+// Ledger holds the bans. It is safe for concurrent use.
+type Ledger struct {
+	rules Rules
+	// changed receives a value when a ban is made, unless one is waiting
+	// already.
+	changed chan struct{}
+
+	mu sync.Mutex
+	// netblocks holds each banned netblock's bans, oldest first. Check and
+	// Find make each netblock they find the most recently seen.
+	netblocks *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban]
+	// held is how many bans netblocks holds whose cause is not CauseAdmin,
+	// at most rules.MaxBans.
+	held int
+	// made is how many bans have been made since the start, by cause: by
+	// the ledger, and by an admin in an edit of bans.json.
+	made map[string]int
+	// v4Lengths and v6Lengths are the lengths of the IPv4 and IPv6
+	// netblocks that have been banned. Check looks for a ban at each of
+	// them, so that a ban read from bans.json refuses every client in its
+	// netblock even when it was made with another SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX,
+	// or another length of an IPv6 client's netblock.
+	v4Lengths, v6Lengths []int
+}
+
+// New returns a Ledger with no ban yet.
+func New(rules Rules) *Ledger {
+	// The ledger drops bans itself, and never those whose cause is
+	// CauseAdmin, however many there are, so the LRU has no limit of its
+	// own: it keeps the netblocks in the order they were last seen.
+	netblocks, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *[]Ban](math.MaxInt, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
+	}
+
+	return &Ledger{
+		rules:     rules,
+		changed:   make(chan struct{}, 1),
+		netblocks: netblocks,
+		made:      map[string]int{},
+	}
+}
+
+// Changed receives a value after a ban is made or made permanent, so that
+// bans.json can be written. Several changes before it is read leave one
+// value.
+func (l *Ledger) Changed() <-chan struct{} {
+	return l.changed
+}
+
+// Check is called for a request from client, at now. It reports whether
+// a ban on a netblock client is in is active, and returns that ban, with
+// the request counted among those it refused. A ban for a clear sign of
+// attack is made permanent by the request: the netblock is malicious.
+func (l *Ledger) Check(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	ban := l.active(client, now)
+	if ban == nil {
+		return Ban{}, false
+	}
+
+	ban.Notes.Requests++
+	ban.Notes.Refused++
+
+	if ban.Cause == CauseAttack && !ban.Permanent() {
+		ban.Expires = time.Time{}
+
+		l.markChanged()
+	}
+
+	return *ban, true
+}
+
+// Find is Check without counting the request among those the ban
+// refused: in observe mode a ban refuses nothing.
+func (l *Ledger) Find(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) (Ban, bool) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	ban := l.active(client, now)
+	if ban == nil {
+		return Ban{}, false
+	}
+
+	return *ban, true
+}
+
+// activeBan returns the ban in bans, a netblock's bans oldest first, that
+// is active at now, or nil when none is. If several are, it returns the
+// one that started last. Every ban is looked at, since a ban an admin adds
+// to bans.json can start before the netblock's others and outlast them.
+func activeBan(bans []Ban, now time.Time) *Ban {
+	for i := len(bans) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		if bans[i].ActiveAt(now) {
+			return &bans[i]
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// BanForLimit bans netblock at now for a broken limit, with notes, and
+// returns the ban. A first ban lasts LimitBanDuration. A ban made within
+// LimitBanRepeatWindow after the netblock's ban that ended last, other
+// than one for a clear sign of attack or a lifted one, lasts repeatFactor
+// times as long as that one. A ban that would be longer than
+// MaxBanDuration is permanent instead. If a ban on netblock is still
+// active, as when two of its requests break a limit at once, that ban is
+// returned and no other is made. The ledger fills in the notes' Refused
+// and EarlierBans itself, and gives the ban the reason "requests per
+// <Window> over the limit of <Limit>", from the notes.
+func (l *Ledger) BanForLimit(netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes) Ban {
+	reason := fmt.Sprintf("requests per %s over the limit of %d",
+		notes.Window, notes.Limit)
+
+	return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseLimit, reason, notes)
+}
+
+// BanForAttack bans netblock at now for a clear sign of attack, with
+// notes, and returns the ban, as BanForLimit does. A first ban lasts
+// AttackBanDuration; once the netblock has had one that was not lifted,
+// the next is permanent. Its reason is "matched the rule <RuleID>".
+func (l *Ledger) BanForAttack(netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, notes Notes) Ban {
+	return l.ban(netblock, now, CauseAttack, "matched the rule "+notes.RuleID, notes)
+}
+
+// Bans returns the bans held on netblock, oldest first. It is not a
+// request from netblock, and leaves when it was last seen unchanged.
+func (l *Ledger) Bans(netblock netip.Prefix) []Ban {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	bans, found := l.netblocks.Peek(netblock)
+	if !found {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return slices.Clone(*bans)
+}
+
+// Made returns how many bans for cause have been made since the start:
+// for CauseLimit and CauseAttack, by the ledger; for CauseAdmin, by an
+// admin in an edit of bans.json, as LoadEdit counts them. The bans read
+// from bans.json at the start are not among them.
+func (l *Ledger) Made(cause string) int {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return l.made[cause]
+}
+
+// Count returns how many of the bans held are active at now, and how many
+// of those are permanent. A lifted ban is neither.
+func (l *Ledger) Count(now time.Time) (int, int) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	active, permanent := 0, 0
+
+	for _, bans := range l.netblocks.Values() {
+		for _, ban := range *bans {
+			if !ban.ActiveAt(now) {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			active++
+
+			if ban.Permanent() {
+				permanent++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return active, permanent
+}
+
+// Snapshot returns every ban held, sorted by netblock, and each
+// netblock's bans oldest first, as bans.json lists them.
+func (l *Ledger) Snapshot() []Ban {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	held := make([]Ban, 0, l.held)
+	for _, bans := range l.netblocks.Values() {
+		held = append(held, *bans...)
+	}
+
+	slices.SortStableFunc(held, func(a, b Ban) int {
+		return a.Netblock.Compare(b.Netblock)
+	})
+
+	return held
+}
+
+// Load puts bans read from bans.json at the start into the ledger, in
+// place of the bans it holds, in the order they started, so that a
+// netblock whose last ban started latest counts as the most recently
+// seen. A ban without a cause is an admin's, and gets CauseAdmin. Each
+// netblock is masked to its length, so that 203.0.113.9/24 is
+// 203.0.113.0/24, and each text in the notes is cut to 256 bytes. Past
+// MaxBans the earliest bans whose cause is not CauseAdmin are dropped, as
+// when they are made.
+func (l *Ledger) Load(bans []Ban) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	l.load(bans)
+}
+
+// LoadEdit is Load for an admin's edit of bans.json, taken in while
+// smallwebwaf runs. Each ban in it whose cause is CauseAdmin, and which
+// the ledger did not hold, with the same netblock and start, is one the
+// admin made, and is counted among the bans made.
+func (l *Ledger) LoadEdit(bans []Ban) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	l.made[CauseAdmin] += l.load(bans)
+}
+
+// load does what Load describes, and returns how many of bans are bans
+// whose cause is CauseAdmin that the ledger did not hold before.
+func (l *Ledger) load(bans []Ban) int {
+	bans = slices.Clone(bans)
+	added := 0
+
+	for i := range bans {
+		ban := &bans[i]
+		ban.Netblock = ban.Netblock.Masked()
+		ban.Notes.Request = ban.Notes.Request.cut()
+
+		if ban.Cause == "" {
+			ban.Cause = CauseAdmin
+		}
+
+		if ban.Cause == CauseAdmin && !l.holds(ban.Netblock, ban.Start) {
+			added++
+		}
+	}
+
+	slices.SortStableFunc(bans, func(a, b Ban) int {
+		return a.Start.Compare(b.Start)
+	})
+
+	l.netblocks.Purge()
+	l.held = 0
+	l.v4Lengths, l.v6Lengths = nil, nil
+
+	for _, ban := range bans {
+		l.add(ban)
+	}
+
+	return added
+}
+
+// holds reports whether the ledger holds a ban on netblock that started
+// at start.
+func (l *Ledger) holds(netblock netip.Prefix, start time.Time) bool {
+	bans, found := l.netblocks.Peek(netblock)
+
+	return found && slices.ContainsFunc(*bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
+		return ban.Start.Equal(start)
+	})
+}
+
+// ban bans netblock at now for cause, with reason and notes, as
+// BanForLimit and BanForAttack describe, and returns the ban.
+func (l *Ledger) ban(
+	netblock netip.Prefix, now time.Time, cause, reason string, notes Notes,
+) Ban {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// held are the netblock's bans, none of them active.
+	var held []Ban
+
+	bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netblock)
+	if found {
+		active := activeBan(*bans, now)
+		if active != nil {
+			return *active
+		}
+
+		held = *bans
+		notes.EarlierBans = earlierBans(held)
+	}
+
+	notes.Request = notes.Request.cut()
+	ban := Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: now, Cause: cause, Reason: reason, Notes: notes}
+
+	if cause == CauseAttack {
+		ban.Expires = l.attackExpiry(held, now)
+	} else {
+		ban.Expires = l.limitExpiry(held, now)
+	}
+
+	l.add(ban)
+	l.made[cause]++
+	l.markChanged()
+
+	return ban
+}
+
+// earlierBans returns how many bans a netblock with the bans held, oldest
+// first, has had, by cause: the first ban held counts the bans the
+// netblock had before that one, since dropped to make room, and each ban
+// held adds one.
+func earlierBans(held []Ban) EarlierBans {
+	earlier := held[0].Notes.EarlierBans
+
+	for _, ban := range held {
+		switch ban.Cause {
+		case CauseLimit:
+			earlier.Limit++
+		case CauseAttack:
+			earlier.Attack++
+		case CauseAdmin:
+			earlier.Admin++
+		}
+	}
+
+	return earlier
+}
+
+// markChanged has Changed receive a value, unless one is waiting already.
+func (l *Ledger) markChanged() {
+	select {
+	case l.changed <- struct{}{}:
+	default: // a value is waiting already
+	}
+}
+
+// active returns the ban active at now on a netblock client is in, or
+// nil.
+func (l *Ledger) active(client netip.Addr, now time.Time) *Ban {
+	lengths := l.v6Lengths
+	if client.Is4() {
+		lengths = l.v4Lengths
+	}
+
+	for _, length := range lengths {
+		bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(netip.PrefixFrom(client, length).Masked())
+		if !found {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		ban := activeBan(*bans, now)
+		if ban != nil {
+			return ban
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// add adds ban to its netblock's bans, after the last, and makes its
+// netblock the most recently seen. With MaxBans held, it drops one first,
+// unless ban's cause is CauseAdmin, which does not count toward MaxBans.
+func (l *Ledger) add(ban Ban) {
+	counted := ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
+	if counted && l.held == l.rules.MaxBans {
+		l.dropOne()
+	}
+
+	// dropOne can have dropped the netblock's last ban, and the netblock
+	// with it.
+	bans, found := l.netblocks.Get(ban.Netblock)
+	if !found {
+		bans = &[]Ban{}
+		l.netblocks.Add(ban.Netblock, bans)
+	}
+
+	*bans = append(*bans, ban)
+
+	if counted {
+		l.held++
+	}
+
+	lengths := &l.v6Lengths
+	if ban.Netblock.Addr().Is4() {
+		lengths = &l.v4Lengths
+	}
+
+	if !slices.Contains(*lengths, ban.Netblock.Bits()) {
+		*lengths = append(*lengths, ban.Netblock.Bits())
+	}
+}
+
+// limitExpiry returns when a ban for a broken limit made at now ends, or
+// zero when it is permanent. held are the netblock's bans, none of them
+// active, of which the one that ended last, other than a ban for a clear
+// sign of attack or a lifted one, can make the new ban longer. A ban an
+// admin adds to bans.json can start after another and end before it, so
+// that one is looked for among them all.
+func (l *Ledger) limitExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
+	length := l.rules.LimitBanDuration
+
+	var last *Ban
+
+	for i, ban := range held {
+		if ban.Cause != CauseAttack && ban.Lifted.IsZero() &&
+			(last == nil || ban.Expires.After(last.Expires)) {
+			last = &held[i]
+		}
+	}
+
+	if last != nil && now.Sub(last.Expires) <= l.rules.LimitBanRepeatWindow {
+		lastLength := last.Expires.Sub(last.Start)
+		// This is repeatFactor * lastLength > MaxBanDuration, written so
+		// that it cannot overflow.
+		if lastLength > l.rules.MaxBanDuration/repeatFactor {
+			return time.Time{}
+		}
+
+		length = repeatFactor * lastLength
+	}
+
+	if length > l.rules.MaxBanDuration {
+		return time.Time{}
+	}
+
+	return now.Add(length)
+}
+
+// attackExpiry returns when a ban for a clear sign of attack made at now
+// ends. held are the netblock's bans, none of them active: if one of them
+// is for a clear sign of attack too, and was not lifted, the new ban is
+// permanent, and its end zero; otherwise it ends AttackBanDuration later.
+func (l *Ledger) attackExpiry(held []Ban, now time.Time) time.Time {
+	for _, ban := range held {
+		if ban.Cause == CauseAttack && ban.Lifted.IsZero() {
+			return time.Time{}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return now.Add(l.rules.AttackBanDuration)
+}
+
+// dropOne drops the earliest ban whose cause is not CauseAdmin of the
+// netblock that has gone longest without a request, of those that hold
+// such a ban, and the netblock with it if that was its only ban. It is
+// called with at least one such ban held. It looks at each netblock once
+// at most, and drops nothing when none holds such a ban.
+func (l *Ledger) dropOne() {
+	for range l.netblocks.Len() {
+		netblock, bans, _ := l.netblocks.GetOldest()
+
+		i := slices.IndexFunc(*bans, func(ban Ban) bool {
+			return ban.Cause != CauseAdmin
+		})
+		if i < 0 {
+			// Its bans are all an admin's, and never dropped. Get makes
+			// it the most recently seen, so that the next netblock is
+			// looked at; when it was seen matters only for dropping a
+			// ban, and a ban added to it makes it the most recently seen
+			// anyway.
+			l.netblocks.Get(netblock)
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if len(*bans) == 1 {
+			l.netblocks.Remove(netblock)
+		} else {
+			*bans = slices.Delete(*bans, i, i+1)
+		}
+
+		l.held--
+
+		return
+	}
+}
+
+// cut returns r with each text cut to maxTextBytes and copied, so that
+// the notes do not keep the rest of the request in memory.
+func (r Request) cut() Request {
+	r.Method = cutText(r.Method)
+	r.Host = cutText(r.Host)
+	r.Path = cutText(r.Path)
+	r.UserAgent = cutText(r.UserAgent)
+
+	return r
+}
+
+// cutText returns a copy of the first maxTextBytes of text.
+func cutText(text string) string {
+	return strings.Clone(text[:min(len(text), maxTextBytes)])
+}

internal/bans/bans_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+package bans_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+)
+
+const day = 24 * time.Hour
+
+func TestRepeatsTripleUntilPermanent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	now := midnight()
+
+	// Each ban is followed by another as soon as it ends: 1, 3, 9, 27 and
+	// 81 hours.
+	for i, hours := range []int{1, 3, 9, 27, 81} {
+		ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+
+		length := time.Duration(hours) * time.Hour
+		if !ban.Expires.Equal(now.Add(length)) ||
+			ban.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: i}) {
+			t.Fatalf("ban %d lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want %d hours and %d for a limit",
+				i+1, ban.Expires.Sub(now), ban.Notes.EarlierBans, hours, i)
+		}
+
+		now = ban.Expires
+	}
+
+	// The sixth would last 243 hours, more than seven days: it is
+	// permanent, and never ends.
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+	if !ban.Permanent() {
+		t.Fatalf("sixth ban ends at %s, want a permanent one", ban.Expires)
+	}
+
+	_, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), now.Add(100*365*day))
+	if !banned {
+		t.Error("a permanent ban ended")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRepeatWindowRunsOut(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		// gap is the time between the end of the first ban and the second.
+		gap  time.Duration
+		want time.Duration
+	}{
+		{"broken again as the window ends", day, 3 * time.Hour},
+		{"broken again after the window", day + time.Nanosecond, time.Hour},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+			netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+			first := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+			second := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires.Add(tc.gap), bans.Notes{})
+
+			if second.Expires.Sub(second.Start) != tc.want ||
+				second.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
+				t.Errorf("second ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want %s and 1 for a limit",
+					second.Expires.Sub(second.Start), second.Notes.EarlierBans, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFirstBanLongerThanTheMaximumIsPermanent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.LimitBanDuration = rules.MaxBanDuration + time.Hour
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), midnight(),
+		bans.Notes{})
+	if !ban.Permanent() {
+		t.Errorf("first ban ends at %s, want a permanent one", ban.Expires)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLongestBanSetFarOffDoesNotOverflow(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// With bans of up to 100,000 days, the 14th ban in a row, of 3^13
+	// hours, is within the maximum, and three times as long would not fit
+	// in a time.Duration. The 15th is permanent.
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.MaxBanDuration = 100000 * day
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	now := midnight()
+
+	for i := range 14 {
+		ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+		if !ban.Expires.After(ban.Start) {
+			t.Fatalf("ban %d starts at %s and ends at %s", i+1, ban.Start, ban.Expires)
+		}
+
+		now = ban.Expires
+	}
+
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+	if !ban.Permanent() {
+		t.Errorf("15th ban ends at %s, want a permanent one", ban.Expires)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBrokenLimitDuringABanMakesNoOther(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+	first := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	again := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
+
+	if again != first || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("a limit broken during a ban gave %+v and %d bans, want %+v and 1",
+			again, len(ledger.Bans(netblock)), first)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCheckRefusesWhileTheBanLastsAndCountsTheRefusals(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
+
+	for range 3 {
+		got, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond))
+		if !banned || got.Start != ban.Start {
+			t.Fatalf("check during the ban gives %+v and %t", got, banned)
+		}
+	}
+
+	_, banned := ledger.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.10"), midnight())
+	if banned {
+		t.Error("another netblock is banned")
+	}
+
+	_, banned = ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires)
+	if banned {
+		t.Error("the ban did not end")
+	}
+
+	// The netblock's requests went from 5 to 8 with the three refused.
+	notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes
+	if notes.Refused != 3 || notes.Requests != 8 {
+		t.Errorf("the notes count %d refused requests of %d, want 3 of 8",
+			notes.Refused, notes.Requests)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFindCountsNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Requests: 5})
+
+	got, banned := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Nanosecond))
+	if !banned || got != ban {
+		t.Errorf("find during the ban gives %+v and %t, want %+v", got, banned, ban)
+	}
+
+	_, banned = ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires)
+	if banned {
+		t.Error("the ban did not end")
+	}
+
+	if notes := ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes; notes != ban.Notes {
+		t.Errorf("the notes are %+v, want them unchanged, %+v", notes, ban.Notes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMaxBansDropsTheEarliestBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.MaxBans = 3
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	a := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
+	b := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32")
+	c := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32")
+	d := netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")
+	now := midnight()
+
+	first := ledger.BanForLimit(a, now, bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(b, now, bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(c, now, bans.Notes{})
+
+	// A request from a makes b the netblock seen longest ago, and its ban
+	// goes to make room for d's.
+	ledger.Check(a.Addr(), now)
+	ledger.BanForLimit(d, now, bans.Notes{})
+	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{a: 1, b: 0, c: 1, d: 1})
+
+	// a is banned again once its ban has ended; c, seen longest ago, goes.
+	ledger.BanForLimit(a, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{a: 2, c: 0, d: 1})
+
+	// With d seen since, a is seen longest ago, and its earlier ban goes
+	// first.
+	ledger.Check(d.Addr(), first.Expires)
+	ledger.BanForLimit(b, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+	wantBans(t, ledger, map[netip.Prefix]int{a: 1, b: 1, d: 1})
+
+	if !ledger.Bans(a)[0].Start.Equal(first.Expires) {
+		t.Errorf("a kept its ban of %s, want the later one", ledger.Bans(a)[0].Start)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFullLedgerDropsTheEarlierBanOfTheNetblockBannedAgain(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// With room for one ban, the netblock's ended ban goes to make room for
+	// its new one, whose notes still count it.
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.MaxBans = 1
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+	first := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	second := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+
+	held := ledger.Bans(netblock)
+	if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != second ||
+		held[0].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the second ban, "+
+			"with 1 earlier ban for a limit", held)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestDuringAnAttackBanMakesItPermanent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	notes := bans.Notes{RuleID: "env-file", Target: "path"}
+
+	ban := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), notes)
+	if !ban.Expires.Equal(midnight().Add(7*day)) || ban.Cause != bans.CauseAttack ||
+		ban.Notes.RuleID != "env-file" || ledger.Made(bans.CauseAttack) != 1 ||
+		ledger.Made(bans.CauseLimit) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("the ban is %+v, with %d made for an attack and %d for a limit, "+
+			"want one for an attack, of seven days", ban,
+			ledger.Made(bans.CauseAttack), ledger.Made(bans.CauseLimit))
+	}
+
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
+
+	// In observe mode the ban refuses nothing, and stays as it is.
+	got, _ := ledger.Find(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(time.Hour))
+	if got.Permanent() {
+		t.Fatal("a request found under the ban made it permanent")
+	}
+
+	// A request it refuses makes it permanent, and bans.json due.
+	got, _ = ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(time.Hour))
+	if !got.Permanent() || !ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Permanent() {
+		t.Fatalf("after a request during the ban, it is %+v, want it permanent", got)
+	}
+
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
+
+	_, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(100*365*day))
+	if !banned {
+		t.Error("the permanent ban ended")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAttackAfterAnAttackBanHasEndedBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+	// A ban for a broken limit before does not count.
+	first := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	second := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+
+	if second.Expires.Sub(second.Start) != 7*day {
+		t.Fatalf("the first ban for an attack lasts %s, want 7 days",
+			second.Expires.Sub(second.Start))
+	}
+
+	// Once that has run out without a request, the netblock is served, and
+	// its next clear sign of attack bans it for good.
+	_, banned := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), second.Expires)
+	if banned {
+		t.Fatal("the ban did not end")
+	}
+
+	// Its notes show the earlier ban for an attack that makes it permanent,
+	// beside the one for a limit.
+	third := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, second.Expires.Add(30*day), bans.Notes{})
+	if !third.Permanent() ||
+		third.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1, Attack: 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("the next ban for an attack is %+v, want a permanent one, "+
+			"with 1 earlier ban for a limit and 1 for an attack", third)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAttackBanDoesNotLengthenTheNextBanForALimit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+	// Three times the seven days would be permanent; a limit broken as the
+	// ban for an attack ends bans for an hour, as a first broken limit does.
+	attack := ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	limit := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, attack.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+
+	if limit.Expires.Sub(limit.Start) != time.Hour || limit.Cause != bans.CauseLimit {
+		t.Errorf("the ban for a limit is %+v, want one of an hour", limit)
+	}
+
+	// And a request during the ban for a limit leaves it as it is.
+	got, _ := ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), limit.Start)
+	if got.Permanent() {
+		t.Error("a request during a ban for a limit made it permanent")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestTextsAreCutTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	long := strings.Repeat("a", 300)
+	request := bans.Request{
+		Time: midnight(), Method: long, Host: long, Path: long, Status: 403, UserAgent: long,
+	}
+
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Request: request})
+
+	cut := long[:256]
+	want := bans.Request{
+		Time: midnight(), Method: cut, Host: cut, Path: cut, Status: 403, UserAgent: cut,
+	}
+
+	if ban.Notes.Request != want || ledger.Bans(netblock)[0].Notes.Request != want {
+		t.Errorf("the notes keep %+v, want each text cut to 256 bytes", ban.Notes.Request)
+	}
+}
+
+// defaultRules are the rules at the settings' defaults.
+func defaultRules() bans.Rules {
+	return bans.Rules{
+		LimitBanDuration:     time.Hour,
+		LimitBanRepeatWindow: day,
+		MaxBanDuration:       7 * day,
+		AttackBanDuration:    7 * day,
+		MaxBans:              5000,
+	}
+}
+
+// midnight is when the tests' first bans are made.
+func midnight() time.Time {
+	return time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
+}
+
+// wantBans checks how many bans the ledger holds on each netblock.
+func wantBans(t *testing.T, ledger *bans.Ledger, want map[netip.Prefix]int) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for netblock, count := range want {
+		got := len(ledger.Bans(netblock))
+		if got != count {
+			t.Errorf("%s has %d bans, want %d", netblock, got, count)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/bans/snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+package bans_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+)
+
+func TestChangedAfterABanIsMade(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
+
+	ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
+
+	// A limit broken during the ban makes no other, and a refusal changes
+	// only the counts in the notes, which wait for the interval's write.
+	ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight().Add(time.Minute), bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.Check(netblock.Addr(), midnight().Add(time.Minute))
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
+
+	// Two bans before the value is read leave one.
+	ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.11/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, true)
+	wantChanged(t, ledger, false)
+}
+
+func TestSnapshotListsEveryBanByNetblock(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	v6 := netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64")
+	high := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32")
+	low := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+
+	first := ledger.BanForLimit(v6, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(high, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(low, midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(v6, first.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+
+	snapshot := ledger.Snapshot()
+
+	got := make([]string, 0, len(snapshot))
+	for _, ban := range snapshot {
+		got = append(got, ban.Netblock.String()+" "+ban.Start.Format(time.Kitchen))
+	}
+
+	want := []string{
+		"203.0.113.9/32 12:00AM", "203.0.113.10/32 12:00AM",
+		"2001:db8::/64 12:00AM", "2001:db8::/64 1:00AM",
+	}
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("snapshot %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadedBansCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	before := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	ban := before.BanForLimit(netblock, midnight(), bans.Notes{Limit: 1})
+
+	// Loaded into a new ledger, as across a restart, the ban still refuses
+	// while it lasts, and once it has ended a broken limit bans for three
+	// times as long, with the loaded ban counted among the earlier ones.
+	after := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	after.Load(before.Snapshot())
+
+	_, banned := after.Check(netblock.Addr(), ban.Expires.Add(-time.Second))
+	if !banned {
+		t.Error("the loaded ban does not refuse")
+	}
+
+	again := after.BanForLimit(netblock, ban.Expires, bans.Notes{})
+	if again.Expires.Sub(again.Start) != 3*time.Hour ||
+		again.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, want 3h and 1 for a limit",
+			again.Expires.Sub(again.Start), again.Notes.EarlierBans)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadedBanRefusesEveryClientInItsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Two entries as an admin might write them, with addresses not masked
+	// to their lengths, the IPv6 one shorter than the /64 an IPv6 client's
+	// ban covers, beside a ban the ledger makes on one IPv4 address.
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
+		{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/24"), Start: midnight()},
+		{Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::1/48"), Start: midnight()},
+	})
+	ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32"), midnight(), bans.Notes{})
+
+	for client, want := range map[string]bool{
+		"203.0.113.0":     true,
+		"203.0.113.200":   true,
+		"203.0.114.1":     false,
+		"2001:db8:0:5::1": true,
+		"2001:db8:1::1":   false,
+		"198.51.100.7":    true,
+		"198.51.100.8":    false,
+	} {
+		_, banned := ledger.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(client), midnight())
+		if banned != want {
+			t.Errorf("%s is refused: %t, want %t", client, banned, want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// The loaded netblocks are written back masked.
+	snapshot := ledger.Snapshot()
+
+	got := make([]string, 0, len(snapshot))
+	for _, ban := range snapshot {
+		got = append(got, ban.Netblock.String())
+	}
+
+	want := []string{"198.51.100.7/32", "203.0.113.0/24", "2001:db8::/48"}
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("the ledger holds bans on %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPermanentBanStartedBeforeAnEndedOneRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// As when an admin adds a permanent ban to bans.json with a start
+	// before that of the netblock's ban that has ended.
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24")
+	permanent := bans.Ban{Netblock: netblock, Start: midnight().Add(-time.Hour)}
+	ended := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Expires:  midnight().Add(time.Hour),
+	}
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{permanent, ended})
+
+	now := midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour)
+	client := netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9")
+
+	ban, banned := ledger.Find(client, now)
+	if !banned || !ban.Permanent() {
+		t.Errorf("find gives %+v and %t, want the permanent ban", ban, banned)
+	}
+
+	ban, banned = ledger.Check(client, now)
+	if !banned || !ban.Permanent() {
+		t.Errorf("the client is refused: %t, under %+v, want under the permanent ban",
+			banned, ban)
+	}
+
+	// A limit broken now makes no shorter ban over the permanent one.
+	ban = ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{})
+	if !ban.Permanent() || len(ledger.Bans(netblock)) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("a broken limit returned %+v and left the netblock %d bans, "+
+			"want the permanent ban and 2", ban, len(ledger.Bans(netblock)))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNextBanWorkedOutFromTheBanThatEndedLast(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// A 9-hour ban smallwebwaf made, the third in a row, and an admin's
+	// 1-hour ban added to bans.json over it, with no cause and no notes.
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	nineHours := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Expires:  midnight().Add(9 * time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+		Notes:    bans.Notes{EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 2}},
+	}
+	admins := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    midnight().Add(time.Hour),
+		Expires:  midnight().Add(2 * time.Hour),
+	}
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{nineHours, admins})
+
+	// Once both have ended, a limit broken within the repeat window bans
+	// for three times the 9 hours, and the notes count the two bans
+	// before the 9-hour one and it, for a limit, and the admin's.
+	ban := ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, nineHours.Expires.Add(time.Hour), bans.Notes{})
+	if ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start) != 27*time.Hour ||
+		ban.Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 3, Admin: 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("the next ban lasts %s with earlier bans %+v, "+
+			"want 27h, 3 for a limit and 1 an admin's",
+			ban.Expires.Sub(ban.Start), ban.Notes.EarlierBans)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadKeepsAtMostMaxBansDroppingTheEarliest(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// bans.json lists the bans by netblock, not in the order they began.
+	later := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"),
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+	}
+	earlier := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32"),
+		Start:    midnight().Add(-time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+	}
+
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.MaxBans = 1
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{later, earlier})
+
+	held := ledger.Snapshot()
+	if len(held) != 1 || held[0] != later {
+		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want only the ban that began later", held)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadReplacesTheBansHeld(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Room for three bans, so that the second load, were it added to the
+	// two bans held, would drop none of them to make room.
+	rules := defaultRules()
+	rules.MaxBans = 3
+	ledger := bans.New(rules)
+	kept := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/64"),
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+	}
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{
+		{
+			Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.0/24"),
+			Start:    midnight(),
+			Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+		},
+		kept,
+	})
+
+	// Loaded again without the first ban, as when an admin's edit of
+	// bans.json is taken in, that ban is lifted.
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{kept})
+
+	_, banned := ledger.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.9"), midnight())
+	if banned {
+		t.Error("a ban left out of the second load still refuses")
+	}
+
+	// The ledger holds one ban, so it makes two more without dropping any.
+	first := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.7/32"), midnight(),
+		bans.Notes{})
+	second := ledger.BanForLimit(netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.8/32"), midnight(),
+		bans.Notes{})
+
+	want := []bans.Ban{first, second, kept}
+	if got := ledger.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("the ledger holds %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadCutsTheTextsTo256Bytes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	long := strings.Repeat("a", 300)
+	ban := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"),
+		Start:    midnight(),
+		Notes: bans.Notes{Request: bans.Request{
+			Method: long, Host: long, Path: long, UserAgent: long,
+		}},
+	}
+
+	ledger := bans.New(defaultRules())
+	ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{ban})
+
+	cut := long[:256]
+	want := bans.Request{Method: cut, Host: cut, Path: cut, UserAgent: cut}
+
+	got := ledger.Snapshot()[0].Notes.Request
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("the notes keep %+v, want each text cut to 256 bytes", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantChanged checks whether the ledger's Changed has a value to read.
+func wantChanged(t *testing.T, ledger *bans.Ledger, want bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got := false
+
+	select {
+	case <-ledger.Changed():
+		got = true
+	default:
+	}
+
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("Changed has a value: %t, want %t", got, want)
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -4,17 +4,24 @@
 package config
 
 import (
+	"crypto/x509"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
 	"math"
 	"net"
+	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
 )
 
 // Config is smallwebwaf's settings. A timeout, size or rate limit of zero
@@ -24,12 +31,28 @@ type Config struct {
 	ListenAddr string
 	// UpstreamURL is the app (SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL).
 	UpstreamURL *url.URL
+	// InstanceName is the name each request log line gives as instance
+	// (SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME), by default the host's name, which docker sets
+	// to the first 12 characters of the container's id.
+	InstanceName string
+	// Observe is true in observe mode, when SWWAF_MODE is observe rather
+	// than enforce: a request that SWWAF_DENY_NETS, a ban, the country
+	// lists, a rate limit or a rule would refuse is passed to the app
+	// instead, and no ban is made.
+	Observe bool
 	// TrustedProxies are the netblocks whose X-Forwarded-For is
 	// believed (SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES).
 	TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
 	// ClientRequestTimeout bounds reading the whole request from the
 	// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT).
 	ClientRequestTimeout time.Duration
+	// ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes is the largest request line and headers
+	// a client may send (SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES). It is
+	// never off, and always more than 4K.
+	ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes int64
+	// ClientIdleTimeout bounds how long a kept-open client connection
+	// may wait for its next request (SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT).
+	ClientIdleTimeout time.Duration
 	// ClientResponseTimeout bounds writing the whole response to the
 	// client (SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT).
 	ClientResponseTimeout time.Duration
@@ -60,6 +83,10 @@ type Config struct {
 	RateLimitPerMinute int64
 	RateLimitPerHour   int64
 	RateLimitPerDay    int64
+	// RateLimitExemptPaths are the path prefixes whose requests the rate
+	// limits neither count nor refuse (SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS).
+	// Each starts with /.
+	RateLimitExemptPaths []string
 	// DeniedCountries are the countries whose clients are refused
 	// (SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES). ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, when not
 	// empty, are the only countries whose clients are let through
@@ -67,6 +94,65 @@ type Config struct {
 	// capitals, as GeoJS gives them.
 	DeniedCountries             []string
 	ExclusivelyAllowedCountries []string
+	// BanResponse is the status a refused client is answered with, 403
+	// or 429, or 0 to close the connection without an answer
+	// (SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE). It answers a banned client, a request that
+	// breaks a rate limit or matches a ban rule, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the
+	// country lists.
+	BanResponse int
+	// LimitBanDuration is the ban for a first broken rate limit
+	// (SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION). A limit broken again within
+	// LimitBanRepeatWindow after the last ban ended bans for three times
+	// as long as that ban (SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW), and a ban that
+	// would be longer than MaxBanDuration is permanent instead
+	// (SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION). None of them can be off.
+	LimitBanDuration     time.Duration
+	LimitBanRepeatWindow time.Duration
+	MaxBanDuration       time.Duration
+	// AttackBanDuration is the ban for a first clear sign of attack
+	// (SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION). It cannot be off.
+	AttackBanDuration time.Duration
+	// MaxBans is the most bans held (SWWAF_MAX_BANS).
+	MaxBans int
+	// BanScopeV4Prefix is the length of the netblock around an IPv4
+	// client that a ban covers (SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX).
+	BanScopeV4Prefix int
+	// StateDir is the directory of the state files, an absolute path
+	// (SWWAF_STATE_DIR). bans.json is written StateWriteDelay after a ban
+	// is made (SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY), and every state file every
+	// StateCounterInterval (SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL). Neither can be
+	// off.
+	StateDir             string
+	StateWriteDelay      time.Duration
+	StateCounterInterval time.Duration
+	// LogRequestHeaders are the request headers whose values the request
+	// log gives, in lower case (SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS).
+	LogRequestHeaders []string
+	// MetricsToken is the bearer token a scraper sends for the metrics
+	// (SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN), "" while it is unset and the metrics are off.
+	// MetricsTopN is how many countries get series of their own in the
+	// metrics (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N).
+	MetricsToken string
+	MetricsTopN  int
+	// RulesDir is the directory of the rule files (SWWAF_RULES_DIR), read
+	// unless RulesEnabled is false (SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED).
+	RulesDir     string
+	RulesEnabled bool
+	// LogRemoteURL is where every line on stdout is also sent
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL), nil while it is unset and nothing is sent.
+	// LogRemoteTLSCAs are the certificates a syslog+tls endpoint's
+	// certificate must chain to (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil while
+	// it is unset and the host's own are used. LogRemoteBuffer is the most
+	// lines held while they wait to be sent (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
+	// LogRemoteFacility is the number of the syslog facility
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and LogRemoteAppName the APP-NAME
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME, by default InstanceName), of the records
+	// the lines are sent in.
+	LogRemoteURL      *url.URL
+	LogRemoteTLSCAs   *x509.CertPool
+	LogRemoteBuffer   int
+	LogRemoteFacility int
+	LogRemoteAppName  string
 
 	// settings are the values read, as given or by default, for the
 	// log line at start.
@@ -82,6 +168,11 @@ const (
 	kibibyte = 1 << 10
 	mebibyte = 1 << 20
 	gibibyte = 1 << 30
+	ipv4Bits = 32
+	// minTokenLength is the fewest characters a token may have.
+	minTokenLength = 32
+	// masked is what the log shows for a token that is set.
+	masked = "********"
 )
 
 var (
@@ -102,7 +193,34 @@ var (
 			"such as http://127.0.0.1:8081")
 	errNotCountry = errors.New(
 		"is not a two-letter country code such as de or kp")
-	errOnBothLists = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
+	errNotHeaderName = errors.New(
+		"is not a header name such as accept-language")
+	errHeaderTakenOut = errors.New(
+		"is taken out of every request by Go's HTTP server, so it can never " +
+			"be logged")
+	errOnBothLists          = errors.New("is in SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES too")
+	errNotOver4K            = errors.New("is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K")
+	errNotDurationAboveZero = errors.New(
+		"is not a duration above zero, such as 1h or 7d")
+	errNotNumberAboveZero = errors.New(
+		"is not a whole number above zero, such as 5000")
+	errNotBanResponse = errors.New("is not 403, 429 or close")
+	errNotV4Prefix    = errors.New(
+		"is not the length of an IPv4 netblock, from 0 to 32, such as 24")
+	errNotAbsolutePath = errors.New(
+		"is not an absolute path, such as /var/lib/smallwebwaf")
+	errShortToken    = errors.New("is shorter than 32 characters")
+	errNotMode       = errors.New("is not enforce or observe")
+	errNotPathPrefix = errors.New(
+		"is not a path prefix starting with /, such as /assets/")
+	errNotBoolean      = errors.New("is not true or false")
+	errNotLogRemoteURL = errors.New(
+		"is not syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls with a host and a port, " +
+			"and nothing more, such as syslog+tls://logs.example:6514")
+	errNoCertificate = errors.New("holds no PEM certificate")
+	errNotFacility   = errors.New("is not a syslog facility such as local0 or daemon")
+	errNotAppName    = errors.New(
+		"is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters without a space, such as gitea")
 )
 
 // FromEnvironment reads the settings with lookupEnv, normally
@@ -110,11 +228,17 @@ var (
 // that is set but invalid is an error that names it.
 func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
 	env := &environment{lookupEnv: lookupEnv}
+	hostname, _ := os.Hostname() // "" when the host has no name to give
 	cfg := &Config{
-		ListenAddr:              env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8080"),
-		UpstreamURL:             env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8081"),
-		TrustedProxies:          env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
-		ClientRequestTimeout:    env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
+		ListenAddr:           env.address("SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR", ":8080"),
+		UpstreamURL:          env.appURL("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8081"),
+		InstanceName:         env.value("SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME", hostname),
+		Observe:              env.observe("SWWAF_MODE", "enforce"),
+		TrustedProxies:       env.netblocks("SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES", privateRanges),
+		ClientRequestTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
+		ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: env.headerSize(
+			"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES", "32K"),
+		ClientIdleTimeout:       env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT", "120s"),
 		ClientResponseTimeout:   env.duration("SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
 		UpstreamRequestTimeout:  env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT", "60s"),
 		UpstreamResponseTimeout: env.duration("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", "30m"),
@@ -126,11 +250,35 @@ func FromEnvironment(lookupEnv func(string) (string, bool)) (*Config, error) {
 		RateLimitPerMinute:      env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE", "1000"),
 		RateLimitPerHour:        env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR", "10000"),
 		RateLimitPerDay:         env.count("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY", "50000"),
+		RateLimitExemptPaths:    env.pathPrefixes("SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS", ""),
 		DeniedCountries:         env.countries("SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES", ""),
 		ExclusivelyAllowedCountries: env.countries(
 			"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES", ""),
+		BanResponse:          env.banResponse("SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE", "403"),
+		LimitBanDuration:     env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION", "1h"),
+		LimitBanRepeatWindow: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW", "24h"),
+		MaxBanDuration:       env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION", "7d"),
+		AttackBanDuration:    env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION", "7d"),
+		MaxBans:              env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_MAX_BANS", "5000"),
+		BanScopeV4Prefix:     env.v4Prefix("SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX", "32"),
+		StateDir:             env.absolutePath("SWWAF_STATE_DIR", "/var/lib/smallwebwaf"),
+		StateWriteDelay:      env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY", "10s"),
+		StateCounterInterval: env.durationNotOff("SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL", "15m"),
+		LogRequestHeaders: env.headerNames("SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS",
+			"accept,accept-language,accept-encoding,content-type,origin,range"),
+		MetricsToken:      env.token("SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN"),
+		MetricsTopN:       env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N", "50"),
+		RulesDir:          env.value("SWWAF_RULES_DIR", "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d"),
+		RulesEnabled:      env.boolean("SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED", "true"),
+		LogRemoteURL:      env.logRemoteURL("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"),
+		LogRemoteTLSCAs:   env.certificates("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"),
+		LogRemoteBuffer:   env.numberNotOff("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER", "10000"),
+		LogRemoteFacility: env.facility("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY", "local0"),
 	}
 
+	cfg.LogRemoteAppName = env.appName("SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME",
+		cfg.InstanceName, cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil)
+
 	for _, country := range cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries {
 		if slices.Contains(cfg.DeniedCountries, country) {
 			env.check("SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES",
@@ -201,6 +349,27 @@ func (e *environment) appURL(name, defaultValue string) *url.URL {
 	return upstream
 }
 
+// observe reads the setting that is the mode, enforce or observe, and
+// reports whether it is observe.
+func (e *environment) observe(name, defaultValue string) bool {
+	mode := e.value(name, defaultValue)
+	if mode != "enforce" && mode != "observe" {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", mode, errNotMode))
+	}
+
+	return mode == "observe"
+}
+
+// boolean reads a setting that is true or false.
+func (e *environment) boolean(name, defaultValue string) bool {
+	value := e.value(name, defaultValue)
+	if value != "true" && value != "false" {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotBoolean))
+	}
+
+	return value == "true"
+}
+
 // netblocks reads a setting that is a list of netblocks.
 func (e *environment) netblocks(name, defaultValue string) []netip.Prefix {
 	netblocks, err := parseNetblocks(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -225,6 +394,15 @@ func (e *environment) size(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
 	return size
 }
 
+// headerSize reads the setting that is the largest request line and
+// headers.
+func (e *environment) headerSize(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
+	size, err := parseHeaderSize(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return size
+}
+
 // count reads a setting that is a number of requests.
 func (e *environment) count(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
 	count, err := parseCount(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -233,6 +411,14 @@ func (e *environment) count(name, defaultValue string) int64 {
 	return count
 }
 
+// pathPrefixes reads a setting that is a list of path prefixes.
+func (e *environment) pathPrefixes(name, defaultValue string) []string {
+	prefixes, err := parsePathPrefixes(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return prefixes
+}
+
 // countries reads a setting that is a list of countries.
 func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string {
 	countries, err := parseCountries(e.value(name, defaultValue))
@@ -241,6 +427,147 @@ func (e *environment) countries(name, defaultValue string) []string {
 	return countries
 }
 
+// headerNames reads a setting that is a list of header names, and
+// returns them in lower case.
+func (e *environment) headerNames(name, defaultValue string) []string {
+	headers, err := parseHeaderNames(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return headers
+}
+
+// durationNotOff reads a setting that is a duration and, unlike a
+// timeout, cannot be off.
+func (e *environment) durationNotOff(name, defaultValue string) time.Duration {
+	duration, err := parseDurationNotOff(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return duration
+}
+
+// numberNotOff reads a setting that is a whole number above zero, which
+// cannot be off.
+func (e *environment) numberNotOff(name, defaultValue string) int {
+	number, err := parseNumberNotOff(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return number
+}
+
+// banResponse reads a setting that is how a refused client is answered.
+func (e *environment) banResponse(name, defaultValue string) int {
+	status, err := parseBanResponse(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return status
+}
+
+// v4Prefix reads a setting that is the length of an IPv4 netblock.
+func (e *environment) v4Prefix(name, defaultValue string) int {
+	length, err := parseV4Prefix(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return length
+}
+
+// absolutePath reads a setting that is an absolute path.
+func (e *environment) absolutePath(name, defaultValue string) string {
+	path := e.value(name, defaultValue)
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", path, errNotAbsolutePath))
+	}
+
+	return path
+}
+
+// token reads a setting that is a bearer token. Unset, it is "", which
+// switches off what it guards; set, it must be at least minTokenLength
+// characters. Neither the log nor an error shows its value.
+func (e *environment) token(name string) string {
+	value, set := e.lookupEnv(name)
+	if !set {
+		e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, ""))
+
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	e.settings = append(e.settings, slog.String(name, masked))
+
+	if utf8.RuneCountInString(value) < minTokenLength {
+		e.check(name, errShortToken)
+	}
+
+	return value
+}
+
+// logRemoteURL reads the setting that is where every log line is also
+// sent. Unset or empty, it is nil, and nothing is sent.
+func (e *environment) logRemoteURL(name string) *url.URL {
+	value := e.value(name, "")
+	if value == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	remote, err := parseLogRemoteURL(value)
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return remote
+}
+
+// certificates reads a setting that is the path of a file of PEM
+// certificates. Unset or empty, it is nil.
+func (e *environment) certificates(name string) *x509.CertPool {
+	path := e.value(name, "")
+	if path == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	pem, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a file the admin names
+	if err != nil {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("cannot be read: %w", err))
+
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	pool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", path, errNoCertificate))
+
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return pool
+}
+
+// facility reads a setting that is a syslog facility, and returns its
+// number.
+func (e *environment) facility(name, defaultValue string) int {
+	number, err := parseFacility(e.value(name, defaultValue))
+	e.check(name, err)
+
+	return number
+}
+
+// appName reads the setting that is the APP-NAME of the records the log
+// lines are sent in, by default the instance name. Its value is checked
+// when it is set, and, while lines are sent, when it is the instance name.
+func (e *environment) appName(name, instanceName string, sending bool) string {
+	_, set := e.lookupEnv(name)
+
+	value := e.value(name, instanceName)
+
+	switch {
+	case isAppName(value):
+	case set:
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotAppName))
+	case sending:
+		e.check(name, fmt.Errorf("is unset, and SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME %q, its default, %w",
+			value, errNotAppName))
+	}
+
+	return value
+}
+
 // parseDuration reads a duration in Go's syntax, such as 90s or 15m, a
 // whole number of days such as 7d, or off.
 func parseDuration(value string) (time.Duration, error) {
@@ -296,6 +623,19 @@ func parseSize(value string) (int64, error) {
 	return n * unit, nil
 }
 
