1 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak 045a5bf83e Check vault names in every command that takes one (closes #68)
check / check (push) Failing after 3s
A vault name may use only lowercase ASCII letters, digits, `.`, `-` and
`_`, and must not be empty, `.` or `..`; the error now states that rule.
`vault create`, `vault import`, `vault select`, `vault remove` and both
vault names of `mv` check the name as typed before building any path
from it. Before, `vault import ..` wrote a long-term key and an unlocker
into the state directory itself, and `vault select ..` made that the
current vault.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-04 10:51:28 +00:00
16 changed files with 217 additions and 532 deletions
-8
View File
@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# script/cibuild sets CHECK_EPOCH to the current time, so the RUN steps
# below run again on each build, an unchanged tree included, while the
# steps above stay cached. ARG is per stage: the build stage declares it too.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
COPY . .
RUN make fmt-check
@@ -30,9 +25,6 @@ WORKDIR /build
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
# As in the lint stage: the RUN steps below run again on each script/cibuild.
ARG CHECK_EPOCH
COPY . .
RUN make test
+1 -2
View File
@@ -526,8 +526,7 @@ them. We provide:
- `script/docker` — build the Docker image tagged with the project name
- `script/cibuild` — CI entrypoint: `docker build --ulimit
memlock=-1:-1 .` (memguard needs mlock; the Dockerfile runs the
checks), with a new `CHECK_EPOCH` build argument on every run so the
checks run again on an unchanged tree
checks)
- `script/precommit` — pre-commit checks: `go mod tidy` verification,
then `script/check`
- `script/install-precommit` — install the git pre-commit hook that
+8 -25
View File
@@ -29,30 +29,10 @@ Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:
`.`, `-` and `_`, and must not be empty, `.` or `..`
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/68); the error and `README.md`
state the rule. `vault create`, `vault import`, `vault select`,
`vault remove`, both vault names of `mv` and shell completion of a
`vault:secret` argument check the name as typed with
`vault remove` and both vault names of `mv` check the name as typed with
`vault.ValidateVaultName` before building any path from it. Before,
`vault import ..` wrote a long-term key and an unlocker into the state
directory itself, and `vault select ..` made that the current vault.
- 2026-10-04: `script/cibuild` runs the checks again on an unchanged
tree (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/54). It passes the
current time as the `CHECK_EPOCH` build argument, which both the lint
and the build stage of the `Dockerfile` declare after their module
download, so the `RUN` steps below the argument run again on each
build while the base images and module downloads stay cached. Before,
a second run on the same tree took every check from the build cache
and reported success having run nothing.
- 2026-10-04: A failed unlocker add no longer leaves a partial unlocker
directory (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/48).
`secret unlocker add pgp` resolves the GPG key's fingerprint once, for
its duplicate check, and passes it to `CreatePGPUnlocker` to record.
`CreatePGPUnlocker` and `CreateKeychainUnlocker` get the long-term key
and encrypt everything before writing anything. All four unlocker
types write their files through `secret.WriteDir`: a new unlocker is
built in a temporary directory, renamed into place when complete and
removed on a failure. One added under the directory name of an
existing unlocker is still written into that directory in place
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/71).
- 2026-10-04: `secret unlocker select` and `secret unlocker remove`
skip, with the warning `unlocker list` gives, an unlocker directory
whose metadata file cannot be checked for, read or parsed, instead of
@@ -157,10 +137,13 @@ Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:
- from `init` or `vault create` killed after the passphrase prompt
but before the unlocker is written, a vault with no unlocker,
which `vault create` has already made the current vault;
- data under a `.tmp-` name in the state directory: a secret,
version or unlocker being added, or the secret, version, unlocker
or vault being removed, encrypted keys included. Nothing deletes
it; it must be deleted by hand
- from an unlocker add stopped before its metadata is written, a
directory that `unlocker list` warns about and `unlocker rm`
removes only by its directory name;
- data under a `.tmp-` name in the state directory: a secret or
version being added, or the secret, version, unlocker or vault
being removed, encrypted keys included. Nothing deletes it; it
must be deleted by hand
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/75).
