Add the HTTP hardening the policy requires before 1.0 (closes #108)
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Every answer carries the six security headers REPO_POLICIES.md lists. The Content-Security-Policy allows inline content only with a nonce made for that answer; the pages put it on their style and script blocks and drop their four style attributes. The request log and /ip/ take a forwarded address only from a proxy listed in TRUSTED_PROXIES, which stops the start when set but invalid: the last X-Forwarded-For entry that is not a trusted proxy. X-Real-IP and True-Client-IP are no longer read. The JSON routes and the health check send fixed messages in place of database, parser and resolver errors, and log the detail. Model: opus-5-5
This commit was merged in pull request #132.
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@@ -54,8 +54,9 @@ DEBUG=routewatch ./routewatch
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picked at random, each with its newest route (HTML)
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- `GET /prefixlength6/{length}` - The same for IPv6
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- `GET /ip/{addr}` - The same JSON answer as `/api/v1/ip/{ip}`
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- `GET /ip/` - The same, for the caller's own address, or the one a proxy names
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in `True-Client-IP`, `X-Real-IP` or `X-Forwarded-For`
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- `GET /ip/` - The same, for the caller's own address: the address the request
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came from or, when that is a trusted proxy (`TRUSTED_PROXIES`, see
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Configuration), the client address in its `X-Forwarded-For`
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### API v1
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@@ -84,7 +85,17 @@ and 4 seconds for the database reads behind `/status.json` and `/api/v1/stats`.
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An AS number, prefix or mask length that does not parse answers 400, as does a
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mask length out of range for its IP version. An AS the database does not hold,
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or a prefix with no live route, answers 404. The HTML pages give these errors as
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plain text.
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plain text. A 500 answer says only `Internal server error`, and a host name that
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does not resolve only `could not resolve host name`; the detail goes to the log.
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Every answer carries `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Content-Security-Policy`,
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`X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy` and
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`Permissions-Policy`. The Content-Security-Policy lets a page load content only
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from the server, and does not allow inline content with `'unsafe-inline'`: the
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pages keep their CSS and JavaScript in inline `<style>` and `<script>` blocks,
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so each answer's policy names a random nonce made for that answer, and the
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browser applies or runs only the blocks that carry it. The pages therefore use
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no `style` attributes, which a nonce cannot cover.
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An origin AS of 0 (`origin_asn` in a route, `asn` in an IP lookup, the key `0`
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in a prefix's `origins`) means the route has no known origin: its AS path ends
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@@ -247,10 +258,20 @@ Configuration is handled via environment variables and OS-specific paths:
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| `XDG_DATA_HOME` | `/var/lib` (in the Docker image) | Base of the state directory; must be an absolute path |
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| `GOMEMLIMIT` | `1536MiB` (in the Docker image) | Go soft memory limit; see Memory |
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| `MALLOC_ARENA_MAX` | `2` (in the Docker image) | glibc malloc arena cap, a positive whole number; see Memory |
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| `TRUSTED_PROXIES` | (empty) | Addresses and CIDR ranges of trusted proxies; see below |
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A variable that is set to an invalid value stops the start with an error and a
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non-zero exit. An empty variable counts as unset.
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`TRUSTED_PROXIES` lists the reverse proxies whose `X-Forwarded-For` the server
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believes, comma-separated, such as `10.0.0.0/8,192.0.2.1`. For a request from
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one of them, the request log and `/ip/` use the last address in
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`X-Forwarded-For` that is not a trusted proxy: each proxy adds the address it
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received the request from to the end, so the entries before it are whatever the
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client sent. For a request from any other address they use the address the
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request came from, whatever forwarding headers it carries. `X-Real-IP` and
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`True-Client-IP` are not read.
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State directory (database location):
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- macOS: `~/Library/Application Support/berlin.sneak.app.routewatch/`
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@@ -336,9 +357,12 @@ What the [upaas](https://git.eeqj.de/sneak/upaas) app needs:
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- Container port: `8080`.
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- Volume: one, at container path `/var/lib/berlin.sneak.app.routewatch`.
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- Environment: nothing is required. Leave `XDG_DATA_HOME`, `GOMEMLIMIT` and
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`MALLOC_ARENA_MAX` at the image's values. `DEBUG=routewatch` is optional and
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adds the `System stats` memory line to the log.
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- Environment: `TRUSTED_PROXIES`, set to the address the reverse proxy in front
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of the app connects from, as the container sees it; without it the request log
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and `/ip/` give the proxy's address for every request. Nothing else is needed:
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leave `XDG_DATA_HOME`, `GOMEMLIMIT` and `MALLOC_ARENA_MAX` at the image's
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values. `DEBUG=routewatch` is optional and adds the `System stats` memory line
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to the log.
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- Memory Limit: `5g`, the 5 GiB limit from Memory above. upaas sets no swap
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limit, so on a host with swap Docker allows the same amount of swap again.
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- Health check: the image's `HEALTHCHECK` requests
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