# secret - Local Secret Manager

secret is a command-line local secret manager that implements a hierarchical
key architecture for storing and managing sensitive data. It supports
multiple vaults, various unlock mechanisms, and provides secure storage
using the `age` encryption library.

It could be used as password manager, but was not designed as such.  I
created it to scratch an itch for a secure key/value store for replacing a
bunch of pgp-encrypted files in a directory structure.

## Core Architecture

### Three-Layer Key Hierarchy

Secret implements a three-layer key architecture:

1. **Long-term Keys**: Derived from BIP39 mnemonic phrases, these provide
   the foundation for all encryption
2. **Unlockers**: Short-term keys that encrypt the long-term keys,
   supporting multiple authentication methods
3. **Version-specific Keys**: Per-version keys that encrypt individual
   secret values

### Version Management

Each secret maintains a history of versions, with each version having:
- Its own encryption key pair
- Metadata (unencrypted) including creation time and validity period
- Immutable value storage
- Atomic version switching via symlink updates

### Vault System

Vaults provide logical separation of secrets, each with its own long-term
key and unlocker set. This allows for complete isolation between different
contexts (work, personal, projects).

## Installation

Build from source:
```bash
git clone <repository>
cd secret
make build
```

## Quick Start

1. **Initialize the secret manager**:
   ```bash
   secret init
   ```
   This creates the default vault and prompts for a BIP39 mnemonic phrase.

2. **Generate a mnemonic** (if needed):
   ```bash
   secret generate mnemonic
   ```

3. **Add a secret**:
   ```bash
   echo "my-password" | secret add myservice/password
   ```

4. **Retrieve a secret**:
   ```bash
   secret get myservice/password
   ```

## Commands Reference

### Initialization

#### `secret init`

Initializes the secret manager with a default vault. Prompts for a BIP39
mnemonic phrase and creates the initial directory structure.

**Environment Variables:**
- `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC`: Pre-set mnemonic phrase
- `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE`: Pre-set unlock passphrase

### Vault Management

#### `secret vault list [--json]` / `secret vault ls`

Lists all available vaults. The current vault is marked.

#### `secret vault create <name>`

Creates a new vault with the specified name.

**Vault Name Format:** only lowercase ASCII letters, digits, `.`, `-` and `_`
are allowed, and a name must not be empty, `.` or `..`.

#### `secret vault select <name>`

Switches to the specified vault for subsequent operations.

#### `secret vault remove <name> [--force]` / `secret vault rm` ⚠️ 🛑

**DANGER**: Permanently removes a vault and all its secrets. Like Unix `rm`,
this command does not ask for confirmation.

Requires --force if the vault contains secrets. With --force, will
automatically switch to another vault if removing the current one.

- `--force, -f`: Force removal even if vault contains secrets
- **NO RECOVERY**: All secrets in the vault will be permanently deleted

### Secret Management

#### `secret add <secret-name> [--force]`

Adds a secret to the current vault. Reads the secret value from stdin.
- `--force, -f`: Overwrite existing secret

**Secret Name Format:** only ASCII letters, digits, `.`, `-`, `_` and `/`
are allowed, and a name must not be empty, start with `.` or `/`, end with
`/`, contain `//`, or have `..` as a path segment.
- Forward slashes (`/`) are converted to percent signs (`%`) for storage
- Examples: `database/password`, `api.key`, `ssh_private_key`

#### `secret get <secret-name> [--version <version>]`

Retrieves and outputs a secret value to stdout.
- `--version, -v`: Get a specific version (default: current)

#### `secret list [filter] [--json]` / `secret ls`

Lists all secrets in the current vault. Optional filter for substring
matching.

#### `secret remove <secret-name>` / `secret rm` ⚠️ 🛑

**DANGER**: Permanently removes a secret and ALL its versions. Like Unix `rm`, this command does not ask for confirmation.
- **NO RECOVERY**: Once removed, the secret cannot be recovered
- **ALL VERSIONS DELETED**: Every version of the secret will be permanently deleted

#### `secret move <source> <destination>` / `secret mv` / `secret rename`

Moves or renames a secret within the current vault.
- Fails if the destination already exists
- Fails if the destination is the source under another name, such as `foo`
  for `Foo` on a case-insensitive filesystem (the macOS default); there, to
  change only the case of a name, move the secret to a third name first
- Preserves all versions and metadata

### Version Management

#### `secret version list <secret-name>` / `secret version ls`

Lists all versions of a secret showing creation time, status, and validity period.

#### `secret version promote <secret-name> <version>`

Promotes a specific version to current by updating the symlink. Does not
modify any timestamps, allowing for rollback scenarios.