- 2026-10-03: The checks run before changing a vault now stop with an
error naming the path and cause when they cannot read what they
+1 -7
View File
@@ -123,9 +123,7 @@ func getVaultNamesCompletionFunc(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) func(
}
// completeVaultQualifiedSecrets completes "vault:secret" references once a
// colon is present in the input. It completes nothing when the vault part
// is not a valid vault name, so that a name such as ".." cannot list a
// directory outside vaults.d.
// colon is present in the input
func completeVaultQualifiedSecrets(
fs afero.Fs, stateDir, toComplete string,
) []string {
@@ -136,10 +134,6 @@ func completeVaultQualifiedSecrets(
vaultName := parts[0]
secretPrefix := parts[1]
if vault.ValidateVaultName(vaultName) != nil {
return nil
}
vlt := vault.NewVault(fs, stateDir, vaultName)
secrets, err := vlt.ListSecrets()
-41
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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported internals
package cli
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestVaultSecretCompletionRejectsInvalidVaultName is a regression test for
// https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/68: completing a `vault:secret`
// argument lists nothing when the vault part is not a valid vault name, even
// where that name, joined onto vaults.d, leads to a secrets.d directory.
func TestVaultSecretCompletionRejectsInvalidVaultName(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
const (
stateDir = "/state"
dirPerm = 0o700
)
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
// The vault "work" holds the secret "x". So does every directory an
// invalid name below would lead to from vaults.d.
for _, vaultName := range []string{"work", ".", "..", "a/b"} {
secretDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "vaults.d", vaultName, "secrets.d", "x")
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(secretDir, dirPerm))
}
assert.Equal(t, []string{"work:x"},
completeVaultQualifiedSecrets(fs, stateDir, "work:"))
for _, toComplete := range []string{".:", "..:", "a/b:"} {
assert.Empty(t, completeVaultQualifiedSecrets(fs, stateDir, toComplete),
"completing %q", toComplete)
}
}
+2 -4
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@@ -685,8 +685,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) addPGPUnlocker(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get current vault: %w", err)
}
// Resolve the GPG key ID to its fingerprint, once: the duplicate check
// and the new unlocker's metadata both use this result
// Resolve the GPG key ID to its fingerprint
fingerprint, err := secret.ResolveGPGKeyFingerprint(gpgKeyID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve GPG key fingerprint: %w", err)
@@ -707,8 +706,7 @@ func (cli *Instance) addPGPUnlocker(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
return fmt.Errorf("GPG key %s %w", gpgKeyID, errGPGKeyAlreadyUnlocker)
}
pgpUnlocker, err := secret.CreatePGPUnlocker(
cli.fs, cli.stateDir, gpgKeyID, fingerprint)
pgpUnlocker, err := secret.CreatePGPUnlocker(cli.fs, cli.stateDir, gpgKeyID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
-35
View File
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
//nolint:testpackage // white-box test of unexported internals
package cli
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// unknownTestGPGUserID is a GPG user ID that no key in the test keyring has.
const unknownTestGPGUserID = "not-in-keyring@example.com"
// TestAddPGPUnlockerUnknownKey asserts that adding a PGP unlocker for a key
// the keyring does not hold fails at looking up the key's fingerprint and
// leaves no new unlocker directory. The error must come from the lookup: a
// lookup moved after anything is written would also come after getting the
// vault's long-term key, which fails first on every platform but macOS
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/88).
//
//nolint:paralleltest // t.Setenv (GNUPGHOME) forbids parallel tests
func TestAddPGPUnlockerUnknownKey(t *testing.T) {
newTestGPGKey(t)
base := newListTestVault(t, 1)
instance, cmd := newTestInstance(base)
cmd.Flags().String("keyid", unknownTestGPGUserID, "")
err := instance.addPGPUnlocker(cmd)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "failed to resolve GPG key fingerprint")
assertDirEntries(t, base,
filepath.Join(testVaultDir(listTestVaultName), listTestUnlockersDirName),
listTestUnlockerDirOne)
}
-47
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@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package secret
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
@@ -62,52 +61,6 @@ func TempDirFor(fs afero.Fs, target string) (string, error) {
return dir, nil
}
// WriteDir calls write to write the files of the directory dir. When dir does
// not exist yet, write writes them into a temporary directory from TempDirFor,
// which is then renamed to dir, so that neither a failure nor a crash leaves
// dir half-written; on a failure the temporary directory is removed, and a
// failure to remove it is returned along with the first. A directory cannot be
// renamed over one that has files in it, so when dir already exists, write
// writes into it in place; dir is then never removed.
