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Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak a0573ec13b Say that rproxy passes a refused question's 400 to the visitor (closes #326)
check / check (push) Failing after 1m57s
The comment above readQuestion said rproxy treats a 400 without a
disposition as no answer. It passes that 400 to the visitor, and its
default disposition does not apply, as SPEC.md and internal/rproxy/waf.go
say. Comment only.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-11-11 05:21:25 +00:00
8 changed files with 85 additions and 225 deletions

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+3 -4
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@@ -509,8 +509,7 @@ request reaches the app.
`waf` takes the checks: `waf` takes the checks:
3. The header limits, then the tag lists. A client in `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips the 3. The tag lists.
header limits.
4. The static lists, `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_DENY_NETS`. 4. The static lists, `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` and `SWW_DENY_NETS`.
5. The bans. 5. The bans.
6. The lookup of the client's AS number and country. 6. The lookup of the client's AS number and country.
@@ -522,7 +521,7 @@ request reaches the app.
11. The rate limits. 11. The rate limits.
12. The trap paths. 12. The trap paths.
13. The rule files. 13. The rule files.
14. The Core Rule Set. 14. The header limits, and then the Core Rule Set.
15. The tag refusals again, so that `exploitsignature` can refuse too. 15. The tag refusals again, so that `exploitsignature` can refuse too.
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that 16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
prefix. prefix.
@@ -538,7 +537,7 @@ request reaches the app.
A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core A refused visitor is answered with `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. A `block` rule or a Core
Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false Rule Set match answers `403` and bans nobody, since the Core Rule Set has false
positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` instead. A positives; such refusals count toward `SWW_ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` instead. A
request over the header limits of step 3 is answered `431`, and bans nobody request over the header limits of step 14 is answered `431`, and bans nobody
either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on, and the either. `rproxy` itself answers `405` to a method it does not pass on, and the
status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large. status for a size or time limit, such as `413` for a body too large.
+19 -28
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@@ -149,12 +149,10 @@ field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give theirs in
- An IPv6 client is its group: the netblock of `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` - An IPv6 client is its group: the netblock of `SWW_IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`
around its address, a /64 by default, since one abuser usually controls a around its address, a /64 by default, since one abuser usually controls a
whole /64. A client is therefore one IPv4 address or one IPv6 group. whole /64. A client is therefore one IPv4 address or one IPv6 group.
3. The header limits (`header_limits`; see "Answering in time"). They come first 3. The tag lists (`tag_lists`; see "Request tags"). Each list that holds the
after `SWW_ALLOW_NETS`, since they only count header fields and cookies. client adds its tag. Next, `routewatch_tags` adds the client's `asn=` and
Next, the tag lists (`tag_lists`; see "Request tags"). Each list that holds
the client adds its tag. Next, `routewatch_tags` adds the client's `asn=` and
`prefix=` tags while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. A client in `prefix=` tags while `SWW_ROUTEWATCH_URL` is set. A client in
`SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips the header limits and gets no tag. `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` gets no tag.
4. The static lists. A client in `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 5 to 15, the byte 4. The static lists. A client in `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips steps 5 to 15, the byte
limits and the error burst. A client in `SWW_DENY_NETS` is refused limits and the error burst. A client in `SWW_DENY_NETS` is refused
(`deny_nets`); a client in both lists is let through. (`deny_nets`); a client in both lists is let through.
@@ -187,9 +185,10 @@ field gives that name. `refusal_limit` and `byte_limits` give theirs in
refused and bans the client. refused and bans the client.
13. The rule files (`rule_files`; see "Rule files"). Matching stops at the first 13. The rule files (`rule_files`; see "Rule files"). Matching stops at the first
rule that refuses. rule that refuses.
14. The Core Rule Set (`core_rule_set`; see "Attack detection"). A match is 14. The header limits (`header_limits`; see "Answering in time"), and then the
refused with `403` while `SWW_WAF_MODE` is `block`, and only logged and Core Rule Set (`core_rule_set`; see "Attack detection"). A Core Rule Set
alerted while it is `detect`. match is refused with `403` while `SWW_WAF_MODE` is `block`, and only logged
and alerted while it is `detect`.
