/**
 * Tests for `downloadFile` and `downloadThumbnail`.
 *
 * These functions combine the ApiClient's streaming download with the
 * secretstream pull decryption to recover the plaintext file content and
 * write it to disk.
 *
 * The encrypted body returned by the CDN is a concatenation of
 * secretstream ciphertext chunks. Each chunk is at most
 * `STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE + STREAM_CHUNK_OVERHEAD` bytes (4 MiB + 17 bytes).
 * The download function buffers incoming network data, splits it on the
 * chunk boundary, and feeds each piece to `pullStreamChunk`.
 *
 * Two contracts are load-bearing for anyone using this library as a backup
 * tool, and both are documented by the tests below:
 *
 * 1. **Truncation is an error, never a short file.** Only the final chunk of
 *    a secretstream carries `TAG_FINAL`. A download cut short by a dropped
 *    connection still decrypts cleanly up to the last whole chunk, so without
 *    an explicit `TAG_FINAL` check a truncated body is indistinguishable from
 *    a complete one. `streamDecrypt` therefore refuses to return unless the
 *    stream ended on `TAG_FINAL`, and the error says the stream was truncated.
 *    A transfer that stopped part-way through a chunk is reported the same
 *    way, since a final chunk that arrived in full always authenticates.
 *
 * 2. **The destination path is written atomically.** Plaintext goes to a
 *    temporary sibling file first and is `rename`d into place only after the
 *    whole stream has decrypted and verified. A caller that sees no exception
 *    can rely on the destination containing the complete, authenticated file;
 *    a caller that sees an exception can rely on the destination being
 *    untouched — whatever was there before is still there, byte for byte, and
 *    no partial file has appeared. This matters because `runBackup` skips any
 *    existing non-empty file, so a partial write would be treated as complete
 *    forever after. The staging file and the rename are observed directly (see
 *    the `rename` hook below), not inferred from an empty directory.
 *
 * 3. **A failed transfer is retried as a whole.** A download is a request, a
 *    stream consumption, and a decryption, and only the first of those three
 *    happens inside `ApiClient`. A socket reset after the response headers
 *    have arrived therefore surfaces here, in the download layer — and that is
 *    the dominant failure mode for multi-megabyte photos over a CDN. So the
 *    entire sequence is retried as one unit, not just the request. The
 *    secretstream pull state is not resumable and there is no Range support,
 *    so a retry starts the file over from byte zero.
 *
 * These tests build synthetic encrypted files using sodium's push API,
 * serve them from a mock fetch, and verify the decrypted output on disk.
 */

import {
    existsSync,
    readdirSync,
    readFileSync,
    rmSync,
    mkdtempSync,
    writeFileSync,
} from "node:fs";
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
import {
    beforeAll,
    beforeEach,
    afterAll,
    describe,
    expect,
    it,
    vi,
} from "vitest";
import { init, toBase64, STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
import { ApiClient } from "../../src/api/client.js";
import { ApiError, TruncatedStreamError } from "../../src/errors.js";
import type { RetryOptions } from "../../src/retry.js";
import { downloadFile, downloadThumbnail } from "../../src/download/index.js";
import type { EnteFile, FileMetadata } from "../../src/model/types.js";

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/**
 * `rename` is intercepted so that the tests can observe — and fail — the
 * final step of the atomic write.
 *
 * Every other failure in this file is injected inside `streamDecrypt`, which
 * runs before anything is written to disk. Those tests therefore cannot tell
 * an atomic write from a plain `writeFile`: under both, nothing was ever
 * created, so an empty directory proves nothing about cleanup. This hook is
 * what closes that gap. It records each rename the downloader performs,
 * including whether the source existed at that moment (i.e. that the staged
 * temp file really was written), and can be told to fail the rename so the
 * cleanup path runs with a temp file genuinely on disk.
 *
 * `vi.hoisted` is required: `vi.mock` factories are hoisted above the imports,
 * so a plain module-level `const` would still be in its temporal dead zone by
 * the time the factory runs.
 */
const renameHook = vi.hoisted(() => ({
    calls: [] as { from: string; to: string; sourceExisted: boolean }[],
    failWith: null as Error | null,
}));

vi.mock("node:fs/promises", async (importOriginal) => {
    const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("node:fs/promises")>();
    const { existsSync: sourceExists } = await import("node:fs");
    return {
        ...actual,
        rename: async (from: string, to: string): Promise<void> => {
            renameHook.calls.push({
                from,
                to,
                sourceExisted: sourceExists(from),
            });
            if (renameHook.failWith !== null) {
                throw renameHook.failWith;
            }
            await actual.rename(from, to);
        },
    };
});

beforeEach(() => {
    renameHook.calls.length = 0;
    renameHook.failWith = null;
});

let testDir: string;

beforeAll(async () => {
    await init();
    await sodium.ready;
    testDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "quak-test-"));
});

afterAll(() => {
    if (testDir && existsSync(testDir)) {
        rmSync(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
    }
});