func WriteDir(fs afero.Fs, dir string, write func(dir string) error) error {
exists, err := afero.Exists(fs, dir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check for %s: %w", dir, err)
}
if exists {
return write(dir)
}
// Create the directory the finished one is renamed into
err = fs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dir), DirPerms)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create %s: %w", filepath.Dir(dir), err)
}
tmp, err := TempDirFor(fs, dir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = write(tmp)
if err == nil {
err = fs.Rename(tmp, dir)
}
if err != nil {
removeErr := fs.RemoveAll(tmp)
if removeErr != nil {
err = errors.Join(err,
fmt.Errorf("failed to remove %s: %w", tmp, removeErr))
}
return err
}
return nil
}
// RemoveDirAtomic deletes the directory dir so that it disappears in one
// rename: dir is moved into a new directory from TempDirFor, which is then
// deleted. A crash part-way leaves only that temporary directory behind.
+15 -101
View File
@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@ const currentFile = "current"
// unlockerMetadataFile is the file a new unlocker writes last.
const unlockerMetadataFile = "unlocker-metadata.json"
// privKeyFile is the file that holds the encrypted private key of a version
// or of a passphrase unlocker.
const privKeyFile = "priv.age"
// unlockerPassphrase protects the passphrase unlockers the tests create.
//
//nolint:gosec // G101: test data, not a real credential
@@ -457,7 +453,7 @@ func TestVersionSaveIsWholeOrAbsent(t *testing.T) {
if exists {
assert.ElementsMatch(t,
[]string{"pub.age", "value.age", privKeyFile, "metadata.age"},
[]string{"pub.age", "value.age", "priv.age", "metadata.age"},
dirNames(t, base, versionDir),
"version directory visible before it was complete")
}
@@ -500,7 +496,7 @@ func TestVersionSaveFailureLeavesNothing(t *testing.T) {
writeLongTermKey(t, base, stateDir)
fs := hookFs{Fs: base, before: func(op, path string) error {
if op == opRename && filepath.Base(path) == privKeyFile {
if op == opRename && filepath.Base(path) == "priv.age" {
return errInjected
}
@@ -646,21 +642,15 @@ func TestPassphraseUnlockerGetsKeyFirst(t *testing.T) {
require.Error(t, err)
}
// TestPassphraseUnlockerIsWholeOrAbsent checks, before every change that
// creating a passphrase unlocker makes, that the unlocker's directory either
// does not exist or holds all of its files: a crash or a failure at any point
// leaves no partial unlocker.
//
//nolint:paralleltest // t.Setenv forbids t.Parallel
func TestPassphraseUnlockerIsWholeOrAbsent(t *testing.T) {
// TestPassphraseUnlockerWritesMetadataLast checks that the last file a new
// passphrase unlocker writes in its directory is its metadata: an unlocker
// directory without metadata is never used, so one interrupted earlier
// cannot be.
func TestPassphraseUnlockerWritesMetadataLast(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, testMnemonic)
files := []string{"pub.age", privKeyFile, "longterm.age", unlockerMetadataFile}
for _, tfs := range testFilesystems {
t.Run(tfs.name, func(t *testing.T) {
base, stateDir := tfs.open(t)
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(base, stateDir, testVaultName)
base := afero.NewMemMapFs()
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(base, testVaultStateDir, testVaultName)
require.NoError(t, err)
vaultDir, err := vlt.GetDirectory()
@@ -668,13 +658,11 @@ func TestPassphraseUnlockerIsWholeOrAbsent(t *testing.T) {
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", "passphrase")
fs := hookFs{Fs: base, before: func(string, string) error {
exists, err := afero.DirExists(base, unlockerDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
var last string
if exists {
assert.ElementsMatch(t, files, dirNames(t, base, unlockerDir),
"unlocker directory visible before it was complete")
fs := hookFs{Fs: base, before: func(_, path string) error {
if filepath.Dir(path) == unlockerDir {
last = filepath.Base(path)
}
return nil
@@ -683,82 +671,8 @@ func TestPassphraseUnlockerIsWholeOrAbsent(t *testing.T) {
passphrase := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(unlockerPassphrase))
defer passphrase.Destroy()
_, err = vault.NewVault(fs, stateDir, testVaultName).