15. The tag refusals again (`tag_deny`), so that `exploitsignature` can refuse 15. The tag refusals again (`tag_deny`), so that `exploitsignature` can refuse
too. too.
16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that 16. A path under `/_sww/` is answered `404`, so that the app never sees that
@@ -242,16 +241,11 @@ apply.
## Bans ## Bans
Until a ban ends, every request from its netblock is refused with Until a ban ends, every request from its netblock is refused with
`SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`, unless it is over the header limits. The netblock is the `SWW_BAN_RESPONSE`. The netblock is the client: its IPv4 address, widened to
client: its IPv4 address, widened to `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`, or its IPv6 `SWW_BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX`, or its IPv6 group. At the defaults a ban covers one
group. At the defaults a ban covers one address or one /64, so a permanent ban address or one /64, so a permanent ban does not reach neighbours who did
does not reach neighbours who did nothing. Requests refused under a ban are not nothing. Requests refused under a ban are not counted against limits. They are
counted against limits. They are counted in the client's history and in the counted in the client's history and in the ban's notes.
ban's notes.
A request over the header limits is refused with `431` before the bans are
checked (see "Answering in time"). It makes no ban, makes no ban permanent and
is not counted in a ban's notes.
An offence is a request `waf` holds against the client. It is one of: An offence is a request `waf` holds against the client. It is one of:
@@ -2031,6 +2025,7 @@ waits on these, which run in the background:
In `enforce` mode, a question does not wait for GeoJS when it is a request: In `enforce` mode, a question does not wait for GeoJS when it is a request:
- over the header limits;
- from a client on a fetched blocklist, while `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` is `deny`; - from a client on a fetched blocklist, while `SWW_BLOCKLIST_ACTION` is `deny`;
- from a client on the CrowdSec decision list; - from a client on the CrowdSec decision list;
- that would take its client over a rate limit at 100% of it, since a percentage - that would take its client over a rate limit at 100% of it, since a percentage
@@ -2042,8 +2037,8 @@ number and country stay unknown until GeoJS has answered. So while
`SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` does not apply to it until then, so not waiting `SWW_UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT` does not apply to it until then, so not waiting
never lowers its limit. never lowers its limit.
The header limits, the static lists and bans come before the lookup, so they The static lists and bans come before the lookup, so they never wait. These can
never wait. These can still wait for GeoJS: still wait for GeoJS:
- a country list, which needs the answer; - a country list, which needs the answer;
- a rate limit a percentage has lowered, which needs the answer; - a rate limit a percentage has lowered, which needs the answer;
@@ -2062,17 +2057,13 @@ either one:
Real clients never reach these limits. The answer is `deny` with `431`, and the Real clients never reach these limits. The answer is `deny` with `431`, and the
log line's action is `request_header_too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is log line's action is `request_header_too_large`. The refusal makes no ban and is
no offence. no offence. The rate limits count the request as usual, so a client that keeps
sending such requests breaks a limit.
The header limits are the first check after `SWW_ALLOW_NETS`. A request over
them is refused before any later check runs. So it causes no lookup, no query to
an outside source and no rule match, and the rate limits do not count it. A
client under a ban or in `SWW_DENY_NETS` also gets `431` for such a request.
The limits apply on every path and in every `SWW_WAF_MODE`. A client in The limits apply on every path and in every `SWW_WAF_MODE`. A client in
`SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips them, as it skips the Core Rule Set. In `observe` mode `SWW_ALLOW_NETS` skips them, as it skips the Core Rule Set. In `observe` mode
such a request is answered `allow` with `would_action`, and no other check runs such a request is answered `allow` with `would_action`, and the Core Rule Set
on it. does not read it.
The Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so thousands of small The Core Rule Set runs each of its rules on each cookie, so thousands of small
cookies would keep it busy for over a second. Within the limits, one long cookie cookies would keep it busy for over a second. Within the limits, one long cookie
+1 -4
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@@ -1117,7 +1117,6 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnIsAnswered502(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("the app was asked") t.Error("the app was asked")
}) })
addr, out := startRProxy(t, backend(t), app.URL, map[string]string{ addr, out := startRProxy(t, backend(t), app.URL, map[string]string{
timeoutSetting: "60000",
defaultDisposition: setting, defaultDisposition: setting,
}) })
@@ -1141,9 +1140,7 @@ func TestAnAnswerThatCannotBePassedOnGetsNoReport(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
standIn := startWAF(t, overOneMiB(dispositionDeny)) standIn := startWAF(t, overOneMiB(dispositionDeny))
addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, map[string]string{ addr, out := startRProxy(t, standIn.URL, nowhere, nil)
timeoutSetting: "60000",
})
if got := get(t, addr, "/"); got.status != http.StatusBadGateway { if got := get(t, addr, "/"); got.status != http.StatusBadGateway {
t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 502", got) t.Errorf("answered %+v, want 502", got)
+4 -30
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@@ -92,31 +92,6 @@ func (o *output) line(t *testing.T, key, value string) map[string]any {
return nil return nil
} }
// lineBeforeExit returns the first line whose msg is msg, waiting for it
// while sww runs. It waits as long as that takes, so that a slow start
// cannot fail the test, and fails the test if sww exits first.
func (o *output) lineBeforeExit(
t *testing.T, msg string, exited <-chan int,
) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
for {
fields := o.findLine(t, func(fields map[string]any) bool {
return fields["msg"] == msg
})
if fields != nil {
return fields
}
select {
case status := <-exited:
t.Fatalf("exit status %d while waiting for a line with msg %q; output:\n%s",
status, msg, o.text())
case <-time.After(pollInterval):
}
}
}
// findLine returns the first line written so far for which matches is true, or // findLine returns the first line written so far for which matches is true, or
// nil. // nil.
func (o *output) findLine( func (o *output) findLine(
@@ -261,12 +236,11 @@ func TestServesUntilToldToStop(t *testing.T) {
}() }()
// The default rule file is read. // The default rule file is read.
readRules := out.lineBeforeExit(t, "read the rule files", exited) if rules := out.line(t, "msg", "read the rule files")["rules"]; rules != 12.0 {
if rules := readRules["rules"]; rules != 12.0 {
t.Errorf("read %v rules from the default rule file, want 12", rules) t.Errorf("read %v rules from the default rule file, want 12", rules)
} }
starting := out.lineBeforeExit(t, "starting", exited) starting := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")
wantStartingLine(t, starting, dir) wantStartingLine(t, starting, dir)
addr, _ := starting["address"].(string) addr, _ := starting["address"].(string)
@@ -312,7 +286,7 @@ func TestLogLevelHoldsBackTheLessSevereProcessLines(t *testing.T) {
}, out) }, out)
}() }()
out.lineBeforeExit(t, "fetching a list failed", exited) out.line(t, "msg", "fetching a list failed")
stop() stop()
select { select {
@@ -1287,7 +1261,7 @@ func runUntilStopped(
exited <- run(ctx, env, out) exited <- run(ctx, env, out)
}() }()
addr, _ := out.lineBeforeExit(t, "starting", exited)["address"].(string) addr, _ := out.line(t, "msg", "starting")["address"].(string)
use("http://" + addr + "/") use("http://" + addr + "/")
stop() stop()
+38 -145
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@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"net/http" "net/http"
"net/http/httptest" "net/http/httptest"
"net/netip" "net/netip"
"path/filepath"
"slices" "slices"
"strconv" "strconv"
"strings" "strings"
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/bans"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/lookup/lookuptest"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/ratelimit"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/reputation"
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
@@ -218,199 +216,93 @@ func TestObserveModeAllowsARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsUnread(t *testing.T) {
} }
} }
func TestTheRateLimitsDoNotCountRequestsOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) { func TestRequestsOverTheHeaderLimitsCountTowardTheRateLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"}) s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"})
ask := func() answer {
for range 2 {
req := s.question(siteA, client, "/") req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1)) req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, waf.DispositionDeny)
return do(t, req)
} }
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(client, "/"), http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow) wantDisposition(t, ask(), tooLarge, waf.DispositionDeny)
wantDisposition(t, ask(), http.StatusForbidden, waf.DispositionDeny)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantLine(t, lines[1], http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
} }
func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeBeforeEveryCheckThatRefuses(t *testing.T) { func TestTheHeaderLimitsComeAfterTheTrapPathsAndTheRuleFiles(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// The lookup database places client in Germany.
