Remove the keychain and Secure Enclave unlockers (closes #132)
check / check (push) Failing after 5s
check / check (push) Failing after 5s
Neither unlocker works without macOS code signing and entitlements, which
secret does not have, so both were research and leave the build.
`secret unlocker add` takes only passphrase and pgp on every platform;
keychain and secure-enclave fail as unknown types and are gone from
--help and shell completion. internal/macse, their files in
internal/secret with their tests, and their branches in internal/vault
and internal/cli are deleted; github.com/keybase/go-keychain leaves
go.mod and go.sum. README and Dockerfile comments no longer mention
them. The research stays at ef0ae90, tagged v1.0.0-rc1.
Judgement call: derivation_index_test.go goes with getLongTermPrivateKey,
its only subject, which only these two unlockers used.
Unverified: not built or run on a Mac; only the GOOS=darwin vet and lint ran.
Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #134.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -223,8 +223,6 @@ Creates a new unlocker of the specified type:
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- `passphrase`: Traditional passphrase-protected unlocker
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- `pgp`: Uses an existing GPG key for encryption/decryption
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- `keychain`: macOS Keychain integration (macOS only)
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- `secure-enclave`: Hardware-backed Secure Enclave protection (macOS only)
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**Options:**
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@@ -345,21 +343,6 @@ Unlockers provide different authentication methods to access the long-term keys:
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- Leverages existing key management workflows
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- Strong authentication through GPG
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3. **Keychain Unlockers** (macOS only):
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- Stores unlock keys in macOS Keychain
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- Kept on this Mac only: the keychain item is never synced to other devices
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- Automatic unlocking when Keychain is unlocked
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- Cross-application integration
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4. **Secure Enclave Unlockers** (macOS):
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- Hardware-backed key storage using Apple Secure Enclave
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- Uses `sc_auth` / CryptoTokenKit for SE key management (no Apple Developer
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Program required)
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- ECIES encryption: the vault long-term key is encrypted directly to the SE
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key, and only the SE can decrypt it
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- The SE key cannot leave this Mac; using it asks for no Touch ID or
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password
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Each vault maintains its own set of unlockers and one long-term key. The
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long-term key is encrypted to each unlocker, allowing any authorized unlocker to
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access vault secrets.
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@@ -412,9 +395,6 @@ variables.
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### Hardware Integration
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- Hardware token support via PGP/GPG integration
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- macOS Keychain integration for system-level security
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- Secure Enclave integration for hardware-backed key protection (macOS, via
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`sc_auth` / CryptoTokenKit)
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## Examples
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@@ -468,8 +448,6 @@ secret vault remove personal --force
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# Add multiple unlock methods
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secret unlocker add passphrase # Password-based
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secret unlocker add pgp --keyid ABCD1234 # GPG key
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secret unlocker add keychain # macOS Keychain (macOS only)
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secret unlocker add secure-enclave # macOS Secure Enclave (macOS only)
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# List unlockers
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secret unlocker list
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@@ -538,12 +516,8 @@ secret decrypt encryption/mykey --input document.txt.age --output document.txt
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### Cross-Platform Support
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- **macOS**: Full support including Keychain and Secure Enclave integration
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- **Linux**: Full support (excluding macOS-specific features)
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The keychain and Secure Enclave unlockers need a macOS build with cgo. A macOS
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build without cgo, such as one cross-compiled from Linux, offers them but fails
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to add or use them.
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- **macOS**: Full support
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- **Linux**: Full support
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## Security Considerations
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@@ -556,7 +530,7 @@ to add or use them.
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### Best Practices
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1. Use strong, unique passphrases for unlockers
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2. Enable hardware authentication (Keychain, hardware tokens) when available
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2. Enable hardware authentication (hardware tokens) when available
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3. Regularly audit unlockers and remove unused ones
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4. Keep mnemonic phrases securely backed up offline
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5. Use separate vaults for different security contexts
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@@ -565,7 +539,6 @@ to add or use them.
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- Requires access to unlockers for secret retrieval
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- Mnemonic phrases must be securely stored and backed up
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- Hardware features limited to supported platforms
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## Development
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@@ -610,10 +583,7 @@ provide:
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rerun passes
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- `script/lint` — build the `lint` phase of the `Dockerfile`, which runs
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`go vet` and `golangci-lint`, then both again on the code as a macOS build
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compiles it (`GOOS=darwin`), which a Linux build never compiles; cgo is off
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there, so the keychain unlocker's calls into the keychain
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(`internal/secret/keychainunlocker_cgo.go`, and `keychainunlocker_test.go`)
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and the Secure Enclave bindings (`internal/macse`) are not checked
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compiles it (`GOOS=darwin`, with cgo off), which a Linux build never compiles
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- `script/fmt` — format all Go code with `go fmt` and every markdown file with
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prettier (4-space tabs, `proseWrap: always`) (writes)
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- `script/fmt-check` — check the same formatting without writing, on the host
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@@ -629,8 +599,7 @@ provide:
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## Features
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- **Multiple Authentication Methods**: Supports passphrase, PGP, macOS Keychain,
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and Secure Enclave unlockers
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- **Multiple Authentication Methods**: Supports passphrase and PGP unlockers
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- **Vault Isolation**: Complete separation between different vaults
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- **Per-Secret Encryption**: Each secret has its own encryption key
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- **BIP39 Mnemonic Support**: Keyless operation using mnemonic phrases
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