_, err = vault.NewVault(fs, testVaultStateDir, testVaultName).
CreatePassphraseUnlocker(passphrase)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, files, dirNames(t, base, unlockerDir))
})
}
}
// TestWriteDirFailureLeavesNothing makes writing a new directory fail after
// a file has been written in it, and checks that neither the directory nor
// its temporary directory is left behind; and, when the temporary directory
// cannot be removed either, that both failures are reported.
func TestWriteDirFailureLeavesNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tfs := range testFilesystems {
t.Run(tfs.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
base, dir := tfs.open(t)
listed := filepath.Join(dir, "unlockers.d")
target := filepath.Join(listed, "new")
writeThenFail := func(tmp string) error {
require.NoError(t, secret.WriteFileAtomic(base,
filepath.Join(tmp, unlockerMetadataFile), []byte("{}")))
return errInjected
}
err := secret.WriteDir(base, target, writeThenFail)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInjected)
// Nothing in the directory that is listed, nor beside it
assert.Empty(t, dirNames(t, base, listed))
assert.Equal(t, []string{"unlockers.d"}, dirNames(t, base, dir))
fs := hookFs{Fs: base, before: func(op, _ string) error {
if op == opRemove {
return os.ErrPermission
}
return nil
}}
err = secret.WriteDir(fs, target, writeThenFail)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInjected)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, os.ErrPermission)
assert.Empty(t, dirNames(t, base, listed))
})
}
}
// TestWriteDirKeepsExistingDir makes writing into a directory that already
// exists fail, and checks that the directory, with what was in it, is still
// there: WriteDir writes into it in place and never removes it.
func TestWriteDirKeepsExistingDir(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
for _, tfs := range testFilesystems {
t.Run(tfs.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs, dir := tfs.open(t)
target := filepath.Join(dir, "unlockers.d", "passphrase")
require.NoError(t, fs.MkdirAll(target, secret.DirPerms))
require.NoError(t, secret.WriteFileAtomic(fs,
filepath.Join(target, unlockerMetadataFile), []byte("{}")))
err := secret.WriteDir(fs, target, func(got string) error {
assert.Equal(t, target, got)
return errInjected
})
require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInjected)
assert.Equal(t, []string{unlockerMetadataFile}, dirNames(t, fs, target))
})
}
assert.Equal(t, unlockerMetadataFile, last)
}
+36 -39
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@@ -341,13 +341,16 @@ func CreateKeychainUnlocker(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) (*KeychainUnlocker, er
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate keychain item name: %w", err)
}
// The unlocker directory is named after the keychain item
// Create unlocker directory using the keychain item name as the directory name
vaultDir, err := vault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get vault directory: %w", err)
}
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", keychainItemName)
if err := fs.MkdirAll(unlockerDir, DirPerms); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create unlocker directory: %w", err)
}
// Step 1: Generate a new age keypair for the keychain unlocker
ageIdentity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
@@ -355,8 +358,6 @@ func CreateKeychainUnlocker(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) (*KeychainUnlocker, er
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate age keypair: %w", err)
}
ageRecipient := ageIdentity.Recipient().String()
// Step 2: Generate a random passphrase for encrypting the age private key
agePrivKeyPassphrase, err := generateRandomPassphrase(agePrivKeyPassphraseLength)
if err != nil {
@@ -364,7 +365,14 @@ func CreateKeychainUnlocker(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) (*KeychainUnlocker, er
}
defer agePrivKeyPassphrase.Destroy()
// Step 3: Encrypt age private key with the generated passphrase
// Step 3: Store age recipient as plaintext
ageRecipient := ageIdentity.Recipient().String()
recipientPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "pub.txt")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, recipientPath, []byte(ageRecipient)); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write age recipient: %w", err)
}
// Step 4: Encrypt age private key with the generated passphrase and store on disk
// Create a secure buffer for the private key
agePrivKeyStr := ageIdentity.String()
agePrivKeyBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(agePrivKeyStr))
@@ -375,20 +383,31 @@ func CreateKeychainUnlocker(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) (*KeychainUnlocker, er
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt age private key with passphrase: %w", err)
}
// Step 4: Get or derive the long-term private key
agePrivKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "priv.age")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, agePrivKeyPath, encryptedAgePrivKey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted age private key: %w", err)
}
// Step 5: Get or derive the long-term private key
ltPrivKeyData, err := getLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer ltPrivKeyData.Destroy()
// Step 5: Encrypt long-term private key to the new age unlocker
// Step 6: Encrypt long-term private key to the new age unlocker
encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge, err := EncryptToRecipient(ltPrivKeyData, ageIdentity.Recipient())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt long-term private key to age unlocker: %w", err)
}
// Step 6: Prepare keychain data
// Write encrypted long-term private key
ltPrivKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "longterm.age")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, ltPrivKeyPath, encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
// Step 7: Prepare keychain data
keychainData := KeychainData{
AgePublicKey: ageRecipient,
AgePrivKeyPassphrase: agePrivKeyPassphrase,
@@ -401,7 +420,12 @@ func CreateKeychainUnlocker(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) (*KeychainUnlocker, er
}
defer keychainDataBuffer.Destroy()
// Step 7: Prepare enhanced metadata
// Step 8: Store data in keychain
if err := storeInKeychain(keychainItemName, keychainDataBuffer); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to store data in keychain: %w", err)
}
// Step 9: Create and write enhanced metadata
keychainMetadata := KeychainUnlockerMetadata{
UnlockerMetadata: UnlockerMetadata{
Type: "keychain",
@@ -416,37 +440,10 @@ func CreateKeychainUnlocker(fs afero.Fs, stateDir string) (*KeychainUnlocker, er
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
// Step 8: Write the unlocker's files and store the data in the keychain,
// the metadata last
err = WriteDir(fs, unlockerDir, func(dir string) error {
pubPath := filepath.Join(dir, "pub.txt")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, pubPath, []byte(ageRecipient)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write age recipient: %w", err)
}
privPath := filepath.Join(dir, "priv.age")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, privPath, encryptedAgePrivKey); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted age private key: %w", err)
}
ltKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "longterm.age")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, ltKeyPath, encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
if err := storeInKeychain(keychainItemName, keychainDataBuffer); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to store data in keychain: %w", err)
}
metadataPath := filepath.Join(dir, "unlocker-metadata.json")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, metadataPath, metadataBytes); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs,
filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "unlocker-metadata.json"),
metadataBytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
return &KeychainUnlocker{
+1 -1
View File
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ Passphrase: ` + testPassphrase + `
}
// Now create a PGP unlock key (this will use our custom GPGEncryptFunc)
pgpUnlocker, err := secret.CreatePGPUnlocker(fs, stateDir, keyID, fingerprint)
pgpUnlocker, err := secret.CreatePGPUnlocker(fs, stateDir, keyID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create PGP unlock key: %v", err)
}
+93 -96
View File
@@ -222,13 +222,20 @@ func generatePGPUnlockerName() (string, error) {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s-pgp-%s", hostname, enrollmentDate), nil
}
// pgpUnlockerDir returns the current vault and the directory in it for a
// new PGP unlocker, named after the host and the day.
// preparePGPUnlockerDir checks GPG availability and creates the
// unlocker directory in the current vault, returning the vault and the
// directory path.
//
//nolint:ireturn // the vault is only available behind VaultInterface
func pgpUnlockerDir(
func preparePGPUnlockerDir(
fs afero.Fs, stateDir string,
) (VaultInterface, string, error) {
// Check if GPG is available
err := checkGPGAvailable()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
// Get current vault
vault, err := GetCurrentVault(fs, stateDir)
if err != nil {
@@ -241,29 +248,27 @@ func pgpUnlockerDir(
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate unlocker name: %w", err)
}
// Create unlocker directory using the generated name
vaultDir, err := vault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get vault directory: %w", err)
}
return vault, filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", unlockerName), nil
}
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", unlockerName)
// CreatePGPUnlocker creates a new PGP unlocker and stores it in the vault.
// It encrypts to the GPG key gpgKeyID and records fingerprint, that key's
// fingerprint as ResolveGPGKeyFingerprint returns it, in the metadata.