lookupDB := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ipinfo_lite.mmdb")
lookuptest.Write(t, lookupDB, map[string]lookuptest.Network{
client + "/32": {ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE, Country: "DE"},
})
for _, tc := range []struct { for _, tc := range []struct {
name string name, path, action string
env map[string]string
path string
// prepare gets the server ready, at now, before the question.
prepare func(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, now time.Time)
}{ }{
{"SWW_DENY_NETS", map[string]string{denyNets: client}, "/", leaveAsItIs}, {"a trap path", "/wp-login.php", requestlog.ActionTemporarilyBanned},
{"a ban", nil, "/", banClient}, {"a block rule", "/blocked", requestlog.ActionBlockedByBlockRule},
{
"the country list", map[string]string{
lookupSource: fileSource, lookupDBPath: lookupDB, allowedCountries: "FR",
},
"/", leaveAsItIs,
},
{"a blocklist", map[string]string{blocklistURLs: dropURL}, "/", listClient},
{
"the CrowdSec decision list",
map[string]string{crowdSecURL: lapi, crowdSecKey: bouncerKey}, "/", decideOnClient,
},
{
"a DNS blocklist", map[string]string{
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, dnsblResolver: noResolver, reputationAction: actionDeny,
},
"/", func(_ *testing.T, server *waf.Server, _ time.Time) {
loadVerdicts(server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
},
},
{
"AbuseIPDB",
map[string]string{abuseIPDBKey: accountKey, reputationAction: actionDeny},
"/", func(_ *testing.T, server *waf.Server, _ time.Time) {
// Over SWW_ABUSEIPDB_MIN_SCORE, 75 by default.
loadScores(server, map[string]int64{client: 80})
},
},
{
"SWW_TAG_DENY", map[string]string{tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList, tagDeny: "vpn"},
"/", func(t *testing.T, server *waf.Server, _ time.Time) {
t.Helper()
loadLists(t, server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {client}})
},
},
{"the rate limits", map[string]string{rateLimitPerMinute: "1"}, "/", countClient},
{
"a trap path", map[string]string{trapPaths: trapPathList}, "/wp-login.php",
leaveAsItIs,
},
{
"a block rule", map[string]string{rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules)}, "/blocked",
leaveAsItIs,
},
} { } {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
s := startWAF(t, "", tc.env) s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
tc.prepare(t, s.server, s.clock.Now()) trapPaths: trapPathList, rulesDir: writeRules(t, testRules),
})
req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path) req := s.question(siteA, client, tc.path)
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1)) req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, waf.DispositionDeny) wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, waf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge) wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden, tc.action)
}) })
} }
} }
func TestARequestOverTheHeaderLimitsRunsNoOtherCheck(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Each check after the header limits leaves a mark on the log line of a
// request it reads: a tag, routewatch_tags_missing, a rule id, the
// counts, or the Core Rule Set's time.
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "ipinfo_lite.mmdb")
lookuptest.Write(t, path, map[string]lookuptest.Network{
client + "/32": {ASN: asnDE, ASName: asNameDE, Country: "DE"},
})
s := startWAF(t, "", map[string]string{
lookupSource: fileSource, lookupDBPath: path,
tagLists: "vpn=" + vpnList,
routeWatchURL: startRouteWatch(t, map[string]standInRoute{client: {prefixDE, 64496}}),
dnsblZones: dnsblZone, reputationAction: actionLog,
rulesDir: writeRules(t, "noted path log ^/\n"),
wafMode: block,
})
loadLists(t, s.server, map[string][]string{vpnList: {client}})
loadVerdicts(s.server, map[string][]string{client: {dnsblZone}})
over := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
over.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, over), tooLarge, waf.DispositionDeny)
within := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
within.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit))
wantDisposition(t, do(t, within), http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow)
lines := s.out.requestLines(t, 2)
wantTags(t, lines[0])
wantTagsMissing(t, lines[0], "")
if lines[0].RuleIDs != nil || lines[0].Counts != (ratelimit.Counts{}) ||
lines[0].DurationCoreRuleSetMS != nil {
t.Errorf("rule ids %v, counts %+v and Core Rule Set time %v, want none",
lines[0].RuleIDs, lines[0].Counts, lines[0].DurationCoreRuleSetMS)
}
// The request within the limits shows that each check leaves its mark.
