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SPEC and README: rule set changes, error bursts, admin bans, GeoJS answers (closes #6)

Browse Source 
Address the second review of the spec update. The Core Rule Set allows
PUT, PATCH and DELETE and the headers git and curl send, inspects only
bodies it can read, leaves responses alone, and by default switches off
the rules that refuse a code forge's ordinary files, uploads and git
traffic. The error burst counts only the sidecar's own refusals. Bans an
admin made are never dropped. A limit ban resets the client's counters.
GeoJS answers move to their own `lookups.json`. The spec now says which
address is the client when every forwarded address is trusted, that the
exclusive country list refuses private addresses, which are never sent to
GeoJS, what `close` gives behind traefik, and Spamhaus's terms for DROP.

Model: opus-5-5
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sneak
2026-09-23 14:36:32 +00:00
parent 8fc7539f1a
commit 2d15e7e746
2 changed files with 173 additions and 96 deletions
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README.md
+12 -5
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@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ goes through the candidates one by one.
running;
- the OWASP Core Rule Set, run by the Coraza engine, refusing the requests
it flags;
- trap paths and bursts of error responses.
- trap paths, and a ban for a client that the rule files or the Core Rule
Set refuse again and again.
- Bans:
- a clear sign of attack, such as a probe for a `.env` file or a scanner's
user agent, bans for seven days on the first request, and any further
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ goes through the candidates one by one.
fields, the decision taken and why, AS number and country, and timings.
Optionally also sent to a remote syslog server.
- Prometheus metrics on their own port.
- State (bans with their notes, each client's counters, history and lookup
answer, the reputation cache, the alerting state) held in memory and kept in
- State (bans with their notes, each client's counters and history, the GeoJS
answers, the reputation cache, the alerting state) held in memory and kept in
readable JSON files, written regularly and at every stop, so a restart loses
nothing. Edit a file, or add a rule file, and the running `smallwebwaf` picks
up the change. Nothing is read from disk while serving a request.
@@ -131,8 +132,9 @@ For each request `smallwebwaf`:
client at once for a clear sign of attack;
- forwards it to the app and streams the response back, within the size and time
limits;
- counts the bytes and any error response, bans the client if it broke a limit,
updates its history, sends any alerts that are due, and writes the log line.
- counts the bytes and any refusal by the rule files or the Core Rule Set, bans
the client if it broke a limit, updates its history, sends any alerts that are
due, and writes the log line.
A minimal deployment beside an app in docker-compose. `UPSTREAM_URL` is the only
setting:
@@ -204,6 +206,11 @@ request. GeoJS publishes no rate limit but may block a caller it thinks asks too
much; while it is not answering, new visitors count as coming from an unknown
country, which `EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refuses.
Neither source can place a private address, so a client on one, such as a
visitor on your local network, another container or your monitoring, has no
country: `EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` refuses it unless you list it in
`ALLOW_NETS`. Such addresses are never sent to GeoJS.
## Documents
- [`SPEC.md`](SPEC.md): the design.
SPEC.md
+161 -91
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@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ directory of hand-editable text files.
- Attack detection: regex rules read from a directory of plain text rule
files and read again whenever the files change (see "Rule files"), Coraza
with the OWASP Core Rule Set, and simple signals (requests for listed trap
paths, bursts of error responses).
paths, bursts of requests refused by the rule files or the Core Rule Set).
- Ban ledger: active and past bans with their notes, and each client's
history, held in memory and kept in JSON files that the sidecar watches
for an admin's edits (see "Bans" and "Persistent state"). No database of
@@ -101,8 +101,13 @@ whole exchange.
- Identify the client.
- If the TCP peer is inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, walk `X-Forwarded-For` from
the right and take the first address not inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`.
Otherwise use the TCP peer address and ignore the header.
the right and take the first address not inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`. If
every address in the header is inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, take the
leftmost, so a visitor on a private network who comes through traefik is
known by its own address, not traefik's. If there is no header, as when
another container calls the sidecar directly, the TCP peer is the client.
- If the TCP peer is outside `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, it is the client, and the
header is ignored.
- IPv6 clients are grouped by prefix (`IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX`, default 64) for
counting and banning, because one abuser usually controls a whole /64. A
client is therefore one IPv4 address or one IPv6 group, a /64 by default.
@@ -115,9 +120,10 @@ whole exchange.
permanent (see "Bans").