/**
 * Deterministic stand-in for random test payloads.
 *
 * Fixture *content* is never load-bearing here — the assertions turn on
 * length, framing, and the secretstream tag — but it must not be a constant
 * fill either, or a downloader that reordered or repeated chunks would still
 * produce the expected bytes. A seeded linear congruential generator gives
 * both: byte patterns that differ across every offset and seed, reproducible
 * on any machine, which is what the README asks of fixtures.
 *
 * It is also the difference between a fast suite and a broken one.
 * `sodium.randombytes_buf` goes through the wasm wrapper a byte at a time and
 * costs roughly 20 seconds for the 4 MiB chunk below — about two hundred
 * times what it costs to encrypt the same buffer, and on its own enough to
 * push `make test` past the 30-second cap in `script/test`. This loop fills
 * 4 MiB in a few milliseconds.
 */
const patternBytes = (length: number, seed: number): Uint8Array => {
    const out = new Uint8Array(length);
    let x = seed >>> 0;
    for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
        // Numerical Recipes' LCG constants; the high byte is used because
        // the low bits of an LCG have short periods.
        x = (Math.imul(x, 1664525) + 1013904223) >>> 0;
        out[i] = (x >>> 24) & 0xff;
    }
    return out;
};

/**
 * Encrypt `plaintext` as a secretstream file body (single chunk with
 * TAG_FINAL). Returns the key, header, and ciphertext that the mock CDN
 * will serve.
 */
const encryptFileBody = (
    plaintext: Uint8Array,
    key: Uint8Array,
): { header: Uint8Array; ciphertext: Uint8Array } => {
    const push = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
    const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
        push.state,
        plaintext,
        null,
        sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL,
    );
    return { header: push.header, ciphertext };
};

/**
 * Encrypt a body that spans more than one secretstream chunk, the way the
 * server does for files larger than the 4 MiB plaintext chunk size.
 *
 * Framing matters here: the downloader splits the byte stream on fixed
 * `STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE + STREAM_CHUNK_OVERHEAD` boundaries, so every chunk
 * except the last must carry exactly `STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE` plaintext bytes.
 * Only the last chunk is tagged `TAG_FINAL`; the leading ones are
 * `TAG_MESSAGE`.
 *
 * Returns the header, the concatenated body, the plaintext it decrypts to,
 * and `finalChunkOffset` — the byte offset at which the `TAG_FINAL` chunk
 * begins, so a test can slice it off to simulate a connection that dropped
 * before the end of the file.
 */
const encryptMultiChunkBody = (
    key: Uint8Array,
    leadingChunks: number,
    finalChunkPlainSize: number,
): {
    header: Uint8Array;
    body: Uint8Array;
    plaintext: Uint8Array;
    finalChunkOffset: number;
} => {
    const push = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
    const cipherParts: Uint8Array[] = [];
    const plainParts: Uint8Array[] = [];

    for (let i = 0; i < leadingChunks; i++) {
        const plain = patternBytes(STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE, i + 1);
        plainParts.push(plain);
        cipherParts.push(
            sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
                push.state,
                plain,
                null,
                sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_MESSAGE,
            ),
        );
    }

    const finalPlain = patternBytes(finalChunkPlainSize, leadingChunks + 1);
    plainParts.push(finalPlain);
    const finalCipher = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
        push.state,
        finalPlain,
        null,
        sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL,
    );

    const finalChunkOffset = cipherParts.reduce((n, c) => n + c.length, 0);
    cipherParts.push(finalCipher);

    return {
        header: push.header,
        body: concat(cipherParts),
        plaintext: concat(plainParts),
        finalChunkOffset,
    };
};

const concat = (parts: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array => {
    const total = parts.reduce((n, p) => n + p.length, 0);
    const out = new Uint8Array(total);
    let offset = 0;
    for (const p of parts) {
        out.set(p, offset);
        offset += p.length;
    }
    return out;
};