wantTags(t, lines[1],
"asn=64496", "country=DE", "dnsbl="+dnsblZone, "exploitsignature", "vpn")
wantTagsMissing(t, lines[1], "no_answer_yet")
if lines[1].RuleIDs == nil || lines[1].Counts.Minute != 1 ||
lines[1].DurationCoreRuleSetMS == nil {
t.Errorf("rule ids %v, counts %+v and Core Rule Set time %v, want each",
lines[1].RuleIDs, lines[1].Counts, lines[1].DurationCoreRuleSetMS)
}
}
func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) { func TestNotWaitingForGeoJSNeverLowersAClientsLimit(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// The client's next request takes it over the whole limit, so it does
// not wait.
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{ s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h", rateLimitPerMinute: "1", unknownLimitPercent: "0", lookupTimeout: "1h",
}) })
countClient(t, s.server, s.clock.Now()) req := s.question(siteA, fromDE, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, waf.DispositionDeny) wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), tooLarge, waf.DispositionDeny)
line := s.out.requestLine(t) line := s.out.requestLine(t)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited) wantLine(t, line, tooLarge, requestlog.ActionRequestHeaderTooLarge)
if line.RateLimitPercent != nil { if line.RateLimitPercent != nil {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.RateLimitPercent) t.Errorf("limit percentage %d, want none", *line.RateLimitPercent)
} }
// The client is under no ban, and GeoJS places it in a country.
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(fromDE, "/"), http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow)
} }
func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) { func TestAClientGeoJSPlacedInNoCountryCountsAsUnknownWithoutWaiting(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
// The client's next request takes it over the whole limit, so it does
// not wait.
geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{ s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{unknownLimitPercent: "0"})
unknownLimitPercent: "0", rateLimitPerMinute: "1",
})
s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{ s.server.GeoJS.Load([]lookup.Answer{{
Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512", Client: netip.MustParsePrefix(client + "/32"), ASN: "AS64512",
Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(), Answered: s.clock.Now(), Used: s.clock.Now(),
}}) }})
countClient(t, s.server, s.clock.Now())
wantDisposition(t, s.ask(client, "/"), http.StatusForbidden, waf.DispositionDeny) req := s.question(siteA, client, "/")
req.Header.Set(cookieHeader, cookies(cookieLimit+1))
line := s.out.requestLine(t) wantDisposition(t, do(t, req), http.StatusForbidden, waf.DispositionDeny)
wantLine(t, line, http.StatusForbidden, requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited) wantLine(t, s.out.requestLine(t), http.StatusForbidden,
requestlog.ActionClientIsRateLimited)
if line.RateLimitPercent == nil || *line.RateLimitPercent != 0 {
t.Errorf("limit percentage %v, want 0", line.RateLimitPercent)
}
} }
func TestObserveModeAsksGeoJSNothingForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) { func TestObserveModeWaitsForGeoJSForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel() t.Parallel()
geojsURL, asked := startGeoJS(t) geojsURL, _ := startGeoJS(t)
s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{ s := startWAF(t, geojsURL, map[string]string{
mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h", mode: observe, addLookupHeaders: on, lookupTimeout: "1h",
}) })
@@ -420,9 +312,10 @@ func TestObserveModeAsksGeoJSNothingForARequestOverTheHeaderLimits(t *testing.T)
got := do(t, req) got := do(t, req)
wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow) wantDisposition(t, got, http.StatusOK, waf.DispositionAllow)
if len(asked()) != 0 || got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn") != "" { asn, country := got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn"), got.header.Get("X-Client-Country")
t.Errorf("GeoJS was asked about %v, and the answer gave the AS number %q, "+ if asn != asnDE || country != "DE" {
"want neither", asked(), got.header.Get("X-Client-Asn")) t.Errorf("answered with the AS number %q and the country %q, want %q and DE",
asn, country, asnDE)
} }
} }
+12 -6
View File
@@ -10,23 +10,22 @@ import (
"sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog" "sneak.berlin/go/smallwebwaf/internal/requestlog"
) )
// The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have. // The header limits: the most cookies and header fields a request may have
// Real clients never reach them. // when the checks reach the Core Rule Set. Real clients never reach them.
const ( const (
maxCookies = 50 maxCookies = 50
maxHeaderFields = 100 maxHeaderFields = 100
) )
// headerLimits refuses a request with more than maxHeaderFields header fields // headerLimits refuses a request over the header limits, with 431. Its figures
// or more than maxCookies cookies, with 431. Its figures are the request's // are the request's header fields and cookies, and the limit of each.