+// parseHeaderSize reads the largest request line and headers: a size as
+// parseSize reads it, but more than 4K and never off. Go's server reads 4K
+// past the limit it is given before it refuses, so proxy.New gives it this
+// size less 4K, which must leave a limit.
+func parseHeaderSize(value string) (int64, error) {
+	size, err := parseSize(value)
+	if err != nil || size <= 4*kibibyte {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotOver4K)
+	}
+
+	return size, nil
+}
+
 // splitUnit splits a size into its number and the bytes its suffix
 // stands for.
 func splitUnit(value string) (string, int64) {
@@ -329,6 +669,52 @@ func parseCount(value string) (int64, error) {
 	return n, nil
 }
 
+// parseDurationNotOff reads a duration above zero, as parseDuration does,
+// but not off.
+func parseDurationNotOff(value string) (time.Duration, error) {
+	duration, err := parseDuration(value)
+	if err != nil || duration == 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotDurationAboveZero)
+	}
+
+	return duration, nil
+}
+
+// parseNumberNotOff reads a whole number above zero.
+func parseNumberNotOff(value string) (int, error) {
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
+	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotNumberAboveZero)
+	}
+
+	return n, nil
+}
+
+// parseBanResponse reads how a refused client is answered: 403, 429, or
+// close, which is 0.
+func parseBanResponse(value string) (int, error) {
+	switch value {
+	case "403":
+		return http.StatusForbidden, nil
+	case "429":
+		return http.StatusTooManyRequests, nil
+	case "close":
+		return 0, nil
+	default:
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotBanResponse)
+	}
+}
+
+// parseV4Prefix reads the length of an IPv4 netblock, from 0 to 32.
+func parseV4Prefix(value string) (int, error) {
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(value)
+	if err != nil || n < 0 || n > ipv4Bits {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotV4Prefix)
+	}
+
+	return n, nil
+}
+
 // parseList splits a comma-separated list and trims the spaces around
 // each item. An empty value is an empty list.
 func parseList(value string) ([]string, error) {
@@ -388,6 +774,23 @@ func parseNetblock(value string) (netip.Prefix, error) {
 	return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen()), nil
 }
 
+// parsePathPrefixes reads a comma-separated list of path prefixes, each
+// starting with /.
+func parsePathPrefixes(value string) ([]string, error) {
+	prefixes, err := parseList(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	for _, prefix := range prefixes {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(prefix, "/") {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", prefix, errNotPathPrefix)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return prefixes, nil
+}
+
 // countryCodes are the two-letter codes ISO 3166-1 assigns today, and XK,
 // the code in common use for Kosovo. golang.org/x/text/language cannot
 // check them: it also takes withdrawn codes such as su, and reserved ones
@@ -444,6 +847,58 @@ func parseCountries(value string) ([]string, error) {
 	return countries, nil
 }
 
+// headerNameChars are the characters RFC 9110 allows in a header name:
+// letters, digits and these marks.
+const headerNameChars = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" +
+	"0123456789!#$%&'*+-.^_`|~"
+
+// IsHeaderName reports whether name can be a header name: one or more of
+// the characters RFC 9110 allows in one.
+func IsHeaderName(name string) bool {
+	if name == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for _, char := range name {
+		if !strings.ContainsRune(headerNameChars, char) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// parseHeaderNames reads a comma-separated list of header names in either
+// case, and returns them in lower case. Host and Transfer-Encoding are
+// refused: Go's HTTP server takes them out of the request's headers.
+func parseHeaderNames(value string) ([]string, error) {
+	items, err := parseList(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	headers := make([]string, 0, len(items))
+
+	for _, item := range items {
+		if !IsHeaderName(item) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errNotHeaderName)
+		}
+
+		header := strings.ToLower(item)
+		switch header {
+		case "host":
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w; the request's host is the field host",
+				item, errHeaderTakenOut)
+		case "transfer-encoding":
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", item, errHeaderTakenOut)
+		}
+
+		headers = append(headers, header)
+	}
+
+	return headers, nil
+}
+
 // parseListenAddr checks an address to listen on: an optional host and a
 // port number.
 func parseListenAddr(value string) (string, error) {
@@ -486,3 +941,64 @@ func parseUpstreamURL(value string) (*url.URL, error) {
 
 	return upstream, nil
 }
+
+// parseLogRemoteURL reads where every log line is also sent:
+// syslog+udp, syslog+tcp or syslog+tls, a host and a port from 1 to
+// 65535, and nothing else.
+func parseLogRemoteURL(value string) (*url.URL, error) {
+	remote, err := url.Parse(value)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLogRemoteURL)
+	}
+
+	schemes := []string{remotelog.SchemeUDP, remotelog.SchemeTCP, remotelog.SchemeTLS}
+	port, err := strconv.ParseUint(remote.Port(), 10, 16)
+
+	onlySchemeHostAndPort := slices.Contains(schemes, remote.Scheme) &&
+		remote.Hostname() != "" && err == nil && port != 0 &&
+		remote.User == nil && remote.Opaque == "" &&
+		(remote.Path == "" || remote.Path == "/") &&
+		remote.RawQuery == "" && remote.Fragment == ""
+	if !onlySchemeHostAndPort {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotLogRemoteURL)
+	}
+
+	return remote, nil
+}
+
+// parseFacility reads the name of a syslog facility, and returns its
+// number, as RFC 5424 numbers them.
+func parseFacility(value string) (int, error) {
+	//nolint:mnd // the facilities' numbers in RFC 5424
+	number, known := map[string]int{
+		"kern": 0, "user": 1, "mail": 2, "daemon": 3, "auth": 4, "syslog": 5,
+		"lpr": 6, "news": 7, "uucp": 8, "cron": 9, "authpriv": 10, "ftp": 11,
+		"local0": 16, "local1": 17, "local2": 18, "local3": 19,
+		"local4": 20, "local5": 21, "local6": 22, "local7": 23,
+	}[value]
+	if !known {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("%q %w", value, errNotFacility)
+	}
+
+	return number, nil
+}
+
+// appNameMaxLength is the most characters RFC 5424 allows in an
+// APP-NAME.
+const appNameMaxLength = 48
+
+// isAppName reports whether value can be an APP-NAME: 1 to
+// appNameMaxLength printable ASCII characters, none of them a space.
+func isAppName(value string) bool {
+	if value == "" || len(value) > appNameMaxLength {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for _, char := range []byte(value) {
+		if char < '!' || char > '~' {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}

internal/config/config_test.go

@@ -2,10 +2,13 @@ package config_test
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"log/slog"
 	"maps"
 	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -18,8 +21,11 @@ import (
 const (
 	listenAddr              = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
 	upstreamURL             = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
+	mode                    = "SWWAF_MODE"
 	trustedProxies          = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
 	clientRequestTimeout    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
+	clientHeaderMaxBytes    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
+	clientIdleTimeout       = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
 	clientResponseTimeout   = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
 	upstreamRequestTimeout  = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
 	upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
@@ -31,8 +37,58 @@ const (
 	rateLimitPerMinute      = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
 	rateLimitPerHour        = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR"
 	rateLimitPerDay         = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
+	rateLimitExemptPaths    = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	deniedCountries         = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
 	allowedCountries        = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
+	banResponse             = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
+	limitBanDuration        = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
+	limitBanRepeatWindow    = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
+	maxBanDuration          = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
+	attackBanDuration       = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
+	maxBans                 = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
+	banScopeV4Prefix        = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
+	stateDir                = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
+	stateWriteDelay         = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
+	stateCounterInterval    = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
+	metricsToken            = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
+	metricsTopN             = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
+	instanceName            = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
+	logRequestHeaders       = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
+	rulesDir                = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
+	rulesEnabled            = "SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED"
+	logRemoteURL            = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL"
+	logRemoteTLSCAFile      = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE"
+	logRemoteBuffer         = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER"
+	logRemoteFacility       = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY"
+	logRemoteAppName        = "SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME"
+)
+
+// defaultLogRequestHeaders is the default of SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS.
+const defaultLogRequestHeaders = "accept,accept-language,accept-encoding," +
+	"content-type,origin,range"
+
+// testCA is a CA certificate, of which only that it reads matters here.
+const testCA = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+`
+
+// token is a token of 32 characters, the shortest allowed.
+const token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+
+// instance is an SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME that is a valid app name too, and
+// remoteURL an SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, for the tests that send the lines.
+const (
+	instance  = "fsn1app1/gitea"
+	remoteURL = "syslog+udp://192.0.2.1:514"
 )
 
 // off switches a timeout, a size limit or a rate limit off.
@@ -66,16 +122,33 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{})
 
 	wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
-		ListenAddr:              ":8080",
-		ClientRequestTimeout:    time.Minute,
-		ClientResponseTimeout:   30 * time.Minute,
-		UpstreamRequestTimeout:  time.Minute,
-		UpstreamResponseTimeout: 30 * time.Minute,
-		RequestMaxBytes:         100 << 20,
-		ResponseMaxBytes:        5 << 30,
-		RateLimitPerMinute:      1000,
-		RateLimitPerHour:        10000,
-		RateLimitPerDay:         50000,
+		ListenAddr:                  ":8080",
+		Observe:                     false,
+		ClientRequestTimeout:        time.Minute,
+		ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: 32 << 10,
+		ClientIdleTimeout:           2 * time.Minute,
+		ClientResponseTimeout:       30 * time.Minute,
+		UpstreamRequestTimeout:      time.Minute,
+		UpstreamResponseTimeout:     30 * time.Minute,
+		RequestMaxBytes:             100 << 20,
+		ResponseMaxBytes:            5 << 30,
+		RateLimitPerMinute:          1000,
+		RateLimitPerHour:            10000,
+		RateLimitPerDay:             50000,
+		BanResponse:                 403,
+		LimitBanDuration:            time.Hour,
+		LimitBanRepeatWindow:        24 * time.Hour,
+		MaxBanDuration:              7 * 24 * time.Hour,
+		AttackBanDuration:           7 * 24 * time.Hour,
+		MaxBans:                     5000,
+		BanScopeV4Prefix:            32,
+		StateDir:                    "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
+		StateWriteDelay:             10 * time.Second,
+		StateCounterInterval:        15 * time.Minute,
+		MetricsToken:                "",
+		MetricsTopN:                 50,
+		RulesDir:                    "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
+		RulesEnabled:                true,
 	})
 
 	if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "http://127.0.0.1:8081" {
@@ -89,6 +162,22 @@ func TestDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	wantNetblocks(t, cfg.DenyNets)
 	wantCountries(t, deniedCountries, cfg.DeniedCountries)
 	wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries)
+
+	hostname, err := os.Hostname()
+	if err != nil || hostname == "" || cfg.InstanceName != hostname {
+		t.Errorf("%s is %q, want the host's name %q (%v)", instanceName,
+			cfg.InstanceName, hostname, err)
+	}
+
+	wantHeaders := strings.Split(defaultLogRequestHeaders, ",")
+	if !slices.Equal(cfg.LogRequestHeaders, wantHeaders) {
+		t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want %v", logRequestHeaders, cfg.LogRequestHeaders,
+			wantHeaders)
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want none", rateLimitExemptPaths, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
@@ -97,8 +186,11 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
 	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
 		listenAddr:              "127.0.0.1:9000",
 		upstreamURL:             "https://app.internal:8443/",
+		mode:                    "observe",
 		trustedProxies:          " 192.0.2.1, 10.1.2.3/8 ,2001:db8::/32",
 		clientRequestTimeout:    "90s",
+		clientHeaderMaxBytes:    "8K",
+		clientIdleTimeout:       "5m",
 		clientResponseTimeout:   "7d",
 		upstreamRequestTimeout:  "1h30m",
 		upstreamResponseTimeout: off,
@@ -112,19 +204,50 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
 		rateLimitPerDay:         "6000",
 		deniedCountries:         "cn, RU,kp,Xk",
 		allowedCountries:        "de",
+		banResponse:             "429",
+		limitBanDuration:        "15m",
+		limitBanRepeatWindow:    "2d",
+		maxBanDuration:          "30d",
+		attackBanDuration:       "1d",
+		maxBans:                 "100",
+		banScopeV4Prefix:        "24",
+		stateDir:                "/srv/waf-state",
+		stateWriteDelay:         "500ms",
+		stateCounterInterval:    "1h",
+		metricsToken:            token,
+		metricsTopN:             "10",
+		rulesDir:                "/srv/waf-rules",
+		rulesEnabled:            "false",
 	})
 
 	wantSettings(t, cfg, config.Config{
-		ListenAddr:              "127.0.0.1:9000",
-		ClientRequestTimeout:    90 * time.Second,
-		ClientResponseTimeout:   7 * 24 * time.Hour,
-		UpstreamRequestTimeout:  90 * time.Minute,
-		UpstreamResponseTimeout: 0,
-		RequestMaxBytes:         512 << 10,
-		ResponseMaxBytes:        1234,
-		RateLimitPerMinute:      60,
-		RateLimitPerHour:        600,
-		RateLimitPerDay:         6000,
+		ListenAddr:                  "127.0.0.1:9000",
+		Observe:                     true,
+		ClientRequestTimeout:        90 * time.Second,
+		ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes: 8 << 10,
+		ClientIdleTimeout:           5 * time.Minute,
+		ClientResponseTimeout:       7 * 24 * time.Hour,
+		UpstreamRequestTimeout:      90 * time.Minute,
+		UpstreamResponseTimeout:     0,
+		RequestMaxBytes:             512 << 10,
+		ResponseMaxBytes:            1234,
+		RateLimitPerMinute:          60,
+		RateLimitPerHour:            600,
+		RateLimitPerDay:             6000,
+		BanResponse:                 429,
+		LimitBanDuration:            15 * time.Minute,
+		LimitBanRepeatWindow:        48 * time.Hour,
+		MaxBanDuration:              30 * 24 * time.Hour,
+		AttackBanDuration:           24 * time.Hour,
+		MaxBans:                     100,
+		BanScopeV4Prefix:            24,
+		StateDir:                    "/srv/waf-state",
+		StateWriteDelay:             500 * time.Millisecond,
+		StateCounterInterval:        time.Hour,
+		MetricsToken:                token,
+		MetricsTopN:                 10,
+		RulesDir:                    "/srv/waf-rules",
+		RulesEnabled:                false,
 	})
 
 	if cfg.UpstreamURL.String() != "https://app.internal:8443/" {
@@ -139,6 +262,216 @@ func TestValuesAsSet(t *testing.T) {
 	wantCountries(t, allowedCountries, cfg.ExclusivelyAllowedCountries, "DE")
 }
 
+func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/, /favicon.ico"})
+
+	if !slices.Equal(cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths, []string{"/assets/", "/favicon.ico"}) {
+		t.Errorf("%s gave %v, want /assets/ and /favicon.ico",
+			rateLimitExemptPaths, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPathPrefixNotStartingWithSlashStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := config.FromEnvironment(
+		environment{rateLimitExemptPaths: "/favicon.ico,assets/"}.lookupEnv)
+
+	want := rateLimitExemptPaths + `: "assets/" is not a path prefix ` +
+		`starting with /, such as /assets/`
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInstanceNameAndLoggedHeadersAsSet(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
+		instanceName:      "fsn1app1/gitea",
+		logRequestHeaders: " Accept , X-Custom",
+	})
+
+	if cfg.InstanceName != "fsn1app1/gitea" ||
+		!slices.Equal(cfg.LogRequestHeaders, []string{"accept", "x-custom"}) {
+		t.Errorf("%s is %q and %s gives %v", instanceName, cfg.InstanceName,
+			logRequestHeaders, cfg.LogRequestHeaders)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoteLogSettingsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{instanceName: instance})
+
+	if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil || cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs != nil ||
+		cfg.LogRemoteBuffer != 10000 || cfg.LogRemoteFacility != 16 ||
+		cfg.LogRemoteAppName != instance {
+		t.Errorf("remote log settings %v, %v, %d, %d and %q, want no URL, no "+
+			"certificates, 10000, 16 and %s's %s", cfg.LogRemoteURL,
+			cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs, cfg.LogRemoteBuffer, cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
+			cfg.LogRemoteAppName, instanceName, instance)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoteLogSettingsAsSet(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	caFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ca.pem")
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(caFile, []byte(testCA), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", caFile, err)
+	}
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{
+		logRemoteURL:       "syslog+tls://logs.example:6514",
+		logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile,
+		logRemoteBuffer:    "500",
+		logRemoteFacility:  "daemon",
+		logRemoteAppName:   instance,
+	})
+
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
+	roots.AppendCertsFromPEM([]byte(testCA))
+
+	if cfg.LogRemoteURL.String() != "syslog+tls://logs.example:6514" ||
+		!roots.Equal(cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs) || cfg.LogRemoteBuffer != 500 ||
+		cfg.LogRemoteFacility != 3 || cfg.LogRemoteAppName != instance {
+		t.Errorf("remote log settings %v, %v, %d, %d and %q", cfg.LogRemoteURL,
+			cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs, cfg.LogRemoteBuffer, cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
+			cfg.LogRemoteAppName)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoteLogURLForms(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, value := range []string{
+		"syslog+udp://192.0.2.1:514",
+		"syslog+tcp://[2001:db8::1]:514",
+		"syslog+tls://logs.example:6514/",
+	} {
+		cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logRemoteURL: value})
+		if cfg.LogRemoteURL.String() != value {
+			t.Errorf("%s read as %v", value, cfg.LogRemoteURL)
+		}
+	}
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logRemoteURL: ""})
+	if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
+		t.Errorf("set but empty, %s read as %v", logRemoteURL, cfg.LogRemoteURL)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoteLogFacilitiesByNumber(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for name, number := range map[string]int{
+		"kern": 0, "user": 1, "auth": 4, "authpriv": 10, "ftp": 11,
+		"local0": 16, "local5": 21, "local7": 23,
+	} {
+		cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{logRemoteFacility: name})
+		if cfg.LogRemoteFacility != number {
+			t.Errorf("%s read as %d, want %d", name, cfg.LogRemoteFacility, number)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInvalidRemoteLogSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value string }{
+		{logRemoteURL, "logs.example:514"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog://logs.example:514"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "http://logs.example:514"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+udp://logs.example"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://:514"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://logs.example:0"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tls://logs.example:65536"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tls://user@logs.example:6514"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://logs.example:514/app"},
+		{logRemoteURL, "syslog+tcp://logs.example:514?tls=1"},
+		{logRemoteTLSCAFile, "/nonexistent/ca.pem"},
+		{logRemoteBuffer, off}, {logRemoteBuffer, "0"}, {logRemoteBuffer, "10K"},
+		{logRemoteFacility, "local8"}, {logRemoteFacility, "LOCAL0"},
+		{logRemoteFacility, "16"}, {logRemoteFacility, ""},
+		{logRemoteAppName, ""}, {logRemoteAppName, "my app"},
+		{logRemoteAppName, "gitéa"}, {logRemoteAppName, strings.Repeat("a", 49)},
+	} {
+		_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{tc.name: tc.value}.lookupEnv)
+		if err == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), tc.name+": ") {
+			t.Errorf("%s=%q: error %v, want one naming it", tc.name, tc.value, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoteLogCAFileWithoutCertificateStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	caFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ca.pem")
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(caFile, []byte("not a certificate\n"), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", caFile, err)
+	}
+
+	_, err = config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRemoteTLSCAFile: caFile}.lookupEnv)
+
+	want := logRemoteTLSCAFile + `: "` + caFile + `" holds no PEM certificate`
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestInstanceNameNotAnAppNameStopsTheStartOnlyWhileSending(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const spaced = "fsn1 app1"
+
+	sending := environment{logRemoteURL: remoteURL, instanceName: spaced}
+
+	_, err := config.FromEnvironment(sending.lookupEnv)
+
+	want := logRemoteAppName + `: is unset, and ` + instanceName +
+		` "fsn1 app1", its default, is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII characters ` +
+		`without a space, such as gitea`
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+	}
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{instanceName: spaced})
+	if cfg.LogRemoteAppName != spaced {
+		t.Errorf("not sending, %s is %q", logRemoteAppName, cfg.LogRemoteAppName)
+	}
+
+	sending[logRemoteAppName] = instance
+
+	cfg = fromEnvironment(t, sending)
+	if cfg.LogRemoteAppName != instance {
+		t.Errorf("set to %s, %s is %q", instance, logRemoteAppName,
+			cfg.LogRemoteAppName)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAppNameSetStopsTheStartWhileSending(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{
+		logRemoteURL:     remoteURL,
+		instanceName:     instance,
+		logRemoteAppName: "my app",
+	}.lookupEnv)
+
+	want := logRemoteAppName + `: "my app" is not 1 to 48 printable ASCII ` +
+		`characters without a space, such as gitea`
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCodeOnBothCountryListsStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -163,12 +496,42 @@ func TestSizesAndOff(t *testing.T) {
 		requestMaxBytes:      "3G",
 		responseMaxBytes:     off,
 		clientRequestTimeout: off,
+		clientIdleTimeout:    off,
 	})
 
 	if cfg.RequestMaxBytes != 3<<30 || cfg.ResponseMaxBytes != 0 ||
-		cfg.ClientRequestTimeout != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("3G, off and off read as %d, %d and %s",
-			cfg.RequestMaxBytes, cfg.ResponseMaxBytes, cfg.ClientRequestTimeout)
+		cfg.ClientRequestTimeout != 0 || cfg.ClientIdleTimeout != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("3G, off, off and off read as %d, %d, %s and %s",
+			cfg.RequestMaxBytes, cfg.ResponseMaxBytes, cfg.ClientRequestTimeout,
+			cfg.ClientIdleTimeout)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestHeaderMaxBytesJustOver4K(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{clientHeaderMaxBytes: "4097"})
+	if cfg.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes != 4097 {
+		t.Errorf("4097 read as %d", cfg.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestHeaderMaxBytesRefusalNeverOffersOff(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, value := range []string{"32KB", "0", "4K", off} {
+		t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			_, err := config.FromEnvironment(
+				environment{clientHeaderMaxBytes: value}.lookupEnv)
+
+			want := clientHeaderMaxBytes + `: "` + value +
+				`" is not a size of more than 4K, such as 32K`
+			if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+				t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+			}
+		})
 	}
 }
 
@@ -188,6 +551,15 @@ func TestRateLimitsOff(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestBanResponseCloseIsZero(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{banResponse: "close"})
+	if cfg.BanResponse != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("close read as %d, want 0", cfg.BanResponse)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -200,10 +572,8 @@ func TestTrustedProxiesSetButEmptyTrustNothing(t *testing.T) {
 func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	for _, tc := range []struct{ name, value string }{
-		{listenAddr, "8080"},
-		{listenAddr, ":http"},
-		{listenAddr, ":65536"},
+	wantStartStopped(t, []struct{ name, value string }{
+		{listenAddr, "8080"}, {listenAddr, ":http"}, {listenAddr, ":65536"},
 		{upstreamURL, "127.0.0.1:8081"},
 		{upstreamURL, "ftp://127.0.0.1:8081"},
 		{upstreamURL, "http://"},
@@ -213,6 +583,7 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 		{upstreamURL, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/app"},
 		{upstreamURL, "http://127.0.0.1:8081/?a=1"},
 		{upstreamURL, "http://user:secret@127.0.0.1:8081"},
+		{mode, "Observe"}, {mode, "block"}, {mode, ""},
 		{trustedProxies, "10.0.0.0/33"},
 		{trustedProxies, "traefik"},
 		{trustedProxies, "10.0.0.0/8,,192.168.0.0/16"},
@@ -220,8 +591,9 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 		{allowNets, "192.0.2.0/24,monitoring"},
 		{rateLimitExemptNets, "2001:db8::/129"},
 		{denyNets, "198.51.100.0/24,"},
-		{clientRequestTimeout, "60"},
-		{clientRequestTimeout, ""},
+		{clientRequestTimeout, "60"}, {clientRequestTimeout, ""},
+		{clientIdleTimeout, "0s"},
+		{clientIdleTimeout, "2 minutes"},
 		{clientResponseTimeout, "1y"},
 		{upstreamRequestTimeout, "-1s"},
 		{upstreamResponseTimeout, "0s"},
@@ -236,8 +608,8 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 		{rateLimitPerMinute, "1K"},
 		{rateLimitPerHour, "0"},
 		{rateLimitPerHour, "1.5"},
-		{rateLimitPerDay, "-1"},
-		{rateLimitPerDay, "lots"},
+		{rateLimitPerDay, "-1"}, {rateLimitPerDay, "lots"},
+		{rateLimitExemptPaths, "/assets/,,/static/"},
 		{deniedCountries, "nk"},
 		{deniedCountries, "kp,,ir"},
 		{deniedCountries, "prk"},
@@ -250,7 +622,37 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 		{allowedCountries, "uk"},
 		{allowedCountries, "zz"},
 		{allowedCountries, "de,germany"},
-	} {
+		{metricsTopN, off}, {metricsTopN, "0"}, {metricsTopN, "-1"},
+		{logRequestHeaders, "accept,,origin"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept;origin"},
+		{logRequestHeaders, "accept language"}, {logRequestHeaders, "x-foo:"},
+		{logRequestHeaders, "host"}, {logRequestHeaders, "accept,Host"},
+		{logRequestHeaders, "transfer-encoding"}, {logRequestHeaders, "TRANSFER-ENCODING"},
+		{rulesEnabled, "yes"}, {rulesEnabled, "True"},
+	})
+}
+
+func TestInvalidBanOrStateValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	wantStartStopped(t, []struct{ name, value string }{
+		{banResponse, "404"}, {banResponse, "drop"}, {banResponse, ""},
+		{limitBanDuration, off}, {limitBanDuration, "0s"}, {limitBanDuration, "1"},
+		{limitBanRepeatWindow, off}, {limitBanRepeatWindow, "-1h"},
+		{maxBanDuration, off}, {maxBanDuration, "1w"}, {attackBanDuration, off},
+		{maxBans, off}, {maxBans, "0"}, {maxBans, "5K"},
+		{banScopeV4Prefix, "33"}, {banScopeV4Prefix, "-1"}, {banScopeV4Prefix, "/24"},
+		{stateDir, ""}, {stateDir, "state"}, {stateDir, "./var/lib/smallwebwaf"},
+		{stateWriteDelay, off}, {stateWriteDelay, "0s"},
+		{stateCounterInterval, off}, {stateCounterInterval, "15"},
+	})
+}
+
+// wantStartStopped checks that each setting, set to its value, stops the
+// start with an error that names the setting.
+func wantStartStopped(t *testing.T, invalid []struct{ name, value string }) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for _, tc := range invalid {
 		t.Run(tc.name+"="+tc.value, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 
@@ -266,6 +668,60 @@ func TestInvalidValueStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestHostOrTransferEncodingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Only Host's message points to the field host.
+	for value, want := range map[string]string{
+		"Host": `"Host" is taken out of every request by Go's HTTP server, ` +
+			"so it can never be logged; the request's host is the field host",
+		"transfer-encoding": `"transfer-encoding" is taken out of every ` +
+			"request by Go's HTTP server, so it can never be logged",
+	} {
+		t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{logRequestHeaders: value}.lookupEnv)
+			if err == nil || err.Error() != logRequestHeaders+": "+want {
+				t.Errorf("error %v, want %s: %s", err, logRequestHeaders, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestShortTokenStopsTheStartWithoutShowingIt(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Characters are counted, not bytes: each é takes two.
+	for _, value := range []string{"", token[1:], strings.Repeat("é", 31)} {
+		t.Run(value, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			_, err := config.FromEnvironment(environment{metricsToken: value}.lookupEnv)
+
+			want := metricsToken + ": is shorter than 32 characters"
+			if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+				t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTokenIsLoggedMasked(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	cfg := fromEnvironment(t, environment{metricsToken: token})
+
+	var out bytes.Buffer
+
+	slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&out, nil)).Info("starting", "settings", cfg)
+
+	if strings.Contains(out.String(), token) ||
+		!strings.Contains(out.String(), `"`+metricsToken+`":"********"`) {
+		t.Errorf("the token is not logged masked: %s", out.String())
+	}
+}
+
 func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -284,11 +740,16 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("decode %s: %v", out.Bytes(), err)
 	}
 
+	hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
+
 	want := map[string]string{
 		listenAddr:              ":8080",
 		upstreamURL:             "http://127.0.0.1:8081",
+		mode:                    "enforce",
 		trustedProxies:          "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
 		clientRequestTimeout:    "45s",
+		clientHeaderMaxBytes:    "32K",
+		clientIdleTimeout:       "120s",
 		clientResponseTimeout:   "30m",
 		upstreamRequestTimeout:  "60s",
 		upstreamResponseTimeout: "30m",
@@ -300,8 +761,30 @@ func TestLogsEachSettingWithItsValue(t *testing.T) {
 		rateLimitPerMinute:      "1000",
 		rateLimitPerHour:        "10000",
 		rateLimitPerDay:         "50000",
+		rateLimitExemptPaths:    "",
 		deniedCountries:         "",
 		allowedCountries:        "",
+		banResponse:             "403",
+		limitBanDuration:        "1h",
+		limitBanRepeatWindow:    "24h",
+		maxBanDuration:          "7d",
+		attackBanDuration:       "7d",
+		maxBans:                 "5000",
+		banScopeV4Prefix:        "32",
+		stateDir:                "/var/lib/smallwebwaf",
+		stateWriteDelay:         "10s",
+		stateCounterInterval:    "15m",
+		metricsToken:            "",
+		metricsTopN:             "50",
+		instanceName:            hostname,
+		logRequestHeaders:       defaultLogRequestHeaders,
+		rulesDir:                "/etc/smallwebwaf/rules.d",
+		rulesEnabled:            "true",
+		logRemoteURL:            "",
+		logRemoteTLSCAFile:      "",
+		logRemoteBuffer:         "10000",
+		logRemoteFacility:       "local0",
+		logRemoteAppName:        hostname,
 	}
 	if !maps.Equal(line.Settings, want) {
 		t.Errorf("logged settings\n%v\nwant\n%v", line.Settings, want)
@@ -313,7 +796,10 @@ func wantSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	if got.ListenAddr != want.ListenAddr ||
+		got.Observe != want.Observe ||
 		got.ClientRequestTimeout != want.ClientRequestTimeout ||
+		got.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes != want.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes ||
+		got.ClientIdleTimeout != want.ClientIdleTimeout ||
 		got.ClientResponseTimeout != want.ClientResponseTimeout ||
 		got.UpstreamRequestTimeout != want.UpstreamRequestTimeout ||
 		got.UpstreamResponseTimeout != want.UpstreamResponseTimeout ||
@@ -324,6 +810,40 @@ func wantSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
 		got.RateLimitPerDay != want.RateLimitPerDay {
 		t.Errorf("settings\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
 	}
+
+	wantBanSettings(t, got, want)
+}
+
+// wantBanSettings checks the settings for bans, the state files, the
+// metrics and the rule files.
+func wantBanSettings(t *testing.T, got *config.Config, want config.Config) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if got.BanResponse != want.BanResponse ||
+		got.LimitBanDuration != want.LimitBanDuration ||
+		got.LimitBanRepeatWindow != want.LimitBanRepeatWindow ||
+		got.MaxBanDuration != want.MaxBanDuration ||
+		got.AttackBanDuration != want.AttackBanDuration ||
+		got.MaxBans != want.MaxBans ||
+		got.BanScopeV4Prefix != want.BanScopeV4Prefix {
+		t.Errorf("ban settings\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+	}
+
+	if got.RulesDir != want.RulesDir || got.RulesEnabled != want.RulesEnabled {
+		t.Errorf("rule files in %q, on: %t, want %q, %t",
+			got.RulesDir, got.RulesEnabled, want.RulesDir, want.RulesEnabled)
+	}
+
+	if got.StateDir != want.StateDir ||
+		got.StateWriteDelay != want.StateWriteDelay ||
+		got.StateCounterInterval != want.StateCounterInterval {
+		t.Errorf("state settings\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+	}
+
+	if got.MetricsToken != want.MetricsToken || got.MetricsTopN != want.MetricsTopN {
+		t.Errorf("metrics token %q and top %d, want %q and %d",
+			got.MetricsToken, got.MetricsTopN, want.MetricsToken, want.MetricsTopN)
+	}
 }
 
 // wantNetblocks checks a list of netblocks.

internal/lookup/export_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+package lookup
+
+import "net/http"
+
+// SetTransport has g's requests to GeoJS go through transport instead of
+// the network.
+func (g *GeoJS) SetTransport(transport http.RoundTripper) {
+	g.httpClient.Transport = transport
+}

internal/lookup/lookup.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // Package lookup looks up each client's country through the GeoJS web
 // service, and keeps the answers in memory, for at most 100,000 clients
-// and for 7 days each.
+// and for 7 days each. The answers are written to lookups.json and read
+// from it by the state package.
 package lookup
 
 import (
@@ -12,11 +13,13 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/simplelru"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 )
 
 // URL is GeoJS's country endpoint. Asked about several addresses at once,
@@ -62,6 +65,9 @@ type Params struct {
 	Now func() time.Time
 	// ProcessLog receives GeoJS's failures.
 	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
+	// Metrics count the requests to GeoJS, those that failed, and the
+	// clients that go without an answer.
+	Metrics *metrics.Metrics
 }
 
 // GeoJS looks up clients' countries through GeoJS. At most one request
@@ -71,12 +77,13 @@ type GeoJS struct {
 	url        string
 	now        func() time.Time
 	processLog *slog.Logger
+	metrics    *metrics.Metrics
 	// httpClient follows no redirect, so that visitors' addresses go to
 	// GeoJS alone: a redirect is a failure.
 	httpClient *http.Client
 
 	mu      sync.Mutex
-	answers *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, answer]
+	answers *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *Answer]
 	// waiting are the clients without an answer: those to ask GeoJS about,
 	// and those it is being asked about.
 	waiting map[netip.Prefix]*wait
@@ -88,11 +95,14 @@ type GeoJS struct {
 	retryAt    time.Time
 }
 
-// answer is what GeoJS said about a client: its country, "" when GeoJS
-// cannot place it, and when GeoJS said so.
-type answer struct {
-	country  string
-	received time.Time
+// Answer is what GeoJS said about a client, as lookups.json holds it: its
+// country, "" when GeoJS cannot place it, when GeoJS said so, and when
+// the answer was last used.
+type Answer struct {
+	Client   netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
+	Country  string       `json:"country"`
+	Answered time.Time    `json:"answered"`
+	Used     time.Time    `json:"used"`
 }
 
 // wait is a client waiting for its answer.
@@ -107,7 +117,7 @@ type wait struct {
 
 // New returns a GeoJS with no answer kept yet.
 func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
-	answers, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, answer](maxAnswers, nil)
+	answers, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *Answer](maxAnswers, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
 	}
@@ -116,6 +126,7 @@ func New(params Params) *GeoJS {
 		url:        params.URL,
 		now:        params.Now,
 		processLog: params.ProcessLog,
+		metrics:    params.Metrics,
 		httpClient: &http.Client{
 			CheckRedirect: func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
 				return http.ErrUseLastResponse
@@ -155,6 +166,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Country(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) string {
 	defer g.mu.Unlock()
 
 	country, found := g.kept(client)
+	if !found {
+		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+	}
 
 	w, waiting := g.waiting[client]
 	if !found && waiting {
@@ -164,6 +178,49 @@ func (g *GeoJS) Country(ctx context.Context, client netip.Prefix) string {
 	return country
 }
 
+// Snapshot returns every answer kept, sorted by client, as lookups.json
+// lists them.
+func (g *GeoJS) Snapshot() []Answer {
+	g.mu.Lock()
+
+	answers := make([]Answer, 0, g.answers.Len())
+	for _, kept := range g.answers.Values() {
+		answers = append(answers, *kept)
+	}
+
+	g.mu.Unlock()
+
+	slices.SortFunc(answers, func(a, b Answer) int {
+		return a.Client.Compare(b.Client)
+	})
+
+	return answers
+}
+
+// Load keeps answers read from lookups.json, in place of the answers it
+// keeps, in the order they were last used, so that the one used longest
+// ago is dropped first. Answers GeoJS gave keepFor ago or more are
+// dropped.
+func (g *GeoJS) Load(answers []Answer) {
+	answers = slices.Clone(answers)
+	slices.SortStableFunc(answers, func(a, b Answer) int {
+		return a.Used.Compare(b.Used)
+	})
+
+	g.mu.Lock()
+	defer g.mu.Unlock()
+
+	g.answers.Purge()
+
+	now := g.now()
+
+	for _, answer := range answers {
+		if now.Sub(answer.Answered) < keepFor {
+			g.answers.Add(answer.Client, &answer)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 // answerOrWait returns client's kept answer if it has one. Otherwise it
 // puts the client among those waiting if there is room, has GeoJS asked
 // about them if it can be, and returns what to wait on for the answer, or
@@ -188,6 +245,8 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
 	g.ask(ctx)
 
 	if w == nil {
+		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+
 		return "", nil // too many clients wait already
 	}
 
@@ -197,21 +256,27 @@ func (g *GeoJS) answerOrWait(
 	}
 
 	if w.late {
+		g.metrics.GeoJSUnanswered.Inc()
+
 		return "", nil
 	}
 
 	return "", w.asked
 }
 
-// kept returns client's answer, if one was received less than keepFor
-// ago.
+// kept returns client's answer, if GeoJS gave it less than keepFor ago,
+// and notes that it was used.
 func (g *GeoJS) kept(client netip.Prefix) (string, bool) {
+	now := g.now()
+
 	kept, found := g.answers.Get(client)
-	if !found || g.now().Sub(kept.received) >= keepFor {
+	if !found || now.Sub(kept.Answered) >= keepFor {
 		return "", false
 	}
 
-	return kept.country, true
+	kept.Used = now
+
+	return kept.Country, true
 }
 
 // ask starts asking GeoJS about the waiting clients, unless a request to
@@ -293,7 +358,9 @@ func (g *GeoJS) keep(
 			continue
 		}
 
-		g.answers.Add(client, answer{country: country, received: now})
+		g.answers.Add(client, &Answer{
+			Client: client, Country: country, Answered: now, Used: now,
+		})
 		close(g.waiting[client].asked)
 		delete(g.waiting, client)
 	}
@@ -303,6 +370,8 @@ func (g *GeoJS) keep(
 	}
 
 	if err != nil {
+		g.metrics.GeoJSFailures.Inc()
+
 		g.retryDelay = min(max(retryDelayFactor*g.retryDelay, firstRetryDelay),
 			maxRetryDelay)
 		g.retryAt = now.Add(g.retryDelay)
@@ -347,6 +416,8 @@ func (g *GeoJS) request(
 
 	req.URL.RawQuery = "ip=" + strings.Join(addrs, ",")
 
+	g.metrics.GeoJSRequests.Inc()
+
 	res, err := g.httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		// Do's error names the URL, and so the visitors' addresses, which

internal/lookup/lookup_test.go

@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/testutil"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -26,80 +29,87 @@ const (
 	leftOut = "203.0.113.7"
 	// timeout is how long a new client waits for its answer.
 	timeout = time.Second
-	// waitLimit bounds how long a test waits for what should happen.
-	waitLimit = 10 * time.Second
-	// pollInterval is how often a test looks again.
-	pollInterval = 10 * time.Millisecond
 	// week is how long an answer is kept.
 	week = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
 )
 
+// The tests that have GeoJS asked run in a synctest bubble, where the time
+// package runs on a clock of the test's own: a wait lasts exactly as long
+// as it should, however slowly the test process runs, and synctest.Wait
+// returns once g has done all it can before time passes. The stand-in for
+// GeoJS answers without the network, since a request waiting on the
+// network would keep that clock from moving on.
+
 func TestKeptAnswerIsUsedFor7DaysThenAskedAgain(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, clock, g := start(t)
-	placed := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
-	notPlaced := netip.MustParsePrefix(unplaced + "/32")
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
+		placed := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+		notPlaced := netip.MustParsePrefix(unplaced + "/32")
 
-	wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
-	wantCountry(t, g, notPlaced, "")
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 2)
+		wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
+		wantCountry(t, g, notPlaced, "")
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 2)
 
-	// An answer without a country is kept too.
-	clock.advance(week - time.Second)
-	wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
-	wantCountry(t, g, notPlaced, "")
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 2)
+		// An answer without a country is kept too.
+		clock.advance(week - time.Second)
+		wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
+		wantCountry(t, g, notPlaced, "")
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 2)
 
-	clock.advance(time.Second)
-	wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 3)
-	wantAsked(t, geojs, 2, "203.0.113.9")
+		clock.advance(time.Second)
+		wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 3)
+		wantAsked(t, geojs, 2, "203.0.113.9")
+	})
 }
 
 func TestNewClientWaitsAtMostOneSecondThenCountsAsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, clock, g := start(t)
-	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
+		client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
 
-	// The client comes while GeoJS is asked about an earlier client, which
-	// it answers most of a second later. It is then asked about the client
-	// and does not answer: that request is abandoned a second after it
-	// began, well after the client's wait is over.
-	geojs.set(answeringSlowly)
+		// The client comes while GeoJS is asked about an earlier client, which
+		// it answers most of a second later. It is then asked about the client
+		// and does not answer: that request is abandoned a second after it
+		// began, well after the client's wait is over.
+		geojs.set(answeringSlowly)
 
-	var earlier sync.WaitGroup
+		var earlier sync.WaitGroup
 
-	earlier.Go(func() { g.Country(t.Context(), netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")) })
-	defer earlier.Wait()
+		earlier.Go(func() { g.Country(t.Context(), netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")) })
+		defer earlier.Wait()
 
-	waitForRequests(t, geojs, 1)
-	geojs.set(hanging)
+		waitForRequests(t, geojs, 1)
+		geojs.set(hanging)
 
-	began := time.Now()
+		began := time.Now()
 
-	wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
+		wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
 
-	took := time.Since(began)
-	if took < timeout || took > timeout+timeout/2 {
-		t.Errorf("waited %s for the answer, want %s", took, timeout)
-	}
+		took := time.Since(began)
+		if took != timeout {
+			t.Errorf("waited %s for the answer, want %s", took, timeout)
+		}
 
-	// Its next request does not wait.
-	began = time.Now()
+		// Its next request does not wait.
+		began = time.Now()
 
-	wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
+		wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
 
-	took = time.Since(began)
-	if took > timeout/2 {
-		t.Errorf("waited %s again, want no wait", took)
-	}
+		took = time.Since(began)
+		if took != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("waited %s again, want no wait", took)
+		}
 
-	// Once GeoJS answers, the client is asked about again in the
-	// background, and has its country.
-	geojs.set(answering)
-	waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
+		// Once GeoJS answers, the client is asked about again in the
+		// background, and has its country.
+		geojs.set(answering)
+		waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
+	})
 }
 
 func TestAddressLeftOutOfAnAnswerIsAskedAboutAgain(t *testing.T) {
@@ -118,33 +128,35 @@ func TestAddressLeftOutOfAnAnswerIsAskedAboutAgain(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Parallel()
 
-			geojs, clock, g := start(t)
-			other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
-			client := netip.MustParsePrefix(leftOut + "/32")
+			synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+				geojs, clock, g := start()
+				other := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32")
+				client := netip.MustParsePrefix(leftOut + "/32")
 
-			// GeoJS fails, and is left alone for a second while the client
-			// comes too, so that the next request asks about both.
-			geojs.set(failing)
-			wantCountry(t, g, other, "")
-			wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
+				// GeoJS fails, and is left alone for a second while the client
+				// comes too, so that the next request asks about both.
+				geojs.set(failing)
+				wantCountry(t, g, other, "")
+				wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
 
-			geojs.set(tc.answers)
-			clock.advance(time.Second)
-			wantCountry(t, g, other, "")
-			waitForRequests(t, geojs, 2)
+				geojs.set(tc.answers)
+				clock.advance(time.Second)
+				wantCountry(t, g, other, "")
+				waitForRequests(t, geojs, 2)
 
-			// The answer counts as a failure, and the client is asked about
-			// again, with the other client only if the answer left it out too.
-			geojs.set(answering)
-			waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
-			wantCountry(t, g, other, germany)
-			wantRequests(t, geojs, 3)
+				// The answer counts as a failure, and the client is asked about
+				// again, with the other client only if the answer left it out too.
+				geojs.set(answering)
+				waitForCountry(t, g, clock, client, germany)
+				wantCountry(t, g, other, germany)
+				wantRequests(t, geojs, 3)
 