const buildMockEnteFile = (
    key: Uint8Array,
    fileHeader: Uint8Array,
    thumbHeader: Uint8Array,
): EnteFile => ({
    id: 999,
    collectionID: 1,
    ownerID: 1,
    key,
    metadata: {
        title: "test-photo.jpg",
        fileType: "image",
        creationTime: 0,
        modificationTime: 0,
    } as FileMetadata,
    file: { decryptionHeader: toBase64(fileHeader) },
    thumbnail: { decryptionHeader: toBase64(thumbHeader) },
    updationTime: 0,
});

const mockFetchForBody = (body: Uint8Array) => {
    const fake = async (): Promise<Response> =>
        new Response(body, { status: 200 });
    return fake as typeof globalThis.fetch;
};

/**
 * Encrypt a body consisting of one chunk that is *not* tagged TAG_FINAL.
 *
 * This is the cheap way to present a stream that ended without its final
 * chunk: the downloader pulls it, authenticates it, and finds the stream
 * over on a TAG_MESSAGE chunk — the same terminal condition as a large file
 * whose last chunk was lost, without paying for a 4 MiB fixture. The
 * multi-chunk fixture above covers the realistic wire shape; this one is
 * used where the test is really about what happens on disk afterwards.
 */
const encryptNonFinalBody = (
    plaintext: Uint8Array,
    key: Uint8Array,
): { header: Uint8Array; ciphertext: Uint8Array } => {
    const push = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
    const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
        push.state,
        plaintext,
        null,
        sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_MESSAGE,
    );
    return { header: push.header, ciphertext };
};

/**
 * Compare file contents by digest rather than with `toEqual`. Vitest's deep
 * equality walks multi-megabyte buffers byte by byte, which costs seconds on
 * the 4 MiB fixtures; a digest comparison is exact and effectively free.
 */
const expectSameBytes = (actual: Uint8Array, expected: Uint8Array): void => {
    expect(actual.length).toBe(expected.length);
    expect(createHash("sha256").update(actual).digest("hex")).toBe(
        createHash("sha256").update(expected).digest("hex"),
    );
};

/**
 * A multi-chunk fixture shared by the truncation tests: one full 4 MiB
 * `TAG_MESSAGE` chunk followed by a small `TAG_FINAL` chunk. It is built once
 * and shared because encrypting 4 MiB costs about 100ms. Its plaintext is
 * generated rather than drawn from the CSPRNG, which is what keeps that
 * encryption the whole cost of the fixture.
 */
let multiChunk: ReturnType<typeof encryptMultiChunkBody>;
let multiChunkKey: Uint8Array;

beforeAll(() => {
    multiChunkKey = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
    multiChunk = encryptMultiChunkBody(multiChunkKey, 1, 1024);
});

/** An error shaped like a Node transport failure: the errno is on `.code`. */
const errnoError = (code: string, message = code): Error =>
    Object.assign(new Error(message), { code });

/**
 * A retry policy with the waiting removed, used by every fixture in this
 * file. Backoff arithmetic belongs to `test/retry/retry.test.ts`; here the
 * only interesting quantity is how many requests a download issued, so the
 * injected `sleep` returns immediately and nothing in this file waits.
 */
const noWait: RetryOptions = {
    sleep: () => Promise.resolve(),
    random: () => 0,
};

/**
 * One scripted outcome for a single request to the CDN.
 *
 *   - `body` — a complete response body.
 *   - `status` — an HTTP error response.
 *   - `reset` — a response whose headers arrive, whose body delivers `bytes`,
 *     and which then dies with a socket reset. This is the failure that
 *     motivates retrying the download rather than the request: by the time it
 *     happens `ApiClient` has already returned successfully.
 */
type BodyStep =
    | { kind: "body"; bytes: Uint8Array }
    | { kind: "status"; status: number }
    | { kind: "reset"; bytes: Uint8Array };

/**
 * A fetch that serves one scripted step per call and counts the calls. It
 * deliberately refuses to serve more requests than it was given steps for, so
 * a retry loop that ran away is a test failure rather than a silent success.
 */
const scriptedCdnFetch = (
    ...steps: BodyStep[]
): { fetch: typeof globalThis.fetch; requests: () => number } => {
    let calls = 0;
    const fake = async (): Promise<Response> => {
        const step = steps[calls++];
        if (step === undefined) {
            throw new Error(`scriptedCdnFetch: no step for request #${calls}`);
        }
        if (step.kind === "status") {
            return new Response("error", { status: step.status });
        }
        if (step.kind === "body") {
            return new Response(step.bytes, { status: 200 });
        }
        const bytes = step.bytes;
        return new Response(
            new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
                start(controller) {
                    controller.enqueue(bytes);
                    controller.error(
                        errnoError("ECONNRESET", "aborted by peer"),
                    );
                },
            }),
            { status: 200 },
        );
    };
    return { fetch: fake as typeof globalThis.fetch, requests: () => calls };
};

