1 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
sneak accfd5878f Write encrypt and decrypt output only once they succeed (closes #143)
check / check (push) Canceled after 0s
`secret encrypt` and `secret decrypt` emptied the file named by
`--output` before reading any input, so a failure left it empty, and a
file given as both `--input` and `--output` was emptied before it was
read. They now write into a temporary file of mode 0600 next to it, or
next to the file it is a symbolic link to, and rename that over it only
on success, using the new `secret.WriteFileAtomicFunc`, which
`secret.WriteFileAtomic` now calls. Ctrl-C or SIGTERM removes the
temporary file. A device or pipe given as `--output`, such as
`/dev/null`, is written to directly.

Judgement call: the device and pipe case goes beyond the plan.
Judgement call: a link to a file that does not exist yet is replaced.

Model: opus-5-5
2026-10-14 18:28:40 +00:00
7 changed files with 19 additions and 276 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ Both write the result to a new file next to `--output` and rename it over
leaves an existing `--output` as it was and creates none, and `--input` and
`--output` can be the same file. The file has mode 0600, whatever mode the file
it replaced had. When `--output` is a symbolic link, the file it points to is
replaced, or created if it does not exist yet, and the link kept. A device or a
pipe, such as `/dev/null`, is written to directly.
replaced and the link kept. A device or a pipe, such as `/dev/null`, is written
to directly.
## Storage Architecture
-8
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@@ -29,14 +29,6 @@ https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/milestone/12
output file has mode 0600. Ctrl-C or SIGTERM removes the temporary file. A
device or a pipe given as `--output`, such as `/dev/null`, is still written to
directly.
- 2026-10-14: A `secret add --force` that cannot unlock the vault, given a wrong
passphrase or mnemonic, leaves the secret as it was
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/136). The new version used to be
written before the vault was unlocked to set `notAfter` on the version it
replaces, so each failed add left one more version that `secret version list`
showed. The vault is now unlocked, and that version's metadata read, before
anything is written. `generate secret --force` and `import --force` take the
same path.
- 2026-10-12: A mnemonic typed with extra spaces, tabs or line breaks gives the
same long-term key as its words separated by single spaces
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/135). The key was derived from the
+5 -35
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@@ -314,9 +314,12 @@ func (cli *Instance) writeOutput(
return write(file)
}
path, err := outputPath(outputFile)
// Replace the file a symbolic link points to and keep the link, as
// writing through the link would; /dev/stdout with stdout going to a
// file is such a link. A path that does not exist yet is used as given.
path, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(outputFile)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to open output file: %w", err)
path = outputFile
}
err = secret.WriteFileAtomicFunc(cli.fs, path, func(file afero.File) error {
@@ -331,39 +334,6 @@ func (cli *Instance) writeOutput(
return err
}
// outputPath returns the path of the file that writing to outputFile
// replaces. When outputFile is a symbolic link, as /dev/stdout is when
// stdout goes to a file, that is the path the link points to, whether or
// not a file is there yet, so the link is kept, as writing through it would
// keep it. A link that cannot be followed, such as one that points to
// itself, is an error.
func outputPath(outputFile string) (string, error) {
path, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(outputFile)
if !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return path, err
}
// No file is at outputFile, or at the end of its links, yet
target, err := os.Readlink(outputFile)
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return outputFile, nil
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if !filepath.IsAbs(target) {
// Not filepath.Join, which would remove a ".." in target together
// with the name before it, even when that name is a link to a
// directory
dir, _ := filepath.Split(outputFile)
target = dir + target
}
return outputPath(target)
}
// isValidAgeSecretKey checks if a string is a valid age secret key by
// attempting to parse it
func isValidAgeSecretKey(key string) bool {
-50
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@@ -172,56 +172,6 @@ func TestDecryptThroughLink(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
}
// TestDecryptThroughLinkToMissingFile checks that secret decrypt given a
// symbolic link to a file that does not exist yet as --output creates that
// file and keeps the link, as writing through the link would. Here --output
// is a relative link to a second link, which points into another directory.
func TestDecryptThroughLinkToMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cli, dir := newCryptoTest(t)
targetDir := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(targetDir, "target.txt")
link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink("second-link", link))
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(target, filepath.Join(dir, "second-link")))
require.NoError(t, cli.Decrypt("key", filepath.Join(dir, "plain.txt.age"), link))
for _, name := range []string{"link", "second-link"} {
info, err := os.Lstat(filepath.Join(dir, name))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, os.ModeSymlink, info.Mode().Type(), name)
}
content, err := afero.ReadFile(cli.fs, target)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, plainText, string(content))
// No temporary file left beside the target
entries, err := afero.ReadDir(cli.fs, targetDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
}
// TestDecryptThroughLoopingLink checks that secret decrypt given a symbolic
// link that points to itself as --output fails, as writing through it
// would, and leaves the link as it was.
func TestDecryptThroughLoopingLink(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
cli, dir := newCryptoTest(t)
link := filepath.Join(dir, "link")
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink("link", link))
require.Error(t, cli.Decrypt("key", filepath.Join(dir, "plain.txt.age"), link))
target, err := os.Readlink(link)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "link", target)
}
// TestDecryptToLongestName checks that secret decrypt writes an --output
// whose name is as long as a file name can be, 255 bytes on Linux and
// macOS: the temporary file's name must not be longer.
+12 -39
View File
@@ -219,15 +219,6 @@ func (v *Vault) addVersion(
name, secretDir string, value *memguard.LockedBuffer,
previousVersion *secret.Version,
) error {
// Unlock the vault before writing anything, so that a wrong passphrase
// or mnemonic leaves the secret as it was
err := v.loadPreviousVersionMetadata(previousVersion)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Taken after the unlock, which can wait for the user to type the
// passphrase, so that the new version starts when it is created
now := time.Now()
// Create the new version and save the encrypted value
@@ -641,35 +632,8 @@ func (v *Vault) checkExistingSecret(
return true, previousVersion, nil
}
// loadPreviousVersionMetadata unlocks the vault and loads the metadata of
// the version being superseded. It is a no-op when previousVersion is nil.
func (v *Vault) loadPreviousVersionMetadata(
previousVersion *secret.Version,
) error {
if previousVersion == nil {
return nil
}
ltIdentity, err := v.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
if err != nil {
secret.Debug("Failed to get long-term key for previous version", "error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get long-term key: %w", err)
}
err = previousVersion.LoadMetadata(ltIdentity)
if err != nil {
secret.Debug("Failed to load previous version metadata", "error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load previous version metadata: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// updatePreviousVersion sets the notAfter timestamp on the version being
// superseded, whose metadata loadPreviousVersionMetadata has loaded. It is
// a no-op when previousVersion is nil.
// superseded. It is a no-op when previousVersion is nil.
func (v *Vault) updatePreviousVersion(
previousVersion *secret.Version, now *time.Time,
) error {
@@ -677,13 +641,22 @@ func (v *Vault) updatePreviousVersion(
return nil
}
// loadPreviousVersionMetadata unlocked the vault, so this returns the
// key it keeps in memory
// Get long-term key to decrypt/encrypt metadata
ltIdentity, err := v.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
if err != nil {
secret.Debug("Failed to get long-term key for metadata update", "error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get long-term key: %w", err)
}
// Load previous version metadata
err = previousVersion.LoadMetadata(ltIdentity)
if err != nil {
secret.Debug("Failed to load previous version metadata", "error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to load previous version metadata: %w", err)
}
// Update notAfter timestamp
previousVersion.Metadata.NotAfter = now
-66
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@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
// version
// - TestVaultVersionTimestamps: Tests timestamp logic (notBefore/notAfter)
// across versions
// - TestVaultVersionTimestampsAfterUnlock: Tests that those timestamps are
// taken after AddSecret unlocks the vault
// - TestVaultGetNonExistentVersion: Tests error handling for invalid versions
// - TestUpdateVersionMetadata: Tests metadata update functionality
//
@@ -297,70 +295,6 @@ func TestVaultVersionTimestamps(t *testing.T) {
assert.Nil(t, secondVersion.Metadata.NotAfter) // Current version
}
// longTermKeyReadFs records when longterm.age, the last file an unlock
// reads, was last opened.