-			if tc.named {
-				wantAsked(t, geojs, 2, leftOut)
-			} else {
-				wantAsked(t, geojs, 2, leftOut, "203.0.113.1")
-			}
+				if tc.named {
+					wantAsked(t, geojs, 2, leftOut)
+				} else {
+					wantAsked(t, geojs, 2, leftOut, "203.0.113.1")
+				}
+			})
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -152,173 +164,225 @@ func TestAddressLeftOutOfAnAnswerIsAskedAboutAgain(t *testing.T) {
 func TestRedirectCountsAsFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, _, g := start(t)
-	geojs.set(redirecting)
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, _, g := start()
+		geojs.set(redirecting)
 
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), "")
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 1)
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), "")
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 1)
+	})
 }
 
 func TestCountryIsKeptInCapitals(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, _, g := start(t)
-	geojs.set(answeringInLowerCase)
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, _, g := start()
+		geojs.set(answeringInLowerCase)
 
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), germany)
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), germany)
+	})
 }
 
 func TestFailureIsLoggedWithoutTheAddressesAskedAbout(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	var log strings.Builder
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		var log strings.Builder
 
-	// Nothing listens on port 1, so asking GeoJS fails.
-	g := lookup.New(lookup.Params{
-		URL:        "http://127.0.0.1:1",
-		Now:        time.Now,
-		ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&log, nil)),
+		// GeoJS does not answer, so the request to it is abandoned, and fails.
+		geojs := &standIn{answers: hanging}
+		g := lookup.New(lookup.Params{
+			URL:        lookup.URL,
+			Now:        time.Now,
+			ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&log, nil)),
+			Metrics:    metrics.New(1),
+		})
+		g.SetTransport(geojs)
+
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), "")
+		synctest.Wait()
+
+		logged := log.String()
+		if !strings.Contains(logged, "asking GeoJS failed") ||
+			strings.Contains(logged, "203.0.113.9") {
+			t.Errorf("logged %q, want the failure without the address asked about", logged)
+		}
 	})
-
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"), "")
-
-	logged := log.String()
-	if !strings.Contains(logged, "asking GeoJS failed") ||
-		strings.Contains(logged, "203.0.113.9") {
-		t.Errorf("logged %q, want the failure without the address asked about", logged)
-	}
 }
 
 func TestWaitingClientsAreAskedAboutInOneRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, clock, g := start(t)
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
 
-	// GeoJS fails, and is then left alone for a second, while three more
-	// clients come. An IPv6 client is a /64, and GeoJS is asked about its
-	// first address.
-	geojs.set(failing)
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), "")
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32"), "")
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8:1:2::/64"), "")
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 1)
+		// GeoJS fails, and is then left alone for a second, while three more
+		// clients come. An IPv6 client is a /64, and GeoJS is asked about its
+		// first address.
+		geojs.set(failing)
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.1/32"), "")
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.2/32"), "")
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8:1:2::/64"), "")
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 1)
 
-	geojs.set(answering)
-	clock.advance(time.Second)
-	wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32"), germany)
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 2)
-	wantAsked(t, geojs, 1, "203.0.113.1", "203.0.113.2", "2001:db8:1:2::", "203.0.113.3")
+		geojs.set(answering)
+		clock.advance(time.Second)
+		wantCountry(t, g, netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.3/32"), germany)
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 2)
+		wantAsked(t, geojs, 1, "203.0.113.1", "203.0.113.2", "2001:db8:1:2::", "203.0.113.3")
+	})
 }
 
 func TestKeptAnswersUnaffectedWhileGeoJSFailsAndAskedAgainWithBackoff(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, clock, g := start(t)
-	clients := newClients()
-	kept := clients()
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
+		clients := newClients()
+		kept := clients()
 
-	wantCountry(t, g, kept, germany)
-
-	geojs.set(failing)
-	wantCountry(t, g, kept, germany)
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, 1)
-
-	// Each failure leaves GeoJS alone twice as long as the one before, up
-	// to five minutes. New clients meanwhile count as not found, and the
-	// client with a kept answer still gets its country, without GeoJS being
-	// asked.
-	requests := 1
-
-	for _, delay := range []time.Duration{
-		time.Second, 2 * time.Second, 4 * time.Second, 8 * time.Second,
-		16 * time.Second, 32 * time.Second, 64 * time.Second, 128 * time.Second,
-		256 * time.Second, 5 * time.Minute, 5 * time.Minute,
-	} {
-		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-
-		requests++
-		wantRequests(t, geojs, requests)
-
-		clock.advance(delay - time.Millisecond)
-		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
 		wantCountry(t, g, kept, germany)
-		wantRequests(t, geojs, requests)
 
-		clock.advance(time.Millisecond)
-	}
+		geojs.set(failing)
+		wantCountry(t, g, kept, germany)
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, 1)
 
-	// Once GeoJS answers again, it is asked about every client waiting.
-	geojs.set(answering)
-	wantCountry(t, g, clients(), germany)
-	wantRequests(t, geojs, requests+1)
+		// Each failure leaves GeoJS alone twice as long as the one before, up
+		// to five minutes. New clients meanwhile count as not found, and the
+		// client with a kept answer still gets its country, without GeoJS being
+		// asked.
+		requests := 1
 
-	asked := waitForRequests(t, geojs, requests+1)
-	if len(asked[requests]) != 23 {
-		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %d clients, want 23", len(asked[requests]))
-	}
+		for _, delay := range []time.Duration{
+			time.Second, 2 * time.Second, 4 * time.Second, 8 * time.Second,
+			16 * time.Second, 32 * time.Second, 64 * time.Second, 128 * time.Second,
+			256 * time.Second, 5 * time.Minute, 5 * time.Minute,
+		} {
+			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
+
+			requests++
+			wantRequests(t, geojs, requests)
+
+			clock.advance(delay - time.Millisecond)
+			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
+			wantCountry(t, g, kept, germany)
+			wantRequests(t, geojs, requests)
+
+			clock.advance(time.Millisecond)
+		}
+
+		// Once GeoJS answers again, it is asked about every client waiting.
+		geojs.set(answering)
+		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), germany)
+		wantRequests(t, geojs, requests+1)
+
+		asked := waitForRequests(t, geojs, requests+1)
+		if len(asked[requests]) != 23 {
+			t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %d clients, want 23", len(asked[requests]))
+		}
+	})
 }
 
 func TestAtMost200AddressesInOneRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, clock, g := start(t)
-	clients := newClients()
-	first := clients()
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
+		clients := newClients()
+		first := clients()
 
-	// 201 clients wait while GeoJS is left alone after a failure.
-	geojs.set(failing)
-	wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
+		// 201 clients wait while GeoJS is left alone after a failure.
+		geojs.set(failing)
+		wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
 
-	for range 200 {
-		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-	}
+		for range 200 {
+			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
+		}
 
-	// The first one's next request has GeoJS asked again.
-	geojs.set(answering)
-	clock.advance(time.Second)
-	wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
+		// The first one's next request has GeoJS asked again.
+		geojs.set(answering)
+		clock.advance(time.Second)
+		wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
 
-	asked := waitForRequests(t, geojs, 3)
-	if len(asked[1]) != 200 || len(asked[2]) != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %d and then %d clients, want 200 and 1",
-			len(asked[1]), len(asked[2]))
-	}
+		asked := waitForRequests(t, geojs, 3)
+		if len(asked[1]) != 200 || len(asked[2]) != 1 {
+			t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %d and then %d clients, want 200 and 1",
+				len(asked[1]), len(asked[2]))
+		}
+	})
 }
 
 func TestAtMost10000ClientsWait(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	geojs, clock, g := start(t)
-	clients := newClients()
-	first := clients()
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		geojs, clock, g := start()
+		clients := newClients()
+		first := clients()
 
-	// 10,000 clients wait while GeoJS is left alone after a failure, and
-	// one more cannot join them.
-	geojs.set(failing)
-	wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
+		// 10,000 clients wait while GeoJS is left alone after a failure, and
+		// one more cannot join them.
+		geojs.set(failing)
+		wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
 
-	for range 9999 {
-		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
-	}
-
-	extra := clients()
-	wantCountry(t, g, extra, "")
-
-	// The first one's next request has GeoJS asked about the 10,000, 200
-	// at a time, and not about the one more.
-	geojs.set(answering)
-	clock.advance(time.Second)
-	wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
-
-	asked := waitForRequests(t, geojs, 51)
-	for i, request := range asked {
-		if slices.Contains(request, extra.Addr().String()) {
-			t.Errorf("request %d asked about %s", i, extra.Addr())
+		for range 9999 {
+			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
 		}
-	}
 
-	// With room among those waiting, it is asked about.
-	wantCountry(t, g, extra, germany)
+		extra := clients()
+		wantCountry(t, g, extra, "")
+
+		// The first one's next request has GeoJS asked about the 10,000, 200
+		// at a time, and not about the one more.
+		geojs.set(answering)
+		clock.advance(time.Second)
+		wantCountry(t, g, first, "")
+
+		asked := waitForRequests(t, geojs, 51)
+		for i, request := range asked {
+			if slices.Contains(request, extra.Addr().String()) {
+				t.Errorf("request %d asked about %s", i, extra.Addr())
+			}
+		}
+
+		// With room among those waiting, it is asked about.
+		wantCountry(t, g, extra, germany)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestClientsWithoutAnAnswerAreCounted(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		m := metrics.New(1)
+		g := lookup.New(lookup.Params{
+			URL:        lookup.URL,
+			Now:        time.Now,
+			ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
+			Metrics:    m,
+		})
+		g.SetTransport(&standIn{answers: failing})
+
+		clients := newClients()
+
+		// GeoJS fails, so the first client goes without an answer, and GeoJS
+		// is left alone for a second, which does not pass in this test.
+		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
+		wantUnanswered(t, m, 1)
+
+		// Meanwhile each new client goes without one at once, while there is
+		// room for it among the 10,000 that may wait.
+		for range 9999 {
+			wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
+		}
+
+		wantUnanswered(t, m, 10000)
+
+		// One more, for which there is no room, goes without one too.
+		wantCountry(t, g, clients(), "")
+		wantUnanswered(t, m, 10001)
+	})
 }
 
 // How the stand-in for GeoJS answers.
@@ -337,13 +401,25 @@ const (
 // standIn is a stand-in for GeoJS. It notes the addresses each request
 // asks about.
 type standIn struct {
-	server *httptest.Server
-
 	mu       sync.Mutex
 	answers  int
 	requests [][]string
 }
 
+// RoundTrip has the stand-in answer req, in place of the network. A request
+// abandoned before the stand-in answers fails, as over the network.
+func (s *standIn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	answer := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	s.ServeHTTP(answer, req)
+
+	err := req.Context().Err()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return answer.Result(), nil
+}
+
 // ServeHTTP answers a request about the addresses in its ip parameter.
 func (s *standIn) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	addrs := strings.Split(r.URL.Query().Get("ip"), ",")
@@ -422,7 +498,8 @@ func (s *standIn) asked() [][]string {
 	return slices.Clone(s.requests)
 }
 
-// testClock is a clock the test sets.
+// testClock is a clock the test sets. GeoJS tells the time by it, while
+// waits run on the bubble's clock.
 type testClock struct {
 	mu  sync.Mutex
 	now time.Time
@@ -444,21 +521,18 @@ func (c *testClock) advance(d time.Duration) {
 	c.now = c.now.Add(d)
 }
 
-// start starts a stand-in for GeoJS that answers, and returns it, a
-// clock, and a GeoJS asking it by that clock.
-func start(t *testing.T) (*standIn, *testClock, *lookup.GeoJS) {
-	t.Helper()
-
+// start returns a stand-in for GeoJS that answers, a clock, and a GeoJS
+// asking the stand-in by that clock.
+func start() (*standIn, *testClock, *lookup.GeoJS) {
 	geojs := &standIn{}
-	geojs.server = httptest.NewServer(geojs)
-	t.Cleanup(geojs.server.Close)
-
 	clock := &testClock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
 	g := lookup.New(lookup.Params{
-		URL:        geojs.server.URL,
+		URL:        lookup.URL,
 		Now:        clock.Now,
 		ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
+		Metrics:    metrics.New(1),
 	})
+	g.SetTransport(geojs)
 
 	return geojs, clock, g
 }
@@ -513,41 +587,45 @@ func wantAsked(t *testing.T, geojs *standIn, i int, want ...string) {
 	}
 }
 
-// waitForRequests waits for GeoJS to have had count requests, and returns
-// the addresses each asked about.
+// wantUnanswered checks how many requests m counts as having gone without
+// an answer from GeoJS.
+func wantUnanswered(t *testing.T, m *metrics.Metrics, want float64) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got := testutil.ToFloat64(m.GeoJSUnanswered)
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("%v requests went without an answer, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// waitForRequests waits until g has done all it can before time passes,
+// checks that GeoJS has had count requests, and returns the addresses each
+// asked about.
 func waitForRequests(t *testing.T, geojs *standIn, count int) [][]string {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		asked := geojs.asked()
-		if len(asked) >= count {
-			return asked
-		}
+	synctest.Wait()
 
-		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
+	asked := geojs.asked()
+	if len(asked) != count {
+		t.Fatalf("GeoJS had %d requests, want %d", len(asked), count)
 	}
 
-	t.Fatalf("fewer than %d requests to GeoJS after %s", count, waitLimit)
-
-	return nil
+	return asked
 }
 
-// waitForCountry waits for g to give client the country want, moving the
-// clock on a minute at a time, so that GeoJS is asked again after a
-// failure.
+// waitForCountry lets a request to GeoJS under way be abandoned, and moves
+// the clock on a minute, so that GeoJS may be asked again after a failure.
+// It then checks that client's next request does not wait but has it asked
+// about again in the background, after which g gives it the country want.
 func waitForCountry(
 	t *testing.T, g *lookup.GeoJS, clock *testClock, client netip.Prefix, want string,
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
-	for g.Country(t.Context(), client) != want {
-		if time.Now().After(deadline) {
-			t.Fatalf("%s is not in %q after %s", client, want, waitLimit)
-		}
-
-		clock.advance(time.Minute)
-		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
-	}
+	time.Sleep(timeout)
+	clock.advance(time.Minute)
+	wantCountry(t, g, client, "")
+	synctest.Wait()
+	wantCountry(t, g, client, want)
 }

internal/lookup/snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+package lookup_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+)
+
+func TestSnapshotHoldsEachAnswerAndWhenItWasLastUsed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		_, clock, g := start()
+		placed := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+		notPlaced := netip.MustParsePrefix(unplaced + "/32")
+		asked := clock.Now()
+
+		wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
+		wantCountry(t, g, notPlaced, "")
+
+		clock.advance(time.Hour)
+		wantCountry(t, g, placed, germany)
+
+		want := []lookup.Answer{
+			{Client: notPlaced, Country: "", Answered: asked, Used: asked},
+			{Client: placed, Country: germany, Answered: asked, Used: asked.Add(time.Hour)},
+		}
+		if got := g.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+			t.Errorf("snapshot\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestLoadedAnswersAreKeptFor7DaysFromWhenGeoJSGaveThem(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojs, clock, g := start()
+	now := clock.Now()
+	kept := lookup.Answer{
+		Client:   netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32"),
+		Country:  "FR",
+		Answered: now.Add(-week + time.Second),
+		Used:     now.Add(-time.Hour),
+	}
+	stale := lookup.Answer{
+		Client:   netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.10/32"),
+		Country:  "FR",
+		Answered: now.Add(-week),
+		Used:     now.Add(-time.Hour),
+	}
+
+	g.Load([]lookup.Answer{kept, stale})
+
+	if got := g.Snapshot(); !slices.Equal(got, []lookup.Answer{kept}) {
+		t.Errorf("kept %+v, want only the answer GeoJS gave less than 7 days ago", got)
+	}
+
+	wantCountry(t, g, kept.Client, "FR")
+	wantRequests(t, geojs, 0)
+}
+
+func TestLoadDropsTheAnswerUsedLongestAgoFirst(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const maxAnswers = 100000
+
+	_, clock, g := start()
+	now := clock.Now()
+
+	// lookups.json lists the answers by client. Here each was last used a
+	// second before the one listed before it, so the last listed is the
+	// one used longest ago, and the one dropped.
+	answers := make([]lookup.Answer, maxAnswers+1)
+	addr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.0")
+
+	for i := range answers {
+		answers[i] = lookup.Answer{
+			Client:   netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen()),
+			Country:  germany,
+			Answered: now,
+			Used:     now.Add(-time.Duration(i) * time.Second),
+		}
+		addr = addr.Next()
+	}
+
+	g.Load(answers)
+
+	got := g.Snapshot()
+	if len(got) != maxAnswers || got[0] != answers[0] ||
+		got[maxAnswers-1] != answers[maxAnswers-1] {
+		t.Errorf("%d answers kept, from %s to %s; want %d, from %s to %s",
+			len(got), got[0].Client, got[len(got)-1].Client, maxAnswers,
+			answers[0].Client, answers[maxAnswers-1].Client)
+	}
+}

internal/metrics/countries.go

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+package metrics
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// other is the label under which the countries outside the busiest are
+// counted.
+const other = "other"
+
+// countries are the metrics by the client's country, for requests whose
+// client's country is known. The topN busiest countries, by their requests
+// since the start, have series of their own, and the others are counted
+// under other, so that there are never more than topN + 1 series. A
+// country that drops out of the busiest loses its series, and its next
+// requests are counted under other; one that becomes one of them gets a
+// series that counts from then on. Each series therefore only ever goes
+// up.
+type countries struct {
+	topN int
+
+	requests      *prometheus.CounterVec
+	requestBytes  *prometheus.CounterVec
+	responseBytes *prometheus.CounterVec
+	// refused are the requests the country lists refused.
+	refused *prometheus.CounterVec
+
+	mu sync.Mutex
+	// seen is each country's requests since the start, by which the
+	// countries are ranked. GeoJS gives two-letter codes, so it holds at
+	// most a few hundred.
+	seen map[string]int64
+	// top are the countries with series of their own.
+	top map[string]bool
+}
+
+// newCountries returns the metrics by country, with series of their own
+// for the topN busiest countries.
+func newCountries(topN int) *countries {
+	byCountry := []string{"country"}
+
+	return &countries{
+		topN: topN,
+		requests: counterVec("smallwebwaf_country_requests_total",
+			"Requests, by the client's country.", byCountry),
+		requestBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total",
+			"Request body bytes, by the client's country.", byCountry),
+		responseBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total",
+			"Response body bytes, by the client's country.", byCountry),
+		refused: counterVec("smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total",
+			"Requests the country lists refused, by the client's country.",
+			byCountry),
+		seen: map[string]int64{},
+		top:  map[string]bool{},
+	}
+}
+
+// add counts a request from its log line, whose country is known.
+func (c *countries) add(line *requestlog.Line) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+	c.seen[line.Country]++
+
+	label := c.label(line.Country)
+	c.requests.WithLabelValues(label).Inc()
+	c.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(label).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
+	c.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(label).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
+
+	if line.Action == requestlog.ActionCountryDenied {
+		c.refused.WithLabelValues(label).Inc()
+	}
+}
+
+// label returns the label a request from country is counted under: the
+// country while it is one of the busiest, other while it is not. A
+// country busier than the least busy of them takes its place, and that
+// country's series are dropped.
+func (c *countries) label(country string) string {
+	if c.top[country] {
+		return country
+	}
+
+	if len(c.top) < c.topN {
+		c.top[country] = true
+
+		return country
+	}
+
+	least := ""
+
+	for top := range c.top {
+		if least == "" || c.seen[top] < c.seen[least] {
+			least = top
+		}
+	}
+
+	if c.seen[country] <= c.seen[least] {
+		return other
+	}
+
+	delete(c.top, least)
+
+	for _, vec := range []*prometheus.CounterVec{
+		c.requests, c.requestBytes, c.responseBytes, c.refused,
+	} {
+		vec.DeleteLabelValues(least)
+	}
+
+	c.top[country] = true
+
+	return country
+}

internal/metrics/metrics.go

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+// Package metrics keeps smallwebwaf's Prometheus metrics, as the "Metrics
+// endpoint" section of SPEC.md lists them, and serves them in the
+// Prometheus text format. No metric carries a client's address.
+package metrics
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
+	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/collectors"
+	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// Metrics are smallwebwaf's metrics. They are safe for concurrent use.
+type Metrics struct {
+	registry *prometheus.Registry
+	handler  http.Handler
+
+	inFlight             prometheus.Gauge
+	requests             *prometheus.CounterVec
+	requestBytes         *prometheus.CounterVec
+	responseBytes        *prometheus.CounterVec
+	requestDuration      prometheus.Histogram
+	upstreamDuration     prometheus.Histogram
+	rateLimitHits        *prometheus.CounterVec
+	sizeAndTimeLimitHits *prometheus.CounterVec
+	offences             *prometheus.CounterVec
+	// ruleMatches are made by AddRules.
+	ruleMatches *prometheus.CounterVec
+	countries   *countries
+
+	// GeoJSRequests are the requests to GeoJS, and GeoJSFailures those
+	// that failed. GeoJSUnanswered are the requests whose client counted
+	// as coming from an unknown country because GeoJS had not answered
+	// about it in time.
+	GeoJSRequests   prometheus.Counter
+	GeoJSFailures   prometheus.Counter
+	GeoJSUnanswered prometheus.Counter
+
+	stateFileWrites        *prometheus.CounterVec
+	stateFileWriteFailures *prometheus.CounterVec
+	stateFileLastWrite     *prometheus.GaugeVec
+	stateFileSize          *prometheus.GaugeVec
+	stateFileEditsTakenIn  *prometheus.CounterVec
+	stateFileEditsSetAside *prometheus.CounterVec
+}
+
+// New returns the metrics, with the Go runtime's and the process's own.
+// topN is how many countries get series of their own
+// (SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N).
+func New(topN int) *Metrics {
+	byStatus := []string{"status_class", "action"}
+	byFile := []string{"file"}
+
+	m := &Metrics{
+		registry: prometheus.NewRegistry(),
+		inFlight: prometheus.NewGauge(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight",
+			Help: "Requests under way.",
+		}),
+		requests: counterVec("smallwebwaf_requests_total",
+			"Requests, by the class of their status and their action.", byStatus),
+		requestBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total",
+			"Request body bytes, by the class of the status and the action.",
+			byStatus),
+		responseBytes: counterVec("smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total",
+			"Response body bytes, by the class of the status and the action.",
+			byStatus),
+		requestDuration: prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds",
+			Help: "How long requests took, from their arrival to their end.",
+		}),
+		upstreamDuration: prometheus.NewHistogram(prometheus.HistogramOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds",
+			Help: "How long requests passed to the app took, from then to their end.",
+		}),
+		rateLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total",
+			"Requests that broke a rate limit, by its window.",
+			[]string{"window"}),
+		sizeAndTimeLimitHits: counterVec("smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total",
+			"Requests that passed a size or time limit, by its setting.",
+			[]string{"limit"}),
+		offences: counterVec("smallwebwaf_offences_total",
+			"Offences, by kind.", []string{"kind"}),
+		countries: newCountries(topN),
+		GeoJSRequests: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total",
+			Help: "Requests to GeoJS.",
+		}),
+		GeoJSFailures: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total",
+			Help: "Requests to GeoJS that failed.",
+		}),
+		GeoJSUnanswered: prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total",
+			Help: "Requests whose client counted as coming from an unknown " +
+				"country because GeoJS had not answered about it in time.",
+		}),
+		stateFileWrites: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_writes_total",
+			"Writes of each state file.", byFile),
+		stateFileWriteFailures: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_write_failures_total",
+			"Writes of each state file that failed.", byFile),
+		stateFileLastWrite: gaugeVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_last_write_timestamp_seconds",
+			"When each state file was last written, in seconds since 1970.", byFile),
+		stateFileSize: gaugeVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_size_bytes",
+			"The size of each state file, as it was last written.", byFile),
+		stateFileEditsTakenIn: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_taken_in_total",
+			"Edits of each state file taken in while running.", byFile),
+		stateFileEditsSetAside: counterVec("smallwebwaf_state_file_edits_set_aside_total",
+			"Edits of each state file renamed to <name>.bad because they did not parse.",
+			byFile),
+	}
+
+	m.handler = promhttp.HandlerFor(m.registry, promhttp.HandlerOpts{})
+
+	m.registry.MustRegister(
+		collectors.NewGoCollector(),
+		collectors.NewProcessCollector(collectors.ProcessCollectorOpts{}),
+		m.inFlight, m.requests, m.requestBytes, m.responseBytes,
+		m.requestDuration, m.upstreamDuration,
+		m.rateLimitHits, m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits, m.offences,
+		m.countries.requests, m.countries.requestBytes, m.countries.responseBytes,
+		m.countries.refused,
+		m.GeoJSRequests, m.GeoJSFailures, m.GeoJSUnanswered,
+		m.stateFileWrites, m.stateFileWriteFailures,
+		m.stateFileLastWrite, m.stateFileSize,
+		m.stateFileEditsTakenIn, m.stateFileEditsSetAside,
+	)
+
+	return m
+}
+
+// AddBansAndClients adds the metrics read from the ledger and the table
+// of clients as the metrics are asked for: the bans made since the start,
+// by cause, the bans active and permanent at now, and the clients in the
+// table.
+func (m *Metrics) AddBansAndClients(
+	ledger *bans.Ledger, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, now func() time.Time,
+) {
+	for _, cause := range []string{bans.CauseLimit, bans.CauseAttack, bans.CauseAdmin} {
+		m.registry.MustRegister(prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name:        "smallwebwaf_bans_made_total",
+			Help:        "Bans made, by cause.",
+			ConstLabels: prometheus.Labels{"cause": cause},
+		}, func() float64 {
+			return float64(ledger.Made(cause))
+		}))
+	}
+
+	m.registry.MustRegister(
+		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_active_bans",
+			Help: "Bans active now, the permanent ones included.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			active, _ := ledger.Count(now())
+
+			return float64(active)
+		}),
+		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans",
+			Help: "Permanent bans not lifted.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			_, permanent := ledger.Count(now())
+
+			return float64(permanent)
+		}),
+		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_tracked_clients",
+			Help: "Clients in the table of clients.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			return float64(limiter.Len())
+		}),
+	)
+}
+
+// AddRules adds the metrics of the rule files: the requests that matched
+// each rule, which RuleMatched counts, and the rules loaded from
+// ruleFiles, read as the metrics are asked for. It is called once, before
+// RuleMatched.
+func (m *Metrics) AddRules(ruleFiles *rules.Files) {
+	m.ruleMatches = counterVec("smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total",
+		"Requests that matched a rule of the rule files, by its id and action.",
+		[]string{"rule_id", "action"})
+
+	m.registry.MustRegister(m.ruleMatches,
+		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_rules_loaded",
+			Help: "Rules loaded from the rule files.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			return float64(ruleFiles.Len())
+		}))
+}
+
+// AddRemoteLog adds the metrics of sending the log lines to
+// SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, read from remote as the metrics are asked for: the
+// lines sent, those dropped, and those waiting in the buffer.
+func (m *Metrics) AddRemoteLog(remote *remotelog.Sender) {
+	m.registry.MustRegister(
+		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total",
+			Help: "Log lines sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			return float64(remote.Sent())
+		}),
+		prometheus.NewCounterFunc(prometheus.CounterOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total",
+			Help: "Log lines dropped: the oldest in a full buffer, and those " +
+				"whose sending failed.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			return float64(remote.Dropped())
+		}),
+		prometheus.NewGaugeFunc(prometheus.GaugeOpts{
+			Name: "smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth",
+			Help: "Log lines in the buffer, waiting to be sent.",
+		}, func() float64 {
+			return float64(remote.Depth())
+		}),
+	)
+}
+
+// ServeHTTP answers with the metrics in the Prometheus text format.
+func (m *Metrics) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	m.handler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+}
+
+// RequestStarted counts a request as under way.
+func (m *Metrics) RequestStarted() {
+	m.inFlight.Inc()
+}
+
+// RequestEnded counts a request that has ended, from its log line. limit
+// is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, "" if none.
+// duration is how long the request took, and upstreamDuration how long it
+// took from when it was passed to the app, zero if it was not.
+func (m *Metrics) RequestEnded(
+	line *requestlog.Line, limit string, duration, upstreamDuration time.Duration,
+) {
+	m.inFlight.Dec()
+
+	class := statusClass(line.Status)
+	m.requests.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Inc()
+	m.requestBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.RequestBytes))
+	m.responseBytes.WithLabelValues(class, line.Action).Add(float64(line.ResponseBytes))
+	m.requestDuration.Observe(duration.Seconds())
+
+	if upstreamDuration > 0 {
+		m.upstreamDuration.Observe(upstreamDuration.Seconds())
+	}
+
+	if line.LimitHit != "" {
+		m.rateLimitHits.WithLabelValues(line.LimitHit).Inc()
+	}
+
+	if limit != "" {
+		m.sizeAndTimeLimitHits.WithLabelValues(limit).Inc()
+	}
+
+	if line.Offence != "" {
+		m.offences.WithLabelValues(line.Offence).Inc()
+	}
+
+	if line.Country != "" {
+		m.countries.add(line)
+	}
+}
+
+// RuleMatched counts a request that matched the rule id, whose action is
+// action.
+func (m *Metrics) RuleMatched(id, action string) {
+	m.ruleMatches.WithLabelValues(id, action).Inc()
+}
+
+// StateFileWritten counts a write of the state file name, of size bytes,
+// that ended with err.
+func (m *Metrics) StateFileWritten(name string, size int, err error) {
+	m.stateFileWrites.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
+
+	// The series of failures is there from the first write, at zero until
+	// one fails.
+	failures := m.stateFileWriteFailures.WithLabelValues(name)
+
+	if err != nil {
+		failures.Inc()
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	m.stateFileLastWrite.WithLabelValues(name).SetToCurrentTime()
+	m.stateFileSize.WithLabelValues(name).Set(float64(size))
+}
+
+// StateFileEditTakenIn counts an admin's edit of the state file name
+// taken in while smallwebwaf runs.
+func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditTakenIn(name string) {
+	m.stateFileEditsTakenIn.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
+}
+
+// StateFileEditSetAside counts an admin's edit of the state file name
+// renamed to name.bad because it did not parse.
+func (m *Metrics) StateFileEditSetAside(name string) {
+	m.stateFileEditsSetAside.WithLabelValues(name).Inc()
+}
+
+// statusClass returns the class of status, such as 2xx, or none when no
+// status was sent.
+func statusClass(status int) string {
+	if status == 0 {
+		return "none"
+	}
+
+	// A status's class is its hundreds: 404 is in 4xx.
+	const hundred = 100
+
+	return strconv.Itoa(status/hundred) + "xx"
+}
+
+// counterVec returns a counter named name, described by help, with a
+// series for each set of values of labels.
+func counterVec(name, help string, labels []string) *prometheus.CounterVec {
+	return prometheus.NewCounterVec(prometheus.CounterOpts{Name: name, Help: help},
+		labels)
+}
+
+// gaugeVec returns a gauge named name, described by help, with a series
+// for each set of values of labels.
+func gaugeVec(name, help string, labels []string) *prometheus.GaugeVec {
+	return prometheus.NewGaugeVec(prometheus.GaugeOpts{Name: name, Help: help}, labels)
+}

internal/proxy/admin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// answerAdmin answers a request for smallwebwaf itself, under
+// /_smallwebwaf/, once it has passed the checks: GET MetricsPath with
+// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN gets the metrics, and without it is refused with
+// 401. Any other request gets 404, as the metrics do while
+// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN is unset.
+func (rq *request) answerAdmin() {
+	rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
+	rq.startClientResponseTimeout()
+
+	token := rq.h.config.MetricsToken
+
+	switch {
+	case token == "" || rq.in.Method != http.MethodGet || rq.in.URL.Path != MetricsPath:
+		http.Error(rq.out, http.StatusText(http.StatusNotFound), http.StatusNotFound)
+	case !hasToken(rq.in, token):
+		rq.out.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
+		rq.answer(refusal{
+			status: http.StatusUnauthorized,
+			action: requestlog.ActionAdmin,
+		})
+	default:
+		rq.h.metrics.ServeHTTP(rq.out, rq.in)
+	}
+}
+
+// hasToken reports whether r carries token, as Authorization: Bearer
+// <token>.
+func hasToken(r *http.Request, token string) bool {
+	scheme, sent, _ := strings.Cut(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), " ")
+
+	return strings.EqualFold(scheme, "Bearer") &&
+		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(sent), []byte(token)) == 1
+}

internal/proxy/bans.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// banResponse is a refusal answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and logged
+// with action.
+func (rq *request) banResponse(action string) *refusal {
+	return &refusal{status: rq.h.config.BanResponse, action: action}
+}
+
+// banned reports whether a ban on a netblock the client is in covers the
+// request at now, and notes for the log line when that ban ends.
+func (rq *request) banned(now time.Time) bool {
+	check := rq.h.ledger.Check
+	if rq.h.config.Observe {
+		check = rq.h.ledger.Find // in observe mode the ban refuses nothing
+	}
+
+	ban, banned := check(rq.client, now)
+	if banned {
+		rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
+	}
+
+	return banned
+}
+
+// limitBroken counts the request for the rate limits at now, notes the
+// client's counts for the log line, and reports whether the request takes
+// the client over a limit. In enforce mode such a request bans the
+// client's netblock, and sets the client's counters back to zero; in
+// observe mode it does neither.
+func (rq *request) limitBroken(now time.Time) bool {
+	group := clientGroup(rq.client)
+
+	counts, hit, over := rq.h.limiter.Count(group, now)
+	rq.line.Counts = counts
+
+	if !over {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	rq.line.LimitHit = hit.Window
+	rq.line.Offence = requestlog.OffenceLimit
+
+	if rq.h.config.Observe {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	netblock := rq.netblock()
+	ban := rq.h.ledger.BanForLimit(netblock, now, bans.Notes{
+		Country:  rq.line.Country,
+		Limit:    hit.Limit,
+		Window:   hit.Window,
+		Count:    hit.Requests,
+		Request:  rq.noted(now),
+		Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
+	})
+	rq.h.limiter.Reset(group)
+	rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// banForAttack bans the client's netblock at now for a clear sign of
+// attack, the match of rule, a ban rule.
+func (rq *request) banForAttack(now time.Time, rule rules.Rule) {
+	netblock := rq.netblock()
+	ban := rq.h.ledger.BanForAttack(netblock, now, bans.Notes{
+		Country:  rq.line.Country,
+		RuleID:   rule.ID,
+		Target:   rule.Target,
+		Request:  rq.noted(now),
+		Requests: rq.netblockRequests(netblock),
+	})
+	rq.line.BanExpires = banExpires(ban)
+}
+
+// noted is the request, refused at now with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, as the
+// notes of the ban it makes keep it.
+func (rq *request) noted(now time.Time) bans.Request {
+	return bans.Request{
+		Time:      now,
+		Method:    rq.in.Method,
+		Host:      rq.in.Host,
+		Path:      rq.in.URL.RequestURI(),
+		Status:    rq.h.config.BanResponse,
+		UserAgent: rq.in.UserAgent(),
+	}
+}
+
+// netblockRequests is how many requests netblock has sent since it was
+// first seen, this one included: the histories count it only once it has
+// ended.
+func (rq *request) netblockRequests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
+	return rq.h.limiter.Requests(netblock) + 1
+}
+
+// netblock is the netblock a ban on the client covers: its IPv4 address,
+// widened to SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX, or the IPv6 group clientGroup
+// counts it in.
+func (rq *request) netblock() netip.Prefix {
+	addr := rq.client.Unmap()
+	if addr.Is4() {
+		return netip.PrefixFrom(addr, rq.h.config.BanScopeV4Prefix).Masked()
+	}
+
+	return clientGroup(addr)
+}
+
+// banExpires is when ban ends, as the log line gives it: a time, or
+// permanent.
+func banExpires(ban bans.Ban) string {
+	if ban.Permanent() {
+		return "permanent"
+	}
+
+	return requestlog.FormatTime(ban.Expires)
+}

internal/proxy/bans_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+const (
+	// otherClient is a client next to client.
+	otherClient = "203.0.113.10"
+	// userAgent is the user agent of every request a sender sends.
+	userAgent = "ban-test/1.0"
+	// permanent is the log line's ban_expires for a permanent ban.
+	permanent = "permanent"
+)
+
+func TestBrokenLimitBansTheClient(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
+	expires := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	// The request over the limit of one a minute is refused, and bans the
+	// client for an hour, the default.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
+		line.BanExpires != expires {
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, offence %q and ban_expires %q, "+
+			"want minute, limit and %s", line.LimitHit, line.Offence, line.BanExpires,
+			expires)
+	}
+
+	// Every request while the ban lasts is refused.
+	clk.advance(time.Hour - time.Second)
+
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	if line.BanExpires != expires || line.Offence != "" || line.LimitHit != "" {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, offence %q and limit_hit %q, "+
+			"want %s and neither of the others", line.BanExpires, line.Offence,
+			line.LimitHit, expires)
+	}
+
+	// Once it ends, the client is let through.
+	clk.advance(time.Second)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+}
+
+func TestBanLengthsFollowTheSettings(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute:   "1",
+		limitBanDuration:     "10m",
+		limitBanRepeatWindow: "1h",
+		maxBanDuration:       "1h",
+	})
+
+	// breakLimit has client go over the limit of one a minute, and
+	// returns when the ban that makes ends.
+	breakLimit := func() string {
+		s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+		return s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited).BanExpires
+	}
+	wantExpires := func(got string, length time.Duration) {
+		t.Helper()
+
+		want := requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(length))
+		if got != want {
+			t.Errorf("ban ends at %s, want %s", got, want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// A first ban lasts SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION; one within
+	// SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW after it ended, three times as long.
+	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
+	clk.advance(10*time.Minute + time.Hour)
+	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
+
+	// Later than that, SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION again.
+	clk.advance(30*time.Minute + time.Hour + time.Second)
+	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 10*time.Minute)
+	clk.advance(10 * time.Minute)
+	wantExpires(breakLimit(), 30*time.Minute)
+
+	// 90 minutes would be longer than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION: the ban is
+	// permanent.
+	clk.advance(30 * time.Minute)
+
+	got := breakLimit()
+	if got != permanent {
+		t.Errorf("ban ends at %s, want a permanent one", got)
+	}
+
+	clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+}
+
+func TestBanIsNotCountedAndResetsTheCounters(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerDay: "2"})
+
+	// The third request in a day is over the limit of two, and bans the
+	// client for an hour.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	for range 3 {
+		s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	}
+
+	// Later the same day the client has its whole allowance again: the
+	// ban set its counters back to zero, and the requests it refused were
+	// not counted for the rate limits, only in its notes.
+	clk.advance(time.Hour)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	banned := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
+	if len(banned) != 2 || banned[0].Notes.Refused != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want two, the first with 3 requests refused", banned)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBanCoversTheClientsNetblock(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// In the IPv4 cases, client breaks the limit; these two are next to it.
+	const (
+		allowed = "203.0.113.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "203.0.113.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+	)
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		env     map[string]string
+		breaker string // the client that breaks the limit
+		refused []string
+		let     []string // let through
+	}{
+		{
+			"an IPv4 address, by default", nil, client,
+			nil, []string{otherClient, exempt},
+		},
+		{
+			"the IPv4 netblock SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX sets",
+			map[string]string{banScopeV4Prefix: "24"}, client,
+			[]string{otherClient, exempt}, []string{"203.0.112.9", allowed},
+		},
+		{
+			"an IPv6 /64", nil, "2001:db8:5::1",
+			[]string{"2001:db8:5::ffff:1"}, []string{"2001:db8:5:1::1"},
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			env := map[string]string{
+				rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
+				allowNets:           allowed,
+				rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
+			}
+			maps.Copy(env, tc.env)
+			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", env)
+
+			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+			s.get(tc.breaker, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+			for _, sent := range tc.refused {
+				s.get(sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+			}
+
+			for _, sent := range tc.let {
+				s.get(sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBannedClientIsRefusedBeforeItsCountryIsLookedUp(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t)
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+		banScopeV4Prefix:   "24",
+		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+	})
+
+	// fromDE's ban covers otherClient, which is refused unasked about.
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	if line.Country != "" {
+		t.Errorf("log line has country %q, want none", line.Country)
+	}
+
+	if !slices.Equal(asked(), []string{fromDE}) {
+		t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, want %s alone", asked(), fromDE)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBanResponseAnswersEveryRefusalButTheSizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		setting string // "" leaves SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE at its default
+		status  int    // 0 is the connection closed without an answer
+	}{
+		{"", http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"403", http.StatusForbidden},
+		{"429", http.StatusTooManyRequests},
+		{"close", 0},
+	} {
+		t.Run(banResponse+"="+tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+			env := map[string]string{
+				rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+				denyNets:           denied,
+				deniedCountries:    "kp",
+			}
+
+			if tc.setting != "" {
+				env[banResponse] = tc.setting
+			}
+
+			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)
+
+			s.get(denied, tc.status, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+			s.get(fromKP, tc.status, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
+			s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+			s.get(fromDE, tc.status, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBanNotes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+	})
+	start := clk.Now()
+
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.request(fromDE, "/repo/commits?page=2",
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(fromDE + "/32")
+	want := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    start,
+		Expires:  start.Add(time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseLimit,
+		Reason:   "requests per minute over the limit of 1",
+		Notes: bans.Notes{
+			Country: "DE",
+			Limit:   1,
+			Window:  minute,
+			Count:   2,
+			Request: bans.Request{
+				Time:      start,
+				Method:    http.MethodGet,
+				Host:      appHost,
+				Path:      "/repo/commits?page=2",
+				Status:    http.StatusForbidden,
+				UserAgent: userAgent,
+			},
+			// The one let through, the one that broke the limit and the two
+			// refused under the ban.
+			Requests:    4,
+			Refused:     2,
+			EarlierBans: bans.EarlierBans{},
+		},
+	}
+
+	ledger := server.Ledger
+
+	got := ledger.Bans(netblock)
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
+		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+	}
+
+	// The next ban counts this one among the earlier.
+	clk.advance(time.Hour)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	got = ledger.Bans(netblock)
+	if len(got) != 2 || got[1].Notes.EarlierBans != (bans.EarlierBans{Limit: 1}) {
+		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want two, the second with one earlier ban for a limit", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMaxBansDropsTheBanOfTheNetblockSeenLongestAgo(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+		maxBans:            "1",
+	})
+
+	// One ban is held, so otherClient's ban drops client's.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(otherClient, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+}
+
+// clock is the time a test sets, by which smallwebwaf counts requests and
+// makes bans.
+type clock struct {
+	mu  sync.Mutex
+	now time.Time
+}
+
+// Now tells the time.
+func (c *clock) Now() time.Time {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return c.now
+}
+
+// advance moves the clock on by d.
+func (c *clock) advance(d time.Duration) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+	c.now = c.now.Add(d)
+}
+
+// startWithClock starts smallwebwaf in front of an app that answers 200,
+// with the settings in env on top of trusting localhost's
+// X-Forwarded-For, clients' countries looked up at geojsURL, and a clock
+// set to midnight, the start of a bucket in every window.
+func startWithClock(
+	t *testing.T, geojsURL string, env map[string]string,
+) (*sender, *clock, *proxy.Server) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+	clk := &clock{now: time.Date(2026, 10, 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)}
+	settings := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
+	maps.Copy(settings, env)
+
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, geojsURL, clk.Now, settings)
+
+	return &sender{t: t, addr: addr, out: out}, clk, server
+}
+
+// sender sends requests to smallwebwaf one after another, each on a
+// connection of its own, and checks each one's answer and log line. They
+// must be the only requests smallwebwaf is sent, since the log lines are
+// matched to them in order.
+type sender struct {
+	t    *testing.T
+	addr string
+	out  *output
+	sent int
+}
+
+// get sends a GET request for / from the client at from.
+func (s *sender) get(from string, status int, action string) logLine {
+	s.t.Helper()
+
+	return s.request(from, "/", status, action)
+}
+
+// request sends a GET request for path from the client at from, as
+// X-Forwarded-For names it, and checks that its answer and its log line
+// have status, 0 for the connection closed without an answer, and that
+// the line has action. It returns the log line.
+func (s *sender) request(from, path string, status int, action string) logLine {
+	s.t.Helper()
+
+	line, _ := s.requestWithHeader(from, path, "", status, action)
+
+	return line
+}
+
+// requestWithHeader is request with header, such as "Authorization:
+// Bearer x", added to the request unless it is "". It returns the body of
+// the answer too.
+func (s *sender) requestWithHeader(
+	from, path, header string, status int, action string,
+) (logLine, string) {
+	s.t.Helper()
+
+	if header != "" {
+		header += "\r\n"
+	}
+
+	conn := dial(s.t, s.addr)
+	send(s.t, conn, "GET "+path+" HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+
+		"\r\nUser-Agent: "+userAgent+"\r\n"+forwardedFor+": "+from+"\r\n"+
+		header+"\r\n")
+
+	err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(waitLimit))
+	if err != nil {
+		s.t.Fatalf("set read deadline: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var got answer
+
+	res, err := http.ReadResponse(bufio.NewReader(conn), nil)
+
+	switch {
+	case err == nil:
+		got = readAnswer(res)
+	case !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF):
+		s.t.Fatalf("read response: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_ = conn.Close()
+
+	if got.status != status {
+		s.t.Errorf("request %d, from %s: status %d, want %d", s.sent+1, from,
+			got.status, status)
+	}
+
+	line := s.out.requestLines(s.t, s.sent+1)[s.sent]
+	s.sent++
+	wantLine(s.t, line, status, action)
+
+	return line, string(got.body)
+}

internal/proxy/bodies.go

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ func (b *requestBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 		b.rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
+			limit:  "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
 		})
 	}
 