/**
 * Build an EnteFile plus ApiClient whose file *and* thumbnail streams both
 * serve `body` under `header`. The download path under test is otherwise
 * identical for the two, so every truncation/atomicity case below runs
 * against both entry points from a single fixture.
 *
 * The default policy here is a single attempt. The failure-contract tests are
 * about what the caller and the filesystem are left with, not about how many
 * times quak asked; pinning attempts to one keeps them saying exactly that,
 * and keeps them from re-decrypting a 4 MiB fixture four times over. The
 * retry counts have their own tests at the bottom of this file, which set the
 * attempt count explicitly.
 */
const fixtureFor = (
    key: Uint8Array,
    header: Uint8Array,
    body: Uint8Array,
    retry: RetryOptions = { ...noWait, attempts: 1 },
): { api: ApiClient; file: EnteFile } => ({
    api: new ApiClient({ fetch: mockFetchForBody(body), retry }),
    file: buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header),
});

// The two entry points share `streamDecrypt` and the atomic-write wrapper,
// so the contract tests are written once and run against both.
const entryPoints = [
    { name: "downloadFile", download: downloadFile },
    { name: "downloadThumbnail", download: downloadThumbnail },
];

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

describe("downloadFile", () => {
    it("downloads, decrypts, and writes a single-chunk file", async () => {
        const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(
            "Hello from quak! This is a test photo payload.",
        );
        const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
        const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);

        // Separate header for thumbnail (not used in this test path but
        // needed to construct the EnteFile)
        const thumbPush =
            sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);

        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, thumbPush.header);
        const api = new ApiClient({ fetch: mockFetchForBody(ciphertext) });
        const outPath = join(testDir, "single-chunk.jpg");

        const result = await downloadFile(api, file, outPath);

        // The whole DownloadResult shape is asserted, not just its fields:
        // callers depend on `path` being the destination they asked for
        // (never the temporary file used along the way) and on
        // `bytesWritten` being the plaintext length.
        expect(result).toEqual({
            path: outPath,
            bytesWritten: plaintext.length,
        });
        expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
    });

    it("uses metadata.title as filename when outPath is omitted", async () => {
        // With no `outPath`, the destination is `metadata.title`, used
        // verbatim as a path. The title here is therefore given inside the
        // test's temporary directory: a bare relative name would resolve
        // against the process working directory, i.e. the repo root, and
        // `make check` must not create files in the repo — a failure between
        // the write and any cleanup would leave one behind.
        const plaintext = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
        const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
        const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);
        const thumbPush =
            sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, thumbPush.header);
        const titlePath = join(testDir, "fallback-name.png");
        file.metadata.title = titlePath;

        const api = new ApiClient({ fetch: mockFetchForBody(ciphertext) });
        const result = await downloadFile(api, file);

        expect(result.path).toBe(titlePath);
        expect(readFileSync(result.path)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
    });

    it("handles a larger single-chunk file (random binary payload)", async () => {
        // Most photos are under 4 MiB and therefore a single secretstream
        // chunk. This test exercises a non-trivial payload size with
        // arbitrary binary data (not just ASCII) to verify no encoding bugs.
        const plaintext = patternBytes(100_000, 11);
        const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
        const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);
        const thumbPush =
            sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, thumbPush.header);

        const api = new ApiClient({ fetch: mockFetchForBody(ciphertext) });
        const outPath = join(testDir, "large-single.bin");
        const result = await downloadFile(api, file, outPath);

        expect(result.bytesWritten).toBe(100_000);
        expectSameBytes(readFileSync(outPath), plaintext);
    });

    it("decrypts a body that spans several secretstream chunks", async () => {
        // Files over 4 MiB arrive as several ciphertext chunks concatenated
        // into one HTTP body. The downloader has to re-split them on the
        // exact chunk boundary; getting that wrong corrupts every large
        // photo in an account. This is also the positive control for the
        // truncation tests below: it proves the multi-chunk fixture itself
        // decrypts cleanly when nothing has been removed from it.
        const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
            multiChunkKey,
            multiChunk.header,
            multiChunk.body,
        );
        const outPath = join(testDir, "multi-chunk.bin");

        const result = await downloadFile(api, file, outPath);

        expect(result.bytesWritten).toBe(multiChunk.plaintext.length);
        expectSameBytes(readFileSync(outPath), multiChunk.plaintext);
    });
});

describe("downloadThumbnail", () => {
    it("downloads and decrypts the thumbnail stream", async () => {
        const plaintext = new Uint8Array([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0]); // JPEG SOI
        const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();

        const filePush =
            sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
        const { header: thumbHeader, ciphertext: thumbCipher } =
            encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);