- Look up the AS number and country, unless `LOOKUP_SOURCE` is `off`. With
GeoJS, a client whose answer is not yet kept waits for it, up to
`LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`. A client the lookup cannot place has an unknown country and
AS number: the exclusive country list refuses it, the biased thresholds give
it `UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, and nothing else treats it differently.
`LOOKUP_TIMEOUT`. A client the lookup cannot place, which includes every
private, loopback and link-local address, has an unknown country and AS
number: the exclusive country list refuses it, the biased thresholds give it
`UNKNOWN_LIMIT_PERCENT`, and nothing else treats it differently.
- Country lists. A client whose country is in `DENIED_COUNTRIES`, or, when
`EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES` is set, is not in it, is refused with
`BAN_RESPONSE`. Every step up to here needs only the client's address, so the
@@ -139,20 +145,23 @@ whole exchange.
in file name order then line order. Each rule that matches takes its action:
only log, refuse with 403, or refuse and ban. Matching stops at the first rule
that refuses or bans.
- Core Rule Set inspection of the request (headers, URL, and body up to
`WAF_BODY_LIMIT`). In `block` mode, the default, a match at or over the
anomaly threshold is refused with 403; in `detect` mode it is only logged and
alerted.
- Core Rule Set inspection of the request: its headers, its URL, and its body up
to `WAF_BODY_LIMIT` when the body is form data, multipart, JSON or XML, the
kinds the Core Rule Set can read. Any other body, such as a git push or a
container image layer, reaches the app uninspected, and so does a JSON or XML
body larger than `WAF_BODY_LIMIT`, which cannot be read in part. Responses are
not inspected. In `block` mode, the default, a match at or over the anomaly
threshold is refused with 403; in `detect` mode it is only logged and alerted.
- Forward to `UPSTREAM_URL`, streaming. Add `X-Forwarded-For` and, if enabled,
`X-Client-ASN` and `X-Client-Country` for the app's own logs.
- After the response.
- Add response bytes (and request body bytes) to the byte counters. A client
whose byte total passes a byte limit times the percentage has broken that
limit and is banned. The response in progress is not cut off.
- Count the client's requests answered with 403 or 404, whether the app gave
that answer or the sidecar refused the request after a rule file or Core
Rule Set match. More than `ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` of them within a minute
breaks a limit and bans the client.
- Count the client's requests that the sidecar refused after a rule file or
Core Rule Set match; answers the app gave are not counted. More than
`ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` of them within a minute breaks a limit and bans
the client.
- Update the client's history and the anomaly counters, and evaluate alert
thresholds.
@@ -167,20 +176,25 @@ whole exchange.
shutdown and loaded again at start (see "Persistent state"), so a restart does
not hand every client a fresh allowance. Buckets whose time has passed are
discarded on load.
- Memory is bounded by `MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` and `MAX_BANS`. When the table of
clients is full, the least recently seen client is dropped first, with its
history and its lookup answer. When `MAX_BANS` bans are held, the ban that has
gone longest without a request from its netblock is dropped first, whether it
is past, active or permanent (see "Bans").
- Memory is bounded by `MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS`, `MAX_BANS` and the number of GeoJS
answers kept (see "Configuration surface"). When the table of clients is full,
the least recently seen client is dropped first, with its history. When
`MAX_BANS` bans the sidecar made are held, the one that has gone longest
without a request from its netblock is dropped first, whether it is past,
active or permanent. Bans an admin made are never dropped, and there are as
many as the admin adds (see "Bans").
## Bans
A ban refuses every request from a netblock, answering with `BAN_RESPONSE`
(`403` by default), until the ban ends. A permanent ban does not run out: it
ends only when an admin lifts it, or when a new ban is made while `MAX_BANS`
bans are held and it is the ban that has gone longest without a request. A
scanner whose ban was dropped that way is refused and banned again by its next
probe.
ends when an admin lifts it or, if the sidecar made it, when a new ban is made
while `MAX_BANS` bans the sidecar made are held and it is the one that has gone
longest without a request. A scanner whose ban was dropped that way is refused
and banned again by its next probe. A ban an admin made, whose cause is `admin`,
is never dropped and does not count toward `MAX_BANS`, so such bans can never
fill the table, however many there are. An admin who wants to keep a ban the
sidecar made sets its cause to `admin`.