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ func (b *responseBody) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 		b.rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusBadGateway,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
+			limit:  "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
 		})
 
 		return n, errResponseTooLarge

internal/proxy/client.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package proxy
 
 import (
+	"crypto/rand"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
@@ -48,6 +49,33 @@ func clientAddress(
 	return client
 }
 
+// requestIDHeader carries the request's id, from traefik and to the app.
+const requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
+
+// requestID is the request's id: the one a trusted proxy sent, or a new
+// random one. A peer outside the trusted proxies did not come through
+// traefik, so the id it sends is its own claim, and is replaced.
+func requestID(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
+	id := r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
+	if !peerTrusted || id == "" {
+		id = rand.Text()
+	}
+
+	return id
+}
+
+// scheme is how the client reached traefik, as a trusted proxy says in
+// X-Forwarded-Proto, or otherwise http, the only scheme smallwebwaf
+// serves.
+func scheme(r *http.Request, peerTrusted bool) string {
+	proto := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto")
+	if !peerTrusted || proto == "" {
+		return "http"
+	}
+
+	return proto
+}
+
 // ipv6GroupPrefix is the length of the IPv6 netblock that is one client.
 const ipv6GroupPrefix = 64
 

internal/proxy/client_test.go

@@ -14,10 +14,14 @@ const (
 	appHost = "app.example"
 	// client is the client's address, as a proxy names it.
 	client = "203.0.113.9"
-	// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies.
-	forwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
-	// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with.
+	// forwardedFor is the header that lists the client and its proxies,
+	// and forwardedProto the one that gives the scheme the client used.
+	forwardedFor   = "X-Forwarded-For"
+	forwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
+	// secure is the scheme a client reached traefik with, and plain the
+	// one smallwebwaf serves.
 	secure = "https"
+	plain  = "http"
 )
 
 // appHeaders is what the app tells about the headers it received.
@@ -65,13 +69,13 @@ func TestClientAddressAndForwardedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
 	trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
 	forged := http.Header{
-		forwardedFor:        {client},
-		"X-Forwarded-Host":  {"forged.example"},
-		"X-Forwarded-Proto": {secure},
-		"X-Real-Ip":         {client},
+		forwardedFor:       {client},
+		"X-Forwarded-Host": {"forged.example"},
+		forwardedProto:     {secure},
+		"X-Real-Ip":        {client},
 	}
 	replaced := appHeaders{
-		ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: "http",
+		ForwardedFor: localhost, ForwardedHost: appHost, ForwardedProto: plain,
 	}
 
 	return []clientAddressCase{{
@@ -87,10 +91,10 @@ func clientAddressCases() []clientAddressCase {
 			"outside the trusted proxies from the right",
 		env: trusted,
 		header: http.Header{
-			forwardedFor:        {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
-			"X-Forwarded-Host":  {appHost},
-			"X-Forwarded-Proto": {secure},
-			"X-Real-Ip":         {client},
+			forwardedFor:       {"198.51.100.7, " + client + ", 10.0.0.2"},
+			"X-Forwarded-Host": {appHost},
+			forwardedProto:     {secure},
+			"X-Real-Ip":        {client},
 		},
 		wantClient: client,
 		wantApp: appHeaders{
@@ -138,8 +142,8 @@ func requestWithHeaders(
 			Host:           r.Host,
 			ForwardedFor:   r.Header.Get(forwardedFor),
 			ForwardedHost:  r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Host"),
-			ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"),
-			RealIP:         r.Header.Get("X-Real-Ip"),
+			ForwardedProto: r.Header.Get(forwardedProto),
+			RealIP:         r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"),
 		})
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, env)

internal/proxy/health_test.go

@@ -21,14 +21,18 @@ func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
 	// the last one would have it refused.
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
 
-	const healthChecks = 3
+	const (
+		healthChecks = 3
+		contentType  = "text/plain; charset=utf-8"
+	)
 
 	for range healthChecks {
 		got := get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath)
 		wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
 
-		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" {
-			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q, want ok", got.body)
+		if string(got.body) != "ok\n" || got.header.Get("Content-Type") != contentType {
+			t.Errorf("health endpoint answered %q with Content-Type %q, want ok "+
+				"with %q", got.body, got.header.Get("Content-Type"), contentType)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -37,6 +41,11 @@ func TestHealthEndpointIsAnsweredBeforeAnyCheck(t *testing.T) {
 	lines := out.requestLines(t, healthChecks+1)
 	for _, line := range lines[:healthChecks] {
 		wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+
+		if line.ResponseContentType != contentType {
+			t.Errorf("health check's log line has response_content_type %q, "+
+				"want %q", line.ResponseContentType, contentType)
+		}
 	}
 
 	wantLine(t, lines[healthChecks], http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)

internal/proxy/history_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+func TestHistoryKeepsEachRequestOfTheClient(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "2",
+		deniedCountries:    "kp",
+	})
+	start := clk.Now()
+
+	// Two let through, one over the limit, which bans the client, and one
+	// refused under that ban, for which the country is not looked up.
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	clk.advance(time.Second)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	clk.advance(time.Second)
+	s.get(fromDE, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+
+	want := ratelimit.History{
+		FirstSeen: start,
+		LastSeen:  start.Add(2 * time.Second),
+		Country:   "DE",
+		LookedUp:  start.Add(time.Second),
+		Requests:  4,
+		Forwarded: 2,
+		Refused:   2,
+		// The app answers with no body, smallwebwaf with its status text.
+		ResponseBytes: 2 * int64(len("Forbidden\n")),
+		Responses:     ratelimit.Responses{Status2xx: 2, Status4xx: 2},
+		Offences:      ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1},
+	}
+
+	got := historyOf(t, server, fromDE)
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("history\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHistoryCountsTheBodiesEachWay(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
+	})
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
+
+	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
+	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
+	out.requestLine(t)
+
+	history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
+	if history.RequestBytes != 3 || history.ResponseBytes != 5 {
+		t.Errorf("history counts %d bytes in and %d out, want 3 and 5",
+			history.RequestBytes, history.ResponseBytes)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestHealthEndpointIsNotInTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, nil)
+
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
+	out.requestLine(t)
+
+	if clients := server.Limiter.Snapshot(); len(clients) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the table holds %+v, want no client", clients)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestForSmallwebwafIsRefusedOnlyWithoutTheToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now,
+		map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+
+	// The metrics and the 404 are neither forwarded nor refused; the 401
+	// is refused.
+	scrape(t, addr)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.MetricsPath), http.StatusUnauthorized)
+	out.requestLines(t, 3)
+
+	history := historyOf(t, server, localhost)
+	if history.Requests != 3 || history.Forwarded != 0 || history.Refused != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("history counts %d requests, %d forwarded and %d refused, "+
+			"want 3, 0 and 1", history.Requests, history.Forwarded, history.Refused)
+	}
+}
+
+// historyOf returns the history of the client at addr.
+func historyOf(t *testing.T, server *proxy.Server, addr string) ratelimit.History {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32")
+	for _, c := range server.Limiter.Snapshot() {
+		if c.Client == client {
+			return c.History
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("%s is not in the table", client)
+
+	return ratelimit.History{}
+}

internal/proxy/limits_test.go

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ func TestRequestBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
 			})
 			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 				requestMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
+				metricsToken:    token,
 			})
 
 			var body io.Reader = bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, tc.size))
@@ -66,6 +67,13 @@ func TestRequestBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
 				tc.want)
 			wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), tc.want, tc.action)
 
+			hits := 0
+			if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
+				hits = 1
+			}
+
+			wantLimitHits(t, addr, requestMaxBytes, hits)
+
 			if tc.refusedBeforeApp && calls.Load() != 0 {
 				t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
 			}
@@ -106,6 +114,7 @@ func TestResponseBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
 			})
 			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 				responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
+				metricsToken:     token,
 			})
 
 			got := get(t, addr, "/download")
@@ -123,6 +132,13 @@ func TestResponseBodyLimit(t *testing.T) {
 			if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
 				t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d", line.UpstreamStatus)
 			}
+
+			hits := 0
+			if tc.action == requestlog.ActionTooLarge {
+				hits = 1
+			}
+
+			wantLimitHits(t, addr, responseMaxBytes, hits)
 		})
 	}
 }

internal/proxy/metrics_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+const (
+	metricsToken = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN" //nolint:gosec // the setting's name
+	metricsTopN  = "SWWAF_METRICS_TOP_N"
+	// token is the SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN the tests set, and bearer how a
+	// request carries it.
+	token  = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+	bearer = "Bearer " + token
+)
+
+func TestMetricsAreOffWhileTheTokenIsUnset(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+	})
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
+
+	// An empty token does not match the unset one either.
+	for i, authorization := range []string{bearer, "Bearer ", ""} {
+		req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
+		if authorization != "" {
+			req.Header.Set("Authorization", authorization)
+		}
+
+		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusNotFound)
+		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], http.StatusNotFound,
+			requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+	}
+
+	if calls.Load() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMetricsNeedTheTokenAndOtherPathsAreNotFound(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+	})
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+
+	for i, tc := range []struct {
+		method, path, authorization string
+		status                      int
+	}{
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "", http.StatusUnauthorized},
+		{
+			http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Bearer " + strings.ToUpper(token),
+			http.StatusUnauthorized,
+		},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "Basic " + token, http.StatusUnauthorized},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusOK},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, "bearer " + token, http.StatusOK},
+		{http.MethodPost, proxy.MetricsPath, bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath + "/", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{http.MethodGet, "/_smallwebwaf/bans", bearer, http.StatusNotFound},
+		{http.MethodPost, proxy.HealthPath, "", http.StatusNotFound},
+	} {
+		req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, http.NoBody)
+		if tc.authorization != "" {
+			req.Header.Set("Authorization", tc.authorization)
+		}
+
+		got := do(t, req)
+		wantStatus(t, got, tc.status)
+		wantLine(t, out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i], tc.status, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+
+		if tc.status == http.StatusUnauthorized &&
+			got.header.Get("WWW-Authenticate") != "Bearer" {
+			t.Errorf("%q was answered without WWW-Authenticate: Bearer",
+				tc.authorization)
+		}
+
+		if tc.status == http.StatusOK &&
+			!strings.Contains(string(got.body), "# TYPE smallwebwaf_requests_total counter") {
+			t.Errorf("the metrics are\n%s", got.body)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if calls.Load() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want never", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMetricsAreAskedForThroughTheChecks(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		metricsToken:       token,
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+	})
+
+	// Asking for the metrics counts toward the client's limit of one
+	// request a minute, so its next request breaks it, and bans it. A
+	// banned client is refused the metrics too.
+	s.scrape(client)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	s.requestWithHeader(client, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountTheTraffic(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	arrived, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
+
+		if r.URL.Path == "/held" {
+			close(arrived)
+			<-release
+		}
+
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
+	})
+	releaseApp := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
+	t.Cleanup(releaseApp)
+
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{metricsToken: token})
+
+	got := do(t, newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc")))
+	wantStatus(t, got, http.StatusOK)
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/_smallwebwaf/nothing"), http.StatusNotFound)
+	out.requestLines(t, 2)
+
+	forward := `{action="forward",status_class="2xx"}`
+	notFound := `{action="admin",status_class="4xx"}`
+
+	// The request for the metrics is itself under way.
+	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+forward, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_total"+notFound, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_bytes_total"+forward, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+forward, 5)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_response_bytes_total"+notFound,
+		float64(len("Not Found\n")))
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_request_duration_seconds_count", 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_upstream_duration_seconds_count", 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight", 1)
+	metric(t, metrics, "go_goroutines")
+	metric(t, metrics, "process_start_time_seconds")
+
+	// A request the app holds is under way until it ends.
+	httpClient := newClient(t)
+	held := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/held", http.NoBody)
+	ended := make(chan error, 1)
+
+	go func() {
+		res, err := httpClient.Do(held)
+		if err == nil {
+			err = readAnswer(res).err
+		}
+
+		ended <- err
+	}()
+
+	<-arrived
+	wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), "smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight", 2)
+	releaseApp()
+
+	err := <-ended
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("held request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	out.requestLines(t, 5)
+	wantMetric(t, scrape(t, addr), "smallwebwaf_requests_in_flight", 1)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountLimitsAndBans(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+		denied  = "192.0.2.50"  // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+	)
+
+	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		metricsToken:        token,
+		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
+		rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
+		denyNets:            denied,
+		banResponse:         "close",
+		limitBanDuration:    "1h",
+		maxBanDuration:      "2h",
+	})
+
+	// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE=close sends no status at all.
+	s.get(denied, 0, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+
+	// A first broken limit bans for an hour.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="denied",status_class="none"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{window="minute"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{kind="limit"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_active_bans", 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans", 0)
+
+	clk.advance(time.Hour)
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), "smallwebwaf_active_bans", 0)
+
+	// A limit broken again right after would ban for three hours, longer
+	// than SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION, so the ban is permanent.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, 0, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	metrics = s.scrape(scraper)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_rate_limit_hits_total{window="minute"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_offences_total{kind="limit"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_active_bans", 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans", 1)
+	// denied, client, and the scraper as of its earlier requests.
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_tracked_clients", 3)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountTheBansAnAdminMakes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const scraper = "192.0.2.200" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		metricsToken:        token,
+		rateLimitExemptNets: scraper,
+	})
+
+	const admins = `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="admin"}`
+
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 0)
+
+	// As an admin's edit of bans.json that adds a ban is taken in.
+	server.Ledger.LoadEdit([]bans.Ban{{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"),
+		Start:    clk.Now(),
+	}})
+
+	wantMetric(t, s.scrape(scraper), admins, 1)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsByCountryKeepTheBusiestAndCountTheRestAsOther(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const fromFR = "198.51.100.20"
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello")
+	})
+	env := map[string]string{
+		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
+		metricsToken:    token,
+		metricsTopN:     "2",
+		deniedCountries: "kp",
+	}
+	addr, out, server := startProxyWithClock(t, app.URL, "", time.Now, env)
+
+	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
+	// GeoJS.
+	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
+		keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"), keptAnswer(fromDE, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromFR, "FR"),
+	})
+
+	lines := 0
+	send := func(from string, times, status int) {
+		t.Helper()
+
+		for range times {
+			req := newRequest(t, http.MethodPost, addr, "/", strings.NewReader("abc"))
+			req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, from)
+			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), status)
+
+			// Each is counted before the next is sent, so that the
+			// countries are ranked in the order sent.
+			lines++
+			out.requestLines(t, lines)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// With two countries of their own, the third is counted as other.
+	send(fromKP, 3, http.StatusForbidden)
+	send(fromDE, 2, http.StatusOK)
+	send(fromFR, 1, http.StatusOK)
+
+	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
+	lines++
+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="DE"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="other"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_list_refusals_total{country="KP"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="KP"}`, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE"}`, 6)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total{country="KP"}`,
+		float64(3*len("Forbidden\n")))
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_response_bytes_total{country="other"}`,
+		float64(len("hello")))
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="FR"}`)
+
+	// Once FR is busier than DE, it takes DE's place: its series counts
+	// from then on, and DE's is gone.
+	send(fromFR, 3, http.StatusOK)
+
+	metrics = scrape(t, addr)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="KP"}`, 3)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="FR"}`, 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="other"}`, 2)
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_requests_total{country="DE"}`)
+	wantNoSeries(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_country_request_bytes_total{country="DE"}`)
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountGeoJSRequestsAndFailures(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	geojs := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+		}))
+	t.Cleanup(geojs.Close)
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+	addr, _ := startProxyWithGeoJS(t, app.URL, geojs.URL, map[string]string{
+		trustedProxies:  trustLocalhost,
+		metricsToken:    token,
+		deniedCountries: "kp",
+	})
+
+	// GeoJS fails, so the client counts as coming from an unknown country,
+	// which SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES does not refuse.
+	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, fromDE)
+	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
+
+	// The client stops waiting for GeoJS after a second, so GeoJS's
+	// failure can come after its request has ended.
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(waitLimit)
+	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
+
+	for metric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total") == 0 &&
+		time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
+
+		metrics = scrape(t, addr)
+	}
+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_geojs_requests_total", 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_geojs_failures_total", 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_geojs_unanswered_total", 1)
+}
+
+// keptAnswer returns GeoJS's answer that the client at addr is in
+// country, given now.
+func keptAnswer(addr, country string) lookup.Answer {
+	now := time.Now()
+
+	return lookup.Answer{
+		Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(addr + "/32"), Country: country,
+		Answered: now, Used: now,
+	}
+}
+
+// scrape asks smallwebwaf at addr for the metrics, with the token, and
+// returns them.
+func scrape(t *testing.T, addr string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", bearer)
+
+	got := do(t, req)
+	if got.status != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("the metrics were answered %d", got.status)
+	}
+
+	return string(got.body)
+}
+
+// scrape asks for the metrics, with the token, from the client at from,
+// and returns them.
+func (s *sender) scrape(from string) string {
+	s.t.Helper()
+
+	_, metrics := s.requestWithHeader(from, proxy.MetricsPath, "Authorization: "+bearer,
+		http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionAdmin)
+
+	return metrics
+}
+
+// metric returns the value of series in metrics, which are in the
+// Prometheus text format. series is a name and its labels in the order of
+// their names, such as smallwebwaf_offences_total{kind="limit"}. It fails
+// the test if there is no such series.
+func metric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) float64 {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for line := range strings.Lines(metrics) {
+		value, found := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), series+" ")
+		if !found {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		number, err := strconv.ParseFloat(value, 64)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s has the value %q", series, value)
+		}
+
+		return number
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("no series %s in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
+
+	return 0
+}
+
+// wantMetric checks the value of series in metrics, as metric reads it.
+func wantMetric(t *testing.T, metrics, series string, want float64) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got := metric(t, metrics, series)
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("%s is %v, want %v", series, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantNoSeries checks that metrics have no series series.
+func wantNoSeries(t *testing.T, metrics, series string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+" ") {
+		t.Errorf("there is a series %s", series)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantLimitHits checks that the metrics of smallwebwaf at addr count hits
+// requests that passed the size or time limit of the setting limit, with
+// no series for it when hits is 0.
+func wantLimitHits(t *testing.T, addr, limit string, hits int) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	series := `smallwebwaf_size_and_time_limit_hits_total{limit="` + limit + `"}`
+	metrics := scrape(t, addr)
+
+	if hits == 0 {
+		wantNoSeries(t, metrics, series)
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, series, float64(hits))
+}

internal/proxy/observe_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// observe is the value of SWWAF_MODE for observe mode.
+const observe = "observe"
+
+func TestObserveModeForwardsWhatEnforceModeRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+		banned = otherClient  // under a ban read from bans.json
+	)
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		setting string // "" leaves SWWAF_MODE at its default
+		observe bool
+	}{
+		{"", false},
+		{"enforce", false},
+		{observe, true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(mode+"="+tc.setting, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
+			env := map[string]string{
+				rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+				denyNets:           denied,
+				deniedCountries:    "kp",
+			}
+
+			if tc.setting != "" {
+				env[mode] = tc.setting
+			}
+
+			s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, geojsURL, env)
+			server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{{
+				Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(banned + "/32"),
+				Start:    clk.Now(),
+				Expires:  clk.Now().Add(time.Hour),
+			}})
+
+			// fromDE's first request is within the limit of one a minute,
+			// and its second breaks it.
+			s.get(fromDE, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+			for _, sent := range []struct{ from, refusal string }{
+				{denied, requestlog.ActionDenied},
+				{banned, requestlog.ActionBanned},
+				{fromKP, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
+				{fromDE, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+			} {
+				if !tc.observe {
+					line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusForbidden, sent.refusal)
+					wantWouldAction(t, line, "")
+
+					continue
+				}
+
+				// Passed to the app, which answered it.
+				line := s.get(sent.from, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+				wantWouldAction(t, line, sent.refusal)
+
+				if line.UpstreamStatus != http.StatusOK {
+					t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %d, want 200",
+						line.UpstreamStatus)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeMakesNoBanAndKeepsTheBansItHas(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		mode:               observe,
+		rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
+	})
+	kept := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netip.MustParsePrefix(otherClient + "/32"),
+		Start:    clk.Now(),
+		Expires:  clk.Now().Add(time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseAdmin,
+	}
+	server.Ledger.Load([]bans.Ban{kept})
+
+	// No ban sets client's counters back to zero, so each request after
+	// the first breaks the limit of one a minute.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	for range 2 {
+		line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+		if line.LimitHit != minute || line.Offence != requestlog.OffenceLimit ||
+			line.BanExpires != "" {
+			t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, offence %q and ban_expires %q, "+
+				"want minute, limit and none", line.LimitHit, line.Offence,
+				line.BanExpires)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// The ban read from bans.json refuses nothing, and so counts no
+	// refusal in its notes, but is kept.
+	line := s.get(otherClient, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+
+	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(kept.Expires) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want %s", line.BanExpires,
+			requestlog.FormatTime(kept.Expires))
+	}
+
+	got := server.Ledger.Snapshot()
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != kept {
+		t.Errorf("bans\n%+v\nwant only\n%+v", got, kept)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeKeepsTheSizeLimitsAndTheToken(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+
+	var calls atomic.Int32
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		answerWithSize(w, 2*sizeLimit, true)
+	})
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
+		mode:             observe,
+		trustedProxies:   trustLocalhost,
+		denyNets:         denied,
+		requestMaxBytes:  sizeLimitSetting,
+		responseMaxBytes: sizeLimitSetting,
+		metricsToken:     token,
+	})
+
+	// SWWAF_DENY_NETS would refuse each request; instead a size limit or
+	// the missing token does.
+	for i, tc := range []struct {
+		method, path string
+		body         io.Reader
+		status       int
+		action       string
+	}{
+		{
+			http.MethodPost, "/upload", bytes.NewReader(make([]byte, 2*sizeLimit)),
+			http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
+		},
+		{
+			http.MethodGet, "/download", http.NoBody,
+			http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
+		},
+		{
+			http.MethodGet, proxy.MetricsPath, http.NoBody,
+			http.StatusUnauthorized, requestlog.ActionAdmin,
+		},
+	} {
+		req := newRequest(t, tc.method, addr, tc.path, tc.body)
+		req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
+		wantStatus(t, do(t, req), tc.status)
+
+		line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
+		wantLine(t, line, tc.status, tc.action)
+		wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+	}
+
+	// The upload was refused before it reached the app.
+	if calls.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+// wantWouldAction checks the request log line's would_action, and that a
+// line that should have none has no such field.
+func wantWouldAction(t *testing.T, line logLine, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got, present := line.fields["would_action"]
+
+	switch {
+	case want == "" && present:
+		t.Errorf("log line has would_action %v, want none", got)
+	case want != "" && got != want:
+		t.Errorf("log line has would_action %v, want %s", got, want)
+	}
+}

internal/proxy/passthrough_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"reflect"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
@@ -14,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 
@@ -115,27 +118,34 @@ func wantAnswer(t *testing.T, got answer, body []byte) {
 	}
 }
 
-// wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request.
+// wantRequestFields checks the log line's fields about the request. Its
+// time, its id and its timings are checked only for being there.
 func wantRequestFields(t *testing.T, line logLine, host string, sent, received int) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	want := requestlog.Line{
-		Type: "request", Time: line.Time, ClientIP: localhost, PeerIP: localhost,
-		Method: http.MethodPatch, Host: host, Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery,
-		Protocol: "HTTP/1.1", Status: http.StatusTeapot,
-		UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
+	hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
+
+	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
+		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: hostname,
+		ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPatch, Scheme: plain, Host: host,
+		Path: rawPath, Query: rawQuery, Protocol: protocol,
+		Status: http.StatusTeapot, RequestBytes: int64(sent),
 		ResponseBytes: int64(received), UserAgent: "test-agent",
-		Action: requestlog.ActionForward, DurationTotal: line.DurationTotal,
-		DurationUpstreamTotal: line.DurationUpstreamTotal,
-	}
-	if line.Line != want {
+		RequestID: line.RequestID, PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
+		ContentLength: int64(sent), ResponseContentType: "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
+		UpstreamStatus: http.StatusTeapot, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
+		Counts: ratelimit.Counts{Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1},
+	})
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
 		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
 	}
 
 	_, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, line.Time)
-	if err != nil || line.DurationTotal <= 0 || line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
-		t.Errorf("log line has time %q and durations %v and %v",
-			line.Time, line.DurationTotal, line.DurationUpstreamTotal)
+	if err != nil || line.RequestID == "" || line.DurationTotal <= 0 ||
+		line.DurationUpstreamTotal == nil || *line.DurationUpstreamTotal <= 0 {
+		t.Errorf("log line has time %q, request_id %q and durations %v and %v",
+			line.Time, line.RequestID, line.DurationTotal,
+			line.fields["duration_upstream_total"])
 	}
 }
 
@@ -297,7 +307,7 @@ func echoAfterUpgrade(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestServerHasTheFixedLimits(t *testing.T) {
+func TestServerHasTheDefaultLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(string) (string, bool) { return "", false })
@@ -319,37 +329,48 @@ func TestServerHasTheFixedLimits(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRefusesHeadersOver32KiB(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRefusesHeadersOverTheLimit(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-
-	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-	})
-	addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
-
-	// size counts every byte of the request: the request line, the
-	// headers and the blank line that ends them.
-	const (
-		start = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nX-Large: "
-		end   = "\r\n\r\n"
-	)
-
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		size int
-		want int
+		name  string
+		env   map[string]string
+		limit int
 	}{
-		{size: 32 << 10, want: http.StatusOK},
-		{size: 32<<10 + 1, want: http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge},
+		{"by default", nil, 32 << 10},
+		{"as set", map[string]string{clientHeaderMaxBytes: "8K"}, 8 << 10},
 	} {
-		conn := dial(t, addr)
-		send(t, conn, start+strings.Repeat("a", tc.size-len(start)-len(end))+end)
-		wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), tc.want)
-	}
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
 
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
+			var calls atomic.Int32
+
+			app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {
+				calls.Add(1)
+			})
+			addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
+
+			// size counts every byte of the request: the request line,
+			// the headers and the blank line that ends them.
+			const (
+				start = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\nX-Large: "
+				end   = "\r\n\r\n"
+			)
+
+			for _, sent := range []struct{ size, want int }{
+				{tc.limit, http.StatusOK},
+				{tc.limit + 1, http.StatusRequestHeaderFieldsTooLarge},
+			} {
+				conn := dial(t, addr)
+				send(t, conn,
+					start+strings.Repeat("a", sent.size-len(start)-len(end))+end)
+				wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), sent.want)
+			}
+
+			if calls.Load() != 1 {
+				t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want once", calls.Load())
+			}
+		})
 	}
 }
 
@@ -360,8 +381,13 @@ func TestAnswers502WhenTheAppCannotBeReached(t *testing.T) {
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, "http://"+localhost+":1", nil)
 
 	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusBadGateway)
-	wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), http.StatusBadGateway,
-		requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
+
+	line := out.requestLine(t)
+	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusBadGateway, requestlog.ActionUpstreamError)
+
+	// There never was a connection to the app, nor an answer from it.
+	wantTimings(t, line, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
+		"duration_upstream_total")
 
 	logged := slices.ContainsFunc(out.lines(t), func(line map[string]any) bool {
 		return line["type"] == "process" && line["msg"] == "request to the app failed"

internal/proxy/proxy.go

@@ -8,25 +8,16 @@ import (
 	"log"
 	"log/slog"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
-)
-
-// The request line and headers a client may send, and how long a
-// kept-open client connection may wait for its next request, are fixed
-// rather than settings. The limit on the request line and headers is
-// 32 KiB, but Go's server reads 4 KiB past its MaxHeaderBytes before it
-// refuses, so MaxHeaderBytes is set 4 KiB lower. The idle time is longer
-// than the 90 seconds after which traefik closes a connection it is not
-// using, so traefik never sends a request on a connection smallwebwaf is
-// closing.
-const (
-	requestHeaderMaxBytes = 32<<10 - 4<<10
-	clientIdleTimeout     = 120 * time.Second
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 
 // How smallwebwaf keeps connections to the app open between requests.
@@ -35,10 +26,18 @@ const (
 	appIdleConnTimeout = 90 * time.Second
 )
 
+// adminPrefix starts the path of every request for smallwebwaf itself,
+// which never reaches the app.
+const adminPrefix = "/_smallwebwaf/"
+
 // HealthPath is smallwebwaf's health endpoint, which the container's
 // health check asks.
 const HealthPath = "/_smallwebwaf/healthz"
 
+// MetricsPath is where the metrics are, for a request that carries
+// SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN.
+const MetricsPath = "/_smallwebwaf/metrics"
+
 // Params are what New needs.
 type Params struct {
 	Config *config.Config
@@ -49,39 +48,83 @@ type Params struct {
 	// GeoJSURL is where clients' countries are looked up, normally
 	// lookup.URL. GeoJS is asked only while a country list is set.
 	GeoJSURL string
+	// Now tells the time by which requests are counted for the rate
+	// limits, bans are made and run out, and GeoJS's answers are kept,
+	// normally time.Now in UTC, the time the state files give.
+	Now func() time.Time
+	// Rules are the rule files' rules, which each request is checked
+	// against.
+	Rules *rules.Files
+}
+
+// Server is the server smallwebwaf runs, with the parts of the proxy
+// whose state the state files keep, and the metrics.
+type Server struct {
+	*http.Server
+
+	Ledger  *bans.Ledger
+	Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
+	GeoJS   *lookup.GeoJS
+	Metrics *metrics.Metrics
 }
 
 // New returns the server smallwebwaf runs: each request it reads passes
-// through the proxy. Go's server itself refuses headers over 32 KiB, with
-// 431, closes a connection idle for 120 seconds, and applies
+// through the proxy. Go's server itself refuses a request line and
+// headers over SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES, with 431, closes a
+// connection idle for SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT, and applies
 // SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT while the headers arrive; the proxy
 // applies the timeouts and size limits from then on.
-func New(params Params) *http.Server {
+func New(params Params) *Server {
 	errorLog := slog.NewLogLogger(params.ProcessLog.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn)
+	m := metrics.New(params.Config.MetricsTopN)
+	h := &handler{
+		config:     params.Config,
+		requestLog: params.RequestLog,
+		processLog: params.ProcessLog,
+		errorLog:   errorLog,
+		transport:  newTransport(),
+		now:        params.Now,
+		metrics:    m,
+		limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
+			PerMinute: params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
+			PerHour:   params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
+			PerDay:    params.Config.RateLimitPerDay,
+		}),
+		ledger: bans.New(bans.Rules{
+			LimitBanDuration:     params.Config.LimitBanDuration,
+			LimitBanRepeatWindow: params.Config.LimitBanRepeatWindow,
+			MaxBanDuration:       params.Config.MaxBanDuration,
+			AttackBanDuration:    params.Config.AttackBanDuration,
+			MaxBans:              params.Config.MaxBans,
+		}),
+		geojs: lookup.New(lookup.Params{
+			URL:        params.GeoJSURL,
+			Now:        params.Now,
+			ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
+			Metrics:    m,
+		}),
+		rules: params.Rules,
+	}
+	m.AddBansAndClients(h.ledger, h.limiter, params.Now)
+	m.AddRules(params.Rules)
 
-	return &http.Server{
-		Addr: params.Config.ListenAddr,
-		Handler: &handler{
-			config:     params.Config,
-			requestLog: params.RequestLog,
-			processLog: params.ProcessLog,
-			errorLog:   errorLog,
-			transport:  newTransport(),
-			limiter: ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{
-				PerMinute: params.Config.RateLimitPerMinute,
-				PerHour:   params.Config.RateLimitPerHour,
-				PerDay:    params.Config.RateLimitPerDay,
-			}),
-			geojs: lookup.New(lookup.Params{
-				URL:        params.GeoJSURL,
-				Now:        time.Now,
-				ProcessLog: params.ProcessLog,
-			}),
+	return &Server{
+		Server: &http.Server{
+			Addr:              params.Config.ListenAddr,
+			Handler:           h,
+			ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
+			// Off is an IdleTimeout of 0, which Go's server replaces with
+			// ReadTimeout: no limit, as long as ReadTimeout stays unset.
+			IdleTimeout: params.Config.ClientIdleTimeout,
+			// Go's server reads 4 KiB past MaxHeaderBytes before it
+			// refuses, so the limit a client meets is the setting.
+			MaxHeaderBytes: int(params.Config.ClientRequestHeaderMaxBytes - 4<<10),
+			ErrorLog:       errorLog,
 		},
-		ReadHeaderTimeout: params.Config.ClientRequestTimeout,
-		IdleTimeout:       clientIdleTimeout,
-		MaxHeaderBytes:    requestHeaderMaxBytes,
-		ErrorLog:          errorLog,
+		Ledger:  h.ledger,
+		Limiter: h.limiter,
+		GeoJS:   h.geojs,
+		Metrics: m,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -93,8 +136,12 @@ type handler struct {
 	processLog *slog.Logger
 	errorLog   *log.Logger
 	transport  http.RoundTripper
+	now        func() time.Time
+	metrics    *metrics.Metrics
 	limiter    *ratelimit.Limiter
+	ledger     *bans.Ledger
 	geojs      *lookup.GeoJS
+	rules      *rules.Files
 }
 
 // newTransport returns what carries requests to the app. It never goes
@@ -111,7 +158,8 @@ func newTransport() *http.Transport {
 
 // ServeHTTP handles one request: it works out the client, runs the
 // checks, passes the request to the app and the answer back within the
-// limits, and writes the request's log line.
+// limits, or answers it itself if it is for smallwebwaf, and writes the
+// request's log line.
 func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	rq := h.newRequest(w, r)
 	defer rq.finish()
@@ -120,17 +168,33 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// a health checker is never refused. It does not ask the app.
 	if r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.URL.Path == HealthPath {
 		rq.line.Action = requestlog.ActionAdmin
+		// Set here rather than left to Go's server, which would set it only
+		// after the log line has taken the response's headers.
+		rq.out.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
 		_, _ = io.WriteString(rq.out, "ok\n")
 
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Once the request has ended, before its log line is written.
+	defer rq.addToHistory()
+
 	refused := rq.check(r.Context())
+	rq.checked = time.Now()
+
 	if refused != nil {
 		rq.answer(*refused)
 
 		return
 	}
 
+	// A request for smallwebwaf itself is answered where another would be
+	// passed to the app, so that it goes through every check first.
+	if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, adminPrefix) {
+		rq.answerAdmin()
+
+		return
+	}
+
 	rq.forward(r.Context())
 }

internal/proxy/proxy_test.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ const (
 	// localhost is where every test server listens, and so the address
 	// smallwebwaf sees each test's requests come from.
 	localhost = "127.0.0.1"
+	// requestType is the type that marks a request log line.
+	requestType = "request"
+	// protocol is the protocol of every test's requests.
+	protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
 )
 
 // shortTimeoutSetting is shortTimeout as a setting's value.
@@ -45,9 +50,12 @@ var shortTimeoutSetting = shortTimeout.String()
 // The settings the tests set.
 const (
 	clientRequestTimeout    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
+	clientHeaderMaxBytes    = "SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES"
+	clientIdleTimeout       = "SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT"
 	clientResponseTimeout   = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
 	upstreamRequestTimeout  = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT"
 	upstreamResponseTimeout = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
+	mode                    = "SWWAF_MODE"
 	requestMaxBytes         = "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES"
 	responseMaxBytes        = "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES"
 	trustedProxies          = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
@@ -55,8 +63,20 @@ const (
 	rateLimitExemptNets     = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS"
 	denyNets                = "SWWAF_DENY_NETS"
 	rateLimitPerMinute      = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE"
+	rateLimitPerDay         = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
+	rateLimitExemptPaths    = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS"
 	deniedCountries         = "SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES"
 	allowedCountries        = "SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES"
+	banResponse             = "SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE"
+	limitBanDuration        = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION"
+	limitBanRepeatWindow    = "SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW"
+	maxBanDuration          = "SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION"
+	maxBans                 = "SWWAF_MAX_BANS"
+	banScopeV4Prefix        = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
+	instanceName            = "SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME"
+	logRequestHeaders       = "SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS"
+	attackBanDuration       = "SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION"
+	rulesDir                = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
 )
 
 // output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
@@ -73,6 +93,14 @@ func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
 	return o.buf.Write(p)
 }
 
+// text returns everything written so far.
+func (o *output) text() string {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return o.buf.String()
+}
+
 // lines returns every line written so far, decoded.
 func (o *output) lines(t *testing.T) []map[string]any {
 	t.Helper()
@@ -112,7 +140,7 @@ func (o *output) requestLines(t *testing.T, count int) []logLine {
 		var found []logLine
 
 		for _, fields := range o.lines(t) {
-			if fields["type"] == "request" {
+			if fields["type"] == requestType {
 				found = append(found, decodeLine(t, fields))
 			}
 		}
@@ -181,7 +209,21 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
 ) (string, *output) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	settings := map[string]string{"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL}
+	addr, out, _ := startProxyWithClock(t, appURL, geojsURL, time.Now, env)
+
+	return addr, out
+}
+
+// startProxyWithClock is startProxyWithGeoJS with requests counted and
+// bans made by the time now tells, and returns the server as well. Unless
+// env sets SWWAF_RULES_DIR, it is an empty directory, of no rules.
+func startProxyWithClock(
+	t *testing.T, appURL, geojsURL string, now func() time.Time,
+	env map[string]string,
+) (string, *output, *proxy.Server) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	settings := map[string]string{"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL": appURL, rulesDir: t.TempDir()}
 	maps.Copy(settings, env)
 
 	cfg, err := config.FromEnvironment(func(name string) (string, bool) {
@@ -194,11 +236,22 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
 	}
 
 	out := &output{}
+	processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out)
+
+	ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
+		Dir: cfg.RulesDir, Enabled: cfg.RulesEnabled, ProcessLog: processLog,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rule files: %v", err)
+	}
+
 	server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
 		Config:     cfg,
 		RequestLog: out,
-		ProcessLog: requestlog.NewProcessLogger(out),
+		ProcessLog: processLog,
 		GeoJSURL:   geojsURL,
+		Now:        now,
+		Rules:      ruleFiles,
 	})
 
 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
@@ -214,7 +267,7 @@ func startProxyWithGeoJS(
 		_ = server.Close()
 	})
 
-	return listener.Addr().String(), out
+	return listener.Addr().String(), out, server
 }
 
 // newClient returns an HTTP client that sends requests as they are made,

internal/proxy/ratelimits_test.go

@@ -5,10 +5,16 @@ import (
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 
-func TestRateLimitRefusesWith429BeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
+// minute is the window of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE, as a log line's
+// limit_hit names it.
+const minute = "minute"
+
+func TestRateLimitRefusesBeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	var calls atomic.Int32
@@ -24,19 +30,19 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesWith429BeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 	const otherClient = "203.0.113.10"
 
 	// With a limit of one request a minute, a client's second request is
-	// refused. A client is one IPv4 address, or one IPv6 /64; an IPv4
-	// address in IPv6 form is that IPv4 address.
+	// refused, with 403 by default. A client is one IPv4 address, or one
+	// IPv6 /64; an IPv4 address in IPv6 form is that IPv4 address.
 	requests := []struct {
 		client string // as X-Forwarded-For names it
 		logged string // as the log line's client_ip names it
 		want   int
 	}{
 		{client, client, http.StatusOK},
-		{client, client, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
+		{client, client, http.StatusForbidden},
 		{otherClient, otherClient, http.StatusOK},
-		{"::ffff:" + otherClient, otherClient, http.StatusTooManyRequests},
+		{"::ffff:" + otherClient, otherClient, http.StatusForbidden},
 		{"2001:db8::1", "2001:db8::1", http.StatusOK},
-		{"2001:db8::8000:0:0:1", "2001:db8::8000:0:0:1", http.StatusTooManyRequests},
+		{"2001:db8::8000:0:0:1", "2001:db8::8000:0:0:1", http.StatusForbidden},
 		{"2001:db8:0:1::1", "2001:db8:0:1::1", http.StatusOK},
 	}
 
@@ -53,9 +59,9 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesWith429BeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 		if sent.want == http.StatusOK {
 			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
 		} else {
-			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+			wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
 
-			if line.LimitHit != "minute" {
+			if line.LimitHit != minute {
 				t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q, want minute", line.LimitHit)
 			}
 		}
@@ -65,3 +71,89 @@ func TestRateLimitRefusesWith429BeforeTheApp(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("the app was called %d times, want 4", calls.Load())
 	}
 }
+
+func TestRateLimitExemptPathsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rateLimitPerMinute:   "1",
+		rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/,/favicon.ico",
+		denyNets:             denied,
+		deniedCountries:      "kp",
+	})
+
+	// The answers are kept before the requests, so that none waits for
+	// GeoJS.
+	server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{
+		keptAnswer(client, "DE"), keptAnswer(fromKP, "KP"),
+	})
+
+	// With a limit of one request a minute, the requests for paths under a
+	// prefix are not counted, so client's first request for / is within
+	// the limit; and once client has reached it, they are not refused.
+	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.request(client, "/favicon.ico?v=2", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	line := s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	if line.LimitHit != "" || line.Counts != (ratelimit.Counts{}) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has limit_hit %q and counts %+v, want neither",
+			line.LimitHit, line.Counts)
+	}
+
+	// A path outside every prefix is counted: /assets is not under
+	// /assets/, and breaks the limit.
+	s.request(client, "/assets", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+
+	// A ban, SWWAF_DENY_NETS and the country lists still refuse a path
+	// under a prefix.
+	s.request(client, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.request(denied, "/assets/app.js", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied)
+	s.request(fromKP, "/assets/app.js",
+		http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied)
+}
+
+func TestRateLimitCountsPathsThatAreNotExempt(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, sent := range []string{
+		// A prefix matches only at the start of the path.
+		"/static/assets/app.js",
+		// A prefix matches the path as sent: a router that matches the
+		// path as received does not take /%61ssets/x for a path under
+		// /assets/.
+		"/%61ssets/x",
+		// .. once percent-decoded: an app may act on these as /login, the
+		// last as a path under /sneak/app/ or as /assets/x.
+		"/assets/../login",
+		"/assets/%2e%2e/login",
+		"/assets/..%2Flogin",
+		"/assets/..;/login",
+		"/sneak/app/src/branch/main/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fassets/x",
+		// Not under /assets/ as sent: Go's router takes /assets%2Fx for one
+		// path segment, not a path under /assets/.
+		"/assets%2Fx",
+		"/assets%2fx",
+		// Under /assets/ as sent, but holding an encoded slash, in either
+		// case, or a backslash: never exempt, whatever the prefix.
+		"/assets/x%2Fy",
+		"/assets/x%2fy",
+		`/assets/x\y`,
+	} {
+		t.Run(sent, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+				rateLimitPerMinute:   "1",
+				rateLimitExemptPaths: "/assets/",
+			})
+
+			// Counted, the second request breaks the limit of one request
+			// a minute.
+			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+			s.request(client, sent, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/proxy/request.go

@@ -7,11 +7,15 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptrace"
 	"net/http/httputil"
 	"net/netip"
+	"net/url"
 	"os"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
 )
 
@@ -21,10 +25,13 @@ const flushAfterEachWrite time.Duration = -1
 
 // refusal is smallwebwaf refusing a request, or refusing to go on with it:
 // the status the client is answered if the response has not started yet,
-// and the action the log line names.
+// 0 to close the connection without an answer, the action the log line
+// names, and the setting whose size or time limit the request passed, if
+// that is why.
 type refusal struct {
 	status int
 	action string
+	limit  string
 }
 
 // request is one request on its way through smallwebwaf, from the moment
@@ -42,7 +49,9 @@ type request struct {
 	peer        netip.Addr
 	peerTrusted bool
 	start       time.Time
-	// upstreamStart is when the request was handed to the app.
+	// checked is when the checks were done, and upstreamStart when the
+	// request was handed to the app.
+	checked       time.Time
 	upstreamStart time.Time
 	// cancel ends the request to the app.
 	cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -52,24 +61,34 @@ type request struct {
 	complete bool
 
 	// mu guards what follows. The timeouts run on goroutines of their
-	// own, and the transport starts and stops them from its own; once
-	// timersStopped is set, none of them acts any more.
+	// own, and the transport starts and stops them, and notes the times
+	// below, from its own; once timersStopped is set, none of the timeouts
+	// acts any more.
 	mu                    sync.Mutex
 	timersStopped         bool
 	clientRequestTimer    *time.Timer
 	upstreamRequestTimer  *time.Timer
 	upstreamResponseTimer *time.Timer
-	// requestSent is when the app had been sent the whole request.
-	requestSent time.Time
+	// connected is when there was a connection to the app, requestSent
+	// when the app had been sent the whole request, and answerStarted
+	// when the first byte of its answer arrived.
+	connected     time.Time
+	requestSent   time.Time
+	answerStarted time.Time
 }
 
-// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time and works out the
-// client.
+// newRequest starts handling r: it notes the time, counts the request as
+// under way, works out the client, and starts the log line with what is
+// known of the request.
 func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
+	h.metrics.RequestStarted()
+
 	start := time.Now()
 	peer := peerAddress(r)
 	trusted := h.config.TrustedProxies
-	client := clientAddress(peer, r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), trusted)
+	peerTrusted := isInside(peer, trusted)
+	forwardedFor := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For")
+	client := clientAddress(peer, forwardedFor, trusted)
 
 	rq := &request{
 		h:           h,
@@ -78,22 +97,37 @@ func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
 		out:         &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w},
 		client:      client,
 		peer:        peer,
-		peerTrusted: isInside(peer, trusted),
+		peerTrusted: peerTrusted,
 		start:       start,
 		line: requestlog.Line{
-			Time:      requestlog.FormatTime(start),
-			ClientIP:  client.String(),
-			PeerIP:    peer.String(),
-			Method:    r.Method,
-			Host:      r.Host,
-			Path:      r.URL.EscapedPath(),
-			Query:     r.URL.RawQuery,
-			Protocol:  r.Proto,
-			Referer:   r.Referer(),
-			UserAgent: r.UserAgent(),
-			Action:    requestlog.ActionForward,
+			Time:             requestlog.FormatTime(start),
+			Instance:         h.config.InstanceName,
+			ClientIP:         client.String(),
+			Method:           r.Method,
+			Scheme:           scheme(r, peerTrusted),
+			Host:             r.Host,
+			Path:             r.URL.EscapedPath(),
+			Query:            r.URL.RawQuery,
+			Protocol:         r.Proto,
+			Referer:          r.Referer(),
+			UserAgent:        r.UserAgent(),
+			RequestID:        requestID(r, peerTrusted),
+			PeerIP:           peer.String(),
+			ForwardedFor:     strings.Join(forwardedFor, ", "),
+			ClientGroup:      clientGroup(client).String(),
+			ContentType:      r.Header.Get("Content-Type"),
+			RequestHeaders:   requestHeaders(r, h.config.LogRequestHeaders),
+			HasAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 0,
+			HasCookie:        len(r.Header.Values("Cookie")) > 0,
+			Action:           requestlog.ActionForward,
 		},
 	}
+
+	// A length of -1 is a body whose length was not announced.
+	if r.ContentLength > 0 {
+		rq.line.ContentLength = r.ContentLength
+	}
+
 	if r.Body != http.NoBody {
 		rq.body = &requestBody{body: limitBody(r.Body, h.config.RequestMaxBytes), rq: rq}
 	}
@@ -101,56 +135,124 @@ func (h *handler) newRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *request {
 	return rq
 }
 
+// requestHeaders returns the headers of r that names lists, by name in
+// lower case, each with its values joined by ", ". Authorization, Cookie
+// and Set-Cookie are never among them, whatever names says.
+func requestHeaders(r *http.Request, names []string) map[string]string {
+	headers := map[string]string{}
+
+	for _, name := range names {
+		switch name {
+		case "authorization", "cookie", "set-cookie":
+			continue
+		}
+
+		values := r.Header.Values(name)
+		if len(values) > 0 {
+			headers[name] = strings.Join(values, ", ")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return headers
+}
+
 // check is the one place where a request can be refused once its client
 // is known, before its body is read or anything reaches the app. It
-// returns nil to let the request through. A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
-// skips every check but the size limit. For any other client,
-// SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, so that a client it refuses is not looked
-// up, and then the country lists; a request either refuses is not counted
-// for the rate limits. Then come the rate limits, unless the client is in
-// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS, so that every other request is counted,
-// one refused for its size too. ctx is the request's own context.
+// returns nil to let the request through. The checks of checkClient come
+// first, answered with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, or 403 for a block rule, and
+// then the size limit, so that a request the rate limits count is counted
+// even when it is refused for its size. In observe mode a request
+// checkClient refuses goes on to the size limit like any other. ctx is
+// the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) check(ctx context.Context) *refusal {
-	cfg := rq.h.config
-	allowed := isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets)
+	action := rq.checkClient(ctx)
 
-	if !allowed && isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
-		return &refusal{
-			status: http.StatusForbidden,
-			action: requestlog.ActionDenied,
-		}
+	switch {
+	case action == "":
+	case rq.h.config.Observe:
+		// The log line names what enforce mode would have done.
+		rq.line.WouldAction = action
+	case action == requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked:
+		return &refusal{status: http.StatusForbidden, action: action}
+	default:
+		return rq.banResponse(action)
 	}
 
-	if !allowed && rq.countryDenied(ctx) {
-		return &refusal{
-			status: http.StatusForbidden,
-			action: requestlog.ActionCountryDenied,
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !allowed && !isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) {
-		limitHit := rq.h.limiter.Count(clientGroup(rq.client), rq.start)
-		if limitHit != "" {
-			rq.line.LimitHit = limitHit
-
-			return &refusal{
-				status: http.StatusTooManyRequests,
-				action: requestlog.ActionRateLimited,
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	maxBytes := cfg.RequestMaxBytes
+	maxBytes := rq.h.config.RequestMaxBytes
 	if maxBytes > 0 && rq.in.ContentLength > maxBytes {
 		return &refusal{
 			status: http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
+			limit:  "SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES",
 		}
 	}
 
 	return nil
 }
 
+// checkClient runs the checks on the request's client, and returns the
+// action of the first that refuses the request, or "" when none does. A
+// client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS skips them. For any other client,
+// SWWAF_DENY_NETS comes first, then a ban on its netblock, so that a
+// client either refuses is not looked up, and then the country lists; a
+// request any of them refuses is not counted for the rate limits. Then
+// come the rate limits, unless the client is in
+// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS or the request's path is exempt under
+// SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS, so that every other request is counted,
+// and last the rule files. ctx is the request's own context.
+func (rq *request) checkClient(ctx context.Context) string {
+	cfg := rq.h.config
+	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.AllowNets) {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	now := rq.h.now()
+
+	if isInside(rq.client, cfg.DenyNets) {
+		return requestlog.ActionDenied
+	}
+
+	if rq.banned(now) {
+		return requestlog.ActionBanned
+	}
+
+	if rq.countryDenied(ctx) {
+		return requestlog.ActionCountryDenied
+	}
+
+	exempt := isInside(rq.client, cfg.RateLimitExemptNets) ||
+		pathExempt(rq.in.URL, cfg.RateLimitExemptPaths)
+	if !exempt && rq.limitBroken(now) {
+		return requestlog.ActionRateLimited
+	}
+
+	return rq.checkRules(now)
+}
+
+// pathExempt reports whether the rate limits leave out a request for u
+// because of SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS: whether its path as sent, the
+// path the app receives, not percent-decoded, starts with one of
+// prefixes, so that /%61ssets/x is not under /assets/ for an app whose
+// router matches the path as received. A request whose decoded path
+// contains .. anywhere or a backslash, or whose path as sent holds an
+// encoded slash (%2F or %2f), never is, since an app may act on it as a
+// path outside every prefix: /assets/..%2Flogin as /login, or /assets%2Fx
+// as one path segment, as Go's router does.
+func pathExempt(u *url.URL, prefixes []string) bool {
+	decoded := u.Path
+	// EscapedPath is the path as the app receives it, not decoded.
+	sent := u.EscapedPath()
+
+	if strings.Contains(decoded, "..") || strings.Contains(decoded, `\`) ||
+		strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(sent), "%2f") {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return slices.ContainsFunc(prefixes, func(prefix string) bool {
+		return strings.HasPrefix(sent, prefix)
+	})
+}
+
 // forward passes the request to the app and the app's answer back. ctx
 // is the request's own context.
 func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
@@ -159,7 +261,9 @@ func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
 
 	rq.cancel = cancel
 	ctx = httptrace.WithClientTrace(ctx, &httptrace.ClientTrace{
-		WroteRequest: rq.wroteRequest,
+		GotConn:              rq.gotConn,
+		WroteRequest:         rq.wroteRequest,
+		GotFirstResponseByte: rq.gotFirstResponseByte,
 	})
 
 	out := rq.in.WithContext(ctx)
@@ -182,7 +286,8 @@ func (rq *request) forward(ctx context.Context) {
 }
 
 // rewrite makes the request the app receives: the client's request,
-// unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers set.
+// unchanged, sent to SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL, with the forwarded headers and
+// the request's id set.
 func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
 	upstream := rq.h.config.UpstreamURL
 	pr.Out.URL.Scheme = upstream.Scheme
@@ -191,6 +296,7 @@ func (rq *request) rewrite(pr *httputil.ProxyRequest) {
 	// the query as the client sent it.
 	pr.Out.URL.RawQuery = pr.In.URL.RawQuery
 	setForwardedHeaders(pr.In, pr.Out, rq.peer, rq.peerTrusted)
+	pr.Out.Header.Set(requestIDHeader, rq.line.RequestID)
 }
 
 // modifyResponse looks at the app's answer before ReverseProxy passes it
@@ -204,13 +310,18 @@ func (rq *request) modifyResponse(res *http.Response) error {
 		// connection it takes over, not through rq.out.
 		rq.stopTimers()
 		rq.out.status = res.StatusCode
+		rq.line.Websocket = true
 
 		return nil
 	}
 
 	maxBytes := rq.h.config.ResponseMaxBytes
 	if maxBytes > 0 && res.Body != http.NoBody && res.ContentLength > maxBytes {
-		rq.refuse(refusal{status: http.StatusBadGateway, action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge})
+		rq.refuse(refusal{
+			status: http.StatusBadGateway,
+			action: requestlog.ActionTooLarge,
+			limit:  "SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES",
+		})
 
 		return errResponseTooLarge
 	}
@@ -250,6 +361,13 @@ func (rq *request) answer(r refusal) {
 		return // too late to answer: the connection can only be cut
 	}
 
+	if r.status == 0 {
+		// SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is close. This panic has Go's server close
+		// the connection without an answer, and log nothing; the log line
+		// is still written as the handler returns.
+		panic(http.ErrAbortHandler)
+	}
+
 	// A client found too slow is read no more; any other may go on
 	// sending until its time is up, so that Go's server can read the
 	// rest of the body and end the request cleanly.
@@ -275,7 +393,8 @@ func (rq *request) refuse(r refusal) {
 	rq.cancel()
 }
 
-// finish ends the request's timeouts and writes its log line.
+// finish ends the request's timeouts, counts it in the metrics and writes
+// its log line.
 func (rq *request) finish() {
 	rq.stopTimers()
 
@@ -287,35 +406,90 @@ func (rq *request) finish() {
 	line := &rq.line
 	line.Status = rq.out.status
 	line.ResponseBytes = rq.out.bytes
+	header := rq.out.Header()
+	line.ResponseContentType = header.Get("Content-Type")
+	line.CacheControl = header.Get("Cache-Control")
+	line.Location = header.Get("Location")
 
 	if rq.body != nil {
 		line.RequestBytes = rq.body.bytes.Load()
 	}
 
+	// limit is the setting whose size or time limit the request passed.
+	var limit string
+
 	switch {
 	case refused != nil:
 		line.Action = refused.action
+		limit = refused.limit
 	case errors.Is(rq.out.err, os.ErrDeadlineExceeded):
 		// The client took longer than SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT to
 		// take the response.
 		line.Action = requestlog.ActionTimedOut
+		limit = "SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT"
 	case !rq.complete && (rq.out.err != nil || rq.in.Context().Err() != nil):
 		line.Aborted = true
 	}
 
 	now := time.Now()
-	line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(now.Sub(rq.start))
+	duration := now.Sub(rq.start)
+	line.DurationTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(duration)
+	line.DurationChecks = timing(rq.start, rq.checked)
+
+	var upstreamDuration time.Duration
 
 	if !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero() {
-		line.DurationUpstreamTotal = requestlog.Milliseconds(now.Sub(rq.upstreamStart))
+		upstreamDuration = now.Sub(rq.upstreamStart)
+		line.DurationUpstreamTotal = new(requestlog.Milliseconds(upstreamDuration))
+
+		rq.mu.Lock()
+		line.DurationUpstreamConnect = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.connected)
+		line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = timing(rq.upstreamStart, rq.answerStarted)
+		rq.mu.Unlock()
 	}
 
+	// Counted before the log line is written, so that the metrics count
+	// every request whose line is out.
+	rq.h.metrics.RequestEnded(line, limit, duration, upstreamDuration)
+
 	err := requestlog.Write(rq.h.requestLog, line)
 	if err != nil {
 		rq.h.processLog.Error("writing the request log failed", "error", err.Error())
 	}
 }
 
+// timing is the time from start to end in milliseconds, for one of the
+// log line's timings, or nil when end is zero: what it times never
+// happened.
+func timing(start, end time.Time) *float64 {
+	if end.IsZero() {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return new(requestlog.Milliseconds(end.Sub(start)))
+}
+
+// addToHistory adds the request, which has ended, to its client's
+// history.
+func (rq *request) addToHistory() {
+	var requestBytes int64
+	if rq.body != nil {
+		requestBytes = rq.body.bytes.Load()
+	}
+
+	forwarded := !rq.upstreamStart.IsZero()
+
+	rq.h.limiter.AddToHistory(clientGroup(rq.client), rq.h.now(), ratelimit.Request{
+		Country:       rq.line.Country,
+		Forwarded:     forwarded,
+		Refused:       !forwarded && rq.refused.Load() != nil,
+		Status:        rq.out.status,
+		RequestBytes:  requestBytes,
+		ResponseBytes: rq.out.bytes,
+		BrokeLimit:    rq.line.Offence == requestlog.OffenceLimit,
+	})
+}
+
 // clientRequestDeadline is when the client must have sent its whole
 // request, or zero when SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT is off.
 func (rq *request) clientRequestDeadline() time.Time {
@@ -348,21 +522,26 @@ func (rq *request) startRequestTimers() {
 
 	if rq.body != nil && rq.h.config.ClientRequestTimeout > 0 {
 		rq.clientRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(
-			time.Until(rq.clientRequestDeadline()), rq.requestTimedOut)
+			time.Until(rq.clientRequestDeadline()), func() {
+				rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
+			})
 	}
 
 	timeout := rq.h.config.UpstreamRequestTimeout
 	if timeout > 0 {
-		rq.upstreamRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, rq.requestTimedOut)
+		rq.upstreamRequestTimer = time.AfterFunc(timeout, func() {
+			rq.requestTimedOut("SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT")
+		})
 	}
 }
 
-// requestTimedOut is called when a request timeout runs out while the
-// request is still on its way to the app. The answer names the side
-// smallwebwaf was waiting on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for
-// the client to send more of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the
-// app to be reached or to take what it had.
-func (rq *request) requestTimedOut() {
+// requestTimedOut is called when limit, SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT or
+// SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, runs out while the request is still on
+// its way to the app. The answer names the side smallwebwaf was waiting
+// on at that moment: 408 when it was waiting for the client to send more
+// of its body, 504 when it was waiting for the app to be reached or to
+// take what it had.
+func (rq *request) requestTimedOut(limit string) {
 	rq.mu.Lock()
 	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
 
@@ -374,6 +553,7 @@ func (rq *request) requestTimedOut() {
 		rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
+			limit:  limit,
 		})
 
 		return
@@ -382,6 +562,7 @@ func (rq *request) requestTimedOut() {
 	rq.refuse(refusal{
 		status: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 		action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
+		limit:  limit,
 	})
 	// The transport gives up on the app only once its Read of the
 	// client's body returns, so that Read is ended now. The lock keeps
@@ -397,6 +578,24 @@ func (rq *request) bodyReceived() {
 	stopTimer(rq.clientRequestTimer)
 }
 
+// gotConn is called once there is a connection to the app, a new one or
+// one kept open from an earlier request.
+func (rq *request) gotConn(httptrace.GotConnInfo) {
+	rq.mu.Lock()
+	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
+
+	rq.connected = time.Now()
+}
+
+// gotFirstResponseByte is called once the first byte of the app's answer
+// has arrived.
+func (rq *request) gotFirstResponseByte() {
+	rq.mu.Lock()
+	defer rq.mu.Unlock()
+
+	rq.answerStarted = time.Now()
+}
+
 // wroteRequest is called once the app has been sent the whole request:
 // the request timeouts end and SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT starts.
 func (rq *request) wroteRequest(info httptrace.WroteRequestInfo) {
@@ -431,6 +630,7 @@ func (rq *request) responseTimedOut() {
 		rq.refuse(refusal{
 			status: http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 			action: requestlog.ActionTimedOut,
+			limit:  "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT",
 		})
 	}
 }

internal/proxy/requestlog_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"maps"
+	"math"
+	"net/http"
+	"reflect"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+const (
+	// requestIDHeader carries the request's id.
+	requestIDHeader = "X-Request-ID"
+	// instance is the SWWAF_INSTANCE_NAME a test sets.
+	instance = "fsn1app1/gitea"
+	// ipv6Client is a client on IPv6, and ipv6Group the netblock the rate
+	// limits count it as.
+	ipv6Client = "2001:db8::7"
+	ipv6Group  = "2001:db8::/64"
+)
+
+func TestLogLineHasEachFieldWhereItApplies(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	received := make(chan string, 2) // the request ids the app received
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
+
+		_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
+
+		if r.URL.Path != "/full" {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+
+			return
+		}
+
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+		w.Header().Set("Location", "/elsewhere")
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "moved")
+	})
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
+		trustedProxies:      trustLocalhost,
+		rateLimitExemptNets: localhost,
+		instanceName:        instance,
+		logRequestHeaders:   "Accept,x-custom,Authorization,cookie,SET-COOKIE",
+	})
+
+	// This request comes from ipv6Client through a trusted proxy, with a
+	// body and each header the log line looks at, and is answered with a
+	// redirect.
+	conn := dial(t, addr)
+	send(t, conn, "POST /full HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
+		forwardedFor+": 198.51.100.7, "+ipv6Client+"\r\n"+
+		forwardedProto+": "+secure+"\r\n"+requestIDHeader+": from-traefik\r\n"+
+		"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n"+
+		"Accept: text/html\r\nX-Custom: one\r\nX-Custom: two\r\n"+
+		"Authorization: Bearer secret-token\r\nCookie: session=secret-cookie\r\n"+
+		"Set-Cookie: secret-set-cookie\r\n\r\na=b")
+	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusFound)
+
+	// A request's log line can come after its answer: each is waited for
+	// before the next request, so that the lines are in order.
+	full := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
+
+	// This one comes from 127.0.0.1, which the rate limits do not count,
+	// with a body of 4 bytes whose length it does not announce, so that its
+	// request_bytes is not its content_length, and no header the log line
+	// looks at, and is answered with 204 and no header.
+	conn = dial(t, addr)
+	send(t, conn, "POST /bare HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "+appHost+"\r\n"+
+		"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n4\r\nbody\r\n0\r\n\r\n")
+	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusNoContent)
+
+	bare := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
+
+	wantFullLine(t, full)
+	wantBareLine(t, bare)
+
+	for _, line := range []logLine{full, bare} {
+		got := <-received
+		if got != line.RequestID {
+			t.Errorf("the app received request id %q, the log line has %q",
+				got, line.RequestID)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if strings.Contains(out.text(), "secret") {
+		t.Errorf("a value of Authorization, Cookie or Set-Cookie is logged:\n%s",
+			out.text())
+	}
+}
+
+// wantFullLine checks the log line of the request with every header the
+// line looks at. Its timings are checked by TestTimingsAreInOrder.
+func wantFullLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	headers := map[string]string{"accept": "text/html", "x-custom": "one, two"}
+
+	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
+		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
+		ClientIP: ipv6Client, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: secure,
+		Host: appHost, Path: "/full", Protocol: protocol,
+		Status: http.StatusFound, RequestBytes: 3, ResponseBytes: 5,
+		RequestID: "from-traefik", PeerIP: localhost,
+		ForwardedFor: "198.51.100.7, " + ipv6Client, ClientGroup: ipv6Group,
+		ContentType: "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", ContentLength: 3,
+		RequestHeaders: headers, HasAuthorization: true, HasCookie: true,
+		ResponseContentType: "text/html", UpstreamStatus: http.StatusFound,
+		CacheControl: "no-store", Location: "/elsewhere",
+		Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
+		Counts: ratelimit.Counts{Minute: 1, Hour: 1, Day: 1},
+	})
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) {
+		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", line.Line, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantBareLine checks the log line of the request with none of them, and
+// that the fields that do not apply to it are left out.
+func wantBareLine(t *testing.T, line logLine) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	want := withTimings(line, requestlog.Line{
+		Type: requestType, Time: line.Time, Instance: instance,
+		ClientIP: localhost, Method: http.MethodPost, Scheme: plain,
+		Host: appHost, Path: "/bare", Protocol: protocol,
+		Status: http.StatusNoContent, RequestBytes: 4, RequestID: line.RequestID,
+		PeerIP: localhost, ClientGroup: localhost + "/32",
+		UpstreamStatus: http.StatusNoContent, Action: requestlog.ActionForward,
+	})
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(line.Line, want) || line.RequestID == "" {
+		t.Errorf("log line\n%+v\nwant\n%+v, with a request id", line.Line, want)
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range []string{
+		"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
+		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
+		"cache_control", "location", "counts",
+	} {
+		_, present := line.fields[name]
+		if present {
+			t.Errorf("log line has %s, which does not apply", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// withTimings returns want with the timings of line.
+func withTimings(line logLine, want requestlog.Line) requestlog.Line {
+	want.DurationTotal = line.DurationTotal
+	want.DurationChecks = line.DurationChecks
+	want.DurationUpstreamConnect = line.DurationUpstreamConnect
+	want.DurationUpstreamFirstByte = line.DurationUpstreamFirstByte
+	want.DurationUpstreamTotal = line.DurationUpstreamTotal
+
+	return want
+}
+
+func TestHasAuthorizationAndHasCookieEachComeFromTheirOwnHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const hasAuthorization, hasCookie = "has_authorization", "has_cookie"
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ header, field, other string }{
+		{"Authorization", hasAuthorization, hasCookie},
+		{"Cookie", hasCookie, hasAuthorization},
+	} {
+		t.Run("only "+tc.header, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
+
+			req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
+			req.Header.Set(tc.header, "secret")
+			wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
+
+			line := out.requestLine(t)
+
+			_, otherPresent := line.fields[tc.other]
+			if line.fields[tc.field] != true || otherPresent {
+				t.Errorf("log line has %s %v and %s %v, want true and none",
+					tc.field, line.fields[tc.field], tc.other, line.fields[tc.other])
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestIDAndSchemeComeOnlyFromATrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const sentID = "from-traefik"
+
+	sent := http.Header{requestIDHeader: {sentID}, forwardedProto: {secure}}
+	trusted := map[string]string{trustedProxies: trustLocalhost}
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		env    map[string]string
+		header http.Header
+		// wantID is the request id logged, "" for a new one.
+		wantID, wantScheme string
+	}{
+		{"a trusted proxy's are kept", trusted, sent, sentID, secure},
+		{"without them, the id is new and the scheme http", trusted, nil, "", plain},
+		{"another peer's are replaced", nil, sent, "", plain},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			received := make(chan string, 2)
+			app := startApp(t, func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+				received <- r.Header.Get(requestIDHeader)
+			})
+			addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, tc.env)
+
+			// Two requests, so that two new ids can be told apart.
+			ids := make([]string, 0, 2)
+
+			for i := range 2 {
+				req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
+				maps.Copy(req.Header, tc.header)
+				wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusOK)
+
+				line := out.requestLines(t, i+1)[i]
+				ids = append(ids, line.RequestID)
+
+				got := <-received
+				if line.RequestID != got || line.Scheme != tc.wantScheme {
+					t.Errorf("log line has request_id %q and scheme %q, and the "+
+						"app received id %q; want the same id and scheme %q",
+						line.RequestID, line.Scheme, got, tc.wantScheme)
+				}
+			}
+
+			switch {
+			case tc.wantID != "" && (ids[0] != tc.wantID || ids[1] != tc.wantID):
+				t.Errorf("request ids %q, want %q", ids, tc.wantID)
+			case tc.wantID == "" && (slices.Contains(ids, sentID) ||
+				slices.Contains(ids, "") || ids[0] == ids[1]):
+				t.Errorf("request ids %q, want two new ones", ids)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTimingsAreInOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const denied = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_DENY_NETS
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		// The pauses set the times apart; a hold-up of the test only
+		// lengthens them.
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		_ = http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Millisecond)
+
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "done")
+	})
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
+		trustedProxies: trustLocalhost,
+		denyNets:       denied,
+	})
+
+	// Each log line is waited for before the next request, so that the
+	// lines are in order.
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, "/"), http.StatusOK)
+	forwarded := out.requestLines(t, 1)[0]
+
+	req := newRequest(t, http.MethodGet, addr, "/", http.NoBody)
+	req.Header.Set(forwardedFor, denied)
+	wantStatus(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden)
+	refused := out.requestLines(t, 2)[1]
+
+	wantStatus(t, get(t, addr, proxy.HealthPath), http.StatusOK)
+	health := out.requestLines(t, 3)[2]
+
+	// A request passed to the app has every timing; one refused, none of
+	// the app's; the health check, which runs no check, only the total.
+	wantTimings(t, forwarded, "duration_total", "duration_checks",
+		"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
+		"duration_upstream_total")
+	wantTimings(t, refused, "duration_total", "duration_checks")
+	wantTimings(t, health, "duration_total")
+
+	if t.Failed() {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// In whole microseconds, as they are logged, so that the sum below is
+	// exact.
+	total := microseconds(forwarded.DurationTotal)
+	checks := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationChecks)
+	connect := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamConnect)
+	firstByte := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamFirstByte)
+	upstream := microseconds(*forwarded.DurationUpstreamTotal)
+
+	// The checks end before the request is handed to the app, and the
+	// connection comes before the answer, which the app ends after a
+	// pause.
+	if checks+upstream > total || connect >= firstByte || firstByte >= upstream {
+		t.Errorf("timings in microseconds: total %d, checks %d, connect %d, "+
+			"first byte %d, upstream total %d", total, checks, connect, firstByte,
+			upstream)
+	}
+
+	if *refused.DurationChecks > refused.DurationTotal {
+		t.Errorf("refused request's checks took %v of %v milliseconds",
+			*refused.DurationChecks, refused.DurationTotal)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantTimings checks that the timings named are the only ones line has.
+func wantTimings(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var got []string
+
+	for name := range line.fields {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(name, "duration_") {
+			got = append(got, name)
+		}
+	}
+
+	slices.Sort(got)
+	slices.Sort(want)
+
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("log line of %s has timings %v, want %v", line.Path, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// microseconds is a timing in whole microseconds.
+func microseconds(milliseconds float64) int64 {
+	return int64(math.Round(milliseconds * 1000))
+}
+
+func TestLogsAnUpgradedConnection(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := startApp(t, echoAfterUpgrade)
+	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, nil)
+
+	conn := dial(t, addr)
+	send(t, conn, "GET /socket HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n"+
+		"Connection: Upgrade\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\n\r\n")
+	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusSwitchingProtocols)
+
+	_ = conn.Close()
+
+	line := out.requestLine(t)
+	if line.fields["websocket"] != true {
+		t.Errorf("log line has websocket %v, want true", line.fields["websocket"])
+	}
+}

internal/proxy/rulefiles_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// testRules are the rules most tests here load: a block rule for
+// /blocked and a ban rule for /.env.
+const testRules = `
+blocked  path  block  ^/blocked$
+probe    path  ban    ^/\.env$
+`
+
+func TestEachRuleAction(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir:    writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"+testRules),
+		banResponse: "429",
+	})
+	start := clk.Now()
+
+	// A log rule notes its match, and lets the request through.
+	line := s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted")
+
+	// A block rule refuses with 403, whatever SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE is, and
+	// bans no one.
+	line = s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden,
+		requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "blocked")
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	// A ban rule refuses with SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE, and bans the client for
+	// seven days, the default.
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "noted", "probe")
+
+	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(start.Add(7*24*time.Hour)) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want seven days on", line.BanExpires)
+	}
+
+	netblock := netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32")
+	want := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: netblock,
+		Start:    start,
+		Expires:  start.Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
+		Cause:    bans.CauseAttack,
+		Reason:   "matched the rule probe",
+		Notes: bans.Notes{
+			RuleID: "probe",
+			Target: "path",
+			Request: bans.Request{
+				Time:      start,
+				Method:    http.MethodGet,
+				Host:      appHost,
+				Path:      "/.env",
+				Status:    http.StatusTooManyRequests,
+				UserAgent: userAgent,
+			},
+			// The four requests up to and including the probe.
+			Requests: 4,
+		},
+	}
+
+	got := server.Ledger.Bans(netblock)
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != want {
+		t.Fatalf("bans\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+	}
+
+	// The next request is refused under the ban, without being checked
+	// against the rules, and makes the ban permanent.
+	clk.advance(time.Hour)
+
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
+
+	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
+	}
+
+	clk.advance(365 * 24 * time.Hour)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+}
+
+func TestNextClearSignOfAttackAfterABanBansPermanently(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, clk, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir:          writeRules(t, testRules),
+		attackBanDuration: "1h",
+	})
+
+	// The first probe bans for SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION.
+	line := s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	if line.BanExpires != requestlog.FormatTime(clk.Now().Add(time.Hour)) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want an hour on", line.BanExpires)
+	}
+
+	// Once that ban has run out without a request, the client is served,
+	// and its next probe bans it for good.
+	clk.advance(time.Hour)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	if line.BanExpires != permanent {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want permanent", line.BanExpires)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRulesComeAfterTheOtherChecks(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		allowed = "192.0.2.60" // in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS
+		exempt  = "192.0.2.50" // in SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS
+	)
+
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir:            writeRules(t, testRules),
+		allowNets:           allowed,
+		rateLimitExemptNets: exempt,
+		rateLimitPerMinute:  "1",
+	})
+
+	// A client in SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS is not checked.
+	line := s.request(allowed, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
+
+	// A probe over the rate limit breaks the limit before any rule sees
+	// it.
+	s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line)
+
+	limitBan := server.Ledger.Bans(netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"))
+	if len(limitBan) != 1 || limitBan[0].Cause != bans.CauseLimit {
+		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want one for a broken limit", limitBan)
+	}
+
+	// A client the rate limits do not apply to is still checked.
+	s.get(exempt, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	s.request(exempt, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+}
+
+func TestObserveModeLogsWhatTheRulesWouldDo(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	s, _, server := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
+		mode:     observe,
+	})
+
+	line := s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "blocked")
+
+	line = s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	wantRuleIDs(t, line, "probe")
+
+	if line.BanExpires != "" {
+		t.Errorf("log line has ban_expires %q, want none", line.BanExpires)
+	}
+
+	// No ban was made.
+	line = s.get(client, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward)
+	wantWouldAction(t, line, "")
+
+	if got := server.Ledger.Snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("bans %+v, want none", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMetricsCountRuleMatchesAndBansForAnAttack(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const scraper = "192.0.2.200"
+
+	s, _, _ := startWithClock(t, "", map[string]string{
+		rulesDir:     writeRules(t, testRules),
+		metricsToken: token,
+	})
+
+	s.request(client, "/blocked", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked)
+	s.request(client, "/.env", http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+	s.get(client, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionBanned)
+
+	metrics := s.scrape(scraper)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="block",rule_id="blocked"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`smallwebwaf_rule_matches_total{action="ban",rule_id="probe"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_rules_loaded", 2)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics,
+		`smallwebwaf_requests_total{action="rule_blocked",status_class="4xx"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="attack"}`, 1)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, `smallwebwaf_bans_made_total{cause="limit"}`, 0)
+	wantMetric(t, metrics, "smallwebwaf_permanent_bans", 1)
+}
+
+// writeRules writes content as a rule file into a new directory, and
+// returns the directory.
+func writeRules(t *testing.T, content string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "test.rules"), []byte(content), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write the rule file: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return dir
+}
+
+// wantRuleIDs checks the request log line's rule_ids.
+func wantRuleIDs(t *testing.T, line logLine, want ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if !slices.Equal(line.RuleIDs, want) {
+		t.Errorf("log line has rule_ids %v, want %v", line.RuleIDs, want)
+	}
+}

internal/proxy/rules.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package proxy
+
+import (
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+// checkRules checks the request against the rules of the rule files at
+// now, notes the ids of those it matches in the log line, and returns the
+// action of the rule that refuses it, ActionRuleBlocked for a block rule
+// and ActionBanned for a ban rule, or "" when none does. In enforce mode
+// a ban rule bans the client's netblock for a clear sign of attack.
+func (rq *request) checkRules(now time.Time) string {
+	matched := rq.h.rules.Match(rq.in)
+
+	for _, rule := range matched {
+		rq.line.RuleIDs = append(rq.line.RuleIDs, rule.ID)
+		rq.h.metrics.RuleMatched(rule.ID, rule.Action)
+	}
+
+	if len(matched) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	// Only the last rule matched can refuse the request.
+	switch last := matched[len(matched)-1]; last.Action {
+	case rules.ActionBlock:
+		return requestlog.ActionRuleBlocked
+	case rules.ActionBan:
+		if !rq.h.config.Observe {
+			rq.banForAttack(now, last)
+		}
+
+		return requestlog.ActionBanned
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}

internal/proxy/staticlists_test.go

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func TestRequestFromAllowNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 	})
 }
 
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ func TestRequestRefusedByDenyNetsIsNotCounted(t *testing.T) {
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionDenied},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 	})
 }
 
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestRateLimitExemptNetsAreNeitherCountedNorRefused(t *testing.T) {
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{listedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
 		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionForward},
-		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusTooManyRequests, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
+		{unlistedAddr, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionRateLimited},
 		{fromKP, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionCountryDenied},
 	})
 }

internal/proxy/timeouts_test.go

@@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
 
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		name string
-		env  map[string]string
+		// limit is the setting set to shortTimeout, which runs out; long
+		// is one set to longTimeoutSetting, which does not, or "".
+		limit, long string
 		// appTakesNothing has the app never read, while the client sends
 		// as fast as it can; otherwise the app reads, and the client
 		// stops sending halfway.
@@ -36,30 +38,26 @@ func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
 		want            int
 	}{
 		{
-			name: "client request timeout, waiting on the client",
-			env:  map[string]string{clientRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting},
-			want: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
+			name:  "client request timeout, waiting on the client",
+			limit: clientRequestTimeout,
+			want:  http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 		},
 		{
-			name: "upstream request timeout, waiting on the client",
-			env: map[string]string{
-				upstreamRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
-				clientRequestTimeout:   longTimeoutSetting,
-			},
-			want: http.StatusRequestTimeout,
+			name:  "upstream request timeout, waiting on the client",
+			limit: upstreamRequestTimeout,
+			long:  clientRequestTimeout,
+			want:  http.StatusRequestTimeout,
 		},
 		{
 			name:            "upstream request timeout, waiting on the app",
-			env:             map[string]string{upstreamRequestTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting},
+			limit:           upstreamRequestTimeout,
 			appTakesNothing: true,
 			want:            http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 		},
 		{
-			name: "client request timeout, waiting on the app",
-			env: map[string]string{
-				clientRequestTimeout:   shortTimeoutSetting,
-				upstreamRequestTimeout: longTimeoutSetting,
-			},
+			name:            "client request timeout, waiting on the app",
+			limit:           clientRequestTimeout,
+			long:            upstreamRequestTimeout,
 			appTakesNothing: true,
 			want:            http.StatusGatewayTimeout,
 		},
@@ -84,7 +82,12 @@ func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
 				appURL, sendRequest = app.URL, sendPartOfBody
 			}
 
-			addr, out := startProxy(t, appURL, tc.env)
+			env := map[string]string{tc.limit: shortTimeoutSetting, metricsToken: token}
+			if tc.long != "" {
+				env[tc.long] = longTimeoutSetting
+			}
+
+			addr, out := startProxy(t, appURL, env)
 			start := time.Now()
 			got := readResponse(t, sendRequest(t, addr))
 			wantTimedOut(t, start)
@@ -105,6 +108,7 @@ func TestRequestTimeouts(t *testing.T) {
 
 			wantStatus(t, got, want)
 			wantLine(t, out.requestLine(t), want, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
+			wantLimitHits(t, addr, tc.limit, 1)
 		})
 	}
 }
@@ -198,6 +202,7 @@ func TestAppTooSlowToAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		upstreamResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
+		metricsToken:            token,
 	})
 
 	start := time.Now()
@@ -213,6 +218,8 @@ func TestAppTooSlowToAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("log line has upstream_status %v for an app that never answered",
 			line.fields["upstream_status"])
 	}
+
+	wantLimitHits(t, addr, upstreamResponseTimeout, 1)
 }
 
 func TestAppTooSlowToFinishItsAnswer(t *testing.T) {
@@ -261,6 +268,7 @@ func TestClientTooSlowToTakeTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	addr, out := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
 		clientResponseTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
+		metricsToken:          token,
 	})
 
 	start := time.Now()
@@ -272,4 +280,28 @@ func TestClientTooSlowToTakeTheAnswer(t *testing.T) {
 	line := out.requestLine(t)
 	wantTimedOut(t, start)
 	wantLine(t, line, http.StatusOK, requestlog.ActionTimedOut)
+	wantLimitHits(t, addr, clientResponseTimeout, 1)
+}
+
+func TestClosesAnIdleConnection(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	app := startApp(t, func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {})
+	addr, _ := startProxy(t, app.URL, map[string]string{
+		clientIdleTimeout: shortTimeoutSetting,
+	})
+
+	// The idle time starts once the answer is sent, so after start.
+	start := time.Now()
+	conn := dial(t, addr)
+	send(t, conn, "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: app\r\n\r\n")
+	wantStatus(t, readResponse(t, conn), http.StatusOK)
+
+	// The read deadline readResponse set still bounds this read.
+	_, err := conn.Read(make([]byte, 1))
+	if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		t.Fatalf("read on the idle connection: %v, want it closed", err)
+	}
+
+	wantTimedOut(t, start)
 }

internal/ratelimit/history_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package ratelimit_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+)
+
+func TestHistoryKeepsEveryRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	for i, r := range []ratelimit.Request{
+		{Country: "DE", Forwarded: true, Status: 200, RequestBytes: 10, ResponseBytes: 100},
+		{Forwarded: true, Status: 101},
+		{Forwarded: true, Status: 304, RequestBytes: 5},
+		{Country: "FR", Refused: true, Status: 403, ResponseBytes: 10, BrokeLimit: true},
+		{Forwarded: true, Status: 502, ResponseBytes: 12},
+		// Closed without an answer: refused, and no response.
+		{Refused: true, Status: 0},
+		// Answered 404 at smallwebwaf's own endpoints: neither forwarded
+		// nor refused.
+		{Status: 404},
+	} {
+		limiter.AddToHistory(client, start.Add(time.Duration(i)*time.Minute), r)
+	}
+
+	want := ratelimit.History{
+		FirstSeen:     start,
+		LastSeen:      start.Add(6 * time.Minute),
+		Country:       "FR",
+		LookedUp:      start.Add(3 * time.Minute),
+		Requests:      7,
+		Forwarded:     4,
+		Refused:       2,
+		RequestBytes:  15,
+		ResponseBytes: 122,
+		Responses: ratelimit.Responses{
+			Status1xx: 1, Status2xx: 1, Status3xx: 1, Status4xx: 2, Status5xx: 1,
+		},
+		Offences: ratelimit.Offences{Limit: 1},
+	}
+
+	got := historyOf(t, limiter, client)
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("history\n%+v\nwant\n%+v", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResetKeepsTheHistory(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit})
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	for range limit {
+		wantCount(t, limiter, client, start, "")
+		limiter.AddToHistory(client, start, ratelimit.Request{Forwarded: true})
+	}
+
+	limiter.Reset(client)
+
+	if got := historyOf(t, limiter, client).Requests; got != limit {
+		t.Errorf("the history counts %d requests, want %d", got, limit)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestsAddsUpTheClientsInsideTheNetblock(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+
+	for client, requests := range map[string]int{
+		"198.51.100.9/32":  2,
+		"198.51.100.10/32": 3,
+		"192.0.2.1/32":     5,
+		"2001:db8:5::/64":  7,
+	} {
+		for range requests {
+			limiter.AddToHistory(netip.MustParsePrefix(client), midnight(),
+				ratelimit.Request{})
+		}
+	}
+
+	for netblock, want := range map[string]int64{
+		"198.51.100.9/32": 2,
+		"198.51.100.0/24": 5,
+		"2001:db8:5::/64": 7,
+		"203.0.113.0/24":  0,
+	} {
+		got := limiter.Requests(netip.MustParsePrefix(netblock))
+		if got != want {
+			t.Errorf("%s has sent %d requests, want %d", netblock, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// historyOf returns client's history.
+func historyOf(
+	t *testing.T, limiter *ratelimit.Limiter, client netip.Prefix,
+) ratelimit.History {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for _, c := range limiter.Snapshot() {
+		if c.Client == client {
+			return c.History
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("%s is not in the table", client)
+
+	return ratelimit.History{}
+}

internal/ratelimit/ratelimit.go

@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
-// Package ratelimit counts each client's requests over a minute, an hour
-// and a day, as the "Counting method" section of SPEC.md describes, and
-// tells when a request takes a client over a rate limit. The counts are
-// kept in memory only, for at most 20,000 clients.
+// Package ratelimit keeps the table of clients: each client's requests
+// counted over a minute, an hour and a day, as the "Counting method"
+// section of SPEC.md describes, which tell when a request takes the client
+// over a rate limit, and each client's history since it was first seen.
+// At most 20,000 clients are kept, in memory, and written to clients.json
+// and read from it by the state package.
 package ratelimit
 
 import (
+	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -13,7 +17,8 @@ import (
 )
 
 // maxClients is how many clients are kept. Past it, the least recently
-// seen client is dropped, and starts afresh if it comes back.
+// seen client is dropped, with its history, and starts afresh if it comes
+// back.
 const maxClients = 20000
 
 const day = 24 * time.Hour
@@ -26,20 +31,99 @@ type Limits struct {
 	PerDay    int64
 }
 
-// Limiter counts each client's requests against the limits. It is safe
-// for concurrent use.
+// Limiter counts each client's requests against the limits, and keeps
+// its history. It is safe for concurrent use.
 type Limiter struct {
+	// windows are the minute, the hour and the day, in the order of
+	// Client.buckets.
 	windows [3]window
 
-	mu sync.Mutex
-	// clients holds each client's buckets, one pair for each of windows,
-	// in the same order.
-	clients *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *[3]buckets]
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	clients *simplelru.LRU[netip.Prefix, *Client]
+}
+
+// Client is a client in the table, as clients.json holds it: its buckets
+// in each window, and its history.
+type Client struct {
+	Client  netip.Prefix `json:"client"`
+	Minute  Buckets      `json:"minute"`
+	Hour    Buckets      `json:"hour"`
+	Day     Buckets      `json:"day"`
+	History History      `json:"history"`
+}
+
+// Buckets are a client's two buckets in one window: the requests in the
+// bucket under way, which began at Start, and in the bucket before it.
+type Buckets struct {
+	Start    time.Time `json:"start"`
+	Current  int64     `json:"current"`
+	Previous int64     `json:"previous"`
+}
+
+// History is what is known of a client since it was first seen.
+//
+//nolint:tagliatelle // the state files use snake_case, as the request log does
+type History struct {
+	FirstSeen time.Time `json:"first_seen"`
+	LastSeen  time.Time `json:"last_seen"`
+	// Country is the client's country as it was last looked up, and
+	// LookedUp when that was; both are empty while it never was.
+	Country  string    `json:"country,omitempty"`
+	LookedUp time.Time `json:"looked_up,omitzero"`
+	// Requests are all the client's requests: Forwarded those passed to
+	// the app, Refused those refused before anything reached it, a 401 at
+	// smallwebwaf's own endpoints included, and neither the others
+	// smallwebwaf answered there.
+	Requests  int64 `json:"requests"`
+	Forwarded int64 `json:"forwarded"`
+	Refused   int64 `json:"refused"`
+	// RequestBytes and ResponseBytes are the body bytes of its requests
+	// and of the responses it was sent.
+	RequestBytes  int64     `json:"request_bytes"`
+	ResponseBytes int64     `json:"response_bytes"`
+	Responses     Responses `json:"responses,omitzero"`
+	Offences      Offences  `json:"offences,omitzero"`
+}
+
+// Responses are the responses a client was sent, by status class;
+// Status5xx counts every status from 500 up.
+type Responses struct {
+	Status1xx int64 `json:"1xx,omitempty"`
+	Status2xx int64 `json:"2xx,omitempty"`
+	Status3xx int64 `json:"3xx,omitempty"`
+	Status4xx int64 `json:"4xx,omitempty"`
+	Status5xx int64 `json:"5xx,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Offences are a client's offences, by kind.
+type Offences struct {
+	// Limit is its requests that broke a rate limit.
+	Limit int64 `json:"limit"`
+}
+
+// Request is what a client's history keeps of one of its requests.
+type Request struct {
+	// Country is the client's country, when the request looked it up.
+	Country string
+	// Forwarded is true for a request passed to the app, Refused for one
+	// refused before anything reached it, a 401 at smallwebwaf's own
+	// endpoints included. Both are false for any other request smallwebwaf
+	// answered there.
+	Forwarded bool
+	Refused   bool
+	// Status is what the client was sent, 0 if nothing was.
+	Status int
+	// RequestBytes and ResponseBytes are the body bytes of the request
+	// and of its response.
+	RequestBytes  int64
+	ResponseBytes int64
+	// BrokeLimit is true for a request that broke a rate limit.
+	BrokeLimit bool
 }
 
 // New returns a Limiter for limits, with no client counted yet.
 func New(limits Limits) *Limiter {
-	clients, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *[3]buckets](maxClients, nil)
+	clients, err := simplelru.NewLRU[netip.Prefix, *Client](maxClients, nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err) // NewLRU fails only for a size below one
 	}
@@ -54,30 +138,194 @@ func New(limits Limits) *Limiter {
 	}
 }
 
