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Details

Reject invalid secret names before any command builds a path (closes #33 )

`secret rm ..` resolved to the vault directory and deleted the whole
vault; `secret rm .` and `secret rm ""` deleted every secret. rm, mv and
import built paths from the name without checking it, and so did the
version commands, encrypt and decrypt.

vault.ValidateSecretName wraps the existing name rule and returns
ErrInvalidSecretName. Each of those commands calls it on the name as
given, both names for a move, before building any path. AddSecret and
GetSecretVersion use it too, so the rule has one implementation.

The regression test snapshots every file under the state directory of
two in-memory vaults and requires it unchanged after each rejected
command.

Model: opus-5-5

2026-10-03 12:31:35 +00:00

6.6 KiB

Raw Blame History

Workflow

branch (from main)
do the work in Next Step
move Next Step to the top of Completed Steps
move the top item of Future Steps into Next Step
commit (TODO.md changes in the same commit as the work)
merge to main if the branch is not protected, otherwise open a PR
push

Status

pre-1.0. No git tags. TODO.md carries open 1.0 security blockers. Work in flight on branch secure-enclave-unlocker (clean tree as of 2026-07-06).

Next Step

Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:

Add fmt-check and hooks targets to the Makefile (test/lint/fmt/check/ docker already exist).
Add REPO_POLICIES.md and .editorconfig.
Add .gitea/workflows/check.yml running make check.
Verify Dockerfile base images are pinned by sha256.

Completed Steps

2026-10-03: Every command that builds a path from a secret name checks the name first with vault.ValidateSecretName and touches nothing when it is invalid: rm, mv (both names, within a vault and between vaults), import, version list/promote/rm, encrypt and decrypt. Before, secret rm .. deleted the whole vault and secret rm . every secret in it.
2026-10-02: A plain docker build . builds again: the size tests skip a case that needs more locked memory than the process can lock, and run every case under script/cibuild. The image stamps the VERSION build argument, else git describe --tags --always, into Version, and fails if .git is present but yields no version; make build stamps git describe too, not a fixed 0.1.0. .dockerignore keeps .git/config out; script/docker is the canonical copy.
2026-08-07: Updated golangci-lint to v2.12.2 with the canonical .golangci.yml (all linters enabled minus the standard disable list, lll 88, tests linted); bumped the Dockerfile lint-stage image to the tagged v2.12.2 Debian digest; fixed all ~1550 new findings across internal/ and pkg/ (line wrapping, wsl_v5 blank lines, sentinel errors for err113, t.Parallel() where safe, _test package conversions, complexity/dupl helper extraction) on branch golangci-v2.12.2. Reworked after review: the err113 sentinels in internal/vault, internal/secret, internal/cli and pkg/bip85 were reshaped so every composed error message is byte-identical to main, and findUnlockerIDByMetadata now returns an error so unlocker list skips an unreadable unlockers.d entry with a warning instead of emitting a fabricated fallback ID.
2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: script/ entrypoints, Makefile shims, README Entrypoints section
2026-03-11: Secure Enclave unlocker for hardware-backed secret protection, plus review fixes (stub panics, derivation index, tests, README) on branch secure-enclave-unlocker.
2026-02-28: Repo cleanup, removed stale .cursorrules and coverage.out.
Audit fix wave (issues #1, #2, #3, #13, #14): skip unlockers with missing metadata, allow uppercase secret names, fix hardcoded derivation index, validate names in GetSecretVersion against path traversal, return errors instead of panicking, add Warn() on silent anomalies.
Memory security hardening: LockedBuffer used through encrypt/decrypt paths (Save/EncryptWithPassphrase/GetValue/gpg helpers), deprecated bare-[]byte APIs removed.
Per-secret keypair architecture, vault package refactor, versioning with --version, comprehensive test suite with in-memory filesystem.
Debug logging system (slog, GODEBUG flag, TTY-aware output).
Renamed SEP unlocker to Keychain, reorganized import commands.
2025-05-28: Initial implementation (vault, age encryption, mnemonic, CLI).

Future Steps

Compliance (after Next Step lands): keep main green under the new .gitea workflow; run make check before every merge.
Implement version-number shell completion for the second arg of secret version promote and secret version rm (internal/cli/version.go; was an in-code TODO removed for godox).
Cover mnemonic-vs-xprv identity consistency in pkg/agehd/agehd_test.go TestMnemonicVsXPRVConsistency (was an in-code FIXME removed for godox).
Darwin-gated files (internal/secret/keychainunlocker.go, seunlocker_darwin.go, internal/macse/macse_darwin.go, related tests) are not linted on the Linux CI runner and still contain lines over the new 88-column limit; they will surface if lint ever runs on macOS.
Merge secure-enclave-unlocker to main once review is done.
1.0 critical security blockers (from repo TODO.md):
- Command injection: GPG key IDs passed unescaped to exec.Command (pgpunlocker.go:323-327); data.String() passed unescaped to the security command (keychainunlocker.go:472-476).
- Memory security: KeychainData stores AgePrivKeyPassphrase as a plain string (keychainunlocker.go:342,393-396); age identity .String() creates unprotected copies (keychainunlocker.go:356, pgpunlocker.go:256, version.go:155); age secret key held in a plain string in cli/crypto.go:86,91,113; private keys exposed via buffer.Bytes() to GPGEncryptFunc and EncryptWithPassphrase.
- Race conditions: no file locking in vault/secrets.go:142-176; non-atomic writes can leave the vault inconsistent.
- Input validation: no maximum secret size (DoS).
- Timing attacks: bytes.Equal passphrase compare (cli/init.go: 209-216); non-constant-time public key compare (vault.go:95-100).
High priority:
- Return errors instead of panicking on corrupted metadata (pgpunlocker.go:116, keychainunlocker.go:141).
- Secure temporary file handling and cleanup.
- Print cobra usage only for argument errors, not internal failures.
- Initialize a default unlock key at vault creation.
- Confirmation prompts for destructive operations (keys rm, vault deletion).
- Add secret rm and vault deletion commands.
Medium priority:
- Standardize error messages; stop leaking internals.
- Graceful handling of corrupted or missing key files with recovery suggestions.
- Validate GPG key existence before creating PGP unlock keys.
- Split oversized CLI functions.
- Document env var security (SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE, SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC); clear after use.
- mlock/munlock for sensitive allocations.
Cleanups: read statedir from environment or default instead of passing it around.
Enhancements: help examples, shell completion, colored output, --quiet flag, name suggestions on miss, audit logging, hardware integration tests (Keychain, GPG), naming consistency, vault export/import, batch operations, search, secret metadata (descriptions, tags).