The netblock a ban covers is the client: its IPv4 address, or its IPv6 group of
`IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (a /64 by default). `BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` can widen an IPv4
@@ -201,8 +215,8 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
- Once that ban has run out, the netblock is served like any other, but its
next clear sign of attack bans it permanently at once.
- A broken limit: a request over a request limit, a response that takes the
client's byte total past a byte limit, or more error responses than
`ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` within a minute.
client's byte total past a byte limit, or more than `ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD`
requests within a minute refused after a rule file or Core Rule Set match.
- The first such ban, or one that comes more than `LIMIT_BAN_REPEAT_WINDOW`
(default `24h`) after the last such ban ended, lasts `LIMIT_BAN_DURATION`
(default `1h`).
@@ -210,13 +224,16 @@ to a ban, each by its own rule:
long as the last one: one hour, then 3, 9, 27 and 81 hours.
- A ban that would be longer than `MAX_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`) is
permanent instead; with the defaults, that is the sixth ban in a row.
- Each such ban sets the client's counters for every limit back to zero, so
once it ends only new requests can break a limit again; the client's
history keeps its totals.
A Core Rule Set match refuses only the request it matched, without a ban,
because the Core Rule Set has false positives; a `block` rule does the same.
Those refusals count toward the error burst like any other 403, so a client that
keeps setting them off is banned under the second rule. Requests refused under a
ban are not counted against limits, but they are counted in the client's history
and in the ban's notes.
Those refusals count toward the error burst, so a client that keeps setting them
off is banned under the second rule. Requests refused under a ban are not
counted against limits, but they are counted in the client's history and in the
ban's notes.
Every ban carries notes with what an admin needs to decide whether to lift it
(see "Persistent state"). An admin can add or lift a ban at any time by editing
@@ -283,8 +300,9 @@ The settings, by group:
- `IPV6_GROUP_PREFIX` (default `64`).
- `MAX_TRACKED_CLIENTS` (default `20000`): clients held in memory and in
`clients.json` (see "Persistent state").
- `MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): bans held in memory and in `bans.json`, past,
active and permanent (see "Bans").
- `MAX_BANS` (default `5000`): bans the sidecar made, past, active and
permanent, held in memory and in `bans.json`. Bans an admin made are kept
besides these and never dropped (see "Bans").
- Persistent state
- `STATE_DIR` (default `/data`): the JSON state files. The image declares
`/data` as a volume, so it is writable even when nothing is mounted; a
@@ -294,8 +312,8 @@ The settings, by group:
permanent, `bans.json` is written this long later with every change made
in between, so a burst of changes becomes one write.
- `STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL` (default `15m`): how often `clients.json`,
`reputation.json` and `alerts.json` are written, and `bans.json` when only
the counts in its notes changed.
`lookups.json`, `reputation.json` and `alerts.json` are written, and
`bans.json` when only the counts in its notes changed.
- Logging
- The request log on stdout is always on and has no switch.
- `LOG_LEVEL` (default `info`): for the process's own messages (start-up,
@@ -400,10 +418,13 @@ The settings, by group:
`country_code`, `asn` and `organization_name` (the AS name). A
`country_code` of `null`, which GeoJS gives for some ranges, and an `asn`
of `64512`, which it gives when it knows none, count as unknown. GeoJS is
told the address of every new visitor.
- Each GeoJS answer is kept for 7 days with the client's record, in memory
and in `clients.json`, so it survives a restart; after 7 days the client's
next request asks again. A client dropped from the table loses its answer.
told the address of every new visitor, except private, loopback and
link-local addresses, which no source can place and which are never sent.
- Each GeoJS answer is kept for 7 days in memory and in `lookups.json`,
apart from the table of clients, so it survives a restart and outlasts a
client dropped from that table; after 7 days the client's next request
asks again. Up to 100,000 answers are kept, about 15 MiB; when that many
are held, the answer used longest ago goes first.
- `LOOKUP_TIMEOUT` (default `1s`): how long a client with no kept answer
waits for one; GeoJS normally answers in a fraction of that. At most one
request to GeoJS is under way at a time, the addresses that arrive
@@ -431,9 +452,12 @@ The settings, by group:
listed country is refused.