+// Hit is a request that takes a client over a rate limit.
+type Hit struct {
+	// Window is "minute", "hour" or "day".
+	Window string
+	// Limit is the window's limit.
+	Limit int64
+	// Requests is the client's requests counted in the window, this one
+	// included.
+	Requests float64
+}
+
+// Counts are a client's requests in the minute, the hour and the day that
+// end at a request, that request included.
+type Counts struct {
+	Minute float64 `json:"minute"`
+	Hour   float64 `json:"hour"`
+	Day    float64 `json:"day"`
+}
+
 // Count counts a request from client at now, in every window, whether or
-// not it is refused. It returns the window whose limit the request takes
-// the client over, "minute", "hour" or "day", the shortest if it is over
-// several, or "" if it is within every limit.
-func (l *Limiter) Count(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) string {
+// not it is refused, and returns the client's requests in each window. It
+// reports whether the request takes the client over a limit, and the
+// window whose limit it goes over, the shortest if it is over several.
+func (l *Limiter) Count(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time) (Counts, Hit, bool) {
 	l.mu.Lock()
 	defer l.mu.Unlock()
 
-	counts, seen := l.clients.Get(client)
-	if !seen {
-		counts = &[3]buckets{}
-		l.clients.Add(client, counts)
-	}
+	var (
+		requests [3]float64
+		hit      Hit
+	)
 
-	limitHit := ""
+	for i, b := range l.get(client).buckets() {
+		w := l.windows[i]
 
-	for i, w := range l.windows {
-		requests := counts[i].add(now, w.length)
-		if limitHit == "" && w.limit > 0 && requests > float64(w.limit) {
-			limitHit = w.name
+		requests[i] = b.add(now, w.length)
+		if hit.Window == "" && w.limit > 0 && requests[i] > float64(w.limit) {
+			hit = Hit{Window: w.name, Limit: w.limit, Requests: requests[i]}
 		}
 	}
 
-	return limitHit
+	counts := Counts{Minute: requests[0], Hour: requests[1], Day: requests[2]}
+
+	return counts, hit, hit.Window != ""
+}
+
+// Reset sets client's counts in every window back to zero. Its history
+// keeps its totals.
+func (l *Limiter) Reset(client netip.Prefix) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	c, seen := l.clients.Peek(client)
+	if seen {
+		c.Minute, c.Hour, c.Day = Buckets{}, Buckets{}, Buckets{}
+	}
+}
+
+// AddToHistory adds r, a request from client at now, to the client's
+// history.
+func (l *Limiter) AddToHistory(client netip.Prefix, now time.Time, r Request) {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	h := &l.get(client).History
+	if h.FirstSeen.IsZero() {
+		h.FirstSeen = now
+	}
+
+	h.LastSeen = now
+
+	if r.Country != "" {
+		h.Country = r.Country
+		h.LookedUp = now
+	}
+
+	h.Requests++
+	if r.Forwarded {
+		h.Forwarded++
+	}
+
+	if r.Refused {
+		h.Refused++
+	}
+
+	h.RequestBytes += r.RequestBytes
+	h.ResponseBytes += r.ResponseBytes
+	h.Responses.add(r.Status)
+
+	if r.BrokeLimit {
+		h.Offences.Limit++
+	}
+}
+
+// Requests returns how many requests the clients inside netblock have
+// sent, as their histories count them.
+func (l *Limiter) Requests(netblock netip.Prefix) int64 {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Most often the netblock is one client.
+	c, seen := l.clients.Peek(netblock)
+	if seen {
+		return c.History.Requests
+	}
+
+	var requests int64
+
+	for _, c := range l.clients.Values() {
+		if netblock.Overlaps(c.Client) {
+			requests += c.History.Requests
+		}
+	}
+
+	return requests
+}
+
+// Len returns how many clients are in the table.
+func (l *Limiter) Len() int {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return l.clients.Len()
+}
+
+// Snapshot returns every client in the table, sorted by address, as
+// clients.json lists them.
+func (l *Limiter) Snapshot() []Client {
+	l.mu.Lock()
+
+	clients := make([]Client, 0, l.clients.Len())
+	for _, c := range l.clients.Values() {
+		clients = append(clients, *c)
+	}
+
+	l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	slices.SortFunc(clients, func(a, b Client) int {
+		return a.Client.Compare(b.Client)
+	})
+
+	return clients
+}
+
+// Load puts clients read from clients.json into the table, in place of
+// the clients it holds, in the order they were last seen, so that the
+// least recently seen is dropped first. Buckets whose time has passed at
+// now are emptied.
+func (l *Limiter) Load(clients []Client, now time.Time) {
+	clients = slices.Clone(clients)
+	slices.SortStableFunc(clients, func(a, b Client) int {
+		return a.History.LastSeen.Compare(b.History.LastSeen)
+	})
+
+	l.mu.Lock()
+	defer l.mu.Unlock()
+
+	l.clients.Purge()
+
+	for _, c := range clients {
+		for i, b := range c.buckets() {
+			// The window that ends at now covers neither bucket once it
+			// begins after the bucket under way has ended.
+			length := l.windows[i].length
+			if !now.Add(-length).Before(b.Start.Add(length)) {
+				*b = Buckets{}
+			}
+		}
+
+		l.clients.Add(c.Client, &c)
+	}
+}
+
+// get returns client's entry in the table, a new one if it has none, and
+// makes it the most recently seen.
+func (l *Limiter) get(client netip.Prefix) *Client {
+	c, seen := l.clients.Get(client)
+	if !seen {
+		c = &Client{Client: client}
+		l.clients.Add(client, c)
+	}
+
+	return c
+}
+
+// buckets returns c's buckets in the minute, the hour and the day.
+func (c *Client) buckets() [3]*Buckets {
+	return [3]*Buckets{&c.Minute, &c.Hour, &c.Day}
 }
 
 // window is a length of time over which requests are counted, and the
@@ -88,14 +336,6 @@ type window struct {
 	limit  int64
 }
 
-// buckets are a client's two buckets in one window: the requests in the
-// bucket under way, which began at start, and in the bucket before it.
-type buckets struct {
-	start    time.Time
-	current  int64
-	previous int64
-}
-
 // add counts a request at now in a window of length, and returns the
 // client's requests in the window that ends at now: those in the bucket
 // under way, and those in the bucket before it weighted by how much of
@@ -106,27 +346,44 @@ type buckets struct {
 // bucket. A request dated more than a second before it means the clock
 // was set back, and the buckets start afresh: otherwise the bucket before
 // would keep its full weight until the clock caught up.
-func (b *buckets) add(now time.Time, length time.Duration) float64 {
-	if now.Before(b.start.Add(-time.Second)) {
-		*b = buckets{}
+func (b *Buckets) add(now time.Time, length time.Duration) float64 {
+	if now.Before(b.Start.Add(-time.Second)) {
+		*b = Buckets{}
 	}
 
 	start := now.Truncate(length)
-	if start.After(b.start) {
-		if start.Equal(b.start.Add(length)) {
-			b.previous = b.current
+	if start.After(b.Start) {
+		if start.Equal(b.Start.Add(length)) {
+			b.Previous = b.Current
 		} else {
-			b.previous = 0
+			b.Previous = 0
 		}
 
-		b.start = start
-		b.current = 0
+		b.Start = start
+		b.Current = 0
 	}
 
-	b.current++
+	b.Current++
 
-	elapsed := max(now.Sub(b.start), 0)
+	elapsed := max(now.Sub(b.Start), 0)
 	covered := 1 - float64(elapsed)/float64(length)
 
-	return float64(b.previous)*covered + float64(b.current)
+	return float64(b.Previous)*covered + float64(b.Current)
+}
+
+// add counts a response with status in its class. A status of 0, for
+// nothing sent, is not a response.
+func (r *Responses) add(status int) {
+	switch {
+	case status >= http.StatusInternalServerError:
+		r.Status5xx++
+	case status >= http.StatusBadRequest:
+		r.Status4xx++
+	case status >= http.StatusMultipleChoices:
+		r.Status3xx++
+	case status >= http.StatusOK:
+		r.Status2xx++
+	case status >= http.StatusContinue:
+		r.Status1xx++
+	}
 }

internal/ratelimit/ratelimit_test.go

@@ -54,6 +54,75 @@ func TestEachWindowRefusesAtItsLimitAndLetsTheClientBack(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestHitGivesTheLimitAndTheRequestsCounted(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerHour: limit})
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	for range limit {
+		_, _, over := limiter.Count(client, start)
+		if over {
+			t.Fatal("a request within the limit is over it")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Over both limits; the minute's is named, with the four requests.
+	_, hit, over := limiter.Count(client, start)
+
+	want := ratelimit.Hit{Window: minute, Limit: limit, Requests: limit + 1}
+	if !over || hit != want {
+		t.Errorf("request over the limit gives %+v and %t, want %+v and true",
+			hit, over, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCountGivesTheRequestsInEachWindow(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	for range 3 {
+		limiter.Count(client, start)
+	}
+
+	// A quarter into the next hour, the minute has only this request. The
+	// hour still covers three quarters of the bucket before, with its three
+	// requests, which count 2.25, and this one: 3.25. The day covers all
+	// four.
+	counts, _, _ := limiter.Count(client, start.Add(time.Hour+time.Hour/4))
+
+	want := ratelimit.Counts{Minute: 1, Hour: 3.25, Day: 4}
+	if counts != want {
+		t.Errorf("counts %+v, want %+v", counts, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResetSetsTheCountsBackToZero(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerMinute: limit, PerDay: limit})
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	for range limit {
+		wantCount(t, limiter, client, start, "")
+	}
+
+	wantCount(t, limiter, client, start, minute)
+	limiter.Reset(client)
+
+	// At the same moment, the client has its whole allowance again.
+	for range limit {
+		wantCount(t, limiter, client, start, "")
+	}
+
+	wantCount(t, limiter, client, start, minute)
+}
+
 func TestClientBackAfterAWholeBucketIsWithinTheLimitAtOnce(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -192,9 +261,9 @@ func wantCount(
 ) {
 	t.Helper()
 
-	got := limiter.Count(client, now)
-	if got != want {
+	_, hit, _ := limiter.Count(client, now)
+	if hit.Window != want {
 		t.Errorf("request from %s at %s is over %q, want %q",
-			client, now.Format(time.RFC3339), got, want)
+			client, now.Format(time.RFC3339), hit.Window, want)
 	}
 }

internal/ratelimit/snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package ratelimit_test
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+)
+
+func TestSnapshotListsTheClientsByAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	want := []string{"192.0.2.1/32", "203.0.113.9/32", "203.0.113.10/32", "2001:db8::/64"}
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+	for _, i := range []int{2, 3, 0, 1} {
+		limiter.Count(netip.MustParsePrefix(want[i]), midnight())
+	}
+
+	snapshot := limiter.Snapshot()
+
+	got := make([]string, 0, len(snapshot))
+	for _, c := range snapshot {
+		got = append(got, c.Client.String())
+	}
+
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("snapshot %v, want %v", got, want)
+	}
+
+	counted := ratelimit.Buckets{Start: midnight(), Current: 1}
+	if snapshot[0].Minute != counted || snapshot[0].Day != counted {
+		t.Errorf("buckets %+v and %+v, want %+v", snapshot[0].Minute, snapshot[0].Day,
+			counted)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadedCountsCarryOn(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	before := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit})
+	for range limit {
+		wantCount(t, before, client, start, "")
+	}
+
+	// Loaded into a new limiter, as across a restart, the client has no
+	// fresh allowance.
+	later := start.Add(time.Minute)
+	after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{PerHour: limit})
+	after.Load(before.Snapshot(), later)
+	wantCount(t, after, client, later, hour)
+}
+
+func TestLoadEmptiesBucketsWhoseTimeHasPassed(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	client := netip.MustParsePrefix("203.0.113.9/32")
+	start := midnight()
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+	limiter.Count(client, start)
+	limiter.AddToHistory(client, start, ratelimit.Request{Forwarded: true})
+
+	loaded := func(now time.Time) ratelimit.Client {
+		t.Helper()
+
+		after := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+		after.Load(limiter.Snapshot(), now)
+
+		return after.Snapshot()[0]
+	}
+
+	// Two minutes on, the window that ends then covers neither of the
+	// minute's buckets, which are emptied; the hour's and the day's stay,
+	// and so does the history.
+	got := loaded(start.Add(2 * time.Minute))
+	if got.Minute != (ratelimit.Buckets{}) || got.Hour.Current != 1 ||
+		got.Day.Current != 1 || got.History.Requests != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("loaded two minutes on as %+v", got)
+	}
+
+	// A moment before, the window still covers some of the earlier one.
+	got = loaded(start.Add(2*time.Minute - time.Nanosecond))
+	if got.Minute.Current != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("loaded just under two minutes on with minute buckets %+v",
+			got.Minute)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLoadDropsTheLeastRecentlySeenFirst(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const maxClients = 20000
+
+	// clients.json lists the clients by address. Here each was last seen
+	// a second before the one listed before it, so the last listed is the
+	// one seen longest ago, and the one dropped.
+	clients := make([]ratelimit.Client, maxClients+1)
+	addr := netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.0")
+
+	for i := range clients {
+		clients[i].Client = netip.PrefixFrom(addr, addr.BitLen())
+		clients[i].History.LastSeen = midnight().Add(-time.Duration(i) * time.Second)
+		addr = addr.Next()
+	}
+
+	limiter := ratelimit.New(ratelimit.Limits{})
+	limiter.Load(clients, midnight())
+
+	got := limiter.Snapshot()
+	if len(got) != maxClients || got[0].Client != clients[0].Client ||
+		got[maxClients-1].Client != clients[maxClients-1].Client {
+		t.Errorf("%d clients kept, from %s to %s; want %d, from %s to %s",
+			len(got), got[0].Client, got[len(got)-1].Client, maxClients,
+			clients[0].Client, clients[maxClients-1].Client)
+	}
+}

internal/remotelog/remotelog.go

@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+// Package remotelog sends the lines smallwebwaf writes on stdout to the
+// remote log endpoint, SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, as the "Request log" section
+// of SPEC.md describes: each line as the message of an RFC 5424 syslog
+// record, over UDP, TCP or TLS. Lines wait in a bounded buffer, so a slow
+// or unreachable endpoint never holds up a request or stdout.
+package remotelog
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"syscall"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+)
+
+// The forms of SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, by its scheme.
+const (
+	SchemeUDP = "syslog+udp"
+	SchemeTCP = "syslog+tcp"
+	SchemeTLS = "syslog+tls"
+)
+
+// A record's priority is the number of its facility times the number of
+// severities there are, plus the number of its severity. Every record's
+// severity is informational.
+const (
+	severities    = 8
+	informational = 6
+)
+
+const (
+	// dialTimeout bounds connecting to the endpoint, the TLS handshake
+	// included.
+	dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
+	// After a failed attempt to connect, or a connection on which a record
+	// fails, the next attempt to connect is made a second later, and
+	// retryDelayFactor times as long after each further failure in a row,
+	// up to a minute. A connection that fails after it has stayed up for
+	// resetRetryDelayAfter ends the row.
+	firstRetryDelay      = time.Second
+	retryDelayFactor     = 2
+	maxRetryDelay        = time.Minute
+	resetRetryDelayAfter = time.Minute
+)
+
+// Params are what New needs.
+type Params struct {
+	// URL is the endpoint (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL): SchemeUDP, SchemeTCP or
+	// SchemeTLS, a host and a port.
+	URL *url.URL
+	// RootCAs are the certificates a SchemeTLS endpoint's certificate
+	// must chain to (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_TLS_CA_FILE), nil for the host's.
+	RootCAs *x509.CertPool
+	// Buffer is the most lines held while they wait to be sent
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER).
+	Buffer int
+	// Facility is the number of the records' syslog facility
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_FACILITY), and AppName their APP-NAME
+	// (SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_APP_NAME).
+	Facility int
+	AppName  string
+}
+
+// Sender sends lines to the endpoint. Write puts them in its buffer, and
+// Run sends them from there.
+type Sender struct {
+	url       *url.URL
+	tlsConfig *tls.Config
+	// beforeTime and afterTime are the parts of every record's header
+	// before and after its time, as RFC 5424 lays the header out.
+	beforeTime string
+	afterTime  string
+	// records is the buffer: each line's record, framed to be sent.
+	records chan []byte
+	sent    atomic.Int64
+	dropped atomic.Int64
+}
+
+// New returns a Sender for the endpoint params.URL.
+func New(params Params) *Sender {
+	hostname, err := os.Hostname()
+	if err != nil || hostname == "" {
+		hostname = "-" // RFC 5424's value for a field that has none
+	}
+
+	priority := params.Facility*severities + informational
+
+	return &Sender{
+		url: params.URL,
+		tlsConfig: &tls.Config{
+			RootCAs:    params.RootCAs,
+			MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
+		},
+		// The 1 is the version of the format. The process id, the message
+		// id and the structured data have no value.
+		beforeTime: "<" + strconv.Itoa(priority) + ">1 ",
+		afterTime:  " " + hostname + " " + params.AppName + " - - - ",
+		records:    make(chan []byte, params.Buffer),
+	}
+}
+
+// Write puts each line in p in the buffer, as the message of a record of
+// its own, and never waits: when the buffer is full, the oldest record in
+// it is dropped to make room. It is safe for concurrent use.
+func (s *Sender) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	at := requestlog.FormatTime(time.Now())
+
+	for line := range bytes.Lines(p) {
+		line = bytes.TrimSuffix(line, []byte("\n"))
+		if len(line) > 0 {
+			s.put(s.record(at, line))
+		}
+	}
+
+	return len(p), nil
+}
+
+// Sent is how many records have been sent.
+func (s *Sender) Sent() int64 {
+	return s.sent.Load()
+}
+
+// Dropped is how many records were dropped: the oldest in a full buffer,
+// and those whose sending failed.
+func (s *Sender) Dropped() int64 {
+	return s.dropped.Load()
+}
+
+// Depth is how many records are in the buffer.
+func (s *Sender) Depth() int {
+	return len(s.records)
+}
+
+// Run connects to the endpoint and sends each record as it comes into the
+// buffer, until ctx is done. Then it sends the records still in the buffer,
+// on the connection open at that time or, if there is none, on a new one,
+// until none is left or one fails, and returns. How long it may take over
+// that is for the caller to bound.
+//
+// A connection on which a record fails is closed and the record dropped.
+// That failure, like a failed attempt to connect, is logged to processLog
+// and followed by the next attempt after firstRetryDelay, retryDelayFactor
+// times as long after each further failure in a row up to maxRetryDelay,
+// and firstRetryDelay again after a connection that stayed up for
+// resetRetryDelayAfter. Meanwhile the records wait in the buffer.
+func (s *Sender) Run(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) {
+	conn := s.send(ctx, processLog)
+	if conn == nil && len(s.records) > 0 {
+		conn, _ = s.dial(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
+	}
+
+	if conn == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	defer func() {
+		_ = conn.Close()
+	}()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case record := <-s.records:
+			if s.write(conn, record) != nil {
+				return
+			}
+		default:
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// record returns line as an RFC 5424 record made at the time at, framed
+// for the endpoint: on its own over UDP, since each datagram holds one,
+// and over TCP and TLS after its length in bytes and a space, the
+// octet-counted framing of RFC 6587 and RFC 5425.
+func (s *Sender) record(at string, line []byte) []byte {
+	record := make([]byte, 0, len(s.beforeTime)+len(at)+len(s.afterTime)+len(line))
+	record = append(record, s.beforeTime...)
+	record = append(record, at...)
+	record = append(record, s.afterTime...)
+	record = append(record, line...)
+
+	if s.url.Scheme == SchemeUDP {
+		return record
+	}
+
+	return append([]byte(strconv.Itoa(len(record))+" "), record...)
+}
+
+// put adds record to the buffer, first dropping the oldest record in it
+// while it is full.
+func (s *Sender) put(record []byte) {
+	for {
+		select {
+		case s.records <- record:
+			return
+		default:
+		}
+
+		select {
+		case <-s.records:
+			s.dropped.Add(1)
+		default:
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// send connects to the endpoint and sends each record as it comes into
+// the buffer, until ctx is done, and returns the connection then open, or
+// nil.
+func (s *Sender) send(ctx context.Context, processLog *slog.Logger) net.Conn {
+	delay := firstRetryDelay
+
+	for {
+		conn, err := s.dial(ctx)
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return conn
+		}
+
+		if err == nil {
+			connected := time.Now()
+
+			err = s.sendOn(ctx, conn)
+			if err == nil {
+				return conn
+			}
+
+			_ = conn.Close()
+
+			if time.Since(connected) >= resetRetryDelayAfter {
+				delay = firstRetryDelay
+			}
+		}
+
+		processLog.Warn("sending to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed",
+			"error", err.Error(), "connecting_again_in", delay.String())
+
+		select {
+		case <-time.After(delay):
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		delay = min(retryDelayFactor*delay, maxRetryDelay)
+	}
+}
+
+// sendOn sends each record on conn as it comes into the buffer, until one
+// fails, whose error it returns, or ctx is done.
+func (s *Sender) sendOn(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn) error {
+	for {
+		select {
+		case record := <-s.records:
+			err := s.write(conn, record)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return nil
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// write sends record on conn, and counts it as sent or, if that fails,
+// as dropped. A record too long for one UDP datagram is dropped without
+// an error, since the connection has not failed: a long request must not
+// hold up the lines after it.
+func (s *Sender) write(conn net.Conn, record []byte) error {
+	_, err := conn.Write(record)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.dropped.Add(1)
+
+		if errors.Is(err, syscall.EMSGSIZE) {
+			return nil
+		}
+
+		return fmt.Errorf("send a record: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	s.sent.Add(1)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// dial connects to the endpoint.
+func (s *Sender) dial(ctx context.Context) (net.Conn, error) {
+	dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: dialTimeout}
+
+	switch s.url.Scheme {
+	case SchemeUDP:
+		return dialer.DialContext(ctx, "udp", s.url.Host)
+	case SchemeTLS:
+		tlsDialer := &tls.Dialer{NetDialer: dialer, Config: s.tlsConfig}
+
+		return tlsDialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", s.url.Host)
+	default:
+		return dialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", s.url.Host)
+	}
+}

internal/remotelog/remotelog_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+package remotelog_test
+
+import (
+	"bufio"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"crypto/x509/pkix"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"log/slog"
+	"math/big"
+	"net"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"slices"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
+)
+
+// The tests run in a synctest bubble, where the time package runs on a
+// clock of the test's own, which starts at 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z: a wait
+// lasts exactly as long as it should, however slowly the test process
+// runs, and synctest.Wait returns once the sender has done all it can
+// before time passes. The endpoint is a listener on the loopback address.
+// A test reads from it only once the records are on their way, and checks
+// the sender's counts first, since a goroutine of the bubble that waits on
+// the network keeps that clock from moving on. For the same reason the
+// endpoint that refuses connections, a tlsEndpoint, runs outside the
+// bubble: a sender connecting over TLS waits on the endpoint's answer.
+
+const (
+	// started is the time a record made as a test starts gives.
+	started = "2000-01-01T00:00:00.000Z"
+	appName = "fsn1app1/gitea"
+	// local0 is the number of the default facility, and local0Info the
+	// priority of its records.
+	local0     = 16
+	local0Info = "<134>"
+	// loopback is where the endpoints listen.
+	loopback = "127.0.0.1:0"
+)
+
+func TestRecordsOverUDPGoOnePerDatagram(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", loopback)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = endpoint.Close() })
+
+		sender, _, _ := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeUDP, endpoint.LocalAddr()))
+
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte(`{"type":"request"}` + "\n" + `{"type":"process"}` + "\n"))
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
+
+		for _, line := range []string{`{"type":"request"}`, `{"type":"process"}`} {
+			datagram := make([]byte, 1024)
+
+			n, _, err := endpoint.ReadFrom(datagram)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			want := record(t, local0Info, appName, line)
+			if string(datagram[:n]) != want {
+				t.Errorf("datagram %q, want %q", datagram[:n], want)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestRecordsOverTCPAreOctetCountedWithTheirFacility(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		endpoint := listen(t)
+		endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, endpoint.Addr())
+		endpointParams.Facility = 19 // local3
+		endpointParams.AppName = "gitea"
+		sender, _, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
+
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("first\nsecond\n"))
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
+
+		frames := bufio.NewReader(accept(t, endpoint))
+		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "gitea", "first"))
+		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, "<158>", "gitea", "second"))
+	})
+}
+
+func TestStalledEndpointHoldsUpNoWriteAndOldestRecordsAreDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		certificate, roots := testCertificate(t)
+		endpoint := listen(t)
+		endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTLS, endpoint.Addr())
+		endpointParams.RootCAs = roots
+		endpointParams.Buffer = 3
+		sender, _, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
+
+		// The sender connects, and its TLS handshake waits for an answer
+		// the endpoint does not give yet.
+		conn := accept(t, endpoint)
+
+		var stdout bytes.Buffer
+
+		out := io.MultiWriter(&stdout, sender)
+		for i := range 5 {
+			_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "line %d\n", i+1)
+		}
+
+		if stdout.String() != "line 1\nline 2\nline 3\nline 4\nline 5\n" {
+			t.Errorf("stdout has %q", stdout.String())
+		}
+
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 0, 2, 3)
+
+		// Once the endpoint answers, the three newest records are sent.
+		server := tls.Server(conn, &tls.Config{
+			Certificates: []tls.Certificate{certificate},
+			MinVersion:   tls.VersionTLS12,
+		})
+
+		err := server.HandshakeContext(t.Context())
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("handshake: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 3, 2, 0)
+
+		frames := bufio.NewReader(server)
+		for _, line := range []string{"line 3", "line 4", "line 5"} {
+			wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, local0Info, appName, line))
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestReconnectsWithBackoffAfterTheEndpointGoesAway(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	certificate, roots := testCertificate(t)
+	endpoint := startTLSEndpoint(t, certificate)
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTLS, endpoint.addr)
+		endpointParams.RootCAs = roots
+		sender, logged, _ := run(t, endpointParams)
+
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("one\n"))
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 1, 0, 0)
+
+		conn := endpoint.next(t)
+		wantFrame(t, bufio.NewReader(conn), record(t, local0Info, appName, "one"))
+
+		// The endpoint goes away: it closes the connection, and refuses the
+		// next ones. The sender notices when a record fails, and tries to
+		// connect again a second later, then two seconds after that.
+		endpoint.refusing.Store(true)
+
+		_ = conn.Close()
+
+		writeUntilDropped(t, sender, 1)
+		sent := sender.Sent()
+
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("two\n"))
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Second)
+		synctest.Wait()
+
+		endpoint.refusing.Store(false)
+
+		time.Sleep(2*time.Second - time.Nanosecond)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, sent, 1, 1)
+
+		// The endpoint is back, and the record waiting is sent.
+		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, sent+1, 1, 0)
+
+		conn = endpoint.next(t)
+		wantFrame(t, bufio.NewReader(conn), record(t, local0Info, appName, "two"))
+		wantRetries(t, logged, "1s", "2s")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestAConnectionClosedAtOnceIsMadeAgainAfterAGrowingDelay(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		endpoint := listen(t)
+		sender, logged, _ := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, endpoint.Addr()))
+
+		// The endpoint closes each connection as soon as it takes it. The
+		// sender notices when a record fails, and connects again a second
+		// later, then two seconds after that, then four.
+		delays := []time.Duration{time.Second, 2 * time.Second, 4 * time.Second}
+		for i, delay := range delays {
+			_ = accept(t, endpoint).Close()
+
+			writeUntilDropped(t, sender, int64(i+1))
+			wantConnectedAgainAfter(t, sender, delay)
+		}
+
+		wantRetries(t, logged, "1s", "2s", "4s")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestTheDelayStartsAgainAfterAConnectionThatStayedUpAMinute(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		endpoint := listen(t)
+		sender, logged, _ := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeTCP, endpoint.Addr()))
+
+		_ = accept(t, endpoint).Close()
+
+		writeUntilDropped(t, sender, 1)
+		wantConnectedAgainAfter(t, sender, time.Second)
+
+		// A connection that fails just short of a minute after it was made
+		// leaves the delay growing.
+		conn := accept(t, endpoint)
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Minute - time.Nanosecond)
+
+		_ = conn.Close()
+
+		writeUntilDropped(t, sender, 2)
+		wantConnectedAgainAfter(t, sender, 2*time.Second)
+
+		// One that fails a minute after it was made starts it again from a
+		// second.
+		conn = accept(t, endpoint)
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Minute)
+
+		_ = conn.Close()
+
+		writeUntilDropped(t, sender, 3)
+		wantConnectedAgainAfter(t, sender, time.Second)
+		wantRetries(t, logged, "1s", "2s", "1s")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestALineTooLongForADatagramIsDroppedAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).ListenPacket(t.Context(), "udp", loopback)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = endpoint.Close() })
+
+		sender, logged, _ := run(t, params(remotelog.SchemeUDP, endpoint.LocalAddr()))
+
+		// With its header, the first line's record is longer than the 65507
+		// bytes a UDP datagram over IPv4 holds. It is dropped, nothing is
+		// logged, and the next line is sent at once.
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte(strings.Repeat("x", 65507) + "\nnext\n"))
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 1, 1, 0)
+		wantRetries(t, logged)
+
+		datagram := make([]byte, 1024)
+
+		n, _, err := endpoint.ReadFrom(datagram)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		want := record(t, local0Info, appName, "next")
+		if string(datagram[:n]) != want {
+			t.Errorf("datagram %q, want %q", datagram[:n], want)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestRecordsWaitingAtTheStopAreSent(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	certificate, roots := testCertificate(t)
+	endpoint := startTLSEndpoint(t, certificate)
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		// The endpoint refuses the sender's first connection: it fails to
+		// connect, and waits a second to try again.
+		endpoint.refusing.Store(true)
+
+		endpointParams := params(remotelog.SchemeTLS, endpoint.addr)
+		endpointParams.RootCAs = roots
+		sender, logged, stop := run(t, endpointParams)
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantRetries(t, logged, "1s")
+
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("one\ntwo\n"))
+
+		endpoint.refusing.Store(false)
+
+		// Stopped before that second is over, it connects to send them.
+		stop()
+		wantCounts(t, sender, 2, 0, 0)
+
+		frames := bufio.NewReader(endpoint.next(t))
+		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, local0Info, appName, "one"))
+		wantFrame(t, frames, record(t, local0Info, appName, "two"))
+	})
+}
+
+// output collects what the sender logs.
+type output struct {
+	mu  sync.Mutex
+	buf bytes.Buffer
+}
+
+// Write adds lines the sender logs.
+func (o *output) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return o.buf.Write(p)
+}
+
+// text returns everything logged so far.
+func (o *output) text() string {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return o.buf.String()
+}
+
+// params returns the settings of a Sender for the endpoint at addr, in
+// the form scheme names: room for ten lines, the default facility, and
+// appName.
+func params(scheme string, addr net.Addr) remotelog.Params {
+	return remotelog.Params{
+		URL:      &url.URL{Scheme: scheme, Host: addr.String()},
+		Buffer:   10,
+		Facility: local0,
+		AppName:  appName,
+	}
+}
+
+// run runs a Sender with settings until the test ends or the function
+// it returns is called, which waits for Run to return. It returns the
+// Sender, and what it logs.
+func run(t *testing.T, settings remotelog.Params) (*remotelog.Sender, *output, func()) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sender := remotelog.New(settings)
+	logged := &output{}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+	ran := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		sender.Run(ctx, slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(logged, nil)))
+		close(ran)
+	}()
+
+	stop := func() {
+		cancel()
+		<-ran
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(stop)
+
+	return sender, logged, stop
+}
+
+// listen returns a TCP listener on the loopback address, closed when the
+// test ends.
+func listen(t *testing.T) net.Listener {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", loopback)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = listener.Close() })
+
+	return listener
+}
+
+// accept returns the next connection to listener, closed when the test
+// ends.
+func accept(t *testing.T, listener net.Listener) net.Conn {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	conn, err := listener.Accept()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("accept: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+
+	return conn
+}
+
+// tlsEndpoint is a syslog+tls endpoint on the loopback address, which a
+// test starts outside its bubble. It keeps its listener until the test
+// ends, and either takes each connection or refuses it.
+type tlsEndpoint struct {
+	addr net.Addr
+	// refusing is set while the endpoint closes each connection before the
+	// TLS handshake, which fails the sender's attempt to connect.
+	refusing atomic.Bool
+	// conns are the connections it has taken, after the handshake.
+	conns chan net.Conn
+}
+
+// startTLSEndpoint starts a tlsEndpoint with certificate, which takes
+// connections until it is told to refuse them.
+func startTLSEndpoint(t *testing.T, certificate tls.Certificate) *tlsEndpoint {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	listener := listen(t)
+	endpoint := &tlsEndpoint{addr: listener.Addr(), conns: make(chan net.Conn, 10)}
+	config := &tls.Config{
+		Certificates: []tls.Certificate{certificate},
+		MinVersion:   tls.VersionTLS12,
+	}
+
+	go func() {
+		for {
+			conn, err := listener.Accept()
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+
+			server := tls.Server(conn, config)
+			if endpoint.refusing.Load() || server.HandshakeContext(t.Context()) != nil {
+				_ = conn.Close()
+
+				continue
+			}
+
+			endpoint.conns <- server
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return endpoint
+}
+
+// next returns the next connection the endpoint has taken, closed when
+// the test ends.
+func (e *tlsEndpoint) next(t *testing.T) net.Conn {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	conn := <-e.conns
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+
+	return conn
+}
+
+// record returns the record of line made as the test started, with the
+// priority and the app name given.
+func record(t *testing.T, priority, app, line string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	hostname, err := os.Hostname()
+	if err != nil || hostname == "" {
+		hostname = "-"
+	}
+
+	return priority + "1 " + started + " " + hostname + " " + app + " - - - " + line
+}
+
+// wantFrame reads the next octet-counted frame from frames, and checks
+// that it holds want.
+func wantFrame(t *testing.T, frames *bufio.Reader, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	count, err := frames.ReadString(' ')
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read a frame's length: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	length, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSuffix(count, " "))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("frame starts %q, not with its length", count)
+	}
+
+	got := make([]byte, length)
+
+	_, err = io.ReadFull(frames, got)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read a frame: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if string(got) != want {
+		t.Errorf("frame %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantCounts checks the records sender has sent, dropped and holds in
+// its buffer.
+func wantCounts(
+	t *testing.T, sender *remotelog.Sender, sent, dropped int64, depth int,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	if sender.Sent() != sent || sender.Dropped() != dropped || sender.Depth() != depth {
+		t.Fatalf("sent %d, dropped %d, %d in the buffer; want %d, %d and %d",
+			sender.Sent(), sender.Dropped(), sender.Depth(), sent, dropped, depth)
+	}
+}
+
+// writeUntilDropped writes a line at a time until the count of records
+// sender has dropped reaches dropped. The records it sends on a
+// connection the endpoint has closed are lost before one fails; how many
+// depends on when the endpoint's host answers that the connection is
+// gone.
+func writeUntilDropped(t *testing.T, sender *remotelog.Sender, dropped int64) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for sender.Dropped() < dropped {
+		_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("lost\n"))
+
+		synctest.Wait()
+	}
+}
+
+// wantConnectedAgainAfter writes a line while the sender waits to connect
+// again, and checks that it connects, and takes the line from the buffer,
+// only once delay is over.
+func wantConnectedAgainAfter(
+	t *testing.T, sender *remotelog.Sender, delay time.Duration,
+) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	_, _ = sender.Write([]byte("waiting\n"))
+
+	time.Sleep(delay - time.Nanosecond)
+	synctest.Wait()
+
+	if sender.Depth() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("connected again before %v", delay)
+	}
+
+	time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
+	synctest.Wait()
+
+	if sender.Depth() != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("not connected again after %v", delay)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantRetries checks that the sender logged a failure, of an attempt to
+// connect or of a connection, for each of delays, the time until the next
+// attempt, in order, and logged nothing else.
+func wantRetries(t *testing.T, logged *output, delays ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var got []string
+
+	for line := range strings.Lines(logged.text()) {
+		var fields map[string]any
+
+		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
+		if err != nil || fields["msg"] != "sending to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL failed" {
+			t.Fatalf("logged %q", line)
+		}
+
+		delay, _ := fields["connecting_again_in"].(string)
+		got = append(got, delay)
+	}
+
+	if !slices.Equal(got, delays) {
+		t.Errorf("logged failures to connect again in %v, want %v", got, delays)
+	}
+}
+
+// testCertificate returns a certificate for 127.0.0.1 that is its own
+// CA, and a pool that holds it. It is valid on the bubble's clock, which
+// starts at 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z.
+func testCertificate(t *testing.T) (tls.Certificate, *x509.CertPool) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate a key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	template := &x509.Certificate{
+		SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(1),
+		Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: "smallwebwaf test CA"},
+		NotBefore:             time.Date(1999, 12, 31, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
+		NotAfter:              time.Date(2000, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
+		IsCA:                  true,
+		BasicConstraintsValid: true,
+		KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
+		ExtKeyUsage:           []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
+		IPAddresses:           []net.IP{net.IPv4(127, 0, 0, 1)},
+	}
+
+	der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template,
+		&key.PublicKey, key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create a certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	certificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse the certificate: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
+	roots.AddCert(certificate)
+
+	return tls.Certificate{Certificate: [][]byte{der}, PrivateKey: key}, roots
+}

internal/requestlog/requestlog.go

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
 )
 
 // The action a request line names: what smallwebwaf did with the
@@ -24,8 +26,14 @@ const (
 	// for, or whose answer could not be passed on.
 	ActionUpstreamError = "upstream_error"
 	// ActionRateLimited is a request refused because it took its client
-	// over a rate limit, or came while the client was over one.
+	// over a rate limit, which bans the client.
 	ActionRateLimited = "rate_limited"
+	// ActionBanned is a request refused because a ban covers its client,
+	// or because it matched a ban rule, which bans the client.
+	ActionBanned = "banned"
+	// ActionRuleBlocked is a request refused because it matched a block
+	// rule.
+	ActionRuleBlocked = "rule_blocked"
 	// ActionDenied is a request refused because its client is in
 	// SWWAF_DENY_NETS.
 	ActionDenied = "denied"
@@ -36,39 +44,101 @@ const (
 	ActionAdmin = "admin"
 )
 
+// OffenceLimit is the offence a request line names for a request that
+// broke a rate limit.
+const OffenceLimit = "limit"
+
 // timeLayout is RFC 3339 with milliseconds.
 const timeLayout = "2006-01-02T15:04:05.000Z07:00"
 
-// Line is one request's line in the request log. The field names are
-// those of the "Request log" section of SPEC.md.
+// Line is one request's line in the request log. The field names, and
+// their order, are those of the "Request log" section of SPEC.md. A field
+// that may not apply to a request is left out of its line when it does
+// not.
 //
 //nolint:tagliatelle // SPEC.md's request log names its fields in snake_case
 type Line struct {
-	Type           string `json:"type"`
-	Time           string `json:"time"`
-	ClientIP       string `json:"client_ip"`
-	PeerIP         string `json:"peer_ip"`
-	Country        string `json:"country"`
-	Method         string `json:"method"`
-	Host           string `json:"host"`
-	Path           string `json:"path"`
-	Query          string `json:"query"`
-	Protocol       string `json:"protocol"`
-	Status         int    `json:"status"`
-	UpstreamStatus int    `json:"upstream_status,omitempty"`
-	RequestBytes   int64  `json:"request_bytes"`
-	ResponseBytes  int64  `json:"response_bytes"`
-	Referer        string `json:"referer"`
-	UserAgent      string `json:"user_agent"`
-	Action         string `json:"action"`
+	Type string `json:"type"`
+
+	// The standard web log fields. Scheme is how the client reached
+	// smallwebwaf, or the trusted proxy in front of it.
+	Time          string `json:"time"`
+	Instance      string `json:"instance"`
+	ClientIP      string `json:"client_ip"`
+	Method        string `json:"method"`
+	Scheme        string `json:"scheme"`
+	Host          string `json:"host"`
+	Path          string `json:"path"`
+	Query         string `json:"query"`
+	Protocol      string `json:"protocol"`
+	Status        int    `json:"status"`
+	RequestBytes  int64  `json:"request_bytes"`
+	ResponseBytes int64  `json:"response_bytes"`
+	Referer       string `json:"referer"`
+	UserAgent     string `json:"user_agent"`
+
+	// Request detail. RequestID is the X-Request-ID a trusted proxy sent,
+	// or a new one, and is sent on to the app. ForwardedFor is the
+	// X-Forwarded-For header as received. ClientGroup is the netblock the
+	// client is counted as.
+	RequestID    string `json:"request_id"`
+	PeerIP       string `json:"peer_ip"`
+	ForwardedFor string `json:"forwarded_for,omitempty"`
+	ClientGroup  string `json:"client_group"`
+	Country      string `json:"country"`
+	ContentType  string `json:"content_type,omitempty"`
+	// ContentLength is the length of its body the request announced.
+	ContentLength int64 `json:"content_length,omitempty"`
+	// RequestHeaders are the headers SWWAF_LOG_REQUEST_HEADERS names that
+	// the request carried, by name in lower case.
+	RequestHeaders   map[string]string `json:"request_headers,omitempty"`
+	HasAuthorization bool              `json:"has_authorization,omitempty"`
+	HasCookie        bool              `json:"has_cookie,omitempty"`
+	// Websocket is true when the connection was upgraded, as for a
+	// WebSocket.
+	Websocket bool `json:"websocket,omitempty"`
+
+	// Response detail, from the headers of the answer: the app's, as
+	// passed on, or those of smallwebwaf's own. Aborted is true when the
+	// client went away early.
+	ResponseContentType string `json:"response_content_type,omitempty"`
+	UpstreamStatus      int    `json:"upstream_status,omitempty"`
+	CacheControl        string `json:"cache_control,omitempty"`
+	Location            string `json:"location,omitempty"`
+	Aborted             bool   `json:"aborted,omitempty"`
+
+	// The decision.
+	Action string `json:"action"`
+	// WouldAction is, in observe mode, the action enforce mode would have
+	// taken with a request it would have refused: ActionDenied,
+	// ActionBanned, ActionCountryDenied, ActionRateLimited or
+	// ActionRuleBlocked.
+	WouldAction string `json:"would_action,omitempty"`
+	// Counts are the client's requests as the rate limits counted them
+	// with this one, for a request they counted.
+	Counts ratelimit.Counts `json:"counts,omitzero"`
+	// RuleIDs are the ids of the rule file rules the request matched.
+	RuleIDs []string `json:"rule_ids,omitempty"`
 	// LimitHit is the window whose rate limit the request went over:
 	// minute, hour or day.
 	LimitHit string `json:"limit_hit,omitempty"`
-	// Aborted is true when the client went away early.
-	Aborted bool `json:"aborted,omitempty"`
-	// DurationTotal and DurationUpstreamTotal are in milliseconds.
-	DurationTotal         float64 `json:"duration_total"`
-	DurationUpstreamTotal float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
+	// Offence is the offence the request was held as, OffenceLimit.
+	Offence string `json:"offence,omitempty"`
+	// BanExpires is when the ban the request made, or was refused under,
+	// ends: a time, or "permanent".
+	BanExpires string `json:"ban_expires,omitempty"`
+
+	// The timings, in milliseconds. DurationChecks is the time until the
+	// checks were done. DurationUpstreamConnect, DurationUpstreamFirstByte
+	// and DurationUpstreamTotal run from when the request was handed to the
+	// app: until there was a connection to it, until the first byte of its
+	// answer arrived, and until the end. Each but DurationTotal is nil for
+	// a request that did not get that far.
+	DurationTotal             float64  `json:"duration_total"`
+	DurationChecks            *float64 `json:"duration_checks,omitempty"`
+	DurationUpstreamConnect   *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_connect,omitempty"`
+	DurationUpstreamFirstByte *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_first_byte,omitempty"`
+	DurationUpstreamTotal     *float64 `json:"duration_upstream_total,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // Write writes line to w as one JSON line marked "type":"request".