        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, filePush.header, thumbHeader);
        const api = new ApiClient({ fetch: mockFetchForBody(thumbCipher) });
        const outPath = join(testDir, "thumb.jpg");

        const result = await downloadThumbnail(api, file, outPath);

        expect(result).toEqual({ path: outPath, bytesWritten: 4 });
        expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
    });
});

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Truncation detection and atomic writes
//
// Everything below is the failure contract. It is deliberately written once
// per entry point via `entryPoints`, because `downloadFile` and
// `downloadThumbnail` must behave identically here: a corrupt thumbnail is
// just as unacceptable as a corrupt original, and `runBackup` trusts both.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

describe.each(entryPoints)(
    "$name truncation handling",
    ({ name, download }) => {
        /** A fresh, empty directory so leftover-file assertions are meaningful. */
        const freshDir = (): string => {
            const dir = mkdtempSync(join(testDir, `${name}-`));
            return dir;
        };

        it("rejects a body whose final TAG_FINAL chunk never arrived", async () => {
            // Simulate a connection that dropped after the first 4 MiB chunk.
            // Every byte that did arrive decrypts and authenticates perfectly —
            // that is precisely the danger. The only signal that the file is
            // incomplete is the absence of a chunk tagged TAG_FINAL, so the
            // downloader must treat "stream ended on TAG_MESSAGE" as a hard
            // error rather than returning a short file.
            const truncatedBody = multiChunk.body.slice(
                0,
                multiChunk.finalChunkOffset,
            );
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
                multiChunkKey,
                multiChunk.header,
                truncatedBody,
            );
            const outPath = join(freshDir(), "truncated.bin");

            const err: unknown = await download(api, file, outPath).catch(
                (e: unknown) => e,
            );

            // The type, not the wording, is the contract. The retry policy
            // classifies truncation as worth another attempt, and it decides
            // that with `instanceof`: matching on message text would make
            // rewording a diagnostic silently turn every truncated download
            // into a permanent failure.
            expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(TruncatedStreamError);
            expect((err as Error).message).toMatch(/truncated/i);
        });

        it("rejects a body whose final chunk arrived only in part", async () => {
            // The likelier shape of a dropped connection: the transfer stops
            // in the middle of a chunk rather than neatly between two. The
            // bytes that arrived are a prefix of a complete chunk, so Poly1305
            // rejects them — which is, cryptographically, indistinguishable
            // from corruption of a whole chunk.
            //
            // It is still reported as truncation, because that is what it
            // almost always is and because this library's entire reason for
            // checking TAG_FINAL is to make a short transfer visible. Calling
            // a short transfer "authentication failed" would send a user
            // hunting for a corrupt file when their network is at fault. The
            // underlying authentication failure is kept as the error's
            // `cause`, so the real diagnosis is never lost.
            const shortBody = multiChunk.body.slice(
                0,
                multiChunk.body.length - 8,
            );
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
                multiChunkKey,
                multiChunk.header,
                shortBody,
            );
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "partial-final.bin");

            const err = await download(api, file, outPath).catch(
                (e: unknown) => e,
            );

            expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(TruncatedStreamError);
            expect((err as Error).message).toMatch(/truncated/i);
            expect((err as Error).cause).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
            expect(((err as Error).cause as Error).message).toMatch(
                /authentication failed/i,
            );