- `EXCLUSIVELY_ALLOWED_COUNTRIES`: for example `us,de`. Every request from
any other country is refused, and so is every request from a client the
lookup cannot place, such as an address missing from the database or one
GeoJS has not answered for in time. A list that let those through would
let every new client in whenever GeoJS stops answering.
lookup cannot place: one whose address is missing from the database, one
GeoJS has not answered for in time, and any client on a private address,
such as a visitor on the local network, another container or internal
monitoring. Those that should reach the app go in `ALLOW_NETS`. A list
that let unplaced clients through would let every new client in whenever
GeoJS stops answering.
- Both may be set. `DENIED_COUNTRIES` then adds nothing, since the exclusive
list already refuses every other country, and a code on both lists stops
the start with a message naming it.
@@ -477,27 +501,55 @@ The settings, by group:
- `WAF_PARANOIA_LEVEL` (default `1`), `WAF_ANOMALY_THRESHOLD` (default `5`):
the Core Rule Set's own two tuning values, at the Core Rule Set's own
defaults.
- `WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default `920420,920440`): rule ids to switch off
when an app trips a false positive. The two in the default refuse requests
by content type and by file extension; in front of a code forge they would
refuse git's clone and push over HTTP and the display of source files such
as `.sh` or `.sql`. A list given replaces the default, so include them in
it.
- The sidecar also changes the Core Rule Set in four ways that no setting
undoes, since in front of gitea each would otherwise refuse ordinary
requests:
- PUT, PATCH and DELETE are allowed methods besides GET, HEAD, POST and
OPTIONS; APIs, container image pushes and package uploads use them.
Other methods stay refused.
- The request headers `Content-Encoding` and `Expect` are allowed: git
compresses a fetch request over 1 KiB and says so in
`Content-Encoding`, and curl and git send `Expect` before some large
uploads. The other headers the Core Rule Set refuses, such as `Proxy`,
stay refused.
- Only a body the Core Rule Set can read is inspected (see "Data flow
for one request"). It would read any other body as form data, where
binary content such as a git push trips rules written for text.
- Responses are not inspected. A raw file from a repository, such as a
shell script, looks to the response rules like source code leaking
from the server.
- `WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (default
`920340,920420,920440,920640,930130,930140,932180`): rule ids to switch
off when an app trips a false positive. The default switches off the rules
that refuse a request for the type of its body, when it is missing or not
on the Core Rule Set's short list (920340, 920420, 920640); for its file
extension, such as `.sh` or `.sql` (920440); for a file or directory name
in its path, such as `.git/`, `.gitignore`, `Dockerfile`, `package.json`
or an editor's settings directory (930130, 930140); and for the name of an
uploaded file, such as `debug.log` or `config.yml` (932180). In front of a
code forge these refuse git over HTTP, container image and package
uploads, views of ordinary files in a repository, and logs attached to
issues. The default rule file still bans probes for `.env` and `.git` at
the site root (see "Rule files"). A list given replaces the default, so
include them in it.
- `WAF_EXEMPT_PATHS`: path prefixes not inspected.
- `WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `128K`): bodies are inspected up to this size
and streamed beyond it without buffering, so large uploads and git pushes
are not held in memory.
- `WAF_BODY_LIMIT` (default `128K`): bodies the Core Rule Set reads are
inspected up to this size and streamed beyond it without buffering, so
large uploads are not held in memory.
- `TRAP_PATHS`: paths the app never serves and only scanners ask for, for
example `/wp-login.php,/xmlrpc.php` in front of gitea. A request for one
is a clear sign of attack. This is the env-var short form of a `path` rule
with the `ban` action, for deployments that mount no rule files.
- `ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): responses with status 403 or 404
per client per minute; more than this breaks a limit (see "Bans").
Scanners walking lists of paths cause hundreds a minute; a person rarely
causes more than a few. 401 is not counted: git and container registry
clients send their first request without credentials and are answered 401
at the start of every push, every fetch from a private repository and
every image pull.
- `ERROR_BURST_THRESHOLD` (default `30`): requests per client per minute
that the sidecar refused after a rule file or Core Rule Set match; more
than this breaks a limit (see "Bans"). A client trying one attack after
another is refused many times a minute; a person rarely more than a few
times. Answers the app gives are not counted, since they do not tell a
scanner from an ordinary client: in front of gitea, container image and
package clients are answered 404 by design, for each layer a push checks
and each package a lookup asks about, often hundreds of times a minute,
and git and registry clients are answered 401 at the start of every push,
every fetch from a private repository and every image pull.