internal/requestlog/requestlog_test.go

@@ -50,7 +50,12 @@ func TestWriteWritesOneJSONLineMarkedRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	unset := []string{
-		"upstream_status", "limit_hit", "aborted", "duration_upstream_total",
+		"forwarded_for", "content_type", "content_length", "request_headers",
+		"has_authorization", "has_cookie", "websocket", "response_content_type",
+		"upstream_status", "cache_control", "location", "aborted", "counts",
+		"limit_hit", "offence", "ban_expires", "duration_checks",
+		"duration_upstream_connect", "duration_upstream_first_byte",
+		"duration_upstream_total",
 	}
 	for _, name := range unset {
 		_, present := fields[name]

internal/rules/rules.go

@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+// Package rules reads the rule files: the plain text files in
+// SWWAF_RULES_DIR, one rule to a line, that each request is checked
+// against, as the "Rule files" section of SPEC.md describes. They are read
+// at start, and again once the directory has had no change for a short
+// time after one is edited, added or removed.
+package rules
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
+)
+
+// The actions a rule takes when it matches.
+const (
+	// ActionLog notes the match in the request log, and does nothing else.
+	ActionLog = "log"
+	// ActionBlock refuses the request with 403.
+	ActionBlock = "block"
+	// ActionBan refuses the request and bans the client's netblock: the
+	// request is a clear sign of attack.
+	ActionBan = "ban"
+)
+
+// extension ends the name of every rule file.
+const extension = ".rules"
+
+// quietTime is how long SWWAF_RULES_DIR must go without a change before
+// the rule files are read again, so that a file still being written, such
+// as one saved in place, appended to or copied in with scp, is read only
+// once whole.
+const quietTime = 2 * time.Second
+
+// headerTarget starts the target that is one request header,
+// header:<Name>.
+const headerTarget = "header:"
+
+// escapeLength is the length of a percent escape, such as %2e.
+const escapeLength = 3
+
+var (
+	// ruleLine is a rule: four fields separated by spaces or tabs, of
+	// which the fourth, the regex, runs to the end of the line.
+	ruleLine = regexp.MustCompile(`^([^ \t]+)[ \t]+([^ \t]+)[ \t]+([^ \t]+)[ \t]+(.+)$`)
+	// idChars are the characters of a rule's id.
+	idChars = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$`)
+)
+
+var (
+	errNotRule = errors.New(
+		"is not a rule: an id, a target, an action and a regex, " +
+			"separated by spaces or tabs")
+	errNotID     = errors.New("is not an id of letters, digits, - and _")
+	errNotTarget = errors.New(
+		"is not path, query, uri, method, host, user_agent, referer or header:<Name>")
+	errNotHeaderName = errors.New(
+		"has a character after header: that no header name can have")
+	errHeaderTakenOut = errors.New(
+		"names a header that Go's HTTP server takes out of every request, " +
+			"so a rule never sees it")
+	errNotAction = errors.New("is not log, block or ban")
+	errNotRegex  = errors.New("does not compile")
+	errUsedTwice = errors.New("is already the id of the rule at")
+)
+
+// Rule is one rule of a rule file.
+type Rule struct {
+	// ID names the rule in the request log, the metrics and ban notes.
+	ID string
+	// Target is what the regex is matched against, such as path or
+	// header:Accept.
+	Target string
+	// Action is ActionLog, ActionBlock or ActionBan.
+	Action string
+
+	regex *regexp.Regexp
+}
+
+// Params are what Load needs.
+type Params struct {
+	// Dir is the directory of the rule files (SWWAF_RULES_DIR).
+	Dir string
+	// Enabled is SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED: while it is false, no file is read
+	// and no rule loaded.
+	Enabled bool
+	// ProcessLog receives how many rules were read, and the error in a
+	// rule file edited while smallwebwaf runs.
+	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
+}
+
+// Files are the rule files of a running smallwebwaf, and the rules read
+// from them. They are safe for concurrent use.
+type Files struct {
+	params Params
+	// rules are the rules loaded, in the order of their files' names, and
+	// then of their lines.
+	rules atomic.Pointer[[]Rule]
+}
+
+// Load reads the rules of every *.rules file in Dir, in the order of the
+// files' names, unless Enabled is false. A Dir that cannot be read is an
+// error, and so is a line that is not a rule, a header name with a
+// character no header name can have, a rule for the Host or the
+// Transfer-Encoding header, which Go's HTTP server takes out of every
+// request, a regex that does not compile and an id used twice, each named
+// with its file and line.
+func Load(params Params) (*Files, error) {
+	f := &Files{params: params}
+	f.rules.Store(&[]Rule{})
+
+	if !params.Enabled {
+		return f, nil
+	}
+
+	rules, err := read(params.Dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	f.rules.Store(&rules)
+	f.logRead(len(rules))
+
+	return f, nil
+}
+
+// Match checks r against the rules, in order, and returns those it
+// matches, up to the first whose action refuses it, block or ban, which
+// is then the last one returned.
+func (f *Files) Match(r *http.Request) []Rule {
+	var matched []Rule
+
+	for _, rule := range *f.rules.Load() {
+		if !rule.matches(r) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		matched = append(matched, rule)
+		if rule.Action != ActionLog {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	return matched
+}
+
+// Len returns how many rules are loaded.
+func (f *Files) Len() int {
+	return len(*f.rules.Load())
+}
+
+// Watch watches Dir until ctx is done, and reads the rule files again
+// once Dir has had no change for quietTime, after one is edited, added or
+// removed, and after Watch starts watching. If they then hold an error,
+// the rules stay as they were, the error is logged with its file and
+// line, and the files are read again after the next change. If Dir cannot
+// be watched, that is logged, and the rules stay as they were loaded.
+// While Enabled is false, Watch returns at once.
+func (f *Files) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
+	if !f.params.Enabled {
+		return
+	}
+
+	watcher, err := fsnotify.NewWatcher()
+	if err == nil {
+		defer func() {
+			_ = watcher.Close()
+		}()
+
+		err = watcher.Add(f.params.Dir)
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		f.params.ProcessLog.Error("cannot watch the rule files for edits",
+			"error", err.Error())
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Info("watching the rule files for edits",
+		"directory", f.params.Dir)
+
+	f.readAfterChanges(ctx, watcher.Events, watcher.Errors)
+}
+
+// readAfterChanges reads the rule files again once quietTime has passed
+// without a change from events, until ctx is done, and logs the errors
+// from errs. The wait starts at once, as if for a change, so that an edit
+// saved after Load read the files, and before Dir was watched, is taken
+// in too.
+func (f *Files) readAfterChanges(
+	ctx context.Context, events <-chan fsnotify.Event, errs <-chan error,
+) {
+	quiet := time.NewTimer(quietTime)
+	defer quiet.Stop()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-events:
+			quiet.Reset(quietTime)
+		case <-quiet.C:
+			f.readAgain()
+		case err := <-errs:
+			f.params.ProcessLog.Warn("watching the rule files failed",
+				"error", err.Error())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// readAgain reads the rule files again, in place of the rules loaded, or
+// logs the error that keeps the rules as they were.
+func (f *Files) readAgain() {
+	rules, err := read(f.params.Dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		f.params.ProcessLog.Error(
+			"a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were",
+			"error", err.Error())
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	f.rules.Store(&rules)
+	f.logRead(len(rules))
+}
+
+// logRead logs that the rule files were read, and how many rules they
+// hold, which can be none.
+func (f *Files) logRead(count int) {
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Info("read the rule files",
+		"directory", f.params.Dir, "rules", count)
+}
+
+// read returns the rules of every rule file in dir, in the order of the
+// files' names, and then of their lines. A file whose name starts with a
+// dot, such as an editor's lock file .#50-app.rules, is not a rule file,
+// as a shell's *.rules would not match it.
+func read(dir string) ([]Rule, error) {
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var rules []Rule
+
+	// places are where each id is, as "<file>, line <n>".
+	places := map[string]string{}
+
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		name := entry.Name()
+		if entry.IsDir() || strings.HasPrefix(name, ".") || filepath.Ext(name) != extension {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		rules, err = readFile(filepath.Join(dir, name), rules, places)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rules, nil
+}
+
+// readFile appends the rules of the rule file at path to rules. places
+// are where each id read so far is, and gain those of the file.
+func readFile(path string, rules []Rule, places map[string]string) ([]Rule, error) {
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a rule file, in SWWAF_RULES_DIR
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	number := 0
+
+	for line := range strings.Lines(string(data)) {
+		number++
+		place := fmt.Sprintf("%s, line %d", path, number)
+
+		text := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\n"), "\r")
+
+		rule, isRule, err := parse(text)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", place, err)
+		}
+
+		if !isRule {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		first, used := places[rule.ID]
+		if used {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: the id %q %w %s", place, rule.ID, errUsedTwice, first)
+		}
+
+		places[rule.ID] = place
+		rules = append(rules, rule)
+	}
+
+	return rules, nil
+}
+
+// parse reads a line of a rule file. It returns false for a blank line
+// and for a comment, a line that starts with #. Spaces and tabs at the
+// end of the line are not part of its regex, so a line with only those
+// after its action has no regex, and is not a rule.
+func parse(line string) (Rule, bool, error) {
+	line = strings.Trim(line, " \t")
+	if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
+		return Rule{}, false, nil
+	}
+
+	fields := ruleLine.FindStringSubmatch(line)
+	if fields == nil {
+		return Rule{}, false, errNotRule
+	}
+
+	rule := Rule{ID: fields[1], Target: fields[2], Action: fields[3]}
+	headerName, isHeader := strings.CutPrefix(rule.Target, headerTarget)
+
+	switch {
+	case !idChars.MatchString(rule.ID):
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the id %q %w", rule.ID, errNotID)
+	case !isTarget(rule.Target):
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the target %q %w", rule.Target, errNotTarget)
+	case isHeader && !config.IsHeaderName(headerName):
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the target %q %w", rule.Target, errNotHeaderName)
+	case strings.EqualFold(rule.Target, headerTarget+"Host"):
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf(
+			"the target %q %w; the request's host is the target host",
+			rule.Target, errHeaderTakenOut)
+	case strings.EqualFold(rule.Target, headerTarget+"Transfer-Encoding"):
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the target %q %w", rule.Target, errHeaderTakenOut)
+	case !slices.Contains([]string{ActionLog, ActionBlock, ActionBan}, rule.Action):
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the action %q %w", rule.Action, errNotAction)
+	}
+
+	regex, err := regexp.Compile(fields[4])
+	if err != nil {
+		return Rule{}, false, fmt.Errorf("the regex %w: %w", errNotRegex, err)
+	}
+
+	rule.regex = regex
+
+	return rule, true, nil
+}
+
+// isTarget reports whether target is one a rule may have.
+func isTarget(target string) bool {
+	switch target {
+	case "path", "query", "uri", "method", "host", "user_agent", "referer":
+		return true
+	}
+
+	name, isHeader := strings.CutPrefix(target, headerTarget)
+
+	return isHeader && name != ""
+}
+
+// matches reports whether the rule's regex matches its target in r. For
+// uri it is matched against the path and query as received, and against
+// them once percent-decoded, so that an encoded probe cannot slip past.
+func (rule Rule) matches(r *http.Request) bool {
+	if rule.Target == "uri" {
+		uri := pathAndQuery(r)
+
+		return rule.regex.MatchString(uri) || rule.regex.MatchString(decodeOnce(uri))
+	}
+
+	return rule.regex.MatchString(value(rule.Target, r))
+}
+
+// value returns what a rule with target, other than uri, is matched
+// against in r: the path and the query as the client sent them, before
+// any decoding or re-encoding, split at the first ?, and a header's values
+// joined by ", ", as HTTP joins those of a header sent more than once.
+func value(target string, r *http.Request) string {
+	switch target {
+	case "path":
+		path, _, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
+
+		return path
+	case "query":
+		_, query, _ := strings.Cut(pathAndQuery(r), "?")
+
+		return query
+	case "method":
+		return r.Method
+	case "host":
+		return r.Host
+	case "user_agent":
+		return header(r, "User-Agent")
+	case "referer":
+		return header(r, "Referer")
+	default:
+		return header(r, strings.TrimPrefix(target, headerTarget))
+	}
+}
+
+// pathAndQuery returns the target of r's request line, r.RequestURI, as
+// the client sent it, less any scheme and host: a target with a scheme
+// gives what follows the scheme and its :, and the host when // follows.
+// So http://host/path, as a client sends it to a proxy, gives /path, and
+// so does http:/path, which Go reads as a target with a scheme and no
+// host. r.URL is not used: when the path holds a character it escapes,
+// such as \ or a non-ASCII byte, it decodes the whole path and escapes it
+// again, so that \ becomes %5C and %2e a dot.
+func pathAndQuery(r *http.Request) string {
+	if !r.URL.IsAbs() {
+		return r.RequestURI
+	}
+
+	_, afterScheme, _ := strings.Cut(r.RequestURI, ":")
+
+	hostAndRest, hasHost := strings.CutPrefix(afterScheme, "//")
+	if !hasHost {
+		return afterScheme
+	}
+
+	start := strings.IndexAny(hostAndRest, "/?")
+	if start < 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	return hostAndRest[start:]
+}
+
+// header returns the values of r's header name joined by ", ", or "" if
+// r has no such header.
+func header(r *http.Request, name string) string {
+	return strings.Join(r.Header.Values(name), ", ")
+}
+
+// decodeOnce returns s with each percent escape, such as %2e, replaced by
+// the byte it stands for. A % that is not followed by two hex digits is
+// left as it is, so that a malformed escape cannot keep the rest of s
+// from being decoded.
+func decodeOnce(s string) string {
+	var decoded strings.Builder
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
+		if s[i] == '%' && i+escapeLength <= len(s) {
+			b, err := hex.DecodeString(s[i+1 : i+escapeLength])
+			if err == nil {
+				decoded.Write(b)
+
+				i += escapeLength - 1
+
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+
+		decoded.WriteByte(s[i])
+	}
+
+	return decoded.String()
+}

internal/rules/rules_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,662 @@
+package rules_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"log/slog"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+)
+
+const (
+	// What the process log says once Watch watches the directory, after
+	// each reading of the rule files, and for one that has an error.
+	watching = "watching the rule files for edits"
+	read     = "read the rule files"
+	hasError = "a rule file has an error, and the rules stay as they were"
+	// maxLogLines is how many lines of the process log wait for a test to
+	// read them.
+	maxLogLines = 64
+	// browser is the user agent of an ordinary visitor.
+	browser = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0"
+	// testFile is the rule file of a test that needs only one, and
+	// firstFile the first of a test's rule files.
+	testFile  = "test.rules"
+	firstFile = "00-a.rules"
+	// userAgent is the header that carries the user agent.
+	userAgent = "User-Agent"
+)
+
+func TestEachTargetMatchesWhatItNames(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		rule   string // its target, action and regex
+		uri    string // the request's path and query
+		header http.Header
+		want   bool
+	}{
+		{"path as received", `path log ^/%2eenv$`, "/%2eenv", nil, true},
+		{"path not decoded", `path log ^/\.env$`, "/%2eenv", nil, false},
+		{"path without the query", `path log ^/a$`, "/a?b=c", nil, true},
+		{"query as received", `query log ^b=%2e$`, "/a?b=%2e", nil, true},
+		{"uri as received", `uri log ^/a\?b=%2e$`, "/a?b=%2e", nil, true},
+		{"uri decoded", `uri log (\.\./){2}`, "/a?f=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f", nil, true},
+		{
+			"uri decoded past malformed escapes", `uri log (\.\./){2}&h=%$`,
+			"/a?g=%zz&f=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f&h=%", nil, true,
+		},
+		{"uri decoded only once", `uri log ^/a\.b$`, "/a%252eb", nil, false},
+		{"method", `method log ^PUT$`, "/", nil, true},
+		{"host", `host log ^app\.example$`, "/", nil, true},
+		{
+			"user_agent", `user_agent log ^sqlmap/`, "/",
+			http.Header{userAgent: {"sqlmap/1.8"}}, true,
+		},
+		{
+			"user_agent sent twice", `user_agent log ^curl/8, sqlmap/`, "/",
+			http.Header{userAgent: {"curl/8", "sqlmap/1.8"}}, true,
+		},
+		{"user_agent missing", `user_agent log ^$`, "/", nil, true},
+		{
+			"referer", `referer log ^https://spam\.example/`, "/",
+			http.Header{"Referer": {"https://spam.example/buy"}}, true,
+		},
+		{
+			"a header sent twice", `header:x-api-version log ^2, 3$`, "/",
+			http.Header{"X-Api-Version": {"2", "3"}}, true,
+		},
+		{"a header missing", `header:X-Api-Version log ^$`, "/", nil, true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "a-rule " + tc.rule + "\n"})
+
+			// Every request is a PUT, which the method rule looks for.
+			r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPut,
+				"http://app.example"+tc.uri, nil)
+			maps.Copy(r.Header, tc.header)
+
+			got := len(files.Match(r)) == 1
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Errorf("%s matches %s: %t, want %t", tc.rule, tc.uri, got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPathMatchedAsTheClientSentIt(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// Each path holds a character Go's URL type would escape again, \ or
+	// a non-ASCII byte, and each rule is written for the path as sent.
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		rule string // its target, action and regex
+		sent string // the path and query the client sent
+	}{
+		{`path log ^/\.\.\\\.\.\\windows\\win\.ini$`, `/..\..\windows\win.ini`},
+		{`path log ^/%2e%2e\\%2e%2e\\windows\\win\.ini$`, `/%2e%2e\%2e%2e\windows\win.ini`},
+		{`path log ^/café$`, "/café?x=1"},
+		{`uri log ^/%2e%2e\\%2e%2e\\boot\.ini\?x=1$`, `/%2e%2e\%2e%2e\boot.ini?x=1`},
+	} {
+		files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "as-sent " + tc.rule + "\n"})
+
+		// The target in origin form, as traefik sends it, in absolute form,
+		// as a client sends it to a proxy, and with a scheme but no host,
+		// which Go reads as absolute form with no host, sending the app
+		// the path.
+		for _, target := range []string{
+			tc.sent, "http://app.example" + tc.sent, "http:" + tc.sent, "foo:" + tc.sent,
+		} {
+			r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, target, nil)
+			wantMatched(t, files, r, "as-sent")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMatchingStopsAtTheFirstRuleThatRefuses(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: `
+every-path     path  log    ^/
+no-path        path  log    ^$
+first-refusal  path  block  ^/probe
+later-ban      path  ban    ^/probe
+after          path  log    ^/
+`})
+
+	// Every log rule that matches is noted, and the block rule ends the
+	// matching.
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/probe"), "every-path", "first-refusal")
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/page"), "every-path", "after")
+
+	// A ban rule ends it too.
+	files = load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "ban path ban ^/\nlater path block ^/\n"})
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/"), "ban")
+}
+
+func TestSpacesAndTabsEndingALineAreNotPartOfItsRegex(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	files := load(t, ruleFiles{testFile: "env-file path block ^/\\.env$ \t \n"})
+
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/.env"), "env-file")
+}
+
+func TestFilesReadInNameOrderThenLineOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	files := load(t, ruleFiles{
+		"50-b.rules": "b1 path log ^/\n\n# a comment\n  # an indented one\nb2 path log ^/\n",
+		firstFile:    "a1 path log ^/\r\n",
+		// None is a rule file.
+		"notes.txt":       "notes, not rules\n",
+		"10-c.rules.bak":  "an old copy\n",
+		"20-d.rules/keep": "a file in a directory\n",
+	})
+
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/"), "a1", "b1", "b2")
+
+	if files.Len() != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("%d rules loaded, want 3", files.Len())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFileWhoseNameStartsWithADotIsNotARuleFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{firstFile: "probe path block ^/probe\n"})
+
+	// The lock file Emacs makes beside a file while it is edited: a link to
+	// nothing, which cannot be read.
+	err := os.Symlink("user@host.1234:1700000000", filepath.Join(dir, ".#"+firstFile))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("symlink: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	params, _ := newParams(dir)
+
+	files, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/probe"), "probe")
+}
+
+func TestFaultStopsTheStartNamingTheFileAndLine(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		content string
+		line    int
+		want    string
+	}{
+		{
+			"too few fields", "env-file path ban\n", 1,
+			"is not a rule: an id, a target, an action and a regex, " +
+				"separated by spaces or tabs",
+		},
+		{
+			// Else its regex would be a space, found in nearly every user agent.
+			"a regex of only spaces and tabs", "scanner user_agent ban\t \n", 1,
+			"is not a rule: an id, a target, an action and a regex, " +
+				"separated by spaces or tabs",
+		},
+		{
+			"an id of other characters", "# ids\n\nenv.file path ban ^/\n", 3,
+			`the id "env.file" is not an id of letters, digits, - and _`,
+		},
+		{
+			"an unknown target", "env-file paths ban ^/\n", 1,
+			`the target "paths" is not path, query, uri, method, host, ` +
+				"user_agent, referer or header:<Name>",
+		},
+		{
+			"a header without a name", "env-file header: ban ^/\n", 1,
+			`the target "header:" is not path, query, uri, method, host, ` +
+				"user_agent, referer or header:<Name>",
+		},
+		{
+			"a header name written with its colon", "sqlmap header:User-Agent: ban sqlmap\n", 1,
+			`the target "header:User-Agent:" has a character after header: ` +
+				"that no header name can have",
+		},
+		{
+			"a header name with a semicolon", "accept header:Accept;q log ^$\n", 1,
+			`the target "header:Accept;q" has a character after header: ` +
+				"that no header name can have",
+		},
+		{
+			"a header name with brackets", "x-header header:X(y) log ^$\n", 1,
+			`the target "header:X(y)" has a character after header: ` +
+				"that no header name can have",
+		},
+		{
+			"the Host header", "host-header header:host block ^$\n", 1,
+			`the target "header:host" names a header that Go's HTTP server ` +
+				"takes out of every request, so a rule never sees it; " +
+				"the request's host is the target host",
+		},
+		{
+			"the Transfer-Encoding header",
+			"# bodies sent in chunks\nchunked header:Transfer-Encoding block ^chunked$\n", 2,
+			`the target "header:Transfer-Encoding" names a header that Go's ` +
+				"HTTP server takes out of every request, so a rule never sees it",
+		},
+		{
+			"an unknown action", "env-file path deny ^/\n", 1,
+			`the action "deny" is not log, block or ban`,
+		},
+		{
+			"a regex that does not compile", "env-file path ban ^/(\n", 1,
+			"the regex does not compile: error parsing regexp: " +
+				"missing closing ): `^/(`",
+		},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{"00-default.rules": tc.content})
+			path := filepath.Join(dir, "00-default.rules")
+
+			wantRefused(t, dir, path+", line "+strconv.Itoa(tc.line)+": "+tc.want)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIDUsedTwiceStopsTheStartNamingBothPlaces(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{
+		"00-a.rules": "probe path log ^/a\n",
+		"50-b.rules": "other path log ^/b\nprobe path ban ^/c\n",
+	})
+
+	wantRefused(t, dir, filepath.Join(dir, "50-b.rules")+`, line 2: the id "probe" `+
+		"is already the id of the rule at "+filepath.Join(dir, "00-a.rules")+", line 1")
+}
+
+func TestDirectoryThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
+
+	wantRefused(t, dir, "SWWAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
+		": no such file or directory")
+}
+
+func TestEmptyDirectoryLoadsNoRulesAndSaysSo(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	params, lines := newParams(writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{"00-default.rules": "# none\n"}))
+
+	files, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	line := lines.waitFor(t, read)
+	if files.Len() != 0 || line["rules"] != 0.0 {
+		t.Errorf("%d rules loaded, and the log says %v, want none", files.Len(), line)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRuleFilesOffReadNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	// SWWAF_RULES_DIR does not exist, which would stop the start.
+	params, _ := newParams(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d"))
+	params.Enabled = false
+
+	files, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if files.Len() != 0 || files.Match(get(t, "/")) != nil {
+		t.Errorf("%d rules loaded with the rule files off", files.Len())
+	}
+
+	// It would watch until the test ends.
+	files.Watch(t.Context())
+}
+
+func TestEditsTakenInWhileRunning(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{firstFile: "first path block ^/first\n"})
+	files, lines := watch(t, dir)
+
+	// matches reports whether path matches a rule.
+	matches := func(path string) bool { return len(files.Match(get(t, path))) == 1 }
+
+	// A file added.
+	save(t, dir, "50-b.rules", "second path block ^/second\n")
+	lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return matches("/second") })
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/first"), "first")
+
+	// A file edited.
+	save(t, dir, firstFile, "first path block ^/edited\n")
+	lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return !matches("/first") })
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/edited"), "first")
+
+	// A file removed.
+	err := os.Remove(filepath.Join(dir, "50-b.rules"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return !matches("/second") })
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/edited"), "first")
+}
+
+func TestBrokenEditKeepsTheRulesAsTheyWere(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := writeFiles(t, ruleFiles{firstFile: "first path block ^/first\n"})
+	files, lines := watch(t, dir)
+
+	// The edit's second line has an unknown action, so the rules stay as
+	// they were, the first line's earlier version included.
+	save(t, dir, firstFile, "first path block ^/edited\nsecond path bann ^/second\n")
+
+	line := lines.waitFor(t, hasError)
+	want := filepath.Join(dir, firstFile) +
+		`, line 2: the action "bann" is not log, block or ban`
+
+	if line["error"] != want || line["level"] != "ERROR" {
+		t.Errorf("logged %v, want an error %q", line, want)
+	}
+
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/first"), "first")
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/second"))
+
+	// Once mended, the file is read again.
+	save(t, dir, firstFile, "first path block ^/edited\nsecond path ban ^/second\n")
+	lines.waitUntil(t, func() bool { return len(files.Match(get(t, "/second"))) == 1 })
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/edited"), "first")
+}
+
+func TestDefaultFileBansProbesAtTheSiteRootAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	params, _ := newParams(filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"))
+
+	files, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load the default file: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Probes sent by a browser, by the rule that refuses them.
+	for rule, targets := range map[string][]string{
+		"env-file":    {"/.env", "/.env.production", "/.ENV"},
+		"vcs-dir":     {"/.git/config", "/.git", "/.svn/entries"},
+		"secrets-dir": {"/.aws/credentials", "/.ssh/id_rsa"},
+		"secret-file": {"/.htpasswd", "/.DS_Store", "/.git-credentials"},
+		"editor-dir":  {"/.vscode/sftp.json"},
+		"backup-file": {
+			"/wp-config.php.bak", "/index.php~", "/dump.sql", "/backup.sql.gz",
+		},
+		"log-file":     {"/debug.log"},
+		"compose-file": {"/docker-compose.yml", "/compose.yaml"},
+		"php-shell":    {"/shell.php"},
+		"path-traversal": {
+			"/static/../../etc/passwd", "/f?f=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd",
+		},
+	} {
+		for _, target := range targets {
+			wantRefusedBy(t, files, target, browser, rule)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Scanners, by their user agents.
+	for _, scanner := range []string{
+		"sqlmap/1.8.4#stable (https://sqlmap.org)",
+		"Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Nuclei - Open-source project)",
+	} {
+		wantRefusedBy(t, files, "/", scanner, "scanner-agent")
+	}
+
+	// Ordinary requests to a code forge for files of those names deeper
+	// in its paths, and for other files at its root.
+	for _, target := range []string{
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.env.example",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.env",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.github/workflows/ci.yml",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.vscode/settings.json",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/.htaccess",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docker-compose.yml",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/db/schema.sql",
+		"/owner/repo/raw/branch/main/debug.log",
+		"/owner/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
+		"/owner/repo/src/branch/main/docs/../README.md",
+		"/user/login?redirect_to=%2fowner%2frepo",
+		"/index.php",
+		"/.well-known/security.txt",
+	} {
+		r := get(t, target)
+		r.Header.Set(userAgent, browser)
+
+		matched := files.Match(r)
+		if len(matched) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("%s matched %v, want no rule", target, ids(matched))
+		}
+	}
+
+	// A request without a user agent is only noted.
+	wantMatched(t, files, get(t, "/"), "empty-agent")
+}
+
+// ruleFiles are files to write into a directory of rule files, by name.
+type ruleFiles map[string]string
+
+// writeFiles writes files into a new directory, and returns it.
+func writeFiles(t *testing.T, files ruleFiles) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	for name, content := range files {
+		path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
+
+		err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		err = os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", name, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return dir
+}
+
+// save writes content to the rule file name in dir as an editor that
+// saves by renaming does, so that the file is never seen half written.
+func save(t *testing.T, dir, name, content string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path+".tmp", []byte(content), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", name, err)
+	}
+
+	err = os.Rename(path+".tmp", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("rename: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// newParams returns Params for the rule files in dir, switched on, with
+// the process log in the processLog returned.
+func newParams(dir string) (rules.Params, processLog) {
+	lines := make(processLog, maxLogLines)
+
+	return rules.Params{
+		Dir:        dir,
+		Enabled:    true,
+		ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(lines, nil)),
+	}, lines
+}
+
+// load writes files into a new directory and loads the rules in it.
+func load(t *testing.T, files ruleFiles) *rules.Files {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	params, _ := newParams(writeFiles(t, files))
+	params.ProcessLog = slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)
+
+	loaded, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return loaded
+}
+
+// watch loads the rules in dir, runs their Watch until the test ends, and
+// waits until it watches the directory.
+func watch(t *testing.T, dir string) (*rules.Files, processLog) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	params, lines := newParams(dir)
+
+	files, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+	stopped := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		files.Watch(ctx)
+		close(stopped)
+	}()
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		stop()
+		<-stopped
+	})
+
+	lines.waitFor(t, watching)
+
+	return files, lines
+}
+
+// wantRefused checks that loading the rule files in dir fails with the
+// error want.
+func wantRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	params, _ := newParams(dir)
+
+	_, err := rules.Load(params)
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != want {
+		t.Errorf("error %v, want %s", err, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// get returns a GET request for target, a path and an optional query, as
+// smallwebwaf's server reads it, without a user agent.
+func get(t *testing.T, target string) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	return httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
+		"http://app.example"+target, nil)
+}
+
+// wantRefusedBy checks that a GET request for target with the user agent
+// sent matches rule alone, and that rule refuses it.
+func wantRefusedBy(t *testing.T, files *rules.Files, target, sent, rule string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	r := get(t, target)
+	r.Header.Set(userAgent, sent)
+
+	matched := files.Match(r)
+	if len(matched) != 1 || matched[0].ID != rule || matched[0].Action == rules.ActionLog {
+		t.Errorf("%s from %q matched %v, want %s alone, refusing it", target,
+			sent, ids(matched), rule)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantMatched checks the ids of the rules r matches, in order.
+func wantMatched(t *testing.T, files *rules.Files, r *http.Request, want ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got := ids(files.Match(r))
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("%s matched %v, want %v", r.URL, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// ids returns the ids of matched.
+func ids(matched []rules.Rule) []string {
+	got := make([]string, 0, len(matched))
+	for _, rule := range matched {
+		got = append(got, rule.ID)
+	}
+
+	return got
+}
+
+// processLog receives the lines of a process log, each a JSON object, for
+// a test to wait for.
+type processLog chan string
+
+// Write receives a line of the process log.
+func (l processLog) Write(line []byte) (int, error) {
+	l <- string(line)
+
+	return len(line), nil
+}
+
+// waitFor returns the next line of the process log whose message is msg,
+// passing over the lines before it. It waits as long as that takes, so
+// that a slow test process cannot fail the test.
+func (l processLog) waitFor(t *testing.T, msg string) map[string]any {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for line := range l {
+		var fields map[string]any
+
+		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &fields)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("process log line %q is not JSON: %v", line, err)
+		}
+
+		if fields["msg"] == msg {
+			return fields
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// waitUntil waits for the rule files to be read until done reports true,
+// as it does once they have been read after the test's last change. They
+// can be read before then too, as they are once Watch starts watching.
+func (l processLog) waitUntil(t *testing.T, done func() bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for !done() {
+		l.waitFor(t, read)
+	}
+}

internal/rules/watch_internal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+package rules
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"
+)
+
+// The tests below run readAfterChanges in a synctest bubble, where time is
+// a clock of the test's own: time.Sleep moves it on at once, and
+// synctest.Wait returns once readAfterChanges waits again, so that every
+// reading due by then is done. The test sends the changes itself, as the
+// watch of a directory cannot run in a bubble.
+
+func TestFileWrittenInTwoPartsTakenInOnlyWhole(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := t.TempDir()
+		path := filepath.Join(dir, "50-app.rules")
+		writeFile(t, path, "first path block ^/first\n")
+		files := load(t, dir)
+		changes := run(t, files)
+
+		file, err := os.Create(path) //nolint:gosec // a file the test wrote
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		defer func() {
+			_ = file.Close()
+		}()
+
+		// The first part ends in the middle of a ban rule's regex, which,
+		// read then, would ban every request.
+		write(t, file, "first path block ^/first\nprobe path ban ^/")
+
+		changes <- fsnotify.Event{Name: path, Op: fsnotify.Write}
+
+		time.Sleep(quietTime - time.Nanosecond)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantMatched(t, files, "/anything")
+
+		// The second part starts the wait again.
+		write(t, file, `\.env$`+"\n")
+
+		changes <- fsnotify.Event{Name: path, Op: fsnotify.Write}
+
+		time.Sleep(quietTime - time.Nanosecond)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantMatched(t, files, "/.env")
+
+		time.Sleep(time.Nanosecond)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantMatched(t, files, "/.env", "probe")
+		wantMatched(t, files, "/anything")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestEditSavedBeforeTheWatchStartsTakenIn(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		dir := t.TempDir()
+		path := filepath.Join(dir, "50-app.rules")
+		writeFile(t, path, "first path block ^/first\n")
+		files := load(t, dir)
+
+		// Saved after Load read the files, and before the directory was
+		// watched, so that no change is seen for it.
+		writeFile(t, path, "first path block ^/edited\n")
+		run(t, files)
+		time.Sleep(quietTime)
+		synctest.Wait()
+		wantMatched(t, files, "/edited", "first")
+	})
+}
+
+// load loads the rules in dir.
+func load(t *testing.T, dir string) *Files {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	files, err := Load(Params{
+		Dir: dir, Enabled: true, ProcessLog: slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler),
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	return files
+}
+
+// run runs files' readAfterChanges until the test ends, and returns the
+// channel that sends it changes.
+func run(t *testing.T, files *Files) chan<- fsnotify.Event {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	changes := make(chan fsnotify.Event)
+	ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+	stopped := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		files.readAfterChanges(ctx, changes, nil)
+		close(stopped)
+	}()
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		stop()
+		<-stopped
+	})
+
+	return changes
+}
+
+// writeFile writes content to the file at path.
+func writeFile(t *testing.T, path, content string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", path, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// write writes text to the end of file.
+func write(t *testing.T, file *os.File, text string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	_, err := file.WriteString(text)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantMatched checks the ids of the rules that a GET request for path
+// matches, in order.
+func wantMatched(t *testing.T, files *Files, path string, want ...string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet,
+		"http://app.example"+path, nil)
+
+	matched := files.Match(r)
+
+	got := make([]string, 0, len(matched))
+	for _, rule := range matched {
+		got = append(got, rule.ID)
+	}
+
+	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("%s matched %v, want %v", path, got, want)
+	}
+}

internal/smallwebwaf/healthcheck_test.go

@@ -24,12 +24,15 @@ func TestHealthCheck(t *testing.T) {
 
 	out := &output{}
 	exited := make(chan int, 1)
+	settings := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:  localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL: app.URL,
+		stateDir:    t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:    t.TempDir(),
+	}
 
 	go func() {
-		exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
-			listenAddr:  localhost + ":0",
-			upstreamURL: app.URL,
-		}, out)
+		exited <- run(ctx, settings, out)
 	}()
 
 	addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)

internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf.go

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // Package smallwebwaf runs the smallwebwaf process: it reads the settings,
-// serves requests until it is told to stop, and then stops in an orderly
-// way.
+// the rule files and the state files, serves requests until it is told to
+// stop, and then stops in an orderly way, writing the state files.
 package smallwebwaf
 
 import (
@@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ import (
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/config"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/proxy"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
 	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/rules"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/state"
 )
 
 // shutdownTimeout is how long requests in progress may take to finish
@@ -26,6 +29,11 @@ import (
 // runit and docker wait a little longer before they kill the process.
 const shutdownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
 
+// remoteLogStopTimeout is how long, as smallwebwaf stops, the log lines
+// still waiting are sent to SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL before they are given
+// up. stdout has carried them.
+const remoteLogStopTimeout = 2 * time.Second
+
 // Params are what Run needs from the process.
 type Params struct {
 	// Version is the version of the binary, set when it is built.
@@ -55,8 +63,9 @@ func Main(version string) int {
 	})
 }
 
-// Run reads the settings, then serves requests until ctx is done. It
-// returns the process's exit status, 1 when smallwebwaf cannot start.
+// Run reads the settings, the rule files and the state files, then serves
+// requests until ctx is done. It returns the process's exit status, 1
+// when smallwebwaf cannot start.
 func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
 	processLog := requestlog.NewProcessLogger(params.Stdout)
 
@@ -67,6 +76,64 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
 		return 1
 	}
 
+	// While SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL is set, every line on stdout from here on
+	// is sent there too.
+	stdout := params.Stdout
+
+	var remote *remotelog.Sender
+
+	if cfg.LogRemoteURL != nil {
+		remote = newRemoteLogSender(cfg)
+		stdout = io.MultiWriter(params.Stdout, remote)
+		processLog = requestlog.NewProcessLogger(stdout)
+
+		stopSending := startSending(ctx, remote, processLog)
+		defer stopSending()
+	}
+
+	ruleFiles, err := rules.Load(rules.Params{
+		Dir:        cfg.RulesDir,
+		Enabled:    cfg.RulesEnabled,
+		ProcessLog: processLog,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		processLog.Error("cannot use the rule files", "error", err.Error())
+
+		return 1
+	}
+
+	// The state files give times in UTC.
+	now := func() time.Time { return time.Now().UTC() }
+
+	server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
+		Config:     cfg,
+		RequestLog: stdout,
+		ProcessLog: processLog,
+		GeoJSURL:   lookup.URL,
+		Now:        now,
+		Rules:      ruleFiles,
+	})
+	if remote != nil {
+		server.Metrics.AddRemoteLog(remote)
+	}
+
+	files, err := state.Load(state.Params{
+		Dir:             cfg.StateDir,
+		WriteDelay:      cfg.StateWriteDelay,
+		CounterInterval: cfg.StateCounterInterval,
+		Ledger:          server.Ledger,
+		Limiter:         server.Limiter,
+		GeoJS:           server.GeoJS,
+		Now:             now,
+		ProcessLog:      processLog,
+		Metrics:         server.Metrics,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		processLog.Error("cannot use the state files", "error", err.Error())
+
+		return 1
+	}
+
 	listener, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(ctx, "tcp", cfg.ListenAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		processLog.Error("cannot listen on SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR",
@@ -75,26 +142,58 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, params Params) int {
 		return 1
 	}
 
-	server := proxy.New(proxy.Params{
-		Config:     cfg,
-		RequestLog: params.Stdout,
-		ProcessLog: processLog,
-		GeoJSURL:   lookup.URL,
-	})
-
 	processLog.Info("starting",
 		"version", params.Version,
 		"address", listener.Addr().String(),
 		"settings", cfg)
 
-	return serve(ctx, server, listener, processLog)
+	return serve(ctx, server.Server, listener, files, ruleFiles, processLog)
 }
 
-// serve serves requests on listener until ctx is done, then gives the
-// requests in progress shutdownTimeout to finish.
+// newRemoteLogSender returns a sender of the log lines to
+// SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL, with the settings for it.
+func newRemoteLogSender(cfg *config.Config) *remotelog.Sender {
+	return remotelog.New(remotelog.Params{
+		URL:      cfg.LogRemoteURL,
+		RootCAs:  cfg.LogRemoteTLSCAs,
+		Buffer:   cfg.LogRemoteBuffer,
+		Facility: cfg.LogRemoteFacility,
+		AppName:  cfg.LogRemoteAppName,
+	})
+}
+
+// startSending runs remote until the function it returns is called, which
+// then waits at most remoteLogStopTimeout for the lines still waiting to
+// be sent. Sending goes on after ctx is done, so that the lines written
+// while smallwebwaf stops are sent too.
+func startSending(
+	ctx context.Context, remote *remotelog.Sender, processLog *slog.Logger,
+) func() {
+	sending, stop := context.WithCancel(context.WithoutCancel(ctx))
+	sent := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		remote.Run(sending, processLog)
+		close(sent)
+	}()
+
+	return func() {
+		stop()
+
+		select {
+		case <-sent:
+		case <-time.After(remoteLogStopTimeout):
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// serve serves requests on listener, writes the state files as they are
+// due, takes in an admin's edits of them, and reads the rule files again
+// as they change, until ctx is done. Then it gives the requests in
+// progress shutdownTimeout to finish, and writes every state file.
 func serve(
 	ctx context.Context, server *http.Server, listener net.Listener,
-	processLog *slog.Logger,
+	files *state.Files, ruleFiles *rules.Files, processLog *slog.Logger,
 ) int {
 	served := make(chan error, 1)
 
@@ -102,6 +201,28 @@ func serve(
 		served <- server.Serve(listener)
 	}()
 
+	writing, stopWriting := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+	defer stopWriting()
+
+	written := make(chan struct{})
+	watched := make(chan struct{})
+	rulesWatched := make(chan struct{})
+
+	go func() {
+		files.Run(writing)
+		close(written)
+	}()
+
+	go func() {
+		files.Watch(writing)
+		close(watched)
+	}()
+
+	go func() {
+		ruleFiles.Watch(writing)
+		close(rulesWatched)
+	}()
+
 	select {
 	case err := <-served:
 		processLog.Error("serving failed", "error", err.Error())
@@ -131,6 +252,24 @@ func serve(
 		return 1
 	}
 
+	// Run and Watch have ended, so nothing else reads or writes the
+	// files. Every request has ended too, but for two kinds
+	// that Go's server does not wait for: one cut off because Shutdown
+	// timed out, and one whose connection switched protocols, such as a
+	// WebSocket. Such a request adds to its client's history only as it
+	// ends, which can be after this write, and then that request is
+	// missing from clients.json.
+	<-written
+	<-watched
+	<-rulesWatched
+
+	err = files.WriteAll()
+	if err != nil {
+		processLog.Error("writing the state files failed", "error", err.Error())
+
+		return 1
+	}
+
 	processLog.Info("stopped")
 
 	return 0

internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf_internal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+package smallwebwaf
+
+import (
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+	"testing/synctest"
+	"time"
+
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/remotelog"
+)
+
+// The stop's tests run in a synctest bubble, where the time package runs
+// on a clock of the test's own, so that how long the stop takes can be
+// told exactly. The sender is held up by its process log, not by the
+// network: a goroutine of the bubble that waits on the network keeps that
+// clock from moving on.
+
+func TestStopWaitsForTheSenderToFinish(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		took := stopHeldSender(t, time.Second)
+		if took != time.Second {
+			t.Errorf("the stop took %s, want the second the sender took", took)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestStopWaitsForTheSenderAtMostTwoSeconds(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
+		took := stopHeldSender(t, time.Minute)
+		if took != 2*time.Second {
+			t.Errorf("the stop took %s, want 2s", took)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// heldLog holds each line written to it until it is closed.
+type heldLog chan struct{}
+
+// Write waits until the log is closed.
+func (l heldLog) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	<-l
+
+	return len(p), nil
+}
+
+// stopHeldSender starts sending to an endpoint the sender cannot connect
+// to, holds the sender as it logs that failure until release has passed,
+// stops the sending, and returns how long the stop took. It returns once
+// the sender has ended, as a bubble must.
+func stopHeldSender(t *testing.T, release time.Duration) time.Duration {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	log := make(heldLog)
+	sender := remotelog.New(remotelog.Params{
+		// No port is 65536, so each attempt to connect fails at once,
+		// before it reaches the network.
+		URL:    &url.URL{Scheme: remotelog.SchemeTCP, Host: "127.0.0.1:65536"},
+		Buffer: 1,
+	})
+
+	stopSending := startSending(t.Context(), sender,
+		slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(log, nil)))
+
+	synctest.Wait()
+	time.AfterFunc(release, func() { close(log) })
+
+	stopped := time.Now()
+
+	stopSending()
+
+	took := time.Since(stopped)
+
+	time.Sleep(release)
+	synctest.Wait()
+
+	return took
+}

internal/smallwebwaf/smallwebwaf_test.go

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"slices"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
@@ -24,9 +28,17 @@ const (
 	// testVersion is the version the tests give smallwebwaf.
 	testVersion = "test"
 	// localhost is where the tests listen.
-	localhost   = "127.0.0.1"
-	listenAddr  = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
-	upstreamURL = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
+	localhost            = "127.0.0.1"
+	listenAddr           = "SWWAF_LISTEN_ADDR"
+	upstreamURL          = "SWWAF_UPSTREAM_URL"
+	trustedProxies       = "SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES"
+	stateDir             = "SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
+	stateWriteDelay      = "SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY"
+	stateCounterInterval = "SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL"
+	rateLimitPerDay      = "SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY"
+	rulesDir             = "SWWAF_RULES_DIR"
+	// greeting is what the tests' app answers.
+	greeting = "hello from the app"
 )
 
 // output collects what smallwebwaf writes on stdout.
@@ -69,11 +81,19 @@ func (o *output) line(t *testing.T, key, value string) map[string]any {
 		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
 	}
 
-	t.Fatalf("no line with %s %q in the output:\n%s", key, value, o.buf.String())
+	t.Fatalf("no line with %s %q in the output:\n%s", key, value, o.text())
 
 	return nil
 }
 
+// text returns everything written so far.
+func (o *output) text() string {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return o.buf.String()
+}
+
 // run runs smallwebwaf with the settings in env until ctx is done, and
 // returns its exit status.
 func run(ctx context.Context, env map[string]string, out *output) int {
@@ -107,6 +127,28 @@ func TestInvalidSettingStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestShortMetricsTokenStopsTheStartUnshown(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const token = "a-token-of-31-characters-at-all" //nolint:gosec // too short to use
+
+	out := &output{}
+
+	status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN": token}, out)
+	if status != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
+	}
+
+	line := out.line(t, "msg", "invalid setting")
+	if line["error"] != "SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN: is shorter than 32 characters" {
+		t.Errorf("start refused with %v", line)
+	}
+
+	if strings.Contains(out.text(), token) {
+		t.Errorf("the output shows the token:\n%s", out.text())
+	}
+}
+
 func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
@@ -121,7 +163,11 @@ func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 
 	out := &output{}
 
-	status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{listenAddr: taken.Addr().String()}, out)
+	status := run(t.Context(), map[string]string{
+		listenAddr: taken.Addr().String(),
+		stateDir:   t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:   t.TempDir(),
+	}, out)
 	if status != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
 	}
@@ -132,11 +178,8 @@ func TestAddressInUseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
 func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
-	app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
-		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-			_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "hello from the app")
-		}))
-	defer app.Close()
+	appURL := startApp(t)
+	dir := t.TempDir()
 
 	ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
 	out := &output{}
@@ -145,12 +188,19 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
 	go func() {
 		exited <- run(ctx, map[string]string{
 			listenAddr:  localhost + ":0",
-			upstreamURL: app.URL,
+			upstreamURL: appURL,
+			stateDir:    dir,
+			rulesDir:    filepath.Join("..", "..", "share", "rules.d"),
 		}, out)
 	}()
 
+	// The default rule file is read.
+	if rules := out.line(t, "msg", "read the rule files")["rules"]; rules != 12.0 {
+		t.Errorf("read %v rules from the default rule file, want 12", rules)
+	}
+
 	starting := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
-	wantStartingLine(t, starting, app.URL)
+	wantStartingLine(t, starting, appURL, dir)
 
 	addr, _ := starting["address"].(string)
 	wantGreeting(t, "http://"+addr+"/")
@@ -170,30 +220,436 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
 	out.line(t, "msg", "stopped")
 }
 