            // And, as with every other failure, the destination is untouched
            // and no staged temp file survives.
            expect(existsSync(outPath)).toBe(false);
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
        });

        it("rejects an empty body instead of writing a zero-byte file", async () => {
            // Ente always emits at least one chunk, even for empty content:
            // `encryptBlob` shows that a zero-length plaintext still produces a
            // TAG_FINAL chunk. A body with no chunks at all therefore means the
            // transfer failed, not that the file is empty. Writing a zero-byte
            // file here would be the worst outcome, because `runBackup` would
            // then see a file it considers present and never retry it.
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
                multiChunkKey,
                multiChunk.header,
                new Uint8Array(0),
            );
            const outPath = join(freshDir(), "empty.bin");

            await expect(download(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
                TruncatedStreamError,
            );
        });

        it("leaves no file at the destination after a truncated download", async () => {
            // The caller's contract: if the promise rejects, the destination
            // path does not exist. Nothing downstream should ever have to guess
            // whether a leftover file is complete.
            //
            // The body here is a single chunk that was never tagged TAG_FINAL,
            // which puts the downloader in exactly the terminal state a lost
            // last chunk produces, without the cost of a 4 MiB fixture. What
            // this test is really about is the state of the filesystem after
            // the rejection.
            const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
            const { header, ciphertext } = encryptNonFinalBody(
                patternBytes(256, 21),
                key,
            );
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "absent.bin");

            await expect(download(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
                TruncatedStreamError,
            );

            expect(existsSync(outPath)).toBe(false);
            // And no temporary scratch file is left behind either: the download
            // stages plaintext in a sibling temp file, which must be removed on
            // the failure path so repeated failures cannot fill the disk.
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
        });

        it("reports a corrupt whole chunk as an authentication failure, not truncation", async () => {
            // The counterpart to the partial-final-chunk case above, and the
            // reason the two are distinguishable at all. A byte is flipped
            // inside the first chunk of a multi-chunk body: that chunk arrives
            // complete — the stream goes on past it — so its failure cannot be
            // a short transfer. It is corruption, and the caller is told so,
            // with `pullStreamChunk`'s error propagated unchanged because it is
            // the real diagnosis.
            //
            // The same on-disk guarantee holds for this failure mode as for
            // every other: nothing at the destination, nothing left over.
            const corrupted = Uint8Array.from(multiChunk.body);
            corrupted[10] ^= 0xff;

            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
                multiChunkKey,
                multiChunk.header,
                corrupted,
            );
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "corrupt.bin");

            const err: unknown = await download(api, file, outPath).catch(
                (e: unknown) => e,
            );

            expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
            expect((err as Error).message).toMatch(/authentication failed/i);
            // And explicitly *not* the truncation type, because that type is
            // what the retry policy keys on: mislabelling corruption as
            // truncation would spend the whole attempt budget re-downloading
            // a file that will never decrypt.
            expect(err).not.toBeInstanceOf(TruncatedStreamError);

            expect(existsSync(outPath)).toBe(false);
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
        });

        it("does not clobber an existing file when the download fails", async () => {
            // The repair case. A user re-running a backup over a directory that
            // already holds good originals must never end up worse off: a failed
            // download leaves the previous contents exactly as they were, so the
            // old good copy survives until a complete new one is available to
            // replace it in a single rename.
            const existing = new TextEncoder().encode(
                "previously downloaded, known-good contents",
            );
            const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
            const { header, ciphertext } = encryptNonFinalBody(
                patternBytes(256, 22),
                key,
            );
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "existing.bin");
            writeFileSync(outPath, existing);

            await expect(download(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
                TruncatedStreamError,
            );

            expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(existing));
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["existing.bin"]);
        });

        it("replaces an existing file when the download succeeds", async () => {
            // The mirror image of the previous test: a complete download does
            // overwrite whatever was at the destination, atomically, via rename.
            const existing = new TextEncoder().encode("stale contents");
            const plaintext = patternBytes(512, 23);
            const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
            const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);

            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "replaced.bin");
            writeFileSync(outPath, existing);

            const result = await download(api, file, outPath);

            expect(result).toEqual({ path: outPath, bytesWritten: 512 });
            expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
            // The temp file is gone once the rename has happened, so a
            // successful download leaves exactly one file behind.
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["replaced.bin"]);
        });

        it("stages the plaintext in a sibling temp file and renames it into place", async () => {
            // The atomic write, observed directly rather than inferred from an
            // empty directory. Every other failure in this file is injected
            // inside `streamDecrypt`, which runs before anything is written —
            // so under those tests a plain `writeFile` to the destination would
            // look identical. This one watches the rename itself.
            //
            // Two properties are load-bearing. The staging file must exist on
            // disk when the rename happens: that is what makes the destination
            // appear complete or not at all, instead of filling up as bytes
            // land. And it must be a sibling of the destination, because
            // `rename` is only atomic within one filesystem — staging in
            // `/tmp` and renaming across a mount point would silently become a
            // copy, reintroducing the partial-file window this exists to close.
            const plaintext = patternBytes(512, 31);
            const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
            const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "staged.bin");

            await download(api, file, outPath);

            expect(renameHook.calls).toHaveLength(1);
            const staged = renameHook.calls[0]!;
            expect(staged.to).toBe(outPath);
            expect(staged.from).not.toBe(outPath);
            expect(dirname(staged.from)).toBe(dir);
            expect(staged.sourceExisted).toBe(true);