#### `secret version remove <secret-name> <version>` / `secret version rm` ⚠️ 🛑

**DANGER**: Permanently removes a specific version of a secret. Like Unix
`rm`, this command does not ask for confirmation.
- **NO RECOVERY**: Once removed, this version cannot be recovered
- Cannot remove the current version (must promote another version first)

### Key Generation

#### `secret generate mnemonic`

Generates a cryptographically secure BIP39 mnemonic phrase.

#### `secret generate secret <name> [--length=16] [--type=base58] [--force]`

Generates and stores a random secret.
- `--length, -l`: Length of generated secret (default: 16)
- `--type, -t`: Type of secret (`base58`, `alnum`)
- `--force, -f`: Overwrite existing secret

### Unlocker Management

#### `secret unlocker list [--json]` / `secret unlocker ls`

Lists all unlockers in the current vault with their metadata.

#### `secret unlocker add <type> [options]`

Creates a new unlocker of the specified type:

**Types:**
- `passphrase`: Traditional passphrase-protected unlocker
- `pgp`: Uses an existing GPG key for encryption/decryption
- `keychain`: macOS Keychain integration (macOS only)
- `secure-enclave`: Hardware-backed Secure Enclave protection (macOS only)

**Options:**
- `--keyid <id>`: GPG key ID (optional for PGP type, uses default key if not specified)

A vault has one passphrase unlocker: adding one replaces the one the vault
has, which is removed only once the new one is the current unlocker.

#### `secret unlocker remove <unlocker-id> [--force]` / `secret unlocker rm` ⚠️ 🛑

**DANGER**: Permanently removes an unlocker. Like Unix `rm`, this command
does not ask for confirmation.  Cannot remove the last unlocker if the vault
has secrets unless --force is used. An unlocker directory that
`secret unlocker list` skips with a warning, because its metadata cannot be
read or parsed, is removed by the directory name the warning gives.
- `--force, -f`: Force removal of last unlocker even if vault has secrets
- **CRITICAL WARNING**: Without unlockers and without your mnemonic phrase,
  vault data will be PERMANENTLY INACCESSIBLE
- **NO RECOVERY**: Removing all unlockers without having your mnemonic means
  losing access to all secrets forever

#### `secret unlocker select <unlocker-id>`

Selects an unlocker as the current default for operations.

### Import Operations

#### `secret import <secret-name> --source <filename>`

Imports a secret from a file and stores it in the current vault under the given name.

#### `secret vault import [vault-name]`

Imports a mnemonic phrase into the specified vault (defaults to "default").

### Encryption Operations

#### `secret encrypt <secret-name> [--input=file] [--output=file]`

Encrypts data using an Age key stored as a secret. If the secret doesn't exist, generates a new Age key.

#### `secret decrypt <secret-name> [--input=file] [--output=file]`

Decrypts data using an Age key stored as a secret.

## Storage Architecture

### Directory Structure

```
~/.local/share/secret/
├── vaults.d/
│   ├── default/
│   │   ├── unlockers.d/
│   │   │   ├── passphrase-<time>/       # Passphrase unlocker
│   │   │   └── <host>-pgp-<time>/       # PGP unlocker
│   │   ├── secrets.d/
│   │   │   ├── api%key/                 # Secret: api/key
│   │   │   │   ├── versions/
│   │   │   │   │   ├── 20231215.001/   # Version directory
│   │   │   │   │   │   ├── pub.age     # Version public key
│   │   │   │   │   │   ├── priv.age    # Version private key (encrypted)
│   │   │   │   │   │   ├── value.age   # Encrypted value
│   │   │   │   │   │   └── metadata.json # Unencrypted metadata
│   │   │   │   │   └── 20231216.001/   # Another version
│   │   │   │   └── current -> versions/20231216.001
│   │   │   └── database%password/       # Secret: database/password
│   │   │       ├── versions/
│   │   │       └── current -> versions/20231215.001
│   │   ├── vault-metadata.json          # Vault metadata
│   │   ├── pub.age                      # Long-term public key
│   │   └── current-unlocker             # Current unlocker's directory name
│   └── work/
│       ├── unlockers.d/
│       ├── secrets.d/
│       ├── vault-metadata.json
│       ├── pub.age
│       └── current-unlocker
└── currentvault -> vaults.d/default
```

### Key Management and Encryption Flow

#### 1: Long-term Keys
- **Source**: Derived from BIP39 mnemonic phrases using hierarchical deterministic (HD) key derivation
- **Purpose**: Master keys for each vault, used to encrypt secret-specific keys
- **Storage**: Public key stored as `pub.age`, private key encrypted by unlockers

#### 2: Unlockers

Unlockers provide different authentication methods to access the long-term keys:

1. **Passphrase Unlockers**:
   - Encrypted with user-provided passphrase
   - Stored as encrypted Age keys
   - Cross-platform compatible

2. **PGP Unlockers**:
   - Uses existing GPG key infrastructure
   - Leverages existing key management workflows
   - Strong authentication through GPG

3. **Keychain Unlockers** (macOS only):
   - Stores unlock keys in macOS Keychain
   - Protected by system authentication (Touch ID, password)
   - Automatic unlocking when Keychain is unlocked
   - Cross-application integration

4. **Secure Enclave Unlockers** (macOS):
   - Hardware-backed key storage using Apple Secure Enclave
   - Uses `sc_auth` / CryptoTokenKit for SE key management (no Apple Developer Program required)
   - ECIES encryption: vault long-term key encrypted directly by SE hardware
   - Protected by biometric authentication (Touch ID) or system password

Each vault maintains its own set of unlockers and one long-term key. The long-term key is encrypted to each unlocker, allowing any authorized unlocker to access vault secrets.

#### 3: Secret-specific Keys

- Each secret version has its own encryption key pair
- Private key encrypted to the vault's long-term key
- Provides forward secrecy and granular access control

### Environment Variables

- `SB_SECRET_STATE_DIR`: Custom state directory location
- `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC`: Pre-set mnemonic phrase (avoids interactive prompt)
- `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE`: Pre-set unlock passphrase (avoids interactive prompt)
- `SB_GPG_KEY_ID`: GPG key ID for PGP unlockers

**Warning:** `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` and `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` expose the secret
they hold. Other processes running as the same user can read a process's
environment (on Linux, from `/proc/<pid>/environ`). Every child process of the
shell or script that sets them inherits them, `gpg` included. Set on a command
line or in a CI job, they end up in shell history and CI logs. `secret` unsets
each one as soon as it has read it, so that the programs it runs itself, such
as `gpg`, do not inherit it, but that erases nothing: the environment the
process started with, and its memory, still hold the value. The interactive
prompt, which every command except `secret vault import` offers when the
variable is not set, is the safer default; `secret vault import` has no prompt
and needs both variables.

## Security Features

### Encryption

- Uses the [age encryption library](https://age-encryption.org/) with X25519 keys
- All private keys are encrypted at rest
- No plaintext secrets stored on disk

### Access Control

- Multiple authentication methods supported
- Vault isolation prevents cross-contamination

### Forward Secrecy

- Per-version encryption keys limit exposure if compromised
- Each version is independently encrypted
- Historical versions remain encrypted with their original keys

### Hardware Integration

- Hardware token support via PGP/GPG integration
- macOS Keychain integration for system-level security
- Secure Enclave integration for hardware-backed key protection (macOS, via `sc_auth` / CryptoTokenKit)

## Examples

### Basic Workflow

```bash
# Initialize with a new mnemonic
secret generate mnemonic  # Copy the output
secret init              # Paste the mnemonic when prompted

# Add some secrets
echo "supersecret123" | secret add database/prod/password
echo "api-key-xyz" | secret add services/api/key
echo "ssh-private-key-content" | secret add ssh/servers/web01

# List and retrieve secrets
secret list
secret get database/prod/password
secret get services/api/key

# Remove a secret ⚠️ 🛑 (NO CONFIRMATION - PERMANENT!)
secret remove ssh/servers/web01
```

### Multi-vault Setup

```bash
# Create separate vaults for different contexts
secret vault create work
secret vault create personal

# Work with work vault
secret vault select work
echo "work-db-pass" | secret add database/password
secret unlocker add passphrase  # Add passphrase authentication

# Switch to personal vault
secret vault select personal
echo "personal-email-pass" | secret add email/password

# List all vaults
secret vault list

# Remove a vault ⚠️ 🛑 (NO CONFIRMATION - PERMANENT!)
secret vault remove personal --force
```

### Advanced Authentication
```bash
# Add multiple unlock methods
secret unlocker add passphrase              # Password-based
secret unlocker add pgp --keyid ABCD1234    # GPG key
secret unlocker add keychain                # macOS Keychain (macOS only)
secret unlocker add secure-enclave          # macOS Secure Enclave (macOS only)

# List unlockers
secret unlocker list

# Select a specific unlocker
secret unlocker select <unlocker-id>

# Remove an unlocker ⚠️ 🛑 (NO CONFIRMATION!)
secret unlocker remove <unlocker-id>
```

### Version Management

```bash
# List all versions of a secret
secret version list database/prod/password

# Promote an older version to current
secret version promote database/prod/password 20231215.001

# Remove an old version ⚠️ 🛑 (NO CONFIRMATION - PERMANENT!)
secret version remove database/prod/password 20231214.001
```