- Bans (R5), following the rules under "Bans"
- `ATTACK_BAN_DURATION` (default `7d`): the ban for a first clear sign of
attack.
@@ -509,21 +561,27 @@ The settings, by group:
instead.
- `BAN_RESPONSE` (default `403`): `403`, `429`, or `close` to drop the
connection without an answer. `403` makes a ban easy to recognise when
debugging; `close` tells the client nothing.
debugging. Behind traefik, `close` does not leave the client unanswered:
traefik answers `502`, as it does whenever its backend drops a connection.
- `BAN_SCOPE_V4_PREFIX` (default `32`): widen to for example `24` to ban the
surrounding netblock.
- Reputation (R6). No source is on by default. A DNS blocklist would be told the
address of every visitor. AbuseIPDB and CrowdSec need an account or an engine
of the operator's own. A downloaded list reveals nothing about visitors, but
each sidecar fetches its own copy, and the list most fit to be a default,
Spamhaus DROP, may be fetched at most once a day: a default would break that
on any host that runs several sidecars.
the list most fit to be a default, Spamhaus DROP, must not be downloaded
automatically more than once an hour, and Spamhaus may block an address that
downloads it too often. Each sidecar fetches its own copy, so on a host that
runs several sidecars, which share one address, downloads would often come
less than an hour apart.
- `BLOCKLIST_URLS`: text files of addresses and netblocks, one per line;
anything after a `;` or `#` on a line is ignored. For example the Spamhaus
DROP list, `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`; Spamhaus asks that it
be fetched at most once a day and that products using it credit The
Spamhaus Project. Refreshed every `BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`); the
last good copy is kept on failure and across restarts.
DROP list, `https://www.spamhaus.org/drop/drop.txt`. Spamhaus's terms for
it, on its DROP page: automated downloads must be at least one hour apart,
and once a day is more than enough in most cases; a product that uses it
must credit The Spamhaus Project and keep the list's date and copyright
lines with the data. Refreshed every `BLOCKLIST_REFRESH` (default `24h`);
the last good copy is kept whole, comment lines included, on failure and
across restarts.
- `BLOCKLIST_ACTION` (default `deny`): `deny`, `limit:<percent>`, or `log`.
`deny` refuses every request from a listed address, which suits lists of
networks that send nothing legitimate, such as DROP. `limit:<percent>`
@@ -691,17 +749,21 @@ files are meant for people as well: an admin can read or edit them at any time,
and the running sidecar takes the edit in.
- Files, each holding one kind of state:
- `bans.json`: active and past bans, up to `MAX_BANS`. Per entry: the
netblock, start, expiry (`null` for permanent), what caused it (`attack`,
`limit`, `admin` or `crowdsec`), a short reason, when it was lifted if an
admin lifted it, and a `notes` field (below).
- `bans.json`: active and past bans, up to `MAX_BANS` that the sidecar made
and every ban an admin made. Per entry: the netblock, start, expiry
(`null` for permanent), what caused it (`attack`, `limit`, `admin` or
`crowdsec`), a short reason, when it was lifted if an admin lifted it, and
a `notes` field (below).
- `clients.json`: per client, its minute, hour and day counters and its
history since it was first seen: first and last time seen, the AS number,
AS name and country last looked up and when (with GeoJS, the answer kept
for 7 days), total requests and bytes in each direction, how many requests
were forwarded and how many refused, responses by status class, and
offences by kind. Clients that were never banned are kept too, so every
client's history survives a restart; `GET /clients/<ip>` shows it.
AS name and country last looked up and when, total requests and bytes in
each direction, how many requests were forwarded and how many refused,
responses by status class, and offences by kind. Clients that were never
banned are kept too, so every client's history survives a restart;
`GET /clients/<ip>` shows it.
- `lookups.json`: GeoJS answers, one per client: the AS number, AS name and
country, when GeoJS was asked and when the answer was last used; up to
100,000, each for 7 days.
- `reputation.json`: the last good copy of each list fetched from a URL,
cached DNSBL and reputation API verdicts, each with the time it was
fetched, and the AbuseIPDB checks spent today, so a restart does not reset
@@ -733,20 +795,22 @@ and the running sidecar takes the edit in.
that is under 2 GiB of disk writes a day.