// header fields and cookies, and the limit of each.
type headerLimits struct{} type headerLimits struct{}
func (headerLimits) name() string { return "header_limits" } func (headerLimits) name() string { return "header_limits" }
func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict { func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict {
fields, cookies := rq.headerCounts() fields, cookies := rq.headerCounts()
if fields <= maxHeaderFields && cookies <= maxCookies { if !overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies) {
return nil return nil
} }
@@ -39,6 +38,13 @@ func (headerLimits) check(_ context.Context, rq *request, _ time.Time) *verdict
} }
} }
// overHeaderLimits reports whether a request with these counts of header fields
// and cookies, as headerCounts counts them, is over the header limits: it has
// more than maxHeaderFields fields or more than maxCookies cookies.
func overHeaderLimits(fields, cookies int) bool {
return fields > maxHeaderFields || cookies > maxCookies
}
// headerCounts returns the request's header fields, each value of a header sent // headerCounts returns the request's header fields, each value of a header sent
// twice being one, and its cookies, each part of a Cookie header between // twice being one, and its cookies, each part of a Cookie header between
// semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The Core // semicolons being one unless it is empty or only spaces and tabs. The Core
+1 -3
View File
@@ -41,11 +41,8 @@ const (
// beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and // beforeLookup are the heuristics that run before the client's AS number and
// country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up. // country are looked up, so that a client they refuse is not looked up.
// header_limits comes first: it only counts, and a request it refuses causes no
// other work.
func beforeLookup() []heuristic { func beforeLookup() []heuristic {
return []heuristic{ return []heuristic{
headerLimits{},
tagLists{}, tagLists{},
routeWatchTags{}, routeWatchTags{},
denyNets{}, denyNets{},
@@ -67,6 +64,7 @@ func afterLookup() []heuristic {
rateLimits{}, rateLimits{},
trapPaths{}, trapPaths{},
ruleFiles{}, ruleFiles{},
headerLimits{},
coreRuleSet{}, coreRuleSet{},
tagDeny{}, tagDeny{},
} }
+7 -5
View File
@@ -143,9 +143,10 @@ func (h *handler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait // refusedWhateverTheAnswer reports whether the request is one that does not wait
// for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about // for GeoJS, since the checks will refuse it at now whatever GeoJS answers about
// its client: the heuristic crowdsec, blocklists or rate_limits will refuse it, // its client: the heuristic crowdsec, header_limits, blocklists or rate_limits
// as a function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode, which refuses // will refuse it, as a function in that heuristic's file says. In observe mode,
// nothing, none is. rproxy lets a request through when waf answers too late. // which refuses nothing, none is. rproxy lets a request through when
// waf answers too late.
func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool { func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
if rq.h.config.Observe { if rq.h.config.Observe {
return false return false
@@ -153,7 +154,8 @@ func (rq *request) refusedWhateverTheAnswer(now time.Time) bool {
_, decided := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now) _, decided := rq.crowdSecDecisionInForce(now)
return decided || rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) || return decided || overHeaderLimits(rq.headerCounts()) ||
rq.refusedByBlocklists(rq.h.lists.ListedBy(rq.client)) ||
rq.overAWholeRateLimit(now) rq.overAWholeRateLimit(now)
} }
@@ -214,7 +216,7 @@ func (h *handler) answerQuestion(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries, // readQuestion returns the visitor's address and the body a question carries,
// and whether waf takes the question. It answers a question it does not // and whether waf takes the question. It answers a question it does not
// take with 400 and no disposition. rproxy passes that 400 to the visitor, // take with 400 and no disposition. rproxy passes that 400 to the visitor,
// and SWRP_DEFAULT_DISPOSITION does not apply. The id of a question waf takes // and its default disposition does not apply. The id of a question it takes
// is held from here on, without a decision yet, so that another question with // is held from here on, without a decision yet, so that another question with
// that id is refused while this one is being handled. // that id is refused while this one is being handled.
// //