While SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_KEY is set, waf fetches AbuseIPDB's blacklist at
the start and every SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BLACKLIST_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MINS
(60), cut at SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_THRESHOLD (90, from 25 to 100). Each
listed client's netblock gets a ban of SWW_WAF_ABUSEIPDB_BAN_DAYS (30)
with the new cause abuseipdb. The blacklist itself is not kept.
These bans do not count toward SWW_WAF_MAX_BANS, so a 10,000-address
blacklist cannot push out the bans for limits and attacks. Each fetch
forgets the abuseipdb bans that have ended. A netblock with an active
ban is left alone, and so is one whose abuseipdb ban an admin lifted,
until that ban would have ended. Observe mode makes no ban.
Model: opus-5-5
While the lookup waits for GeoJS, the trap paths, the rule files and the
Core Rule Set run at the same time as the checks after the lookup. The
first side to refuse answers the request; what the other side finds leaves
no trace. Those three checks have 500 ms together: past it, the request is
refused with 503 as checks_timed_out, with no ban and no offence.
Tests hold GeoJS and the Core Rule Set with stand-ins under synctest. The
test helper lifts the 500 ms limit for tests that run the real Core Rule
Set, which the race detector slows past it.
Model: opus-5-5