Verify secretstream TAG_FINAL and write downloads atomically (closes #1) #20
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TODO.md
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TODO.md
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ downloads, cover it with mock-server tests, and update the README TODO checkbox.
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# Completed Steps
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- 2026-08-09: Downloads verify the secretstream terminated on `TAG_FINAL` and
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write output atomically: a truncated body is rejected instead of landing on
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disk as a short file, and plaintext is staged in a sibling temp file and
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renamed into place, so a failed download leaves the destination untouched.
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- 2026-07-07 Adopted scripts-to-rule-them-all: `script/` entrypoints, Makefile
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shims, README Entrypoints section
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- 2026-06-10: Decrypted collections shared by other users (sealed-box keys);
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@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@ export {
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pullStreamChunk,
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STREAM_CHUNK_OVERHEAD,
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STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE,
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STREAM_TAG_FINAL,
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type StreamPullState,
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} from "./stream.js";
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@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ export const STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
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// 16 bytes of Poly1305 tag plus 1 byte of secretstream tag.
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export const STREAM_CHUNK_OVERHEAD = 17;
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// The secretstream tag that marks the last chunk of a stream, i.e.
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// libsodium's crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL. Exported so
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// callers (the download layer) can detect truncation without importing
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// sodium themselves.
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//
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// Written as a literal because libsodium only attaches its constants to the
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// module object once `sodium.ready` has resolved, which is long after this
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// module is evaluated. The value is fixed at 3 by the secretstream wire
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// format; test/crypto/stream.test.ts pins it against libsodium's own
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// constant so the two cannot drift apart unnoticed.
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export const STREAM_TAG_FINAL = 3;
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// Encrypt a small blob as a single secretstream chunk with TAG_FINAL.
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// Returns the header and ciphertext. Used for encrypting thumbnails
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// and metadata before upload.
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@@ -37,9 +49,6 @@ export const initStreamPull = (
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): StreamPullState =>
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sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull(header, key);
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// Decrypt one ciphertext chunk. Returns the plaintext and the secretstream
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// tag (0=MESSAGE, 1=PUSH, 2=REKEY, 3=FINAL). The caller should verify the
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// stream ended on TAG_FINAL to detect truncation.
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// Decrypt a small blob that was encrypted as a single secretstream chunk
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// with TAG_FINAL. Ente uses this form ("blob") for file metadata and
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// magic metadata — anything under ~1 MiB that isn't chunked.
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@@ -50,12 +59,15 @@ export const decryptBlob = (
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): Uint8Array => {
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const state = initStreamPull(header, key);
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const { plaintext, tag } = pullStreamChunk(state, ciphertext);
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if (tag !== sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_FINAL) {
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if (tag !== STREAM_TAG_FINAL) {
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throw new Error(`decryptBlob: expected TAG_FINAL (3), got tag ${tag}`);
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}
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return plaintext;
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};
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// Decrypt one ciphertext chunk. Returns the plaintext and the secretstream
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// tag (0=MESSAGE, 1=PUSH, 2=REKEY, 3=FINAL). The caller must verify the
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// stream ended on TAG_FINAL to detect truncation.
