// File names built from server-supplied metadata.
//
// quak does not trust the server. A file's title and a collection's name are
// decrypted from data the server hands us, and a hostile server (or a
// compromised account) can set them to anything. quak uses them to name files
// on disk: `quak get` without `--out`, `downloadFile` without `outPath`, the
// backup's symlink and collection directories, and the extension of every file
// in the originals cache. Each of those goes through `sanitizeFileName` or
// `safeExtension`, so a title can only ever name one file inside the directory
// the caller chose.
//
// A path the user supplies (`--out`, `outPath`) is never sanitized: the caller
// is trusted, the server is not.

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";

import { safeExtension, sanitizeFileName } from "../../src/filename.js";

const FALLBACK = "file-42";

describe("sanitizeFileName", () => {
    it("passes a normal title through unchanged", () => {
        expect(sanitizeFileName("IMG_0001.HEIC", FALLBACK)).toBe(
            "IMG_0001.HEIC",
        );
        expect(sanitizeFileName("Holiday 2024 (1).jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe(
            "Holiday 2024 (1).jpg",
        );
        expect(sanitizeFileName("café.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("café.jpg");
    });

    it("cannot climb out of the directory with ../", () => {
        // Without sanitizing, this would overwrite the user's SSH keys.
        expect(sanitizeFileName("../../.ssh/authorized_keys", FALLBACK)).toBe(
            "__.._.ssh_authorized_keys",
        );
        expect(sanitizeFileName("..", FALLBACK)).toBe("_");
        expect(sanitizeFileName("..\\..\\x", FALLBACK)).toBe("__.._x");
    });

    it("cannot name an absolute path", () => {
        expect(sanitizeFileName("/etc/passwd", FALLBACK)).toBe("_etc_passwd");
        expect(sanitizeFileName("C:\\Windows\\x.dll", FALLBACK)).toBe(
            "C__Windows_x.dll",
        );
    });

    it("replaces embedded separators, so the name stays one file", () => {
        expect(sanitizeFileName("a/b\\c.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("a_b_c.jpg");
    });

    it("replaces NUL and other control characters", () => {
        // A NUL truncates the path in C code and makes Node's fs throw.
        expect(sanitizeFileName("evil\0.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("evil_.jpg");
        expect(sanitizeFileName("line\nbreak\x7f.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe(
            "line_break_.jpg",
        );
    });

    it("does not produce a hidden file", () => {
        expect(sanitizeFileName(".bashrc", FALLBACK)).toBe("_bashrc");
    });

    it("does not produce a Windows device name", () => {
        expect(sanitizeFileName("CON", FALLBACK)).toBe("_CON");
        expect(sanitizeFileName("nul.txt", FALLBACK)).toBe("_nul.txt");
        expect(sanitizeFileName("LPT1", FALLBACK)).toBe("_LPT1");
        // Only the exact names are reserved.
        expect(sanitizeFileName("console.jpg", FALLBACK)).toBe("console.jpg");
    });

    it("falls back to the given name for an empty title", () => {
        expect(sanitizeFileName("", FALLBACK)).toBe(FALLBACK);
    });
});

describe("safeExtension", () => {
    it("keeps a normal extension", () => {
        expect(safeExtension("IMG_0001.HEIC")).toBe(".HEIC");
        expect(safeExtension("clip.mp4")).toBe(".mp4");
    });

    it("uses .bin when there is no extension", () => {
        expect(safeExtension("")).toBe(".bin");
        expect(safeExtension("README")).toBe(".bin");
    });

    it("uses .bin when the extension holds anything but letters and digits", () => {
        expect(safeExtension("x.j\\..\\pg")).toBe(".bin");
        expect(safeExtension("x.jp g")).toBe(".bin");
        expect(safeExtension("x.jpg\0")).toBe(".bin");
    });
});