+func TestStateKeptAcrossRestarts(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	env := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:      localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL:     startApp(t),
+		stateDir:        t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:        t.TempDir(),
+		rateLimitPerDay: "2",
+		// Neither comes due in the test: the files are written as
+		// smallwebwaf stops.
+		stateWriteDelay:      "1h",
+		stateCounterInterval: "1h",
+	}
+
+	// The two requests a day allows, and a stop.
+	runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantGreeting(t, url)
+		wantGreeting(t, url)
+	})
+
+	// After a restart the client has no fresh allowance: its third
+	// request breaks the day limit, and bans it.
+	out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantRefused(t, url)
+	})
+	out.line(t, "action", "rate_limited")
+
+	// After another, the ban still refuses it.
+	out = runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantRefused(t, url)
+	})
+	out.line(t, "action", "banned")
+}
+
+func TestBanRefusesItsNetblockAfterARestartWithAnotherScope(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const scope = "SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX"
+
+	env := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:      localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL:     startApp(t),
+		stateDir:        t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:        t.TempDir(),
+		trustedProxies:  localhost + "/32",
+		rateLimitPerDay: "1",
+		scope:           "24",
+	}
+
+	// 203.0.113.9's second request breaks the day limit, and bans
+	// 203.0.113.0/24.
+	runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.9", http.StatusOK)
+		wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.9", http.StatusForbidden)
+	})
+
+	// With each address a netblock of its own after a restart, that ban
+	// still refuses all of 203.0.113.0/24. 198.51.100.7 is banned alone.
+	env[scope] = "32"
+	runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.113.200", http.StatusForbidden)
+		wantStatus(t, url, "203.0.114.1", http.StatusOK)
+		wantStatus(t, url, "198.51.100.7", http.StatusOK)
+		wantStatus(t, url, "198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden)
+	})
+
+	// With /24 netblocks again, that ban still refuses 198.51.100.7, and
+	// no other address.
+	env[scope] = "24"
+	runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantStatus(t, url, "198.51.100.7", http.StatusForbidden)
+		wantStatus(t, url, "198.51.100.8", http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestBanAddedAndLiftedByEditingBansJSON(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const (
+		// bans.json as an admin writes it with a ban, permanent, on
+		// 203.0.113.0/24, and with none.
+		oneBan = `{"version": 1, "bans": [{"netblock": "203.0.113.0/24", ` +
+			`"start": "2026-10-06T00:00:00Z", "expires": null}]}`
+		noBan = `{"version": 1, "bans": []}`
+	)
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	env := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:     localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL:    startApp(t),
+		stateDir:       dir,
+		rulesDir:       t.TempDir(),
+		trustedProxies: localhost + "/32",
+		// No write comes due in the test, so only the watch on the
+		// directory can take the edits in.
+		stateWriteDelay:      "1h",
+		stateCounterInterval: "1h",
+	}
+
+	runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		path := filepath.Join(dir, "bans.json")
+
+		saveUntilAnswered(t, path, oneBan, url, "203.0.113.9", http.StatusForbidden)
+		wantStatus(t, url, "198.51.100.7", http.StatusOK)
+		saveUntilAnswered(t, path, noBan, url, "203.0.113.9", http.StatusOK)
+	})
+}
+
+func TestRuleFileAddedWhileRunningTakesEffect(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	env := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:  localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL: startApp(t),
+		stateDir:    t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:    dir,
+		// The requests sent until the rule takes effect must not break a
+		// rate limit, whose ban would refuse them too.
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE": "off",
+	}
+
+	out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantGreeting(t, url)
+
+		// Written once: each change would start the rule files' wait
+		// again. A file written before smallwebwaf watches the directory is
+		// read once it does.
+		err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "50-app.rules"),
+			[]byte("everything path block ^/\n"), 0o600)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("write the rule file: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		// As long as that takes, so that a slow test process cannot fail
+		// the test.
+		for statusFrom(t, url, "203.0.113.9") != http.StatusForbidden {
+			time.Sleep(pollInterval)
+		}
+	})
+	out.line(t, "action", "rule_blocked")
+}
+
+func TestRuleFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "00-default.rules")
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("# probes\nenv-file path bann ^/\\.env$\n"), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write the rule file: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	wantRulesRefused(t, dir, path+`, line 2: the action "bann" is not log, block or ban`)
+}
+
+func TestRulesDirThatDoesNotExistStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rules.d")
+
+	wantRulesRefused(t, dir, "SWWAF_RULES_DIR cannot be read: open "+dir+
+		": no such file or directory")
+}
+
+func TestEveryLineIsAlsoSentToTheRemoteLogEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	defer func() {
+		_ = endpoint.Close()
+	}()
+
+	env := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:             localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL:            startApp(t),
+		stateDir:               t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:               t.TempDir(),
+		"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL": "syslog+tcp://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
+	}
+
+	out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantGreeting(t, url)
+	})
+	out.line(t, "type", "request")
+
+	// smallwebwaf connected as it started, and closes the connection once
+	// it has sent the lines written as it stopped.
+	conn, err := endpoint.Accept()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("accept: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	received, err := io.ReadAll(conn)
+	_ = conn.Close()
+
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Lines written at once by several goroutines may reach stdout and
+	// the endpoint in different orders.
+	sent := messages(t, string(received))
+	written := slices.Collect(strings.Lines(out.text()))
+
+	slices.Sort(sent)
+	slices.Sort(written)
+
+	if !slices.Equal(sent, written) {
+		t.Errorf("sent\n%v\nwrote\n%v", sent, written)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStalledRemoteLogEndpointHoldsUpNoRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	const token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+
+	// The endpoint takes connections and never answers, so the TLS
+	// handshake of each waits on it, and no line is ever sent.
+	endpoint, err := (&net.ListenConfig{}).Listen(t.Context(), "tcp", localhost+":0")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	defer func() {
+		_ = endpoint.Close()
+	}()
+
+	env := map[string]string{
+		listenAddr:                localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL:               startApp(t),
+		stateDir:                  t.TempDir(),
+		rulesDir:                  t.TempDir(),
+		"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_URL":    "syslog+tls://" + endpoint.Addr().String(),
+		"SWWAF_LOG_REMOTE_BUFFER": "1",
+		"SWWAF_METRICS_TOKEN":     token,
+	}
+
+	out := runUntilStopped(t, env, func(url string) {
+		wantGreeting(t, url)
+
+		// More than one line has been written, and the buffer holds the
+		// last.
+		metrics := metricsText(t, url+"_smallwebwaf/metrics", token)
+		for _, series := range []string{
+			"smallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_sent_total 0",
+			"smallwebwaf_remote_log_buffer_depth 1",
+		} {
+			if !strings.Contains(metrics, "\n"+series+"\n") {
+				t.Errorf("no %q in the metrics:\n%s", series, metrics)
+			}
+		}
+
+		if strings.Contains(metrics, "\nsmallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total 0\n") ||
+			!strings.Contains(metrics, "\nsmallwebwaf_remote_log_lines_dropped_total ") {
+			t.Errorf("no line dropped in the metrics:\n%s", metrics)
+		}
+
+		// Closed, the endpoint refuses the connection made to send the
+		// lines still waiting at the stop, which then does not wait.
+		_ = endpoint.Close()
+	})
+
+	out.line(t, "type", "request")
+}
+
+func TestStateFileThatDoesNotParseStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "bans.json"), []byte("{\n"), 0o600)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write bans.json: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The file ends at the newline that is the second byte of its first
+	// line.
+	wantStartRefused(t, dir, filepath.Join(dir, "bans.json")+", line 1, column 2: ")
+}
+
+func TestUnwritableStateDirStopsTheStart(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	wantStartRefused(t, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "missing"),
+		"SWWAF_STATE_DIR cannot be written: ")
+}
+
+// wantStartRefused runs smallwebwaf with its state files in dir, and
+// checks that it stops at start, with an error that starts with want. If
+// it starts instead, it is stopped after waitLimit.
+func wantStartRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	ctx, stop := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), waitLimit)
+	defer stop()
+
+	out := &output{}
+
+	status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
+		listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: dir, rulesDir: t.TempDir(),
+	}, out)
+	if status != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
+	}
+
+	line := out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the state files")
+	message, _ := line["error"].(string)
+
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(message, want) {
+		t.Errorf("start refused with %q, want an error starting %q", message, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantRulesRefused runs smallwebwaf with its rule files in dir, and
+// checks that it stops at start, with the error want. If it starts
+// instead, it is stopped after waitLimit.
+func wantRulesRefused(t *testing.T, dir, want string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	ctx, stop := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), waitLimit)
+	defer stop()
+
+	out := &output{}
+
+	status := run(ctx, map[string]string{
+		listenAddr: localhost + ":0", stateDir: t.TempDir(), rulesDir: dir,
+	}, out)
+	if status != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 1", status)
+	}
+
+	line := out.line(t, "msg", "cannot use the rule files")
+	if line["error"] != want || line["level"] != "ERROR" {
+		t.Errorf("start refused with %v, want the error %q", line, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// startApp starts an app that answers every request with greeting, and
+// returns its URL.
+func startApp(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	app := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(
+		func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			_, _ = io.WriteString(w, greeting)
+		}))
+	t.Cleanup(app.Close)
+
+	return app.URL
+}
+
+// runUntilStopped runs smallwebwaf with the settings in env, has use send
+// it requests at url, then stops it as SIGTERM does, checks that it
+// stopped in order, and returns its output.
+func runUntilStopped(
+	t *testing.T, env map[string]string, use func(url string),
+) *output {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	ctx, stop := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+	out := &output{}
+	exited := make(chan int, 1)
+
+	go func() {
+		exited <- run(ctx, env, out)
+	}()
+
+	addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
+	use("http://" + addr + "/")
+	stop()
+
+	select {
+	case status := <-exited:
+		if status != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("exit status %d, want 0; output:\n%s", status, out.text())
+		}
+	case <-time.After(waitLimit):
+		t.Fatal("still running after being told to stop")
+	}
+
+	return out
+}
+
 // wantStartingLine checks that the line at start gives the version and
 // every setting's value.
-func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL string) {
+func wantStartingLine(t *testing.T, line map[string]any, appURL, dir string) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	settings, _ := line["settings"].(map[string]any)
 	want := map[string]any{
-		listenAddr:                            localhost + ":0",
-		upstreamURL:                           appURL,
-		"SWWAF_TRUSTED_PROXIES":               "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
-		"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT":        "60s",
-		"SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT":       "30m",
-		"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT":      "60s",
-		"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT":     "30m",
-		"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES":             "100M",
-		"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES":            "5G",
-		"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS":                    "",
-		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS":        "",
-		"SWWAF_DENY_NETS":                     "",
-		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE":         "1000",
-		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR":           "10000",
-		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY":            "50000",
-		"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES":              "",
-		"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES": "",
+		listenAddr:                              localhost + ":0",
+		upstreamURL:                             appURL,
+		stateDir:                                dir,
+		"SWWAF_MODE":                            "enforce",
+		stateWriteDelay:                         "10s",
+		stateCounterInterval:                    "15m",
+		trustedProxies:                          "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16",
+		"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT":          "60s",
+		"SWWAF_CLIENT_REQUEST_HEADER_MAX_BYTES": "32K",
+		"SWWAF_CLIENT_IDLE_TIMEOUT":             "120s",
+		"SWWAF_CLIENT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT":         "30m",
+		"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT":        "60s",
+		"SWWAF_UPSTREAM_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT":       "30m",
+		"SWWAF_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES":               "100M",
+		"SWWAF_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES":              "5G",
+		"SWWAF_ALLOW_NETS":                      "",
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS":          "",
+		"SWWAF_DENY_NETS":                       "",
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE":           "1000",
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR":             "10000",
+		rateLimitPerDay:                         "50000",
+		"SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_PATHS":         "",
+		"SWWAF_DENIED_COUNTRIES":                "",
+		"SWWAF_EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES":   "",
+		"SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE":                    "403",
+		"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_DURATION":              "1h",
+		"SWWAF_LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW":         "24h",
+		"SWWAF_MAX_BAN_DURATION":                "7d",
+		"SWWAF_ATTACK_BAN_DURATION":             "7d",
+		"SWWAF_MAX_BANS":                        "5000",
+		"SWWAF_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX":             "32",
+		"SWWAF_RULES_ENABLED":                   "true",
 	}
 
 	for name, value := range want {
@@ -228,7 +684,156 @@ func wantGreeting(t *testing.T, url string) {
 	body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
 	_ = res.Body.Close()
 
-	if err != nil || string(body) != "hello from the app" {
+	if err != nil || string(body) != greeting {
 		t.Errorf("got %q (%v), want the app's answer", body, err)
 	}
 }
+
+// messages returns the message of each record in received, octet-counted
+// frames of RFC 5424 records with the default facility and app name, each
+// with the newline that ends a line on stdout.
+func messages(t *testing.T, received string) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	hostname, _ := os.Hostname()
+	header := " " + hostname + " " + hostname + " - - - "
+
+	var found []string
+
+	for received != "" {
+		count, rest, _ := strings.Cut(received, " ")
+
+		length, err := strconv.Atoi(count)
+		if err != nil || length > len(rest) {
+			t.Fatalf("no frame at %q", received)
+		}
+
+		record := rest[:length]
+		received = rest[length:]
+
+		_, message, ok := strings.Cut(record, header)
+		if !ok || !strings.HasPrefix(record, "<134>1 ") {
+			t.Fatalf("record %q, want priority <134> and header %q", record, header)
+		}
+
+		found = append(found, message+"\n")
+	}
+
+	return found
+}
+
+// metricsText asks for the metrics at url with token, and returns them.
+func metricsText(t *testing.T, url, token string) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
+		http.NoBody)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
+
+	transport := &http.Transport{}
+	defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+
+	res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
+	_ = res.Body.Close()
+
+	if err != nil || res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("metrics answered %d (%v)", res.StatusCode, err)
+	}
+
+	return string(body)
+}
+
+// wantRefused checks that a request to url is refused with 403, the
+// default SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE.
+func wantRefused(t *testing.T, url string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
+		http.NoBody)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	transport := &http.Transport{}
+	defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+
+	res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_ = res.Body.Close()
+
+	if res.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("status %d, want %d", res.StatusCode, http.StatusForbidden)
+	}
+}
+
+// wantStatus checks that a request to url from the client at from, as
+// X-Forwarded-For names it, is answered with status.
+func wantStatus(t *testing.T, url, from string, status int) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	got := statusFrom(t, url, from)
+	if got != status {
+		t.Errorf("request from %s: status %d, want %d", from, got, status)
+	}
+}
+
+// saveUntilAnswered writes content to the state file at path, as an
+// admin saves an edit of it, until a request to url from the client at
+// from is answered with status. The file is written again before each
+// request, since smallwebwaf may not watch its directory yet when it is
+// first written. It waits as long as that takes, so that a slow test
+// process cannot fail the test.
+func saveUntilAnswered(t *testing.T, path, content, url, from string, status int) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for {
+		err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o600)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", path, err)
+		}
+
+		if statusFrom(t, url, from) == status {
+			return
+		}
+
+		time.Sleep(pollInterval)
+	}
+}
+
+// statusFrom returns the status a request to url from the client at
+// from, as X-Forwarded-For names it, is answered with.
+func statusFrom(t *testing.T, url, from string) int {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodGet, url,
+		http.NoBody)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", from)
+
+	transport := &http.Transport{}
+	defer transport.CloseIdleConnections()
+
+	res, err := (&http.Client{Transport: transport}).Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("request: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_ = res.Body.Close()
+
+	return res.StatusCode
+}

internal/state/state.go

@@ -0,0 +1,728 @@
+// Package state keeps smallwebwaf's state in JSON files in
+// SWWAF_STATE_DIR, as the "Persistent state" section of SPEC.md describes:
+// bans.json holds the bans, clients.json each client's counters and
+// history, and lookups.json GeoJS's answers. Load reads them at start,
+// Watch takes in an admin's edit of one while smallwebwaf runs, and Run
+// and WriteAll write them. The disk is read and written outside the
+// parts' locks, which are held only to take a snapshot or to put in what
+// a file holds, so that no request waits on the disk.
+package state
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io/fs"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/metrics"
+	"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
+)
+
+// version is the version of the files' format, the only one read.
+const version = 1
+
+// fileMode lets the smallwebwaf user alone read and write the files, which
+// hold visitors' addresses.
+const fileMode = 0o600
+
+// The state files' names.
+const (
+	bansJSON    = "bans.json"
+	clientsJSON = "clients.json"
+	lookupsJSON = "lookups.json"
+)
+
+var (
+	errVersion = errors.New("unknown version")
+	// errMissing is for an entry without a field it needs.
+	errMissing = errors.New("has no")
+	errCause   = errors.New("is not limit, attack or admin")
+)
+
+// Params are what Load needs.
+type Params struct {
+	// Dir is the directory of the state files (SWWAF_STATE_DIR).
+	Dir string
+	// WriteDelay is how long after a ban is made bans.json is written
+	// (SWWAF_STATE_WRITE_DELAY), and CounterInterval how often every file
+	// is (SWWAF_STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL).
+	WriteDelay      time.Duration
+	CounterInterval time.Duration
+	// Ledger, Limiter and GeoJS hold the state.
+	Ledger  *bans.Ledger
+	Limiter *ratelimit.Limiter
+	GeoJS   *lookup.GeoJS
+	// Now tells the time by which the counters' buckets run out, normally
+	// time.Now in UTC.
+	Now func() time.Time
+	// ProcessLog receives what was read and taken in, the edits set aside,
+	// and the writes that fail.
+	ProcessLog *slog.Logger
+	// Metrics count each file's writes, and the edits taken in and set
+	// aside.
+	Metrics *metrics.Metrics
+}
+
+// Files are the state files of a running smallwebwaf.
+type Files struct {
+	params Params
+
+	// mu is held while a file is read for an edit, and while it is
+	// written, so that Watch and the writes take turns. No request takes
+	// it.
+	mu sync.Mutex
+	// sums are the SHA-256 sums of what each file held, by name, when
+	// smallwebwaf last read or wrote it. A file that holds anything else
+	// has been edited since.
+	sums map[string][sha256.Size]byte
+}
+
+// bansFile is bans.json, indented for an admin to read and edit.
+type bansFile struct {
+	Version int        `json:"version"`
+	Bans    []banEntry `json:"bans"`
+}
+
+// banEntry is a ban as bans.json holds it: a permanent ban's expires is
+// null, a ban an admin added may have no cause, which makes it an
+// admin's, and lifted is left out until an admin lifts the ban.
+type banEntry struct {
+	Netblock netip.Prefix `json:"netblock"`
+	Start    time.Time    `json:"start"`
+	Expires  *time.Time   `json:"expires"`
+	Cause    string       `json:"cause"`
+	Reason   string       `json:"reason,omitempty"`
+	Lifted   *time.Time   `json:"lifted,omitempty"`
+	Notes    bans.Notes   `json:"notes"`
+}
+
+// clientsFile is clients.json, with each client on a line of its own.
+type clientsFile struct {
+	Version int                `json:"version"`
+	Clients []ratelimit.Client `json:"clients"`
+}
+
+// lookupsFile is lookups.json, with each answer on a line of its own.
+type lookupsFile struct {
+	Version int             `json:"version"`
+	Lookups []lookup.Answer `json:"lookups"`
+}
+
+// stateFile is the struct of a state file. Once the file is decoded, its
+// check refuses the first entry without a field it needs, which would
+// otherwise be read as something the entry does not say. data is the
+// file, for a field that may be null or "" but not left out, which the
+// struct cannot tell apart.
+type stateFile interface {
+	check(data []byte) error
+}
+
+// Load checks that files can be written in Dir, and reads the state files
+// in it into the ledger, the limiter and GeoJS. A missing file is empty
+// state, as on a first start. A file that does not parse, has an unknown
+// version, or has an entry without a field it needs, is an error that
+// names the file and, where the JSON decoder tells it, the line and
+// column, or else the entry.
+func Load(params Params) (*Files, error) {
+	err := checkWritable(params.Dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("SWWAF_STATE_DIR cannot be written: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	f := &Files{params: params, sums: map[string][sha256.Size]byte{}}
+
+	bansRead, bansErr := f.read(bansJSON)
+	clientsRead, clientsErr := f.read(clientsJSON)
+	lookupsRead, lookupsErr := f.read(lookupsJSON)
+
+	err = errors.Join(bansErr, clientsErr, lookupsErr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	params.ProcessLog.Info("read the state files", "directory", params.Dir,
+		"bans", bansRead, "clients", clientsRead, "lookups", lookupsRead)
+
+	return f, nil
+}
+
+// Run writes bans.json WriteDelay after a ban is made, with every ban
+// made in between, and every file every CounterInterval, until ctx is
+// done. A write that fails is logged, and the file is written again at
+// its next write. Each write takes in an admin's edit of its file first,
+// as writeFile describes.
+func (f *Files) Run(ctx context.Context) {
+	interval := time.NewTicker(f.params.CounterInterval)
+	defer interval.Stop()
+
+	var bansDue <-chan time.Time // nil while no ban waits to be written
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-f.params.Ledger.Changed():
+			if bansDue == nil {
+				bansDue = time.After(f.params.WriteDelay)
+			}
+		case <-bansDue:
+			bansDue = nil
+
+			f.logFailure(f.writeFile(bansJSON))
+		case <-interval.C:
+			f.logFailure(f.WriteAll())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// WriteAll writes every state file, as smallwebwaf stops. A file that
+// fails does not keep the others from being written.
+func (f *Files) WriteAll() error {
+	return errors.Join(f.writeFile(bansJSON), f.writeFile(clientsJSON),
+		f.writeFile(lookupsJSON))
+}
+
+// Watch watches Dir until ctx is done, and takes in an admin's edit of a
+// state file as soon as it is saved: what the file holds replaces what
+// smallwebwaf held for it. An edit that does not parse is left for the
+// file's next write, which sets it aside, since a file can be read while
+// an editor is still writing it. If Dir cannot be watched, that is
+// logged, and an edit is taken in only before its file is written.
+func (f *Files) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
+	watcher, err := fsnotify.NewWatcher()
+	if err == nil {
+		defer func() {
+			_ = watcher.Close()
+		}()
+
+		err = watcher.Add(f.params.Dir)
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		f.params.ProcessLog.Error("cannot watch the state files for edits",
+			"error", err.Error())
+
+		return
+	}
+
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Info("watching the state files for edits",
+		"directory", f.params.Dir)
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case event := <-watcher.Events:
+			switch name := filepath.Base(event.Name); name {
+			case bansJSON, clientsJSON, lookupsJSON:
+				f.fileChanged(name)
+			}
+		case err = <-watcher.Errors:
+			f.params.ProcessLog.Warn("watching the state files failed",
+				"error", err.Error())
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// logFailure logs a write that failed.
+func (f *Files) logFailure(err error) {
+	if err != nil {
+		f.params.ProcessLog.Error("writing the state files failed",
+			"error", err.Error())
+	}
+}
+
+// fileChanged takes in what the state file name holds, as Watch sees it
+// change, if that is an edit made since smallwebwaf last read or wrote
+// the file. A file that cannot be read or does not parse is left for its
+// next write.
+func (f *Files) fileChanged(name string) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	data, changed, err := f.readChanged(name)
+	if err != nil || !changed {
+		return
+	}
+
+	_ = f.takeInEdit(name, data)
+}
+
+// takeInEdit takes in data, an edit of the state file name, as takeIn
+// does, and counts and logs it. Every edit taken in while smallwebwaf
+// runs, by Watch or by a write, is taken in here. An edit that does not
+// parse is neither counted nor logged, and takeIn's error returned.
+func (f *Files) takeInEdit(name string, data []byte) error {
+	_, err := f.takeIn(name, data, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Counted before it is logged, so that the count is there once the
+	// log line is.
+	f.params.Metrics.StateFileEditTakenIn(name)
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Info("took in an edit of a state file",
+		"file", filepath.Join(f.params.Dir, name))
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// read takes in the state file name at start, and returns how many
+// entries it holds. A missing file holds none.
+func (f *Files) read(name string) (int, error) {
+	data, changed, err := f.readChanged(name)
+	if err != nil || !changed {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	return f.takeIn(name, data, false)
+}
+
+// readChanged returns what the state file name holds, and whether that
+// has changed since smallwebwaf last read or wrote the file, as it has
+// for a file smallwebwaf never read or wrote. A missing file has not
+// changed: it is written again at its next write.
+func (f *Files) readChanged(name string) ([]byte, bool, error) {
+	path := filepath.Join(f.params.Dir, name)
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // a state file, in SWWAF_STATE_DIR
+	if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+		return nil, false, nil
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, false, err
+	}
+
+	return data, sha256.Sum256(data) != f.sums[name], nil
+}
+
+// takeIn parses data, what the state file name holds, puts it into the
+// part that keeps that state, in place of what the part held, and returns
+// how many entries the file holds. edit is whether data is an admin's
+// edit taken in while smallwebwaf runs, rather than the file read at the
+// start. An error names the file and, where the JSON decoder tells it,
+// the line and column, or else the entry.
+func (f *Files) takeIn(name string, data []byte, edit bool) (int, error) {
+	path := filepath.Join(f.params.Dir, name)
+
+	var entries int
+
+	switch name {
+	case bansJSON:
+		var file bansFile
+
+		err := parse(path, data, &file)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+
+		held := make([]bans.Ban, 0, len(file.Bans))
+		for _, entry := range file.Bans {
+			held = append(held, entry.ban())
+		}
+
+		if edit {
+			f.params.Ledger.LoadEdit(held)
+		} else {
+			f.params.Ledger.Load(held)
+		}
+
+		entries = len(held)
+	case clientsJSON:
+		var file clientsFile
+
+		err := parse(path, data, &file)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+
+		f.params.Limiter.Load(file.Clients, f.params.Now())
+		entries = len(file.Clients)
+	case lookupsJSON:
+		var file lookupsFile
+
+		err := parse(path, data, &file)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+
+		f.params.GeoJS.Load(file.Lookups)
+		entries = len(file.Lookups)
+	}
+
+	f.sums[name] = sha256.Sum256(data)
+
+	return entries, nil
+}
+
+// writeFile writes the state file name from what smallwebwaf holds. An
+// edit made since smallwebwaf last read or wrote the file is taken in
+// first, so that it is not overwritten, or set aside if it does not
+// parse. A file that cannot be read, or an edit that cannot be set
+// aside, is left as it is, and the write given up. Every write is counted
+// in the metrics, and one that fails or is given up as a failure.
+func (f *Files) writeFile(name string) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	data, changed, err := f.readChanged(name)
+	if err == nil && changed {
+		err = f.takeInEdit(name, data)
+		if err != nil {
+			err = f.setAside(name, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err == nil {
+		data, err = f.encode(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			err = fmt.Errorf("encode %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err == nil {
+		err = write(f.params.Dir, name, data)
+	}
+
+	if err == nil {
+		// The file holds data from here on, even if the directory sync
+		// fails, so that its next read does not take it for an admin's
+		// edit.
+		f.sums[name] = sha256.Sum256(data)
+		err = syncDirectory(f.params.Dir)
+	}
+
+	f.params.Metrics.StateFileWritten(name, len(data), err)
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// setAside renames the state file name, an edit that does not parse with
+// parseErr, to name.bad, for the admin to mend, and logs it with where in
+// the file the error is. If the rename fails, the edit is left as it is,
+// and the error returned is parseErr joined with the rename's.
+func (f *Files) setAside(name string, parseErr error) error {
+	path := filepath.Join(f.params.Dir, name)
+
+	err := os.Rename(path, path+".bad")
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.Join(parseErr, err)
+	}
+
+	f.params.ProcessLog.Error("set aside an edit of a state file that does not parse",
+		"file", path+".bad", "error", parseErr.Error())
+	f.params.Metrics.StateFileEditSetAside(name)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// encode returns the state file name as smallwebwaf writes it, from a
+// snapshot of the part that keeps that state.
+func (f *Files) encode(name string) ([]byte, error) {
+	switch name {
+	case bansJSON:
+		held := f.params.Ledger.Snapshot()
+
+		file := bansFile{Version: version, Bans: make([]banEntry, 0, len(held))}
+		for _, ban := range held {
+			file.Bans = append(file.Bans, newBanEntry(ban))
+		}
+
+		data, err := json.MarshalIndent(file, "", "    ")
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		return append(data, '\n'), nil
+	case clientsJSON:
+		return encodeOnePerLine("clients", f.params.Limiter.Snapshot())
+	default: // lookups.json
+		return encodeOnePerLine("lookups", f.params.GeoJS.Snapshot())
+	}
+}
+
+// newBanEntry returns ban as bans.json holds it.
+func newBanEntry(ban bans.Ban) banEntry {
+	entry := banEntry{
+		Netblock: ban.Netblock, Start: ban.Start, Cause: ban.Cause, Reason: ban.Reason,
+		Notes: ban.Notes,
+	}
+	if !ban.Permanent() {
+		entry.Expires = &ban.Expires
+	}
+
+	if !ban.Lifted.IsZero() {
+		entry.Lifted = &ban.Lifted
+	}
+
+	return entry
+}
+
+// ban returns the ban an entry of bans.json holds.
+func (e banEntry) ban() bans.Ban {
+	ban := bans.Ban{
+		Netblock: e.Netblock, Start: e.Start, Cause: e.Cause, Reason: e.Reason,
+		Notes: e.Notes,
+	}
+	if e.Expires != nil {
+		ban.Expires = *e.Expires
+	}
+
+	if e.Lifted != nil {
+		ban.Lifted = *e.Lifted
+	}
+
+	return ban
+}
+
+// check refuses a ban without a netblock, which would refuse every IPv6
+// client, a start, from which the length of the netblock's next ban is
+// worked out, or an expires, which would make it permanent. A permanent
+// ban's expires is null, which Bans cannot tell from a missing one, so
+// each expires is read again as written. A cause other than limit,
+// attack or admin, most likely misspelt, is refused too.
+func (f *bansFile) check(data []byte) error {
+	var written struct {
+		Bans []struct {
+			Expires json.RawMessage `json:"expires"`
+		} `json:"bans"`
+	}
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &written)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	for i, entry := range f.Bans {
+		switch {
+		case !entry.Netblock.IsValid():
+			return missing(i, "netblock")
+		case entry.Start.IsZero():
+			return missing(i, "start")
+		case written.Bans[i].Expires == nil:
+			return missing(i, "expires")
+		case entry.Cause != "" && entry.Cause != bans.CauseLimit &&
+			entry.Cause != bans.CauseAttack && entry.Cause != bans.CauseAdmin:
+			return fmt.Errorf("entry %d's cause %q %w", i+1, entry.Cause, errCause)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// check refuses a client without its address, which would count nobody's
+// requests, or with requests in a window but no start, which would drop
+// them and give the client a fresh allowance.
+func (f *clientsFile) check([]byte) error {
+	for i, client := range f.Clients {
+		switch {
+		case !client.Client.IsValid():
+			return missing(i, "client")
+		case countsWithoutStart(client.Minute):
+			return missing(i, "minute.start")
+		case countsWithoutStart(client.Hour):
+			return missing(i, "hour.start")
+		case countsWithoutStart(client.Day):
+			return missing(i, "day.start")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// check refuses an answer without a client, which would answer for
+// nobody, a country, which would place the client nowhere, or the time
+// GeoJS gave it, which would drop it. "" is the country of a client
+// GeoJS cannot place, which Lookups cannot tell from a missing one, so
+// each country is read again as written.
+func (f *lookupsFile) check(data []byte) error {
+	var written struct {
+		Lookups []struct {
+			Country *string `json:"country"`
+		} `json:"lookups"`
+	}
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &written)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	for i, answer := range f.Lookups {
+		switch {
+		case !answer.Client.IsValid():
+			return missing(i, "client")
+		case written.Lookups[i].Country == nil:
+			return missing(i, "country")
+		case answer.Answered.IsZero():
+			return missing(i, "answered")
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// countsWithoutStart reports whether b holds requests but no start, which
+// places them in time.
+func countsWithoutStart(b ratelimit.Buckets) bool {
+	return b.Start.IsZero() && (b.Current != 0 || b.Previous != 0)
+}
+
+// missing returns the error for entry i, counted from 0, of a state file,
+// which has no field.
+func missing(i int, field string) error {
+	return fmt.Errorf("entry %d %w %q", i+1, errMissing, field)
+}
+
+// encodeOnePerLine encodes a state file whose entries, under key, are one
+// to a line, so that grep shows everything about one client.
+func encodeOnePerLine[E any](key string, entries []E) ([]byte, error) {
+	var b bytes.Buffer
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(&b, "{\n    \"version\": %d,\n    %q: [", version, key)
+
+	for i, entry := range entries {
+		line, err := json.Marshal(entry)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		if i > 0 {
+			b.WriteString(",")
+		}
+
+		b.WriteString("\n        ")
+		b.Write(line)
+	}
+
+	b.WriteString("\n    ]\n}\n")
+
+	return b.Bytes(), nil
+}
+
+// checkWritable makes a file in dir and removes it again.
+func checkWritable(dir string) error {
+	file, err := os.CreateTemp(dir, "write-check-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return errors.Join(file.Close(), os.Remove(file.Name()))
+}
+
+// parse reads data, what the state file at path holds, into file, a
+// pointer to that file's struct, and checks its entries.
+func parse(path string, data []byte, file stateFile) error {
+	// The version is read first, so that a file of another version is
+	// refused for that, and not for an entry this version cannot read.
+	var header struct {
+		Version int `json:"version"`
+	}
+
+	err := json.Unmarshal(data, &header)
+	if err == nil && header.Version != version {
+		err = fmt.Errorf("%w %d, where this smallwebwaf reads version %d",
+			errVersion, header.Version, version)
+	}
+
+	if err == nil {
+		decoder := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
+		// A field this version does not know is most likely misspelt, and
+		// its value would be lost without a word.
+		decoder.DisallowUnknownFields()
+		err = decoder.Decode(file)
+	}
+
+	if err == nil {
+		err = file.check(data)
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s%s: %w", path, position(data, err), err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// position returns where in data err was found, as ", line L, column C"
+// of the last byte the JSON decoder read, or "" when err does not tell.
+func position(data []byte, err error) string {
+	var (
+		syntaxErr *json.SyntaxError
+		typeErr   *json.UnmarshalTypeError
+		read      int64
+	)
+
+	switch {
+	case errors.As(err, &syntaxErr):
+		read = syntaxErr.Offset
+	case errors.As(err, &typeErr):
+		read = typeErr.Offset
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	before := data[:max(min(read, int64(len(data)))-1, 0)]
+	line := bytes.Count(before, []byte("\n")) + 1
+	column := len(before) - bytes.LastIndexByte(before, '\n')
+
+	return fmt.Sprintf(", line %d, column %d", line, column)
+}
+
+// write writes data to the file name in dir so that a crash at any
+// moment leaves either the old file or the new one, whole: data goes to a
+// temporary file in the same directory, which is synced and renamed over
+// name. syncDirectory must follow, so that the rename lasts.
+func write(dir, name string, data []byte) error {
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, name)
+	temporary := path + ".tmp"
+
+	err := writeSynced(temporary, data)
+	if err == nil {
+		err = os.Rename(temporary, path)
+	}
+
+	if err != nil {
+		_ = os.Remove(temporary)
+	}
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// syncDirectory syncs dir to the disk, so that a rename in it lasts.
+func syncDirectory(dir string) error {
+	directory, err := os.Open(dir) //nolint:gosec // SWWAF_STATE_DIR itself
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return errors.Join(directory.Sync(), directory.Close())
+}
+
+// writeSynced writes data to the file at path, and syncs it to the disk.
+func writeSynced(path string, data []byte) error {
+	//nolint:gosec // a state file's temporary file, in SWWAF_STATE_DIR
+	file, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileMode)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	_, err = file.Write(data)
+	if err == nil {
+		err = file.Sync()
+	}
+
+	return errors.Join(err, file.Close())
+}

internal/state/write_internal_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+package state
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// The test is on write itself: a state file is read before it is
+// written, and a directory in its place fails that read first.
+func TestFailedRenameLeavesNoTemporaryFile(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	// A directory named bans.json cannot be renamed over.
+	err := os.Mkdir(filepath.Join(dir, bansJSON), 0o700)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	err = write(dir, bansJSON, []byte("{}\n"))
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Error("writing over a directory did not fail")
+	}
+
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", dir, err)
+	}
+
+	if len(entries) != 1 || entries[0].Name() != bansJSON {
+		t.Errorf("%s holds %v, want only bans.json", dir, entries)
+	}
+}

script/cibuild

@@ -16,9 +16,8 @@ main() {
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/check"
     # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
     # not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
-    # empty constant. VERSION is computed here because .dockerignore
-    # excludes .git, so `git describe` in a build stage yields an empty
-    # version without failing.
+    # empty constant. The VERSION build argument takes precedence over
+    # the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
     version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
     [ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
     docker build --no-cache \

script/docker

@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ main() {
     cd "$ROOT"
     # Own line: a failing command substitution inside an argument does
     # not trip `set -e`, so the inline form degrades silently to an
-    # empty constant. VERSION is computed here because .dockerignore
-    # excludes .git, so `git describe` in a build stage yields an empty
-    # version without failing.
+    # empty constant. The VERSION build argument takes precedence over
+    # the version a build stage derives from the .git in the context.
     version="$(git describe --tags --always --dirty 2>/dev/null || true)"
     [ -n "$version" ] || version="unknown"
     docker build --no-cache \

script/example-app

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/example-app: build the image, and on it the example app in
-# deploy/example-app, then run the app's container and check that the
-# health check passes, that a request is served through smallwebwaf,
-# that `sv stop` stops smallwebwaf in order, and that `docker stop`
-# stops the container without having to kill it. The container and both
-# images are removed however the script ends. Building the app needs
-# network access, for nixpkgs' binary cache. script/check does not run
-# this.
+# deploy/example-app, then run the app's container with a volume for the
+# state files and check that the health check passes, that a request is
+# served through smallwebwaf, that a second one in a minute bans the
+# client, that a probe for /.env bans another client, which its next
+# request bans for good, that `sv stop` stops smallwebwaf in order, that
+# `docker stop` stops the container without having to kill it, and that
+# a new container on the same volume still refuses the banned client. The
+# containers, the volume and both images are removed however the script
+# ends. Building the app needs network access, for nixpkgs' binary cache.
+# script/check does not run this.
 set -eu
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -18,9 +21,11 @@ NAME="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/projectname")-example-$$"
 IMAGE="$NAME-base"
 APP_IMAGE="$NAME-app"
 CONTAINER="$NAME"
+VOLUME="$NAME-state"
 
 cleanup() {
     docker rm --force "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    docker volume rm --force "$VOLUME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
     docker rmi --force "$APP_IMAGE" "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
 }
 
@@ -48,9 +53,42 @@ healthy() {
     [ "$status" = healthy ]
 }
 
-# logged <text>: the container's output holds text.
+# logged <text>...: a line of the container's output holds every text,
+# in any order.
 logged() {
-    docker logs "$CONTAINER" 2>&1 | grep -qF "$1"
+    lines="$(docker logs "$CONTAINER" 2>&1)"
+    for text in "$@"; do
+        lines="$(printf '%s\n' "$lines" | grep -F "$text")" || return 1
+    done
+}
+
+# start_container: run the app's container, with the state files on the
+# volume and a rate limit of one request a minute, and wait until it is
+# healthy.
+start_container() {
+    docker run --detach --name "$CONTAINER" --publish 127.0.0.1::8080 \
+        --volume "$VOLUME:/var/lib/smallwebwaf" \
+        --env SWWAF_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=1 \
+        "$APP_IMAGE" >/dev/null
+    wait_for "the health check did not pass" healthy
+    address="$(docker port "$CONTAINER" 8080/tcp)"
+}
+
+# refused: a request to the container gets 403, SWWAF_BAN_RESPONSE's
+# default.
+refused() {
+    code="$(curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' \
+        --max-time 10 "http://$address/")" || true
+    [ "$code" = 403 ]
+}
+
+# refused_from <client> <path>: a request for path from client, as
+# X-Forwarded-For names it, gets 403. smallwebwaf believes the header
+# from docker's gateway, a private address.
+refused_from() {
+    code="$(curl --silent --output /dev/null --write-out '%{http_code}' \
+        --max-time 10 --header "X-Forwarded-For: $1" "http://$address$2")" || true
+    [ "$code" = 403 ]
 }
 
 main() {
@@ -62,18 +100,28 @@ main() {
     docker build --no-cache --build-arg SMALLWEBWAF_IMAGE="$IMAGE" \
         -t "$APP_IMAGE" deploy/example-app
 
-    docker run --detach --name "$CONTAINER" --publish 127.0.0.1::8080 \
-        "$APP_IMAGE" >/dev/null
-    wait_for "the health check did not pass" healthy
+    docker volume create "$VOLUME" >/dev/null
+    start_container
     echo "example-app: the health check passes"
 
-    address="$(docker port "$CONTAINER" 8080/tcp)"
     page="$(curl --fail --silent --show-error --max-time 10 "http://$address/")" ||
         fail "no answer on port 8080"
     [ "$page" = "hello from the example app" ] || fail "port 8080 answered $page"
     wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no request it forwarded" logged '"action":"forward"'
     echo "example-app: smallwebwaf passes a request to the app and its answer back"
 
+    refused || fail "a second request in a minute was not refused"
+    wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no ban" logged '"action":"rate_limited"'
+    echo "example-app: a second request in a minute bans the client"
+
+    refused_from 203.0.113.9 /.env || fail "a probe for /.env was not refused"
+    wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no ban for the probe" \
+        logged '"action":"banned"' '"rule_ids":["env-file"]'
+    refused_from 203.0.113.9 / || fail "the client of the probe was let through"
+    wait_for "the client's next request did not make its ban permanent" \
+        logged '"ban_expires":"permanent"'
+    echo "example-app: a probe for /.env bans the client, its next request for good"
+
     docker exec "$CONTAINER" sv stop smallwebwaf >/dev/null ||
         fail "sv stop smallwebwaf failed"
     wait_for "smallwebwaf did not stop in order" logged '"msg":"stopped"'
@@ -83,6 +131,13 @@ main() {
     status="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.ExitCode}}' "$CONTAINER")"
     [ "$status" = 0 ] || fail "docker stop left exit status $status"
     echo "example-app: docker stop stops the container in order"
+
+    docker rm "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null
+    start_container
+    refused || fail "the new container let the banned client through"
+    wait_for "smallwebwaf logged no request refused under the ban" \
+        logged '"action":"banned"'
+    echo "example-app: a new container on the same volume keeps the ban"
 }
 
 main "$@"

script/run

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # script/run: build bin/smallwebwaf with script/build and run it, with
-# the settings in the environment.
+# the settings in the environment. Unless SWWAF_STATE_DIR is set, the
+# state files go in bin/state, beside the binary, and unless
+# SWWAF_RULES_DIR is set, the rule files are those of share/rules.d,
+# which the image ships.
 set -eu
 
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd -P)"
@@ -8,6 +11,15 @@ ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd -P)"
 
 main() {
     "$SCRIPT_DIR/build"
+    if [ -z "${SWWAF_STATE_DIR+set}" ]; then
+        SWWAF_STATE_DIR="$ROOT/bin/state"
+        export SWWAF_STATE_DIR
+        mkdir -p "$SWWAF_STATE_DIR"
+    fi
+    if [ -z "${SWWAF_RULES_DIR+set}" ]; then
+        SWWAF_RULES_DIR="$ROOT/share/rules.d"
+        export SWWAF_RULES_DIR
+    fi
     exec "$ROOT/bin/smallwebwaf"
 }
 

share/rules.d/00-default.rules

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# 00-default.rules: probes no real visitor sends, anchored at the site root
+
+# id             target      action  regex
+env-file         path        ban     (?i)^/\.env(\.[a-z]+)?$
+vcs-dir          path        ban     (?i)^/\.(git|svn|hg|bzr)(/|$)
+secrets-dir      path        ban     (?i)^/\.(aws|ssh|docker|kube)/
+secret-file      path        ban     (?i)^/\.(htpasswd|htaccess|npmrc|netrc|pgpass|git-credentials|bash_history|DS_Store)$
+editor-dir       path        ban     (?i)^/\.(vscode|idea)/
+backup-file      path        ban     (?i)^/[^/]+\.(php(\.[a-z0-9]+|~)|sql(\.[a-z0-9]+)?)$
+log-file         path        ban     (?i)^/(debug|error|access)\.log$
+compose-file     path        ban     (?i)^/(docker-)?compose\.ya?ml$
+php-shell        path        ban     (?i)^/(shell|c99|r57|wso|alfa)\.php$
+scanner-agent    user_agent  ban     (?i)\b(sqlmap|nikto|nuclei|masscan|zgrab|wpscan)\b
+path-traversal   uri         block   (\.\./){2,}
+empty-agent      user_agent  log     ^$

share/smallwebwaf.run

@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@
 set -euo pipefail
 
 # runit's run script for smallwebwaf, run again whenever smallwebwaf
-# exits; the wait spaces out the restarts. exec, so that the signal
-# `sv stop` sends reaches smallwebwaf itself.
+# exits; the wait spaces out the restarts. The state directory and every
+# file in it are given to the smallwebwaf user, so that a volume mounted
+# there needs no change of owner; chown -R changes a symbolic link itself,
+# never what it points to. exec, so that the signal `sv stop` sends
+# reaches smallwebwaf itself.
 main() {
     sleep 1
+    chown -R smallwebwaf:smallwebwaf "${SWWAF_STATE_DIR:-/var/lib/smallwebwaf}"
     exec chpst -u smallwebwaf:smallwebwaf /usr/local/bin/smallwebwaf
 }