            // Afterwards the temp file is gone and only the destination is
            // left, holding the complete plaintext.
            expect(existsSync(staged.from)).toBe(false);
            expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["staged.bin"]);
        });

        it("removes the staged temp file when the rename itself fails", async () => {
            // The cleanup path. It can only run when something fails at or
            // after the write, which no amount of bad network data can
            // produce: by the time anything is written the whole stream has
            // already decrypted and verified. Failing the rename is what
            // reaches it — a real possibility on a full disk, a read-only
            // mount, or a destination that has become a directory.
            //
            // This is the only case in which the temp file is on disk at the
            // moment of failure, so it is the only one that can show it is
            // actually removed rather than merely never created. It also pins
            // that the caller sees the original failure: a cleanup that threw
            // over the top of it would hide why the download failed.
            const existing = new TextEncoder().encode("known-good contents");
            const plaintext = patternBytes(512, 32);
            const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
            const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);
            const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
            const dir = freshDir();
            const outPath = join(dir, "rename-fails.bin");
            writeFileSync(outPath, existing);

            renameHook.failWith = new Error("simulated rename failure");

            await expect(download(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toThrow(
                "simulated rename failure",
            );

            expect(renameHook.calls).toHaveLength(1);
            const staged = renameHook.calls[0]!;
            expect(staged.sourceExisted).toBe(true);
            expect(existsSync(staged.from)).toBe(false);

            // The previous contents are still there, untouched, and the
            // directory holds nothing else.
            expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(existing));
            expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["rename-fails.bin"]);
        });
    },
);

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Retries
//
// What is retried here is the whole download — request, stream consumption,
// decryption — because only the first of those three happens inside
// `ApiClient`. Every assertion counts requests; none of them measures time.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

describe.each(entryPoints)("$name retries", ({ name, download }) => {
    const freshDir = (): string => mkdtempSync(join(testDir, `${name}-retry-`));

    /** A cheap single-chunk fixture: no 4 MiB encryption in the retry tests. */
    const smallFixture = (
        seed: number,
    ): {
        key: Uint8Array;
        header: Uint8Array;
        ciphertext: Uint8Array;
        plaintext: Uint8Array;
    } => {
        const plaintext = patternBytes(1024, seed);
        const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
        const { header, ciphertext } = encryptFileBody(plaintext, key);
        return { key, header, ciphertext, plaintext };
    };

    const clientFor = (
        fetch: typeof globalThis.fetch,
        attempts: number,
    ): ApiClient => new ApiClient({ fetch, retry: { ...noWait, attempts } });

    it("retries a connection reset that happened mid-body", async () => {
        // The case `ApiClient` cannot see. Its own request succeeded: headers
        // arrived, a `ReadableStream` was handed back, and only then did the
        // socket die. Retrying the fetch alone would have caught nothing,
        // which is why the retry wraps the whole sequence.
        const { key, header, ciphertext, plaintext } = smallFixture(41);
        const { fetch, requests } = scriptedCdnFetch(
            { kind: "reset", bytes: ciphertext.slice(0, 16) },
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
        );
        const api = clientFor(fetch, 4);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header);
        const dir = freshDir();
        const outPath = join(dir, "reset-then-ok.bin");

        const result = await download(api, file, outPath);

        expect(requests()).toBe(2);
        expect(result.bytesWritten).toBe(plaintext.length);
        expectSameBytes(readFileSync(outPath), plaintext);
    });

    it("stages one temp file for the attempt that succeeded, not one per attempt", async () => {
        // The atomic write stays outside the retry loop. A retried download
        // must not leave a trail of half-written scratch files, and the
        // destination must be touched exactly once — by the attempt that
        // produced a complete, authenticated plaintext.
        const { key, header, ciphertext } = smallFixture(42);
        const { fetch } = scriptedCdnFetch(
            { kind: "reset", bytes: ciphertext.slice(0, 16) },
            { kind: "reset", bytes: ciphertext.slice(0, 16) },
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
        );
        const api = clientFor(fetch, 4);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header);
        const dir = freshDir();
        const outPath = join(dir, "one-stage.bin");