type longTermKeyReadFs struct {
afero.Fs
readAt time.Time
}
//nolint:ireturn // afero.File is the interface required by afero.Fs
func (f *longTermKeyReadFs) Open(name string) (afero.File, error) {
if filepath.Base(name) == "longterm.age" {
f.readAt = time.Now()
}
return f.Fs.Open(name)
}
// TestVaultVersionTimestampsAfterUnlock checks that when AddSecret has to
// unlock the vault to replace a version, the new version's notBefore and the
// replaced version's notAfter are taken after the unlock, which can wait for
// the user to type the passphrase.
func TestVaultVersionTimestampsAfterUnlock(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := &longTermKeyReadFs{Fs: afero.NewMemMapFs()}
mnemonic := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testMnemonic))
defer mnemonic.Destroy()
passphrase := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("test-passphrase"))
defer passphrase.Destroy()
created, err := CreateVault(fs, testStateDir, "test", mnemonic, passphrase)
require.NoError(t, err)
addTestSecretToVault(t, created, testSecretPath, []byte("version-1"), false)
// A new instance is locked; AddSecret unlocks it with the passphrase
vault := NewVault(fs, testStateDir, "test")
vault.SetUnlockPassphrase(passphrase)
addTestSecretToVault(t, vault, testSecretPath, []byte("version-2"), true)
require.False(t, fs.readAt.IsZero(), "AddSecret did not unlock the vault")
ltIdentity, err := vault.GetOrDeriveLongTermKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
vaultDir, _ := vault.GetDirectory()
secretDir := filepath.Join(vaultDir, "secrets.d", "test%secret")
versions, err := secret.ListVersions(fs, secretDir)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, versions, 2)
newVersion := secret.NewVersion(vault, testSecretPath, versions[0])
require.NoError(t, newVersion.LoadMetadata(ltIdentity))
replacedVersion := secret.NewVersion(vault, testSecretPath, versions[1])
require.NoError(t, replacedVersion.LoadMetadata(ltIdentity))
assert.False(t, newVersion.Metadata.NotBefore.Before(fs.readAt))
assert.False(t, replacedVersion.Metadata.NotAfter.Before(fs.readAt))
}
func TestVaultGetNonExistentVersion(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
-76
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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"filippo.io/age"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
"github.com/spf13/afero"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -104,78 +103,3 @@ func TestAddSecretCleansUpOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, entries, 1)
assert.Equal(t, "pub.age", entries[0].Name())
}
// TestAddSecretForceWithWrongPassphraseChangesNothing checks that adding a
// version to an existing secret, with a passphrase that does not open the
// vault, fails and leaves the secret's directory as it was.
func TestAddSecretForceWithWrongPassphraseChangesNothing(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
fs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
passphrase := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte(testPassphrase))
t.Cleanup(passphrase.Destroy)
created, err := vault.CreateVault(fs, testStateDir, testVaultName,
testMnemonicBuffer(t), passphrase)
require.NoError(t, err)
first := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("first"))
t.Cleanup(first.Destroy)
require.NoError(t, created.AddSecret(testSecretName, first, false))
wrong := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("wrong passphrase"))
t.Cleanup(wrong.Destroy)
vlt := vault.NewVault(fs, testStateDir, testVaultName)
vlt.SetUnlockPassphrase(wrong)
secretDir := filepath.Join(testStateDir, "vaults.d", testVaultName,
"secrets.d", testSecretName)
before := dirContents(t, fs, secretDir)
second := memguard.NewBufferFromBytes([]byte("second"))
t.Cleanup(second.Destroy)
err = vlt.AddSecret(testSecretName, second, true)
var noMatch *age.NoIdentityMatchError
require.ErrorAs(t, err, &noMatch)
assert.Equal(t, before, dirContents(t, fs, secretDir))
}
// dirContents maps every file under dir to its contents, and every
// directory, written with a trailing "/", to "".
func dirContents(t *testing.T, fs afero.Fs, dir string) map[string]string {
t.Helper()
contents := map[string]string{}
err := afero.Walk(fs, dir, func(
path string, info os.FileInfo, err error,
) error {
if err != nil {
return err
}
if info.IsDir() {
contents[path+"/"] = ""
return nil
}
content, err := afero.ReadFile(fs, path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
contents[path] = string(content)
return nil
})
require.NoError(t, err)
return contents
}