// Everything that can fail short of writing a file is done before anything
// is written, and the files are written through WriteDir, so a failure
// leaves no partial unlocker.
func CreatePGPUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, stateDir, gpgKeyID, fingerprint string,
) (*PGPUnlocker, error) {
err := checkGPGAvailable()
err = fs.MkdirAll(unlockerDir, DirPerms)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create unlocker directory: %w", err)
}
vault, unlockerDir, err := pgpUnlockerDir(fs, stateDir)
return vault, unlockerDir, nil
}
// CreatePGPUnlocker creates a new PGP unlocker and stores it in the vault
func CreatePGPUnlocker(
fs afero.Fs, stateDir string, gpgKeyID string,
) (*PGPUnlocker, error) {
vault, unlockerDir, err := preparePGPUnlockerDir(fs, stateDir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -274,13 +279,77 @@ func CreatePGPUnlocker(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate age keypair: %w", err)
}
// Step 2: Encrypt the long-term private key to the new keypair, and the
// keypair's private key to the GPG key
encryptedLtPrivKey, encryptedAgePrivKey, err := encryptPGPUnlockerKeys(
fs, vault, ageIdentity, gpgKeyID)
// Step 2: Store age recipient as plaintext
ageRecipient := ageIdentity.Recipient().String()
recipientPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "pub.txt")
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, recipientPath, []byte(ageRecipient))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write age recipient: %w", err)
}
// Step 3: Get or derive the long-term private key
ltPrivKeyData, err := getLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer ltPrivKeyData.Destroy()
// Step 7: Encrypt long-term private key to the new age unlocker
encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge, err := EncryptToRecipient(
ltPrivKeyData, ageIdentity.Recipient())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to encrypt long-term private key to age unlocker: %w", err)
}
// Write encrypted long-term private key
ltPrivKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "longterm.age")
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, ltPrivKeyPath, encryptedLtPrivKeyToAge)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
// Step 8: Encrypt age private key to the GPG key ID
// Use memguard to protect the private key in memory
agePrivateKeyBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(ageIdentity.String()))
defer agePrivateKeyBuffer.Destroy()
encryptedAgePrivKey, err := GPGEncryptFunc(agePrivateKeyBuffer, gpgKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt age private key with GPG: %w", err)
}
agePrivKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "priv.age.gpg")
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, agePrivKeyPath, encryptedAgePrivKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted age private key: %w", err)
}
// Steps 9-10: Resolve the fingerprint and write enhanced metadata
pgpMetadata, err := writePGPUnlockerMetadata(fs, unlockerDir, gpgKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &PGPUnlocker{
Directory: unlockerDir,
Metadata: pgpMetadata.UnlockerMetadata,
fs: fs,
}, nil
}
// writePGPUnlockerMetadata resolves the GPG key fingerprint and writes
// the unlocker metadata file, returning the metadata written.
func writePGPUnlockerMetadata(
fs afero.Fs, unlockerDir string, gpgKeyID string,
) (*PGPUnlockerMetadata, error) {
fingerprint, err := ResolveGPGKeyFingerprint(gpgKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve GPG key fingerprint: %w", err)
}
pgpMetadata := PGPUnlockerMetadata{
UnlockerMetadata: UnlockerMetadata{
@@ -296,85 +365,13 @@ func CreatePGPUnlocker(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
// Step 3: Write the unlocker's files, the metadata last
err = WriteDir(fs, unlockerDir, func(dir string) error {
return writePGPUnlockerFiles(fs, dir, ageIdentity.Recipient(),
encryptedLtPrivKey, encryptedAgePrivKey, metadataBytes)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &PGPUnlocker{
Directory: unlockerDir,
Metadata: pgpMetadata.UnlockerMetadata,
fs: fs,
}, nil
}
// encryptPGPUnlockerKeys returns the vault's long-term private key encrypted
// to the new PGP unlocker's age keypair, and that keypair's private key
// encrypted to the GPG key gpgKeyID.