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export const pullStreamChunk = (
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state: StreamPullState,
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ciphertext: Uint8Array,
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@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
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import { writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import { rename, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
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import {
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fromBase64,
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initStreamPull,
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pullStreamChunk,
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STREAM_CHUNK_OVERHEAD,
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STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE,
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STREAM_TAG_FINAL,
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} from "../crypto/index.js";
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import type { ApiClient } from "../api/client.js";
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import type { EnteFile } from "../model/types.js";
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@@ -26,6 +29,8 @@ const streamDecrypt = async (
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let buffer = new Uint8Array(0);
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const plainChunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
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let totalPlain = 0;
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let chunksPulled = 0;
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let lastTag = -1;
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for (;;) {
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const { done, value } = await reader.read();
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@@ -39,21 +44,41 @@ const streamDecrypt = async (
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while (buffer.length >= ENC_CHUNK_SIZE) {
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const encChunk = buffer.slice(0, ENC_CHUNK_SIZE);
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buffer = buffer.slice(ENC_CHUNK_SIZE);
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const { plaintext } = pullStreamChunk(state, encChunk);
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const { plaintext, tag } = pullStreamChunk(state, encChunk);
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plainChunks.push(plaintext);
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totalPlain += plaintext.length;
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chunksPulled++;
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lastTag = tag;
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}
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if (done) {
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if (buffer.length > 0) {
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const { plaintext } = pullStreamChunk(state, buffer);
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const { plaintext, tag } = pullStreamChunk(state, buffer);
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plainChunks.push(plaintext);
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totalPlain += plaintext.length;
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chunksPulled++;
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lastTag = tag;
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}
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break;
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}
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}
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// Only the last chunk of a secretstream carries TAG_FINAL. Everything a
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// dropped connection did deliver still decrypts and authenticates, so the
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// absence of TAG_FINAL is the only evidence that the body was cut short.
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// Returning a short plaintext here would put a corrupt file on disk that
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// later backup runs would treat as complete.
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if (chunksPulled === 0) {
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throw new Error(
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"download: stream truncated: response body contained no secretstream chunks",
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);
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}
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if (lastTag !== STREAM_TAG_FINAL) {
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throw new Error(
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`download: stream truncated: last chunk tag ${lastTag}, expected TAG_FINAL (${STREAM_TAG_FINAL})`,
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);
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}
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const result = new Uint8Array(totalPlain);
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let offset = 0;
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for (const chunk of plainChunks) {
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@@ -63,6 +88,29 @@ const streamDecrypt = async (
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return result;
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};
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// Write `plaintext` to `destination` atomically: stage it in a temporary
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// sibling file (same directory, so the rename cannot cross a filesystem
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// boundary) and rename it into place. Callers therefore never observe a
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// partially written destination, and a pre-existing file at that path is
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// replaced only once the new contents are complete on disk.
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const writeAtomic = async (
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destination: string,
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plaintext: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<void> => {
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// The random suffix keeps concurrent downloads of the same destination
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// from stepping on each other's temporary file.
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const tmpPath = join(dirname(destination), `.quak-${randomUUID()}.tmp`);
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try {
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await writeFile(tmpPath, plaintext);
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await rename(tmpPath, destination);
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} catch (err) {
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// Best-effort cleanup. A failure to remove the temporary file must
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// never replace the error that actually explains what went wrong.
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await rm(tmpPath, { force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
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throw err;
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}
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};
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export const downloadFile = async (
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api: ApiClient,
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file: EnteFile,
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@@ -72,7 +120,7 @@ export const downloadFile = async (
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const stream = await api.getFileStream(file.id);
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const header = fromBase64(file.file.decryptionHeader);
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const plaintext = await streamDecrypt(stream, header, file.key);
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await writeFile(resolvedPath, plaintext);
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await writeAtomic(resolvedPath, plaintext);
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return { path: resolvedPath, bytesWritten: plaintext.length };
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};
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@@ -85,6 +133,6 @@ export const downloadThumbnail = async (
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const stream = await api.getThumbnailStream(file.id);
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const header = fromBase64(file.thumbnail.decryptionHeader);
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const plaintext = await streamDecrypt(stream, header, file.key);
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await writeFile(resolvedPath, plaintext);
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await writeAtomic(resolvedPath, plaintext);
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return { path: resolvedPath, bytesWritten: plaintext.length };
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};
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@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ import {
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} from "node:fs";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import sodium from "libsodium-wrappers-sumo";
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import { beforeAll, afterAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { init, toBase64, STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE } from "../../src/crypto/index.js";
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@@ -188,6 +189,42 @@ const mockFetchForBody = (body: Uint8Array) => {
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return fake as typeof globalThis.fetch;
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};
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/**
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* Encrypt a body consisting of one chunk that is *not* tagged TAG_FINAL.
