Read secret environment variables once per command, then unset them (closes #60)
check / check (push) Failing after 1s

init and vault create put the mnemonic into the process environment for
vault.CreateVault to read back, so every program they ran, gpg included,
inherited it, and SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC and SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE were read
at 13 places and never unset. Each command that may need them now reads
both once, in its RunE, into locked buffers on the CLI Instance, and
unsets them at once. The buffers are passed down: vault.CreateVault
takes the mnemonic, a Vault carries Mnemonic and UnlockPassphrase, and
the PGP, keychain and Secure Enclave unlocker constructors take both;
CreatePGPUnlocker sets them on the vault it loads through SetMnemonic
and SetUnlockPassphrase, new in VaultInterface. README warns against
both variables.

Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #94.
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-04 16:07:57 +02:00
parent 5ca615a7a6
commit db7d2c952e
42 changed files with 727 additions and 428 deletions
+14 -2
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,20 @@ Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:
# Completed Steps
- 2026-10-04: `SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC` and `SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE` are read once
per command, in its `RunE`, into locked buffers on the CLI `Instance`, and
unset at once, so that no program the command runs, `gpg` included,
inherits them (https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/60). Nothing below
the command reads the environment; the buffers are passed down:
`vault.CreateVault` takes the mnemonic (nil for none), a `Vault` derives its
long-term key from its `Mnemonic` and gives its `UnlockPassphrase` to a
passphrase unlocker, and the PGP, keychain and Secure Enclave unlocker
constructors take both. `CreatePGPUnlocker` sets both on the vault it
loads, through `SetMnemonic` and `SetUnlockPassphrase`, now part of
`VaultInterface`, before calling its `GetOrDeriveLongTermKey`. `init` and
`vault create` no longer put the mnemonic into the environment. Unsetting
erases nothing: the starting environment (`/proc/<pid>/environ`) and
memory still hold the value. The README warns against both variables.
- 2026-10-04: `.golangci.yml` is again the canonical file from
`sneak/prompts`, byte for byte
(https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/secret/issues/66). It runs `gomodguard_v2`
@@ -293,8 +307,6 @@ Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:
suggestions.
- Validate GPG key existence before creating PGP unlock keys.
- Split oversized CLI functions.
- Document env var security (SB_UNLOCK_PASSPHRASE,
SB_SECRET_MNEMONIC); clear after use.
- mlock/munlock for sensitive allocations.
- Cleanups: read statedir from environment or default instead of
passing it around.