        await download(api, file, outPath);

        expect(renameHook.calls).toHaveLength(1);
        expect(renameHook.calls[0]!.to).toBe(outPath);
        expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual(["one-stage.bin"]);
    });

    it("retries a truncated body and gives up after the configured attempts", async () => {
        // Truncation is retryable — the file on the server is intact, the
        // transfer was not — but it is not retryable forever. Three attempts
        // configured, three requests, then the caller gets the error.
        const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
        const { header, ciphertext } = encryptNonFinalBody(
            patternBytes(256, 43),
            key,
        );
        const { fetch, requests } = scriptedCdnFetch(
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
        );
        const api = clientFor(fetch, 3);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header);
        const dir = freshDir();
        const outPath = join(dir, "always-truncated.bin");

        await expect(download(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
            TruncatedStreamError,
        );

        expect(requests()).toBe(3);
        // Every attempt failed before anything was written, so the directory
        // is still empty.
        expect(readdirSync(dir)).toEqual([]);
    });

    it("issues exactly one request when the file is gone", async () => {
        // A 404 from the CDN is an answer. `runBackup` logs it and moves on;
        // spending three more requests and three backoff waits on it would
        // slow a large backup down for nothing.
        const { key, header } = smallFixture(44);
        const { fetch, requests } = scriptedCdnFetch(
            { kind: "status", status: 404 },
            { kind: "status", status: 404 },
            { kind: "status", status: 404 },
            { kind: "status", status: 404 },
        );
        const api = clientFor(fetch, 4);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header);
        const outPath = join(freshDir(), "gone.bin");

        const err: unknown = await download(api, file, outPath).catch(
            (e: unknown) => e,
        );

        expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(ApiError);
        expect((err as ApiError).status).toBe(404);
        expect(requests()).toBe(1);
    });

    it("retries a 503 from the CDN", async () => {
        const { key, header, ciphertext, plaintext } = smallFixture(45);
        const { fetch, requests } = scriptedCdnFetch(
            { kind: "status", status: 503 },
            { kind: "status", status: 503 },
            { kind: "body", bytes: ciphertext },
        );
        const api = clientFor(fetch, 4);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header);
        const outPath = join(freshDir(), "flaky-cdn.bin");

        await download(api, file, outPath);

        expect(requests()).toBe(3);
        expectSameBytes(readFileSync(outPath), plaintext);
    });

    it("spends one attempt budget, not one per layer", async () => {
        // `ApiClient.getFileStream` retries on its own for direct callers.
        // The download layer opts out of that and runs its own retry over the
        // whole sequence. If it did not, the two budgets would compose: three
        // attempts here would become nine requests to the CDN for a single
        // file, and the default four would become sixteen.
        const { key, header } = smallFixture(46);
        const steps: BodyStep[] = Array.from({ length: 12 }, () => ({
            kind: "status" as const,
            status: 503,
        }));
        const { fetch, requests } = scriptedCdnFetch(...steps);
        const api = clientFor(fetch, 3);
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(key, header, header);
        const outPath = join(freshDir(), "budget.bin");

        await expect(download(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
            ApiError,
        );

        expect(requests()).toBe(3);
    });
});

describe("download retries: corruption is not retried", () => {
    it("gives up immediately on a chunk that failed to authenticate", async () => {
        // A whole chunk that failed to authenticate while the stream
        // continued past it is corruption or a wrong key. Neither is fixed by
        // asking again, and a backup run that retried every such file would
        // multiply the cost of a genuinely broken file by the attempt count.
        //
        // This is also the boundary of the single-chunk ambiguity documented
        // at the classifier: the split is only achievable because this body
        // has more than one chunk.
        const corrupted = Uint8Array.from(multiChunk.body);
        corrupted[10] ^= 0xff;
        const { fetch, requests } = scriptedCdnFetch(
            { kind: "body", bytes: corrupted },
            { kind: "body", bytes: corrupted },
            { kind: "body", bytes: corrupted },
            { kind: "body", bytes: corrupted },
        );
        const api = new ApiClient({ fetch, retry: { ...noWait, attempts: 4 } });
        const file = buildMockEnteFile(
            multiChunkKey,
            multiChunk.header,
            multiChunk.header,
        );
        const outPath = join(mkdtempSync(join(testDir, "corrupt-")), "c.bin");

        await expect(downloadFile(api, file, outPath)).rejects.toThrow(
            /authentication failed/i,
        );

        expect(requests()).toBe(1);
    });
});