Reject invalid secret names before any command builds a path (closes #33)
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`secret rm ..` resolved to the vault directory and deleted the whole vault; `secret rm .` and `secret rm ""` deleted every secret. rm, mv, the version commands, encrypt and decrypt built paths from the name without checking it; import checked it only after reading the source file. vault.ValidateSecretName wraps the existing name rule and its error states the rule. Each of those commands calls it on the name as given, before building any path; a move checks both names before switching the current vault. AddSecret, GetSecretVersion and GetSecretObject use it too. The regression test copies two in-memory vaults for each rejected command and requires the exact error and an unchanged state directory. Model: opus-5-5
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@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-10-03: Every command that builds a path from a secret name
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checks the name first with `vault.ValidateSecretName` and touches
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nothing when it is invalid: `rm`, `mv` (both names, within a vault
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and between vaults, before switching the current vault), `import`,
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`version list`/`promote`/`rm`, `encrypt` and `decrypt`. The error
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states the naming rule. Before, `secret rm ..` deleted the whole
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vault and `secret rm .` every secret in it.
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- 2026-10-02: A plain `docker build .` builds again: the size tests
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skip a case that needs more locked memory than the process can
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lock, and run every case under `script/cibuild`. The image stamps the
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@@ -96,8 +103,7 @@ Bring the repo into policy compliance in one commit:
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buffer.Bytes() to GPGEncryptFunc and EncryptWithPassphrase.
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- Race conditions: no file locking in vault/secrets.go:142-176;
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non-atomic writes can leave the vault inconsistent.
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- Input validation: dots in secret names risk path traversal
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(vault/secrets.go:75-99); no maximum secret size (DoS).
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- Input validation: no maximum secret size (DoS).
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- Timing attacks: bytes.Equal passphrase compare (cli/init.go:
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209-216); non-constant-time public key compare (vault.go:95-100).
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- High priority:
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