### Encryption/Decryption with Age Keys

```bash
# Generate an Age key and store it as a secret
secret generate secret encryption/mykey

# Encrypt a file using the stored key
secret encrypt encryption/mykey --input document.txt --output document.txt.age

# Decrypt the file
secret decrypt encryption/mykey --input document.txt.age --output document.txt
```

## Technical Details

### Cryptographic Primitives
- **Key Derivation**: BIP32/BIP39 hierarchical deterministic key derivation
- **Encryption**: Age (X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- **Authentication**: Poly1305 MAC
- **Hashing**: Double SHA-256 for public key identification

### File Formats
- **age Files**: Standard age encryption format (.age extension)
- **Metadata**: Unencrypted JSON format with timestamps and type information
- **Vault Metadata**: JSON containing vault name, creation time, derivation index, and public key hash

### Vault Management

- **Derivation Index**: Each vault uses a unique derivation index from the mnemonic, and thus a unique key pair
- **Public Key Hash**: Double SHA-256 hash of the index-0 public key identifies vaults from the same mnemonic
- **Automatic Key Derivation**: When creating vaults with a mnemonic, keys are automatically derived

### Cross-Platform Support

- **macOS**: Full support including Keychain and Secure Enclave integration
- **Linux**: Full support (excluding macOS-specific features)

## Security Considerations

### Threat Model

- Protects against unauthorized access to secret values
- Provides defense against compromise of individual components
- Supports hardware-backed authentication where available

### Best Practices

1. Use strong, unique passphrases for unlockers
2. Enable hardware authentication (Keychain, hardware tokens) when available
3. Regularly audit unlockers and remove unused ones
4. Keep mnemonic phrases securely backed up offline
5. Use separate vaults for different security contexts

### Limitations

- Requires access to unlockers for secret retrieval
- Mnemonic phrases must be securely stored and backed up
- Hardware features limited to supported platforms

## Development

### Building
```bash
make build    # Build binary
make test     # Run tests
make lint     # Run linter
```

### Testing
The project includes comprehensive tests:
```bash
make test     # Run all tests
go test ./... # Unit tests
go test -tags=integration -v ./internal/cli  # Integration tests
```

## Entrypoints

This repository adheres to the
[Scripts to Rule Them All](https://github.com/github/scripts-to-rule-them-all)
standard: normalized scripts in `script/` are the entrypoints for the
development workflow, and the Makefile targets are thin shims that call
them. We provide:

- `script/bootstrap` — install all dependencies (Go, Go module
  download), idempotently; golangci-lint is not installed, it runs in
  docker
- `script/setup` — make a fresh clone ready for development: runs
  `script/bootstrap`, then `script/install-precommit`
- `script/projectname` — output the project name (`secret`); used by
  other scripts such as `script/docker`
- `script/build` — build the `secret` binary into the repo root, stamping
  the version (`VERSION` from the environment, else `git describe`) and
  the git commit
- `script/test` — run `go vet` and the test suite (verbose rerun on
  failure)
- `script/lint` — run `golangci-lint` in docker only: builds
  `Dockerfile.lint`, where the linter is a build step that runs on every
  call, also on an unchanged tree
- `script/fmt` — format all Go code (writes)
- `script/fmt-check` — check formatting without writing
- `script/check` — run `script/test`, `script/lint`, and
  `script/fmt-check`
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged with the project name
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build --ulimit
  memlock=-1:-1 .` (memguard needs mlock; the Dockerfile runs the
  checks), with a new `CHECK_EPOCH` build argument on every run so the
  checks run again on an unchanged tree
- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks: `go mod tidy` verification,
  then `script/check`
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
  runs `script/precommit`

## Features

- **Multiple Authentication Methods**: Supports passphrase, PGP, macOS Keychain, and Secure Enclave unlockers
- **Vault Isolation**: Complete separation between different vaults
- **Per-Secret Encryption**: Each secret has its own encryption key
- **BIP39 Mnemonic Support**: Keyless operation using mnemonic phrases
- **Cross-Platform**: Works on macOS, Linux, and other Unix-like systems

# Author

Made with love and lots of expensive SOTA AI by
[sneak](https://sneak.berlin) in Berlin in the summer of 2025.

Released as a free software gift to the world, no strings attached, under
the [WTFPL](https://www.wtfpl.net/) license.

Contact: [sneak@sneak.berlin](mailto:sneak@sneak.berlin)

[https://keys.openpgp.org/vks/v1/by-fingerprint/5539AD00DE4C42F3AFE11575052443F4DF2A55C2](https://keys.openpgp.org/vks/v1/by-fingerprint/5539AD00DE4C42F3AFE11575052443F4DF2A55C2)