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*
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* This is the cheap way to present a stream that ended without its final
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* chunk: the downloader pulls it, authenticates it, and finds the stream
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* over on a TAG_MESSAGE chunk — the same terminal condition as a large file
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* whose last chunk was lost, without paying for a 4 MiB fixture. The
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* multi-chunk fixture above covers the realistic wire shape; this one is
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* used where the test is really about what happens on disk afterwards.
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*/
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const encryptNonFinalBody = (
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plaintext: Uint8Array,
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key: Uint8Array,
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): { header: Uint8Array; ciphertext: Uint8Array } => {
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const push = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_push(key);
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const ciphertext = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_push(
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push.state,
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plaintext,
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null,
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sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_TAG_MESSAGE,
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);
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return { header: push.header, ciphertext };
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};
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/**
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* Compare file contents by digest rather than with `toEqual`. Vitest's deep
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* equality walks multi-megabyte buffers byte by byte, which costs seconds on
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* the 4 MiB fixtures; a digest comparison is exact and effectively free.
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*/
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const expectSameBytes = (actual: Uint8Array, expected: Uint8Array): void => {
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expect(actual.length).toBe(expected.length);
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expect(createHash("sha256").update(actual).digest("hex")).toBe(
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createHash("sha256").update(expected).digest("hex"),
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);
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};
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/**
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* A multi-chunk fixture shared by the truncation tests. Building it costs a
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* few MiB of encryption, so it is built once: one full 4 MiB `TAG_MESSAGE`
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@@ -291,7 +328,7 @@ describe("downloadFile", () => {
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const result = await downloadFile(api, file, outPath);
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expect(result.bytesWritten).toBe(100_000);
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expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(Buffer.from(plaintext));
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expectSameBytes(readFileSync(outPath), plaintext);
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});
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it("decrypts a body that spans several secretstream chunks", async () => {
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@@ -311,9 +348,7 @@ describe("downloadFile", () => {
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const result = await downloadFile(api, file, outPath);
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expect(result.bytesWritten).toBe(multiChunk.plaintext.length);
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expect(readFileSync(outPath)).toEqual(
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Buffer.from(multiChunk.plaintext),
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);
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expectSameBytes(readFileSync(outPath), multiChunk.plaintext);
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});
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});
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@@ -402,15 +437,18 @@ describe.each(entryPoints)(
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// The caller's contract: if the promise rejects, the destination
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// path does not exist. Nothing downstream should ever have to guess
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// whether a leftover file is complete.
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const truncatedBody = multiChunk.body.slice(
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0,
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multiChunk.finalChunkOffset,
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);
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const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
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multiChunkKey,
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multiChunk.header,
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truncatedBody,
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//
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// The body here is a single chunk that was never tagged TAG_FINAL,
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// which puts the downloader in exactly the terminal state a lost
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// last chunk produces, without the cost of a 4 MiB fixture. What
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// this test is really about is the state of the filesystem after
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// the rejection.
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const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
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const { header, ciphertext } = encryptNonFinalBody(
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sodium.randombytes_buf(256),
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key,
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);
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const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
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const dir = freshDir();
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const outPath = join(dir, "absent.bin");
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@@ -458,15 +496,12 @@ describe.each(entryPoints)(
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const existing = new TextEncoder().encode(
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"previously downloaded, known-good contents",
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);
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const truncatedBody = multiChunk.body.slice(
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0,
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multiChunk.finalChunkOffset,
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);
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const { api, file } = fixtureFor(
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multiChunkKey,
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multiChunk.header,
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truncatedBody,
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const key = sodium.crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_keygen();
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const { header, ciphertext } = encryptNonFinalBody(
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sodium.randombytes_buf(256),
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key,
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);
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const { api, file } = fixtureFor(key, header, ciphertext);
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const dir = freshDir();
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const outPath = join(dir, "existing.bin");
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writeFileSync(outPath, existing);
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Block a user