- `bans.json` takes about 2 KiB per ban and at most about 8 KiB, since the
texts in the notes are cut short. At the default `MAX_BANS` of 5,000 it is
about 10 MiB, and never more than about 40 MiB. It is written when a ban
is made, lifted or made permanent, at most once every 10 seconds, and
otherwise with the 15-minute write, so its writes follow the bans made:
with a full file, a hundred new bans a day come to about 1 GiB of disk
writes.
about 10 MiB, and never more than about 40 MiB, plus whatever bans an
admin made. It is written when a ban is made, lifted or made permanent, at
most once every 10 seconds, and otherwise with the 15-minute write, so its
writes follow the bans made: with a full file, a hundred new bans a day
come to about 1 GiB of disk writes.
- `lookups.json` takes about 150 bytes per answer, about 15 MiB when full.
Written every 15 minutes, that is under 1.5 GiB of disk writes a day.
- `reputation.json` and `alerts.json` are usually a few MiB or less.
- Writing a file of these sizes takes well under a second on an ordinary
disk, in the background, so rewriting whole files needs nothing cleverer.
- Format: indented JSON with a top-level `version` number, entries sorted by
client address, times in RFC 3339 UTC, durations and sizes as plain numbers
with the unit in the field name. The aim is that a person can open `bans.json`
in an editor, find an address, and remove or add an entry. `clients.json` puts
each client on one line instead, which halves its size and lets `grep` show
everything about one client.
in an editor, find an address, and remove or add an entry. `clients.json` and
`lookups.json` put each entry on one line instead, which halves their size and
lets `grep` show everything about one client.
- Writing:
- serialise from a snapshot taken under the lock, so requests are not held
up while the file is written;
@@ -756,8 +820,8 @@ and the running sidecar takes the edit in.
- `bans.json` is written `STATE_WRITE_DELAY` after a ban is made, lifted or
made permanent. Changes that only update the counts in its notes wait for
the write every `STATE_COUNTER_INTERVAL`, as all of `clients.json`,
`reputation.json` and `alerts.json` do. All four are written on orderly
shutdown (SIGTERM);
`lookups.json`, `reputation.json` and `alerts.json` do. All five are
written on orderly shutdown (SIGTERM);
- before writing a file, the sidecar checks whether it changed on disk since
the sidecar last read or wrote it; if it did, the sidecar takes that edit
in first (below), so an admin's edit is never overwritten.
@@ -954,12 +1018,17 @@ networks:
at the defaults, one larger than 100 MB or taking more than 60 seconds to
upload is cut off, so a gitea that takes large pushes needs
`CLIENT_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES`, `UPSTREAM_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES`,
`CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` raised to fit.
`WAF_BODY_LIMIT` keeps pack uploads out of memory.
- The default `WAF_DISABLED_RULES` lets git's clone and push over HTTP, and
the display of source files, through the Core Rule Set. Pages where people
post code (issues, pull requests, the web editor) can still trip other
rules; such a match refuses only that request, and the request log names
`CLIENT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` and `UPSTREAM_REQUEST_TIMEOUT` raised to fit. The
Core Rule Set does not read a pack upload, which streams through without
being held in memory.
- With the sidecar's changes to the Core Rule Set and the default
`WAF_DISABLED_RULES` (see "Configuration surface", attack detection),
git's clone, fetch and push over HTTP, the API, container images,
packages, and views of ordinary files pass the Core Rule Set. Requests
that carry text people write, such as issues, pull requests, searches, the
web editor and uploads, can still trip other rules, and so can a file
whose name the Core Rule Set takes for an attack, such as an `.xhtml`
page. Such a match refuses only that request, and the request log names
the rule in `waf_rule_ids` for `WAF_DISABLED_RULES`.
- Archive download and blame or history pages are what scrapers hammer;
request limits do most of the work there.
@@ -1001,8 +1070,9 @@ networks:
- Forged `X-Forwarded-For`: handled by believing the header only from a peer
inside `TRUSTED_PROXIES` and by walking it from the right. The default trusts
every private address, which in the intended deployment means traefik; where
other containers can reach the sidecar directly, setting `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to
traefik's own network closes that gap.
other containers can reach the sidecar directly, or visitors on a private
network reach traefik, they can name another address in the header, and
setting `TRUSTED_PROXIES` to traefik's own network closes that gap.
- Many clients behind one address (mobile carriers, offices, Tor): they share
its limits and its bans. The default limits sit several times above what one
busy person produces, `RATE_LIMIT_EXEMPT_NETS` and `ALLOW_NETS` take known