func encryptPGPUnlockerKeys(
fs afero.Fs, vault VaultInterface,
ageIdentity *age.X25519Identity, gpgKeyID string,
) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
// Get or derive the long-term private key
ltPrivKeyData, err := getLongTermPrivateKey(fs, vault)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
defer ltPrivKeyData.Destroy()
encryptedLtPrivKey, err := EncryptToRecipient(
ltPrivKeyData, ageIdentity.Recipient())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to encrypt long-term private key to age unlocker: %w", err)
}
// Use memguard to protect the private key in memory
agePrivateKeyBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(ageIdentity.String()))
defer agePrivateKeyBuffer.Destroy()
encryptedAgePrivKey, err := GPGEncryptFunc(agePrivateKeyBuffer, gpgKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to encrypt age private key with GPG: %w", err)
}
return encryptedLtPrivKey, encryptedAgePrivKey, nil
}
// writePGPUnlockerFiles writes the files of a PGP unlocker into dir, the
// metadata last.
func writePGPUnlockerFiles(
fs afero.Fs, dir string, ageRecipient *age.X25519Recipient,
encryptedLtPrivKey, encryptedAgePrivKey, metadataBytes []byte,
) error {
err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "pub.txt"),
[]byte(ageRecipient.String()))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write age recipient: %w", err)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "longterm.age"), encryptedLtPrivKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs, filepath.Join(dir, "priv.age.gpg"), encryptedAgePrivKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted age private key: %w", err)
}
err = WriteFileAtomic(fs,
filepath.Join(dir, "unlocker-metadata.json"), metadataBytes)
filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "unlocker-metadata.json"), metadataBytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
return &pgpMetadata, nil
}
// validateGPGKeyID validates that a GPG key ID is safe for command execution
-67
View File
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
package secret_test
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/secret"
"git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/internal/vault"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// The GPG key ID and fingerprint passed to CreatePGPUnlocker.
const (
testGPGKeyID = "0123456789ABCDEF"
testGPGFingerprint = "0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567"
)
// fakeGPGScript is a gpg for which `gpg --version` succeeds and anything
// else fails.
const fakeGPGScript = `#!/bin/sh
[ "$*" = --version ]
`
// installFakeGPG makes fakeGPGScript the only gpg on PATH for the test.
func installFakeGPG(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
//nolint:gosec // G306: the script must be executable
err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "gpg"), []byte(fakeGPGScript), 0o700)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Setenv("PATH", dir)
}
// TestCreatePGPUnlockerFailureWritesNothing makes CreatePGPUnlocker fail at
// getting the vault's long-term key, which used to come after part of the
// unlocker was written, and asserts that nothing is written. Getting the key
// fails because on macOS there is no mnemonic and no current unlocker, and
// on every other platform it always fails
// (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/88).
func TestCreatePGPUnlockerFailureWritesNothing(t *testing.T) {
installFakeGPG(t)
t.Setenv(secret.EnvMnemonic, "")
base := afero.NewMemMapFs()
vlt, err := vault.CreateVault(base, testVaultStateDir, testVaultName)
require.NoError(t, err)
fs := hookFs{Fs: base, before: func(_, path string) error {
t.Errorf("changed %s", path)
return nil
}}
_, err = secret.CreatePGPUnlocker(
fs, testVaultStateDir, testGPGKeyID, testGPGFingerprint)
require.Error(t, err)
vaultDir, err := vlt.GetDirectory()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, dirNames(t, base, filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d")))
}
+19 -19
View File
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ func CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
)
}
// Step 4: Prepare the unlocker directory's path and metadata
// Step 4: Create unlocker directory and write files
vaultDir, err := vault.GetDirectory()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get vault directory: %w", err)
@@ -262,7 +262,23 @@ func CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
unlockerDirName := fmt.Sprintf("se-%s", filepath.Base(seKeyLabel))
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", unlockerDirName)
if err := fs.MkdirAll(unlockerDir, DirPerms); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to create unlocker directory: %w",
err,
)
}
// Write SE-encrypted long-term key
ltKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, seLongtermFilename)
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, ltKeyPath, encryptedLtKey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"failed to write SE-encrypted long-term key: %w",
err,
)
}
// Write metadata
seMetadata := SecureEnclaveUnlockerMetadata{
UnlockerMetadata: UnlockerMetadata{
Type: seUnlockerType,
@@ -278,25 +294,9 @@ func CreateSecureEnclaveUnlocker(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal metadata: %w", err)
}
// Step 5: Write the SE-encrypted long-term key, then the metadata
err = WriteDir(fs, unlockerDir, func(dir string) error {
ltKeyPath := filepath.Join(dir, seLongtermFilename)
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, ltKeyPath, encryptedLtKey); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"failed to write SE-encrypted long-term key: %w",
err,
)
}
metadataPath := filepath.Join(dir, "unlocker-metadata.json")
metadataPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "unlocker-metadata.json")
if err := WriteFileAtomic(fs, metadataPath, metadataBytes); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write metadata: %w", err)
}
return &SecureEnclaveUnlocker{
+28 -23
View File
@@ -357,14 +357,26 @@ func (v *Vault) CreatePassphraseUnlocker(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get long-term key: %w", err)
}
// Create unlocker directory
unlockerDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "unlockers.d", unlockerTypePassphrase)
err = v.fs.MkdirAll(unlockerDir, secret.DirPerms)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create unlocker directory: %w", err)
}
// Generate new age keypair for unlocker
unlockerIdentity, err := age.GenerateX25519Identity()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to generate unlocker: %w", err)
}
// Write the unlocker keypair (public and passphrase-encrypted private)
err = v.writeUnlockerKeypair(unlockerDir, unlockerIdentity, passphrase)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Encrypt long-term private key to this unlocker
ltPrivKeyBuffer := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(ltIdentity.String()))
defer ltPrivKeyBuffer.Destroy()
@@ -375,6 +387,15 @@ func (v *Vault) CreatePassphraseUnlocker(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt long-term private key: %w", err)
}
ltPrivKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "longterm.age")
err = secret.WriteFileAtomic(v.fs, ltPrivKeyPath, encryptedLtPrivKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
// Write the metadata last: readers skip an unlocker directory without
// it, so an unlocker interrupted before this point is never used.
metadata := UnlockerMetadata{
Type: unlockerTypePassphrase,
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
@@ -386,13 +407,11 @@ func (v *Vault) CreatePassphraseUnlocker(
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal metadata: %w", err)
}
// Write the unlocker's files, the metadata last
err = secret.WriteDir(v.fs, unlockerDir, func(dir string) error {
return v.writeUnlockerFiles(dir, unlockerIdentity, passphrase,
encryptedLtPrivKey, metadataBytes)
})
metadataPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "unlocker-metadata.json")
err = secret.WriteFileAtomic(v.fs, metadataPath, metadataBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
// Create the unlocker instance
@@ -438,14 +457,12 @@ func (v *Vault) readUnlockerMetadata(unlockerDir string) (UnlockerMetadata, erro
return metadata, nil
}
// writeUnlockerFiles writes the files of a passphrase unlocker into
// unlockerDir: its public key, its passphrase-encrypted private key, the
// long-term private key encrypted to it, and its metadata, last.
func (v *Vault) writeUnlockerFiles(
// writeUnlockerKeypair writes the unlocker's public key and its
// passphrase-encrypted private key into the unlocker directory.
func (v *Vault) writeUnlockerKeypair(
unlockerDir string,
unlockerIdentity *age.X25519Identity,
passphrase *memguard.LockedBuffer,
encryptedLtPrivKey, metadataBytes []byte,
) error {
// Write public key
pubKeyPath := filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "pub.age")
@@ -475,17 +492,5 @@ func (v *Vault) writeUnlockerFiles(
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted unlocker private key: %w", err)
}
err = secret.WriteFileAtomic(v.fs,
filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "longterm.age"), encryptedLtPrivKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write encrypted long-term private key: %w", err)
}
err = secret.WriteFileAtomic(v.fs,
filepath.Join(unlockerDir, "unlocker-metadata.json"), metadataBytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write unlocker metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
+1 -5
View File
@@ -4,17 +4,13 @@
# The Gitea workflow runs this on push. The memlock ulimit lets the tests
# that lock large secrets in memory (memguard mlocks them) run; under the
# lower limit of a plain `docker build .` they are skipped.
# A cached build checks nothing: a new CHECK_EPOCH on every run makes the
# Dockerfile's check steps run again on an unchanged tree, while its base
# images and module downloads stay cached.
set -eu
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd -P)"
main() {
cd "$ROOT"
docker build --ulimit memlock=-1:-1 \
--build-arg CHECK_EPOCH="$(date +%s)" .
docker build --ulimit memlock=-1:-1 .
}
main "$@"